STATE-MEDIATED CAPITALISM FROM BELOW AND THE SMALL-SCALE PEASANT AQUACULTURE IN NAYARIT (MEXICO)

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DECLARATION AND WORD COUNT

I, Omar Wicab-Gutiérrez confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a historical case study of small-scale peasant shrimp production and its forms of organisation in the region known as “La Costa” in the northwest Mexican state of Nayarit. This case study constitutes a good example of the evolution of peasant communities over a century of history in which various government policies left their mark on the development of the political economy of the region in the period following the Mexican Revolution. From that time, La Costa became the setting for a process of peasantisation and for a set of policies supporting the development of cooperatives for the exploitation of water resources. This period was defined by the struggle faced by these communities to consolidate their political, economic, and administrative autonomy.

In the 1990s, these same communities and their cooperatives suffered the effects of neoliberal policies (privatisation, trade liberalisation, deregulation) in their Mexican incarnation, which have had the effect of undermining peasant production and promoting a search for new ways of surviving, along with the appearance of new strata and social actors.

Using the concepts of early simple commodity production and advanced simple commodity production as used by Terence J. Byres (1996), the process described in this thesis constitutes an example of a process of capitalist development from below, in a region with a high population density and a significant level of state intervention in political and regulatory terms, in the context of a labour surplus (Lewis, 1954). It could be argued that it shows how neoliberalism has changed the way we need to conceptualise the "classical agrarian question" and to interpret the labour surplus in middle income societies as suggested by Bernstein (2009b).
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<tr>
<td>AGN</td>
<td>Archivo General de la Nación (Historical Archive of Mexico).</td>
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<tr>
<td>BANFOCO</td>
<td>Banco de Fomento Cooperativo (National Cooperative Development Bank)</td>
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<td>BANRURAL</td>
<td>Banco Nacional de Crédito Rural (National Bank for Peasant Loans).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America (NAFTA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CESANAY</td>
<td>Comité Estatal de Sanidad Acuícola de Nayarit, A.C. (Nayarit State Aquacultural Sanitation Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>Comisión Nacional del Agua (National Water Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNC</td>
<td>Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Peasant Trade Union Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNOP</td>
<td>Consejo Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (National Council of Popular Organisations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>Confederación de Trabajadores de México (Trade Union Federation of Mexican Workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FONAES</td>
<td>Fondo Nacional de Empresas en Solidaridad (National Fund for Support of Peasant Enterprises)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEGI</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (National Bureau for Statistics, Geography and Digital Information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INP</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Pesca (National Fisheries Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI/PRM/PNR</td>
<td>Partido Revolucionario Institucional/ Partido de la Revolución Mexicana/ Partido Nacional Revolucionario (Institutional Revolutionary Party. The other acronyms are different names for the same party).</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRONASOL</td>
<td>Programa Nacional en Solidaridad (The National Solidarity Programme).</td>
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Glossary

La Única  The Unique/The Only One Co-operative.

Peón acasillado  Who was bound in servitude of all kinds to landholders, resulting in a kind of debt bondage, which was also inherited. This system also included sharecropping and other forms of rent.

Latifundios or Haciendas  The "hacienda", or estate, emerged during the colonial period, but only became widespread as a form of land tenure during the last third of the nineteenth century through the confiscation of the lands of the Church, the main landowner in Mexico until the mid-nineteenth century. The process also included confiscation of indigenous lands, which had been defended by the Spanish Crown as a counterweight to the ambitions of Spanish landowners.

Hacendados  The "hacendados" were members of the landowning class that grew out of the liberal policies of the nineteenth century.

Avecindados  Inhabitant of an ejido town who is non-member of it. Without rights over lands.

Ejido  The ejido is an agrarian community that includes agricultural land and land for common use (generally used for grazing cattle and, in the case studied here, land for aquaculture), and a fundo legal, or town in which backyard activities peasants are engaged in (like feeding chickens, small spices of cattle or growing small vegetable gardens, etc., for familiar consumption and support).

Ejidatarios (as)  Member of an ejido.

Derechos a salvo  Legal member of an ejido. To have access to the agricultural land, the members of the ejido must have an ejido rights title ("derechos a salvo"), which can be transferred to one of their descendants, who become the new
holder of the right on the piece of land.

Map 1
Mexican Republic and Nayarit State
Map 2.
Nayarit and Municipalities.

Source: INEGI
INTRODUCTION:
CONTEXT AND NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Nayarit is a state with 80% of the land in the hands of ejidos\(^1\). As such, it offers a highly representative picture of small-scale shrimp production\(^2\) and also clearly reflects the evolution of the changes in the Mexican rural sector at the federal level.

The area under study is located on the coast of the state of Nayarit in western Mexico, referred to locally as “La costa”. Inhabited by a population that is primarily mestizo, up until the 1960s the rural population in the state represented more than 50% of its total population. This percentage has been falling due to an increase in the urban population resulting from internal migration.

“La Costa” is located at the beginning of a vast plain that runs from central-northern Nayarit up to the state of Sonora on the U.S. border. This huge plain is the source of one of Mexico’s richest rural economies, producing extremely valuable agricultural products, nearly all of them for export. The northern part of this plain is comprised of large properties, while in the south of the state of Sinaloa and northern Nayarit (where the region under study is located) ownership is held largely by small-scale peasant-run ejido operations. This plain forms part of Mexico’s Pacific coastal region, and the major rivers that empty into the Pacific serve for the irrigation of commercial crops. It also forms part of

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\(^1\) The *ejido* system, derived from the Spanish tradition, is an institution recognized by the Mexican Constitution that involves a grant or restitution of land to a group of peasants. The peasants were given *possession* of their lands (but not ownership) until 1992.

\(^2\) For the purposes of the study, small-scale shrimp production refers to production in which the producer participates directly (individually or collectively), which permits the reproduction of an average-sized family (according to the sample obtained among the cooperatives, the average number of dependents per producer is 3.6), and is complementary in many cases to agricultural production. Small-scale production may be aimed at the market or serve for self-consumption, depending on the needs of the direct producers (see Macías Macías (2013), “Introducción. Los pequeños productores agrícolas en México”, *Carta Económica Regional*, Vol 25, Nos 111-112 (Enero-Diciembre), pp. 7-18).
the Gulf of California, one of the richest marine ecosystems on the planet. Moreover, the northern part of the plain (in northern Sinaloa and Sonora) was the site of the so-called “Green Revolution” in the 1950s and 1960s, which has been the subject of numerous studies\(^3\).

The peasant *ejido* economy, however, has received much less attention. Thus, this research began as a complement to broader research into rural areas of Nayarit, which had been ongoing since about 1988. My objective was to identify the consequences of these changes in the country’s political direction for Nayarit’s rural sector.

By the early 1990s, a group of researchers already involved in studying in the region had begun analysing the rural sector of Nayarit\(^4\) (see Map 1) and the productive dislocation phenomena occurring as a result of neoliberal-style adjustment programmes associated with the fiscal crisis and the devaluation of the peso in 1982 (Wicab Gutiérrez, 1994; Wicab Gutiérrez and Sifuentes Ocegueda, 1993). At that time there was very little data on the La Costa region, which was undergoing a major economic transformation. Indeed, by the late 1980s, when this research began, the rural development described above was in crisis. Although there has been considerable focus given to agricultural and livestock issues related to this crisis, there seemed to be very little documentation on the huge network of activities in aquaculture and fishing.

Research into artisanal aquaculture in ponds and inland marshes along the coast of Nayarit—linked to previous research—posed a number of challenges because the region’s economy was intertwined with the agrarian structure of the small rural properties of the *ejidos*, and the wide variety of products found in the lagoons and ecological environments seemed to offer an interesting object of research. There are not only agricultural products like corn (maize), tobacco

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\(^4\) Nayarit is a state in the northwestern part of Mexico, bordering the Pacific Ocean, with the largest marshland area on the Pacific coast of the Americas. Of its approximately one million inhabitants, one third live in this area, formed by the mouths of several major rivers, such as the Santiago, San Pedro and Acaponeta. The Acaponeta runs into the ocean via a network of deltas that give rise to a set of highly fragile ecosystems, allowing for a range of economic activities. At present this vast and complex ecosystem is populated by mostly rural communities and *ejidos* (see note 8).
leaves, fresh fruits and vegetables, but also active cattle-raising and forestry activities. Added to these economic activities are the fisheries and aquaculture in estuaries, rivers and inland lakes.

Again during the first few months of 1993 and 1994, I made many visits to the region under study, and talked to officials and residents of La Costa ("The Coast"), some of them involved in fishing, others not. In 1994, I conducted a more detailed study to identify the relationship between the natural dynamics of ecosystems (mangroves, rivers, lagoons and estuarine systems) and the economic and social activities of the population. Then, together with other researchers at the Autonomous University of Nayarit and World Bank, I visited virtually all of the North Coast and the municipality of San Blas (DeWalt, 2002). This early immersion in the subject offered me the opportunity to understand the natural dynamics of the rivers, estuaries and the sea, and how the peasants of La Costa\(^5\) were involved in these dynamics, in addition to being involved in the production of agricultural products along with extensive use of aquaculture to generate more cash income through cooperatives. Cooperatives seemed to dominate aquaculture at the time of the first talks I had with ejidatarios\(^6\) and officials, but the agricultural reforms in 1992 that deregulated the industry left the structure of the aquaculture industry in serious doubt.

As my research progressed, analysis of the interplay between aquaculture and other rural activities such as agriculture and livestock, but particularly shrimp catching in the estuaries, raised more questions about the organisation of markets and the proportion of ejidatario income that such activities represented (e.g. what is the relative importance of aquaculture among economic activities of the peasantry? Is small-scale aquaculture compatible with the idea we had of the peasantry as farmers or ranchers?).

My first opportunity to become involved in research into non-agricultural rural activities (such as forestry, and in this case, fishing and rural aquaculture) came in the years 1980-82, when while an economics student I joined the Economics

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\(^5\) Municipalities of Tecuala, Acaponeta, Tuxpan, Rosamorada, Santiago Ixcuintla and San Blas (see Map 1)

\(^6\) The ejidatarios are ejido residents who hold rights to the ejido lands (see note 7).
Research Institute at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (IIEc-UNAM) as a research assistant to José Luis Calva, who tasked me and other colleagues with an in-depth study of Mexico's forestry industry since 1917. This work afforded us the chance to look at different dimensions of *ejido* life that allowed and continue to allow *ejiditario* families to *supplement* their income.\(^7\)

The idea that the rural economy is based on agriculture is true in general terms, but it is important to note that the communities that we were able to study over the course of more than two years seem to support the notion of a more diverse and extensive rural economy. Wood, cellulose and resin production, among other activities *complementary* to the agricultural economy, became fundamental for vast regions of Mexico from 1940 on. I personally had the experience of living in a small community in the Tzitzio region in Michoacán whose economy was based on resin production. It was the same peasantry, but with an economy basically determined by the resin market (for turpentine and tar production).

As I mention before it was my work in 1994 as part of a team of researchers subcontracted by the World Bank, that gave me the opportunity to complete a report on aquacultural activity in La Costa de Nayarit, bringing me into contact for the first time with the issue of artisanal aquaculture in the region from the perspective described above: how do rural communities supplement their farming income?

After this experience, for a period of more than ten years I continued compiling information on La Costa de Nayarit; I analysed the local shrimp market, particularly the little market in Tepic where several women (known colloquially as "*changueras"*) sell shrimp on the street every day; and I reviewed Nayarit's agrarian archives and interviewed people working in the sector. My documentary research was intertwined with contact with friends at my university who were originally from La Costa and who connected me with fishermen from different La Costa communities, on the *ejidos* of Pescadero, Pimientillo and,

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subsequently, Pericos (particularly I should mention to Rubén “el compadre”, trader himself, and Rubén Pérez, from the FONAES team), affording me the chance to conduct ongoing visits and direct, unstructured interviews with some of the local residents. Subsequently in the region of Las Haciendas, in the heart of La Costa, the son of Santos Ceja, the founder of the La Única cooperative, helped me. One talk in particular that I had with them (Santos Soto and his son Edel Soto) guided me to identify the political context prior to 1961 that gave rise to the formation of the large fishing cooperative that dominated the fisheries sector in Nayarit for nearly thirty years, and to recognise how little was still known about the topic. In 2004, I became the rector of my university, which brought me into contact on another level with directors of the La Costa cooperatives responsible for academic and research support. I was able to meet directly with Cecilio (Chilo) Rendón, Anacleto (Cleto) Ceja and other fishing sector leaders who furnished me with valuable information on the issues in the region and its history through their personal experiences. I met them quite frequently to discuss the current political situation of the fishing sector and its history in the region. Several academics engaged in business activities in shrimp breeding labs (Norberto Vivanco Pérez y Marichuy Medina) helped me with the organization of the information that constitutes the basis for Chapter 6, And the FONAES staff (Rubén Pérez González and Rocío Valdez, and also Pablo Fregoso, who was responsible for the Empresas en Solidaridad program), who took part in the establishment of the farms in the 1990s, gave me their version of events. Finally, I was able to interview important historical figures like Dr. Gascón Mercado, the State Governor of Nayarit from 1964 to 1969, who was responsible for leading the start-up of the La Única de Pescadores cooperative. All of this was combined with time spent at places in La Costa where, as mentioned above, I had the opportunity to develop friendships with fishers and ejidatarios (ejido members).

Little by little I pieced together a history that had been practically unknown to most residents of this state, who have been more interested in little fragments of that history. However, there were still large gaps in the information that I was unable to fill and that did not fit with the information that I already had, which lacked a general perspective on the political and economic phenomena of the
region under study. To be able to contextualise the phenomena associated with the fishing sector, I needed to understand a little more about the agrarian, political and economic history of Nayarit. In this way, ejido fishing and aquaculture offered me a clue that enabled me to link these aspects to the wider history of the state. The historical research of a more unstructured nature, gathered through my friendships with La Costa residents and our conversations about their experiences I have mention before, gave me the opportunity to partially reconstruct the history of fishing and aquaculture from their perspective, but I needed a documentary structure that would link together the isolated phenomena and the stories of people who had taken part in the events recounted in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Using unstructured interviews, my intention was to study, identify and adopt the point of view of my research subjects. In my case, I tried to conduct a historical analysis of peasant cooperatives and to understand the role of and reasons behind the decisions taken by the leaders of La Única in its day. This was not research that would afford me an understanding of their current living strategies and interaction with their environment, which would have required a different type of immersion in the social context of La Costa. My interest was in reconstructing the history of the region, of a very large area and not just one community or village. I therefore needed to employ methods that would facilitate my “integration” into the place under study, which would enable me to reconstruct the local history.

It is also important to highlight that Nayarit is a state with its own unique characteristics. It is a complex state with a highly pronounced clientelist and corporate culture. Therefore, to be able to work around the natural resistance of the people concerned and gain the level of access to the pertinent information that the research required, it was essential for me to belong to a social network that would enable me to gain the trust of the interviewees. I learned to do this almost naturally, after coming to live in this state in 1988 as an outsider from Mexico City. What reason could I use to justify my arrival and facilitate my integration into a place like Nayarit? To integrate in this way normally would have required a long period of adaptation and coexistence, and would only have given me access to certain social spaces, not to those I was really
interested in. I soon discovered that as an academic at the local university I immediately had a place in the social context in which I had started moving. People identified me by my place of work and could establish a certain degree of openness with me which with some of them developed over time into a connection of friendship and trust and a commitment to issues related to the fishing sector in particular. In corporate and clientelist societies a relationship of trust is established by belonging to a social network; lone wolves do not inspire empathy. I soon developed connections with people and was invited to eat with them – a very important step in the local culture. The highest levels of personal connection occur at mealtimes (breakfast or the main midday meal), when the members of a community or family share their points of view on any topic of the moment (See Rap, 2007).

Previously I had spent several months in Mexico City reviewing the historical archives kept by the Mexican government on the La Única cooperative. This review proved crucial for linking events together and constructing my first working hypotheses and the periodisation that underpins this case study.

Prior to the development of the part of the empirical research that involved collecting data within the communities, I had to undertake what might be called a documentary investigation, because there was so little literature about the development of the Nayarit communities. The literature that did exist was scattered over a number of archives, all of which had to be consulted. In fact, I discovered new archives found in the AGN (Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico's National Historical Archives) which served as a guide for the construction of the questionnaires and subsequent interviews and provided a socio-historical overview that was indispensable to a conceptualisation of the problem. This was supplemented by direct observation of the cultural and political processes that characterise the institutional life, as well as the daily practices of the people of the Nayarit coast. Another reason to invest time in the archives was, as stated above, that the existing studies on ejido aquaculture (as is indeed the case of studies on the small peasantry in Mexico as a whole) were developed from preconceived models that essentially tried to select bits and portions of reality that could fit comfortably into the theoretical mould. My argument is that theorists have often started from the theory and deduced the
reality from it rather than working with an empirical model. I will also discuss the reasons for such an approach in the relevant sections of this work.

It was clear that there were two very different periods in the region's history: a first period, from 1930 to around 1980, marked by the implementation of the agrarian reform that handed over land and resources to the local inhabitants; and a second period, in which a shift in federal policies led to a radical change in the support given to the rural sector, marked by neoliberal policies of fiscal tightening and structural change that had their origins in the Mexican debt crisis of 1982, with profound consequences for the region under study.

One thing that became clear from my work in La Costa was that the region was subject to a profound dynamic of change, and in the fishing sector the developments in the communities along the Pacific coastline were not in keeping with those that occurred further inland. A visit to the Palmar de Cuautla ejido, in the municipality of Santiago Ixcuintla (in the heart of La Costa) gave me the key to understanding this dynamic: the community of Palmar de Cuautla was just about to be devastated by the opening of a small canal that would connect the beachline with waterways further inland. Because of the fragility of the ecosystem, the canal had been widening and when it reached a few metres in width it had opened up to a point where it covered several kilometres, a situation that threatened to destroy the whole community. But this disaster, provoked by the inefficiency of local authorities, was combined with the problem that fish species were no longer abundant in this area, also due to the opening of the canal, which had “pushed” the resource inland to the estuary region. A conversation I had at a meal with local fishers provided me with an explanation of the history of conflicts that have been perceived to exist in the region since the 1970s. And it was this that led me to posit my first working hypothesis. These conversations underpin the account of events in Chapter 5.

I still needed to understand the period of agrarian reform, which included the period after the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) and the situation of fishing and aquacultural activity and its connection with the handover of land and the disappearance of the haciendas. This information came from the review of documentation and from historical research. The full picture of the research subject began to take shape. There was a process of change that was
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associated with what Byres (1996) identifies as the contemporary process of the so-called “ agrarian question ” in classical terms as: “ the continued existence in the countryside, in a substantive sense, of obstacles to an unleashing of accumulation in both the countryside itself and more generally – in particular, the accumulation associated with capitalist industrialization. ” ( cited by Akram- Lodhi and Kay, 2009 b ). Or put another way: “ those changes in the countryside of a poor country necessary to the overall development of capitalism and its ultimate dominance in a particular national social formation ” ( Byres 1996 ).

In their general historical context, the dynamics of rural change involve “ explore the process that contribute to or constrain the emergence of agrarian capital and rural capitalism The key dynamic process in the emergence of agrarian capital and agrarian capitalism is the transformation, or indeed even partial transformation – or petty commodity- producing peasants into wage labour, and enhance labour power. ” ( Akram- Lodhi and Kay, 2009 b )

But what was most striking was the lack of existing literature linking estuary fishing to the peasant economy, i.e., the characterisation of these “ fishers ” and their relation to the agricultural and livestock economy. In general, studies of these producers do not associate them with the agrarian economy, yet in La Costa the diversity of the ecosystem seemed to contradict the idea of a peasantry associated exclusively with agriculture and therefore not engaged in artisanal aquacultural activities. In reality, these producers seemed to be involved in the full range of activities engaged in by peasant producers and their families. Thus, studying these producers could offer an opportunity to develop a historical perspective on the process of transformation of the peasantry of La Costa on the basis of what Lewis ( 1954 ) defined as a dual economy development model ( capitalist and non-capitalist), but not only related to agricultural peasant economies ( see also Kay ’ s, and Vergara Camus’ points of view on pluriactivity in chapter 2 ).

The development of peasant economies and their absorption through the capitalist development process described by Lewis in his 1954 article suggests that in certain countries the labour surplus contributed to capital accumulation in modern sectors, as low wages ( the marginal productivity of labour was close to zero ) made capital investments more profitable.
The analysis of dual structures has been extensively documented in the literature on the peasantry (see Chapter 2, which presents an overview of the most important currents of thought on peasant economies). However, this research appears to refer only to peasant organisations based on agricultural activity, and the particular features of this region do not seem to reflect this general trend of greater uniformity of production; i.e., the complexity of the economic and social structure of this particular process could reveal new information on the agrarian development in which peasant producers are involved, and the dissolution or reinforcement, depending on the case, of this type of peasant economy as a whole as the capitalist development process progresses. With this in mind, this research analyses the aquacultural economy as a complementary branch of the interaction of different rural activities and their role in this commodification process (see Kay's and Vergara Camus' points of view on pluriactivity in chapter 2).

The literature in Mexico lacked this view of agrarian development, considered at the level of complexity described above. Research on the peasantry only considers agricultural and livestock activities to be peasant activities (Calva Téllez, 1989). The research undertaken here thus did not fit into the general theoretical frameworks employed for such research, where aquaculture has never been taken into account as a complementary activity of the peasantry. In Mexico, shrimp catching is considered a rural activity, but not a peasant activity. The New Ruralists have recently focused on these kinds of peculiarities of the Latin American rural sector.

In short, theorists have traditionally treated artisanal fishing in lagoons and estuaries as separate from agricultural and livestock activities. However, in Nayarit, these activities appear to constitute a single but at the same time complex sector that could help explain new forms of capitalist development in countries like Mexico, thus contributing to a reinterpretation of development processes from a historical perspective. While the theory associated with small-scale peasant production focuses on studies of largely homogeneous communities (such as those in central or northern Mexico), the Mexican coastal regions offer a very different reality in many respects, including aspects of culture and traditions, as a more complex peasant economy.
Another specific aspect that does not tend to feature in studies on Mexico is the role of the State and its agencies. Amid the complexities of the economy of La Costa described above, the lives of the *ejidatarios* were characterised by conflict, due in particular to the presence of a wide variety of external agents, including, for example, officials from different levels of government, trade intermediaries who negotiated prices and sale conditions, and the open involvement of politicians in *ejido* affairs. It was also difficult for me to make sense of market structures, as these appeared to be strongly influenced by the decisions of government agencies.

Questions related to *ejido* cooperatives, the income of aquacultural farmers, the cultural peculiarities identified and the role of political institutions and government need to be answered within the framework of the theory of the peasantry. In other words, political relations sometimes seemed to determine the economic dynamic in a particular way, pointing to the need for a methodological framework that could shed some light on this unique set of circumstances. The political culture also allowed *clientelist networks* to dissolve traditional peasant relationships because of ‘rational’ hierarchical rules of organisation associated with the idea of production efficiency (see Chapter 4 and 5). To what extent are clientelist relationships linked to a process of political control and construction of power networks in La Costa?

The purpose of this thesis is to attempt to make sense of the phenomenon of small-scale and extensive and semi-intensive aquaculture (shrimp farming) in Nayarit State. The aim is to contribute to our understanding of how these peasant communities have been affected by the changes to the political and economic context set in motion partially by the diverse upheavals in Mexico’s socio-political landscape in the first half of the twentieth century, combined with the policies inspired by the recent adoption of a version of neoliberalism in the region. That is, I seek to go beyond definitions such as ‘self-sufficient’ or ‘the peasantry’ found in the literature of rural economists like Chayanov and rural sociologists like Shanin by incorporating elements of history and political economy developed by researchers as diverse as Servolin, de Janvry and Byres (see bibliography).
To do this, it was necessary to integrate a more holistic approach, a methodological framework that could account for the complexities of the historical process of development in peasant economies. In particular, Byres' (1996, 1999, 2002, 2009) study of India, Japan, and other countries concludes that the nature of capitalist development in the rural sector varies depending on agrarian history and other socio-political factors. Specifically, Byres points to the need for further research on the definition of new models of capitalist development through the study of the peculiarities whereby capitalist development processes “from above” or “from below” can be identified in non-European regions without having to fit into the North American or European “farmer” or “junker” models.

The historical perspective is essential to assess the value of the theory of the peasantry as a mode of production, which is based on the notion of the coexistence/articulation of two different modes of production (a peasant mode and a capitalist mode), or of underdevelopment and the predominance of pre-capitalist/non-capitalist relations or interaction between peripheral and central countries. This notion, through different theoretical frameworks, generally supports the theory of economic dualism, where the surviving peasants, tied to their traditional ways of production and life, are juxtaposed against the modern characteristics of the capitalist economy.

Methodologically the Byres’ perspective opens up a new horizon and offers an opportunity to compare the evolution of early simple commodity production in the region under study (capitalism from below), in order to identify particular features that can contribute to the construction of a model that might more adequately explain the evolution of small-scale peasant production in places with complex agrarian histories and ecosystems (Kay 2009; Vergara-Camus 2011; see also a full discussion of the New Ruralist in Chapter 2). This approach moves away from the Eurocentrism of most of these types of studies to focus on the particular features that will afford us a better understanding of these realities.

In other words, after a period of research it became evident that the configuration of government policies needed to be considered an essential component of the region, and it became clear that the history of government
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Policy in La Costa could be divided into two key periods: the regulation of the local economy beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, and the neoliberal reforms that accompanied the upheavals of the 1980s, which deregulated economic activity in La Costa. Given the complexity of the coastal ecosystem and the extraordinary economic dynamism that it gave rise to, aquaculture offered an opportunity to analyse the unique character that this activity gave the economy of the region, which had not been studied until very recently.

This case study of the La Costa region of Nayarit and the historical comparison of these two periods of time is of particular importance because the spectacular growth in shrimp production since the 1990s in countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America (Thailand, Vietnam, mainland China, India, Ecuador, and Mexico, among others) has been largely driven by small farms and agrarian communities8 that have adapted their abundant aquatic resources to the needs of extensive and intensive crustacean production. It is therefore important to understand how the different agrarian, legal, cultural, and political contexts interact with the increasing deregulation of rural activities in these countries in such a way that they may either dissolve or reinforce traditional peasant relationships.

In other words, the features observed in the economic development of small-scale peasant producers in La Costa could help to explain how similar processes are operating in other regions of Latin America and in Southeast Asia that share similar ecological and cultural characteristics, and where, due to the processes of globalization, small-scale rural peasant production is undergoing an increasing economic transformation. The strong presence of commercial capital, in particular, might have operated similarly to the way it has done in La Costa of Nayarit since World War II.

There is a growing body of literature on small-scale production in countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America involved in aquaculture. However, the vast majority of this literature is of a technical nature or focuses on bioeconomic issues. The FAO has regularly compiled publications and other materials of a similar nature in its collection of Fisheries Technical Papers and its Yearbook.

8 The FAO has documented these processes extensively in numerous technical studies.
Context and Nature of the Problem

(FAO, *The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture*, various years). Similarly, various specialist journals in Mexico, such as *Panorama Acuícola* (first published just over a decade ago), and a diverse range of international journals reflect the growing interest in issues related to shrimp aquaculture and the production of other aquatic organisms.

Indeed, as I point out in the body of the research, even investigations into the concept of the agrarian community have been flawed because of theoretical limitations imposed by the reigning socio-economic context of the time (more doctrinaire than theoretical or empirical). Only recently some researchers have started to focus on the hitherto unexamined social and legal problems associated with what has been called small-scale aquaculture in Mexico, Southeast Asia, and Latin America (See discussions of new theoretical focuses on Latin America in the era of neoliberalism and globalisation in Chapter 2). Hence, this is to a large extent virgin territory and the aim of the study is not only to collect relevant data about these small communities but also to use the data to reflect upon and hopefully enhance the theories of small-scale production themselves.

In other words, this study seeks to explore and highlight the need for new information and new historical data that can clarify the *particular features* of agrarian development processes in regions with more complex ecosystems than the homogeneous agrarian structures on which current theory of the peasantry has been founded.

The first approach would involve the identification of *general* aspects of the process of agrarian development in La Costa in order to contrast them with existing case studies (Lijphart, 1971). The second approach would privilege the *particular* features of the agrarian process in question. I have chosen the second approach in order to highlight the *particular* features and contribute to the construction of a theoretical framework adapted to the reality of the situation in Nayarit.

More specifically, the conclusions I reached can be presented as follows: Byres (Byres 2009) considers three conditions as fundamental for establishing a
hypothesis of agrarian transition. Based on his propositions, I have re-classified these conditions as four variables, which are:

(a) Variable 1: capital accumulation, and from this perspective the role and nature of the landowning class during the process of agrarian transition (in this respect, I will analyse the income of the cooperatives, investments, technologies and the *dominance* of commercial capital during the period from 1930 to 1990);

(b) Variable 2: differentiation among the peasantry (the process of transformation from early to advanced simple commodity production, clientelism and differentiated access to information, the consolidation of clientelist networks by the State, etc.);

(c) Variable 3: the class struggle (the struggle for land and aquatic resources, the forms that these struggles took, the autonomy of peasant cooperatives, etc.);

(d) Variable 4: the role of the State, which allows us to broaden the perspective of the study to incorporate the patron-client relationships that have been found to be such a prominent feature of the region under study, as will be demonstrated in the empirical study.

These four conditions will be the main focus of this study of La Costa, and by studying these research topics I will attempt to establish whether or not small-scale aquaculture shares features with peasant enterprises devoted to self-sufficiency.

The results of my research suggest that during the first period of the case study, which began with the end of the armed struggle of the Mexican Revolution from 1910 to 1920, the hacienda system was incapable of structuring and defining the model of capital accumulation “from above”, which following the armed struggle gave rise to a period of political instability in the region under study. The hacienda system failed to define a framework of political and social partnerships that were needed to impose a hegemonic system of control. The political instability ended when a new system of political and economic organisation was implemented, in which the axis of the accumulation process in the countryside shifted to the *ejido*, a form of peasant ownership that was
accompanied by a major agrarian reform and policies to support small-scale rural production, which included the promotion of fishing cooperatives. Thus, my point of departure is the perspective of Byres' theory of the classical agrarian question as a process of development of capitalism from below.

