Introduction

As any user of LSJ will know, its method is to provide a diachronic history of the meanings of each lexeme by listing the attested usages from oldest to latest. This method, at core, has remained substantially unchanged throughout the nine editions of Liddell and Scott, and is adopted from Passow’s *Handwörterbuch der griechischen Sprache*, on which the first edition of Liddell and Scott was based. Passow’s *Handwörterbuch* itself was based on the earlier dictionary of Schneider, who also adopted such an approach. Unsurprisingly, this historical principle has not gone unchallenged over the past two centuries: words are not unanimously felt to have a discrete and finite set of meanings which are clearly distinguishable from one another. Theoretical and historical aspects of this problem are discussed in other chapters of this book; the present chapter presents a case study of the Lexicon’s treatment of a single author, Hesiod. Early Greek poetry in general, and Hesiod in particular (at least as we now think of them), present certain difficulties for the historical approach which do not arise for texts of later periods. The main body of this chapter will be divided into three sections that treat different respects in which LSJ, and the historical principle it adopts, may seem problematic for the modern reader of Hesiod. The first shall consider some ways in which LSJ conflicts with current beliefs concerning text and dating of Hesiod. The second section shall outline some respects in which the historical principle may be inadequate for dealing with early Greek hexameter in general, given more recent scholarship on the nature and semantics of formulaic verse. The third shall treat more idiosyncratic features of Hesiod’s poetry that are particularly noteworthy for the lexicographer.

Throughout, the main focus will be on the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*, but reference will also be made to the fragments, especially those of the *Catalogue of Women*, which, of the other works attributed to Hesiod, has the strongest claim to authenticity. I shall investigate the treatment of particularly problematic lexemes in LSJ and earlier editions of the lexicon. The in-progress *Diccionario Griego-Español* and the recently recently completed *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* (LfgrE) will provide further comparanda for LSJ’s approach. It is hoped that this analysis will be of value both for the historical question of why LSJ treats Hesiod in the way that it does, and for the broader question of how any future edition might best serve the needs of students and researchers of the sage of Ascra.

1. LSJ and the modern history of Hesiodic Vocabulary

In the preface to the first edition, Liddell and Scott planned ‘to make each Article a History of the usage of the word referred to’. There are certain obvious respects in which LSJ’s ‘history’

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1 Hesiodic fragment numbers are taken from Solmsen et al. 1990.
3 See, with regard to LSJ, Clarke 2010, and on lexicography in general, Kilgarriff 1997. For specific criticism of Liddell and Scott see especially Chadwick 1996 pp.3-28 and Glare 1997.
4 See, most recently on this, Janko 2012.
5 Preface p.vii.
of each word seems incomplete, or conflicts with modern views about the chronology and text of Hesiod.

(a) Hesiodic Citations

LSJ does not cite every word Hesiod uses, and is especially unlikely to cite a Hesiodic word if it has already been used by Homer. This is in accordance with the method made explicit in the preface to the first edition, according to which, Liddell and Scott were satisfied to ‘give first the earliest authority for [each word’s use]. Then, if no change was introduced by later writers, to leave it with that general authority alone, –adding, however, whether it continued in general use or not.’ However, as Hesiod is one of the earliest and most influential Greek authors, we might want a lexicon to cite his usage, especially for particularly rare words, even if it does not differ substantially from that of Homer. For instance, κερτομέω occurs in both Homer and Hesiod (Th. 545) but is relatively rare in later Greek; a reader of LSJ’s entry for the verb, which lacks the Hesiodic citation, might mistakenly infer that the usage of the verb at (e.g.) A. Pr. 986 is specifically in imitation of Homer, rather than an appropriation of epic diction in general. LSJ’s occasional neglect of Hesiod may derive from a wider neglect of the poet in nineteenth century British scholarship. It is symptomatic of that trend that Gaisford’s text of the poet, used by the first eight editions of the lexicon, was from a collection entitled Poetae Minores Graecae (Oxford 1814, Leipzig 1823). The only other nineteenth century British edition of Hesiod, that of Paley (London 1861, revised 1883) describes that Hesiodic poems as ‘by a kind of common consent, or long established fashion, in this country at least, so little studied in modern times.’ This nineteenth-century British distaste for Hesiod may, then, still be felt in LSJ, in cases where Hesiodic citations are lacking. Of course, a dictionary of LSJ’s size and purpose could not list every attested citation for every lexeme. However, the neglect of Hesiod in particular means that LSJ cannot be relied upon to determine whether a word is unique to Homer in early Greek poetry, even if no other early references are supplied.

(b) Relative Chronology

LSJ follows the practice of all earlier editions of Liddell and Scott, and Passow, in citing the Hymns before him, as if they are earlier compositions (see, e.g., the entries for αἰμώλιος, βαρόκτυπος, and ῥοδόπηχυς.). Yet this conflicts with the modern understanding of the relative chronology of early Greek hexameter poetry, whereby Hesiod is usually considered to be later than the Iliad and Odyssey, and earlier than the Homeric Hymns. The linguistic evidence shows that certain archaic features decrease, whilst neologisms increase, from Homer, to Hesiod, and then the Homeric Hymns (with the exception of the Hymn to Aphrodite, which

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6 E.g. κρήνη (Th. 3, 6; Op. 595, 736a, 758; fr. 188A.2, 380.1); ἵππης (Th. 574) and κερτομέω (Th. 545).
7 Preface p.viii.
8 Contrast the seven nineteenth century German editions listed in the bibliography of West (1966).
9 Paley 1883 p.v, who also remarks of the Theogony that ‘it is certainly a dull poem’ (p. vi).
10 On the relative chronology of early Greek epic, see the collection Andersen and Haug 2012.
may be older than Hesiod). The archaisms can now be identified as such with greater confidence since the decipherment of Linear B, as certain features—such as observation of the digamma, genitive singulars ending in −αω (first declension) and −ωο (second declension), and genitive plurals in −αων (first declension)—have been shown to go back to the Mycenean period. The LfgrE, accordingly, treats Hesiod as earlier than the Hymns. Indeed, even in the nineteenth century, the Hymns in general seem to have been thought to be later than Hesiod, as Wolf’s still influential theory that they were later rhapsodic compositions, designed as proems to longer epic performances, gained influence. Liddell and Scott may have maintained this order for the sake of convenience, or it may be a product of the influence of Passow. In any case, we might want future editions of the lexicon to list Hesiodic citations before those of the Hymns, if the historical principle is maintained.

