A New Dawn?

Indigenous Movements and Ethnic Inclusion in Latin America

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Abstract

This article investigates how indigenous movements in Latin America promote the political inclusion of historically marginalized indigenous groups. I argue that the social pressure produced by a strong movement promotes the inclusion of indigenous representatives in formal leadership positions. However, this effect depends both on movements’ internal unity and the general responsiveness of the political system. I examine my claims using a mixed-methods design. I draw on a new group-level dataset on ethnic parties and ethnic civil society organizations in Latin America between 1946 and 2009. My statistical analysis finds that indigenous groups with well-organized movements are more likely to achieve inclusion in executive positions of state power. The level of democratic freedom in a country greatly conditions this effect, while movement-internal factionalism undermines the political effectiveness of indigenous mobilization. I illuminate the causal mechanisms underlying these results in a case study of the rise and decline of indigenous mobilization in Ecuador.
Introduction

In December 2005, the Bolivian Movement for Socialism (MAS) party achieved a convincing electoral victory that brought Aymara politician Evo Morales to power. In a highly symbolic inauguration ceremony, Morales, the country’s first indigenous president in 180 years of independence, was crowned “supreme leader” of his Aymara group. The electoral triumph of Morales and the MAS illustrates the arrival of indigenous movements as central actors in Latin American politics following centuries of racial oppression (Dávalos 2005; Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2000, 2005; Yashar 2005).

Have such movements promoted the inclusion of Latin American indigenous people in executive positions of state power? While the academic literature supplies abundant theoretical and empirical accounts of the (re-)emergence of these ethnic movements (Birnir 2004; Lucero 2008; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005), we lack systematic knowledge about their political consequences. Moreover, almost all comparative works on this subject focus on *de jure* ethnic group rights (see, e.g., Barié 2003; Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2000). In contrast, the question of indigenous people’s political inclusion receives much less attention. Yet, according to a number of recent studies, the inclusion of representatives of underprivileged groups in state institutions – commonly referred to as “descriptive representation” (Pitkin 1967, 60-91) – profoundly affects these groups’ substantive representation in terms of collective rights, redistribution, and public goods provision (Carnes and Lupu 2015; Pande 2003; Preuhs 2006; Reingold and Smith 2012). Thus, in light of Latin America’s history of ethnic discrimination, the question of indigenous political inclusion takes on paramount importance.

I argue that the social pressure produced by a well-organized indigenous movement demonstrates the political significance of its constituency. This, in turn, makes the inclusion of indigenous leaders in formal leadership positions more likely. However, a movement’s effectiveness generally depends on movement-internal processes of “horizontal voice” (O’Donnell 1986, 251) that foster unity, as well as on the general responsiveness of the political system. Focusing on indigenous people’s inclusion in executive state power at both the national and regional levels, I test these arguments using a new cross-sectional time-series dataset on ethnic organizations in all Latin American countries from the end of World War II to 2009. I find that the organizational strength of indigenous movements tends to positively affect indigenous groups’ chances of inclu-
sion in executive positions of state power. Yet, the results also suggest that this effect is conditioned by the level of democratic freedom. Moreover, factional divisions between competing national organizations decrease the political effectiveness of indigenous mobilization. The subsequent case study demonstrates that both the successes and failures of Ecuador’s indigenous movement reflect the importance of the theorized processes of horizontal voice. In particular, factional rivalries – exploited by the country’s non-indigenous rulers – prevented more far-reaching gains in indigenous inclusion at the national level of state power, despite the organizational strength of the movement.

While most of the existing literature on ethnic inclusion focuses on legal and electoral variables (e.g., Htun 2004; Lijphart 2004; Norris 2008), this study highlights the relevance of ethnic social movements in societies with a history of ethnic discrimination. Thus, it adds to actor-centered accounts of democratization in Latin America (see, e.g., Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Smith 2009) by demonstrating how the mobilization of previously excluded actors may enhance political equality in highly unequal societies. In this sense, the findings of this study qualify scholarly arguments which warn against the divisive force of ethnic organizations in multiethnic societies (see, e.g., Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006).

**Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America and the Importance of Political Inclusion**

Ever since the colonial conquest, indigenous groups have been politically, economically, and socially marginalized in Latin American societies. Starting in the 1970s, however, they embarked on a sustained process of collective mobilization – first through civic movements (Rice 2012; Yashar 2005) and subsequently in electoral politics (Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2005). Indigenous organizations in all countries have demanded equal political participation, as well as collective rights, such as land rights or the right to bilingual education (Dávalos 2005; Lucero 2008; Yashar 2005). In assessing the political gains from this mobilization, comparative studies mainly focus on *de jure* ethnic group rights (see, e.g., Barié 2003; Hooker 2005; Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2000), examining the emergence of what Van Cott (2000, 17) calls a “regional model of ‘multi-cultural constitutionalism.’” In contrast, although some studies examined indigenous people’s participation in local or regional politics of specific countries (e.g., Ospina, Santillana, and
Arboleda 2008; Van Cott 2001, 2008), we currently lack systematic evidence about the effect of this mobilization on indigenous people’s political inclusion.

The question of ethnic inclusion is closely related to the concept of “descriptive representation” (Pitkin 1967, 60-5, 209), i.e. the degree to which the composition of political institutions corresponds to that of the people as a whole with respect to demographic characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, and class. A number of recent studies suggest that the descriptive representation of underprivileged social groups promotes their political interests in the policy output of the political system (“substantive representation”) – not only in terms of formal group rights, but also with regard to redistribution and public goods provision (Carnes and Lupu 2015; Pande 2003; Preuhs 2006; Reingold and Smith 2012). Furthermore, the representation of ethnic groups in state institutions indicates their status and power in society more generally (Horowitz 1985, 185-228; Mansbridge 1999, 648-50). Additionally, as Mansbridge (1999, 650-2) argues, the political inclusion of historically marginalized groups may increase the legitimacy of the political system. Thus, in view of Latin America’s history of ethnic discrimination, the question of whether indigenous movements have been able to promote the political inclusion of indigenous groups in state institutions takes on paramount importance.

