Azouvi, S;
Hicks, A;
Murdoch, SJ;
(2018)
Incentives in Security Protocols.
In: Matyáš, V and Švenda, P and Stajano, F and Christianson, B and Anderson, J, (eds.)
Security Protocols XXVI: 26th International Workshop, Cambridge, UK, March 19–21, 2018, Revised Selected Papers.
(pp. pp. 132-141).
Springer: Cham, Switzerland.
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Abstract
Real world protocols often involve human choices that depend on incentives, including when they fail. We look at three example systems (the EMV protocol, consensus in cryptocurrencies, and Tor), paying particular attention to the role that incentives play in fail-safe and fail-deadly situations. In this position paper we argue that incentives should explicitly be taken into account in the design of security protocols, and discuss general challenges in doing so.
| Type: | Proceedings paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Incentives in Security Protocols |
| Event: | 26th International Workshop on Security Protocols, 19-21 March 2018, Cambridge, UK |
| Location: | Cambridge, UK |
| Dates: | 19 March 2018 - 21 March 2018 |
| ISBN-13: | 978-3-030-03251-7 |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-030-03251-7_15 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03251-7_15 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > Dept of Computer Science |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10046619 |
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