However, the relative chronology of early Greek hexameter is highly controversial. The linguistic method for dating the poems has been challenged: the data may be explained by differences in space or genre rather than time; a poet in his seventies may compose a poem at the same time as a poet in his twenties, but still use more archaic features. Martin West has famously argued that Hesiod is to be dated earlier than the Iliad and Odyssey, on the basis of the ancient tradition and apparent influences of the former on the latter (although few have agreed with him). No chronological ordering of early hexameter is likely to be universally accepted. In light of this uncertainty, it might seem preferable, as far as early hexameter is concerned, to abandon such a strict chronological ordering. We might, for instance, prefer to order the citations according to how close they seem to an all-encompassing prototypical sense of the word. Alternatively, the citations could be ordered according to context in syntax and discourse before date, as we find in the LfgrE.

(c) The Text of Hesiod

A further, obvious respect in which the historical picture presented by LSJ differs from more recent attitudes is in the very texts it cites. LSJ cites Rzach’s edition of 1913. Since then, the most significant developments in our understanding of the text of Hesiod have been various

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11 As demonstrated by Janko 1982; updated in Janko 2012. The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite is generally accepted as being the oldest of the Homeric Hymns. Janko 2012 p. 21 suggests it may be close in date to Homer. For further discussion see Faulkner 2008 pp. 47-50 and Olson 2012 pp. 10-15.
12 The DGE is inconsistent in its relative chronology of Hesiod and the Hymns: for aιμάλιος it cites hMerc. 317 before Th. 890, despite the fact that the Hymn to Hermes has always been regarded as one of the latest of the Hymns (see Vergados 2012 pp. 130-153); whereas the entry for βαιρόκτοπος cites the Hesiodic examples (Op. 79, Th. 388, Sc. 318) before those of the Hymn to Demeter (3, 334, 441, 460).
13 Outlined in Wolf 1795, English translation Wolf 1986, of which see pp. 112-3 for discussion of the Hymns. This view accepted in the major editions of the Hymns by Ilgen 1796 and Hermann 1806. The first eight editions of Liddell and Scott use Wolf’s edition for the Homeric Hymns.
15 A view recently defended in West 2012.
16 See Clarke 2010.
17 For example, the LfgrE’s citations under κελεύω 1c1αα refer to sense ‘command, order, direct’ (1) addressed to human or divine subordinates (c), used with an infinitive (α), specifically directed towards ἐταῖρος (α). Of course, practical limitations may preclude a single-volume dictionary that aims to cover the entire corpus of ancient Greek, such as LSJ, from including such detailed information.
new papyrus discoveries, especially of the *Catalogue of Women*. These have modified our understanding of Hesiodic vocabulary in a number of respects. The papyri have produced two new lexemes: ἰσαίων (fr. 1.8 from P.Oxy. 2354, first published 1956, of which note is taken in the Supplements) and εὐσίγεθής (fr. 33a.32 from P.Oxy. 2481, first published 1962, of which note is taken in the Revised Supplement). Occasionally, we now find that Hesiod is the earliest attested author for a particular word. In some cases (ὥλοσόνη, fr. 37.15; σπαρνός, fr. 66.6; μίτρα for a woman’s girdle at fr. 1.4), note is taken in the Supplements. For others, however, the Supplements provide no new assistance (συνοπηδός, fr. 26.10; μαψίδος, fr. 10a.87; possibly ὠμοπάτριος, fr. 280.18 a fragment of doubtful authorship). An active form of στεφανόω is found at fr. 185.5, in spite of the fact that LSJ described the word as ‘used by Hom. and Hes. only in Pass.’, and no correction is made in the Supplements.

Of course, LSJ could not be faulted for failing to take account of papyri that were discovered later than 1940. However, in at least one instance, LSJ fails to cite Hesiod where, on the basis of the manuscript tradition, he is the earliest attested source for a lexeme. ἀπλαστός occurs at Th. 151 and Op. 148 in all modern editions of Hesiod (including Rzach) where it refers to the ‘Hundred-handers’ and the men of the age of bronze respectively; but Aristotle (*Mete.* 385a15) is the earliest citation for the lexeme supplied by LSJ, which translates the first sense of the adjective as *not capable of being moulded*. However, LSJ also describes the adjective as a ‘v.l. for ἀπλατός‘. The Revised Supplement adds the Hesiodic citations: ‘after “II” read “app. = ἀπλατός, (w. which it frequently coexists as a variant), Hes. Th. 151, Op. 148”’. The Supplement, then, accepts the validity of the variant adopted by modern editors, and treats it as an alternative form of ἀπλατός, a word meaning, ‘unapproachable, always with a notion of *terrible, monstrous*’ (LSJ s. v., related to πελάζω). However, as West points out, the translation, ‘unmoulded’ – in the sense *rudis, informis* – may be more appropriate for the Hesiodic examples, given that πλαστός means ‘shaped’ by a craftsman at Th. 513. If West is correct, LSJ and the Revised Supplement are simply wrong in treating Hesiod’s ἀπλαστός as interchangeable with ἀπλατός.