Studies of the determinants of ethnic inclusion generally focus on legal measures, such as ethnic quotas for minorities (e.g., Htun 2004) or electoral politics, e.g., the electoral system and the impact of ethnic parties (e.g., Lijphart 2004; Norris 2008; Spirova and Stefanova 2012). However, the effect – and indeed the very enactment – of electoral and other legal provisions targeting specific ethnic groups very much depends on whether these groups have established themselves as recognized political actors in the first place. Also, while ethnic parties may enable ethnic group representatives to take up legislative and/or executive positions, high intergroup socioeconomic inequalities often bias the electoral process against the poorer groups. Under these conditions, ethnic parties resemble “carrier[s] of a challenge to the political system” (Gamson 1975, 14), thus exercising functions similar to those of social movement organizations. Accordingly, I argue that in societies with a history of ethnic discrimination, as typically found in Latin America, social movements are a key driver of ethnic inclusion.
Ethnic Mobilization and the Political Inclusion of Marginalized Groups

The political inclusion of any social group in the polity hinges on its ability to present itself to the ruling elite as a relevant electoral bloc or as capable of disrupting the normal functioning of the political system (Gamson 1975). I argue that the social pressure produced by a strong indigenous movement demonstrates the political significance of the indigenous constituency to the government and leading political parties, and thus makes the inclusion of indigenous representatives in formal leadership positions more likely. For instance, national and regional governments may feel persuaded to appoint indigenous representatives to stave off social protest. Similarly, traditional political parties may include indigenous leaders, either at the national level or in specific regions, in order to appeal to this mobilized constituency and thus improve their own electoral success (Madrid 2005, 167). Yet, as illustrated in Figure 1, this effect results from a sequence of two related processes of collective action which, borrowing from O'Donnell (1986, 251-2), we could call “horizontal voice” and “vertical voice.” While the former refers to the movement-internal construction of a collective political identity and agenda, vertical voice is what emerges from the contentious actions directed at the ruling elite. The effectiveness of this vertical voice is not only a function of the preceding process of horizontal voice, but also hinges on the general responsiveness of the political system.

Figure 1 shows that a movement’s contentious actions form the core of what is referred to here as indigenous mobilization. Using both disruptive (e.g., protest) and “insider” tactics, such as lobbying and negotiation with the state, the movement transmits the group’s demands to the ruling elite. Strong organizations make these actions possible by providing the necessary resources (labor, money, leadership, etc.) (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1216-20; Minkoff 1997, 780-82). By establishing an institutional link between group members, indigenous organizations are able to stage large-scale popular protests. Moreover, by aggregating the interests of the individual group members, they can effectively lobby the relevant state institutions and other political parties (Skocpol, Abend-Wein, Howard, and Goodrich 1993, 689-91; Tilly 2004, 139).
However, as Figure 1 suggests, successful contentious actions depend not only on the existence of strong organizations, but also on their degree of unity. The latter results from the movement-internal processes of horizontal voice, i.e., the strategic coordination processes through which a common political agenda is negotiated within the movement, namely the “ideal and/or material interests, the pursuit of which supposedly will guide [its] collective action” (O'Donnell 1986, 251). For instance, the integration of a movement’s different components into a unifying organizational structure that orchestrates the movement’s actions can be considered an outcome of effective horizontal voice. Hence, horizontal voice is a prerequisite for a strong vertical voice (O'Donnell 1986, 251-2).

In contrast, if horizontal voice is weak or fails to develop, multiple factions that pretend or claim to lead the movement are likely to emerge. A faction is defined here as an identifiable segment of the movement that unites various organizations within it and pursues a particular political agenda. In the case of factionalism, supporters are likely to be divided in their loyalty or become alienated (Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992, 383-4). Moreover, the different factions will find it difficult to achieve consensus on key substantive issues (Vogt 2015, 37-9). Finally, factionalism also increases inter-organizational competition over the available resources (money, labor from supporters, etc.) (Minkoff 1997, 782). As a result, organizations and their leaders become embroiled in struggles over leadership and legitimate group representation, diverting the movement from its...
original goals. Hence, whereas a movement’s organizational strength generally increases the social pressure it exerts on the governing elite, internal factionalism undermines its political strength. This results in the first two testable hypotheses:

H1: *The stronger the political mobilization of indigenous groups, the higher their chances of inclusion in executive state power.*

H2: *Movement-internal factionalism decreases the likelihood of indigenous inclusion in executive state power.*

Yet a movement’s vertical voice only prevails if the political system is generally responsive to the demands of new challengers. Two elements of the political opportunity structure are particularly crucial. First, the degree of democratic freedom – or, reversely, the ability and willingness of the elite to use repression – should strongly influence the political outcomes of contentious actions (see, e.g., Tilly 2004, 125-39; Yashar 2005, 46-9). A political system that rests upon democratic principles of accountability and free and fair elections can be expected to be more receptive to indigenous (and other social) organizations’ demands than authoritarian regimes. The suppression of Guatemala’s Maya movement during the military regimes and its strong protagonism after the country’s political opening clearly reflect these patterns. Moreover, democracies are assumed to be more sensitive to the political inclusion of minorities (Gurr 2000, 81-6). Thus, the effectiveness of indigenous movements strongly depends on the existence of democratic rights in the country.

Second, the strength of a social movement’s vertical voice increases when it forms alliances with the established elite (Tarrow 1998, 157-66). Because of its concern with social inequality, the Left has been more sensitive to the grievances of indigenous people than other political parties in Latin America and has more actively tried to promote their political inclusion (see, e.g., Becker 2011, 10-1, 50). In the case of Venezuela, for example, Van Cott (2001, 49) argues that the support of the leftist Chávez government was critical for indigenous people’s achievement of regional autonomy. Hence, an indigenous movement’s impact on political inclusion should also depend on the strength of leftist parties. Powerful leftist parties should amplify the influence of
an indigenous movement’s vertical voice by taking up the movement’s demands and supporting them from within the polity. These expectations lead to two additional hypotheses that partly qualify the basic hypothesis H1, emphasizing the conditionality of the effect of organizational strength:

H3: The mobilization of indigenous groups increases their chances of political inclusion only under conditions of democratic rule.

