In August 1819 the custos or chief magistrate of the parish of St Catherine in Jamaica laid a request before the governor in Spanish Town. A number of groups of runaway slaves had taken up residence in the Hellshire (or Healthshire) Hills in the southern part of the parish, and were raiding and burning local plantations. He asked the governor to call out the militia and a party of trustworthy slaves and maroons to ‘scour’ the region. Over the next six or seven months they carried out an extended descent into Hellshire that broke up these groups and brought many back to Spanish Town for punishment. These events therefore lacked the drama of the rebellions that convulsed Jamaica and other slave societies in the Americas during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, not least the Haitian Revolution between 1791 and 1804, which replaced the colonial society with a black republic, or the Baptist War of 1831 in Jamaica itself. The descent was typical though of the small-scale actions routinely fought by slave societies to control runaways and maintain order, and a close study of this successful descent into Hellshire challenges the widespread impression that white planters were powerless against the rising tide of black resistance during this ‘age of revolutions’. In Jamaica they retained the military capacity to confront this challenge, due in a large part to the cooperation of free and enslaved people of colour, suggesting that the brutal system of plantation slavery in the British West Indies in fact remained politically and socially viable even on the eve of Emancipation in 1834. The weak link was in fact financial, as the monetary and social costs of defending the plantation system and slavery against black resistance, exacerbated by the paranoia and over-reaction of planters themselves, eventually exceeded both the willingness and capacity of white society to sustain these costs.
‘A Descent into Hellshire’

The Hellshire (or Healthshire) Hills are a range of limestone or ‘cockpit karst’ hills of about 160 square kilometres or 62 square miles in the southernmost part of the parish of St Catherine in Jamaica (Figure 1). Located only a few miles from the colonial capital of St Jago de la Vega or Spanish Town and the commercial city of Kingston, between the sea and the mountains, the region lay in the centre of the colonial state but was (and is), in the words of the Jamaican planter and historian Edward Long in 1774, ‘so rocky and barren as not to be worth inhabiting … [and] the want of water-springs, there being only one … will probably be the means of its remaining for the most part in a state of nature’. This made it an ideal refuge for runaway slaves in the early nineteenth century. ‘Independent of the extensive and almost trackless woods to which they can always resort on the least approach of danger’, a newspaper stated in 1846, ‘there are also numerous caves leading in many instances from one to another, and where some of the entrances are so narrow that one man at a time can only creep into them’. Parties were despatched there in 1774 and 1805 to ‘scour’ the hills of runaways, but it soon filled up again, and even in 1846 the newspaper urged that a party of constabulary should be dispatched to break up their settlements.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

The Hellshire Hills therefore raised problems of security that were wholly typical of the issues faced by slave societies across the Americas. Groups of runaways, often called ‘maroons’, existed outside the plantations, patrols and prisons that attempted to control the hostility and resistance endemic to slavery. ‘Marronage on a grand scale … struck directly at the foundations of the plantation system’, notes Richard Price, both by raids on plantations and provision grounds and by the inspiration it offered to other slaves, ‘presenting military and economic threats that often taxed the colonists to their very limits’. Planters in Jamaica
fought a series of damaging campaigns in the 1730s against the maroons that laid waste to
large parts of the interior, and again in 1795 and 1796 in a campaign that pitched some 5,000
troops against only 200 or 300 maroons.\textsuperscript{8} Other communities of maroons existed across the
British, French and Spanish West Indies and in North America, in places such as northern
Florida or the Great Dismal Swamp in the Chesapeake, where they were likewise objects of
fear to local planters.\textsuperscript{9} Runaways were therefore one aspect of a much wider continuum of
conspiracies, revolts and outright rebellions that menaced slave societies throughout the
Americas but reached a fever pitch from the late eighteenth century during the ‘age of
revolutions’. Building on the earlier work of C.L.R. James, it has been argued by Eugene
Genovese, Michael Craton and others that this eventually made plantation slavery unviable in
the Americas, particularly once the Haitian Revolution of 1791 had openly demonstrated how
tenuously white planters clung to their hegemony in the face of hostility from both free and
enslaved persons of colour.\textsuperscript{10} Combined with the economic weaknesses fully described by
Eric Williams, sympathetic revolts in Barbados in 1816, Demerara in 1823 and Jamaica in
1831 persuaded British elites that slavery was unsustainable, and similar calculations lay
behind failed revolts in New Orleans in 1811, South Carolina in 1822 and Virginia in 1831.\textsuperscript{11}

Examining the successful campaign against the runaways in Hellshire in 1819 offers
an alternative perspective that highlights the importance of the Jamaican state as one of the
elements underpinning the continued stability of slave society in the island. The tempo and
incidence of black resistance may indeed have been rising, and Claudius Fergus and Gelien
Matthews have demonstrated how abolitionists in Britain worked to exploit fears about the
inevitability of revolts to turn metropolitan opinion against slavery, but planters could and did
argue that they had proven that they had the capacity to contain such resistance.\textsuperscript{12} Revolts
were met by the widespread employment of free and enslaved people of colour as military
auxiliaries in successive campaigns during wartime, not least by the purchase by Britain of
‘A Descent into Hellshire’

13,000 slaves between 1795 and 1807 as recruits for the black West India Regiments.13

Planters in the Americas also fitted out parties of slaves and freedmen as rangers or light infantry for use against runaways in place of regular troops.14 In Jamaica and elsewhere planters also made treaties with settled communities of runaway slaves or maroons for their service as military auxiliaries in wartime and peacetime, when they mounted regular raids or expeditions for the recovery of other runaways.15 ‘The evidence is overwhelming’, notes Mavis Campbell, ‘that they … willingly and faithfully assisted the plantocracy in the control mechanism of the slave population.16 In combination with measures such as the system of rural patrols and urban police in the American South, studied recently by Sally Hadden, or the system of prisons in Jamaica after 1770 that Diana Paton has analysed, these had created interlocking state structures by the late eighteenth century which could potentially break up black resistance before it became a threat to the plantation system.17