A key element in the outcome of this process was the class struggle (variable 3). After the revolution, the agrarian question constituted the focal point of conflicts related to the political organisation of the state. And it was in 1934 that the Nayarit state government, under Francisco Parra, launched a wide-sweeping process of agrarian reform that almost definitively destroyed large-scale rural ownership and established a new legal and institutional framework in Nayarit.

From that time, the class struggle had a new focus: the institutional organisation and control of the natural resources of the ejidos, now the beneficial owners of the land (Scott 1985).

In this new context, fishing and aquaculture were developed through a production framework promoted by the government (variable 4) and based on extensive regulation that included the restriction that certain species could only be exploited by cooperatives. The ejidos received the land with the right only to its use and enjoyment and not with full ownership of its resources. This prevented the development of a land market and, therefore, of a mortgage market, thereby limiting the presence of bank capital in the rural sector. In its place, a group of public banks appeared while commercial capital effectively defined a framework of economic relationships at its convenience through capital advances in exchange for control of the market of its suppliers. Private enterprise was eliminated from the realm of production and the peasant cooperatives appropriated the exploitation of water resources, including shrimp, which formed the core of one sector of peasant production. A decisive factor in the new organisation of production was the nationalisation of the waterways, which prevented the exploitation of the resources of rivers, lagoons and estuaries without due government authorisation. This was referred to as the concessions system, and required communities in the region to engage in a kind of clientelist intermediation with the political class and other brokers for the
communities with the government in order to obtain permits and public subsidies.

However, the agrarian reform and the concessions system came into conflict in La Costa as nationalisation led to a system of concessions that prevented the communities granted land and resources from exploiting their waterways because such exploitation was granted in concessions to other communities. The conflict led to the creation in 1961 of a large cooperative only for Nayarit, La Única, which would take over the exploitation of shrimp and other resources reserved for exploitation exclusively by cooperatives (See Byres 2002).

The new cooperative began operating under a marketing scheme controlled by a single packing company, which effectively prevented the sale of shrimp from becoming a profitable enterprise. This constitutes a unique feature of the region in which commercial capital immediately imposed financial conditions on the peasant cooperative. Some authors suggest that this type of control could represent a means of capitalist development from above, although in the case of the region under study, the cooperative and commercial capital remained in constant conflict over the appropriation of the economic surplus.

This gave rise to a structural deficit in the operations of Nayarit's big fishing cooperative, to which was added a series of other internal conflicts over the control of the resources and the operation of the cooperative.

During the 1970s, a canal project in the estuary regions and its connection to waterways running into the open sea altered the dynamic of shrimp production and generated new internal conflicts that ultimately eroded the economic and political viability of the single cooperative, which led to its eventual dismantling and disappearance by the early 1990s.

During the second period of the case study, the neoliberal agrarian reform handed over the land completely to the peasantry, creating ejido ownership, and with it the possibility that private capital might make its presence felt in the rural ejido sector.

From that time on, along with constitutional reforms, the government launched wide-sweeping reforms of the sector that included the promotion of new forms of production organisation in which the ejido and private enterprise were
promoted equally; the sector was deregulated, allowing the production of shrimp and other species previously reserved for exploitation exclusively by cooperatives, thereby giving access to private companies interested in shrimp production using a system of semi-intensive shrimp farms.

This liberalisation of the sector resulted in large-scale competition with other producers, mainly based in Asia, for new markets in both Mexico and the United States, the latter being the main destination for Nayarit's shrimp production.

Deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation of the sector have resulted in the presence of new actors in shrimp production and distribution, but also the growth of the sector of services that accompany the different phases of shrimp production, thereby increasing competition in the sector.

Some of the features referred to in the literature on the effects of globalisation on the countryside have appeared in Nayarit, particularly the impoverishment of the cooperative sector, and aquaculture as a kind of pluriactivity as a mean of boosting incomes, among other phenomena (Kay 2009; Vergara Camus 2011; see discussion in Chapter 2, point 2.3 et passim). Politically there was a shift away from cooperatives as the basis for development of institutional relations towards other social actors, mainly private companies.

In summary, after the neoliberal reform the ejidatarios became involved in a new context of globalisation in which the State abandoned the old rules of political engagement with the peasantry, and this probably offered different conditions from those defined according to the classical agrarian question as established by Byres (see Bernstein, Araghi, the New Ruralists and other researchers in Chapter 2).

This case study of La Costa de Nayarit reveals that the process of capital accumulation (variable 1) can be divided into two periods (which matches the periodisation proposed by Bagchi 2009). In the first, the class struggle (variable 3) determined the change of the capital accumulation pattern from a "development from above" model to a "development from below" model. This gave rise to the development of peasant enterprises, which nevertheless had to continue to struggle with commercial capital for their own economic surplus. Their inability to achieve this limited the possibilities of accumulation during the
first agrarian reform and meant in general that variable 2 (differentiation) would not prove definitive for the general process of accumulation in the sense posited by Wood (2009). Variable 3 took a different direction due to the struggle over the economic surplus (more in the manner suggested by Scott, 1985). During this first period, the labour surplus (Lewis 1954) was a factor that placed constant pressure on existing resources and gave rise to illegal production, which was subsequently legalised. Once it was integrated into the production network, this labour surplus pulled incomes even further down (incomes that were already subject to downward pressure by the struggle with commercial capital) and led to increased overexploitation of the resource.

Subsequently, the neoliberal counter-reform (1992) involved a change in focus in agrarian policy that led to a process of definition of property rights with the aim of promoting private enterprise, and a process of differentiation within fishing and peasant communities (variable 2). These changes have given rise to the displacement of artisanal shrimp production and the consolidation of a middle sector of farmers (ejido and private) who have intensified the production process and have been the beneficiaries of the new, neoliberal agrarian policies. To a large extent the development of this farm sector has taken place on ejido land, through the conversion of swamplands into aquacultural zones as a result of the canal project and the subsequent construction of semi-intensive ponds. This development of aquacultural activity has included children of ejidatarios, which has accentuated the differentiation and stratification of producers with rights to ejido land from other members of the same communities, a kind of intergenerational pluriactivity (see Chapter 2). The field research revealed the presence of several strata of residents engaged in different activities that are clearly the result of neoliberal policies. This supports the observations of researchers who have identified this phenomenon in other parts of Latin America as part of the New Ruralism (see Chapter 2). In this way, variable 2 has become a core element in the accumulation process. To contextualise this situation, it is important to note the failure of large-scale business models in the region due to environmental conflicts and the emergence of a segment of the population sensitive to ecological issues that has openly opposed the establishment of such models. However, the middle
sector of shrimp farmers constitutes a factor for capital accumulation in the aquacultural industry in the sense proposed by Wood (2009).

The liberalisation of the market accentuated competition both internally and on the export markets (western United States) with producers in Southeast Asia, the Far East and Latin America. The Mexican market has also become more competitive.

All these changes have occurred in the context of the strong presence of the government and its agencies (variable 4), which has been a key factor in defining the outcome of the class struggle (variable 3), resulting in a clientelist approach to relations between peasant communities and the State.

Based on the above it can also be concluded that the capital accumulation process initially privileged peasant enterprises, which facilitated the transformation from early simple commodity production to advanced simple commodity production in the sense described by Byres (1996), allowing limited expansion of the internal market due to the pressure of surplus labour and the presence of commercial capital absorbing part of the economic surplus. The implementation of the second agrarian reform has led to an increasing process of differentiation within the communities, expanding the internal market for the industry even more. This has coincided with an increase in pluriactivity among producers engaged in artisanal aquaculture in their quest for alternative income strategies, such as services (small businesses) and work outside the local area as day labourers (Kay 2007). These alternatives have not yet been accompanied by the development of “nested markets”, as there is not as yet a definitive movement towards quality and differentiation of aquacultural products as a joint strategy among buyers and sellers (Hebinck, Schneider & var der Ploeg, 2015). However, there has been an expansion of the internal market through the development of new production sectors associated with semi-intensive farms: sanitation services, shrimp larva labs, inputs, drugs, etc.

My analysis of development over the course of a century reveals that there are two periods in the process of capitalist development: one characterized by a process of peasantisation (without enough data to confirm a process of clear differentiation); and a second characterized by a process of capitalism from
below. The two periods with notably unique features. In terms of the classical model of development from below (Byres, 1996; Lenin, 1908; Reimp, 1964), development in the northern US was defined by a shortage of labour and an abundance of land; in the Mexican model, the abundance of labour and the limited area available for aquacultural activity has had a very particular effect on the process of internal market growth, making it notably slow. However, partnership with the State and the development of corporate and clientelist relations has been a factor that has preserved the same model of growth, although it was also a factor that sustained a policy of control over the peasantry until the 1990s, when a new agrarian reform opened up investment in the rural sector to private enterprise and is probably changing the meaning of “the agrarian question” and “labour surplus”, as Bernstein (2009b) points out. Since then the sector has shown a marked increase in production and a process of capitalist development, although labour absorption has been the result of the tertiarization of the region itself, and not only due to migration to the cities or to the United States (Appendini 2002, 2008).

The integration of artisanal and semi-intensive aquacultural activity has been shaped by productivist criteria, attending to the need to increase food production and supply without a structure that would permit greater competition through qualitative mechanisms of development of the market through the differentiation of products.

Hence, the thesis has the following structure:

In the first chapter, I present the context and the main research questions that have guided this research, as well as certain considerations regarding the variables associated with the four aspects mentioned in the paragraphs above.

In the Second chapter, I will present relevant theories of the peasantry and peasant communities and modes of production.

Chapter Three presents the methodology of the research, starting with a description of the archival research and how archival material is used or, for that matter, misused in conjunction with the evidence of initial observation in order to work towards more sustainable initial hypotheses for the actual fieldwork itself. The fieldwork was guided by a case-study approach as defined by writers
like Yin (2009). Subsequent to the case study a quantitative survey was conducted in order to identify the range of communities and their productive practices that could be subject to more in-depth research. The comparative method as developed by Byres (1996) and Ragin (1987) contributed greatly to the establishment of the methodologies to be used and of my instrument for analysis. This method is described in depth in the course of the chapter.

Taking into account the limited number of case studies, the methodology involves the application of a comparative study of two cases, whereby the region under study is compared at two moments in time (the First and Second Agrarian Reforms), following Lijphart (1971).

In short, the combination of research methods in an historical comparative study will be the basis of the methodological proposal for my analysis, drawing on the propositions of Byres (1996), Ragin (1987), Yin (2009) and Lijphart (1971).

Chapters Four to Seven report the results of the study in detail. Chapter Four takes an historical approach and offers an introduction to the case study. From a new historical perspective, I will explain the structure of power relations that preceded the establishment of aquaculture cooperatives in Nayarit. I will also explain how land reform (which resulted in the peasantisation of the region under study) would enter into conflict with aquaculture policies and the role played by government agencies in this process which would result in the regulation of rural activities. This explanation will tie into the next chapter and support a better understanding of the agrarian and production history of the peasantry in Nayarit.

In this chapter, I will also compare the failure and inadequacies of the large rural estates (haciendas) and the development of the first process of agrarian reform as a regulatory process of ejido-based aquaculture.

Chapter Five offers an in-depth analysis of the regulatory process during the period after World War II. This analysis draws from the archives as well as accounts of the actors who participated in the various processes of organisation and construction of the cooperatives and the advent of what some call the ‘modern’ practice of fish farming. I will highlight the role of the government and
the ‘official’ party in the promotion and development of productive activities and their effects on the social structure of the communities, and chart the changes through a review of the creation of the regulations that established the duty to organise the peasants into aquacultural cooperatives for shrimp catching and fishing and the constitution of networks of interest within the cooperatives and their relations with marketing organisations.

In Chapter Six, I continue the work begun in the previous chapter of charting the changes in the region, in this case covering the period up to the introduction of what may be defined as neoliberal policies. Briefly, the process of deregulation that characterised the Mexican version of neoliberalism permitted the establishment of major private enterprises and the intensification of production and inputs for the shrimp industry in both private and peasant sectors. This movement can be defined as one oriented towards the organisation of ‘farms’ (productive units whose rules are governed by immediate profit) and opposed to the more traditional concept of the holding which, as Servolin (1979), Shanin (1983) and others have demonstrated, operates according to a different set of criteria. This is the essence of Chapter Six, which explores how the advent of shrimp farming led to the development of new interest groups. The result has been the complex situation that currently characterises the situation in contemporary rural Nayarit. This chapter lays the basis for returning to the theoretical models presented at the beginning of the thesis and testing them against my description of the current situation and how it has evolved. The analysis considers statistics from official sources (the Mexican government, the FAO, etc.).

In Chapter Seven I will present the results of the survey of a sample of aquacultural farmers and cooperatives in the region under study, as well as a quantitative analysis to determine how the commodification of rural life in aquacultural communities has influenced the conditions indicated above (capital accumulation, class struggle, differentiation/stratification among the aquacultural peasantry and the role of the State) up to the present time.

In particular, the aim of Chapter 7 is to offer new elements to explain the increasing stratification of aquacultural producers in cooperatives and on shrimp farms as a result of the neoliberal policies implemented since 1992.
Part Four of the thesis contains the principal conclusions that can be drawn from the study of the aquaculture of Nayarit. Chapter Eight contains the results of the comparative analysis of the two periods that form part of the comparative research that I conducted in La Costa in Nayarit. I will discuss the explanatory model derived from the research: *capitalism from below in La Costa of Nayarit*, which seeks to explain the transition from one practice and organisation of small-scale production to another, emphasising the roles of institutions and how their policies and practices often have unexpected consequences. This model represents an attempt to develop a theory of how economic forces exist and evolve within a corporatist society and how they change once that society.
Chapter 1

Agrarian Reform in Nayarit, Peasantisation in the ‘La Costa’ region of Nayarit: A Little History and Geography

1. Introduction

I will begin this chapter with an outline of the location of the area under study, along with a summary of the history of the agrarian process in the region. The agrarian history of Nayarit is divided into two key moments: the first was the fight for the land and its resources (peasantisation) and the initiation of commercial aquacultural activity; the second was marked by the deregulation of that activity. A description of this history will conclude the first part of the chapter.

2. La Costa: Peasantisation of a Region in Mexico

The agrarian history of Nayarit has characteristics that distinguish it from the agrarian history of Mexico in general, although the general processes shaping it have been largely the same. After independence from Spain in 1821, rural ownership was highly concentrated into a few hands, but the political separation from the Old World meant that lands formerly granted as royal concessions by the Spanish Crown lost their legal status as such and were turned into private lands, that were gradually broken up into small estates. This system was known as peonage. Peasant populations were tied to the land, and in exchange they received small plots of land from the landowner to grow maize and other food crops. However, while the Spanish Crown had protected the indigenous communities as a mechanism for moderating the power of the landowners
during the colonial period, with the separation of the Mexican State from the Spanish Crown large-scale ownership tended to expand, with the landowners exploiting the weakness of the fledgling State to appropriate the lands of indigenous communities.

This finally occurred after the so-called Reform Laws of 1857, when a Jacobin-style Liberal Constitution confiscated the lands of the Church and of indigenous communities and definitively separated the Mexican State from its ties to the Catholic Church.

The liberal project of the time pursued the establishment of U.S.-style small-scale ownership as a method of agrarian development by allowing the creation of a land market, but instead the Reform Laws resulted in greater concentration of land ownership, leading to the practical disappearance of small-scale communal and rural ownership within a few decades.

By the end of the nineteenth century nearly all land in Mexico was concentrated into the hands of the haciendas, whose owners became the dominant class of the period. These landowners constituted a kind of “liberal” landed aristocracy that formed an economic and political power structure under the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, whose presidency lasted for more than thirty years.

This is what happened in Nayarit, where a small number of haciendas, most notably La Casa de Aguirre, had appropriated vast swathes of land in what would come to constitute the territory of Nayarit.

The Revolution of 1910-20, in which nearly the whole country became embroiled, thus had agrarian roots, and the land problem described above was the main factor that mobilised the armies of peasants who demanded possession of the land. The nearly decade-long armed conflict set the legal foundations for the subsequent “land distribution”, although as Tannenbaum demonstrates, in 1929-30 the hacienda still constituted the main form of land ownership in Mexico.

The end of the armed conflict led to a new Political Constitution that established the restitution of lands to the communities and the creation of new rural population hubs (called ejidos) as key elements in the new social order in the rural sector on which the majority of the country’s population depended. It also
protected the consolidation of the agrarian indigenous groups that had managed to survive the concentration of land in the nineteenth century. But to prevent another land concentration by private interests, the Constitution established a land nationalisation programme that gave the ejido peasantry and indigenous communities use and enjoyment but not legal ownership of their lands. In so doing the Mexican State retained ownership of the land (including subsoil rights, for mining purposes, for example) and of the waters (the object of this study). The new ejido peasants had no rights to sell, lease or mortgage “their” lands. This situation was referred to as possession, not ownership; they only had access to the land for farming or for family use. To transfer possession a complex system of inheritance was created, whereby children and immediate family members could receive use and enjoyment of all or a part of the land from the father. Meanwhile, water resources (rivers, estuaries, lagoons, etc.) became the exclusive property of the nation and their use could only be granted by means of permits.

The fact that this landholding system made it impossible for the peasantry to accumulate and concentrate their lands has been one of the most widely debated points since that time for development theory in Mexico (which will be analysed in more detail below) and for the theory of the peasantry in particular (see Chapter 2).

The political upheaval resulting from the enactment of the new Constitution in 1917 and the agrarian laws that followed it laid the foundations for a struggle which at times erupted into violence, and at other times led to land seizures by desperate peasants (see Chapter 4), and was further complicated by the action of local governments heavily influenced by the interests of the hacienda owners who sought to maintain their properties and political privileges. This was the context of the situation in Nayarit, which will be described in more detail in Chapter 4.

Thus, by the 1930s this situation had resulted in the peasantisation of rural property in Nayarit, with the ejidos constituting the basis of rural ownership. La Costa – the region under study – did not escape this reality, although it is important to note that the area of study is economically the richest region in
Nayarit’s rural sector, which gave it a specific local significance for the process of formation of the agrarian hubs (ejidos).

In general, each ejido was made up of an area of land for personal or family use, and zones for collective exploitation, intended for livestock, forestry or fishing, according to each case. The organisation of these zones depended on the natural resources thereon. The use of resources ‘defined for common use’ thus required the creation of financial institutions that would facilitate collective operations, such as cooperatives, and a wide-ranging legal framework required for collective production. In the zones allocated for individual use the family economy was the basis of operations, which has meant that studies based on the theory of the peasantry in Mexico consider individual or family production as the basis for its characterisation, and there are very few studies of this kind that include complementary activities (such as forestry or fishing) integrated into the whole. The following map shows the study area (see also Chapter 4, Map 4: Land Distribution after the First Agrarian Reform, which is made up of a patchwork of ejido properties and other private properties intertwined with each other most, however, are ejidos).

Since then, Mexico, unlike other Latin American countries, has maintained a large peasant sector. As there was no possibility of leasing, selling or mortgaging ejido lands, no real estate market developed in association with the national private credit system. Because of this, and in light of the poverty of rural producers, the government implemented various programmes aimed at capitalising these producers, ranging from more rational forms of organisation to a public banking system, parallel to the private system, which because peasant land could not be mortgaged developed a highly complex system of regulations, which to this day sustains much of the new credit and investment resources available to rural producers. The cooperative system studied in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 form part of this framework, its development and subsequent breakdown.

In other words, together with the handover of lands the Mexican government implemented a series of laws aimed at promoting the capitalisation of the new ejido peasantry, regulating forestry, waterways and organisation of production on ejidos. In the fishing and aquacultural sector, the object of study in this research, the government limited the exploitation of species like shrimp...
exclusively to peasant production (organised into cooperatives), to the exclusion of private enterprise.

In Nayarit and La Costa, our area of study, these *ejidatarios* were granted land during the last century. Given the geological structure of the area, the *ejidos* are made up of a multifarious collection of farmland, pastures, swamps, lagoons and estuarine areas that have given rise to a variety of economic activities and cultural practices (see map below).

In general, La Costa is dominated by *ejidos* and agrarian communities. The peasants there share the same land together with farmers, fishermen and livestock breeders. The farming population in these communities uses the same lands, coasts, lakes, rivers, mountains and mangroves from which they all derive their incomes, from activities such as agriculture, livestock, forestry, aquaculture and small-scale fishing.

As was the case in the rest of the country, the economy of La Costa was affected by two major events in the twentieth century. The first was a massive regulatory process, which began in the 1920s and then became associated with the agrarian reform that gave peasants (*ejidatarios*) the arable land in Nayarit State. The second event, during the 1980s and 1990s, was a process of privatisation and deregulation that de Janvry (1997) has conceptualised as a second land reform.

My starting point is the 1920s, when the first attempts were made to organise these communities into productive units that were supposedly cooperatives. From that time, a kind of peasant cooperative production began to spread across northern Nayarit.
The land reform granted or acknowledged the possession of the land to people who had been able to demonstrate that it had been theirs during the late nineteenth century before being confiscated by hacendados (estate owners). After the 1920s, the government explored different ways to improve the income of the residents of La Costa in Nayarit and southern Sinaloa (the neighbouring state to the north, whose southern region is similar in this respect to the La Costa region in Nayarit: see Escuinapa in above map). The federal government regulated certain fishing and aquacultural practices through fisheries legislation (the Fisheries Act), which established the requirement that shrimp and other species may only be caught through cooperatives. Private enterprises were prohibited from catching certain regulated species. This regulation of fishing activity gave rise in the 1920s and 1930s to various cooperatives and the development of commercial peasant aquaculture in La Costa in Nayarit. Commercial shrimp catching was based on artisanal practices, such as the method of containing the shrimp by taking advantage of the tides and river currents through the use of weirs, or the use of manual shrimp catching and processing methods (Díaz Marcial, 1985). The wide availability of resources
CHAPTER 1

and the small population in the region favoured the application of these artisanal aquacultural techniques in this early period.

Traditional shrimp farming has been a widespread economic activity among the farming communities of Nayarit in the lowlands of La Costa for many years. This activity has involved the catching of shrimp and fish using hand-crafted technology (until recently) and traditional knowledge of seasonality and hydraulic dynamics of river flooding and ocean tides. These activities were complementary to a domestic economy that was characterised by the first hacienda\(^9\) system (which was essentially agricultural), and then by the peasant economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

The case of peasant aquaculture in Nayarit itself already constitutes a specific difference, insofar as the agrarian systems of the West have been associated with agriculture and livestock farming, while only in Southeast Asia have aquacultural systems been associated with peasant production. This situation in Southeast Asia appears to be similar to the reality in La Costa.

The policy of land distribution that arose out of the Mexican Revolution – after the second decade of the twentieth century – transformed aquaculture into an increasingly extensive trade activity, which led to the formation of a new rural industry during the 1960s and 1970s (Arredondo Figueroa 1990, Díaz Marcial 1990).

Moreover, over the years that small peasant aquaculture flourished in the region it formed part of a broader agrarian process beginning in the 1920s and '30s, which appeared to have a direct influence on the lack of definition of property rights to the land used for aquacultural exploitation by the peasants of La Costa. As the land and waters were nationalised, its exploitation was handed over to the ejidos, but exploitation of the waterways and their resources were

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\(^9\) The "hacendados" were members of the landowning class that grew out of the liberal policies of the nineteenth century. The "hacienda", or estate, emerged during the colonial period, but only became widespread as a form of land tenure during the last third of the nineteenth century through the confiscation of the lands of the Church, the principal landowner in Mexico until the mid-nineteenth century. The Mexican liberals enacted laws to confiscate both church and indigenous land, and the hacienda estates expanded to become the main form of land ownership in Mexico between the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (See Tannenbaum, F. (1929). *The Mexican Agrarian Revolution*. New York: The Macmillan Company).
subject to a licensing process involving a fishing permit issued by the federal authorities. This licensing was a legal process that might even operate against the interests of the inhabitants of the zones subject to exploitation, as these licences did not require permit holders necessarily to be ejidatarios; they could even be individuals from other regions (see Chapters 4 and 5 below).

In spite of this, with the development of a more commercial agricultural sector that flourished from the 1950s to the ‘70s in the context of the agrarian reform process, complementary activities (such as aquaculture) were able to develop in parallel with this process of agrarian reform and regulation, supported by the legal requirement that fishing and aquacultural activities could only be undertaken through cooperatives and without the interference of private companies, which were left out of the process of development of these resources.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Nayarit was marked by the peasant version of the Green Revolution: industrial inputs, industrial pesticides and facilities, and a marketing programme for the distribution of food products with extensive government participation. At the same time, associated with this revival of the rural economy was the development of an ambitious food production programme based on the development of rural aquaculture. In the 1970s, a vast support programme for the rural economy fostered the development of a thriving rural sector, which enabled the modernisation of cash crops (such as tobacco, sorghum, rice and fresh fruits and vegetables).

By the 1970s the State of Nayarit was becoming increasingly urbanised, although half the population still lived in small settlements of less than 2,500. Rural activities continued to be fundamental to the structure of the state’s GDP, and its industrial sector was associated with the manufacture of farm products, particularly for the sugar, tobacco and coffee industries.

Nayarit’s rural sector was dominated by a growing commodity economy after the peasantisation process of the post-war period. A dynamic change in crop patterns became more pronounced in the 1960s: maize and beans were abandoned in favour of new industrial crops like tobacco, sugar cane and coffee. In the 1970s the State promoted fresh fruit and vegetable production,
which contributed to a complex social division of farm labour that reflected the growing commercialisation of rural life. The land area dedicated to sorghum grown for cattle fodder began to expand in the 1970s as the cattle sector developed in neighbouring states along with the urban development of cities like Guadalajara, and in response to the demand for cattle in the north of the country.

At the same time, the 1970s saw the belated introduction of the technologies that had accompanied the “Green Revolution” in other regions of the country. This precipitated a renewed boost to the automation and commodification of farm crops and increased the dependence of rural production on the industry of inputs and new agricultural services.

The economy of the country was effectively a closed economy, and the system of state corporate control described above ensured that all political decisions were “cooked” inside the single party of the State, the PRI.

The state-run economy was made up of a plethora of institutions to oversee the production of small-scale rural producers, nearly all of them public companies: TABAMEX for tobacco, INMECAFÉ for coffee, AZÚCAR S.A. for sugar production, and CONASUPO for the sale of maize and basic grain products.

The producers received huge subsidies for the production and sale of their agricultural products, which were guaranteed by the institutions mentioned above. And these benefits extended to other rural products: in aquaculture, a huge, single cooperative was established in 1961 to guarantee production of fishery products regulated by the agrarian reform laws of 1920-1940. In the 1960s new institutions would guarantee the sale and financing of fishery production, including Banco de Fomento Cooperativo (BANFOCO), Productos Pesqueros Mexicanos (PROPEMEX) for fish sales, and Ocean Garden for exports, a company that secured the monopoly that Mexican shrimp enjoyed on the west coast of the United States until the end of the 1980s.

In short, practically all social and economic spaces in the state were dominated by the idea of the mixed economy. This highly regulated economy reached its climax in the 1970s. Its closed nature meant that prices could be fixed internally and that the vicissitudes of the international economy would not affect the
domestic situation, except for the oil prices, for which the federal government allowed subsidies when international prices began to rise after the nationalisation of the petroleum industries of the OPEC states. The mixed economy was sustained on this model of prices that fed the federal budget and with it this huge state-run economy.

In 1976 the Mexican peso suffered its first major devaluation, which constituted the first setback for the mixed economy; nevertheless, the discovery of new oil deposits and rising international oil prices once again secured the model described above. In the 1970s, land continued to be handed over and the agrarian reform project had been turned into an ideological discourse to support the model.

In 1982, the second major devaluation occurred, and this time the whole country’s social, economic and political climate was seriously affected. The fiscal crisis led to the need to accept an economic adjustment programme that required a reduction in public spending and the investments that depended on it and an increase in tax revenues. The process of opening up the economy also began at this time, in order to obtain the hard currency the government needed to pay the interest on its foreign debt.

I will begin by analysing the process of regulation of rural life that led to the agrarian reform and the handing over of arable land and ecosystems in Nayarit to the peasantry, (see chapters 4 and 5) which can be described as a state-organised process of *peasantisation*. In doing so, I seek to explain the formation of the peasant aquacultural industry and its evolution in terms of the theory of the peasantry.

### 3. Peasantisation and the Corporatist State

In relation to the first process, associated with the *peasantisation* of the region under study, an early approach posited the need to understand the relationships between the peasantry in general and the Mexican State. According to this approach, the post-Revolutionary Mexican State needed to establish a policy for the masses that would give the necessary support to the new State following the Revolution of 1910-1920. The form that this policy for the masses assumed was an authoritarian corporate system that sought to co-
opt the peasantry through its incorporation into a single organisation, the CNC (Confederación Nacional Campesina, or National Peasant Trade Union Federation), and as an extension of this national organisation, policies were introduced that vested this new relationship between State and peasantry with meaning. The Mexican State thus developed an active policy of promoting peasant ownership of land through the Agrarian Reform and other related projects. The biggest exponent of this theory is Córdoba (1985), whose work has maintained an ongoing influence since it was written.

In this context, this approach focuses on the formation of the post-Revolutionary Mexican State and the need for its consolidation through policies aimed at the masses, a nationwide organisational project and a social policy in keeping with a peasant-oriented model. The approach is thus focused on the political ideology associated with the land reform process. From the beginning, land reform was linked to a state ideology concerned with the protection of the ejido and the peasantry. This focus on authoritarianism, studied mainly by Córdoba (de Janvry, 1981), stresses the importance of the link between ideology and corporatism. In other words, this land reform in Mexico was the result of the need to build a system of social control/consensus, which led to a corporate system with a one-party government. Corporatism is linked to forms of political control of the ejidatarios. However, this control mechanism dissolved by virtue of the political changes that took place between 1988 and 2000 (Carpizo, 2001).

This focus is significant for the agrarian history of the region under study because it coincides with the predominance of a single cooperative from the 1960s to the early 1990s that monopolised the exploitation and sale of shrimp in the state, and that constitutes the clearest manifestation of the corporatisation of peasant aquacultural producers in Nayarit. The implementation of regulations to support the peasantry reached its peak with the rise of this single fishing cooperative (‘La Única’).

Subsequent studies have emphasised another feature of the political process of control of the peasantry: clientelism (Lomnitz, 1975; Lomnitz, 2001). The clientelist relationship that developed was associated with the need to consolidate the political support of the masses through a structure in which the
single party could operate as a channel for the transmission of demands from the different regions of the country to the political class in the nation’s capital. These demands were channelled via the clientelist policy of local leaders, co-opted into the single party. The pragmatism of this structure of relations of representation became an identifying feature of the policy of the new party that not only corporatised the peasantry but also opened up channels of communication that made it possible to achieve political consensus through the clientelist policy of the local leaders integrated into the PRI.