H4: The stronger leftist parties are in a country, the stronger the effect of indigenous mobilization.

Data and Statistical Estimation

The quantitative analysis builds on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-ETH) dataset, version 2.0 (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Constructed on the basis of an expert survey, EPR-ETH is a group-based dataset that lists the politically relevant ethnic groups of each country and records their access to state power over time.¹ An ethnic group is considered “politically relevant” if at least one political organization has claimed to represent its interests at the national level or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination (Cederman et al. 2010, 99). The present study focuses on all indigenous groups in all Latin American countries apart from the Caribbean Island states (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela). This results in a sample of 1,536 group years between 1946 and 2009. The extensive temporal coverage offered by the EPR-ETH dataset, including the decades before the most recent surge of indigenous mobilization in the region, is one of the key advantages of the study’s empirical approach. It allows us to draw reliable conclusions about the relationship between indigenous movements and political inclusion in Latin America.

¹ Version 2.0 of the EPR data covers the time period from 1946 to 2009 and can be accessed at http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data/other/epr-2.0.
Dependent Variable: Measuring Indigenous Political Inclusion in Latin America

The EPR-ETH dataset assesses ethnic groups’ political inclusion based on the positions of the political leaders representing these groups, focusing explicitly on executive power. Depending on the specific political context, this can be the presidency, the cabinet, the army command in military dictatorships, or the ruling party leadership. Version 2.0 of the dataset uses a roughly ordinal scale to measure the degree of political inclusion, composed of three main categories, depending on whether a group i) controls power alone (group status of monopoly or dominant); ii) shares power with other ethnic groups (either as senior or junior partner); or iii) is excluded from executive state power (group status of regional autonomy, powerless, or discriminated).

Groups falling into one of the first two main categories can be regarded as politically included in distinction to the excluded groups in the third main category. Among the excluded groups, the category of “regional autonomy” identifies those groups that are politically included at the sub-state level, as opposed to those that are powerless at both the national and sub-state levels. The sub-state level is defined as a regional administrative level, such as, for example, the departmental, provincial, or district level, but above the local administrative level.

Because indigenous movements in Latin America have attempted to gain both equal access to national political power and regional autonomy, it is important to analyze their impact on indigenous inclusion at both levels of state power. Thus, for the purposes of this study, I constructed an inclusion dummy variable that is coded as 1 if an indigenous group was either included in the central government or enjoyed regional autonomy in a given year. Thus, the dependent variable combines the EPR-ETH power statuses of monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner, and regional autonomy into a single category, in distinction to groups coded as powerless or discriminated. Overall, about 17% of all group years are characterized by political inclusion at either the national or sub-state level. Table 1 lists all such instances.

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2 See Appendix I in the supplementary material for precise definitions of the individual power status categories used in EPR-ETH.

3 Note that it is not possible to analyze the achievement of political inclusion at the national and sub-state levels separately because instances of the former are still very rare (and have only occurred in Bolivia), and always happened after the achievement of inclusion at the sub-state level (see Table 1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Level of inclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Kuna</td>
<td>1938-2009(^1)</td>
<td>Sub-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>1980-1992(^2)</td>
<td>Sub-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td>1980-1992(^2)</td>
<td>Sub-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples of the Amazon</td>
<td>1980-1992(^2)</td>
<td>Sub-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Choco (Embera-Wounan)</td>
<td>1983-2009</td>
<td>Sub-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
<td>1992-2009</td>
<td>Sub-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Ngobe-Bugle</td>
<td>1997-2009</td>
<td>Sub-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>Sub-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>Sub-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>2002-2009</td>
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<td>Sub-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Indigenous peoples of the Amazon</td>
<td>2002-2009</td>
<td>Sub-state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Indigenous inclusion coding according to the EPR-ETH dataset, version 2.0. Inclusion refers to both executive power at the level of the central state and to “regional autonomy.” The “regional autonomy” coding in EPR-ETH implies that the group exerts executive political control at the sub-state level, defined as a regional administrative level, such as, for example, the departmental, provincial, or district level, but above the local administrative level.

1) The Kuna group in Panama gained autonomy in 1938. Yet, since the EPR-ETH dataset covers the period from 1946-2009, in the quantitative analyses the group is coded as having regional autonomy from 1946 on.

2) The EPR-ETH dataset, version 2.0, indicates 1991 as the end year of this first period of autonomy of indigenous groups in Peru. This “period break” corresponds to President Fujimori’s auto-coup in April 1992 that resulted in the suspension of the constitution and a concentration of power in the hands of the country’s president. However, according to the coding rules of the EPR dataset, the coding of each year should always reflect the situation on January 1st of that year, which means that the consequences of the auto-coup should not be reflected in the EPR coding until 1993. Hence, I manually corrected the end date of this first period of indigenous inclusion to 1992, instead of 1991.
Indigenous Movement Organizations

To test its theoretical arguments, this study introduces the first cross-sectional time-series dataset on ethnic civil society in Latin America. The dataset covers all of the above-mentioned states from 1946 to 2009 and includes a large number of indigenous organizations in each of these countries along with information about the group(s) each organization represents and its founding year (and year of dissolution if applicable). Ethnic civil society organizations are defined here as non-governmental organizations that are mainly composed of members of specific ethnic groups and whose explicit and main purpose is to promote the political interests of these groups. Importantly, this is not a complete count of all existing ethnic organizations in the region but a sample compiled on the basis of various sources. In order to avoid systematic biases in the covering of the different countries, I relied on a number of cross-sectional sources. Based on the founding and dissolution years of the organizations, I constructed a count variable that indicates the number of civil society organizations representing a given indigenous group in each group year. I then divided this number by the population of the group’s country, which results in an ethnic civil society density variable (henceforth called ECS), denoting the number of organizations relative to the population size. This procedure is based on the reasoning that a collective of ten organizations, for example, should constitute a stronger social force in a small country of, say, four million people than in a country of forty million inhabitants. Table 2 lists

4 The following sources were consulted: the MAR dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009); the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (Minority Rights Group International 2007); Van Cott (2005); Yashar (2005); qualitative information from the EPR-ETH dataset; the Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas (2006); and the Civil Society Registry of the Organization of American States (OAS) (2015).