The possible mistranslation of ἀπλαστός may appear to be simply a failure to keep up to date with modern scholarship’s understanding of the adjective. However, the first edition of Liddell and Scott already entertains the possibility of West’s interpretation:

‘usu. taken as = ἀπλατός, monstrous, huge, v. l. Hes. Op. 147, Th.151, Soph. Fr. 350 : if in this signif. also it be not better referred to πλάσσω, shapeless, monstrous, like Lat. informis : cf. ἀπλατός, ἀπληστός’

In this case, the first edition actually gives a better idea of the problem posed by Hesiod’s text than LSJ. The extra clause, which poses the possibility that the adjective is related to πλάσσω, is included in the first six editions of the lexicon, but drops out in the seventh. As the lexicon developed across its various editions, lengthy explanations of the kind supplied for this entry in the first edition dropped out in favour of concise definitions, to create space for more, and

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18 For an overview of the contribution of Hesiodic papyri to our understanding of early hexameter language, see West 2008.
more detailed, citations. This seems to be especially the case for Homer and Hesiod, who were given particular prominence in the first edition, but who had to make way for later authors in subsequent editions. The reduction in the space given to Hesiodic entries, in this instance, has elided an alternative interpretation of a word which is now thought to be correct.

2. Lexicography and Early Greek Epic

Developments in scholarship, changes in the main editions used, and discovery of new evidence are all aspects which would eventually render any Greek lexicon out of date for any author. There are, however, certain problems more specific to this period and type of literature.

(a) Obscurity of Early Vocabulary

Because this is the earliest period of surviving Greek literature, there are many words of which the meaning is uncertain to us, and was already disputed by ancient commentators. Occasionally, LSJ gives an indication that this is the case (see e.g. s.v. ἄνοσαία). However, in other instances, LSJ misleadingly offers a confident definition without indicating that the meaning of the term was already uncertain in antiquity. An example of particular relevance to Hesiod is the epithet of men, ἀλφηστής. This term is given various contradictory definitions by the scholiasts. LSJ defines it confidently as ‘lit. earners (ἀλφάνο), i.e. enterprising men’, without indicating that the sense is uncertain. More recent scholars, including the author of the entry in the Revised Supplement, see the epithet as a compound consisting of ἄλφι-, ‘barley’ + *ed- ‘eat’ (cf. ὠμ-ῃστής), so that it means ‘barley’- or ‘bread-eating’. This sense is significant thematically within the Works and Days: men are by definition eaters of bread, therefore they must work the land to produce barley. It will be a hindrance to the student of the poem if she does not find that definition in the dictionary, and does not take the initiative to look in the Supplement. Liddell and Scott can hardly be blamed for not identifying a sense that would only find acceptance in the following century. But more importantly, the lexicon would be more useful if it mentioned that the word is of disputed meaning, as, for instance, the DGE does. Indeed, the entry for the term in the first edition of the lexicon (which itself is virtually a translation of Passow’s entry) supplies more information, as it makes explicit that the translation ‘inventive, reasoning’ derives from Eustathius. Again, a definition has been slimmed down to make way for more entries and citations; consequently, LSJ does not indicate that its definition is partly derived from a late authority, a detail which might suggest to the reader that the sense is questionable.

21 The preface to the first edition claims that ‘Passow indeed had done all that was necessary for Homer and Hesiod’ (p. vi) whilst Passow’s dictionary only covered Greek literature from Homer to Herodotus.
22 As reported in LfgrE s.v. A scholiast at Od. 1.349 defines it as (ἐφ)ευρέται, εὐρετικοὶ, ἐπιευρετικοὶ, whilst scholiast D at Il. 18.593 defines it as ἔντιμοι, βασιλεῖς. The epithet is also used at Aesch. Th. 770 and S. Ph. 709.
23 E.g. LfgrE and Beekes 2010 s.v.; West 1966 ad Th. 512; cf. Il. 6.142 βροτῶν οἱ ἀρωματοφυλακθόντες.
(b) Formulaic Language

In this last example, LSJ’s definition makes use of the context, in which the epithet and the verb it is supposedly derived from are used, in order to justify the sense it provides. However, this method may be problematic in the case of formulaic epithets, such as ἀλφηστής: Milman Parry famously placed emphasis on the ‘essential idea’ of formulas, given their deployment on the principle of ‘thrift’ or ‘economy’, that the epic language is generally free of formulas which, ‘having the same metrical value and expressing the same idea, could replace one another’. We might, therefore, prefer to see the formulaic phrase ἀνδράσιν ἀλφηστήσιν (Op. 82) as expressing merely the ‘essential idea’ of ‘men’, whilst the epithet fills out the expression so that it occupies space up to the third foot caesura. In that case, the context would be irrelevant for our understanding of the sense of ἀλφηστής in this formula. Recent commentators tend to take a more nuanced view of stock epithets, allowing that they can be deployed with relevance to particular contexts, but few would deny that a formulaic collocation such as ἀνέρες ἀλφησταί constitutes a distinct lexical unit. J. M. Foley, in one of many influential contributions to the oral-formulaic theory, even goes so far as to describe such expressions as ‘words’ which belong to a Homeric epic lexicon. Taken literally, this implies that formulas might be given their own entries in a dictionary of ancient Greek. Such a practice would add significantly to the weight of the dictionary. However, it might not be too much to want a dictionary to adopt explicitly a definition of a formula, and indicate the formulas in which lexemes are used accordingly. In most cases, LSJ does provide information which enables the user to infer that a word is used in a formula: we learn that ἀλφηστής is used in the Odyssey ‘in phrase ἀνέρες ἀλφησταί’ in Th. 941, Op. 614) or that πελώρη is one of Γαῖα (Th. 159, 173, 479 etc.).