Up until the 1970s, the productive and, indeed, social lives of the Nayarit peasants (small-scale producers) were regulated and controlled by a corporatist and clientelist state through an agrarian policy that was based on the distribution of lands to the peasantry through the creation of the uniquely Mexican institution called the ejido (see note 7, chapter 1 and Glossary). Part of the policy involved requiring aquacultural farmers to operate exclusively through what were supposed to be self-regulating cooperatives but which in fact, as revealed in this research (Chapters 4 and 5), were hierarchical organisations under the direction of the corporatist and clientelist State.

These clientelist structures and cooperatives formed an essential part of the relationship between the peasantry and the government, which was dominated by a single party (the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI) for more than seventy years. However, as will be shown in this study, these clientelist relationships evolved over time in the region under study and therefore cannot be characterised as homogeneous.

The corporatisation of the rural population, and particularly of the population involved in aquacultural activities in La Costa in Nayarit, did not occur without resistance from the communities, and thus this process is associated with a struggle for control over the marketing channels and cooperative organisations (Scott, 1985).

This policy style had an enormous impact on the nature of production which theories of small-scale production had difficulty explaining until the writings of Lomnitz (1975, 1998, 2001).
Since the 1990s, this method of control has disappeared due to the deregulation of the sector, and the rural communities of La Costa in Nayarit State have since become directly exposed to global markets and competition, as well as to the presence of private investors.

In conclusion, the agrarian reform in Mexico that began in the 1930s handed ownership of the land over to the peasantry and recognised communities that could produce deeds to the land issued during the colonial era. This meant that old communities unaffected by the growth of the haciendas secured greater stability in the possession of their lands and resources. This process of peasantisation is also linked to the corporatisation of peasant rural activities. Linked to this agrarian process was the construction of an institutional system in keeping with the policy of political and social control, and a body of laws that allowed the political system to reproduce itself and to encompass the peasantry within it.

4. De-peasantisation and the State: The Second Agrarian Reform and its Consequences

The separation of aquaculture as a fully independent activity is linked to the general process of deregulation of rural life that began in the 1980s and has accelerated since the 1990s, within the context of neoliberalism (Arredondo Figueroa, 1990).

In 1982, the Mexican government suffered a fiscal crisis due to falling oil prices and the resulting drop in tax revenue. In response, the IMF provided a support package conditional upon public spending cuts and a series of structural reforms. These reforms reduced the share of the government in various sectors of the economy, including rural sectors. The depression that followed the fiscal crisis and the reduction of public spending in Mexico had an immediate effect on production in various rural activities in Nayarit. The rural economy (and, therefore, the peasant economy) was seriously affected due to the withdrawal of production subsidies, the reduction of production credit, the disruption of markets and other factors.

Associated with the depression of the domestic market in the 1980s, ejido agriculture and aquaculture entered a severe crisis due to the process of
privatisation and trade liberalisation. This process, which began in the early 1980s, has been documented in various studies (see Wicab Gutiérrez, 1994; Wicab Gutiérrez and Sifuentes Ocegueda, 1993) of the state of Nayarit, where a severe dislocation of production was observed, as federal and state governments sought to dissolve the public enterprises and companies to which peasant cooperatives were linked (credit, marketing support, support for the purchase of inputs). Neoliberalism had reached the region.

Deregulation also opened up new possibilities for private companies to begin operating in Mexico’s aquacultural sector. During the 1990s, in Nayarit, private investors launched aquacultural projects on land purchased specifically for that purpose (Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America [NAFTA], 2002).

Not only did the new laws open up access to ejido land that would be bought and sold by both Mexican and foreign private entrepreneurs, but also the regulatory changes of the decade gave rise to new relationships between existing agents and new agents, i.e., private companies.

The advent of the age of the so-called neoliberal and globalising policies during the 1980s and 1990s heralded a sharp departure from the previous socio-economic configuration (de Janvry, 1997). It led to a veritable renaissance of aquacultural production in Nayarit, but the enormous growth in production had important implications for peasant producers, who had to adapt themselves to systems of competition generated by the creation of private farms as well to the increasing contamination of their natural resources.

For more than a decade, between 1982 and 1994, significant legal and macroeconomic changes took place in Mexico as a result of the financial crisis triggered by the collapse of oil prices on the global market. Massive public and private debt forced the government to implement a major fiscal adjustment and a reorganisation of economic policy.

In the 1990s these changes received legal support. The process of deregulation of the land and aspects of production through significant changes to the existing agrarian and fishing laws opened up the ejido system (until then confused by Mexican theorists with Chayanovian models of production or models that
basically considered aquacultural farmers in cooperatives as simple proletarians) to new rules of market competition, leading to new forms of organisation and agrarian and fishing practices.

Between 1982 and 1991, when the constitutional reform was enacted to hand over the land to the peasantry definitively as property, the country underwent a process in which the public companies that had guaranteed the system of protection of production and marketing of rural products were transferred into private hands or handed over definitively to rural producers. This process would result in the abandonment of the cooperative fishery project and the beginning of the deregulation of the rural sector as a whole. The need for hard currency dominated the situation, and with it the promotion of rural export products: shrimp was on the list of exportable products in the 1980s and 1990s, but to boost shrimp exports it was necessary to capitalise the sector and this meant deregulating it and opening it up to private investment.

In 1991 the Constitutional Reform was enacted, bringing an end to the agrarian distribution project and establishing ejido ownership; in the years that followed, new secondary laws were passed to deregulate the shrimp market until finally the fisheries sector was deregulated completely.

Chapters 6 and 7 analyse the consequences of the process described above for the ejido and the fishing cooperatives. The second agrarian reform, this one based on neoliberal principles, brought about the emergence of new social actors in shrimp financing, production and marketing in Nayarit: the private farmers.

Little by little, shrimp production came to depend more on semi-intensive farm production, as the whole shrimp market was transformed and the new farmers completely took over shrimp production and marketing. New phenomena affecting production also made their first appearance at this time, such as the sanitation problems arising from more intensive production and the opening up of the market. Shrimp diseases, a phenomenon that was completely unknown before the 1990s, decimated the farms and estuaries in the state. New needs began to arise for inputs and services that had not previously been part of the artisanal vision of fishing in the collective exploitation zones of the ejidos.
The Mexican version of neoliberalism will be outlined with its many problems and contradictions, but one of the most interesting consequences of the second agrarian reform is that which it appears to have had on the structure of producers and the economic differentiation that has occurred within the group, not only in the relationship between these rural producers and the State (which will be studied in Chapter 7).

The second major phase of federal policy would have profound consequences on the social organisation of rural producers in La Costa. The key feature is the loss of economic and political importance of the sector of small-scale *ejido* producers and the greater attention given to the new sector of farmers. Deregulation and privatisation have opened shrimp production up to new actors who have sought to enter the sector, such as large-scale producers (see Chapter 6), while the conflicts have taken on new dimensions, such as environmental protection or the preservation of peasant production sites (also in Chapter 6). The international shrimp market has influenced these structural changes in Mexico and Nayarit, and new producers have come and gone. What is clear is that small-scale rural shrimp production by peasants as a complementary activity to agricultural production needs to be included in the conception of the mode of peasant production and in theories on this social group. The next chapter will analyse this question and propose a closure of the gap left by certain theoretical aspects that need to be debated in this respect.

In short, together with the new deregulation process, new social actors came onto the scene and new social relations emerged from the interaction between peasant farmers and entrepreneurs.

That is the history that this research will explore. This complexity of social relations, with the active participation of government and its agencies and the regulation-deregulation scenarios, is the basis on which I will conduct the theoretical review in the next chapter.

De Janvry (1981, 1997) identifies two agrarian moments in Mexico. The original land reform began in the 1930s, while the second reform began in the 1990s. The first corresponds to a period of extensive regulation, and the second to the Mexican version of neoliberalism. There are thus two well-defined moments in
the agrarian history of Nayarit: the first is associated with the regulation of rural life, and its focus is the land reform that began in the 1920s and accelerated in the 1930s, with the handing over of land to the peasantry and the end of the *hacienda* system; the second began with the fiscal crisis of 1982, which led to a trend towards deregulation of rural life during the 1980s and the neoliberal reform of the land ownership structure in 1992 – what de Janvry calls Mexico's Second Agrarian Reform. Thus, we have one historical period when regulation and the establishment of a support system for rural enterprises, including *ejido* aquaculture, are the dominant elements of government policy, and another historical period when deregulation and the promotion of the liberalisation and capitalisation of private farming is the core of the State policy.

5. Conclusions

The agrarian reform that began in the 1930s led to the *peasantisation* of the region under study, associated with the development of a corporate model that was linked to the Mexican State's need to establish a social and political support base in different regions of the country.

In the 1990s a new model of government relations changed this political and economic connection between the peasantry and the government. A Mexican version of neoliberalism launched a process of privatisation, market deregulation and opening up of the shrimp market to foreign trade, with some profound social consequences.

In the next chapter, the development of the peasant economy will be considered in light of theory that supports the comprehension of the ongoing agrarian process, and of theoretical categories for analysing the relationships between them that best explain the phenomenon in the La Costa region of Nayarit State.
Chapter 2

Peasants and Aquacultural Farmers: What the Theory Tells Us

1. Introduction

Kautsky (1899; Reimp, 1988) defined the so-called “agrarian question” as a process whereby capital assumes control of agriculture and revolutionises it, destroying the old forms of production and poverty to establish new, superior forms. Conversely, Byres (1996, p. 26; see also Akraim-Lodhi and Kay, 2009b) has described it in contemporary terms as: “the continued existence in the countryside, in a substantive sense, of obstacles to an unleashing of accumulation, both in the countryside itself and more generally – in particular, the accumulation associated with capitalist industrialization.”

The central issue of the so-called agrarian question is related to the continued existence or disappearance of the old forms of production or, as Byres describes it, the existence of obstacles in the countryside that impede the full development of capitalist relations in the rural sector, and therefore hinder capital accumulation. One of these “old” forms of production is the peasantry. But posited in modern terms, without qualifiers, the issue is simply that there are different forms of organisation of rural production and that these constitute “obstacles” to the development of capital accumulation in the countryside.

The forms of organisation of production, and the social relations associated with them, differ from capitalist forms, but their differences consist in the nature of their relationship to rural land ownership. They may be associated with large rural estates or with small-scale rural properties. Capital accumulation may therefore be defined by the conversion from forms of feudal ownership (in the case of Mexico, the large estates known as haciendas, inherited from the days of Spanish colonisation) into capitalist enterprises. This development is defined as development from above and made large estates the focal point for the
capitalist transformation of agriculture. But as large estates were destroyed in many regions of Mexico in the revolution from 1910 to 1920, smaller properties known as *ejidos* defined the model of accumulation in much of the country, turning the peasantry into the axis of a process of *agrarian transition to capitalism from below*. Theoretically, this question of the continued existence or disappearance of peasant production is the core of the debate in Mexico.

The Mexican state of Nayarit offers a case where, as we have seen, 80 percent of rural ownership is in the hands of *ejido* members (*ejidatarios*) or small-scale private peasant owners. The theoretical analysis is thus posited in these terms, based on the possibility that small-scale peasant ownership, and particularly the *ejido*, is the basis of a process of accumulation that converts small-scale producers into small business owners, and in many cases proletarianises them.

According to the positions of different researchers, the mode of peasant production may be considered a different mode of production from the capitalist system and may develop different strategies of survival or success in the market or form part of a different process of transition following the effects of neoliberal reform and globalisation, as Bernstein (1996; 2006) and others have shown (see 2.3 below).

Globalisation has changed the context of the classical agrarian transition. In this respect it is important to differentiate two clearly delimited historical periods in the case study: the period in which small-scale peasant production predominated both in the discourse and in specific government initiatives (policy of subsidies, favourable regulations, public banks for financing small-scale ownership, commercial policy to protect basic grains and other peasant products, and public investment in the sector); and the period in which this approach ended to give way to a neoliberal approach to public policy. These two periods fit well with the theoretical interpretations on the question. The academic literature has changed in this respect. We should therefore clarify the different positions on the interpretation of the rural sector in Latin America, particularly with the theory of “New Ruralism”, “La Vía Campesina” (VC), and other similar positions that attempt to identify the distinctive features of each period.
Interpretations of the historical process described in the previous chapter have been divided between researchers who argue that the Mexican peasantry has been proletarianised and others who have sought to demonstrate that the peasantry has modified its strategies for survival to develop a mode of production of its own (according to this proposition, the survival of the peasantry is associated with new movements like La Vía Campesina, “and other social movements against land grabbing and free trade and for a bottom-up agrarian reform and ‘food sovereignty’” [Kay 2015]). For a third group of theorists, the development of rural activities has been affected by the globalisation process and the neoliberal policies that have resulted in the development of contract farming and other forms of subordination of small-scale rural producers to big transnational interests. At the same time, the neoliberal government is unwilling to link national (peasant) agriculture to industry as in the classical formulation of the agrarian question (see 2.3 below). Meanwhile the system of small aquacultural production has been transformed over the last few decades from an early simple commodity production system to an advanced commodity production system in the sense defined by Byres (1996), and aquacultural producers have depended increasingly on the structure of domestic and international shrimp markets. This transformation is evident in the shift from the possession and ownership of production conditions, raw materials and operating supplies by the small producer towards a greater dependence for these elements (including machines, weirs, nets, boats, technology, and even the land itself) on supplier markets. In this way, artisanal aquacultural production has been giving way to advanced commodity production.

Then until the beginning of the 1990s, the tone of academic discussion in Mexico focused mainly on the future of the ejido peasantry. But following the agrarian reforms of 1992, the dynamic of the debate changed substantially, coming to focus on the following question: to what extent had the globalisation process under way altered the meaning of the so-called “agrarian question”? Or, as Akraim-Lodhi and Kay (2009b) put it, “If capital and capital accumulation is increasingly internationalized, does agriculture continue to have a possible role in the emergence of capital within states, or is agriculture transformation
irrelevant to the emergence of capital within a state as the very circuits of capital have become globalized?“.

The discussion has taken on a new dimension. The internationalisation of agrarian markets, with the growing presence of transnational corporations operating in domestic markets, has given rise to a flurry of studies, opinions, and developments. It is this discussion that will be explored in this chapter.

In part 2 of this chapter I will examine the theory that emerged out of the first agrarian process. Some authors, like Córdoba (1985), note the corporatisation of rural life and the rise of an authoritarian State associated with this agrarian process. Later, a series of anthropological studies –Foster (1948), Wolf (1965), Lomnitz (Lomnitz 1975, Lomnitz 1975)— described rural life and its first contradictions associated with the relationships with agents outside the communities (politicians, trade intermediaries, etc.). In the 1960s and 1970s a protracted debate developed over the future of the Mexican peasantry (de Rouffignac, 1985). This debate produced a wide range of peasant literature that used certain classic authors as sources (Chayanov, 1991; Lenin, 1908; 1964; 1972; etc). This debate has continued up to the present in Nayarit and includes recent studies of the situation in certain sectors of the peasantry in the state (Schultz Robles, 1990; Madera Pacheco, 2009; Garrafa Torres, et al., 2013). In this section of the chapter I will present the relevant theory, beginning with the most oft-quoted theoretical sources, and then go on to analyse the treatment of agrarian evolution in Mexico, which has been characterised by some as economic dualism, and by others as an articulation of modes of production. I will examine the recent literature on agrarian deregulation, and what de Janvry (1997) has characterised as Mexico's Second Agrarian Reform.

Other studies, such as those by Foster (1948), Wolf (1965), and Lomnitz, (1975; 1998; 2001), have pointed to the particular feature of clientelist relationships that developed along with this *peasantisation* (politicians, trade intermediaries, etc.). I will also review the main propositions of these theorists.

I will outline the general aspects of the debate from the theoretical perspective of Marxist and non-Marxist Political Economy, mainly according to the theory of
capitalist growth (Lewis, 1954), following Byres (1995; 1996; 2009). From this perspective, it is essential to view the agrarian transition in broad terms through a general characterisation of the process. Having done this, it is then necessary to clarify the nature of the mode of capitalism that will be developed and thus the accumulation of capital, the nature of the class struggle and the role of the State in this transition (Byres 1995; 1996). To this end, I will employ Byres' (1996) interpretation of early and advanced simple commodity production as a characterisation for peasant producers and their evolution into capitalist and market-based societies. Based on this interpretation, the agrarian history of this region can be reconstructed as a process of progress from simple commodity production towards advanced commodity production adapted to the particular historical conditions of capitalist development in the region (Byres, 1996: pp. 361 et passim).

The conclusions drawn from the theoretical review and the variables to be considered in the study and as a preface to chapter 3 (Methodology) are outlined in the last section of the chapter.

2. The First Agrarian Reform: Peasantisation and Regulation

2.1. Problems of Agency and Patronage Relationships

Peasantisation in Mexico, according to some authors (Córdoba, 1985), led to the corporatisation of rural life and the rise of an authoritarian State. Since the late 1950s, and particularly since the 1960s, anthropological studies have identified the presence of a patron-client relationship as one of the characteristic features of the Mexican peasantry in relation to external intermediaries. Foster (1948), Wolf (1965), Lomnitz (1975; 1998; 2001) and others describe these patron-client relationships, although some of them, particularly Wolf (1965 and 1966), see them simply as mechanisms of consolidation of a kind of caste system within the ejidos, which, as it becomes established, may give rise to potential economic, social and political differences (see chapters 4 and 5 below). Clearly this does not constitute a process of classes formation.
These studies have identified particular features of the relationship between rural communities, their organisations and individuals and institutions external to them. They highlight the relationships with trade intermediaries, and certain phenomena associated with political intermediaries, as well as patronage relationships. Over time, these studies have come to constitute a genuine body of theory that identifies certain features related particularly to issues of agency, and the way in which individuals interact with corporatising and centralising tendencies and local power structures, as mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Studies of this type point to the need to discuss agency-structure issues from the perspective recently outlined by Blatter J. Haverland M. (2012). That is, as this study is based on a social class perspective, it assumes that problems of agency are subordinate to the general process of establishing a broad system of social relations of production in the rural sector, in the sense proposed by Marx (1993). In other words, as aquacultural farmers in La Costa are subjected to a growing process of commodification of their economic and social environment, their everyday activities will occasionally express the contradiction between general commodifying tendencies and the everyday activities of a peasant economy (Rap, 2004: 19-20), a contradiction that I will describe further below.

In particular, I adopt the point of view of Byres (1996), who suggests that the battle between the will of individuals and the general shift towards commodification of public life are expressed in the system of social relations

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10 In general, patronage is understood to refer to relationships involving the “power to confer favours, give support and protection, or to appoint to office or position. Providers of patronage (patrons) and receivers (clients) form a network through which access to various resources is obtained. It originates from unequal distribution of power (See Lomnitz, 1975; 1998; 2001). In La cultura política chilena y los partidos de centro: una explicación antropológica, (1998: Mexico, FCE), Lomnitz and Melnick characterise these relationships as vertical as opposed to horizontal, and point out that they may also be mediated by brokers, who liaise between client and patron and who, being linked (as in the case of Mexico) to the single party in power, may hold considerable political influence.

11 “The agency-structure problem refers to the question of whether the building of social science theory should start with the behaviour of individual agents or with the constituting and regulating functions of social structures.” (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: Chapter 1, section 1.2.3, para. 3).
and in the class struggle, sometimes in what Scott (1985) calls ‘everyday forms of resistance’. These are real conflicts for which the solution is not predetermined, and the way in which the struggle is resolved (or not) will give rise to particular features in the development of the agrarian situation in each region or country. And it is precisely there, argues Byers, that the particularities of each case lie.

As peasants need a certain degree of mediation, some individuals may use their privilege and knowledge of bureaucracy or politics to turn this mediation between peasants and bureaucracy into a profitable business. This privilege may be a permanent situation and should offer a clue to follow in analysing the processes of social differentiation among peasants in Nayarit.

Recent works by González Alcantud (1997), Moreno Luzon (1999), Rap (2004 and 2007), the last of which deals with Nayarit, and also Kuhn’s (1998) study of Asian societies, analyse the issue of patron-client relationships from different perspectives. While for Moreno Luzon and Kuhn these relationships explain recent interactions between rural communities and the State in the process of agrarian development in the countries of Southern Europe and Latin America, for Rap (2004; 2007), individuals develop attitudes of agency that allow them to interact and to have an effect on their environment.

The work of Khan (2000) and Khan and Jomo (2000) analyses the growing relationship between patronage and primitive accumulation in fast-growing countries in Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent from an economic perspective. Such issues may indicate that the phenomenon is more widespread, and Mexico could also be a good example of such a model of capitalist development.

Wood (2012) posits the thought-provoking notion that unlike other social formations, capitalism is characterised by the separation of the political sphere from the economic sphere, in the sense that the political sphere constitutes the activity of the public sector while the economic sphere is considered the realm of the private sector. In this case the clientelism and corporativism that characterise societies like Mexico constitute a space in which the political sphere has extended its reach into the domain of civil society. Clientelism-
corporativism appears to be a peculiar feature of societies where state control is expanded through institutions like political parties and civil organisations (such as cooperatives, for example), which it thereby subsumes. As Wood herself suggests, this can happen "where private property remains underdeveloped" (Wood, 2012; p. 22). In the case of Mexico, the presence of regional powers that rival the power of the federal government in their respective regions seemed to compel the State to find mechanisms of control and political consensus that would consolidate its centralised power, while at the same time the weakness of peasant ownership made it necessary for the State to extend its powers beyond the public political sphere to encompass civil society organisations, and particularly peasant institutions like the *ejido*, the community, and the production organisations (cooperatives) themselves. This made it possible to organise the process of surplus extraction in a way whereby the State *privatised* this appropriation, "on such a scale that the state served as a form of private property" (Patriquin, 2012; Byres 2002). Chapter 5 shows how the extension of state power entailed the organisation of the La Única cooperative, and how in the original incarnation of this cooperative the Mexican State controlled the election of its manager. Subsequently, it would employ other mechanisms that would enable it to maintain control of its organisation.

### 2.2. Theories of the Peasantry during the Peasantisation Period (early 1900s to the 1980s)

There is one dominant body of theory associated with the debate over the so-called agrarian question. This body can be subdivided into various explanatory models, or bodies of theory, and constitutes the most extensive theoretical framework in the literature on the rural sector in Mexico.

The peasantry accepts its subsumption through commercial or labour markets in order to subsist (for example, they accept low prices for their products or low wages, etc.), because they are only complementing their agrarian incomes (in cash or in kind).
CHAPTER 2

The main source for campesinista (peasant-oriented) theorists is Chayanov. According to Chayanov (1986), peasants (i.e., peasant family enterprises) who don't depend on wage labour constitute a non-capitalist mode of production, and manage to subsist through the advantages conferred by family labour. However, the peasant economy depends on the existence of a growing agricultural frontier that would allow for expansion in accordance with the demographic expansion of the peasantry. This supposition is not adequately considered by the advocates of the continued stability over time of the peasant economy. In Mexico, campesinista sociologists such as Almeida Salles (1984), Warman (1976; 1983; 2001; 2003), Stavenhagen (1966), Paré (1975), Appendini (2002) and Bartra (1974), economists like Rello (1990) and campesinista anthropologists like Pozas (1971), among others, argue that the Mexican ejido peasantry met the necessary conditions to continue as a productive family enterprise and survive the development of capitalism in the rural sector.

Other interpretations do not deny the existence of the peasant economy and its capacity to survive, but they view it as a capitalist economy in development. In this way, the theories of economic dualism took shape.

The theory of functional dualism (Lewis, 1954; Sen, 1966), through the works of authors like Johnston (Johnston and Mellor, 1961) had a strong influence on a series of research projects in Mexico in the last century; for example, as influential a researcher as Hewitt de Alcántara (1985) or, more recently, Rello and Saavedra (2013).

According to Lewis (1954), the existence of this peasant sector is a characteristic of new developing economies, in which their gradual incorporation into the capitalist economy represents the means of survival for a sector of the population that constitutes an oversupply of labour resulting in a surplus in the capitalist economy that stimulates its growth. This process will continue until the backward sector is absorbed by the capitalist economy.

An alternative theory is associated with the debate over the articulation of modes of production, whereby the peasant mode of production was subordinated to and interacted with the capitalist mode of production.
The debate over the peasant mode of production gave rise to the theory of its articulation with the capitalist mode of production. The basic elements of this approach are the French school (Meillassoux 1977; Servolin 1979; 1977).

In general, the aforementioned theoretical approaches to the evolution of the peasantry in developing societies consider certain factors such as the availability of natural resources, access to credit, marketing channels and available infrastructure (Rello and Saavedra, 2013) as elements that favour the chances of survival of the peasantry in these societies. These approaches require that peasants and their families continue to be associated with rural activities in general, including wage labour (as day labourers, for example), in order to measure the degree to which family ‘survival’ strategies prevent the disappearance of rural self-consumption activities.

An approach in opposition to the ones outlined above points to the incorporation of the peasant economy into the capitalist mode of production, a theory defended by the so-called descampesinistas, or theorists who identify the disappearance of the peasant family economy and the rise of a capitalist economy within the heart of the peasant economy itself, through a process of social and economic differentiation.

In these approaches the average peasant is characterised as a small-scale landowner (Calva, 1988) or petit bourgeois (Foladori, 1986). The peasantry has been disappearing or is in the process of disappearing, and most peasants will be transformed into proletarians or semi-proletarians, while the rest will become members of the rural bourgeoisie. Some theorists following this line posit that the peasant aquacultural farmers of the region have been transformed into proletarians (Lobato González, 1989).

The theories of the campesinistas draw on Leninist theories of the development of capitalism in rural areas (Lenin 1908; 1964 4ed.; 1972) and the engagement with Russian populism, as well as certain Marxist approaches to the topic (Marx, 1981). During the 1970s, this discussion was the focus of the bulk of the work produced by Mexican researchers.
In contrast to the campesinista approaches, some in this debate have posited a ‘need’ for the disappearance of the peasantry as a social class because developing capitalism destroys the foundations of the peasant economy and family labour.

In short, the intense debates of the 1960s and 1970s in Mexico, when peasantisation and agrarian reform continued alongside increasing regulation by the State that sought to stimulate the development of a peasant economy, do not appear to have reached any consensus as to its survival. It is clear that studies of the peasantry separated specifically ‘peasant’ activities from rural activities, such as fishing (see Calva, 1988). In other words, these perspectives did not allow for a consideration of a peasantry involved in non-agricultural activities, such as small-scale aquaculture, and therefore limited its comparability with agrarian societies (such as Southeast Asia) where the supply of protein foods came mainly from aquacultural activities. These perspectives appear to suffer from insufficient empirical evidence.

Instead, discussions centred on conceptual aspects that continue to be the object of debate, such as the very existence of a peasant sector, or the notion of economic dualism. For some authors, the peasantry rapidly adapted to the market and the processes of impoverishment and pauperisation of the peasantry were and are no more than resistance strategies. For others, it was a process of decomposition of the peasant community, and a process of social class formation in the rural sector.

2.3. The Second Period: Neoliberalism and the Peasantry (the Debate over the Effects of Globalisation).

In the last years of the 1980s and with even greater intensity since the 1990s, the discussion over the future of the peasantry in Mexico, echoing the international discussion, came to focus on the effects that neoliberal policies would have on small-scale rural producers.

According to Hobsbawn, as of 2007 and for the first time in global history, the world’s rural population became relatively smaller than its urban population; in other words, globalisation has resulted in significant transformations in the rural
sector. The features of this process have led researchers around the world to different conclusions. In general, we can classify these different positions into three main categories: authors who posit the peasant question from the perspective of the (historical) transition towards a predominantly capitalist economy (Byres, Wood, Bernstein, McMichael, and others) and explore the role of the peasantry in this process; authors who view globalisation as a new era of subordination of rural and peasant producers to new forms of industrial capital, especially transnational corporate capital and big commercial chains, and; authors who take an intermediate position, highlighting the changes that globalisation has brought for peasant economies, but focusing their attention on the new realities resulting from the restructuring of production, commerce and institutions (New Ruralism in general, van der Ploeg, etc.). While this classification is not conclusive and cannot set precise limits on what is an open discussion, it attempts to identify the main features that characterise the arguments and the boundaries between them, for the purposes of clarifying the terms of the academic debate.

In general, the academic literature in Mexico has echoed the global debate and tended towards the adoption of one point of view or the other, with a focus on empirical studies, some of which point to new patterns of institutional relations with the State (e.g. Mackinlay; Carton de Grammont), or the development of new models of peasant organisation in a context of increasing internationalisation of the rural economy (Bartra 2003) or of new models of peasant integration into new markets (Bartra 1995). Finally, there are also authors who integrate these new elements while still considering the issue of social classes to be essential (Rubio, Calva, etc.).

A brief summary of these positions is presented below.

2.3.1. Historical perspectives on the peasantry and small-scale rural producers.

In the current literature (as noted above) the issue of the peasantry and its future in developed and/or less developed capitalist societies is linked to the discussion of the historical factors that have determined the transformation of
peasant economies into capitalist enterprises (Wood) and the so-called “peasant question” or issues related to the role of the rural economy in the development of capitalist social formations and the industrialisation process. The debate on this issue is wide-reaching and the authors mentioned below do not cover the full scope of the debate; however, they stand out for their definitions of the main points around which the discussion revolves.

Ellen Meiksins Wood (2009; 2012) suggests that the transition from a precapitalist (feudal) society to a capitalist society requires a specific explanation because “some characteristics of capitalism are unique”. In opposition to those authors who see the development of capitalism as an urban phenomenon, Wood suggests that in its origins capitalism was an agrarian phenomenon. Patriquin (2012, p. 8) suggests that Wood's essential argument is related to questions like “how is productive activity, in particular surplus-appropriation, organised within an economic system? What is the architecture of exploitation? For instance, are ‘central’ state-officials the dominant exploiters, or do they compete with ‘local’ landlords for the same peasant-produced surpluses?” In responding to such questions, Wood argues that the capitalist mode of production is different from any other; more specifically, for her its essential feature is linked to the question: “in what specific conditions do competitive production and profit-maximisation themselves become survival-strategies, the basic condition of subsistence itself?” (Patriquin 2012, p. 11)

In other words, the key element in the transformation of peasant economies is the identification of the process whereby the social functions of production and distribution, i.e., surplus extraction, appropriation and distribution, are “privatised” (Patriquin 2012, p. 19). The substitution of extra-economic state mechanisms, for example, as mechanisms of surplus extraction gives rise to economic processes of appropriation in which the commodification of economic life is central.