5 Note that an organization may also represent two or more groups simultaneously. In this case, the organization was attributed to all groups.

6 Time-variant data on countries’ population sizes were taken from the Penn World Table, version 7.0 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011). I used the logged population size to calculate the density indicator in order to avoid extreme values caused by very small or very large countries.

7 See, for example, Skocpol et al. (1993) and Soule and Olzak (2004), who relied on the same strategy to measure the organizational strength of women’s movements. An alternative option
the ten indigenous groups with the highest average ECS values in the covered time period. We can see that the pattern corresponds very much to the findings in the qualitative literature (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005), lending high empirical validity to the indicator.

Table 2: Indigenous groups with the highest average ECS values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Avg. ECS value, 1946-2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous peoples of the Amazon, Peru</td>
<td>0.736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous peoples, Ecuador</td>
<td>0.535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous peoples, Mexico</td>
<td>0.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maya, Guatemala</td>
<td>0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapuche, Chile</td>
<td>0.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous peoples, Colombia</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous peoples, Brazil</td>
<td>0.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuna, Panama</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous peoples, Honduras</td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guaraní and other eastern indigenous groups, Bolivia</td>
<td>0.191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Listed are the ten indigenous groups in Latin America with the highest average civil society mobilization values from 1946 to 2009, according to the ECS variable.

Collective action in civil society usually requires considerable time to build up political strength and even more to gain influence in the spheres of power. To capture this potential long-term ef-

would be to use an indicator of protest. The most comprehensive data on ethnic group protests are provided by the MAR dataset (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). However, they only cover the period from 1985 to 2006. Moreover, one important part of the theoretical argument advanced in this study refers explicitly to the movement-internal coordination processes that lead to the emergence of contentious actions in the first place. Thus, the use of a protest measure would skip this fundamental part of the argument. It is important to note, however, that the ECS indicator correlates significantly with MAR’s protest variable at the country level ($r=0.29; p=0.000; N=352$; see Appendix VI in the supplementary material).
fect, the quantitative analysis below relies on an “historical average” version of the ECS variable, which records for each group year the mean value of all preceding years.

In addition, the quantitative analyses below include a variable of the existence of ethnic parties that represent the interests of indigenous groups. To identify ethnic parties in Latin America, I largely followed Van Cott (2005). According to her definition, ethnic parties are “organization[s] authorized to compete in elections, the majority of whose leaders and members identify themselves as belonging to a nondominant ethnic group, and whose electoral platform includes among its central demands programs of an ethnic or cultural nature” (Van Cott 2005, 3). Based on Van Cott and my own research, I created a dummy variable for each group year, indicating whether an indigenous group had an active ethnic party. By “active” I mean those parties which participated in the most current legislative election at the national level and won any number of votes above 0.

**Movement-internal Factionalism**

Hypothesis H2 suggests a negative effect of internal factionalism – defined as the existence of distinct movement segments that pursue particular political agendas – on the strength of indigenous movements’ vertical voice. I proxy the number of different factions within a given indigenous movement by the number of national umbrella organizations that exist within the movement. I define a “national umbrella organization” as a supra-organization within an indigenous movement that integrates various existing organizations and claims to represent them at the national level. For example, the Consejo Nacional Indio de Venezuela (CONIVE) and the Consejo Coordinador Nacional Indígena del Salvador (CCNIS) unify Venezuela’s and El Salvador’s indigenous organizations, respectively, and attempt to represent them vis-à-vis their national

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8 I did not count ethnic parties as such national umbrella organizations because their strategic focus on the electoral process can be seen as a form of “division of labor” within the movement, rather than factionalism. Moreover, the existence of ethnic parties is captured by a separate ethnic party dummy variable. Sub-national umbrella organizations that integrate existing organizations in geographically delimited areas were also excluded because they do not constitute national-level factions of the movement.
governments. In contrast, the Instituto para el Rescate Ancestral Indigena Salvadoreño (RAIS) in El Salvador and the Defensoría Maya in Guatemala are examples of individual organizations that do not unite different existing organizations.

To measure movement-internal factionalism, I first identified the national umbrella organizations of each indigenous group based on my dataset of ethnic civil society organizations. Overall, thirty-three (14%) of the 233 indigenous civil society organizations included in the dataset qualify as national umbrella organizations according to the above definition. I then constructed a count variable indicating the number of national umbrella organizations that existed for a given indigenous group in a given year. The number ranges from 0 (which is also the modal value of all group years) to a maximum of 5. As previously argued, a single national umbrella organization can be considered a sign of effective horizontal voice and may increase the movement’s political strength, whereas multiple such organizations are an indicator of movement-internal factionalism, which undermines its effectiveness. Following this expectation of a curvilinear relationship (in the form of an inverted U-shaped curve), the quantitative models below include the count variable plus a quadratic version of it.