A consistent approach to marking formulaic expressions may help the user to decipher obscurities which arise when formulaic expressions are adapted to new contexts. An example is the description of the snake that guards the golden apples at Th. 333-5:

Κητῶ δ’ ὀπλότατον Φόρκυι φιλότητι μιγείας
gεῖνατο δεινόν ὄφιν, ὃς ἐρεμινῆς κεύθεσι γαῖς
πείρασιν ἐν μεγάλοις παγχρύσεα μῆλα φυλάσσει.

Ceto mingled in love with Phorcys and gave birth to her youngest, a terrible snake, which, in the depths of the dark earth guards the all-golden apples in great limits.

26 See e.g. Nagy 1990 pp.18-35; Foley 1997; Graziosi and Haubold 2005.
28 The DGE, for instance, refers to ἀλφηστής as an epithet.
The relevance of the phrase ‘in great limits’ is unclear, and seems to jar with the context. West explains that we are to understand that the ‘limits’ are of the earth, as the expression seems to be an adaptation of μεγάλης ἐν πεῖρασι γαίης, ‘in the limits of the great earth’, which occurs later in the poem (Th. 622). For West, the omission of γαίης in 335 is made easier by its occurrence in the previous line. The expression πεῖρατα γαίης is conventional in Homer (Il. 14.200, 14.301; Od. 4.563, 9.284; cf. Il. 8.478-9). The poet, then, seems to have adapted a conventional expression, but omitted a significant detail in the process of adaptation, which would have made it more readily comprehensible. An audience familiar with epic diction may have had little trouble in supplying the detail. One problem that this poses for lexicography is whether to include, under πεῖρα, an expression such as ‘esp. of the Earth’ to aid the modern reader with the decipherment of this passage, or whether to supply the meaning ‘limit’ and leave it for the reader of Hesiod to work out the precise significance of the word in that passage. LSJ has, as the word’s first sense, end, limit, and quote part of a line (Il. 8.478) in which the expression πεῖρατα γαίης is used; however the first edition of the lexicon has the extra detail, after the start of the word, ‘poet. esp. Ep. for πέρας, an end, usu. in plur. πεῖρατα γαίης’. This is, essentially, a translation of the opening of Passow’s entry for the word. The entry for the earlier editions of Liddell and Scott, and for Passow, would actually be more helpful for deciphering this Hesiodic passage, as they make it more explicit that πεῖρατα is often used with γαίης in epic. The detail that in epic, the word is mostly used in the plural is included in the first eight editions of the lexicon, but drops out in LSJ. As we saw with ἄπλαστος and ἄλφηστής, extra information that would have been useful for deciphering particularly obscure usages of Hesiod has dropped out of the lexicon.

(c) Glosses

Oral composition (or written imitation of oral composition) seems to encourage the preservation of archaisms, as the artificial Kunstsprache retains forms and vocabulary that have dropped out of the vernacular. As a result, in some cases, Homer and Hesiod use words of which the meaning may already have been uncertain to them. Michael Silk has coined the term ‘iconym’ to deal with certain instances of this kind, where an obsolete word, that no longer carries a specific denotative meaning, is used for its sound or literary associations. An example he cites, used by Hesiod (Th. 611), is ἄλιαστος, which LSJ translate as not to be turned aside, unabating, and as derived from λιάζομαι (go aside, recoil, shrink from). Although Silk accepts the etymology, he argues that, semantically, ‘the word is clearly at some remove from its parent’, as in epic it is applied to battle (μάχη), the din of battle (ὅμαδος), wailing (γόος), and then, in Hesiod, to distress (ἀνίη). As a result, Silk converges with Erbse’s judgement that the word becomes ‘an empty epithet’. If Silk is correct, this may present a peculiar problem for lexicography: instead of supplying specific definitions, it may be more appropriate, with

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29 We sometimes receive information about the typical context of a word in Homer. E.g., for μαλερός we are told ‘in Hom. always epith. of fire’, a details which will help our interpretation of the word in later authors.
30 ‘poet. bes. Ep. st. πέρας, das Ende, das Aeusserste, die äusserste grenze, gew. in plur. πεῖρατα γαίης, πόντου, Ωκεανοῦ’
31 Silk 1983.
these sorts of lexemes, for the lexicographer to provide the etymology with citations of uses, and leave the reader to make up her own mind.  

A further possible example may be the epithet ὁμοῖος (Op. 182):

οὐδὲ πατήρ παίδεσιν ὁμοίος οὐδὲ τι παῖδες
οὐδὲ ξείνος ξεινοδόκω καὶ ἐταῖρος ἐταῖρῳ,
οὐδὲ κασίγνητος φίλος ἐσσεται, ὡς τὸ πάρος περ.  
(Op. 182-4)

Father will not be like-minded with sons, nor sons at all, nor guest with host, nor comrade with comrade, nor will the brother be dear, as he once was.

Here, as LSJ identify, the word is used for ὁμοῖος.  
However, in Homer, ὁμοῖος seems to be a separate adjective of uncertain meaning, applied to old-age, death, strife and war. This sense has been supported by the Sanskrit noun ámīvā [f.], ‘misery, vexation, suffering’, so that ὁμοῖος may come from the putative forms *ὁμοιοτός and *ὁμοι-μα. Possibly, Hesiod has used the term in a manner contrary to established epic usage. He may simply have misunderstood the word. Alternatively, the adjective may simply be a distended form of ὁμοῖος: it is unclear whether we should treat the instance as one of ὁμοῖος used homophonously with ὁμοῖος, or as a distinct usage of the separate lexeme ὁμοίος. LSJ provides an ‘A’ definition of ὁμοῖος and a ‘B’ definition (which cites Hesiod) whereby it is synonymous with ὁμοῖος. This approach enables the student to make sense of the passage, but obscures the uncertainty over the relationship between the two sub-lexemes.

(d) Misunderstandings?