Closer attention to the strength of the colonial state therefore complements a broader reassessment within the scholarship of the underlying cohesion and longer trajectory of the system of plantation slavery in Jamaica. Edward Brathwaite, Trevor Burnard and Christer Petley, among others, have shown how the ‘creole society’ of the island synthesised European and African practices to offer even free and enslaved people of colour a stake in the survival of its racial, social and economic hierarchies.18 Slaves and freedmen who had acquired a modicum of liberty and property were often more than willing to support the society that guaranteed these small gains, even if they also did not cease to lobby for a better place within that society itself. ‘Creole society was stable because the unprivileged and underprivileged within it conformed to the system, its divisions and its restrictions’, Brathwaite concluded, while Burnard has since argued that ‘what preserved slavery in Jamaica was that slaves accepted, albeit reluctantly and conditionally, that they were slaves and that masters had the right, or at least the capacity, to force them to do what they wanted
them to do’. Combined with work by Seymour Drescher and others on continued economic growth up to 1807, this has helped to show that neither Jamaica nor the other British Islands in the West Indies were in decline prior to abolition and emancipation, and to redirect the search for causal factors towards the metropolitan campaigns that gathered force in the 1780s and the 1820s. Yet this approach risks denying entirely the undoubted importance of local events on this process, not least the immense traumas created by unprecedented events such as the Haitian Revolution, which continued to reverberate throughout the Americas long after 1791. A detailed study of the descent into the Hellshire Hills in 1819 and the structures used by the Jamaican state to deal with resistance can suggest a more complex but persuasive way that black resistance affected white society and helped to bring about the end of slavery.

Such episodes have rarely been studied, both because they lacked the drama of larger revolts such as the Haitian Revolution and because colonial officials rarely sent back details of successful small-scale actions to imperial archives. Indeed, the governor of Jamaica nearly made no mention of it at all to the Colonial Secretary in Britain. ‘I should perhaps not have troubled your lordship … were I not apprehensive that more importance might be attached in England to this matter than it deserves’, he wrote, ‘by reason of my having been obliged to notice it in my speech at the opening of the session on account of the expence which had been unavoidably incurred on the occasion’. However, a detailed audit of the campaign by the island’s house of assembly in November 1820 and supporting material from several colonial newspapers and other records makes it possible to reconstruct not only the descent itself but also the underlying workings of the colonial state. These show that at least a hundred free and enslaved people of colour, mainly maroons, served under the command of the planters during the descent into Hellshire. During the first phase between September and October 1819, they scoured groups of runaways from the Hills, and from October 1819 to February 1820 small parties of militia and guides mounted wider patrols to sweep up further runaways.
Though successful in narrow tactical terms, the descent was itself a reflection of the paranoia that seized white planters in the wake of the Haitian Revolution, and ultimately resulted in heavy financial costs that the island found it difficult to shoulder. The descent into Hellshire serves to show how even unsuccessful black resistance served to weaken the system of slavery by raising the costs of maintaining this system to ultimately unsustainable levels.

The first phase of the descent into Hellshire ran from 14 August to 26 September 1819 and began when the vestry of the parish of St Catherine raised the issue of runaways with the governor. The newspaper the *St Jago Gazette* noted that the several groups of runaways had established houses and provision grounds in the region and had ‘become so daring as to burn down the buildings on Mrs Brown’s pen about three miles from this town ... and at Berrydale Pen within a mile of town as well as other properties in the vicinity, [and] no stock could be kept safe from their depredations’.

Other witnesses later reported thefts of corn, cattle and spirits, and the shooting of a cow at Smallwood Pen, which was owned by a member of the vestry named William McRobbie. The planters of the parish argued that these were the harbingers of an uprising, by runaways who were ‘so daring as to commit felonious and rebellious acts almost in public view and evidence a spirit ripe for rebellion’. This was echoed only a few years later by the Jamaican historian George Wilson Brydges, a pro-slavery clergyman and planter whose parish in Manchester lay a few miles away from the runaways. ‘A wide extent of coast lay open to them; the enemies of Jamaica were active and designing; and it was more than suspected that a channel of communication had been kept open with a neighbouring colony of black barbarians [in Haiti],’ he said, ‘[and] their strength and the apparent security of a mountainous country of vast resources and considerable extent,
inhabited by themselves alone, had encouraged this formidable band of robbers to issue from its haunts and commit outrages on the neighbouring properties’.  

The planters focussed in particular on the activities of two small bands of runaways; the ‘Wall Pond party’ in north-east Hellshire under a runaway named Yaw or Walker, and the ‘Amity Hall party’ in north-west Hellshire under another runaway called Quashie or Scipio. Walker was a skilled cooper who had escaped from a plantation in St Thomas in the Vale some twenty years before, and had a reputation for violence. It was his lieutenants Aberdeen, Tooka Tooka Jack and Toney who had burnt Brown’s pen, and they had built several further settlements inside Hellshire around Salt Island Pond in the north-east and a lookout post on the surrounding hillside. Scipio was a creole slave born in Jamaica who had run away from a nearby plantation in St Catherine only five years before, and his gang retained more links with settled society. Their settlement lay between Salt Island Pond and the plantation of Amity Hall in St Dorothy, only half a mile from its provision grounds and near relatives such as his uncle Cudjoe and his mother, who was ‘kept’ by a watchman at Amity Hall named Quamin Fuller. His party included his wife Bessy and his sister Peggy Fuller, his lieutenants Leicester, Old Anthony and Cudjoe, and a wider group of slaves from Amity Hall and other estates who joined and left the party as they saw fit. Yet these gangs did not number more than about thirty people and lived next to larger numbers of runaways who had formed their own settlements in Hellshire itself or on its edges. Two hundred or so were captured in the descent, imprisoned in the workhouse at Spanish Town, and their descriptions published for the benefit of their owners. Around one third were female, and only a third were creoles or locally-born; the remainder were described as African, despite making up only forty percent of the population. Most had lived locally, either in St Catherine and its surrounding parishes or the nearby city of Kingston, and only fifteen percent were from further afield.
Like many other runaways the groups in Hellshire also remained in relatively close contact with the settled regions surrounding the Hills. The *St Jago Gazette* reported with alarm in mid-September that two black soldiers of the West India Regiment at Apostle’s Battery, on the eastern side of the Hellshire Hills, had been arrested for concealing runaways in the settlement established there by retired soldiers, and demanded that the government remove this ‘perfect nuisance to the country’. Witnesses later stated that neither the Wall Pond nor the Amity Hall parties had retreated into self-sufficiency but wove baskets and grew potatoes, cassava, pumpkins, pease and corn at their provision grounds, which they then sold with fresh meat from their raids to nearby plantations such as Cherry Garden and Amity Hall as part of the informal economy. Perhaps most worryingly for planters, they had been able to exchange these goods not only for rum and other luxuries but also for arms, powder and shot. Slaves also moved to and from the Hills relatively freely and a runaway named Richard later testified that he and several others had been invited by both Scipio and Walker to join their gangs, ‘which they declined, as that party wished to steal too much, and the living would be hard, and they thought they would be safer where they were’. He had seen them both frequently at Amity Hall, and a nearby pen owned by John Vaughn, a free person of colour. There were also divisions and contests between the gangs and the plantation slaves. After the Amity Hall party killed McRobbie’s cow in August their settlement was attacked and their huts burnt in revenge by a party of slaves from McRobbie’s pen.