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**Democracy and the Strength of Leftist Parties**

Hypotheses H3 and H4 suggest that the effect of indigenous mobilization on political inclusion depends on the level of democracy and the strength of leftist parties. The degree of democratic freedom is measured here with the Polity index by Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1989), which has the advantage of covering the entire time period of this study. I proxy the strength of leftist parties with a measure of the proportion of seats of all left and center-left parties in the lower chamber of parliament in a given country year, taken from Huber, Stephens, Mustillo, and Pribble (2012). To examine the postulated conditional effects, I constructed interaction variables by

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9 Appendix VII in the supplementary material shows a jittered scatter plot of the ECS density indicator and the number of national umbrella organizations, revealing that the latter varies considerably at most values of the ECS variable.

10 I calculated the sum of the seat shares of all parties coded as secular left, secular center-left, Christian left, and Christian center-left in each country year. Note that alternative
multiplying the ECS variable introduced above with the Polity index and the seat share variable, respectively.

**Control Variables**

The statistical models control for several group and country-level factors that may affect the political inclusion of indigenous groups. The most important is the relative size of the mobilizing groups (as a share of the country’s total population). Larger groups possess a greater number of (potential) followers, which might increase their political leverage. On the other hand, smaller groups may be perceived as less of a threat by the white/mestizo elite, who may thus be more willing to grant them political concessions. The variable of relative group size was taken from the EPR-ETH dataset.

At the country level, economic development is a relevant factor because a strong economy provides the state with more material resources to enact political reforms, such as decentralization, which may increase indigenous groups’ chances of political inclusion at the sub-state level. Thus, I control for states’ GDP per capita as recorded in the Penn World Table, version 7.0 (Heston et al. 2011). Moreover, I use a calendar year variable to capture the general political and economic developments at the regional and global levels that may influence the likelihood of indigenous inclusion in Latin America. Descriptive statistics of all independent variables can be found in Appendix II in the supplementary material.

**Statistical Estimation**

The quantitative analysis below makes use of Markov transition regressions, which are commonly employed to model processes of regime change (see, e.g., Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O’Halloran 2006). The data on indigenous political inclusion used in this article contain only very few instances of “backward” transitions: once inclusion is attained, it is seldom
lost again.\footnote{The only such instances of “backward” transitions occurred in Peru in 1993, affecting the Aymara, Quechua, and Amazonian indigenous peoples (see Table 1).} Therefore, the analysis relies on logit regression models that focus exclusively on the attainment of political inclusion, using the inclusion dummy introduced above as a dependent variable and estimating the probability of a transition toward inclusion at time $t$ if a group was not included in executive positions of power at time $t-1$.\footnote{Hence, these models restrict the sample to those observations in which a given indigenous group was not included in executive state power at time $t-1$, reducing the number of observations to 1,143.} In all models, the unit of analysis is the group year, and the standard errors are clustered on the countries to control for unobserved factors at the state level. Following Carter and Signorino (2010), Model A4 in Appendix IV in the supplementary material also accounts for temporal dependence by including a cubic polynomial of the years a given indigenous group has not been included as an additional regressor.

Although it would allow me to model both the attainment and preservation of political inclusion, I refrain from using dynamic logit models. These models cannot accommodate all control variables because the number of variables resulting from the interaction of all independent variables with the lagged dependent variable is too high to calculate the Wald chi-square statistic with country clusters. Moreover, in the cases of the national umbrella organization and ethnic party dummy variables, the interaction with the lagged dependent variable is not practicable because a positive value of these interaction terms perfectly predicts a positive value of the dependent variable, leading to the loss of the corresponding observations.\footnote{Nevertheless, Appendix III in the supplementary material provides the results of a dynamic logit model with two of the three control variables, omitting the umbrella organizations and ethnic party interaction terms. These results show that the effects of the main explanatory variables are robust to the model selection.}
Quantitative Analysis: Ethnic Mobilization and Indigenous Political Inclusion in Latin America

Table 3 presents the results of the regression models. Because the level of democracy and the electoral strength of leftist parties are highly correlated (r=0.53; p=0.000), I refrain from including them jointly in the same model. Thus, Model 1 includes the Polity index, whereas Model 2 uses the indicator of the electoral strength of leftist parties. Both models provide preliminary evidence for the basic hypothesis H1, which expects a positive effect of indigenous groups’ mobilization strength on the likelihood of political inclusion. The coefficient of the ECS variable is positive and statistically significant. The substantive effect of ethnic civil society organizations is rather impressive. The likelihood of attaining political inclusion in any given country year increases by almost 10% when moving from the mean to the maximum value of the ethnic civil society variable. The coefficient of the ethnic party dummy variable is also positive, as expected, but the effect is only statistically significant in Model 2. The substantive effect of the variable is similar to that of the ethnic civil society indicator. The presence of ethnic parties increases the chances of political inclusion by about 8%. Nevertheless, these results confirm that in societies with a history of ethnic discrimination, where profound intergroup socioeconomic inequality is likely to bias the electoral process against the poorer groups, as in Latin America, social movements are at least as important as political parties for achieving ethnic inclusion.

\[14\] This first difference was calculated based on Model 1 and with simulation methods using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). All other variables were held constant at their mean, median (Polity index, number of umbrella organizations), or mode (ethnic party dummy).

\[15\] Based on Model 2. Again, all other variables were held constant at their mean or median.
Table 3: Markov transition models (logit regressions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<td>Ethnic party dummy (lagged)</td>
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<td>2.96*</td>
<td>2.57</td>
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<td>(1.33)</td>
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<td>5.07***</td>
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<td>-55.97***</td>
<td>-56.01***</td>
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</table>

Robust standard errors, with clustering on countries, in parentheses.

*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001.