In other cases, words seem to acquire a secondary sense as a result of a poet misunderstanding or reinterpreting an earlier usage. This hypothesis was first applied to early Greek epic in Manu Leumann’s influential Homerische Wörter (Basel 1950). A Hesiodic example may be the adjective μεταχρόνι, applied to the Harpies at Th. 269. Morphologically,
the word seems to be formed from μετά χρόνον, and on that basis should mean ‘happening afterwards’ or ‘delayed’, the first senses given by LSJ (citing Tryph. 1, Luc. Alex. 28, Gal. 19.522). However, in the Theogony and other poetry the word seems to mean ‘high in the air’, and is glossed the ancient commentators as such. West explains this unexpected sense using the ‘méthode Leumannienne’: in the Catalogue of Women, the word is used in the expression, μεταχρονίσει πόδεσιν (fr. 150.34, possibly of a Harpy at fr. 76.18), apparently of someone pursuing someone else, where the sense of ‘with following feet’ would be appropriate. In the instance from fr. 150, the pursuit seems to take place δι’ αἰθέρος (fr. 150.35); if such a passage occurred in a pre-Hesiodic epic, a poet may have misunderstood the expression to mean ‘with high-flying foot’, hence the epithet came to mean ‘high-flying’.

A further example along these lines is the name for the flower, ἀσφόδελος, which first occurs as a noun at Op. 41 (although its adjectival form occurs at Od. 11.539, 24.13), in a couplet describing the ‘gift-eating kings’ (Op. 40-1):

νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἵσασιν ὅσων πλέον ἠμισυ παντὸς
οὐδ’ ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἄσφοδελος μέγ’ ὀνειρ.

Fools, they do not know how much the half is more than the whole
nor how much benefit there is in the mallow and the asphodel.

Much ink has been spilled over the significance of the ‘mallow and the asphodel’: traditionally they have been thought to refer to the humble fare of the farmers, which the kings fail to appreciate. An alternative possibility (not incompatible with the traditional explanation), suggested by Bruno Currie, is that the mallow and asphodel are mentioned because of their mystical and eschatological associations. For Hesiod, then, eating the ‘mallow and asphodel’ may be part of becoming a θείος ἀνήρ (Op. 731) who will enjoy eschatological benefits, just like the θείον γένος (Op. 159) of heroes, who will end up on the isles of the blessed (Op. 170-3). Steve Reece has recently suggested a diachronic development, along Leumannian lines, of ἄσφοδελος which explains how the flower came to have these eschatological connotations. In the Odyssey, the adjectival form of the word occurs, in both of its occurrences, in the expression κατ’ ἄσφοδελον λειμώνα. Reece suggests that this formula was originally κατά σποδέλον λειμώνα, where σποδέλος was an adjectival form from the root, σπο-, also found in the Homeric σποδός, meaning ‘ashes’, and the common suffix –ελος. The ‘ashy meadow’ would be appropriate for the underworld in a society which cremates its dead. Here, the etymology could support Currie’s interpretation of the controversial line, and affect our interpretation of the meaning of the poem as a whole.

38 The Et. Mag. explains it as meaning μετέωρος; a scholiast on the line explains that χρόνος is really a word for οὐρανός.
40 See the detailed explanation of the lines by Currie 2007 pp.172-5, who cites extensive bibliography. The topic was a quaestio in antiquity (Plut. Sept. sap. conv. 157d-158c; Gellius 18.2.13; a Proclean scholion on Op. 41).
41 See e.g. West 1978 ad loc.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which a lexicon ought to take account of such complex and speculative etymologies. LSJ, of course, does not, as it was published before Leumann’s *Homerische Wörter*, and long before these particular etymologies were suggested. The LfgrE provides the different possible etymologies and cites West here, without offering his explanation for the shift in full. Reece’s explanation of ἀσφόδελος is too recent for any of the major dictionaries to take account of, although the LfgrE gives an indication of the plant’s mystical and eschatological associations by quoting a substantial part of Proclus’ comment on the line, and mentioning that the line was ‘déjà énigmatique dans l’Antiquité’.\(^4^4\) LSJ gives an indication that this may be the case by mentioning that it refers to ‘the *asphodel* mead which the shades of heroes haunted’. The first edition adds the extra information that the noun refers to, ‘a plant of the lily kind, the roots of which were eaten’. This might help the reader of Hesiod make some sense of the line.

The possibility that poets reinterpret, ‘mistranslate’ or ‘mis-use’ certain terms raises a problem for the lexicographer: most users will want a lexicon of ancient Greek to describe the sense of words as they are found in ancient Greek texts, rather than to prescribe usages that are accepted as being correct. However, users would also want to know when ancient poets use words in a manner that conflicts with normal usage, in order to reconstruct ancient ways of reading the text in question. If an author seems to use a word in a manner that (as far as can be reconstructed) appears to be contrary to established usage, we might interpret such a usage as ‘erroneous’ on the understanding that the author misunderstood the word, and that his usage would have been obscure to his audience. Alternatively, we might choose to be more charitable, and so read such deviant usages as in some way functional. This dilemma seems to be particularly acute in the case of Hesiod, given his reputation as a rough or primitive poet.

3. **Lexicography and Hesiod**

(a) Hesiod gets ‘muddled’?

Hesiod, perhaps more than most early Greek poets, has been thought to make mistakes, both in the form of linguistic errors – thought to arise as a consequence of the fact that he is a Boeotian poet using the predominantly Ionic dialect of epic\(^4^5\) – and in the form of thematic or narrative inconsistencies.\(^4^6\) Both these alleged deficiencies are of relevance to the lexicographer.

I have already mentioned Hesiod’s possibly erroneous usage of ὡμοίος (see above). A further possible example of Hesiod ‘muddling’ the established sense of a word is at *Op.* 240:

\(^{44}\) The DGE offers an ‘Etim. dud.’ (doubtful etymology) of the noun from σφυδόω, ‘be in full health’.