The runaways were therefore in many respects typical of other runaway or maroon communities in the Americas in this period and very far indeed from the rebellious hordes pictured by Bridges and other planters, who were clearly scarred not only by the Haitian Revolution of 1791 but also by the revolt in Barbados only three years before. ‘The most reasonable apprehensions were entertained [in 1816] that the combustible materials of which Jamaica was composed would catch the spreading flame’, Bridges noted, ‘[and] a spark
would at such a moment have caused a general conflagration … follow[ing] the example of Haiti and Barbados’. 35 The incident therefore reinforced fear and paranoia among planters in Jamaica, and led them to interpret minor raids by the runaways in Hellshire in 1819 as the stirrings of a general revolt with aid from revolutionary elements in Haiti, even though that island was in the throes of its own extended civil war and in no condition to incite revolution abroad. 36 Bridges, for example, estimated that there were three thousand runaways in the Hellshire Hills, at a time when the total in the entire island was probably no more than two thousand, and the number in Hellshire itself about six hundred. 37 The paranoia of the planters and their intense fears of slave revolts in the wake of the Haitian Revolution therefore led them to see the runaways in Hellshire as direct threats to the plantation system and society, demanding an immediate military response, when a more sober assessment would probably have encouraged a more measured reaction. The governor, for example, confided to the Colonial Office afterwards that ‘one plantation had been burned … [but] it does not appear that these people entertained any hostile designs against the peace of the country but merely intended to guard themselves against attack or molestation, and … contemplated an establishment similar to the maroons’. 38

The effect of previous revolts in the West Indies was therefore to encourage a direct military confrontation, and despite his private doubts the governor nevertheless quickly set the wheels of the colonial state in motion. Orders were sent on 14 August to the various white superintendents at Moore Town, Charles Town and Accompong Town to muster their parties of maroons, and a further letter was sent to George Marshall of Meweton Pen near Spanish Town asking him to lead them on an expedition against the runaways. 39 Very little can now be found about Marshall except that he was a major planter and vestryman who had served in the militia of St Catherine for over two decades, rising to the rank of major-general only a few years before. 40 It later emerged he lived at Meweton with his black housekeeper
Olive Pennington and her children George and Charlotte Marshall, who would all take key roles in the campaign. The runaways would therefore be driven from the Hellshire Hills not by the imperial state and its garrison of regular troops but by the planters and their colonial state, which faced three main challenges in projecting its power against the runaways.

The first was tactical. Marshall had overall responsibility not only for the Hellshire Hills but also the entire precinct of St Catherine, an area of some 1,200 square kilometres or 460 square miles which included the coastal plain of St Dorothy and the mountainous lands of St John and St Thomas in the Vale. The terrain in the Hellshire Hills was ideal for small-scale guerrilla warfare of ambush and favoured defenders with an intimate knowledge of the local hills and caves, as in the Cockpit Country used by the Trelawny maroons in 1795 and 1796. The second challenge was logistical. As food, water, ammunition and other essentials for maintaining the force in Hellshire could not be found locally, a long logistics train would be needed to keep the maroons in the field. Finally, Marshall lacked the element of surprise. After killing McRobbie’s cow the two parties had immediately retreated into the Hills ‘lest a party should be sent after them’, and soon after Marshall was appointed they met again. ‘Walker said they must join, as a party was to be out; that they would dig pits, and put glass bottles, pegs etc. there’, one witness recalled, ‘[and] that when the party came they would fall into the pit; when they would fall upon them and destroy them’. Scipio refused because their settlements lacked a water supply and Walker’s gang ‘carried on [with] too much hardness’ and proposed instead to recruit more runaways, but the parties made oaths to each other with a mixture of honey, ashes and red dirt in the same way as many other slave rebellions to bolster their alliance with spiritual sanctions. Marshall therefore faced a determined and relatively cohesive force with detailed knowledge of the difficult local terrain, and would have to bring his own supplies in from elsewhere to maintain the force.
To set against these challenges though, Marshall and the colonial fiscal-military state also had formidable resources at their disposal. By far the most important were the maroons. The treaties of 1739 between the Crown and the leeward and windward communities were regulated by further legislation, passed most recently in 1791, which allowed the governor to call out parties of maroons ‘to scour the woods and take up runaway slaves … [it being] of great ease and advantage to the planters and white inhabitants of the island’.\(^{45}\) The legislation gave the white superintendents the power to control maroons, but ‘as an encouragement to the said parties to be diligent in the said service’ it also allowed maroons to receive pay and provisions while on duty and a 40s reward for each slave captured.\(^{46}\) With extensive experience in the light, mobile warfare that could be expected in the Hellshire Hills, the maroons served as the backbone of Marshall’s force. Thanks to various party laws, the most recent one passed in 1807, an operational framework was also available that put Marshall and his adjutant or major of brigade at the head of a clear chain of command which could direct parties of maroons, militia and volunteers and place them under martial law to maintain discipline.\(^{47}\) Marshall also cultivated his own key sources of information. Richard, the slave noted above, was court martialled and violently expelled by the runaways when he refused to swear loyalty to Scipio and Walker, and he offered the colonial state his services as a guide.\(^{48}\) Scipio’s sister Peggy Fuller fled with Richard and was kept at Meweton by Marshall ‘for the purpose of confronting witnesses’.\(^{49}\)