The count variable of national umbrella organizations and its quadratic version are jointly significant in both Models 1 and 2 (p=0.000). In order to interpret this result, Figure 2 plots the predicted probabilities of attaining political inclusion at the maximum level of the ECS indicator, as a function of the number of national umbrella organizations, based on Model 2. The figure clearly reveals a curvilinear relationship between the two variables that is in line with the theoretical argument. The chances of attaining political inclusion are highest in the presence of one single national umbrella organization and decrease significantly with the formation of additional such
organizations. This provides strong support for hypothesis H2, emphasizing the negative effect of movement-internal factionalism on indigenous groups’ chances of being included in executive positions of power. Venezuela’s CONIVE organization provides a clear example of the positive impact of a unified national structure, while the case of Bolivia demonstrates that indigenous movements with no overarching national organization are often more effective than those with multiple such organizations. In terms of the theory advanced in this study, this result confirms the importance of horizontal voice through which a common political agenda is negotiated within indigenous movements. The existence of a variety of different factions that pretend or claim to lead the movement, resulting from weak or even lacking horizontal voice, prevents the emergence of a strong vertical voice.

**Figure 2: The effect of factionalism on the likelihood of political inclusion**

![Graph showing the effect of factionalism on political inclusion](image)

*Notes: Based on Model 2 and calculated with simulation methods using Clarify (King et al. 2000). Predicted probabilities of attaining political inclusion as a function of the number of national umbrella organizations within an indigenous movement. ECS indicator held constant at maximum level, all other variables at their mean or mode.*
With respect to the political opportunity structure, neither the level of democracy nor the availability of allies from strong leftist parties seem to have a significant effect on the likelihood of attaining political inclusion. The coefficient of the democracy variable is positive but statistically insignificant. In the case of the leftist party variable, the sign of the coefficient even points in the opposite direction. However, hypotheses H3 and H4 propose a modifying effect of both the level of democracy and strong leftist parties, suggesting that these two variables should condition the influence of ethnic civil society mobilization. Hence, Models 3 and 4 include interaction terms of the democracy and leftist party variables with the ECS variable.

Model 3 focuses on the effect of ethnic civil society mobilization as a function of the level of democracy. The results in Table 3 are in line with the assumption of conditionality proposed in hypothesis H3. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and the ECS variable and the interaction term are jointly significant ($p=0.000$). Figure 3 displays the effect of the ECS variable conditional on the level of democracy by plotting the changes in the predicted probabilities of attaining political inclusion when moving the ECS value from the 25th to the 75th percentile at each value of the Polity index. It reveals that the effect of the ECS variable only becomes positive at medium values of the Polity index and statistically significant at a Polity value of about 3. The histogram of the Polity variable integrated in the figure indicates that both sides of the spectrum contain a considerable number of observations. This result lends support to hypothesis H3, suggesting that the effect of indigenous groups’ political mobilization on their political inclusion crucially depends on the level of democracy. In other words, the movements’ vertical voice only prevails if the political system is generally responsive to the demands of new political challengers. This is very much in line with the arguments of many social movement scholars (see, e.g., Tilly 2004, 125-39).
Figure 3: The effect of civil society mobilization on political inclusion, conditional on democracy

Notes: Based on Model 3 and calculated with simulation methods using Clarify (King et al. 2000). The solid line shows the first differences in the predicted probabilities of attaining political inclusion when moving the ECS value from the 25th to the 75th percentile at each value of the Polity index. Ethnic party dummy variable held constant at 1, all other variables at their mean or median. The black bars show the distribution of the Polity variable in the sample.

Focusing on the hypothesized modifying effect of leftist parties, the ECS variable and the indicator of the seat share of these parties are interacted in Model 4. Figure 4 again displays the effect of the ECS variable conditional on the modifying variable by plotting the changes in the predicted probabilities of attaining political inclusion when moving the ECS value from the 25th to the 75th percentile at each indicated value of the seat share indicator. However, in this case, the results do not support the notion of a conditional effect as suggested by hypothesis H4. The predicted mean changes are consistently positive, independent of the values of the leftist party variable, although the effect is statistically insignificant for very low and high values of the variable. This means that strong political mobilization generally increases indigenous groups’ chances of being included independent of the strength of leftist parties in the country. In fact, as Van Cott (2005, 37) argues, in some countries ethnic movements have actually benefited from the political space opened up by dwindling leftist parties.
Figure 4: The effect of civil society mobilization on political inclusion, conditional on the strength of leftist parties

Notes: Based on Model 4 and calculated with simulation methods using Clarify (King et al. 2000). The solid line shows the first differences in the predicted probabilities of attaining political inclusion when moving the ECS value from the 25th to the 75th percentile at each indicated value of the leftist party variable. Ethnic party dummy variable held constant at 1, all other variables at their mean or median. The black bars show the distribution of the leftist party variable in the sample.

All other variables behave as they did in Models 1 and 2. None of the three control variables exerts a significant effect on the likelihood of political inclusion of indigenous groups. Although the sign of the coefficient is consistently positive, this observation also applies to the group size variable. While large indigenous groups might be more likely to achieve national-level inclusion, as in Bolivia, Table 1 shows that in almost all instances, indigenous inclusion in executive positions of power has been limited to the sub-state level. This is often the result of regional autonomy regimes, as in Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela. Such autonomy tends to favor small indigenous groups, while large groups face more resistance by state elites as they usually inhabit a much larger territory.
Appendix IV in the supplementary material presents additional regression models demonstrating that these results are robust to alternative model selections and measurement strategies, as well as alternative codings of the dependent variable. First, Model A2 replaces the historical average version of the ECS variable with a simple one-year lag of the variable. Second, Model A3 reexamines the role of movement-internal factionalism, checking whether this curvilinear relationship is specific to the number of national umbrella organizations or whether it also applies to ethnic civil society mobilization in general. To this end, it replaces the ECS density measure by a simple count variable of ethnic civil society organizations representing a given ethnic group, as well as its quadratic version. While the two variables are jointly significant ($p=0.000$), the signs of the coefficients suggest an exponentially increasing effect of the number of ethnic civil society organizations in general. Thus, the curvilinear effect is specific to the number of movement factions measured by the number of national umbrella organizations. Third, Model A4 accounts for temporal dependence by including a cubic polynomial of the years a given indigenous group has not been included as an additional regressor, instead of the calendar year variable (Carter and Signorino 2010). This generally makes the effects of the main explanatory variables stronger and/or statistically more significant.