It is in this respect that Wood's argument seems to me to be supported by the first period of my case study, when the Mexican State promoted the peasantisation of the rural sector, a process that also involved steps that would later lead to the consolidation of mechanisms to allow its subsequent
privatisation. For example, corporatisation and the promotion of clientelism could be considered in this way.

Wood also suggests that the characteristic feature that differentiates the capitalist system from other social forms lies in the fact that “differs from other social forms because producers depend on the market for access to the means of production (unlike, for instance, peasants, who remain in direct, non-market possession of land); while appropriators cannot rely on ‘extra-economic’ powers of appropriation by means of direct coercion […] but must depend on the purely ‘economic’ mechanism of market. This distinct system of market-dependence means that the requirements of competition and profit-maximisation are the fundamental rules of life.” (Wood 2012, p. 37)

This aspect is fundamental in the transition of precapitalist economies to modern, capitalist forms of production. What transforms profit maximisation into a fundamental aspect of life, and competition into the driving force that stimulates constant capital accumulation?

For T. J. Byres (1995; 1996; 1999; 2002; 2009) the key issue is the nature of the transition process, “I do so in terms of the kind of landlord class, the kind of class struggle and the kinda of peasant differentiation that was integral to ‘agrarian transformación’. (Byres 2009, p. 58). Byres views the process of differentiation of the peasantry as interacting with the class struggle and the landlord class to produce a particular outcome. Differentiation is not merely an outcome of the transition process but an essential part of that process.

In Byres's terms (1996: 27), the transition process is defined as “those changes in the countryside of a poor country necessary to the overall development of capitalism and its ultimate dominance in a particular national social formation.” The transition process is therefore determined by three key factors associated with the class directing the transition (capitalism from below or from above) and defining the type of capital accumulation, the role of the State in this process and the class struggle.

F. Araghi (2009) classifies the historical periods as colonialism and post-colonialism. During the second period, there was a governmental impulse
towards endogenous industrial development, or what he calls national developmentalism. A subsequent stage associated with the second period is related to globalisation.

In all these stages, Araghi argues that both the colonial period and the post-colonial period have seen a process of dispossession of the peasantry:

“1 peasant dispossession by differentiation in eras of national protectionism of the home market; and

2 peasant dispossession by displacement in eras of world market hegemony.

I argue here that the specific character of the peasant question of our times is, simultaneously, dispossession by displacement and deproletarianization on a world scale.” (Araghi 2009, p. 118). From a historical perspective, Araghi offers an alternative interpretation for the era of globalisation that criticises Byres: the agrarian question after the postwar period "applied the lessons of the original debate to an altogether different purpose, turning the political peasant question into a developmentalist peasant question focused on third world development" (Araghi 2009).

According to H. Bernstein (2009a; 2009b; 2014; 2015; 2016), “globalization challenges the assumptions of the classic agrarian question” (Bernstein 2009b)

In classical terms, the problem of the transition has been posited from Byres' perspective as revolving around the question of “How do transitions to capitalist agriculture contribute (or otherwise) to the accumulation necessary for industrialization” (Bernstein 2009b, p.241)

According to Bernstein (Bernstein 2009b p. 247) historical notions that associate feudal-like processes with the redistributive policies that might constitute an agrarian reform can no longer be used to characterise the countries of the underdeveloped/developing globalised world. Instead, Bernstein characterises the contemporary context of the agricultural sector as follows:

“The agricultural sector in capitalism today is [...] increasingly, if unevenly, integrated, organized and regulated by the relations between agrarian classes and types of farms, on one hand, and often highly concentrated capital
upstream and downstream of farming, on the other hand. Moreover, such integration and regulation operates through *global* as well as national and, indeed, more local social divisions of labour, circuits of capital, commodity chains and sources and types of technical change, including in transport and industrial processing, as well as farming.” (Bernstein 2009b, p. 248; italics OW)

What this means is that since the 1980s, global capital has taken control of agriculture and of the rural sector, which was the key issue of the “so-called agrarian question”, as outlined above in my discussion of Byres.

With the “agrarian question” now resolved by *global capital*, the problem for the small-scale farmer, or the small-scale rural producer, has turned to a different question: the agrarian question of labour.

“I prefer the term ‘classes of labour’ to the inherited vocabulary of proletarianization and proletariat, semiproletarianization and semiproletariat, as it is less encumbered with problematic assumptions and associations in both political economy, such as functionalist readings of Marx’s concept of the reserve army of labour, and political theory and ideology, such as constructions of an idealized, Hegelian collective class subject.” (Bernstein 2009b p. 250)

According to Bernstein, this configuration has global features and goes beyond the capital-labour relation (See Bernstein 2009b).

In this sense it is also a criticism of the theories on La Via Campesina and other similar propositions that will be discussed in the next section.

According to another researcher, P. McMichael, the peasant question today is related to the historical background of capital accumulation, “The agrarian question today is conditioned by the political history of capitalism, which includes struggles to exercise, obtain and defend a complex of rights. Put simply, rights struggles include workplace conditions, civil and social rights in the state, and human rights in and for representation in global society.” (McMichael 2009, p. 289). From a theoretical perspective, the agrarian question was seen as external to capital accumulation, as it involved precapitalist production relations.
“The postwar food regime was characterized by an intensive accumulation process geared not to cheapening wage-food consumption, but rather to incorporating consumption relations into the accumulation process itself (Friedmann and McMichael 1989). Accordingly, a food culture centred on animal protein consumption, and identified with a ‘developed’ lifestyle, emerged in the USA and as a target for emulation across Europe, Japan and eventually the growing middleclass strata in the third world. This development spurred a second wave of agricultural outsourcing, as consumer markets for processed food, fast food and fresh counter-seasonal food emerged, and food corporations responded by developing joint ventures and transnational supply chains (Friedland 1994) Thus, an increasingly integrated world agriculture emerged, maturing through the devices of the debt regime, which normalized agro-exporting as the new ingredient of financial orthodoxy and global development.” (McMichael 2009, p. 292)

The development of agribusiness has led to a crisis in the farming economies of developing nations, due to the fact that “agrarian communities everywhere are under threat from agribusiness” (McMichael 2009, p. 292).

“This mercantilism originated in the USA as the dominant state – ironically, the source of Kautsky’s agrarian crisis – which used its agricultural surpluses and, later, global food sourcing as a vehicle of hegemony as it built food dependency, dietary emulation and a global food consumer culture across the world.” […] “It has been replaced by a common interest between peasants and wage labour in reconstituting social reproduction. This is food sovereignty in action.” (McMichael 2009, p. 293 and 296)

It is in this sense that the question of food sovereignty arises as an “agrarian question of food” for McMichael. “As Raj Patel observes, food security ‘is agnostic about the production regime, about the social and economic conditions under which food ends up on the table’ (Patel 2007: 90)” (McMichael 2009, p. 298).

McMichael suggests that the trade system that was institutionalised with the WTO and that imposed an artificially cheap world for foodstuffs fetishised and subordinated private profits to public profits (food sovereignty, for example).
“The commodification of food, via agro-industrialization, is thus not just about the substitution of industrial, or wage-foods, for peasant foods; it is also fundamentally about how this food regime generates redundant populations and destabilizes social and ecological relationships.” (McMichael 2009, p. 300)

For McMichael, Byres's theory identifying three key factors in the agrarian question (i.e., in the transition of rural economies to capitalism a) from above or below; b) the relationship of the class struggle in the transition, or the political aspect; and c) the role of farming in accumulation) requires qualification (McMichael 2009, p. 303), as these aspects interpret the transition in national terms and dehistoricise capitalism while paradoxically promoting a historical understanding of capitalism. Instead, McMichael argues that the question should be placed in the contemporary context where the main contradiction is between the peasantry and the global network of agro-capitalism (Kumar 2016).

2.3.2. Perspective of crisis of peasant economy and subordination of the small-scale rural producer.

Authors who adopt a historical perspective on the peasantry, like Araghi, McMichael, and of course Bernstein (see previous section), share the view that the process of globalisation (sustained by neoliberal policies) has involved a subordination/subsumption/proletarisation of the peasantry and of rural producers to agro-global enterprises. In addition to these authors are others who also identify this phenomenon as a key feature of the contemporary period.

According to some authors, the neoliberal transformations of recent decades, and globalisation in particular, has produced a worldwide agrarian crisis:

“This articulation of a global agrarian crisis with, in a sense, massive ‘overproduction’ in some parts of the global food system, has led some to argue that fundamental shifts are under way in the world food system, as capital in the form of agro-food transnational corporations, in conjunction with states operating through the World Trade Organization, seeks to reconfigure global agriculture. As a result, it can be expected that the position of the peasantry will be, at best, as little more than contracted petty commodity-producing pieceworkers subsumed within the buyer-driven commodity chains of corporate
agro-food transnational corporations (McMichael 1994; Friedmann 2004; Bernstein 2006). In this way, the subordination of the peasantry to capital on a global scale continues, as it has in the past, but assumes a new character” (Akram-Lodhi & Kay 2009, pages 4-5)

M. Teubal analyses “the influence of globalisation processes on agrarian and agro-food issues in Latin America and the way in which they impact on what has been referred to as the ‘New Ruralism’” (Teubal 2001, p. 46). The concept of “New Ruralism” (Nueva Ruralidad) thus involves studying the phenomenon of globalisation and its effects on the agrarian and food sector, particularly in Latin America.  

For Vergara-Camus (2011), the Latin American rural sector has changed radically because global agribusiness has been deepening its control over the small-scale peasantry. The former dualistic rural structure (capitalist and peasant economy) has given way to a highly complex peasant crisis in which global agribusiness, the commercial peasantry and small-scale subsistence peasants all co-exist in the new rural world. The crisis in the Latin American rural sector is one of peasant reproduction. As we will see later (in Part Three, Chapters 6 and 7), this argument accords with the situation of the small-scale aquacultural enterprises in Nayarit and with the new structure of rural production.

This phenomenon in particular “reflects the intensification of the domination of capital over agriculture in the context of an increasingly globalised capitalist process: the growing prevalence of wage labour; the precarisation of rural employment; multiple occupation; the expulsion of small and medium-sized producers from the sector; the constant city-country or cross-border migrations; the increasing market-orientation of agricultural production; the articulation of agrarian producers with agro-industrial complexes dominated by decisions of power centres linked to major transnational or transnationalised corporations” (Teubal 2001, p. 46-7; Vergara-Camus 2011).

The analysis of New Ruralism aims to reflect “the international division of labour

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in the agro-food sector” (Teubal 2001, p. 49) and the changes it is undergoing, and the changes to traditional third-world exports with the introduction of new products.

The studies of these changes have several dimensions: in terms of changes in economic policy; in terms of market structures; and in terms of the products promoted for export.

With respect to the first of these, Teubal identifies the policies aimed at privatisation, the promotion of foreign investment and the liberalisation of markets, as well as the abandonment of subsidy policies, food price support programs, credit arrangements, etc.

As far as the promotion of new export products is concerned, Teubal suggests that in many cases non-traditional exports have replaced the production of basic products, resulting in shortages and price rises that have affected Latin America’s poorer populations. Another problem is related to environmental issues, as “significant health and environmental problems have been created as a result of the mass use of agrochemicals, especially pesticides, many of which are banned in the highly industrialised nations” (Teubal 2001, p. 49).

Akram-Lodhi, Kay and Borras (2009) argue that “Neoliberal agrarian restructuring”. […] “as a consequence of neoliberal agrarian restructuring, peasant farms no longer had access to state support in the form of subsidies, financial credit, technical assistance, and marketing, and this had an impact on farm yields.” (Akram-Lodhi, Kay and Borras 2001, p. 224)

“This is because it acts both as a provider of agro-food commodities that lower the value of labour-power in the advanced capitalist countries – and hence raise the rate of relative surplus value – and as a source of the agrifuels that have the potential to power capitalist production.” (Akram-Lodhi, Kay and Borras 2001, p. 226)

These authors also point to the emergence of a capitalist export sector:

“The linkages between transnational agro-food corporations and emerging export-oriented capitalist farms may be direct, through the physical ownership
of capitalist farms or the control of production through contract farming. However, they may also be indirect, operating through public or private intermediaries that arbitrate between on-farm production, global processing, and global wholesale and retail distribution. [...] transnational agro-food corporations play a key role in shaping the configuration of this productive subsector, imposing, as it were, 'capitalism from above' (Byres 2003).” (Akram-Lodhi, Kay and Borras 2001, p. 226-7)

This last point is important because it underscores the fact that in the indirect relationships the intermediaries’ control of product marketing guarantees capitalist development not from below, but from above, even while the peasantry maintains possession of the land.

In Mexico, different authors have pointed to the emergence of an agricultural economy linked to large corporations that use contract farming in a similar way to that indicated by these authors (see, for example, Carton de Grammont; Mackinlay).

M. J. Watts (2009) suggests too that rural life has effectively been transformed by globalisation and it is no longer possible to represent it with characteristic features that include subsistence, autonomy, and ownership of the land. The end of developmentalism in the 1960s and 1970s overturned the historical conditions in which the category of the peasantry had been defined.

“Classical export commodities [...] have been increasingly displaced by so-called ‘high-value foods’, including fruits and vegetables, poultry, dairy products and shellfish (Watts 2009, p. 276).”

“What is striking in all these cases is the prominence of peasant contract production and/or vertical integration in linking farm-level production and downstream processing and trade.” (Watts 2009, p. 277)

According to C. Kay (2007), with the development of the new neoliberal policies, the “great theories and abstractions lost importance” (p. 32). “Structuralist and totalising perspectives were criticised as dogmatic and tautological and replaced by new studies that emphasise the agency and capacities of the subjects to create their own living strategies and, through their various activities, to effect transformations in their own environment and
perhaps even beyond it” (Kay 2007, p. 32). To define the new Latin American problematic since the 1990s, an increasing number of authors have turned to the concept of “New Ruralism”, in which the “main emphasis [is] on broadening the vision of the agrarian countryside to the rural environment, underscoring the multifunctionality of rural spaces due to the increasing importance of non-agrarian activities and the more fluid interrelation between the rural and the urban, the local and the global, and stressing the significant changes in cultural and rural life patterns (Llambí 2004)” (Kay 2007, p. 32).

“The new ruralists call attention to the pluriactivity of peasant households that are becoming increasingly involved in a variety of non-agricultural production activities and services in the rural environment, such as handicrafts, small workshops, trade and tourism.” (Kay 2007, p. 33)

Kay also suggests that the alternative to New Ruralism is the campesinista perspective, “which, without ignoring the merit of non-agrarian activities, emphasises better quality food production, organic agriculture, the promotion of production knowledge and skills, and the creation of new niche markets, among other ideas (Barkin 2001)” (Kay 2007, p. 33).

For Kay, pluriactivity is really a reflection of peasant differentiation in that it reveals that diversification of activities is associated with the socio-economic level of the peasantry. “Neoliberal policies have given a new boost to peasant differentiation. The increasing impoverishment of the peasantry due to their decreasing access to production resources, especially the land, has forced them to seek new opportunities for employment and income” (Kay 2007, p. 34).

Meanwhile, the rich peasantry tends to engage in more lucrative and profitable activities: “for the rich peasants, pluriactivity is an opportunity for capital accumulation and for upward economic and social mobility” (Kay 2007, p. 34). However, the limited number of these rich peasants is insufficient to generate a process of capitalist accumulation from below.

Kay argues that neoliberal policies have accentuated the inequalities that exist in the rural context between peasant farms and capitalist enterprises.

In general terms, neoliberalism has introduced various new phenomena: the
feminisation of rural wage labour; the boom in agricultural exports; the precarisation of rural labour; the development of a stronger rural-urban interrelation and fluidity; the formation of peri-urban spaces and increasing pluriactivity; the rise of indigenous movements; territory and its relationship with globalisation, and others.

2.3.3. Perspectives on the development of new linkages for the peasantry as autonomous family entities and their economic, sociocultural and territorial environment.

For Teubal (2009), who focuses particularly on Latin America, the neoliberal period has brought about “The end of systems of direct subsidies and of support prices for agricultural production resulted in an erosion of institutional structures that had presumably sustained small and medium-sized farm producers.”

Quoting Kay, Borras and others, Teubal (2009, p. 162) suggests that “Thus it is the current phase of global capitalism that has created the conditions whereby peasants and farmers can unite against the neoliberal model (Borras, Edelman and Kay 2008).”

There is a globalised alternative movement, which, Teubal suggests, has distinct features: “González Casanova, when he refers to the new agrarian social and political movements, and in particular the EZLN, points out that these movements struggle not only for land and territory, but also for a defence of culture, the rights of indigenous populations, respect for their autonomy and dignity, their culture and customs, and their participation and representation in the national state.”

At the same time, on the promotion of the Vía Campesina (VC) movement, Borras argues that “land continues to be the key element on which the capacity and autonomy of the poor rural peoples depend in order to build, guarantee and maintain sustainable livelihoods, defend their cultural identity, exercise their political, cultural, social, economic and civil rights, and fight for greater democratisation. The land not only possesses a monetary value; it also confers political power” (Borras 2004, p. 6)

The VC perspective represents an opposition against the marginalisation that
the neoliberal version of globalisation has given rise to, but it also takes a pragmatic approach to seizing upon the advantages and opportunities that the new context offers for an international organisation of the peasantry. In this respect, it recognises the work of NGOs in their fight for the environment, for example (Borras 2004).

Vergara-Camus (2014a; 2014b) argue that the struggle against neoliberalism has given rise to the development of an alternative peasant movement of an autonomous nature (a kind of "new prince" in the Gramscian sense of the term), focused on food sovereignty in Latin America in particular. According to this author, the Latin American peasantry has acquired a high degree of politicisation through its identity with the land, farming, territory, the protection of its resources and the promotion of rights for healthy food. He revisits the experiences of the MST in Brazil and the EZLN in Mexico to support his thesis of a new peasant awareness in response to globalisation.

Like the authors mentioned above, D. Barkin (2001) points to the need to approach development based on a financial autonomy that underpins a sustainable process in relation to the peasant and indigenous economy.

Hebinck, van der Ploeg and Schneider (2015b, p. 1) focus on the existence of new markets that are structurally different from traditional agricultural trade flows, markets where production on family farms and the existence of linkages between family farms or fisheries and consumer relations makes it possible to structure different networks of social relations.

These authors note that “To level of theory and policy the activities associated with the making of these new products and services have been grouped together under the heading of multifunctionality (van der Ploeg, et al. 2010) or as multiple livelihoods (Francis 2002, Hebinck and Lent 2007).” (Hebinck, van der Ploeg and Schneider 2015b, p. 1).

Multifunctional farming embraces the maintenance of landscapes, contributions to biodiversity, the production of high quality products and regional specialties, on-farm processing, the provision of agro-tourism facilities, enlarging the
accessibility of the countryside, the production of energy and the retention of water.” (Hebinck, van der Ploeg and Schneider 2015b, p. 1).

“Multiple livelihoods is a way of expressing the phenomenon and process whereby farmers, or rather rural dwellers, whether small or large scale, combine various ways of making a living. These processes imply (to differing degrees) an occupational shift and a temporal and/or spatial relocation of rural dwellers away from strictly agricultural based modes of livelihood.” (Hebinck, van der Ploeg and Schneider 2015b, p. 1).

According to these authors, this process of multiple livelihoods and multifunctional farming is a new trend in the agrarian sector, as in Europe prior to the last twenty years it was assumed that specialisation was a feature of modern farms.

In this trend, it is possible to identify markets whose unique features allow for a different conceptualisation: nested markets.

Although they are specific market segments that are nested in the wider commodity markets for food, they have a different nature, different dynamics, a different redistribution of value added, different prices and different relations between producers and consumers. That is to say, nested markets in which they are embedded.” (Hebinck, van der Ploeg and Schneider 2015b, p. 3).

These are new markets whose modus operandi is ‘structurally’ different from the markets governed by global players, such as supermarkets and global commodity trading companies.” [...] (Hebinck, van der Ploeg and Schneider 2015b, p. 5).

Van der Ploeg identifies the unique features of these nested markets, defining markets in general as “the places where, or the structures through which goods and services are exchanged.” (van der Ploeg 2015, p. 16).

Markets connect producers with consumers –directly or indirectly— and in straightforward of highly complex ways.” [...] “These relations pattern the flows of goods and services through time and space.” (van der Ploeg 2015, p. 16).
Yet, these patterns can also contain ‘structural holes’: a term that refers to the flows that do not materialize and to the relations that are not created (or are being blocked, for whatever reason).” (van der Ploeg 2015, p. 16).

These structural holes can be filled by new nested markets, which build bridges between consumers and producers in specific markets. These markets may be characterised today by a high degree of multifunctionality (van der Ploeg 2015, p.17). Since around the year 2000, nested markets have received increased attention.

“The distinctiveness of new products and services is neither private property, nor a common good. It is a common-pool resource that links many different stakeholders: farmers, processors, distributors, clients and – sometimes – local and regional authorities and NGOs.” (van der Ploeg 2015, p.19)

2.4. Peasants, Economic Policy and Deregulation in Mexico.

In the 1980s, these issues were still being debated. Symptomatic of this is the work of Calva (1988) and Lobato González (1989), who point to the differentiation and decomposition of the ejidos as the main feature of the rural sector, and the work of Appendini and others who adopted the opposing argument (Appendini, 1992, Pepin Lehalleur, 1988). In other words, the ideological debate frequently took precedence over empirical data.

Empirical studies by social anthropologists were reduced to methodological proposals as criteria of truth (functionalism vs. Marxism, for example), and only issues associated with corporatisation and the authoritarianism associated with peasantisation in Mexico appeared to constitute indisputable truths in the eyes of most theorists (Córdoba, 1974).

Towards the end of the 1980s, the crisis in the peasant sector was palpable, and the studies that dominated the debate were those that highlighted the need for a change in state policy on rural affairs. Authors like Negrín (1991) set the agenda for the debate over changes to the country’s agrarian laws.
The debate between campesinistas and descampesinistas gave way to the debate over the neoliberal reforms instituted during the 1990s. De Janvry (1997) locates the beginning of a new agrarian reform in Mexico in the 1980s and especially from the 1990s, with significant implications for the ejidos and for rural production. This also coincides with a renewed debate over the Mexican and global peasantry in the age of the globalisation of capitalism.

Trade liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation of the rural economy in Mexico constitute a change in the general direction of policy and in the traditional political alliance between small rural production and the State. The authors differ in their interpretation of the results of this policy in Mexico and Nayarit, but they all identify new features in the links between the State and the peasantry (Carton de Grammont, 1996; Mackinlay, 1996) or neo-corporatism. Appendini (2008) points to the disappearance of the peasantry and its transformation into a marginal subject.

On the other hand, Armando Bartra, adopting an approach closer to the VC theory, highlights the internationalisation of peasant struggles, while Carton de Grammont and Mackinlay (see above) agree with the theories of subordination of the peasantry and small-scale rural producers to transnational capital through contract farming posited by New Ruralism (see above).

Others place the issue of the ‘survival’ strategies of the peasantry and the vitality of its mode of production at the centre of the debate, particularly in Nayarit (Schultz Robles, 1990; Madera Pacheco, 2009). Finally a researcher as Vergara-Camus (2009, 2011) considers movements like the EZLN are part a new form of defense of non capitalist forms of peasant organisation.

The prevailing point of view of these last authors is a defence of the peasant mode of production through a definition of a number of categories of the ‘survival strategies of the peasantry’, including the strategy of ‘work outside peasant lands’. These ideas are evident in research into the region under study, for example, the work of Madera Pacheco (2009) and Schultz Robles (1990).

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13 See De Janvry (1997, p. xv) where he defines the main features of neoliberalism in Mexico.
More recently, however, in light of the neoliberal reform, the theories of the campesinistas have evolved to consider the disappearance of the peasantry (Appendini, 2008) or to define it in terms of forms of the Marxist concept of the industrial reserve army (Figueroa, 2005).

In short, the neoliberal reform appears to have left a strange taste in the mouths of Mexico’s agrarian theorists since the 1990s. The end of the agrarian reforms, declared by the government with the enactment of the new Agrarian Act in 1992, silenced everyone who had debated openly during the preceding decades. In Nayarit, liberalisation and privatisation processes were the source of studies such as those by Rap (2004; 2007) or Mackinlay (1996), with significant analyses of contract farming and hydraulic facility transfer processes and the associated clientelist culture.

Clearly, the rate of the changes seems to have been so fast and overwhelming that they have yet to be fully assimilated by Mexican academics.

2.5. A Historical Perspective: On the Shift from Early Simple Commodity Production towards Advanced Simple Commodity Production and its Relevance to Research in La Costa

In contrast with the aforementioned approaches to the transformation of the peasantry in developing economies, a historical focus could be adopted that takes the original agrarian model as a starting point. Since this case study focuses on the changes occurring in the region of La Costa over a period of almost a century, this type of approach would appear to be the most appropriate. In a historical perspective, we need to analyse the changes affecting the agrarian communities and their relationship with aquacultural activity. It is clear that there was a process of peasantisation (and the disappearance of the hacienda system), with government intervention to consolidate a regulatory and deregulatory system that has substantially changed production conditions. From the perspective of Wood, Byres and other authors, it is therefore important to identify the extent to which these changes to
the institutional environment, the class struggle and other factors, have
determined the stability of the communities of northern Nayarit.

In this respect, historical approaches seem to be the most appropriate, although
it is worth considering whether the changes arising from the globalisation
process, as discussed by various researchers mentioned above, might reveal
different patterns that could explain the consequences that the design and
implementation of neoliberal policies in Nayarit have had for the aquacultural
and agricultural sectors. For example, the last part of the research could focus
on certain related issues, such as pluriactivity, multifunctionality, or
environmental issues associated with the intensification of aquacultural
production.

During the first period of peasanisation some Mexican theorists have
characterised the *ejido* economy as a simple commodity production system
(Bartra, 1975, among others). Although this characterisation assumes the final
sale of peasant farm products (agricultural, or in this case also aquacultural
products), its main feature is the possession by the peasantry of the
instruments needed for production (land and other natural resources, inputs and
production tools) or their manual manufacture. The concept is therefore
associated with family labour. Calva (1988) also suggests that small peasant
production has been converted into an economy of petty landowners, although
he basically assumes the same features identified by Bartra, and transforms
*ejido* producers into a kind of entrepreneurial middle class, who are still
essentially dependent on family labour. This characterisation, although similar
to what will be explained further below, essentially omits a stage prior to the
conversion of the peasantry into part of the rural entrepreneurial middle class.

I would argue that independently of the general context analysed above (a
period of *peasantisation* and a period of neoliberal policies with the
subordination of small- and medium-scale peasantry to global agribusiness, and
privatisation of the rural sector), the small-scale peasantry has been subjected
to a process of transformation from early simple commodity producers to
advanced simple commodity producers.
The concept of *advanced simple commodity production* proposed by Byres (1996) seems more in keeping with a process of *historical* transition in the sector of the peasantry. Handcrafting of production instruments and inputs was replaced by the *purchase* of these elements, and the land became a production condition (as *private property* or a possession). Even if the direct labour of commodity producers is assumed as a condition, their dependence on the market has reached such an extreme that commodification leaves them dependent on markets both for the sale of their products and for the acquisition of their production conditions.

In general, the approaches outlined here consider only the period referred to as the peasant economy, but do not discuss the causes of the disappearance of the *haciendas* (estates) as a factor that could have consolidated this pattern of land ownership. This is a significant difference from the perspectives discussed above.

It is important to understand how researchers have defined this development process, the general components of which include two general paths (the ‘farmer path’, i.e., capitalism from below; and a ‘junker path’, i.e., capitalism from above), and the particular features that could define an agrarian development process *sui generis* with a political-economic framework distinct from that of European countries or the ‘farmer path’ in the United States.

According to the *classical* agrarian question, the way in which the agrarian problem is resolved determines the mode of capitalist development in a given national context (Byres, 1996), and the first question that needs to be answered is why the previous form, capitalism from above, was not consolidated as a path of capitalist development in rural areas. To this end, Byres (1996, 2009) proposes the adoption of an historical approach. Historically, this aspect seems to be associated with the emergence of a corporate and clientelist relationship between the Mexican peasantry and the State.

But the discussion above raises the question of how these conclusions might change in the context of a new ruralism in Latin America where the State is absent, global agribusiness is dominant and subordinates small- and medium-
scale peasant producers, and where the national market is now integrated with
global markets, as Bernstein, Araghi, and the New Ruralists argue. Does this
change the nature of the classical agrarian question?

The theory of the agrarian question defines the problem in order to explain the
nature of agrarian transitions in capitalism. Classical political economy
considers that the key to understanding the development of the rural sector is
the *accumulation of capital* (Lewis, 1954; Marx, 1969). Therefore, once the link
has been established between accumulation and the ways that the rural sector
surplus is diverted to form a fund for accumulation, it will be possible to define
what constitutes the market (global or national) for capitalism (Marx 1976) and
its relationship with the peasant economy.

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, in order to offer a general
historical interpretation of the region, I refer to the theories of Byres (1996) and
Lewis (1954) regarding the development of peasant production and its role in
the agrarian transition in capitalist economies. The move from early simple
commodity production towards advanced simple commodity production is
framed within the nature of the transition of the peasant economies of La Costa,
as the peculiarities of the historical process of this area of Mexico had yet to be
clarified.

Adopting a perspective that views early simple commodity production as
undergoing a process of transformation into advanced commodity production
can also shed light on the dynamic of small-scale peasant production in La
Costa, and thus on the role of the State in this transition.

Early simple commodity production (in the Marxist sense) is the small-scale
production of use-values for family consumption, the surplus of which can be
exchanged for other use-values in order to *complement* consumption among
peasant families. This production assumes ownership of the means of
production, and the possession of the land, as well as consumption as the main
aim of the production of a peasant family enterprise. Advanced commodity
production involves the elimination of self-production as the commodification of
economic life gradually transforms this family economy, making it more
dependent on the market and, in particular, the producer’s inputs, machinery,
tools and means of living are now transformed into commodities. This process expands the internal and external market and gradually transforms peasant producers and their families into advanced simple commodity producers.