\(^{45}\) On Hesiod’s dialect – which in fact seems to observe certain Ionicisms more consistently than the Homeric poems – see Cassio 2009.

\(^{46}\) Kirk 1962 p.66 remarks that ‘old formulas derived from the Ionian tradition… are combined with each other in a rather clumsy, redundant or colourless manner.’ West 1966 p.23 is similarly damning of Hesiod’s style; his commentary on the *Works and Days* 1978 frequently points out narrative or logical inconsistencies. He remarks on p.41, ‘To anyone who expects an orderly and systematic progression of ideas, it is liable to appear a bewildering text’. More recent critics, such as Lardinois 1998, Clay 2003, and Scully 2015 tend to be more sympathetic towards Hesiod’s style, and read the inconsistencies as serving literary functions.
Often even a whole city suffers because of an evil man who sins and devises wicked deeds.

The Homeric participle ἀπούρας seems to mean ‘taking away’ or ‘wresting from, robbing of’ (LSJ s.v. I). However, it seems to make little sense to say that ‘the whole city takes away from a bad man who sins and contrives wickedness’. A form of ἐπαυρίσκω / ἐπαυρέω, ‘partake of, have the enjoyment of’ (LSJ s.v. I; cf. Op. 419) may seem more appropriate, and indeed, Triclinius suggested the emendation ἐπαυρεῖ, but otherwise the tradition is unanimous as far back as Aeschines (Ctes. 135) that ἀπήρα is the correct reading. Possibly in imitation of this passage, Euripides and the author of Prometheus Bound also seem to have used ἀπηύρα to mean, ‘partake of’ (Andr. 1030; PV 28), a fact which may further confirm the reading in Hesiod. As a result, LSJ provide a second sense of ἀπούρας as ‘receive good or ill, enjoy or suffer’ citing the examples from Hesiod and Euripides.

West suggests that Hesiod, and possibly the two tragedians, ‘got the words muddled’. Such ‘muddling’ may be paralleled elsewhere in early epic.47 A central reason for supposing this to be the case is that Hesiod’s usage here is unparalleled in archaic poetry. This reason is an application of the principle (usually applied to textual criticism) attributed to Wilamowitz, that einmal ist keinmal und zweimal heisst immer: that is to say, if one other such usage were to be found in early hexameter, we might assume that this was established usage in early hexameter, and so not an instance of ‘muddling’ or textual corruption, but since only one instance is found, it is to be considered erroneous, whether it is an error of the original author, or whether it is a textual corruption as Triclinius thought. The principle, however, is hardly infallible: it is quite possible that Hesiod’s example represents an established usage, of which his is the only instance which happens to survive. The parallels from Andromache and Prometheus Bound suggest that this usage, at some point, became established, at least among tragedians. It may, for instance, be the case that the usage derived from a poet ‘muddling’ the two verbs ἐπαυρέω and ἀπαυράω at an earlier point in the epic tradition, but, by the time of Hesiod, it was already normalized. There is little objective evidence on which to determine whether Hesiod’s use of ἀπαυράω here is deviant or not, and our response to this question will depend largely upon fallible a priori methodological assumptions, such as that einmal ist keinmal.

In addition to possible linguistic errors such as this, the two canonical Hesiodic poems have often been thought to contain inconsistencies of narrative and logic which may affect our understanding of particular lexemes. Perhaps the most famous instance is in the myth of

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47 Note II. 7.434 and 24.789, where ἔγρετο comes from ἀγείρω, not ἐγείρω. Conventionally, the relevant from of ἀγείρω would be ἥγρετο. Janko 1992 p.35 n.65 suggests that bards could have confused the two forms. See also West 2001 p.23.
Pandora, where Hope is found in the jar of evils (Op. 90-105).\textsuperscript{48} There are at least two apparent inconsistencies in the story: firstly, \( \epsilon\lambda\pi\iota\varsigma \) is thought to be a good thing, yet it is in the jar of ‘evils’; and secondly, \( \epsilon\lambda\pi\iota\varsigma \) is among men because it remains in the jar, whilst the evils are among men because they escape it. These have troubled commentators since antiquity.\textsuperscript{49} There are many ways in which Hesiod could be defended against the charge of illogicality: it has been argued that he is being ironic, or we could interpret the symbolism of the jar in such a way as to make it coherent.\textsuperscript{50} Relevant to our immediate purposes, however, is the question of how we choose to translate \( \epsilon\lambda\pi\iota\varsigma \): we are accustomed to translating the noun as ‘hope’, a word which has positive connotations in English; and we would not expect to find ‘hope’ in a jar of ills. However, as is well known, \( \epsilon\lambda\pi\iota\varsigma \) can often mean ‘anticipation’ or ‘anxious thought about the future’ rather than the positive sense of ‘Hope’.\textsuperscript{51} ‘Empty hope’ (\( \kappa\epsilon\nu\epsilon\nu\eta\iota\varsigma \). \( \epsilon\lambda\pi\iota\delta\omicron\alpha \)) seems to be a bad thing at Op. 498. It is possible, then, that \( \epsilon\lambda\pi\iota\varsigma \) is used in a negative or ambiguous sense, so that it is presented as one of the ‘evils’ after all. LSJ simply cite the instance under the sense of hope, expectation, and so does not address the interpretive problem. Possibly, Hesiod is using an already established, negative or ambiguous sense of \( \epsilon\lambda\pi\iota\varsigma \). Alternatively, he may be making the unexpected point, contrary to the normal usage of \( \epsilon\lambda\pi\iota\varsigma \), that it is a bad thing.\textsuperscript{52} Either possibility is more charitable to Hesiod than to regard him as illogical. Our understanding of the semantics of Hesiod’s use of \( \epsilon\lambda\pi\iota\varsigma \) depends in part on whether we apply a principle of charity when interpreting his text, or whether we see him as an imperfect maker, struggling to express ideas and sometimes slipping into confusion.