Model A5 tests the robustness of the results to changes in the coding of the dependent variable in ambiguous cases. Version 2.0 of the EPR data used in this article deviates from the most current EPR 2014 version (Vogt, Bormann, Rüegger, Cederman, Hunziker, and Girardin 2015) in a few cases. Most importantly, the most current version combines the Aymara and Quechua groups in Peru to one single politically relevant group called “Indigenous peoples of the Andes” and codes this group as having regional autonomy only from 2003 on. Moreover, the Aymara group in Bolivia is coded as politically included at the national level between 1993 and 1997. Thus, Model A5 replicates Model 1 of Table 3, adopting the codings of EPR 2014 in these ambiguous cases.16 Again, this makes the effects of the main explanatory variables stronger and/or statistically more significant.

Finally, addressing potential concerns of endogeneity in the relationship between mobilization and political inclusion, Appendix V analyzes whether inclusion stimulates indigenous mobiliza-

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16 See Appendix IV for a summary of all changes adopted from EPR 2014 for the robustness test in Model A5.
tion. I rely on both a linear regression model (Model A6) and a Tobit model with a lower limit at zero (Model A7), with the ECS density indicator as the dependent variable and the lagged inclusion dummy as an independent variable. The results of both Models A6 and A7 reject the notion of reverse causality. Political inclusion at time $t-1$ does not increase the strength of mobilization at time $t$. In summary, the quantitative analysis provides two main results. First, organizationally strong ethnic movements promote the political inclusion of indigenous people in executive state power under conditions of democratic freedom. Second, the chances of inclusion decrease as movement-internal factionalism increases.

**Case Study: Organizational Strength, Factionalism, and the Rise and Decline of Ecuador’s Indigenous Movement**

Ecuador constitutes a particularly fruitful case to shed light on the causal mechanisms underlying the statistical relationships as it is home to Latin America’s strongest indigenous movement. At the same time, however, this movement’s organizations and leaders – and the country’s indigenous population – have experienced widely varying degrees of political inclusion and exclusion in the last decades. Moreover, as the scatter plot in Appendix VII of the supplementary material shows, the case also exhibits considerable variation in the two civil society mobilization measures over time. This allows us to examine within the context of a single case – in the form of a “longitudinal comparison” (Gerring 2007, 160-4) – how the different explanatory factors affect the likelihood of political inclusion. The case study is partly based on field research conducted in Ecuador between April and May 2013. I carried out thirty-one semi-structured interviews with leaders of indigenous organizations, state bureaucrats, political party leaders, parliamentarians, media representatives, and outside experts, using a detailed interview schedule adapted to each target group.17

Ecuador’s indigenous peoples can be divided into two main cultural groups. Highland peoples are generally Kichwa and form part of the larger Quechua ethnolinguistic group. The indigenous population in the eastern Amazonian lowlands is smaller and more fragmented, consisting of

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17 Because all interview partners were ensured anonymity, I refer to the “function” of an interviewee (e.g. “state bureaucrat,” “political party leader,” etc.) and the date of the interview.
about ten different language groups (for example, lowland Kichwa, Shuar, Achuar, etc.) (Becker 2011, 4; Lucero 2008, 10). Both regions have a history of independent indigenous mobilization. In the highlands, this mobilization started within a classist (or unionist) framework directed against the injustices of the feudal agricultural system (Gerlach 2003, 61; Lucero 2008, 96-9). The lowland groups can be considered pioneers of ethnic mobilization in Latin America, successfully linking ecological grievances to a discourse of ethnic group survival (Becker 2011, 6-7).

Due to property and literacy requirements, indigenous people were excluded from voting after the country’s independence (Becker 2011, 46-8; Gerlach 2003, 26, 30). With political power firmly in the hands of the wealthy landowners, for a long time Ecuador resembled a “patrician democracy” in which indigenous inclusion in the spheres of power was unthinkable. This situation is reflected in the EPR-ETH dataset where Ecuador’s indigenous people are coded as politically discriminated until 1979 (see Figure 5). The return to civilian rule in that year was accompanied by a new constitution that finally abolished the exclusionary literacy requirement (Becker 2011, 47). The politically organized indigenous population immediately took advantage of the political opening. Between 1979 and 1986, voter turnout among indigenous people rose from 19% to 45% (Van Cott 2005, 113). As a result, the first self-identifying indigenous parliamentarian was elected in 1984 (Becker 2011, 50-1). Hence, the case of Ecuador clearly illustrates how the political impact of indigenous mobilization at least partly depends on the existence of basic democratic rights.

Figure 5 graphs the strength of indigenous civil society mobilization in Ecuador according to the ECS indicator over time. These indigenous organizations, which have large numbers of followers in the countryside, were able to mount powerful protests and therefore gained considerable leverage in negotiations with the state. Moreover, the creation of the Pachakutik Movement for Plurinational Unity in 1995 as an indigenous electoral vehicle allowed the movement to introduce concrete demands to the Ecuadorian parliament.18 As a result, indigenous people in Ecuador obtained significant political gains during the 1990s and 2000s. Most importantly, as reflected in Figure 5, Pachakutik’s electoral success resulted in indigenous leaders attaining local and

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18 Interviews with indigenous leaders, 2013-4-11-II, 2013-4-23-I, 2013-4-23-II.
regional positions of executive power. In the 2000 elections, for instance, Pachakutik won five provincial prefectures and nineteen municipal governments (Becker 2011, 71).

Figure 5: Ethnic mobilization and the political status of the indigenous people in Ecuador

Both the successes and failures of indigenous mobilization in Ecuador highlight the importance of the movement-internal processes of horizontal voice. The 1986 formation of the national umbrella organization Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) served to integrate the movement’s different components into a unifying organizational structure. For a long time, CONAIE was the dominant indigenous institution in the country which determined the movement’s political agenda and orchestrated its collective action (Becker 2011; Lucero 2008; Selverston-Scher 2001).