It is important to consider the stability of simple commodity production, its evolution and its connection to the capitalist economy in general (national or global). To do this, the case study of the early simple commodity production of La Costa could offer some answers to the questions that have concerned peasant economy theorists since the middle of the last century. It would also provide answers to some of the questions mentioned previously, such as the existence of a duality in social and production structures (capitalism and peasant economy), or the continued survival of the peasant economy in global society. However, the concept of advanced simple commodity production allows us to reinterpret the agrarian history of the region, by configuring the agrarian process as one of increasing commodification of the ejidos.

Byres (1996), in his analysis of the development of the farmer economy in the United States, takes from Marxist political economy the concept of early simple commodity production, but he points out that this is not enough to explain the subsequent evolution of that production in the agrarian transition towards capitalism during the first half of the nineteenth century in the north-eastern US and, subsequently, in the West. He therefore posits the evolution of early simple commodity production into advanced simple commodity production, characterised by the predominance of commodity production among farmers, still maintaining ownership of the means of production and possession or ownership of the land, and family labour as the labour force base of the farm (Byres, 1996), but at the same time breaking up the union of agricultural labour and rural industry. The mechanisation and commodification of the stages of commodity production of US farmers ensured their continued survival and provided a link with the industrial economy and with capitalist enterprise, feeding back into and expanding the internal market base.

This concept of early simple commodity production and advanced simple commodity production (Byres, 1996) broadens the perspective of the original Marxist concept and leads to a dynamic view of the commodity economy within
which peasant production develops, as the old economy is gradually integrated into a capitalist economy and the market expands constantly.

This dynamisation of the concept would help to explain the peculiarities of the peasant process in La Costa, under certain circumstances and in a different agrarian and legal context from the US example, as peasant-ejido production and the producers of this region were immersed in a process of increasing commodification of their products and the transformation of their semi-self-consumption economy (early simple peasant production) into an advanced commodity economy.

As Byres suggests, it is essential to recognise this transition from early simple commodity production to advanced simple commodity production and the extent to which it is possible to identify ownership of the means of production, as well as the possession of the land and its resources, as central aspects that allow us to conceptualise it, and the extent to which the monetary earnings of the producers were derived from an expanding capitalist commodity market.

In the same way, it also allows us to identify the extent to which the innovations and growth of the market offers opportunities to maintain advanced simple commodity production as a basis for income for peasant producers. In other words, unlike other approaches discussed previously, the existence of the highly dynamic economy of La Costa may be better understood if we accept the transformation of the peasant economy into a dynamic commodity economy that incorporates advanced simple commodity production as a stage in a historical process developing over several decades.

Finally, Byres (Calva, 1988) considers three conditions as fundamental for establishing a hypothesis of agrarian transition. Following his suggestions, these will be broken down into four, which are as follows:

(a) Capital accumulation, and from this perspective the role and nature of the landowning class during the process of agrarian transition;

(b) The differentiation between members of the peasantry/unlimited supplies of labour;

(c) The class struggle;
(d) The role of the State, which allows the perspective of the study to be broadened to incorporate the patron-client relationships that have been found to be such a prominent feature of the region under study, as will be demonstrated in the empirical study.

In view of the previous discussion about the classical or global agrarian transition, I will maintain the same variables because they are still essential for establishing the terms of the role of small-scale rural producers in a new globalised rural context.

In addition, during the First Agrarian Reform in the 1930s, which led to the peasantisation of the rural sector in Nayarit, a dispute arose between two classes over the definition of Mexican agrarian process and the path of capitalist development in the rural sector: landowners and peasants. It is important to understand the nature of the landholding class and the causes of its dissolution by the State, as Byres (1995; 1996; 2009) shows that there have been cases in which the landholding class played the decisive role in agrarian transformation (e.g. in Japan and in parts of Germany) and the development of a capitalist market. I will therefore attempt to explain the peculiarities of Nayarit in this respect.

Identifying the agent associated with the capital accumulation process will facilitate the characterisation of the landholding class. A theoretical solution is needed to the debate over the role of this class in the process of accumulation. This role is linked to differentiation (or lack of differentiation) among the peasantry and the class struggle of the early twentieth century.

The arguments of Byres (1996; 2009) and Bernstein (2009) regarding the recognition of differentiation among the peasantry as central to the consideration of the existence of a peasant mode of production are essential for this case study. Moreover, Lenin (1964, 4ed) and, more recently, Cavailhes (1979) have noted the relevance of other concepts when assessing the development of capitalism in rural areas, such as the degree to which the traditional mode of production has been destroyed or the process of
transformation of the mode of production. The latter relates to the aforementioned capital accumulation.

3. Conclusions: Classical Agrarian Question vs New Rural Globalised Transition in Mexico's Rural Sector

I have carefully reviewed several major lines of theoretical research on the subject of the peasantry and the ‘agrarian question’. My main assumptions are related to the ongoing survival of the peasant mode of production, that is, its resolution in the process of the capitalist agrarian transition or its alteration in the process of the agrarian transition in a globalised world. What follows is a summary and the conclusions that can be drawn from them.

First of all, it is important to note that hypotheses linking the theory of the peasantry to development theory (or dependency theory) appear to have generally disappeared from the discussion, especially if we consider that Lewis (1954) described a historical process rather than a model in the positivist sense of the term. In particular, De Janvry (1981) describes the relationship between the two bodies of theory, while Byres (1995; 1996) draws on the theory of capitalist development to explain the connection with the theory of the peasantry. In discussion of the Mexican case, this connection seems less obvious, although it appears implicitly in the definition of the structural dualism of the economy and in a certain sense in the centre-periphery discussion. At the same time, the role of the labour surplus in a developing economy does not appear to be a notable feature of the theories analysed.

In my view, any analysis of the historical process described from Chapter 4 onwards needs to place the existence of a labour surplus into perspective and to identify how that surplus influences the development of the economy of ejido producers and their cooperative organisations.

The theories of dualism and centre-periphery capitalism also assume the survival of the peasantry and its mode of production. De Janvry (1981) suggests the dualism may be temporary, dissolving as the market expands and deepens; this argument in a sense points to the theory of a single system converging with a capitalist market (domestic and foreign markets).
At the same time, other researchers suggest that a process of subordination of the peasantry to the State, along with the patron-client relationship that develops with the emergence of a kind of peasantry caste system, mediates between official institutions and the corporate structure. This could explain the peasantry’s lack of political and economic independence pointed out by De Janvry (De Janvry 1997). The peasantry is inherently subordinated to those intermediaries who take advantage of their social status to engage with new policies and a rational and neutral government, and act as a hinge in these social spaces. However, a more consolidated theory on this question would not develop until the 1980s. Thus, clientelist or patron-client vertical dyadic relationships (Lomnitz 1975; 2001; Lomnitz and Melnick, 1998) and their incorporation into social research would fill a theoretical gap that had been left unattended for several decades.

It is therefore necessary to test the extent to which patronage relationships have expanded in the region under study and assess their effect on the fabric of social relations in rural Nayarit.

The question of the existence of a peasant mode of production, of the existence of dualism or the formation of social classes within the ejidos, cannot be answered theoretically; rather, it needs to be answered empirically, i.e., historically. The supposition of the existence of dualism entails the supposition of a self-consumption sector (with a weak market) and at the same time a market economy linked to rural capitalist enterprises.

But the considerable market dynamism observed in La Costa seems to demonstrate the increasing importance of the shrimp market (and of other rural products such as tobacco, fresh fruit, etc.). In other words, the existence of a growing market does not contradict the theory of the continued existence of a strong sector of small producers linked to that market. On the contrary, as Byres suggests, it might even constitute feedback from an expanding market for a sector of the peasantry linked to advanced commodity production, insofar as this sector of small commodity producers is able to benefit from this expansion and the development of technologies that also stimulate small rural family or
quasi-family enterprises. And this seems to be the case for some rural producers.

In particular, I would emphasise the importance of the work of Byres (1995; 1996; 2009) in identifying the variables to be operationalised (capital accumulation, class struggle, differentiation among peasantry and the role of the State) and the methodological approach for the research. The historical nature of the case study entails a need to determine the extent to which the processes of capitalist development in the area under investigation may differ in interesting ways from those of other regions in late capitalism. This points to the importance of a historical case study approach to highlight aspects of the invariant variables to be studied, but for which it is essential to define their particular characteristics.

Nevertheless, the notions of a national capitalism and a national solution to the agrarian question are in doubt. After the neoliberal reform in Mexico, the process of agrarian transition cannot be said to define the national capitalist structure because privatisation, the opening up of markets to foreign investments and trade, and the absence of government intervention in the rural sector have transformed how the agrarian question is to be addressed.

In the previous paragraphs, I have outlined the propositions of authors such as Bernstein, Aragui, the New Ruralists, the VC, etc., who have pointed out the importance of changing the terms of reference for the discussion of the fate of the peasantry and small-scale rural producers abandon class or structural analysis.

For these authors, globalisation and neoliberal policies have limited the possibilities of small-scale producers because they have been subordinated to global agribusiness. According to Vergara-Camus (2011), the small-scale peasantry in Latin America is facing a crisis of survival.

Government support for the peasantry has vanished, subsidies are nonexistent, and the credits, the national markets and the whole political structure that gave life to a regulated and dynamic peasant economy linked to national industry has been disappearing.
We are thus presented with this methodological option: a comparative case study of La Costa itself, analysing two different points in time. In the first case, the comparisons would be valid not only for the region under study, but could also provide data for a broader comparison with other regions of Mexico, for example the centre, north and south-southeast of the country. In the second case, a case study examining the same region at two moments in time may offer valuable perspectives on the nature and timing of the evolution of agrarian capitalism in Mexico.

It is important to understand that the social phenomena to be examined in this historical study can only be properly appreciated from a diachronic perspective, and only through such an approach will we be able to draw some clear conclusions about them.

The historical perspective is essential to assess the value of the theory of the peasantry as a mode of production, which is based on the notion of the coexistence/articulation of two different modes of production (a peasant mode and a capitalist mode), or of underdevelopment and the predominance of pre-capitalist/non-capitalist relations or interactions between peripheral and central countries. This notion, through different theoretical lenses, generally supports the theory of economic dualism, where the surviving peasants, tied to their traditional ways of production and life, are juxtaposed against the modern characteristics of the capitalist economy.

We thus have a region of study, the causal conditions for the particular agricultural development of La Costa in Nayarit (Byres, 2009; Cavailhes, 1979), and two historical moments involving two clearly defined land reforms. The details and conditions of a case study will be outlined in the following chapter.
Chapter 3
Methodological Considerations: The Comparative Method

1. Introduction

In the previous chapters I have attempted to explain the importance of a study of the La Costa region in Nayarit in view of the theoretical gap that makes it impossible to fully explain the process of transformation of the peasant economy of this region, and the need for an alternative approach that could shed some light on this question. This theoretical gap has significant methodological implications, as it limits the scope of the studies of economic development in regions like La Costa in Nayarit.

In this chapter I will present the methodological considerations that support the choice of a case study as the basis for research. I will mainly discuss the rationale for the choice of the comparative method and a long-term historical study in order to understand social relations in the region of the La Costa region in Nayarit, Mexico. In this discussion, I will follow the methodological suggestions of Byres (1996), Ragin (1987), and Moore (1966) on the scope of comparative studies.

In the introduction of the context it has been made evident that there is a clear differentiation between two periods characterised by two different government policies: in the first period, a broad-sweeping peasant-oriented policy was applied, while in the second period, underpinned by a neoliberal philosophy, the previous policy of support for the ejidatarios was pulled apart. Methodologically, this situation raises some questions about the consequences of the two policies in La Costa in these two clearly differentiated moments in time, which could only be answered through a comparative analysis of these two periods in which government policy had a decisive effect on the agrarian activities of the peasantry of La Costa.
On the other hand, a body of theories could be identified which, drawing on development theory (Lewis, 1954; Byres, 1996), attempts to explain the presence of the peasantry in developing capitalist economies. For some theorists, the presence of the peasantry reflects their capacity for resistance in establishing a unique mode of production that is an alternative to the capitalist mode, while for others their existence is merely the result of a process of absorption into the capitalist economy. Their existence seemed to have a purpose when government policies were aimed at strengthening their social and economic presence, but this appeared to change with the introduction of neoliberal policies. It is thus difficult to explain the complexity of the social phenomena of the La Costa region with theoretical perspectives that presuppose answers to the questions about the evolution of the peasantry in developing capitalist societies.

With the above in mind, I concluded that an empirical study with a historical perspective could contribute to the development of a more suitable methodological framework. In doing so I am following Byres’s (1996) suggestion to conduct empirical research covering a longer period in order to identify specific/particular features of the development of La Costa. This could help to redirect the discussion of this development in agrarian societies like those of Mexico, where different agrarian structures coexist side by side, such as is the case of La Costa in Nayarit.

To identify these specific features, Byres proposes addressing a series of questions that are key for identifying the type of agrarian development being studied: capitalism from below or capitalism from above. As we attempt to identify specific rather than general features in the processes of agrarian development, these questions should guide a theoretical and empirical comparative study.

Thus, the purpose of the empirical case study is to gather relevant empirical data in order to answer the following research questions:

- Are there systematic signs of inequality in terms of income, technology, access to markets and/or loans, which might suggest a process of social and economic differentiation in Nayarit’s peasant aquacultural sector? Do
these signs support the idea of a labour surplus in the rural sector of Nayarit as Lewis (1954) suggests?

• Are there political institutions consolidating this process of economic differentiation in the region through the regulation and deregulation of aquacultural activity?

• Does the culture of patronage encourage this process of differentiation?

• Could a broader characterisation of the process described be applied – for example, following Byres (1996), as state-mediated capitalism from below?

• How have these processes interacted with the promotion of investments in shrimp fishing infrastructure, new technologies and new products?

• Are there signs of class struggle ranging from open struggle to the concept posited by Scott (1985) of symbolic struggle and of what he refers to as ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’

By answering these questions I seek to operationalise the relationship between the following explanatory variables: the links between accumulation of capital (or investments), differentiation between members of the peasantry (i.e., peasant enrichment or impoverishment/signs of labour surpluses), class struggle (ranging from open struggle to the concept posited by Scott [1985] of symbolic struggle and of what he refers to as ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’), and the State, as proposed by Byres (1995; 1996; 2010), and its links with patron-client networks based on the theoretical proposals of Lomnitz, Khan and others who have highlighted the importance of these types of clientelist relationships for the study of the development of social differentiation (i.e., differentiated access to strategic information and public resources) in a particular region of Mexico (see Figure No. 1).

To this end, I have employed a combination of approaches in order to conduct a comparative historical analysis over time. The historical case study based on participant research, archive documentary information, interviews and other sources, has allowed me to document the broader regulatory and deregulatory
processes in the region historically, while also allowing a comparison of two moments in time. Meanwhile, the quantitative approach has enabled me to collect sample information on the differences among ejido aquacultural producers and thereby support or dismiss the hypothesis of a process of differentiation in production, technology and trade among members of the peasantry on Nayarit's north coast.

**Figure 1. Variables and Research Questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Research Questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital accumulation</td>
<td>How have these processes interacted with the promotion of investments in shrimp fishing infrastructure, new technologies and new products?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The differentiation between members of peasantry</td>
<td>Are there systematic signs of inequality in terms of income, technology, access to markets and/or loans, which might suggest a process of social and economic differentiation in Nayarit's peasant aquacultural sector? Is there an unlimited supply of labour?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The class struggle</td>
<td>Are there signs of class struggle ranging from open struggle to the concept posited by Scott (1985) of symbolic struggle and of what he refers to as 'everyday forms of peasant resistance'?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| The role of the state | a) Are there political institutions consolidating this process of economic differentiation in the region through the regulation and deregulation of aquacultural activity?  
b) Does the culture of patronage encourage this process of differentiation? |

In the first section I describe why an in-depth study is necessary. With such a study I seek to establish a means of explaining the complexity of social relations in the region under examination. In my research I have applied a historical case study method (Yin 2009, Ragin 1987), some unstructured interviews (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007; Lincoln and Guba 1985) and a quantitative approach to a sample of aquacultural farmers of the region under study, in order to establish the degree to which the differences observed in the strata of
ejido aquacultural producers support the idea of social differentiation. As Bryman (2003) notes, there are various examples of this mixture of methodological approaches that I have adopted here in an effort to explain small-scale aquaculture in northern Nayarit.

In the first part of the chapter, I will outline the development of the historical case study research, and in the second, the reasons for preparing a survey of a sample of producers and the application of questionnaires, with the aim of measuring variations in income, technology, access to loans, conditions in the sale of their products, access to land, etc., which may help identify the different strata of aquacultural producers in the region, and the degree to which these variations may express systematic differences suggestive of processes of social differentiation.

2. Justification for the Case-Oriented Approach.

The statistical comparative method is used mainly to establish invariance in the variables under study (Byres 1995; Lijphart 1971; Pennings 2006; Ragin, 1987). It assumes the existence of a rich statistical sample that would allow the use of statistical techniques to determine the invariant causal relationships of the variables under study.

In this research, the objective was different: to investigate the social formation of Nayarit in order to identify particular features of the development process. This study does not involve the comparison of a wide range of cases, but of a single case at two different moments (Lijphart 1971). In a study where context becomes essential for the investigation of the variables to be analysed and where there is not a wide range of cases for comparison, I have considered that a case-oriented comparative method is the best option.

There is a growing body of literature that supports the use of the comparative method (Byres, 1995, 1996; 2009; Moore 1966; 1993; Ragin, 1987; Skocpol, 1980; Pennings, 2006; Lijphart, 1971). This method can be developed in two possible ways: one option is to use a statistical approach to determine invariance in the development process; the other is a case-oriented approach to establish the peculiarities of the ‘agrarian transition’ of the social formation under study.
Methodological Considerations: The Comparative Method

Ragin (1987) provides the main methodological aspects, although regarding the nature of the case study I have found some significant contributions from other methodologists such as Bryman (1988) and Glaser & Strauss (1967).

The rationale behind the choice of the comparative method on a single historical case study is dissatisfaction with the cross-sectional survey, which attempts to test relationships between variables. In the study conducted on La Costa, however, I had to analyse the historical evolution of these variables, not just their relationships with other variables, while at the same time examining the context in which the variables developed. In fact, the central problem in the case-oriented research into La Costa seemed to lie in the social context and the relevance of the ‘macrosocial unit’ that determines the set.

As the economic variables do not seem to behave as predicted by rational positive economics or politics, and because there are multiple external determinants, the problem needs to be analysed differently, more contextually, with the definition of a ‘macro unit’ (Ragin, 1987).

‘Macro unit’ is used here in the sense of a ‘macrosocial unit’ as defined by Ragin (1987), i.e., a country or region, as in the case under study. The problem of the definition of a macrosocial unit lies in the question of how to delineate its limits or boundaries. However, the main characteristic of a macrosocial unit (and as such, of the comparative approach) is related to the use of attributes of these macrosocial units in explanatory statements (Ragin, 1987). Specifically, in the case under study, the La Costa region has attributes that other regions (in Mexico and in other countries) do not; for example, 80% of rural property belongs to ejidos, and there are abundant natural seawater and inland water resources that make shrimp production viable. This gives the region under study an enduring reality in terms of its attributes, at least in historical terms. In other words, these attributes affect the explanatory statements.

Another justification can be found in the literature. Most authors seem to give greater importance to holistic, interpretive and historical elements than to quantitative elements, at least as they pertain to developing countries. Among such authors are Byres, Moore and Bernstein, Wood, etc. As this significantly
reduces the number of cases to be observed, statistical methods are no longer practical:

‘As the number of relevant observations decreases, the possibility of subjecting arguments to rigorous statistical testing diminishes. Other methods must be used.’ (Ragin, 1987: Chapter 1, Section 5, para. 1).

Byres suggests using a case-oriented comparative method, while Ragin notes that ‘[t]he close connection between interests and complexity in comparative research is also evident in many comparativists' predilection for studying cases that register ‘extreme values’ on important dimensions of cross-national variation’ (Ragin, 1987: Chapter 2, section 2, para. 6), which could account for the fact that in the social formation under study, we find a social context where patron-client relationships have been developed to an extreme degree, as a cultural and political pattern.

It is possible to identify the four causal conditions outlined above in this diachronic comparison of two historical periods, the first involving the establishment of a regulatory framework for the 'defence' of peasant proprietorship, and the second involving deregulation.

With regard to the comparison of a small number of parallel cases and/or points in time, Ragin suggests that (Chapter 3, section 6 para. 7), ‘the method of systematic comparative illustrations (that is, case-oriented methods) must be used when the number of relevant cases is too small to permit the use of statistical methods.’

3. The Case Study Variables Research Strategy

The methodological aspects outlined above point the way forward for this research. The case study of La Costa in Nayarit involves four variables which need to be operationalised:

(a) Capital accumulation, and from this perspective, the role and nature of the landowning class during the process of agrarian transition. For the peasantry the operationalisation of this variable is linked to elements that define the process of accumulation, and in the case of their companies (cooperatives),
their income, financing, debt, and freedom to grow and make their own decisions, among others.

(b) Differentiation among members of the peasantry. The operationalisation of this variable is linked to concepts identified by Byres, particularly in his 1996 article, such as the context for the differentiated development of the peasantry, the quantitative differentiation of certain strata of the peasantry that are distinct from the vast majority, and their access to the means and conditions for exploiting more labour and resources (including political resources), as well as the differentiation in income received for shrimp sales, the size of their farms, the technology used and the differences in access to the markets for aquacultural products.

(c) The class struggle. The operationalisation of this variable involves the conflict in which the peasantry is immersed, and its alliances or relationships with other social groups, as well as with the government and its agencies.

(d) The role of the State, which allows a broadening of the perspective of the study to incorporate the patron-client relationships that have been found to be such a prominent feature of the region under study, as will be demonstrated in the empirical study. The operationalisation of this variable is related to the presence of government agencies and their orientation in favour of one sector of the population or another, the enactment of laws and who benefits primarily from them, as well as the nature of patron-client relationships and whether they reinforce or attenuate the processes of differentiation among the peasantry, the class struggle and capital accumulation.

Of the variables studied, the most significant and fundamental to this research is differentiation among members of the peasantry. This variable and its entanglement with the others will be the basis for supporting or rejecting the hypothesis of the presence of a peasant mode of production, and the validity of the existing agrarian transition model for the region under study.
4. Collection, Processing and Interpretation of Results.

4.1. Data Collection Method

To operationalise the variables mentioned above, it is first necessary to define the methods for data collection. Given the nature of the research (i.e., historical, involving a small number of cases), in-depth data collection methods are essential to the achievement of the objectives aimed for.

While the comparison of two periods of time represents an opportunity to assess the changes in a single region of study, data collection poses certain challenges that the research needs to take into account. In general, the nature of the comparison made in this research is historical. Two periods of time are being compared using documentary information and – insofar as was possible – open, unstructured interviews, facilitated by my presence in the area of study for more than ten years. Although it is important to acknowledge that the producers interviewed generally have somewhat idealised views of the past, they were able, with a few small exceptions (see Relevant Interviews section at the end of the thesis), to offer some important information on historical aspects of agrarian organisation and cooperativism in Nayarit.

Along with gathering first-hand information, I have been very active as a participant-observer, as I have been directly engaged with the fishermen, peasants and aquacultural producers in the region. Several of my academic colleagues who are themselves producers or distributors of products from La Costa helped introduce me to key figures in the aquacultural sector (in particular, Edel Soto, the son of the main fishing industry leader in the region, introduced me to several leaders, and subsequently accompanied me on interviews with veteran fishermen of the region), etc. In 1994, I took part as an academic advisor on a team conducting an evaluation of the region for the World Bank, which gave me my first opportunity to explore the issue in depth.

Since 1994 I have made numerous visits to the production sites and spoken with the ejidatarios, ejido authorities and cooperative leaders. I have also been able to obtain the point of view of the experts, academics and officials working in the region in government offices. Over time I came to be accepted in the
community and even today I continue to visit many of the producers when the opportunity arises.

More recently, together with the state authorities responsible for aquaculture, I also conducted interviews with most of the leaders of the ‘La Única’ Cooperative who are still alive, and with water sanitation managers and their extension workers. In short, my involvement has included visits to almost every fishing area in the region from San Blas to Boca de Teacapán on the border with the State of Sinaloa. On these visits, I have met and conducted unstructured interviews with buyers, old and young producers and other peasants involved in the production and sale of shrimp. I have also participated as a guest in numerous meetings between specialists and experts in diseases and environmental issues affecting the La Costa region.

The unstructured interviews as a field research method may help to contribute the point of view of the research subjects to the findings (Bryman 2003; Hammersley 2007 3th Ed.). This entails the performance of constant interviews in order to understand contextual and interpretative aspects from the perspective of the subjects.

In this case, non-structured interviews is one of various methods used, as historical interpretation also requires other methods of data and information collection (Bryman 2003; Hammersley 2007 3th Ed.). To this end, the examination of documentary materials, archives, official information (statistics on prices, domestic and international trade of fish products, etc.), reports (FAO, local and federal governments, private agencies) is also necessary.

Although non-structured interview is essential for identifying events from the perspective of the actors themselves, I often found that when the events were in the distant past the capacity of the producers to recall them was vague, and their memories were often foggy and romanticised.

In this respect it was important to turn to historical archives and documents that could provide a framework for connecting relevant information with my interpretation of the interviews conducted.

Among the official records analysed, the following are of particular significance: An essential source of historical information are the national archives (Archivo
**CHAPTER 3**

*General de la Nación*, which contains the files on the existing cooperatives dating back to their creation, as well as official and private documents related to the cooperatives. This database is extremely important for the historical reconstruction of the cooperatives in the region under study.

Equally important are the agrarian files on the *ejidos* in the region under study, which are held in the National Agrarian Registry in the city of Tepic (the capital of Nayarit State) and in Mexico City. Together with the national archives, these constitute indispensable sources of information.

The National Fisheries Institute, in the city of Mazatlán in the state of Sinaloa, is the body responsible for regulating and defining policies related to shrimp production on behalf of the federal authorities.

The FAO has a database on shrimp fisheries throughout the world. The reports and periodic meetings of the members of the FAO or of researchers may contribute to a general identification of international restrictions on aquaculture and its development on the peasant farms of other regions of the world, particularly in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Finally, the US Department of Commerce issues information through the NOOA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration). This information can be significant for foreign trade in crustaceans in the United States, which is the main destination of Mexican shrimp exports.

In historical research, secondary material can prove indispensable, especially when there is no way of obtaining first-hand information. For this reason, I will also need to make use of this type of material, particularly for the analysis of the first period to be compared, related to the First Agrarian Reform. Together with such material are certain periodical publications (mainly magazines) with information related to the topics under study.

Finally, government and private statistical data (provided that it is taken directly from primary sources) may provide information of relevance to my contextual analysis. One example of such data is that issued by Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).
4.2. Recording, Storing, Retrieving and Organising Data

For gathering and storing information I have used a range of methods; as mentioned above, the main collection method was unstructured open interviews, but closed questionnaires and field diaries were also used.

The information collected was organised in various ways, but in the case of the non-structured interviews the use of field diaries (and their conversion to electronic format) would constitute a particularly relevant source of information. There are various computer programs that can aid in the handling of the information obtained from interviews, such as QSR-Nudist. When possible, the use of audio or video recording devices makes interviewing easier and allows us to focus on issues that really should be of concern in relation to the variables to be operationalised. However, some interviewees, even if the interviewer has won their trust, may not willingly accept the use of such devices.

In some cases, field diaries may be accompanied by analytic notes and memos. According to Hammersley (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) the transcription of such notes can prove useful, provided they are not confused with explanations provided by the informants and interviewees themselves.

Tables, graphs, photographs, etc., can be organised using digital media. The use of maps is particularly important for the chapter referring to the agrarian reform and the system of concessions, as reference to the maps will aid in the identification of zones of agrarian conflict.

Information on developments since 1990, but particularly since the year 2000, may also be available on the internet, especially in the case of data from official sources. This facilitates information searches for news items and official reports, and direct searches through newspapers and press releases, such as those of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA) has been particularly useful.

As Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) note, recording, storing and retrieving data forms part of the reflective process of research. The information collected and retrieved is a crucial source for identifying links, checking and triangulating information from different sources, as well as for different stages of the field
research. And, perhaps most importantly, such work highlights the value of the researcher's role in giving shape to the nature of the data and results.

4.3. The Process of Analysis: Validating the Information

In research, analysis of the data is not a separate stage from the research phase (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). The analysis starts over and over again from the moment that the problem to be researched is posed, during the pre-fieldwork stage, and continues during the clarification and formulation of the research problems and during the period of collection, storage and retrieval of the data.

The process of analysis thus has an iterative quality (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The data enters into an ongoing dialogue with the variables under study. For a process aimed at identifying specific differences in capital accumulation, class struggle, social differentiation and the role of the State, the iteration of the process between data and interpretation of the information drawn the data itself is fundamental.

However, the process should not be used as a mean of supporting existing theoretical notions; rather, the theorisation resulting from the analysis involved in the process of iteration should draw ideas out of the data in order to vest it with meaning. Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) point out that this back-and-forth movement is between ideas and data, but while being prepared to go beyond the data to develop ideas that may help shed light on that data. In a subsequent stage, the ideas must be adapted and tested against additional data, and so on successively.

The relationship between data and ideas is at the heart of ‘grounded theorising’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).

The description, interpretation, contextualisation and construction of categories and concepts in the analysis process lead to one of the central problems in any research: the question of validation, or what Hammersley & Atkinson call ‘respondent validation’. Some qualitative researchers, such as Lincoln & Guba (1985) suggest that validation is a matter of importance for the recognition of the actors whose behaviour is being described. In other words, validation of the
results is important to gain the recognition or approval of the members of the social group being explored (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). However, this is a controversial issue, as validation of the research by the actors is not a trouble-free process. Although this research does not fit entirely in the category of qualitative research, my personal connection with the topic and my direct involvement with several research subjects, who provided me with key information and with whom I have developed friendships, has enabled me to share and discuss some of the research results with them, as a kind of validation method.

In this case, Byres (1995; 1996; 2010) suggests that the question of validation is associated with comparison with existing theory on agrarian processes. Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) recognise the importance and significance of this method of validation through ‘systematically developed and tested’ theories, and it is this that they identify as ‘the comparative method’.

The purpose of the process of analytic induction is to test existing theories (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) (see Figure 1 on next page). Interpreting the process described for the case of this research, the process of analytic induction entails a process of iteration between data, hypotheses and analysis of the phenomena until a balance is achieved between the variables operationalised and the hypotheses proposed.

