Lianos, I; Mantzari, D; Wagner Von Papp, F; Thepot, F; (2017) Brexit and Competition Law. (CLES Policy Papers 02/2017). Centre for Law, Economics and Society, UCL Faculty of Laws: London, UK.

Preview

Text Lianos_cles-policy-paper-2-2017.pdf Download (613kB) | Preview

Abstract

1. Post-Brexit, it is likely that there will be parallel investigations in the UK and the EU27, in particular in those cases that are currently investigated by the European Commission and in which there is a substantial effect on competition within the EU, such as global cartels. 2. This will have cost implications. Given that the enforcement resources of the CMA are already stretched, resulting in a dearth of enforcement actions compared to other European competition authorities, it will be a challenge to accommodate these additional cases, which are often particularly complex and resource intensive. There will also be an increased burden resulting from the increased costs of investigative coordination. These costs may partly be offset by higher fines imposed in these more serious cases, which will now be imposed by the CMA instead of the European Commission. Nevertheless, it seems inevitable that either the CMA’s budget will have to be increased substantially, or there will be indirect costs resulting from under-deterrence of competition law infringements in the UK. 3. It is in the mutual interest of the EU and the UK to come to a competition cooperation agreement. The intensity of cooperation under such an agreement will inevitably fall short of that of the cooperation currently practiced within the European Competition Network. Given the current convergence of the competition regimes in the EU and the UK, which is not to be expected to disappear in the short to medium term, it should be possible to negotiate for cooperation that is at the upper bound of what is possible in international competition agreements. The agreement should, in addition to the staple provisions in competition cooperation agreements (such as notifications, negative and positive comity etc), also include provisions for the exchange of confidential information and for enhanced investigative cooperation. 4. We consider that a transitional arrangement is necessary for dealing with the disengagement of the CMA from a well-defined system of public enforcement cooperation within the EU. The CMA and the EU will still be dealing with cases with a cross-border dimension, thereby requiring coordination and cooperation. 5. The UK should make active efforts to reinforce its position as a jurisdiction of choice for private actions for damages, in particular for EU-wide cartels, by facilitating the access claimants have to evidence, eventually offering a wider disclosure of the evidence included in the file of a competition authority compared to that provided by EU law, by recognizing the binding effect of the decisions of the European Commission and NCAs of other Member States of the EU, and by making arrangements that could substitute for those of the Brussels Regulation recast that will be no longer directly applicable in the UK.

Download activity - last month

Export as JSONXMLCSV

Download activity - last 12 months

Export as JSONXMLCSV

Downloads by country - last 12 months

Export as JSONXMLCSV

Archive Staff Only

View Item