However, indigenous mobilization in Ecuador also resulted in the establishment of two alternative national umbrella organizations: the Council of Indigenous Evangelical Peoples and Organizations of Ecuador (FEINE) and the National Confederation of Peasant, Indigenous and Black Organizations (FENOCIN). Although assuming a less prominent role than CONAIE, they inte-
grated various organizations and communities and came to represent distinct factions of the indigenous movement. FEINE, for instance, was founded by evangelical churches as a counter-weight to the leftist ideologies within the indigenous movement (Becker 2011, 17). The organization has often come into political competition with CONAIE, most fiercely when it continued to support Lucio Gutiérrez’ government after its collapsed alliance with Pachakutik and CONAIE in 2003 (Becker 2011, 91-4; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 95-9). FEINE also launched its own electoral vehicle, Amauta Jatari, though it never garnered much support and soon disappeared from the electoral list (Becker 2011, 78, 97; Lucero 2008, 170; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 69). Moreover, the dominant role of CONAIE as a recipient of state resources, for example in relation with the bilingual education program, caused resentment in the other national umbrella organizations and fuelled distribution battles within the movement. Thus, rivalries between these factions prevented further gains in indigenous inclusion at the national level of state power, despite the organizational strength of the movement and Ecuador’s large indigenous population.

Ecuador’s non-indigenous rulers, such as former presidents Abdalá Bucaram and Lucio Gutiérrez, have often successfully exploited these intra-movement divisions through strategies of clientelism and co-option (Becker 2011, 85-96; Lucero 2008, 179-82; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 92-6). The strongest backlash to indigenous mobilization in Ecuador occurred under the current government of Rafael Correa, who comes from a traditional leftist background. He has exploited existing factionalism within the indigenous movement by taking over specific organizations through the infiltration of government-allied elites. A prime example is the contentious change of leadership in FENOCIN, one of the three national umbrella organizations, in early 2013, in which renowned leaders like Pedro de la Cruz were replaced by more government-friendly “newcomers.” Furthermore, because Correa and others who are now in power know the indigenous movement very well from the inside, they were able to appropriate the discourse and (to a

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21 Interview with indigenous leader, 2013-4-15.
lesser extent) the agenda of the indigenous movement, thus depriving the latter of its main source of political appeal.\textsuperscript{22}

Hence, the case of Ecuador also reveals why a strong Left does not necessarily promote the political inclusion of indigenous people in Latin America. Even if leftist parties have historically been allies of indigenous movements, as in Ecuador (Becker 2011, 10, 50), they have their own political agenda. Once in power (or with the realistic chance of winning it), they may exploit indigenous mobilization for their own purposes. According to one observer of Ecuadorian politics, the coming into power of its traditional ally complicated matters for the indigenous movement, as the rightist, neoliberal governments of the past were much easier targets for mobilization.\textsuperscript{23} Therefore, as shown in the quantitative results above, indigenous groups’ autonomous ethno-political mobilization remains indispensable for achieving political inclusion.

### Conclusions

This study examined the effect of indigenous movements on the inclusion of indigenous groups in executive positions of state power in Latin America. I argued that, in societies with a history of ethnic discrimination, the social pressure produced by well-organized ethnic movements promotes the inclusion of representatives of marginalized groups in formal leadership positions. This effect stems from both movement-internal processes of horizontal voice and the vertical voice that transmits the group’s demands to the government and the leading political parties. While effective horizontal voice is a prerequisite of strong vertical voice (O'Donnell 1986, 252), the latter’s effectiveness also depends on the general responsiveness of the political system.

Indigenous groups with strong social movements are more likely to achieve inclusion in executive state power. However, movement-internal factionalism undermines the political effectiveness of indigenous mobilization. Proxying factionalism with the existence of multiple national umbrella organizations, the statistical analysis revealed a curvilinear relationship between the


\textsuperscript{23} Interview 2013-4-25.
number of such organizations and the likelihood of political inclusion. While the chances of attaining inclusion are highest in the case of a single national umbrella organization, the existence of multiple factions prevents the emergence of a strong vertical voice, and thus decreases the movement’s political effectiveness. Moreover, in line with the theoretical argument and much of the social movement literature (see, e.g., Tilly 2004, 125-39; Yashar 2005, 46-9), the effect of Latin America’s indigenous movements on political inclusion strongly depends on the existence of basic democratic rights.

On the other hand, the study did not find a systematic link between the electoral strength of potential allies from the Left and the political inclusion of indigenous groups. The political changes witnessed in the last two decades – most prominently Evo Morales’s rise to power in Bolivia – are thus the product of the autonomous mobilization of the historically marginalized indigenous groups. Although these gains in political inclusion do not mean the end of the region’s historical racial hierarchies, they constitute significant steps toward more equal societies. In this sense, the results of this study also inform the literature on democratization in Latin America (see Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Smith 2009). Specifically, they reveal how bottom-up social mobilization may enhance political equality.

Beyond the Latin American region, the study’s findings add to the research on ethnic inclusion (Htun 2004; Lijphart 2004; Norris 2008), which has mostly focused on legal and electoral variables. Because the effects – and indeed the very enactment – of electoral and other legal provisions targeting specific ethnic groups very much depend on whether these groups have established themselves as recognized political actors in the first place, ethnic social movements constitute a key driver of ethnic inclusion in societies with a history of ethnic discrimination.

Finally, most of the standard academic literature has emphasized the divisive, conflict-fueling force of ethnic organizations (Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006). This study, however, suggests that in such highly unequal societies as in Latin America, ethnic organizations may actually enhance democracy by empowering historically marginalized groups. The Civil Rights Movement in the United States helped to bring segregation in the South to an end. Civic mobilization by the African National Congress and other forces changed the Apartheid state of South Africa. It seems very possible that Latin America’s indigenous movements will
continue to bring about more ethnic equality in this region. This could mean a new political dawn for historically marginalized indigenous groups.
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