The party law also provided him with the crucial logistical resources. Marshall and commissioners in each parish had the power to contract with local merchants for provisions and other supplies, issuing IOUs or certificates payable by the assembly in due course, and to conscript cattle, carts, boats and slaves as necessary on the same terms.\(^{50}\) He could also to tap into the commercial networks around Kingston and Spanish Town, two important hubs for the import of flour and salt provisions from overseas and the retailing of fresh provisions.
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such as meat, vegetables and other supplies from the local pens and provision grounds that both planters and slaves maintained. These were all deposited at Marshall’s head-quarters at Meweton Pen, which gradually became ‘a general depot for provisions, stores and baggage belonging to the party, and also … a hospital for sick and wounded and people with sore feet’. He converted a new brick mill-house into a barracks, gaol and hospital under the supervision of Olive Pennington, who was also charged with nursing the sick and supplying wine, candles, firewood and various other necessaries. Making Meweton his headquarters also allowed Marshall to control the flow of information, and he later noted he had chosen it ‘partly because I could get no other place for such purpose but chiefly for the purpose of keeping everything connected with the operations in as great a state of secrecy as possible’.

These advantages in tactics and logistics allowed Marshall to develop his campaign methodically and to build up an overwhelming strategic advantage. One hundred maroons from Charles Town, Moore Town and Accompong Town arrived at Spanish Town two weeks after receiving the letter from the governor, and were garrisoned at Meweton. Twelve or so volunteers were recruited by Marshall to help the parties, including Samuel Silverwood, John Mattee and Marshall’s own son George, a free person of colour, who were each appointed quartermaster-sergeants and put in charge of the three maroon parties. Marshall also hired about thirty baggage slaves from nearby plantations, including six from his personal estates at Meweton and Golden Grove. Around ten barrels of beef, 450 lb of biscuit and 300 loaves of bread were delivered by local merchants and retailers Asher Levy, Jean Baptiste Garel and Mary Redwar, with numerous casks of wine, rum, sugar, nutmeg, butter, cheese and medical supplies from local merchants. Thirty drays, mules and drivers were hired from two local contractors near the end of August to transport these provisions to three main depots at Salt Pond Island, Wall’s Pond and in Hellshire itself, which would serve as major jumping-off points for maroon expeditions into the interior. Minor depots were set up at strategic points
such as Bog Walk, Lloyd’s Retreat, Brereton’s Pen and Passage Fort to encircle Hellshire and control the movement of people through the precinct. The colonial state therefore displayed an impressive capacity to assemble the military force and logistical support for a sustained campaign against the runaways, drawing in part on free and enslaved persons of colour.

When Marshall unleashed his campaign in early September it therefore broke upon the runaways in the Hellshire Hills with devastating force. The maroons each day sent large parties into the interior, under the direction of the local volunteers and armed guides and with the assistance of three sketches or maps supplied by an engineer in the imperial garrison ‘for use of persons superintending the maroons’. From the depot at Wall’s Pond, the Charles Town maroons under John Matthee ranged to the north and east, patrolling the lowlands around Spanish Town and the north-eastern edge of the Hellshire Hills and also scouring the marshes on the edge of Kingston Harbour. Under Samuel Silverwood, the Moore Town maroons struck south and west into the Hills, setting up a small depot at Wreck Bay on the southern coast to prevent runaways escaping by boat. Meanwhile the Accompong Town maroons under George Marshall used the depot at Salt Island Pond to sweep south and east into the Hills, cutting off Scipio’s party and other runaways from Amity Hall and driving them into the marshes on the southern edge of Hellshire or its barren interior. The Charles Town maroons finished their search of Kingston harbour on 17 September and then crossed the Hills to Old Harbour, where Marshall fitted out boats for three parties under Matthee, Silverwood and Sergeant John Stewart to search the maze of islands and keys to the south-west of Hellshire for further runaways. Regular trips by Matthee, Silverwood and George Marshall between Meweton, Wall’s Pond and Salt Island Pond and Hellshire helped them to coordinate this campaign, intended first to establish a cordon around the Hills and then to drive the runaways into this cordon by expeditions into the interior.
Some sense of these descents into Hellshire is provided by the accounts of the capture of Walker and several other members of his gang in late September. They were taken at their settlement above Wall’s Pond by a party of Charles Town maroons under a white sergeant named John Brammer, who had all left the depot at daybreak with Vaughn as their guide. Climbing the hill with only a few pauses for refreshment, the maroons were ‘obliged to cut thatch and put [it] under their feet for protection from the rocks’, but around midday they came upon a small hut or house which they surrounded and attacked. Walker and his two wives were captured by a maroon named John McInnes ‘who overtook and seized Walker … and thereby stopped him until the rest of the party came up and secured him’ and received a wound in his thigh as a result. Walker was armed with a gun and powder, and Brammer reported that he struggled and eventually conceded ‘“my time is come, it is your time now; had I not been sick you would not have caught me”’. Leaving Walker under guard, the maroons were then led by Vaughn to another group of huts, where they captured Tooka Tooka Jack, Aberdeen and several others. Rather than returning eastwards with their prisoners they then headed west instead to Salt Island Pond, where they met a party of Accompong Town maroons who helped them carry the prisoners back to Meweton Pen. The day-to-day business of hunting down the runaways was thus left almost entirely in the hands of the maroons and local people of colour, and relied on their willing cooperation with only minimal direct intervention and direction, let alone coercion, from the white planters.

Back up this impressive plan of campaign was an immense logistical effort which enabled the maroon parties to maintain their cordon around the Hellshire Hills. The accounts later presented to the assembly show that there were regular deliveries of biscuit, bread and beef to the three depots established on the outskirts of the Hills, as well as further boxes of provisions containing wine, rum, porter, gin, sugar, butter, mustard, ham and cheese. On 28 August thirty-five pairs of shoes were delivered to Meweton by Joseph Cohen Deleon for use...
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by the superintendents, volunteers, guides and baggage slaves, at a cost of £29. Nearly £120 was spent in hiring some thirty slaves to transport the baggage of the maroons and volunteers, usually from nearby plantations such as Meweton, Bodle’s Pen and Bushy Park that were either hosting depots or were close to the scene. At Meweton Pen itself a hospital was maintained that saw a regular stream of medical supplies. On 4 September two doctors arrived to attend to the sick and injured, including John McInnes, who received several further visits over the next few weeks while he recovered and additional medical help when his wound became infected again on the journey back to Charles Town. Combined with the mobility provided by the hire of boats and canoes for shifting supplies and transporting parties offshore, this logistical backing enabled Marshall to maintain for several weeks large parties of maroons in a region with very few local resources.