The central hypotheses are related to the behaviour of the variables (capital accumulation, class struggle, differentiation and the clientelist role of the State) in the region under study. The search for particular features should be contrasted against the hypotheses that suggest the possibility of an historical process moving from early simple commodity production to advanced simple commodity production, along with a process of differentiation that has become accentuated over time. Otherwise, if the data does not support these hypotheses, then a reformulation of the initial proposition on the evolution of the variables would be needed, accepting the existence of a peasant mode of production, or other alternative hypotheses (perhaps dualism).
5. A Quantitative Approach in the Identification of Social Differentiation during the Second Agrarian Reform

Once the historical process of the agrarian reform and the fishing cooperatives had been documented and reconstructed until eighties, it was then necessary to obtain information on the production structure of the producers, particularly in relation to their income and access to the land, and to document certain aspects associated with the technology used in production in estuaries and on farms, to get a picture of the process of internal differentiation among producers during the Second Agrarian Reform period. As one of the key variables in this research is the presence or absence of peasant producers whose essential characteristic, as examined in the previous chapter, is family labour and/or wage labour work, it was important to analyse the processes of social differentiation between them, which according to most authors may be associated with the formation of social classes.

This raises the question of how to identify whether the agrarian reform process after nineties and the changes in policy implemented by the government over the decades precipitated a process of differentiation between peasants in La Costa in terms of income, access to the land, type of technology used or other factors. *This question forms a core theme in the debate over the evolution of the peasantry according to the theory of the peasantry.* In view of the fact that qualitative research offered few possibilities for measuring these aspects, I decided, as a corollary to the historical research, that it would be useful to adopt a quantitative approach, and thus I prepared a questionnaire for the purposes of obtaining a sample of the zone under study.

Once the historical process of simple peasant aquaculture has been analysed against the variables being researched, determining whether the agrarian process has led to social differentiation will be somewhat complex, as this differentiation is related to aspects such as income levels, available technologies, volume and intensity of production, connections to domestic and international markets, ability to obtain loans, transformation of the land ownership system, the quality of the land itself, and other factors. In other words, we are dealing with aspects that are quantifiable and/or that have
features that can make a huge difference to the average income level of a producer.

The questionnaires were aimed at identifying these factors. To this end, in the identification of the characteristics that could affect the design of the sample, the following aspects were considered:

Table 1. Legal Aspects That Could Influence the Participation of Producers

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ejido Member</th>
<th>Non ejidatario(^\text{14})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Private entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Member</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Avecindado</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the information obtained my aim was to identify whether membership in an *ejido*, i.e., access to the land for the purposes of farming or raising livestock, has an influence on the social status of the producer. This factor could be important as the agrarian reform and agrarian counter-reform were focused on this status of rural producers in Mexico.

The questionnaire was administered based on the status of the producers: whether they were cooperative members or farmers. Tables 2 and 3 show the design of the samples according to this status.

With respect to the theoretical discussion outlined in the previous chapter, the determination of this process of social differentiation is essential for determining the consequences of the process of commercial deregulation and liberalisation of the shrimp sector, and for understanding whether this is associated with a process of social class formation, or whether the theory of dualism or of the peasant mode of production should continue to be the theoretical and methodological criterion in future studies. The subject, however, remains extremely complex.

An example may help explain this complexity: the number of motor boats owned as opposed to manually powered boats may make a huge difference in the productive capacity of an aquacultural producer, regardless of whether that

\(^{14}\) People without rights over lands.
CHAPTER 3

producer forms part of a cooperative or holds private ownership of the land exploited for aquacultural production. My aim was to explain these differences, so as to establish the degree to which they have been entrenched and have an effect on the hypotheses posited regarding social differentiation as a key element, in order to support or reject the theory of the existence of a peasant mode of production or its transformation into advanced simple commodity production.

Figure 2
Process of Iteration between Data, Hypotheses and Analysis of the Phenomena

Source: Own elaboration from Bryman (2003: Chapter 4)

As these differences were related to the income that a producer earns, it was possible to measure them or at least to employ some kind of indicator that would help to explain them. In this respect, in addition to historical interpretation, it was essential to measure and take note of variations in the indicators developed.

The hypothesis to be tested was whether the historical process had accentuated social differentiation. Social differentiation may have many shades
of meaning, but I was concerned here with the type of differentiation that arises in the area of production, particularly given the fact that differences in income between the different strata of ejido aquacultural producers is an indicator or estimator of a differentiation that may extend to other areas: education, access to technological information, access to key politicians or officials in the process, etc. Some of these other elements may not be determined in quantitative research, but the quantification of the different strata of producers according to the particular features of production units was an aspect that can be estimated using statistical methods of inference.

For the application of a quantitative instrument like this it was essential to ensure a representative sample of producers (cooperative members and farmers), which proved to be problematic because the universe of shrimp producers is not clearly determined. The government maintains registers of boats, cooperatives and farmers, but these registers do not include producers classified as illegal, i.e., who fish in the region without permits. It is difficult to know how many illegal producers there are, and therefore they were not included in the analysis.

The universe of producers can be found in the register kept by the government of producers operating in the fishing sector (approximately 5,000-7,000 people in the region under study)\(^\text{15}\). This information is used to design a representative random sample and conduct a survey in order to process the information and determine the significance of the differences found through statistical methods. Due to the nature of the topic, it is important to ensure the stratification of the information, based on certain desirable features (ownership of fishing boats and the number thereof and/or the size of land owned may be two criteria), in order to determine the significance of the relevant statistics (variances in the data, for example).

---

\(^\text{15}\) In 2010, a coastal planning study (Ordenamiento Pesquero) conducted by various public institutions in the State of Nayarit and Bahía de Banderas came up with a figure of 5,629. The 2011 survey could be considered a comprehensive census of all producers, as it covered both coastal fishing producers and those who catch shrimp on Nayarit’s inland waterways in the municipalities of interest to this thesis (see p. 21 of the aforementioned document). The methodology used is public and appears in its Final Report (2010). For this reason, the calculation of my sample was based on the information supplied by the 2010 study.
CHAPTER 3

Of the total number of fishers, only those operating in the municipalities of San Blas, Santiago Ixcuintla, Tecuala, Rosamorada and Tuxpan (see Map 2) fall under the category of inland fishers. The rest fish in coastal waters. Moreover, the cooperatives with shrimp-catching licences need to be separated out of the total number of inland fishers.

5.1. Extensive Shrimp Farms (Fishing Cooperatives)

The following table shows the total number of cooperatives that hold shrimp-catching licences according to the Ordenamiento (census) conducted in 2009 and published in 2010. It includes the number of fishers and small boats identified for each cooperative.

Table 2. Licensed Cooperatives and Number of Fishers Identified by the Ordenamiento of 2011 in Nayarit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperatives</th>
<th>Number of Fishermen</th>
<th>Total Boats (Licensed Boats)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>San Blas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP Santa Cruz de Miramar SC de RL de CV*</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Santiago Ixcuintla</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP en General y Acuícola Ostricamichín, SC de RL de CV.</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>84 (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícultores Puerta de Palapares, SC de RL de CV</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>15 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícultores Ostioneros del Mar de Villa Juárez, SC de RL de CV</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícultores Concheros de los Campos, SC de RL de CV</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>33 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícultores Pescadores Unidos de Santa Cruz SC de RL de CV.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola José María Morelos, SC de RL de CV</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>29 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Gorreberto, SC de RL de CV.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tecuala</strong></td>
<td>656</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Iglogar, SC de RL de CV</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>87 (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Unión de Morillos, SC de RL de CV</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Andrés Sandoval Lora, SC de RL de CV.</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>51 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Norte de Nayarit, SC de RL de CV</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>18 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Juventino Espizan, SC de RL de CV.</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>28 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Cecilio Rendón Mora, SC de RL de CV</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>19 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Ejido de Pajaritos, SC de RL de CV.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>32 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Ostioneros y Camaroneros de San Cayetano</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5 (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methodological Considerations: The Comparative Method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperatives</th>
<th>Number of Fishermen</th>
<th>Total Boats (Licensed Boats)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rosamorada SCPP y Acuícola Casa Cuna de Pescadores del Municipio de Rosamorada, SC de RL de CV.</td>
<td>988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>349</td>
<td>222 (102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Ejido Ribereña Los Dorados de Villa, SC de RL de CV.</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>185 (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Granjeros de Pericos, SC de RL de CV.</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>89 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Llano del Tigre, SC de RL de CV.</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>(22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Pescadores de San Miguel, SC de RL de CV</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola La Única de San Miguel, SC de RL de CV</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuxpan</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCPP y Acuícola Pescadores Unidos de Corrientes, SC de RL de CV.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total La Costa in Nayarit State</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,413</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Dirección General de Ordenamiento Pesquero y Acuícola, 2010).

The *Ordenamiento Pesquero 2010* (Dirección General de Ordenamiento Pesquero y Acuícola, 2010) fishing sector census records a total of 5,629 (see footnote 13 before) fishers, out of which there are 98 licence holders (among cooperatives and others) and 1,717 ‘free’ (i.e., illegal) fishers who need to be excluded from the study. This leaves a total of 3,912 members of fishing cooperatives. Of these, only those who hold a shrimp-fishing licence are to be included, which according to the above table comes to a total of 2,413 (see table 2).

Using the data from the aforementioned census (Dirección General de Ordenamiento Pesquero y Acuícola, 2010), a selection was made only of producers whose licences were in order. ‘Free’ (illegal) producers were excluded completely in the interests of avoiding possible conflicts at the locations where the surveys were to be conducted and to prevent skewing of the data. Thus, in each municipality, only those cooperative members that had shrimp-fishing licences according to the census were considered, while cooperative members with fishing licences for other species (fish, molluscs, etc.) were excluded. This reduced the universe to a total of 2,413 fishers, 61.6% of the aforementioned total of 3,912 fishers in La Costa. From there the sample was selected: 300 (Table 2, above), more than 10% of the total number of licensed producers.
CHAPTER 3

This is the most realistic figure for the universe under study that can be established. Illegal fishing activity is not included, as there are no records showing its relative impact on overall shrimp production in Nayarit, although at any given moment it may well be close to 71% of the legally registered total in official records.

5.2. Shrimp aquaculture (shrimp farms)

Aquaculture in the region, according to the last census (CONAPESCA, INCA-RURAL et al. 2012), includes 236 shrimp farms (out of a total of 320 dedicated to different aquacultural activities), 95% of which are deemed semi-intensive, while the rest are intensive. However, shrimp caught on Nayarit's inland waters are not included in this classification. Of these 236, it was possible in 2012 to obtain information on 229, which constitute the universe of this research.

Table 3. Distribution of the Total Area and Production Units of Shrimp Farms, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipalities</th>
<th>Total Land (Has)</th>
<th>Productive Land (Has)</th>
<th>Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acaponeta</td>
<td>2.173,00</td>
<td>1.861,50</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tecuala</td>
<td>567,00</td>
<td>478,00</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosamorada</td>
<td>1.286,64</td>
<td>1.008,20</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago Ixcuintla</td>
<td>75,00</td>
<td>63,50</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuxpan</td>
<td>8,00</td>
<td>7,00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Blas</td>
<td>1.769,77</td>
<td>1.516,38</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Nayarit</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.879,41</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.934,58</strong></td>
<td><strong>229</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (CONAPESCA, INCA-RURAL et al., 2012)

The sample of farmers was designed. In this case, the information available is much better organised, and also benefited from the support of the organisation that reviews sanitation on the farms (CESANAY), which has quite a reliable database on all the farms in Nayarit. For this category, as mentioned in Table 5, it was decided to increase the percentage of farmers to be interviewed to cover 120 of the 229 units registered (52% of the total).
5.3. Design of the sample based on existing information

A questionnaire (see appendices) was administered to a sample of the universe of producers at the end of the last production period, during the months of April and June/July 2013. The information sample was divided into two differentiated groups of shrimp producers: the so-called cooperatives, and farms. The reason for this division lies in the 'institutional' organisation of the sector, and the distinction thus facilitates the gathering of the survey. From an institutional perspective (i.e., from the perspective of the SAGARPA and other government institutions involved in the organisations and management of the group of fishers and aquacultural producers), it was very difficult to consider all the producers as a single group. For aquacultural shrimp farms, there is a structure based on an individualised database of producers maintained by CESANAY (Nayarit State Aquacultural Sanitation Commission), which is used for conducting sanitation studies on the farms. This support structure allowed for the gathering of information through this same organisation.

It is important to note that it was impossible to obtain a random sample for the interviews, due to a general feeling of distrust among cooperative leaders regarding the presence of people from outside the communities. It was thus necessary to allow the cooperative leaders themselves to choose the individuals to whom the questionnaire would be given. This situation prompted me at one point to reconsider the value of administering the questionnaire, but as its aim was to identify the existence of differences among cooperative members and farmers, I decided that although a random sample would have offered a representation of the size of each group of producers in relation to the total, a non-representative sample could still reveal the presence of aspects that differentiate producers. Based on this reasoning I decided to continue with the survey process. The surveys were conducted by ten students from the Universidad Autónoma de Nayarit, several of whom were children of ejidatarios or came from the communities where the surveys were conducted, which ensured an adequate level of trust between producers and interviewers in the interviews.

The following tables show the design of the non-random sample. In the case of the cooperatives, in which the majority of shrimp fishers operate, there is no
such support structure, nor any individualised database of producers. It was therefore necessary to refer to the Ordenamiento Pesquero fishing census of 2010 (Dirección General de Ordenamiento Pesquero y Acuícola 2010), which offers global data on producers per cooperative and per community. As there is only general data on each cooperative and no database that could support the design of a randomised sample, it was necessary to take a non-randomised sample using the total figures on producers provided by the official statistics.

Table 4. Design of sample for cooperatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Number of Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Villa Juárez</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boca de Camichín</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campo de los Limones</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pericos</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unión de Corrientes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexicaltitan</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerta de Palapares</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San André</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llano del Tigre</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pescadero</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Villa</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tecuala</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Felipe Aztatán</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Espino</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Morillos</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio R. Laureles</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río Viejo</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pajaritos</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Cayetano</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>300</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Design of sample for shrimp farms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Municipalities</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Number of Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>Acaponeta</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tecuala</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRE</td>
<td>Rosamorada</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Santiago Ixcuintla</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tuxpan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>San Blas</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAYARIT</td>
<td></td>
<td>229</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To ensure that the information obtained would be representative, the total number of producers was considered, based on the sources consulted (Dirección General de Ordenamiento Pesquero, 2010 and CONAPESCA, INCA-RURAL et al., 2012).

In this way, it was possible to establish approximate totals for producers organised under cooperatives and for farm producers. Two types of questionnaires were designed with ad hoc questions for each group, and the results were calculated.

The above tables show the distribution of the questionnaires in the regions under study. A total of 420 questionnaires were applied (300 in cooperatives plus 120 in farms). The relatively larger number of questionnaires applied to farms is due to the greater willingness of producers to take part in the interviews, and on the support that CESANAY gave to obtaining the sample.

The procedure for applying the questionnaires in the cooperatives involved the submission of a request for authorisation to the state fishing authority (SAGARPA, Department of Fishing and Aquaculture). A meeting was subsequently held with the leaders of the three federations of cooperatives, to explain the academic objectives of the research. A report was then submitted to the presidents of the cooperatives with shrimp production licences, according to
the data of the Nayarit fishing sector census (Dirección General de Ordenamiento Pesquero, 2010), which identifies 22 cooperatives licensed to catch and market shrimp. After this, the number of questionnaires to be applied for each cooperative was defined, based on the information on the number of registered members.

6. Summary of the methods used in the analysis of research variables

Having described the research methods and strategies used in the research, I will now attempt to offer a summary of how they relate to the analysis of the research questions. To do this, we need to return to the questions and variables outlined in Figure 1 and consider the different methods to be used to explain the behaviour of each variable under study (see Figure 3 below).

Figure 3 shows how each research variable and its relationship with the research questions is associated with a research strategy. Some variables have been researched using a combination of research methods, mainly quantitative. The data were then compared to obtain the results that will be presented in the conclusions.

As certain variables are of a qualitative nature (such as the class struggle), it is difficult to document them in terms of specific variables. I have made use of historical research to document developments that can be characterised as social movements in which the social classes expressed their political interests as a reflection of their economic interests (e.g. Chapter 4 will document the political struggle between the land owners and the peasantry for control over the land). It has also been difficult to identify classes as such, although Chapter 5 explores conflicts between marketing companies and the cooperative peasantry which fall into the category of what Scott refers to as everyday forms of resistance.
Figure 3. Research Questions and Methods

**Research Questions**

- How have these processes interacted with the promotion of investments in shrimp fishing infrastructure, new technologies and new products?

- Are there systematic signs of inequality in terms of income, technology, access to markets and/or loans, which might suggest a process of social and economic differentiation in Nayarit’s peasant aquacultural sector? Is there signs of unlimited supply of labour?

- Are there signs of class struggle ranging from open struggle to the concept posited by Scott (1985) of symbolic struggle and of what he refers to as ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’?

- a) Are there political institutions consolidating this process of economic differentiation in the region through the regulation and deregulation of aquacultural activity?

  b) Does the culture of patronage encourage this process of differentiation?

**Methods**

- Historical research, documents, archives, interviews, participant observation, etc;

  Comparative Research: Comparison between first period (transition from states to ejidos 1920-1991) and neoliberal period (1992-2013)

  Quantitative Research: questions about technology in questionnaires, etc;

- Historical research (e.g., technology in cooperatives);

  Quantitative Research: survey;

  Comparative Research: technological improvements, differentiated access to markets, etc.

- Historical research

  Comparative Research.

- Historical research

  Comparative Research.

The comparative analysis encompasses all of the research as it forms the foundation for defining the changes observed over time, as well as for
The comparative analysis encompasses all of the research as it forms the foundation for defining the changes observed over time, as well as for determining the particular features of agrarian development observed in the study.

7. Ethical Considerations

The research undertaken here is not free of ethical considerations that need to be addressed. It is the responsibility of researchers to act in such a way that their acts are ethically appropriate.

According to Hammersley & Atkinson (2007), ethical issues are inevitably associated with the nature of ethnographic work. Specifically, the use of in-depth research imposes responsibilities upon the researcher to the research participants who have placed their trust in him. Hammersley & Atkinson identify five general aspects related to ethics: the informed consent of the research participant(s), their privacy, the risk of causing harm, the exploitation of research participants and the consequences of publication of the research results.

Open research, whereby the research subjects know the purpose and scope of the research, is essential to ensure their informed consent and their freedom to withdraw at any time. In the region under study, the personality of the local inhabitants makes them inclined to accept the conditions of participant research, but it is essential not to exploit this circumstance to the benefit of an external agent like the researcher, who could take advantage of the local culture of acceptance of outsiders and undermine the dignity of the individuals involved.

In a population with a strong clientelist culture, the possibilities of exploitation are even greater. The local inhabitants may view the researcher as a potential intermediary and offer information in the expectation of something in exchange. Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) make explicit reference to this point. These are controversial issues, and in such cases, sincerity and honesty in informing the participant or participants of exactly what is expected of them is absolutely essential. In some cases, the researcher must also accept compromises,
provided that these do not infringe on the interests of any of the people involved.

In my research the topics addressed in the questionnaire to be given to cooperative members and farmers had to receive the approval of both state authorities and cooperative leaders. The farm authorities, more open to this type of research, offered full support for the survey. The questionnaires (see Appendix) were administered once all necessary authorisations (from state government officials, CESANAY, and cooperative leaders) were obtained in order to guarantee the safety of the interviewers and fieldwork coordinators, as explained in this chapter. In total, 420 interviews were planned with cooperative members and farmers.

In the survey administration process, cooperative leaders and CESANAY extension workers approved the interviews and that the interviewees would be members of existing cooperatives and legally established farmers. This process was essential to be able to guarantee the trust of the responsible authorities and cooperative leaders. The interviews were conducted gradually between April and July of 2013 before the shrimp-catching season that begins in September of each year in the estuaries of La Costa. A total of 285 questionnaires with cooperative members were approved (out of 300), and 99 questionnaires with aquacultural shrimp farms (out of 100). The total sample thus included 384 approved questionnaires out of a total of 400 administered.

Table 6. Sample Design and Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towns/Ejidos</th>
<th>Number of Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Villa Juárez</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boca de Camichín</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campo de los Limones</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pericos</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unión de Corrientes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexcaltitán</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerta de Palapares</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Andrés</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once the locations of the official representatives of the cooperatives were identified, the questionnaires were distributed as table 17 shows before.

In the case of the farms, the surveys had the following distribution:

### Table 7. Distribution of Interviews of Shrimp Farmers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm’s Size</th>
<th>No. of Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to 10 hectares of water surface</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1 to 30 hectares of water surface</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 30 hectares of water surface</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questionnaires Discards</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Questionnaires Approved</strong></td>
<td><strong>99</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This distribution was determined based on the data provided by CESANAY on its website on the size of aquacultural producers in Nayarit.

Once the surveys were completed, the information was then compiled in an Excel file which had been previously encoded for the purpose. In the compilation process, I excluded questionnaires whose information could not be processed reliably or whose data could not be quantified. Ambiguous
information or information that could not be reconfirmed by the interviewers was also excluded.

Finally, in order to streamline the information and to guarantee the confidentiality of the interviewees, some of the data from the smaller cooperatives was added to cooperatives with more members. The previous tables summarise the information obtained from the questionnaires.

In conducting the survey care was taken to ensure that the producers interviewed understood that their information would remain confidential. The interviewers received prior training in ethical conduct and were required to wear identification tags, and most were recruited on the basis of their place of origin, some of them being La Costa residents, in the interests of winning the trust of the producers.

For this thesis, it was my aim to treat these issues as being of vital importance. The final version must offer a means of guaranteeing the privacy of the information provided by the interviewees or participants without sacrificing the quality of the data (BERA, 2011).

The following ethical considerations arose in relation to the application of the survey:

- **Risks to participants and/or researchers:** The region under study poses safety risks in light of the nationwide scale of the war on the drug trade in Mexico, and the region under study has been the site of several confrontations in recent years. To reduce these risks, federal and state authorities were approached, as well as local community leaders, in order to explain the purpose and aims of the research. In this way we could ensure protection from the authorities while at the same time eliminating suspicions about the presence of ‘strangers’ in the rural communities where the questionnaire is being applied.

- **Confidentiality:** As the data to be collected includes confidential information on the income of the rural producers interviewed, an effort will be made to protect the information through its aggregation. The purpose of the data is to offer relevant information about groups of producers and not about individuals, and therefore the confidentiality of
the data provided is ensured. Another aspect is the fact that the questionnaire will not gather information that would allow the informant to be identified. This will increase the protection of the interviewees.

- Data protection: This is related to the previous point – the need to protect information about individuals and to guarantee their anonymity.

- Dissemination and use of findings: There is considerable interest in the results of the survey. Both federal and state authorities, as well as rural community leaders, have expressed interest in receiving the final conclusions of the field research upon its completion. Therefore, a presentation of findings at different times should be a requirement of the research process. This will create an atmosphere of trust for future research like this and increase the reliability of the information provided by interviewees.

8. Conclusions

This chapter has dealt with the definition of the research approach, the operationalisation of the variables (capital accumulation, social differentiation, class struggle and the clientelist role of the State in the agrarian process in the La Costa region of Nayarit State), the strategy for collecting and storing information, and the need to construct a method for its interpretation and validation.

The central hypothesis posited is the transformation from early simple commodity production to advanced simple commodity production in the region for ejido aquacultural producers, where the variables in question help to determine the particular features of this group and whether a process of social differentiation actually exists. This last aspect needs to be complemented by conducting a survey that will determine whether the differences identified are significant.

The variables under study are operationalised as follows:

(a) Capital accumulation: for the peasantry, the operationalisation of this variable is linked to elements that define the process of accumulation, and in
the case of their companies (cooperatives), their income, financing, debt, and freedom to grow and make their own decisions, among others.

(b) Differentiation between members of the peasantry: the operationalisation of this variable is linked to concepts identified such as the context for the differentiated development of the peasantry, the quantitative differentiation of certain strata of the peasantry that are distinct from the vast majority, and their access to the means and conditions for exploiting more labour and resources (including political resources).

(c) The class struggle: the operationalisation of this variable involves the conflict in which the peasantry is immersed, and its alliances or relationships with other social groups, as well as with the government and its agencies.

(d) The role of the State: the operationalisation of this variable is related to the presence of government agencies and their orientation in favour of one sector of the population or another, the enactment of laws and who benefits primarily from them, as well as the nature of patron-client relationships and whether they reinforce or attenuate the processes of differentiation among the peasantry, the class struggle and capital accumulation.

The validation process for the main body of the research would have to be determined by applying the analytic induction process described by Hammersley & Atkinson (2007), and for the quantitative research by the use of statistical methods.

Moreover, ethical considerations are central in research with a large qualitative component, particularly with the use of participant observation in the field, as well as the collection of data from primary sources that may pose risks to living people who have been involved in this activity for decades.
PART TWO:
PEASANT AQUACULTURE IN NAYARIT AND THE FIRST AGRARIAN REFORM

1. General Introduction

In this part (including Chapters 4 and 5), I will examine the class conflicts between peasantry and landowners during the 1920s and 1930s in Nayarit from a historical perspective in order to explain the process of class formation in the region. According to Byres (1996), an agrarian process is guided by a social class that determines the mode of capitalism that will develop: capitalism from above or capitalism from below. In the region under study, in the early twentieth century the bases existed for capitalism from above supported by large-scale land ownership: the hacienda. Why did this mode of capitalist development fail to consolidate itself? This is the first question that needs to be answered in the La Costa region in Nayarit State.

This first section analyses the conditions of open class conflict between the peasantry and the owners of the latifundios (large estates). Capital accumulation is viewed firstly from the perspective of the haciendas, and then the subsequent process of peasantisation of the region. The role of the State was essential for the change in direction of the agrarian process in the region. The agrarian process, and the increasing regulation of that process, occurred in the context of a peasantry linked to market production but in conditions of simple commodity production, with a large proportion of family or cooperative labour being used to provide the necessary inputs for shrimp catching.

During the 1930s, the First Agrarian Reform began in Nayarit, initially as a project of local government. Then, with a favourable national context, the federal government would begin handing over land to the peasantry, who would come to form Mexico's ejidatario class. As this chapter involves an historical study, I will make use mainly of secondary sources, historical research and legal documents.
In the midst of an acute class conflict, ownership of the *haciendas* (or estates) still dominated the national scene in the 1930s, and Nayarit was no exception. Nayarit had been constituted as a state a mere decade earlier, during which time it had suffered severe political instability with constant changes of government. Land restitution progressed slowly while landowners seized all they could to prevent the advance of the agrarian reform. The period was marked by alliances between social groups and classes.

The *hacienda* estates continued to use the same production techniques and methods used in the late nineteenth century. With few exceptions, the landowners constituted a hindrance to the development of capitalist production relations (BERA 2011). The inability of the landholding class to transform their production conditions made the development of ‘capitalism from above’ impossible. As Castellon Fonseca (2000) has demonstrated, for the landowner of the time, the land remained ‘a goal in itself’ (p. 6). The distribution of land and the emancipation of the *peón acasillado*\(^\text{16}\) became a necessary step for further local development allowing the end to political instability.

In Chapter 4, I will describe the class conflict and the government’s role as mediator in that conflict and as a factor in the resolution of the first land reform in favour of the peasantry. The allocation of land in Nayarit struck at the heart of the most powerful *hacienda* estates. It was in this respect an economically and politically effective agrarian reform. The First Agrarian Reform would give rise to a different political power structure and the resulting local stability would aid the further development of the domestic market.

Once the agrarian reform and the *peasantisation* associated with it began, cooperativism defined the method of accumulation. However, the lack of capitalisation of the cooperatives made them fall quickly into the hands of commercial capital. The introduction of electricity to the region and other infrastructural works (particularly roads and highways) had an immediate effect on the possibility of establishing distribution channels to the rest of the country.

\(^{16}\) The *peón acasillado* was a form of debt peonage resulting decades of expropriation of agricultural land in Mexico during late nineteenth century, and was a system characterized by an institutionalised hierarchy, at the lowest level of which was the indebted peon, or ‘*peón acasillado*’.

and for exports, as it allowed the main sale product, fresh shrimp, to be processed as frozen shrimp instead of being converted into dried shrimp. This meant that the market for this product expanded dramatically.

The class struggle would now be characterised by a ‘noncompliance, food dragging, deception’ mode, or what Scott (1985) calls ‘weapons of the weak’, a means of resistance that is not necessarily associated with physical violence, but with the attitude taken in response to external decisions (of the government or of private enterprise).

Accumulation by peasant enterprises would be seriously affected by their indebtedness, their lack of real autonomy and the constant agrarian conflicts generated by the government itself.

Differentiation appears to have assumed the form of access or proximity to the policy decision-makers in the region, company owners and other factors that were not necessarily economic. It was developed in an openly clientelist culture, with the formation of ‘power networks’ that the people associated with ‘groups’.

This model of differentiation, which led to a certain stratification of the roles of producers within the cooperative, will be compared with the model of stratification that emerged in the neoliberal period in Chapters 6 and 7.

In Chapter 5, I will trace the history of the peasant crisis and cooperativism and the struggle for permits and licences to fish in the inland marshes, estuaries and lagoons in La Costa before the legal changes introduced in the early 1990s (the Second Agrarian Reform).

In broad terms, the examination of this period is set out in three stages. The first covers the struggle for land and the construction of a new hegemonic system, from the First Agrarian Reform (from the 1920s to the 1950s) to the collapse of the peasant economy in the 1980s. This stage also saw the development of relations between the Mexican State (or politician-entrepreneurs, the patronage system or client-based system) and the ejidatarios. In the second stage, the cooperative movement was adapted to the agrarian process. It was during this second stage that cooperativism was established, before and during the emergence of ‘La Única’ (lit. ‘The Only One’) Cooperative. It was also the period during which the system was developed for shrimp-fishing permits in Nayarit.
Finally, the third stage examined occurred following the monetary and financial crisis of 1982. After this crisis, the existing economic and political model was plunged into crisis, accelerating the collapse of the peasant economy and leading to the deregulation of the sector in the 1990s.

The First Agrarian Reform and the regulations that accompanied it defined the contextual framework for the relationship between the State and the aquacultural peasantry of the region, which assumed an extremely clientelist and corporate nature.