(b) Aetiology

The myth of Pandora and the jar is part of a wider tendency of Hesiod to provide aetiological explanations that hint at nuances of the meaning of certain terms. Given Hesiod’s immense influence in antiquity, we might especially want a dictionary to supply detailed references to his usage of terms for which he provides aetiological or explanatory myths.\textsuperscript{53} However, for certain key terms which fall into this category, LSJ’s impression of Hesiod’s usage is somewhat misleading.

One example is the description of the two ‘Strifes’ (\( \epsilon\rho\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma \)) that feature at Op. 11-25. Here, Hesiod revises the claim made at Th. 225, that there was a single ‘Strife’. The two ‘Strifes’ have different functions: one is blameworthy (Op. 13), and responsible for war and

\textsuperscript{48} Cf. West 1978 p.170; ‘It is of course illogical to make the same jar serve both purposes at once [sc. imprisoning the evils and maintaining Hope]. But that is what Hesiod has done, and we must not distort his meaning for the sake of better logic.’

\textsuperscript{49} Note the scholiast on Op. 97, who reports that Aristarchus claimed that there were two Hopes, a good and a bad one, the former of which flew out of the jar whilst the latter remained.

\textsuperscript{50} Nisbet 2004 argues for irony in Hesiod; for a detailed summary of different views on the symbolism of the jar, see Verdenius 1985 pp.66-70.

\textsuperscript{51} See e.g. LSJ s.v. ‘anxious thought on the future, boding’

\textsuperscript{52} Cf. Clay 2003 pp.102-3, who argues the Hesiod’s ‘hope’ is the ‘ultimate kalon kakon’, and like the jar, and Pandora herself, is ostensibly attractive but harbours ills for man. Cf. also Theognis 1197, where personified \( \epsilon\lambda\pi\iota\varsigma \) is described as the only good god among men.

\textsuperscript{53} Hesiod’s influence on Greek religious thought is perhaps most explicit at Hdt. 2.53. The reception of Hesiod in antiquity has been the subject of much recent research: see Koning 2010, Boys-Stones and Haubold 2010, Hunter 2014 and Van Noorden 2014.
slaughtering (Op. 14) while the other is ‘much better’ (Op. 19) and stirs a lazy man to work when he sees a wealthier man (Op. 21-2). This latter ἔρις is perhaps more accurately translated as ‘emulation’ or ‘rivalry’. LSJ has, as sense III, ‘personified Eris, a goddess who excites to war’ (and cites Th. 225 here), whilst, as sense IV, it has ‘contention, rivalry’, at the end of which is written, ‘cf. Hes. Op. 24.’ This may provide adequate help for deciphering the Greek; however, it is incomplete, and arguably misleading, for readers interested in the history of the concept of Eris: we might want to find reference to the two ‘Strifes’ under sense III, and a citation of this passage after the Homeric references under sense IV.

A further example is in the case of δίκη. Prominently, in the Works and Days, Δίκη is personified at 212ff. and her typical behaviour is described in some detail: she wins out over ἐρις in the end (217); and when she is ‘dragged’ by gift-eating men who make crooked judgements (220-1), she follows the city and tribes of men weeping, and bringing trouble to them (223-4). Later, we are told that whenever a mortal harms her by scorning her, she sits by her father Zeus and tells him of the unjust mind of men (259-60). The description of Δίκη in the Works and Days would be influential in later literature.54 However, LSJ does not include a separate sense for the personified Δίκη as it does for ‘Strife’; instead, it simply includes, under sense II ‘order, right, personified, Hes. Th. 902, A.Th. 662, etc.’ We might wonder whether some elements of Hesiod’s description here, or at least reference to it, ought to be included in a dictionary definition of the term. As it is, the only citations for Hesiod under the entry for Δίκη are that to Th. 902, and reference to Op. 219, 250 for the phrase δίκαι σκολιαί (‘crooked judgements’). Surprisingly, there is no reference to Hesiod under sense IV.3 ‘the object or consequence of the action, atonement, satisfaction, penalty’, in spite of the fact that the word seems to have this sense at Op. 272, and the first source cited for this sense is Herodotus. Because of the immense influence of Hesiod for the ancient understanding of δίκη and ἔρις, we might expect a lexicon to privilege references to him; instead, the opposite seems to be the case: he is neglected at particular points where he seems to have been most influential. This may be a residual consequence of the nineteenth-century neglect of Hesiod, relative to Homer.

(c) Personifications and Figurative Language

Part of the difficulty in both of these cases is that the terms are sometimes used as abstract nouns, and sometimes used as divine personifications. This raises a wider and difficult question of whether there is a conceptual distinction in early Greek thought between divine personifications and the abstract nouns that they personify.55 LSJ is not consistent in distinguishing divine personifications from the non-personified usages: for ἔρις, the personified use receives a separate sense distinction, whilst for Δίκη, the personification is absorbed under the sense of ‘order, right’. A similar example is τύχη, where again, no separate, personified sense-distinction is provided, but for the different senses (e.g. ‘II.1 fortune’; ‘III.2 ill fortune’) an example where the sense is used in a personified form is provided. This latter

54 Cf. e.g. A. Fr. 530 M (282 L1.-J.) and X. Cyn. 12.21 with Hunter 2014 pp.59-63. See also Koning 2010 pp.172-7.
55 For the worship of such personified ‘abstractions’ in cult, see especially Stafford 2000.
example is particularly pernicious, as Hesiod is the earliest attested author to use this word, as a personified Oceanid at Th. 360. Poets often use personifying language of abstract nouns, but that does not necessarily mean that the abstract noun is conceived of as a god; it is up to the editor to determine whether the language used is sufficiently personifying to justify capitalizing the term and treating it as a deity. A problem case is Op. 230, which describes the just city:

οὐδὲν ποτ’ ἱδρύκησι μετ’ ἀνδράσι θριμός ὁπηδεῖ
nor does famine attend straight-judging men

Λιμός is one of the children of Eris at Th. 227, and the verb ὀπηδεῖ, (follow, accompany, attend) may be thought to have a personifying force. As a result, Solmsen and West capitalize the noun here, treating it as a personification. However, ὀπηδέω is frequently used of things, rather than people or animals (LSJ s.v. II; cf. Il. 5.216; Od. 8.237), and Hesiod sometimes uses nouns in a clearly un-personified manner which he personifies elsewhere. Perhaps as a result of this, other editors, such as Rzach and Most leave θριμός uncapped at 230. The choice of whether or not to treat a noun as a true personification is a difficult one, not least because authors personify nouns for literary effect, without conceiving of them as deities. In the case of θριμός, no edition of Liddell and Scott includes a personified sense for it, in spite of its clearly personified status at Th. 227.

The editorial dilemma concerning whether or not to capitalize certain abstract nouns in Hesiod is part of a larger problem of when to distinguish metaphorical from literal uses of language. Few areas of semantics have been more discussed in recent decades than metaphor. A clear division between metaphorical and literal uses of language has sometimes been seen to be problematic: metaphors are much more ubiquitous in everyday speech than was once realised, and, according to some definitions of the term, all language is seen to be metaphorical. Some have rejected altogether a dichotomy between metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses and preferred to see a sliding scale between core and more ‘stretched’ usages. For many entries, LSJ includes a ‘metaph.’ sense. Methodologically, some might object to making such a clear distinction between a metaphorical and a literal usage in a dictionary at all, although most critics of classical literature still seem to employ a traditional, intuitive distinction between metaphorical and literal uses of language.

In light of these developments, LSJ’s approach to the drawing of separate sense-divisions for personifications and for ‘metaph.’ usages seems somewhat arbitrary. A Hesiodic example of the latter is the use of μαυρόω. The LSJ entry (substantially unchanged in all editions of the lexicon) cites Hesiod’s use of the verb at Op. 325 under a secondary sense of ‘metaph., make dim or obscure’; yet the verb is also marked as synonymous with ἄμαυρόω for

56 For criteria for distinguishing such personifications, see Stafford 2000 p.9.
58 For a recent introduction, see Kövecses 2010. On metaphors in Classical literature, see the collection Boys-Stones (ed.) 2003 and Silk 1974.
59 Note, for instance, Geoffrey Lloyd’s preference for the concept of ‘semantic stretch’, as opposed to a clear distinction between Metaphorical and Literal uses, outlined in Lloyd 1987 pp.174ff. and defended in Lloyd 2003.
which the primary sense is given as ‘make dim, faint, or obscure’. The choice to label ‘make faint, obscure’ as a metaphorical, secondary sense for μαυρόω, but a non-metaphorical, primary sense for ἀμαυρώω seems inconsistent. The problem of how a lexicon ought to deal with figurative and non-figurative sense-divisions is a complex one, which will apply to any author, but the particular issue of the division between personified and non-personified usages is especially pertinent to Hesiod. We might at least hope for a consistent and explicit method for dealing with such distinctions in future dictionaries.

Concluding Thoughts

Aside from the basic criticisms that Hesiod ought to be cited before the Homeric Hymns, and that it cites editions and fragment numbers that are now obsolete, LSJ is still extremely useful for the student in translating Hesiod. There are remarkably few instances (perhaps most egregiously, in the cases of ἀλφηστής and ἄπλαστος) where it conflicts with the modern understanding of the Greek. Certain misleading entries seem to arise in part as a consequence of the fact that later editions of Liddell and Scott abridge discussions from earlier editions of problematic passages, and so neglect to mention instances of uncertainty. A further area, in which it could be more useful for the student of early Greek poetry is if more information were provided on the use of words in formulaic expressions. Of course, a dictionary the size of LSJ could not hope to be exhaustive in this respect, in the way that the LfgrE is, but occasionally, a lack of this information limits the value of the dictionary in deciphering certain passages of Hesiod. Yet, LSJ is used by students and scholars not only to help with translation from Greek authors, but also to trace the history of particular words and concepts. After all, in the preface to the first edition, Liddell and Scott planned ‘to make each Article a History of the usage of the word referred to’. For this use, LSJ seems more deficient: Hesiod’s usage of particular words, even when he uses them in an idiosyncratic way, or in a manner which offers an explanation for their meaning, is often neglected. This is particularly problematic given Hesiod’s immense influence in the development of the ancient understanding of particular terms and concepts, such as ἔρις and δίκη.

Some of these complaints – the lack of citations of Hesiod for relevant lexemes, the lack of descriptions of the formulaic phrases in which Hesiodic terms are found – are simply sins of omission, and it could be objected that the inclusion of the extra relevant information would render any dictionary unwieldy. We should remember Chadwick’s principle that the efficiency of a dictionary is equal to its usefulness divided by its weight: the more information a dictionary contains, the heavier it will be and therefore the less efficient. However, the weight-variable is becoming less significant now that users are increasingly using online and digital dictionaries, as opposed to hard copies: the days of the hard-copy dictionary, especially for a ‘dead’ language such as ancient Greek, may well be numbered. Moreover, any researcher is now able to discover almost all attested usages of a lexeme in a matter of seconds, thanks to

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60 Preface p.vii.
the online ‘TLG’.62 In light of this technology, we may be justified in demanding more information from future lexicographical projects. In any case, thanks to these developments, the definitions written and sense-divisions drawn by future lexicographers will be far more easily scrutinized than those of previous generations.