Once the runaways were captured they were brought back to Meweton and carefully interrogated, ‘for the purpose of having them examined whether they were runaways or not … as well as for the purpose of obtaining from all such persons such information respecting rebels and their associates as might be necessary to forward to the several parties then at the outposts’. Marshall or one of the other commissioners made a cursory initial examination to extract any information of immediate value, which would then be sent forward to the maroon parties through the regular journeys made by Matthee, Silverwood and George Marshall, while the commissioners then entered into a second and more detailed examination in the next few days. Marshall later argued that keeping the prisoners confined there ‘until such information was sent off … prevent[ed] any information being given or sent by the captured slaves to those remaining out’. When a maroon party returned with further prisoners they escorted those already sifted to gaol at Spanish Town, apart from those ‘whom it was deemed necessary to keep, for the purpose of confronting runaway slaves who had been captured and who were expected to be brought in’. As noted above, Scipio’s sister
Peggy was kept at Meweton for this purpose. A meeting of the vestry of St Catherine was called on 18 September where members examined lists of runaways and ‘pointed out’ more than thirty slaves who should be tried for rebellion or smaller offences. A firm control over the circulation of information, which was then fed into the strategic direction of the campaign in real time, therefore helped Marshall to make the most of his resources. Far from the dismissive comments of colonial military capacity made by contemporaries and repeated by historians, the first phase of the campaign shows that the Jamaican state was an effective instrument of coercion, in part because it enjoyed the cooperation of many people of colour.

The newspapers were therefore able to report by 26 September 1819 that the main part of the campaign had been concluded. Nearly three hundred runaways had been sent to Meweton, including ten armed rebels ‘and a great number of slaves who had formed themselves into gangs of a dangerous description’. Large numbers of weapons had been confiscated, and their huts and provision grounds in Hellshire and nearby destroyed. ‘Complete success attended the measure’, Marshall later argued, ‘insofar as this, that of the runaways not one remained, nor was a house left upon the hills’. The St Jago Gazette declared that ‘a more useful service could scarcely have been performed to the public … which have not only secured so many dangerous runaways but has occasioned the return of many others to their owners through the fear of being taken up by the maroons’. Now it was necessary for planters to try, convict and punish the runaways through the slave courts, which Diana Paton has argued served to ‘assert the legitimacy of their power … [and] transform … what was otherwise naked violence into legitimate punishment’. Moreover, though Walker had been taken, Scipio and his gang had escaped and remained at large. Marshall therefore dismissed
the contingents of maroons on 26 September but kept under arms the militia and several armed guides, in a second phase that lasted until 22 February 1820 and served to consolidate the gains already secured by descent on Hellshire.

In order not to misuse the didactic possibilities of this moment, when the usual slave court was held at Spanish Town on 26 October it moved quickly to try members of Walker’s gang such as Aberdeen, who were not only runaways but had also been found armed and in actual rebellion against the colonial state. The court heard testimony from Richard and from Scipio’s wife Bessy that Aberdeen had been a member of Walker’s gang, and from other slaves that he had burnt down Brown’s pen earlier in August. He was found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. Walker was confronted with very similar evidence when he was put on trial three days later, as was Tooka Tooka Jack, and both were likewise hanged. A slave named Fortune was captured in September with several runaways and ‘was committed to the Spanish Town workhouse, being a principal evidence against him, and upon his testimony several of the ringleaders were tried, convicted and transported’. More than forty other slaves were gaoled or exiled for carrying weapons and harbouring runaways, though the St. Jago Gazette reported in early November that there were still at least eighty runaways awaiting trial. ‘It is referred to the magistracy to decide whether ample example has not been made and public justice been satisfied’, it wrote, and so the remainder were turned over to the workhouse or dismissed with a summary punishment such as a whipping ‘after ascertaining and reserving the few cases connected with the armed banditti and such others as a committee may select.’ The episode confirms the vital importance of collaboration by free and enslaved persons of colour in this theatre of power, with its rituals of terror, by serving as witnesses and providing the testimony necessary by law for this exemplary punishment.

The fact that Scipio and his gang were still at large was a serious problem though, especially since it undermined the impact of the expedition as a deterrent. ‘Let me ask
whether the *banditti*, if left unpursued, would not have speedily reoccupied their former fastnesses or at no distant period formed themselves into gangs of the most desperate character’, Marshall later commented. ‘If yea, would it not be then too late to expostulate upon the useless expenditure of the maroon expedition of 1819 or to censure the pusillanimous conduct of an officer who refused to follow the horses which he had put to the route’. Marshall therefore kept the volunteers under arms as militiamen and formed them into smaller parties of four or five men under the sergeants Silverwood, Mathee and George Marshall. When on patrol they were to obey orders from several militia officers resident in their districts such as John Townshend and John Macfarlane, who had local knowledge and supplied their own ‘confidential slaves’ such as Cuffee Townshend and Wallace Macfarlane as armed guides to help direct the parties. The headquarters at Meweton Pen continued to receive a stream of beef, rum, bread and other supplies to subsist the parties while out on patrol and the runaways they caught. Olive Pennington supplied medicines, firewood and other necessaries, and horses for carrying provisions and despatches from Meweton to the smaller depots at Amity Hall and other parts of the precinct, while both Peggy and Quamin Fuller remained at Meweton to help Marshall examine the runaways they captured and to identify those belonging to Scipio’s party.

The detailed pattern of patrols between October 1819 and February 1820 is hard to reconstruct but seems to have been restricted to two broad areas. One set of patrols struck westwards from Meweton into St Dorothy and St John and used the depots at Amity Hall and Fuller’s Rest to support a regular series of incursions into the hills around them as well as the swamps and lagoons along the coast. Scipio and his gang had remained in relatively close proximity to Amity Hall and Salt Island Pond and there was a bloody clash on 26 November between the gang and one of the militia parties, which alarmed the assembly so much that they asked the governor to offer a bounty or reward of £100 for capturing them.
fugitives headed further west across the broad coastal belt of sugar plantations and provision pens in St Dorothy to the foothills around Fuller’s Rest and Bully Tree, evading the parties sent after them. The tempo of operations was maintained until December 1819 and then gradually tapered away, though occasional patrolling continued, and George Marshall recalled an extended patrol in February 1820 that swept east from Fuller’s Pen towards Amity Hall, Salt Pond Island, Wall’s Pond and then back to Spanish Town. Other patrols headed north into the parish of St Thomas in the Vale to find runaways who had managed to evade the guard post at Bog Walk, in a narrow gorge that controlled access to the parish. Some ranged even further afield; in February, Marshall received a complaint about runaways at River Road in the parish of St Mary on the northern coast, and despatched a small party to scour the nearby provision grounds, with help from a slave from River Road plantation.