In general, the existence of simple commodity production appears to have prevailed in small peasant aquacultural production. There is a consistency between the theoretical and empirical approaches to this situation, and the discussion that follows reflects this fact. The question is the direction in which these peasant forms of production organisation were evolving. Most campesinista theorists identify production for self-consumption as a defining feature, along with family labour (or in this case, cooperative labour).

However, it is clear that shrimp production was always a commercial enterprise. As such, it is important to understand the specific nature of the type of peasant enterprise that arose in the aquaculture of the region after the First Agrarian Reform.

Early simple commodity production was associated with a phenomenon that determined the fate of the cooperative experiment: a permanent labour surplus linked to agrarian reform (Lewis, 1954). This surplus generated a process of colonisation that increased the pressure on the natural resources of the region, and particularly, the pressure on complementary agrarian activities, such as fishing and shrimp catching. Originally considered an inherent right, shrimp catching in estuaries and lagoons came into conflict with the recently created right to exploit this resource commercially. Subsequently, the commercial activity itself was disrupted by the pressure on the resources. This relative labour surplus found expression in a blind, muted and occasionally violent struggle for the right to belong to the cooperative (as a section within it), and the right to exploit ‘its own land and its resources’ given to it in the First Agrarian
Reform was sometimes expressed in a quest for autonomy for the cooperative organisation.

In other words, early simple commodity production did not constitute a permanent condition. The changes in the form of organisation – the ‘La Única’ cooperative, the struggle for the resources (i.e., water and shrimp), control by commercial capital (firstly by the packing company Empacadora de Escuinapa, and then through other forms of exploitation, mainly by commercial capital) – make it impossible to assert that peasant enterprises experienced a normal process of accumulation. Thus, product marketing, or the control thereof firstly by private corporations and subsequently by public corporations, constitutes a distinguishing feature of the region under study. This situation limited the possibility that the cooperatives had of obtaining loans from the outset.
Chapter 4

The First Agrarian Reform in Nayarit: The Birth of the Peasant Economy, Cooperativism and Artisanal Small-Scale Shrimp Aquaculture in Nayarit (from 1920 to 1940)

1. Introduction

After a brief geographical contextualisation, in this chapter I will present a new interpretation of the history of the region of what is now the state of Nayarit, which is necessary as background to understand the period in which the land was handed over to the peasantry. An analysis of the conflict over the land will provide clues to help understand the formation of the cooperative movement and to show the kind of process of capitalism that has developed (from below or from above) in the region under study.

Based on the work of local historians, historical documents and secondary sources, I will provide a brief history of the formation of social classes in the state of Nayarit.

The ‘agrarian transition’ can be divided into two periods in the area under research, beginning with the growth of large estates (latifundios or haciendas) in what was a large-scale expropriation of the land of the peasantry (1857-1930). The second period began with land reform and would lead to a new configuration of social classes, in which the Revolutionary State would have a strong social and economic presence (1930-1982).

The new hegemonic system of domination that would emerge from the land reform and state involvement in the rural sector would trigger a new process of property dispossession of the peasantry. The new process would lead to conflicts over land in which the government would attempt to mediate a solution. New social agents – mediators and brokers – would also become involved in this process. Brokers would seek to take advantage of their relationships with government officials responsible for agrarian issues while developing close social ties with the direct producers, i.e., the peasantry. The whole system of domination was institutionalised by a single party, which would give legitimacy to the new State that emerged from the Revolution.
The First Agrarian Reform in Nayarit: The Birth of the Peasant Economy, Cooperativism and Artisanal Small-Scale Shrimp Aquaculture in Nayarit (from 1920 to 1940)

However, an essential aspect of the subsequent evolution was the emergence of an artisanal industry of shrimp farming, particularly associated with high raw material prices during the Second World War, and a federal government policy of support for the peasantry in general. This reflects the fact that the peasantry was directly involved in the development of domestic and foreign markets, which favoured a process of capitalisation of agricultural enterprises.

On the other hand, research also demonstrates that alongside the rationalising process of the market, the peasantry was directly subjected to extortion and legal disputes that prevented them from achieving full autonomy in their enterprises. The debt process was a crucial factor in the success or failure of agrarian rural enterprises. At the same time, the control of marketing channels by industrialising companies was another impediment to the further growth of rural businesses organised as cooperatives.

Finally, constant government mediation and the contradictions between the different levels thereof (federal, state and municipal) and between their different agencies would lead to the development of rural aquacultural enterprises in a context of multiple conflicts and interests, which prevented their capitalisation and fomented corruption and the formation of ‘areas of opportunity’ that would bolster the process of political-economic differentiation, with greater opportunities for one sector of the peasantry.

2. From Hacienda to Ejido and the Birth of Commercial Aquaculture in Nayarit

The region that today is the state of Nayarit underwent a dramatic agrarian transformation during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when the defeat of the peasantry after the French invasion of Mexico and the restoration of the Republic led to an unrestrained expansion of the hacienda system throughout the country.

The peasantry and the surviving agrarian communities came to depend on the economy of the haciendas, which were characterised by ‘[p]roductive activities […] oriented toward a self-sufficient supply of food, fiber, and other agricultural goods, along with some commercial production for export to the […] foreign market’ (De Janvry, 1981: 62 et passim).
These estates were notable for particular kinds of social relations of production (De Janvry, 1981: 111): ‘the precapitalist estate maintains feudal internal relations of production that are characterised, in particular, by the presence of internal peasants paying rents in labor services and commonly bonded to the landlord by debts (debt peonage) and extraeconomic coercion. By controlling the state on a political basis – essentially because they dominate large masses of peasants – the traditional landed elites were able to define the nature of the public services for agriculture and appropriate the lion’s share of them.’ Although much of Nayarit (in the north) was practically uninhabited until the 1940s when the agrarian reform and colonisation began, the haciendas effectively controlled the state.

3. The First Agrarian Reform in Nayarit: The Construction of a New Political-Economic Hegemony

The state of Nayarit was created in the context of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) to serve the interests of the big hacienda owners, most of whom held the best land in the territory, and who saw in the armed struggle an opportunity to seize control of the political and economic life of the region (Castañeda, 2010) and to free themselves once and for all from the political tutelage of Mexico’s central metropolis. However, the revolution also awakened hopes among the peasantry of claiming back the lands confiscated from them during the nineteenth century. The issue of agrarian reform and the restoration of the lands appropriated by the haciendas, along with the question of funding for the creation of new agrarian units, unleashed a class struggle that resulted in a decade of political instability for the newly created state.

The lands of La Costa were claimed by groups of peasants who initiated a gradual de facto appropriation of the region and the resources it held (lagoons, rivers, estuaries, etc.). The political situation thus prevented the consolidation of a political structure. Contreras Valdez (2001) has characterised this period, which runs from 1916 to 1934, as a period of popular agrarianism, in the sense that the recovery of the lands taken by the haciendas during the nineteenth century occurred in the form of a direct class struggle, and at times, in spite of official policies.
The thrust of the conflict was led by La Casa de Aguirre, a huge business empire that controlled land, industries and trade in the state. La Casa de Aguirre effectively appointed and removed governors and determined the lives of Nayarit's inhabitants (Meyer, 2005).

Given its importance in the period, it is worth taking a closer look at La Casa de Aguirre and its implications for this study. Using strong alliances with revolutionaries in the national capital, La Casa de Aguirre played a fundamental role in economic, political and social developments. One historian (Meyer, 2005) describes La Casa de Aguirre and the situation that prevailed in the state at the time as follows:

‘All the power [was] in the hands of one family, which exerted such an influence that it was said to appoint and remove governors and generals. [...] There were also other less important estates which meant 96% of agricultural land belonged to properties of more than 500 hectares. Thirty-one properties of more than 1,000 hectares controlled 1.3 million of a total of 1.8 million hectares, or 72% of total land. These properties belonged to Aguirre, Delius, Romano, Menchaca, Corcuera, Flores, Fernandez del Valle and Maisterrena, among others.’ (Meyer, 2005)\(^7\)

The emblematic example of this situation was La Casa de Aguirre, a Spanish enterprise, with its vast properties of about one million hectares, including 30 farms, cattle ranches, mills and industries. In the state capital of Tepic it owned numerous properties and farms, textile mills, the Bellavista power station, the water supply and oil, gas and wood and other resources. On its various ranchos (farms) grazed tens of thousands of heads of cattle.

The vast economic and political control exercised by La Casa de Aguirre and the other haciendas in the state raises the question of why they did not remain at the heart of the capitalist transformation. The answer appears to lie in various factors that affected the internal dynamics of these huge estates. In spite of

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\(^7\) In 1930, most of the population in Nayarit was made up of rural workers. The wealth of the state was basically agricultural, and as that wealth was in few hands, a few people controlled economic life and work in the state. In 1926, there were 2,210 rural properties, of which 31 were larger than 10,000 hectares, thus covering 71.5% of the land area (and 49% of the value). Foreigners controlled 52% of the land area (36% of the value).
their commercial, financial, industrial and agricultural control, the haciendas still had conservative structures, and basically continued to subordinate the economic activities in which they were involved to land ownership for its own sake and the conservatism arising from this view. In other words, the land was an end in itself (Castellon Fonseca, 2000). Moreover, the peonage system (debt peonage), sharecropping and tenant farming hindered the mobility of the labour force and with it the establishment of a wage-earning class, which is the basis of industrial capitalist production (de la Peña 1975).

In addition, the Revolution of 1910-20 had transformed the political context in which the hacienda system had previously enjoyed circumstances favourable to its development. The agrarian conflict that was unleashed with the Revolution determined the political life of the state for the period that followed. The federal government that arose out of the Revolution had meekly initiated the handing over of land: ‘by 1933, a total of 78 ejidos had been endowed and 130 more were in dispute’ (Meyer, 2005; see table below). This meant that the agrarian reform moved forward at a slow pace from 1916 to 1934. The agrarian struggle between the peasantry and the landowners also claimed many lives of peasants in the state during this period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Municipalities</th>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Estates affected</th>
<th>No. of has. granted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.390</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.701</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44.942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1934, a new governor and a new local congress began one of the most radical agrarian reforms in Mexico. Supported by a large social movement of workers and peasants, Governor Francisco Parra (of the National Revolutionary Party, or PNR/PRI) launched the agrarian reform in Nayarit, expropriating the largest part of the best arable land from La Casa de Aguirre and other haciendas in the state.
As one historian describes it, between the years from 1934 to 1937 a deep and broad agrarian policy was developed that formed the core of the social force of the Revolution. Between those years, agrarian communities grew in number from 27 to 325. The CROM (*Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana*), which had been the labour union that brought workers together previously, was replaced by the CTM (*Confederación de Trabajadores de México*), a confederation established through the collective efforts of teachers and workers (Hernández-Zavalza, 1984:323 et passim).

**Table 9. Dynamic of the Agrarian Reform in Nayarit (Five year averages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Lands Granted (Hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-1924</td>
<td>19,161.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1929</td>
<td>27,881.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1934</td>
<td>47,982.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-1939</td>
<td>154,031.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-1944</td>
<td>357,640.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own research based on Local Agrarian Archive.

In a four-year period, 1935-39, as much land was handed over as had been in the twenty years before it (see Table 8).

The above data is a summary of the lands granted to the peasantry to form *ejidos*. A pattern of growth in granting of lands can be observed, resulting in the increasing *peasantisation* of the state, particularly after 1935.

Through the agrarian reform and the formation of a new union movement, the old *hacienda*-based property regime was dismantled, and a new system was created wherein the *ejidatario* peasantry would come to play a leading role in the stability of the new social and political regime.

**4. Shrimp Exploitation and Cooperatives in Nayarit**

It was in this context that commercial shrimp exploitation by peasant communities began. As recognition of peasant ownership of resources developed, a new system of exploitation of these resources began to be
structured. A new set of regulations was implemented to protect small-scale peasant exploitation and the commercial exploitation of peasant resources.

The regulatory process included exclusive concessions of large areas of Nayarit’s La Costa region to the agrarian communities of Mexcaltitán, Tecuala and Acaponeta from 1928 onwards. Private companies were prohibited from catching or fishing for restricted species, including shrimp. Among the regulations implemented at this time was the requirement that the enterprises dedicated to catching these restricted species had to be cooperatives.

In this way, from the late 1920s activities involving the catching of shrimp, oysters, octopus and other species were regulated in favour of peasant enterprises in La Costa and in the south of the state of Sinaloa.

The agrarian reform that intensified both at state and national levels in the 1930s promoted the protection of small-scale peasant ownership and enterprises. This included the enactment of a new Agrarian Code, which guaranteed the possession of the restored peasant lands and the creation of new agrarian units, or *ejidos*.

5. The Establishment of the Hegemonic System of Political-Economic Control and Power Networks in Nayarit

The new regulations also included mechanisms for supervision by federal government authorities, officials or representatives in the official *ejido* assemblies. De Janvry (1997: 2 et passim) notes that ‘mechanisms existed through which the State intervened in the internal life of *ejidos*: first, there were interventions directed at legalising the *ejidos’* internal process of decision making […] calling an *ejido* assembly was only considered legal if a representative of the SRA (Ministry of Agrarian Reform) or of the municipal authority endorsed it. Second, the State intervened in *ejido* arbitration matters […]. Third, the State controlled the flow of public resources to the *ejido.’ Included among these aspects of state control, in the case of peasant fisheries, was the mandatory form of organisation, the cooperative.

By the 1950s, there were at least 5 peasant cooperatives operating in La Costa, all of them associated with mass organisations ruled by the official party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI (previously the PNR or PRM).
The construction of a new political regime in La Costa and in the rest of Nayarit was accompanied by a wide-sweeping regulatory system, but at the same time, social consensus was guaranteed by the strong presence of the mass organisations of the official party.

The lack of experience of the peasantry in commercial management of their enterprises, and particularly in following a new regulatory framework plagued with bureaucratic complexities, led to the creation of a system of networks between certain members of the new agrarian communities and government officials at all levels (municipal, state and federal), as well as the new leaders of the peasant groups and the workers' sector, all affiliated with the sole official party.

Soon these networks transformed into genuine patronage relationships, whereby leaders of the organisations of the official party or bureaucrats mediated or lobbied for their connections in the recently endowed agrarian
communities and the needs and bureaucratic processes of these organisations with the federal or state government (Rap, 2007; Alexander, 2011).

It was in this period that there emerged what I will call a new hegemonic system of social control, based on these new relationships between government, the single party (with its mass organisations) and the clientelist system, which became a truly institutionalised system of social control, while at the same time guaranteeing that the demands of peasants and their enterprises were channelled through quasi-legal institutional brokers. At the top of this pyramid was the governor of the state and the politicians associated with the national system, i.e., deputies and senators in the federal Congress (Lomnitz 1975, 2001).

This system would guarantee political stability for several decades. As Meyer (1997) notes: ‘From 1937 on, all of the governors completed their terms without serious problems, which doesn't mean that they had an easy ride. In Nayarit there was always a strong opposition.’

6. The Emergence of an Agrarian Conflict between 1930 and 1961: Agrarian Reform and Shrimp-Catching Concessions

The years from 1930 to 1961 saw the structuring of the shrimp market in Nayarit. Originally a more artisanal activity (dry shrimp packed in traditional handcrafted containers called barcinas for their preservation), the creation of the infrastructure of highways and railways increased the scope for marketing of the product.

The political atmosphere and the context of war in the 1940s pushed government policy in a nationalist direction, particularly against the Japanese fishermen who exploited the Mexican coastline. This was accentuated after the 1940s, when the shrimp market began to be structured on the basis of support for Mexican companies.

In the 1950s, the introduction of electricity allowed the creation of freezing and packing companies, which expanded the shrimp market considerably. Based in the neighbouring northern state of Sinaloa was the packing company Empacadora de Escuinapa, which would control shrimp marketing from that time and on. The eight existing cooperatives would receive cash advances from
the company for the preparation of shrimp caught in estuaries and lagoons in Nayarit and southern Sinaloa.

This would determine the nature of the relationship: the freezing company would provide advances and the producers would receive provisions and financing from the company that would subsequently buy their product. The cash advances and the storage of supplies and equipment for fishing and catching consolidated a network of interests that began to influence the attitude of the inhabitants of La Costa and the communities that held shrimp-catching concessions. That is, the rights of the inhabitants and owners of the resources would come to be undermined by *shrimp-catching and exploitation rights*, which were legally granted by the federal authorities.

As the agrarian reform progressed in Nayarit, new *ejido* populations were recognised or created, new *ejidos* were established, and this began to create a context of conflict over the spaces for shrimp catching, as at times exploitation rights (the concessions granted by the federal government) were not awarded to those who possessed the right to ownership of the land and its associated resources (the fishing that was permitted within the limits of the newly recognised *ejidos*, in this case).

Nevertheless, the commercial interests of Empacadora de Escuinapa in the existing cooperatives would lead to a growing indebtedness of these associations of fisher peasants. By the end of the 1950s, conflicts in the region were on the rise, and commercial interests became intertwined with political interests. The presidential election for the six-year period from 1958 to 1964 opened up the possibility of sharpening these conflicts, some of which were associated with interests in the national capital, particularly between the president elect, Adolfo López Mateos, and Nayarit's strong man since the 1940s, Gilberto Flores Muñoz.
One conflict arose in the region of Las Haciendas (Interview with Mr. Soto Ceja, 2005), in what was then the most productive shrimp zone in the state, the El Colorado estuary, when a group of peasants rebelled against the concessionaires of neighbouring districts. The latter, backed by networks of interests associated with Empacadora de Escuinapa and local politicians with ties to the national capital, were unable to resolve the dispute and turned to the federal government to determine the organisation of shrimp catching.

The government intervened and created a new company from the merger of the existing cooperatives, integrating the region in conflict over access to shrimp-catching zones into a single cooperative. Thus was created the ‘Cooperativa Única de Pescadores Adolfo López Mateos’, more commonly known as ‘La Única’. The existing cooperatives became sections of ‘La Única’, under a centralised administration for the whole state, closely controlled by the federal authorities, who appointed the Manager of the new cooperative.
7. Conclusions

In this chapter I began with a description of the struggle between landowners and peasantry over control of the resources of La Costa. It was an open class struggle for possession of the land. This struggle took on political and agrarian dimensions at the same time.

The State played a decisive role in the development of the conflict. In the first stage, it took a contradictory approach, supporting the establishment of zones for aquacultural production and laying down the first laws for their exploitation by the peasantry while at the same time maintaining close ties with the *hacienda* owners in the region. However, the resolution of the conflict led to the establishment of a corporate, clientelist system, as the State needed the political force of the peasantry (and of urban workers) to overwhelm the political resistance of the landowners, who were unable to offer a means of ongoing development because of their absolutist view of the land.

Landowners proved unable to establish themselves as the force for capitalist development because they saw the land as an end in itself, and industrial development as subordinate to an economic and political conservatism that came into conflict with the needs of an expanding internal market. Moreover, landowners limited the possibilities for mobility of the labour force by maintaining the system of indebtedness or debt peonage, and production systems based on sharecropping and tenant farming. If we add to this the dissolution of the political system that had provided support for the landowner system – the regime of Porfirio Díaz – we can understand the class struggle between the peasantry and the landowners, led by La Casa de Aguirre, which prevailed for nearly 20 years from the creation of the state of Nayarit to the beginning of the agrarian reform, when the regulatory laws of the federal government allowed the establishment of the first *ejido* aquacultural enterprises for commercial purposes, all of them organised as cooperatives.

Based on the above, it is reasonable to conclude that the development of a commercial peasant aquacultural economy arose as a consequence of the process of agrarian reform and the new regulatory framework. This commercial activity was based on the possession of aquatic resources supported by the
government (at all its levels). This generated a particular kind of relationship between the peasantry and the State, which was mediated by myriad brokers from the official party, as well as politicians and government officials. This effectively marks the emergence of a particular mode of peasant production with strong links to the State (see Vergara-Camus, 2009, who suggests that landowners "essentially" disappear during this period in Mexico).

At the same time, this framework guaranteed peasant support for government policy and the political consolidation of the State. A new hegemonic system of social control was established which from that time ensured an institutionalised political transition, but with clearly authoritarian dimensions.

The resulting *peasantisation* placed the *ejidatarios* in a subordinate relationship with the State and its agencies, which considerably limited their economic and political autonomy and led to the development of a clientelist culture.

During the period from the 1940s to the 1950s, the process of ‘institutionalisation’ imposed through the First Agrarian Reform, along with the control established by virtue of the relationship between the ‘official’ party and its various factions, developed into a direct relationship with society itself so that often the official party effectively *was* society. This new arrangement – which replaced the *hacienda* model – ensured a particular mode of development of economic activities like commercial aquaculture. The external market offered sales opportunities through the intermediation of La Empacadora de Escuinapa, in southern Sinaloa State, which was the company favoured by the system to monopolise the production of the coast of northern Nayarit and southern Sinaloa. And the beneficiaries of shrimp production and sales also began to set up new networks of interests that accentuated their relationship with the political class.

The twenty years following the First Agrarian Reform saw the further development of this situation, and at the same time began awakening the interest of the new colonisers (who had recently been given lands) and those who had been left out of the initial distribution of resources. The destruction of community life by the commercial environment increased the labour force that sought to exploit the aquatic resources of the region in the hope of increasing
their income. And along with the agrarian reform itself came a growth of interest in exploiting the fishing and aquacultural zones.

The expansion of the market as a result of the handing over of land was hindered because the nascent cooperatives also lacked access to loans or other forms of financing. The capitalisation of cooperative enterprises depended on their connections to commercial capital, which offered advances contingent on the delivery of the product. At the same time, the ongoing conflicts over the land accentuated the lack of capitalisation of the peasant enterprises.

But land reform generated greater pressure on the resources of La Costa. New *ejidos* established in inland estuarine zones, along with modifications to the region’s infrastructure through the opening of canals connecting the coastal zone to inland estuaries and lagoons, altered the dynamics of shrimp reproduction, and the new labour force involved in these activities claimed the right to exploit them. The success of the project resulted in lower incomes for certain populations (mainly those who had been the basis for the creation of the ‘La Única’ cooperative) and profits for those who took advantage of the new institutional and production situation that the opening of the canals offered them. The internal conflict resulted in the breakdown of the organisation as a whole.

For the reasons stated above, in the next chapter I will analyse the consequences of the establishment of commercial peasant enterprises and their relationships with private enterprise and with the State. After this, following Lewis (1954), I will explore how the labour surplus (expressed in the creation of new agrarian communities) changed the internal relationships of the groups that coexisted within the ‘La Única’ cooperative, and ultimately led to its demise.
Chapter 5
The ‘La Única’ Cooperative of Peasants and Fishermen: Agrarian Struggle, Corporatist and Clientelist Networks in Nayarit (from 1960 to 1990)

1. Introduction

This chapter continues the examination of the previous chapter. However, it has been given a chapter of its own because there is an abundance of first-hand information available which allows a more detailed analysis of the peasant organisation in aquaculture during this period, and also because it is a period in which production throughout the state of Nayarit was granted to a single peasant cooperative: La Cooperativa Única de Pescadores Adolfo López Mateos, or ‘La Única’.

The organisation of commercial aquacultural enterprises established a system of (early) simple commodity production in the sense defined by Byres (1996) and others (see, for example, de Janvry, 1981; Vergara-Camus, 2009; 2014b; Bartra, 1975). It is a classical link between peasantry and commercial capital with mediation of State. That is, the possession and granting of concessions to the peasants of La Costa gave rise to a situation in which shrimp was the core commercial aquacultural activity, and the use of artisanal fishing techniques and instruments guaranteed an income that could support producers and their families, while at the same time being an activity that was complimentary to agricultural activities.

This was possible because new infrastructural developments favoured the transformation of commercial shrimp-catching into a more profitable activity. Among these developments was the construction of new roads and highways, the railway and the arrival of electricity, which facilitated the development of an industry of shrimp freezing and packing for its subsequent exporting and marketing as a fresh food product.
In this chapter I will also examine the process of corporatisation and the consolidation of clientelist networks in La Costa associated with the creation of the cooperative of fishermen and peasants known as ‘La Única’, which came into being in the midst of agrarian conflicts in Nayarit, as a case study of the mechanisms of surplus extraction. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, this will also illustrate the evolution of the peasantry into peripheral societies according to De Janvry (1981), and the particular features of the process of capitalism from below, with a labour surplus foreseen by Lewis (1954) as a feature of certain developing societies.

At the same time, this case study examines the power relations that were structured around ‘La Única’, as an example of how value and surplus was transferred from rural communities to public or private entities. This demonstrates the existence of a process of impoverishment and social differentiation within the ejidos in Nayarit, and the forms of control over the peasantry.18

The examination of ‘La Única’ will demonstrate the operation of corporatism in Nayarit, and how clientelist groups connected direct producers with the bureaucracy of the different levels of government. This is contrary to the development of agrarian societies in countries like Denmark (Servolin, 1988), as the peasantry was politically subordinated to this bureaucratic structure, which appears to have exploited the market surpluses to its own benefit.

The chronology of the events described below is based on the materials found in the general archives; the boxes from which the information extracted is referenced as AGN, and can be consulted in the last Appendix of the thesis.

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18 ‘La Única’ was composed of sections, and each section had its own management structure. Representatives from each section were delegations to the General Assembly of Members of the cooperative. At the top was the Board of Directors, and executive power was held by the General Manager until 1967, when this figure disappeared and was replaced by the Chairman of the Board of Directors. In fact, all the figures were political rather than administrative, as this case study reveals.
2. The First Period of ‘La Única’: The Struggle between Managers and Cooperative Members; Authoritarian Corporatism (AGN: box nos. 1-10, ‘La Única’ section)\(^{19}\)

‘La Única’ was established in the midst of internal and external conflicts, but the core of the struggle of the peasantry of La Costa involved the fight for greater autonomy and administrative independence from the imposition by the federal government of the general administration of the cooperative. This struggle would mark the course of the organisation for almost a decade.

However, these were not the only challenges faced by the peasant enterprise. The conflicts may be grouped into five areas: (a) the struggle between the peasant fishing culture and the rationalisation imposed by the new cooperative (as described by Scott [1985]); (b) the indebtedness of cooperative members; (c) the agrarian conflict arising from the contradiction between the agrarian reform and the policy of federal government concessions (the labour surplus referred to above, which supports the theory of Lewis [1954]); (d) the relationships between the cooperative and private enterprise (Empacadora de Escuinapa); and (e) the conflict between the fight for autonomy and independence by cooperative members and the authoritarian nature of the model chosen by the federal government.

These aspects will be studied collectively in order to facilitate their comprehension, and I will explore them chronologically insofar as is possible.

2.1. The Incorporation of Rational Exploitation Methods and the Peasant Culture of the Region

One of the first conflicts arose when the cooperative attempted to apply rational methods in the selection and assignment of fishing areas to its registered members, replacing the traditional peasant and communal methods associated, for example, with seasonal celebrations. The *borlote* is a celebration in which the producers assign shrimp catching areas at random, which prevented

\(^{19}\) Full information can be found in the Appendix pp. 227-252: 1961 to 1966.
CHAPTER 5

accumulation of wealth and gave meaning to the right of the community to control fishing in its areas of influence.

The cooperative attempted to base the assignment on rational methods, and with other criteria supposedly favouring productive efficiency, but in reality favouring certain internal groups that controlled production decisions. This would strengthen and consolidate the networks of interests and clientelist relationships within the different sections of ‘La Única’.

2.2. Debt as a Control Mechanism by the Company over the Cooperative

The new sections of ‘La Única’ were established with pre-existing monetary debts. A requirement in the organisation of the cooperative was that Empacadora de Escuinapa would agree to market and purchase its product subject to recognition of the cash advances already made to the former cooperatives and their prior debts, many of which were fictitious. Thus, ‘La Única’ began its existence with an outstanding liability, which would continue to increase as the years went by because the purchaser also fixed the prices for the product, creating a chain of commercial exploitation of the peasant cooperative. These tentacles of exploitation would never be overcome and would mark the main feature of the relationship between private enterprise and peasant enterprise: the subordination of the latter to commercial capital.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Volume of Production (kg)</th>
<th>Advance Payments (MXN)</th>
<th>Total cost of Production (MXN)</th>
<th>Value of all Production (MXN)</th>
<th>Price per kg (MXN)</th>
<th>Cost per kg (MXN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,608,550</td>
<td>5,124,211</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,069,536</td>
<td>5,519,023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>579,631</td>
<td>3,661,195</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>961,214</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
<td>3,078,513</td>
<td>4,071,000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>616,815</td>
<td>1,390,000</td>
<td>4,888,991</td>
<td>3,387,000</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>794,957</td>
<td>1,329,000</td>
<td>4,140,974</td>
<td>3,705,000</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>812,339</td>
<td>1,276,000</td>
<td>3,582,891</td>
<td>4,329,000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>(*)441,691</td>
<td>1,318,000</td>
<td>3,114,744</td>
<td>2,891,000</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Due to heavy flooding the production ended in the Pacific Ocean.

Source: AGN: Box 11, Dossier IX.
The 'La Única' Cooperative of Peasants and Fishermen: Agrarian Struggle, Corporatist and Clientelist Networks in Nayarit (from 1960 to 1990)

The tables above and below show how, in spite of rising prices in the first years of operation of the amalgamated cooperative, the organisation’s final balances prevented it from making a profit, except in a few years.

**Table 11. Results from the First Five Years of ‘La Única’, Nayarit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Profits or Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>177,841</td>
<td>Net Profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,502,524</td>
<td>Net Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,302,488</td>
<td>Net Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>14,891</td>
<td>Net Profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,184,801</td>
<td>Net Loss</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AGN: Box 11, Dossier IX.

**Table 12. Indebtedness of ‘La Única’ During the First Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value (MXN)</th>
<th>Creditor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3,078,000</td>
<td>Empacadora de Escuinapa, S. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
<td>Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>Empacadora de Escuinapa, S. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,060,000</td>
<td>Empacadora de Escuinapa, S. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>Empacadora de Escuinapa, S. A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AGN: Box 11, Dossier IX.

The final result was increasing indebtedness to Empacadora de Escuinapa, which could never be paid off during the life of the cooperative. Here Byres (2002) would see a process from above, but in general it is a traditional mode of subsumption of the peasantry by commercial capital (see, for example, Warman, 1976; Appendini, 1992; Salles, 1984). Even with positive earnings, the original debt eroded all possibilities of accumulation and growth. Politically this increasingly conditioned the individual incomes of the members, and was a source of pressure (negotiation) between government politicians, cooperative members and commercial interests.