Though none these parties were able to catch Scipio, Marshall reported many other successes. They had brought in nearly two hundred more runaways and destroyed their huts and provision grounds, ‘thereby completing a service which was … equal at least in importance to any of a similar feature that can be found in the annals of Jamaica’. After a brief detention at Meweton for examination they were committed to gaol in Spanish Town, though even in March 1820 the backlog remained so high that the decision was taken to try only those slaves accused of serious offences and to turn over the others to the workhouse. At least ten slaves were tried as runaways, and many planters noted that their slaves had either been captured by the maroons or had returned as a result of the parties. ‘Not a planter or an owner of slaves in any of the neighbouring parishes have I conversed with who has not readily expressed his firm belief that the unprecedented activity of the men on duty had so harassed the runaways that they could no longer remain out’, Marshall later concluded, ‘and that therefore a great number equal to those brought in by the party had returned to their owners without further loss of time or any personal expence whatever’. He duly submitted
his accounts to the assembly in November 1820, confidently expecting that the house would fully concur and reimburse him for the money he had laid out on both the maroons during the first phase and the militia parties in the second phase.

However, when presented with a bill for £3,162 3s 4½d the members of the assembly balked, and immediately referred the accounts to a committee for further examination and audit. Marshall and his officers faced a hostile interview and he was accused of keeping the militia on foot after the maroons had been dismissed on 26 September for no reason beyond his own aggrandisement. The fact that he and his own household had received such a large amount of public cash did not help his case, and he was also accused of soliciting a misleading opinion from the attorney-general ‘to induce the receiver-general to satisfy some of the demands made upon the public … and more especially the demand for pay to himself and his brigade-major’. An even more hostile amendment to the report was proposed on 18 December 1820 which accused Marshall of incurring ‘a great and unnecessary expense … without any legal warrant or authority and in a manner which your committee consider highly improper’, and although it was defeated the house asked that the governor launch a suit at law against him for the recovery of the £1,422 15s 2¾d paid out after 26 September. Marshall hit back that the parties had successfully accomplished their main aims and at a much lower cost than the island had any reason to expect. The bills for rations and other logistical costs were cheaper than any for the last twenty years, due to the bargains he had struck with local contractors; he had employed family and friends for convenience and secrecy; his pay as major-general was a fair recompense for the trouble and risk involved; and ‘the business was satisfactorily accomplished without any loss to the public or any benefit, except a trifling remuneration, to the individuals employed’.

-IV-
Even a fairly routine descent into Hellshire between August 1819 and February 1820 therefore relied heavily on maroons and free and enslaved people of colour, both to capture the runaways in the first place and to secure their conviction. Combined with the formidable logistical capacity afforded by established military structures, this was sufficient to allow the Jamaican state to break up the threat that seemed to be posed to planters by the runaways in the Hills. It was consequently a ‘creole’ state in every sense of the word, which helped to maintain the graduated and racialized hierarchies of liberty and property within the island by offering people of colour a selective but important stake in the wider society, thereby breaking up black solidarity and entrenching divisions between different groups. For example, Marshall decided to dismiss the Accompong Town maroons in late September ‘in consequence of their bad conduct to the free and slave inhabitants of the neighbourhood, whose resentment they had raised to a most alarming degree’, and when the Moore Town maroons were returning home they were attacked in turn in Kingston by a mob of slaves and free persons of colour ‘in consequence of their late exertions in apprehending so many runaways’. The St Jago Gazette reported several complaints from slaveowners that their loyal slaves had been hassled by the maroons and other acts of violence committed, ‘but we cannot for a moment doubt that the result will justify every proceeding and a little private evil be compensated by a great deal of public good’. Neither Jamaica nor the other islands in the British West Indies were thus on the point of collapse during the prelude to Emancipation, as Williams and Genovese, among others, have argued, and Haiti in 1791 emerges as an exception rather than the rule, and the sole example of a successful slave rebellion.

The Achilles heel of the colonial state by this point was therefore financial rather than military. Careful economy meant that the descent cost only about £3,000 or about one per cent of annual revenues, but even this met with hostile scrutiny that clearly left its mark on
Marshall. ‘[It is not] wise or consistent with the policy of our local situation, … to impugn the services and impute improper motives to the transactions of an officer engaged in such service’, he wrote, adding that it was ‘[not] consistent with the interest of the great landholder; with the safety of the small settler; with the colonial policy of this island’.\(^{102}\)

Perhaps with an eye on the agricultural disturbances that followed in Jamaica in the 1820s, George Wilson Bridges complained in 1827 that the assembly had ‘instituted so rigorous an inquiry that the active vigilance of the country has ever since been paralysed. The attempt has not been repeated, the runaways have again increased to a most alarming extent, and, though an impartial yet tardy verdict fully exonerated the meritorious officer, it left no triumph but to the partisans of disorder and rebellion’.\(^ {103}\)

When the governor’s secretary wrote to Marshall in May 1830 that they had decided to send another expedition into Hellshire, ‘relative to the hordes of negroes which have again assembled … [in] the scene of your former services … [since] the evil has become of so great a magnitude that something must be done’, he asked Marshall to lead it, but noted – apparently with reference to 1820 – that ‘I am quite aware that there are many circumstances which may discourage you from so laborious an enterprise’.\(^ {104}\)

Even the successful defence of Jamaica against the paranoia of its own planters thus imposed considerable costs on white society that discouraged further action and left planters with no choice but to concede emancipation in 1833. Levels of taxes, the bulk of them spent mainly on defence, rose from about one percent of national income in the mid-eighteenth century to four or five percent after 1791, in response to increasing black resistance, and the cost of defending Jamaica against open rebellions in 1795 and 1831 nearly bankrupted the island each time.\(^ {105}\) Aaron Graham has recently concluded that that the costs of security therefore amounted to an ‘unprecedented burden’ on Jamaican society.\(^ {106}\) This close study of the descent into Hellshire and its aftermath has shown how and why these economic costs
began to undermine the undoubted military power of the colonial state from within, leaving planters exposed to the growing international pressure for emancipation. Black resistance therefore helped to bring about the end of slavery, as both Williams and Genovese argued, but indirectly rather than directly as in Haiti. However, all this came too late for Scipio, who finally surrendered to the authorities in Spanish Town in November 1820. He was placed on trial three months later and faced damming testimony from his sister Peggy and from her companion Richard, who had been manumitted in April by the vestry of St Catherine for his services. Notwithstanding ‘a very feeling and impressive’ speech to the jury from the chief magistrate, ‘[who] drew their attention to the fact of the prisoner having, of his own accord, delivered himself up to justice, a circumstance which might probably induce them to recommend him to mercy’, the jury made no such recommendation, and Scipio was duly hanged at the race course outside Spanish Town five days later.
Endnotes

1 Royal Gazette xli, 38, 11 to 18 September 1819, ‘St Jago Gazette’.
2 Fleurant, Tucker, and Viles, 'Cockpit karst landscape', pp. 3-14.
4 Falmouth Post xii, 28; 14/7/1846
5 Simmonds, “‘Little shadow’” p. 416; Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, Jamaica [hereafter JA], 2/2/6 (St Catherine’s Vestry Minute Book, 1799-1807) f. 146r; Falmouth Post xii, 28, ‘Editorial’.
6 See Price, Maroon societies, especially Price, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-30; Genovese, From rebellion to revolution pp. 51-81. For Jamaica, see Craton, Testing the chains pp. 61-5; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica pp. 15-43
7 Price, ‘Introduction’, p. 3
8 Brathwaite, Creole society pp. 200-11; Craton, Testing the chains pp. 65-92, 125-38, 211-22; Campbell, Maroons pp. 44-134
10 Genovese, Rebellion and revolution pp. 82-125; Craton, Testing the chains pp. 49-53; Gaspar, Bondmen & rebels, esp. pp. 171-2, 224-38.
11 Williams, Capitalism & slavery
12 See Drescher, Econocide; Matthews, Caribbean slave revolts; Fergus, “‘Dread of insurrection’” pp. 757-80
15 Goveia, Slave society pp. 204-33; Burnard, Mastery, tyranny, and desire pp. 70-93; Marshall, Slavery, law and society pp. 149-68.
16 Campbell, Maroons pp. 147-62; Craton, Testing the chains pp. 130-8, 214-21
17 Hadden, Slave patrols esp. pp. 42-70, 103-36; Wade, Slavery in the cities pp. 80-110; Gaspar, Bondmen & rebels pp. 197-204; Franklin and Schweninger, Runaway slaves pp. 150-81; Burnard, Planters, merchants and slaves pp. 78-87; Paton, No bond but the law pp. 19-82
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18 Brathwaite, Creole society, esp. pp. 306-11; Goveia, Slave society pp. 312-16; Burnard, Mastery, tyranny and desire pp. 139-74; Petley, Slaveholders in Jamaica pp. 103-11; Burnard, Planters, merchants and slaves pp. 262-71. For an historiographical overview, see Petley, ‘New perspectives’ pp. 855-63.

19 Brathwaite, Creole society pp. 193 and, more broadly, pp. 193-200; Burnard, Mastery, tyranny and desire p. 154.


22 The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, UK [hereafter TNA], CO137/148 f. 104r, Manchester to Bathurst, 8 November 1819.

23 This was copied in the Kingston Chronicle #5438, 20 September 1819, ‘St Jago Gazette’ and Royal Gazette xli, 39, 18 to 25 September 1819, ‘St Jago de la Vega, September 18’.

24 Royal Gazette, xli, 45, 30 October to 6 November 1819, ‘Slave Court’, 27 October 1819.


27 Evidences in Royal Gazette, xli, 45, 30 October to 6 November 1820, ‘Slave Court’ for 27, 28 and 30 October 1819 and Royal Gazette xliii, 27 January to 3 February 1821, ‘Slave Court’.

28 These figures are based on a survey of detainees who entered the St Catherine workhouse between 23 August and 26 October 1819, when the maroon parties disbanded, from Royal Gazette xli, 37 (4 September 1819) to xli, 49 (27 November 1819). These have been cross-referenced with the lists of runaways and detainees held in the Spanish Town gaol: Votes of the House of Assembly 1819 pp. 238-9; Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 pp. 257-9.

29 Higman, Jamaica pp. 75-80.

30 Royal Gazette, xli, 39, 18 to 25 September 1819, ‘St Jago Gazette’.

31 Evidences of Richard in Royal Gazette, xli, 45, 30 October to 6 November 1820, ‘Slave Court’ for 27, 28 and 30 October 1819 and Royal Gazette xliii, 27 January to 3 February 1821, ‘Slave Court’.

32 See above n. 31.

33 Royal Gazette, xli, 45, 30 October to 6 November 1820, ‘Slave Court’, 27 October 1819.

34 For black and white reactions to 1816, see Lambert, White Creole culture pp. 122-7, 133-9.
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36 Coupeau, *Haiti* pp. 37-61
37 Higman, *Jamaica* pp. 176-83
38 TNA, CO137/148 f. 103r-104r, Manchester to Bathurst, 8 November 1819.
39 *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 157-8, 179-82
40 His career has been reconstructed from the almanacs printed between 1801 and 1821, which have been transcribed and placed online at: http://www.jamaicanfamilysearch.com/Samples/Almanacs.htm
41 *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820, pp. 179-81, 339
42 Craton, *Testing the chains* pp. 215-19
43 Evidences of Bessy in *Royal Gazette*, xli, 45, 30 October to 6 November 1820, ‘Slave Court’ for 30 October 1819.
44 Evidences in *Royal Gazette*, xli, 45, 30 October to 6 November 1820, ‘Slave Court’ for 27, 28 and 30 October 1819 and *Royal Gazette* xliii, 27 January to 3 February 1821, ‘Slave Court’. For the importance of oaths in slave conspiracies and revolts, see Gaspar, *Bondmen & rebels* pp. 227-54, esp. pp. 242-5; Bilby, ‘Swearing by the past’ pp. 655-89
45 Craton, *Testing the chains* pp. 87-92, 224-7; Campbell, *Maroons* pp. 126-47. The acts were 32 Geo III c. 4 and 49 Geo III c. 22 (in *The Laws of Jamaica* (7 vols., Kingston, Jamaica, 1822-4) vol. ii, 473-83; v, 130).
46 32 Geo III c. 22 s. 15, 22; 49 Geo III c. 22 s. 1
47 48 Geo III c. 4 ss. 1-3, 21, 22 (in *The Laws of Jamaica* vol. v, 93-104)
48 Evidences of Richard in *Royal Gazette*, xli, 45, 30 October to 6 November 1820, ‘Slave Court’ for 27, 28 and 30 October 1819 and *Royal Gazette* xliii, 27 January to 3 February 1821, ‘Slave Court’.
49 *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 p. 377
50 48 Geo III c. 4 ss. 6-9, 12-14
52 *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 p. 336
53 *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 pp. 370, 375, 377, 379, 380
54 *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 p. 336
55 Their pay-bills give their names, ranks and times of service: *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 pp. 343, 344, 355-6, 377-8
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57 Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 pp. 357-9

58 Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 pp. 363-7, 371-4

59 This has been extrapolated from the receipts for deliveries: see Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 pp. 357-9 and above n. 58.

60 Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 p. 368. He received £18 for these maps.

61 This plan of campaign has been reconstructed from the journeys made by Matthee, Silverwood and Marshall, and their receipts for the hire of horses: see Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 pp. 359-61.

62 Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 pp. 362

63 Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 pp. 363, 365

64 For Brammer, see Votes of the House of Assembly 1819 p. 239 and the pay-bills from the campaign: see above n. 53.

65 Evidences in Royal Gazette, xli, 45, 30 October to 6 November 1820, ‘Slave Court’ for 27, 28 and 30 October 1819 and Royal Gazette xliii, 27 January to 3 February 1821, ‘Slave Court’; Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 p. 383; TNA, CO137/148 f. 104v, Manchester to Bathurst, 8 November 1819


67 Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 p. 368

68 Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 pp. 357-9

69 Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 p. 368-9, 380-1

70 Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 p. 336

71 Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 p. 336

72 Votes of the House of Assembly 1820 p. 337

73 Royal Gazette, xli, 39, 18 to 25 September 1819, ‘St Jago Gazette’.

74 Royal Gazette, xlii, 23 to 30 December 1820, George Marshall to the Editor, 19 December 1820.

75 Royal Gazette, xliii, 2, 6 to 13 January 1821, ‘To the Editor of the St Jago Gazette [from George Marshall]’, 30 December 1820.

76 Royal Gazette, xli, 39, 18 to 25 September 1819, ‘St Jago Gazette’; TNA, CO137/148 f. 104r, Manchester to Bathurst, 8 November 1819


78 Royal Gazette, xlii, 45, 30 October to 6 November 1819, ‘Slave Court’, 27 October 1819.
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79 *Royal Gazette*, xli, 45, 30 October to 6 November 1819, ‘Slave Court’, 28 and 30 October 1819.; TNA, CO137/148 f. 103r-v, Manchester to Bathurst, 8 November 1819

80 *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 p. 92

81 *Royal Gazette*, xli, 46, 6 to 13 November 1819, ‘Jamaica’, 6 November 1819

82 *Royal Gazette*, xliii, 2, 6 to 13 January 1821, ‘To the Editor of the St Jago Gazette [from George Marshall]’, 30 December 1820 and ‘To the Editor of the St Jago Gazette [continued]’.

83 This has been reconstructed from the pay-bills: see *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 pp. 350-4. Their relationship probably resembled the relationship between Thomas Thistlewood in the mid-eighteenth century and his slave Lincoln, who was eventually trusted with weapons and a substantial degree of autonomy: see Burnard, *Mastery, tyranny and desire* pp. 194-209.


87 See for example ‘A proclamation’ in *St Jago Gazette* lxvi, 4, 15 to 22 January 1820.

88 *Royal Gazette*, xliii, 2, 6 to 13 January 1821, ‘To the Editor of the St Jago Gazette [from George Marshall]’, 30 December 1820 and ‘To the Editor of the St Jago Gazette [continued]’.

89 *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 p. 339


91 *Royal Gazette*, xlii, 2, 6 to 13 January 1821, ‘To the Editor of the St Jago Gazette [from George Marshall]’, 30 December 1820.

92 *Royal Gazette*, xlii, 53, 23 to 30 December 1820, ‘To the Editor [from George Marshall]’, 19 December 1820; *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 p. 182

93 *St Jago Gazette*, lxvi, 11, 4 to 11 March 1820, ‘Quarter Sessions – Spanish Town’.

94 For example, Niall Harding testified that his slave Nero had returned home after being absent for ten years, ‘[and] he does not know where he was harboured but believes he might have been induced to return by the late rousting out of the runaways by the maroons’: see *St Jago Gazette*, lxvi, 11, 4 to 11 March 1820, ‘Quarter Sessions – Spanish Town’.


96 *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 pp. 102-3, 157-8, 179-81

97 *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 p. 180
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98 *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 p. 180-3

99 *Royal Gazette* xlii, 53, 23 to 30 December 1820, ‘To the Editor [from George Marshall]’.


101 See *Royal Gazette* xli, 38, 11 to 18 September 1819, ‘St Jago Gazette’

102 *Royal Gazette*, xlii, 2, 6 to 13 January 1821, ‘To the Editor of the St Jago Gazette [from George Marshall]’, 30 December 1820.


104 JA, 1B/5/81/2 (Governor’s Letterbook, 1827-31) f. 180, Matthew Bullock to George Marshall, 10 May 1830.

105 Graham, ‘Colonial sinews’ pp. 188-209.


107 *Royal Gazette* xlii, 47, 11 to 18 November 1820, ‘Editorial’ and *Royal Gazette* xliii, 5, 27 January to 3 February 1821, ‘Slave Court’; *Votes of the House of Assembly* 1820 p. 253. For the manumission of Richard, see JA, 2/2/7 (St Catherine’s Vestry Minute Book, 1820-8) f. 6r.