**2.3. The Agrarian and Cooperative Conflict (A Permanent Labour Surplus)**
The agrarian conflict, which gave rise to the ‘La Única’ cooperative, would never be resolved. It arose out of two tendencies. The first was the contradiction discussed above between the agrarian reform and the policy of granting concessions. The federal government always gave priority to the latter over the former, which resulted in aquatic resources being exploited by the concessionaires and not by the owners of the resource, i.e., the ejidos. The conflicts ranged from the claim by the communities of their right to fishing for household purposes as a complement to the agricultural economy to the fight over access to commercial fishing on lands legally endowed to the communities but exploited by third parties. The second tendency reinforced the first, insofar as the agrarian reform in progress continued to generate rights to the inhabitants endowed with new lands. This increased the struggle by the new peasant units to claim access to exploitation of their resources. In both cases, the clearest manifestation of this conflict was illegal shrimp catching, and the continuous struggle of the inhabitants of La Costa to become members of the cooperative (see map 3, above).

The table below shows how the demographic pressure fostered by the agrarian reform found expression in the desire to belong to the cooperative. Membership began to increase, albeit slowly.

Table 13. Number of Members of ‘La Única’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Pescadores del Norte de Nayarit</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) José María Morelos</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Pescadores y Ostioneros de San Blas y Boca de Asadero</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Miguel Hidalgo</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Fraternidad de Pescadores</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Costa de Chila y Boca de Ameca</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Nueva Sirena</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Gilberto Flores Muñoz</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Profesor Roberto Barrios</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founders</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociedad Cooperativa Única de Pescadores</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AGN.
Due to the frequent losses being suffered in shrimp catching and sales, this surplus of members resulted in the distribution of the limited revenues among an ever greater number of fishers, which increased discontent within the cooperative and the suspicions of mismanagement by its authorities (a common sentiment among the peasantry of La Costa).

2.4. Subordination of the Cooperative to Private Enterprise and Federal Bureaucracy

As noted earlier, ‘La Única’ had a subordinate relationship with the marketing company. As the latter controlled the purchase prices, the profitability of the cooperative was always in doubt, and its debt continued to grow.

At the same time, the peasantry of La Costa depended on the negotiations of the federal bureaucracy to win better sales conditions. The general manager, appointed by the federal government, was unable to improve the financing conditions of the cooperative, and his bargaining position with the private company and the federal bureaucracy was constantly called into question by the members of the cooperative, who doubted his honesty and generally distrusted this authority figure imposed from outside.

The constant conflicts of interests outside the cooperative were internalised and created a context of ongoing conflict and distrust that further undermined the economic results of ‘La Única’.

2.5. End of the First Stage: Economic and Political Interests in Controlling the Cooperative and Resources in the North of the State

In the midst of the conflicts that afflicted it, there was a constant struggle for control of the cooperative. The interests ranged from the presence of state and federal politicians and officials to union organisations.

The AGN documents included in the Appendix contain an abundance of official communications between cooperative members and federal government officials, as well as with the authorities of the cooperative, between 1961 and 1967, when the internal conditions of ‘La Única’ changed radically. The federal
government seems to have been caught between the interests of La Empacadora de Escuinapa and the position of the peasantry of La Costa and their demand for greater internal autonomy for the cooperative. It is evident that the strength of the control model imposed began gradually to erode, and towards the end of the presidency of Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) the need for legitimacy in La Costa resulted in the development of a different model of control over cooperative members.

The authority of the General Manager (theoretically appointed by the President of Mexico) became diluted to the point of creating total instability within the cooperative, after various failed attempts on the part of the federal authority to appoint managers who would have the support of the cooperative members. In the legal struggle for control over senior positions in the cooperative, it is clear that while the peasantry appeared to accept the designs of the authorities to control the organisation, that control was at the same time eroding (Scott, 1985).

3. The New Bureaucracy, Clientelist Relationships, and New Agrarian Struggles in ‘La Única’ (AGN: box nos. 11-16)\(^{20}\)

All of the circumstances outlined above led to the end of the system of imposed general managers. The end of the presidency of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz gave the federal government the opportunity to attempt to create an administrative framework that would bring an end to the conflicts in ‘La Única’, and to its poor financial results. In the 1970s a new chairman of the cooperative was recognised, this time elected by the members themselves. It appeared to be a victory for the peasantry and a step towards greater autonomy of management and economic independence.

The amendment to the by-laws of the cooperative created a new political and economic situation. It increased the capacity of cooperative members to manage their own organisation, but at the same time it turned control of the cooperative into a political prize.

\(^{20}\) Full information can be found in the Appendix, pp. 252 et passim.
Under the system of a single political party, corporatism, and a clientelist system of relations between the peasant cooperative and the government and its agencies, the figure of the broker was consolidated. Brokers were generally taken from the leaders of the different sections of the cooperative and the members of its board of directors. In other words, a vertical clientelist system had developed.

The authoritarian control over the peasant cooperative of the previous decade thus gave way to a process of obtaining positions that afforded access to privileged information and decision-making power. At the same time, the network of relationships was expanded for one sector of the peasantry, which facilitated the creation of groups with interests that went beyond management of the cooperative.

I will refer to this system as ‘social corporatism’\(^\text{21}\), as opposed to the authoritarian corporate system of the previous decade. Yet in spite of this change, the contradictions and conflicts still remained.

### 3.1. Replacement of Private Enterprise with Public Enterprise

The change in relationships between the government and the peasant cooperative was accompanied by a process of nationalisation of important companies in the industry. Significant among these was Empacadora de Escuinapa, which was transformed into a *parastatal* company; i.e., funded with public capital. Aquaculture District No. 1 was created, and the government attempted to improve the plan and program for the marketing of shrimp and other fishery products.

Infrastructural works were boosted shrimp production further, and with the creation of the fishery product company PROPEMEX (*Productos Pesqueros Mexicanos*) the government sought to improve the marketing of fishery products, and thereby increase the income of the cooperatives.

\(^{21}\) Bartra (2000; p. 28), notes that the bureaucracy conceived of its relationship with the countryside during the sixties as a kind of “ruthless paternalism”, which took over *ejido* production as a sort of “agricultural public sector”.

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The cooperative bank BANFOCO (Banco de Fomento Cooperativo) was created to provide public funding to cooperatives, and social security for cooperative members was increased. These positive signs for the cooperative increased the independence of producers as commodity producers in the sense defined by Byres (1996). Producers began to depend increasingly on shrimp sales, and thus progressed to advanced simple commodity production.

The packing company Empacadora de Chilapa was created in La Costa in 1976. It was a company belonging to the cooperative that operated to prepare the shrimp and other products for local sale or exportation.

In the rural sector in general there was an increase in the size and number of parastatal organisations: the development bank BANRURAL provided services to ejido enterprises; CONASUPO, a state company that bought, stored and distributed basic grains and staple foods at low cost, expanded its activities considerably; in Nayarit, TABAMEX was created, a company dedicated to the preparation, purchase and marketing of the tobacco produced on the peasant lands of La Costa. In general, there was a move to relaunch peasant enterprises all over the country, which in the case of peasant aquaculture in Nayarit was expressed in the consolidation of enterprises selling shrimp from the farms of La Única. Bartra (2000) suggests that this attempt at capitalisation was based not so much on improving the prices of peasant products as on subsidising their production costs.

Another feature that characterised the beginning of the 1970s, and that was expressed in the creation of the aforementioned Aquaculture District No. 1, was the federal bureaucracy’s intention to establish the productive organisation of the peasantry (see Bartra, 2000; p. 29 et passim). However, this organisation was imposed, once again, through blackmail and coercion. Anyone who did not accept this system was excluded from federal and state relations with the fishing sector. The overall result was a consolidation of clientelist and corporate

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22 Bartra (2000) characterises it this way because he does not consider the freedom and Independence of the peasant organisations, or their autonomy. Administrative policies impose the modes of organisation. The La Única cooperative is an example of how, despite the struggles of the 1970s for autonomous organisation, it is the government once again that imposed the forms that it deemed most suitable.
relationships between the Mexican peasantry and the government and its public agencies.

3.2. Agrarian Conflicts Accentuated with the Public Infrastructure and Growth of the Cooperative

The apparent success of the cooperative only served to increase the pressures described in previous sections, particularly the pressure arising from the contradiction between the cooperative as concessionaire and the inhabitants of La Costa. The following table shows how the production of the cooperative stagnated; however, underlying this stagnation were new conflicts. In particular, the illegal shrimp sales that were beyond the control of the organisation, the quantities of which are unknown, although according to data included in the Appendix they may have reached up to half the quantity of officially registered shrimp production.

In their attempt to improve the shrimp production situation, the federal and state governments promoted new infrastructural projects. Among these was the construction of canals connecting the inland zones of the state with the coast, to facilitate the arrival of shrimp and thus promote new communities inland and lessen the social pressure through shrimp production. The Cuautla Canal and other similar canals were constructed in the mid-1970s. The effect continues to be felt today. As these canals were used to take shrimp deep into the interior of the state, following the paths of the estuaries and lagoons, production began to be transferred inland from the coast.

However, the fragile balance of the ecosystem made up of natural canals, rivers and deltas brought an unexpected result. The Cuautla Canal became wider, increasing the salinity of inland soils and waters, which had a profound effect on the estuarine system as a whole.

Shrimp production was now transferred to the interior of the state of Nayarit, far from the coast. The communities that had previously benefited from the schools of shrimp and from the dynamics of the tides were now displaced by inland communities, who became the new owners of the resource.
CHAPTER 5

Table 14. Shrimp Production in Nayarit from 1958 to 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total (Estuaries) Thousands of tonnes</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total (Estuaries) Thousands of tonnes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.2.1. INCREASED PRESSURE TO ACCEPT NEW MEMBERS

As mentioned earlier, the contradictions were expressed in the increase in illegal fishing, and in the local inhabitants who sought to become members of the cooperative. Indeed, the number of members continued to grow gradually year after year. The institutional framework increased the pressure, and turned the cooperative into a marketable commodity for officials and politicians of the official party or government offices.

Although the cooperative had won considerable independence and autonomy of management, it also became increasingly dependent on public funding, and on the marketing of its products with public companies. The political ambitions of public officials mingled with the need to negotiate for the support of the
inhabitants of La Costa who wanted to belong to the cooperative. This created a vicious circle, as the inhabitants made their political support conditional upon membership of the cooperative knowing that the politicians sought their support. The leaders of the sections and of the cooperative as a whole also formed part of these clientelist networks, which favoured their own members, so that they could keep their positions when internal elections were held.

These pressures were multiplied when the infrastructural works completely changed the dynamics of the resource. Harmony no longer existed between the concessionaires of the exploitation of the resource (‘La Única’) and the communities in the zones to which the shrimp came naturally to spawn and feed. The contradictions continued to multiply towards the end of the 1970s and began to cause intensified struggles between rival groups for control of the chairmanship of the cooperative. The labour surplus was now channelled in other directions and not only eroded the authority of the new cooperative management but also became a source of suspicions and mistrust among the members of the different sections of the cooperative.

3.3. The Indebtedness of ‘La Única’

While all of these situations unfolded, some sections of the cooperative were unable to cover their debts (see 2.2 before), as shrimp production dropped due to the consequences arising from the construction of the new canals. The problem was largely due to the fact that the new infrastructure had transferred the zones of incubation and natural growth of shrimp from the coastal areas to Nayarit's inland waters. The new ‘owners’ of the resource, the most productive zones, did not belong to the cooperative, but their ejidos were created in areas of little commercial value – swamps and often inaccessible areas, which in response to the demand for land were endowed as ejidos during the 1950s, 1960s and even as late as the 1970s.

These zones of La Costa nevertheless benefited from the canal works. The huge ecological destruction resulting from these canals, in increasing the salinity of inland regions and thus also reducing the amount of arable land, was compensated for by the arrival of shrimp seeking natural refuges for spawning.
This raised the value of this land, and sparked and expanded the internal conflict.

The new ‘owners’ of the resource opposed shrimp exploitation by the older sections of the cooperative. There was violence in some regions of the state, and the new holders of the resource sought support among the ranks of politicians who saw opportunities in the conflict to negotiate on their behalf. The clientelist networks were reoriented in their direction, and the pressure between the different groups increased.

The unrecognised groups demanded to be allowed to join the cooperative in order to legalise their production and obtain the official papers for the transport of the shrimp they caught. The ‘legal’ sections began facing increasing losses due to poor catches, and the new groups refused to share their illegal production.

3.4. Internal Conflicts over Control of the Cooperative

Finally, in the years 1982-83, the federal and state governments pressured ‘La Única’ to increase the number of its members significantly. From the nine sections with which it began in 1961, the cooperative had now expanded to 24. The original number of 1,000 members had now increased to 5,000. Meanwhile, shrimp production had remained virtually static and at times in decline.

The income of the members could thus not be very high. On the contrary, the constant internal struggles and the canal works had created a differentiation in the productivity of different fishing zones and in the situation of the different sections of the cooperative, some of which had become more impoverished and indebted while others had increased their profits.

The indebtedness of the cooperative since its creation, instead of dropping, had been increasing, and had become a major issue for the public agencies chasing payment of the debts accumulated.

And this situation did not improve with the integration of the new sections of ‘La Única’. On the contrary, it increased suspicion among the sections enjoying
profits who had to share their good fortune with the sections that were suffering losses. The internal operation of the cooperative became increasingly complicated, and there began again to appear a demand for autonomy, but this time for autonomy of the different sections from the organisation as a whole.

**Table 15. New sections of ‘La Única’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Palmar de Cuautla</td>
<td>Cuautla, Santiago Ixc</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez</td>
<td>Unión de Corrientes, Tuxpan.</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Santa Cruz de Miramar</td>
<td>Santa Cruz, San Blas.</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 4 de Julio de 1982</td>
<td>Villa Juárez, Santiago Ixc</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lázaro Cárdenas</td>
<td>Santa Cruz, Santiago Ixc</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Vicente Guerrero</td>
<td>Los Murillos, Tecuala</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 28 de Junio</td>
<td>Pericos, Rosamorada</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Roberto Gómez Reyes</td>
<td>Puerta de Palapares, Santiago Ixc</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Juan Escutia</td>
<td>Francisco Villa y Pescadero</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. San Miguel</td>
<td>San Miguel, Rosamorada</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Novillero</td>
<td>Novillero, Tecuala</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ignacio López García</td>
<td>Antonio R. Laureles, Tecuala</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,868</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration with AGN.

4. **The End of ‘La Única’ (AGN: box nos. 16-19)**

In 1982, Mexico’s federal government was plunged into a fiscal crisis, and the Mexican peso was devalued. A new period of transition in federal politics began. The need for foreign aid to deal with the public and private debt and the obligation to adhere to an IMF austerity programme gave rise to a change in the orientation of public policy. The State could thus no longer sustain peasant enterprises and sought to negotiate a change in the situation.

Associated with this was the aforementioned conflict within the cooperative itself. In addition, new internal contradictions arose. Indebtedness began to overwhelm the cooperative, and the new sections, which benefited from infrastructure works and from the differential productivity of their shrimp-catching areas, refused to financially support the most impoverished and

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23 Full information can be found in the Appendix pp. 275 et seq. A long interview with Anacleto Ceja was used to complete the information.
severely indebted communities. The internal struggle for control of the cooperative grew more intense.

Finally, in this new context, the government managed to reach a new agreement to shut down the cooperative. This agreement would hand over production to individual sections as independent cooperatives, and thus bring an end to the agrarian dispute that had gone on for decades. Each *ejido* would be entitled to exploit its fishing zones as an independent cooperative.

Nevertheless, the conflict would continue, as the leaders of the different factions would fight doggedly to secure the best conditions for settlement and recognition of their new cooperatives.

5. Conclusions: The End of the Cooperative Experiment in La Costa

Following the above discussion it is worth reflecting on the variables of concern to this research.

The end of the cooperative organisation of the peasants represented the end of an era in the La Costa region of Nayarit. The investments of the cooperative also dissolved. Its inability to escape its constant indebtedness restricted its capacity for accumulation and growth, and it could never overcome its subordination to commercial capital. The capital accumulation of the peasant aquacultural enterprises, one of the variables studied in this research, developed in the midst of these contradictions: indebtedness, the struggle for resources between those who possessed the land and resources and the concessionaires; subordination to commercial capital and the inability to establish promising marketing channels; and control of prices on the part of commercial capital. Associated with this was subordination to public banking capital, which acted no differently from commercial capital insofar as the permanent indebtedness of the peasant cooperative was concerned.

The class struggle assumed a form characteristic of what Scott (1985) calls the muted/passive struggle, or ‘everyday peasant resistance’. It was not the open struggle of the period when the *haciendas* sought to maintain ownership and possession of the land, but the constant illegal fishing in concession zones reflected a discontent expressed in the violation of the excessively contradictory
legal framework, particularly given the way it simultaneously favoured opposing parties (concessionaires and owners of the resources).

Differentiation appears to have consolidated a small stratum of peasants at the top of the cooperative (section delegates, members of the board of directors, and chairmen of the cooperative). This group fought over control of the cooperative and maintained links with external agents (officials, company owners and politicians). This differentiation was further reinforced by the clientelist culture. The external agents provided a kind of non-material wealth, and access to first-hand information. There were suspicions of corruption that were expressed openly amid accusations of one group by another. This type of relationship appears to support the argument put forward by Wolf (1966) that such relationships may lead to relationships of control and power that are established initially as strata within the peasant communities. In some cases, this new stratification was consolidated, while in others it merely mitigated the extreme poverty of certain individuals. What did develop was a particular political culture in which the relationships between the leaders of the agrarian communities, or cooperatives, were associated with the political advantages of public office: access to information and to institutional resources, special assistance from public funds, etc.

The State fostered and promoted the contradictions mentioned above, as the agencies representing it promoted their own personal interests or those of their officials. This struggle between conflicting interests was transferred to the arena of the cooperative, which became a kind of sounding board.

The phenomenon of ‘La Única’ is a very clear demonstration of the fate of peasant enterprises in the Mexican context. The agrarian reform created a peasantry subordinated to government mediation. Although it is clear that there was a growing commodification of their economic environment and a move from early to advanced simple commodity production with a higher level of specialisation and dependence, the characteristics of the agrarian process had a huge impact on their development.

As the role of government agencies leaned largely towards attending to the demands of the peasantry, their mediation created a new structure and a
CHAPTER 5

political culture of permanent mediation between the direct producers and the people connected with the public institutions. This would be a feature of the agrarian process particular to the region, and to Nayarit in general. In contrast with the experiences described by Servolin (1979) for the case of societies of northern Europe, the peasantry would not have its own representatives in the political structures; instead, intermediation would play an extremely important role in the search for this representation. It would be these intermediate agents who in many cases would set the parameters for the ‘defence’ of the interests of the cooperative members and the peasantry of La Costa in general. In terms of my initial hypotheses, the presence of the State would be expressed in this mode of intervention. This would lead to an extreme volatility of agrarian policy in the region, and would facilitate the agrarian transformation that was underway, at the heart of which was the change in the agrarian property system.

Initially, the pace of the handing over of land depended on the State. This conditioned the relations between the peasantry and the political powers and their agencies, fostering the construction of patronage networks and the strengthening of different networks of interests and of social control.

The agrarian model hindered the legal commercialisation of the endowed and restored land, which prevented a new concentration of land ownership, but it also conditioned the financial potential of the peasantry. In other words, as it distanced the peasantry from private banking capital, and exposed it to exploitation by commercial capital, which provided producers with advances and compelled them to sell directly to them, imposing the conditions for the sale of shrimp and other agrarian products.

Indeed, the predominance of commercial capital over banking capital is a feature that is crucial to understanding the dynamics and evolution of the peasant cooperative of La Costa. Commercial capital created its networks and generally impoverished ‘La Única’ with the support of the government, which in due course took over the position of the private commercial enterprise. It was only for a short time that the peasant cooperative was able to overcome the economic situation of the company.
At the same time the State, in spite of having handed over land and favoured the creation of the peasantry, determined who would benefit from the exploitation of the aquatic resources. In a second stage, relations between the government and these networks generated a dynamic wherein pressure came periodically from both sides of the clientelist relationship. The fiscal crisis of 1982 had a major effect on this situation.

The conditions assumed by Servolin (1979) for the development of a small farm did not exist in Nayarit because the relationship between government and peasantry placed the latter in a subordinate surplus provider role. Moreover, the need to control the organisations of farmers and workers in the replacement of the old landowning class set the conditions for the development of rural enterprises. The early consolidation of brokerage relations and the consolidation of a single-party government prevented the peasants from building their own political representation and taking a direct (or absolute) path towards farmer capitalism. On the contrary, the peasantry became subjugated to commercial capital.

First of all, ‘La Única’ was imposed upon the existing culture, replacing the traditional mechanisms of social equalisation of the rural communities of La Costa. The mechanism of rational allocation of fishing sites to replace the traditional brollote system is a good example of how enterprise systems were introduced as modernising elements of the new culture. While the randomness of the traditional system had provided the community with a mechanism for ensuring economic equality, the new system imposed by the cooperative brought with it a differentiation of incomes based on the quality of the natural fishing conditions of the sites assigned.

Secondly, it is symptomatic of the situation that ‘La Única’ began its existence with a debt that it was never able to pay off. The ratio of prices to production costs never really depended on the organisation. It is clear here that peasant business income was determined by government control of peasant organisations, in the 1960s by the imposition of a general manager, and in the 1970s by direct control of the economic process. Prices have always been determined by forces outside the rural economy, and this was an important factor in the debt with which ‘La Única’ was saddled. Between BANFOCO,
Empacadora de Escuinapa and PROPEMEX, there was a bottleneck that prevented the cooperative from achieving financial solvency. At the same time, patronage practices that fostered corruption and the exchange of loyalties and favours took their toll on the organisation. This also affected the business management of the cooperative. The constant involvement of government officials in decision-making in ‘La Única’ undermined the ability of its members to develop an understanding of business and an entrepreneurial spirit.

The third factor was the agrarian conflict, which was fuelled and sustained by government agencies responding to the interests of their power networks, or to the interests of the ruling party and its corporate organisations. This ongoing conflict resulted in the impoverishment of the producers. The presence of patronage networks (or power networks), which turned into mechanisms for controlling the cooperative, became a way to maintain competition within the organisation and affected the bargaining power of the cooperative. It can thus be argued that despite holding a monopoly on shrimp production, ‘La Única’ was a price taker.

The fourth factor was the State itself. This is a key factor, without which it is completely impossible to understand the process of impoverishment of the peasant sector in Nayarit. The case study demonstrates that the formation of social classes in Nayarit cannot be explained otherwise.

In the early 1980s, the peasantry of Nayarit was immersed in the worst possible scenario according to the terms of Chayanov (1991): with no land left to distribute, and plunging domestic prices as a result of Mexico's fiscal and financial crisis, the peasants needed to find new ways to earn a living.

In 1982, faced with the fiscal crisis, the Mexican government sought to change the old methods of corporate control. During the 1980s, the economy began opening up to foreign competition. Mexico was admitted to the GATT (WTO) in 1985. Finally, to obtain the dollars needed to pay the external debt, the exchange rate was undervalued for several years.

The consequence of the economic crisis induced by budget cuts and increased trade liberalisation was a huge economic crisis for the peasantry of Nayarit. The ten years following the devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1982 could be
The withdrawal of input subsidies and credit and the cuts and fiscal adjustments had a profound effect on the demand for wage goods, which was the basis of the peasant economy in Nayarit. Only those sectors dedicated to exporting to the United States managed to survive. The deregulation of the economy and privatisation also took their toll. The tobacco industry, the jewel in the crown of the peasant economy, was privatised. The harvested area of tobacco fell from 26,000 hectares to 11,000 hectares on average in 1991. As the centre for many activities, the tobacco industry wiped out the old system of political economy of the region. Vast swathes of land were transferred to private companies. The drop in demand reduced the tobacco industry's input demand, including the need for mangrove wood to dry tobacco. Workers began migrating to other regions of Nayarit and to the United States, while the temporary market for migrant workers who came to harvest local crops collapsed. The crisis affecting Nayarit's agricultural sector made it necessary to seek new sources of revenue.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Chayanov's definition of the peasant mode of production assumes an unlimited agricultural frontier. This was possible insofar as the available land in Nayarit permitted a balance between the needs of the domestic economy and the growth of the labour supply, which depended on the population growth of the peasant household. By the 1980s this balance had been exhausted. The land reform was handing over land of inferior quality and the national economic crisis was undermining the foundations of support for the rural economy. The development model resembled more the model described by Lewis (1954), in which an unlimited supply of labour placed pressure on existing resources.

Chayanov argues that the assumption of a fixed agricultural frontier leaves two basic strategies for peasant households: the intensification of land use or the abandonment of the household to seek jobs elsewhere. Both these strategies are visible in the peasant economy of Nayarit. The intensification of land use determined the search for an alternative means of additional revenue, which occurred to the extent that it served as a valve for aquaculture, as capital markets were closed by the economic crisis. Thus, the pressure for cooperative
membership can only be viewed as a manifestation of this process, coming from both the children of the existing peasantry dedicated to fishing, and from new fishing groups moving into the region.

In an interview in the *ejido* of Pimientillo, I was told that the *ejido* assembly in those years had approved the granting of two hectares per *ejidatario* of *ejido* land commonly used for aquaculture (personal communication, 1994). Many *ejidatarios* gave the land to their children and relatives. Others ‘sold’ their land to other landowners. The same thing happened in several *ejidos* in the municipalities of Rosamorada, Tecuala and Tuxpan (Pericos, Pescadero, etc.). At the same time, a migration process began which, according to data from the 1995 census, resulted in an absolute decline in the population of the north coast of Nayarit.

The end of ‘La Única’ occurred in the context of a struggle for political power in Nayarit (conflicts between groups fighting for the governorship of the state and operating in other networks with links to groups in Mexico City), and in the midst of the fiscal crisis of the Mexican government, which sought to rehabilitate its relationship with the peasantry. Now the government seemed to turn its attention to the definition of property rights and to addressing the lack of peasant capital by generating a market for peasant land.

But in the midst of these conflicts, it is possible to identify the development of a new stratification within the peasantry engaged in aquaculture. The formation of this small group of peasant leaders associated with rural cooperatives operating in aquaculture, with strong political ties to the ruling party for over 50 years, and then with other parties, would be a determining factor in the development of subsequent partnerships. Internal disputes between members of this group over control of these administrative areas, concessions and fishing licences would lead to the dismantling of the *La Única de Pescadores* cooperative.

Other cooperatives would be formed and would support the second agrarian reform, but the basis of social support was the rich peasantry with strong political ties to the government bureaucracy at all levels and organisations of the party in power.
In 1991-92, the agrarian laws in Mexico changed. The secondary legislation changed as well. The main element was the creation of \textit{ejido} properties, which replaced the system of possession of land in usufruct. Now the \textit{ejido} assembly could decide to sell or rent \textit{ejido} land, or use it as collateral. Deregulation of the aquacultural sector began, making way for the presence of private companies, in addition to cooperatives.

However, the presence of government officials did not decrease. On the contrary, new offices with a new type of bureaucracy would seek to capitalise on the neoliberal reform. PRONASOL (the National Solidarity Programme) replaced the old institutions and a new, market-oriented programme of support would emerge.

The changes that took place in the 1990s will be described in the following chapters.
PART THREE:
THE SECOND AGRARIAN REFORM: DEREGULATION, PRIVATISATION AND PRIVATE CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN THE LA COSTA REGION OF NAYARIT (FROM 1991 TO 2012)

Introduction to the Second Agrarian Reform

Part Three of this thesis studies the Second Agrarian Reform. Deregulation began with the amendment to the Agrarian Act (1992), which delivered ownership of ejido land, previously considered property of the nation, to the ejidatarios. This created the legal concept of ‘ejido property’, with the relevant changes to the Constitution. These changes led to a series of amendments to associated laws, such as fishing legislation (Ley de Pesca, 1992; Reglamento de la Ley de Pesca, 1999; Ley de Pesca y Acuacultura Sustentable, 2007), in which the regulations requiring the formation of cooperatives for fishing and aquacultural production were eliminated, and species (such as shrimp) which according to previous legislation (Ley Federal de Pesca, 1986; Reglamento de la Ley Federal de Pesca, 1988\(^ {24} \)) were reserved for social organisations (ejidos and cooperatives), were no longer restricted.

Deregulation liberalised the shrimp market, opening up the possibility of production by private companies, and also by private companies associated with ejido enterprises. Efforts began to increase aquacultural production and the capitalisation of the aquacultural and fishing sector.

Chapter 6 analyses the consequences of the liberalisation of the industry for the La Costa region. ‘La Única’ was split into three large ejido associations, while private enterprise began trying its hand at aquacultural activity. Production increased, and the foreign shrimp trade was liberalised. New phenomena such as shrimp diseases arose and shrimp prices saw marked changes, all of which contributed to increasing the complexity of the sector. Politically, the previous

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\(^{24}\) These laws came out of the previous ones as described in the first chapters of the thesis.
clientelist model began to change, but did not completely disappear. The industry of aquacultural sanitation services, larva and post-larva labs developed rapidly.

Liberalisation changed the socioeconomic dynamic of artisanal aquacultural activity and accentuated the dependence of producers on the market for inputs and the sale of aquacultural products.

The consequences of these legal, political and economic changes would alter the social structure of production. This situation is analysed in Chapter 7. The Mexican version of neoliberalism would generate a new form of social stratification. With the appearance of the new agents (private aquaculture, and investments by ejido producers in shrimp farms, for example), the concentration of aquacultural land, infrastructure, marketing channels and interaction with other agrarian activities has resulted in greater stratification among the producers in the last twenty-five years. The Second Agrarian Reform therefore affords an opportunity for comparison with the changes to the situation in the previous period, which was characterised by a process in which peasant production and peasant phenomena predominated as the axis of aquacultural activity in the La Costa region.

With respect to my working hypotheses, the conditions under which aquaculture developed in the region in the two different periods are clearly observable. Particularly notable is the greater social differentiation in the current period (which will be discussed in Chapter 7), as well as the development of the process of transformation from small-scale production into an advanced simple commodity production system, in the sense defined by Byres (1996; 2009). But during the 1980s, the conditions that gave birth a widespread peasant economy changed. Since then many sociologists and agrarian researchers (see Chapter 2 on the New Ruralists, Bernstein, Kay, Bartra, Araghi, etc.) have even questioned the traditional concept of "agrarian transition" and the meaning of “labour surplus” as proposed by Lewis (1954). For Vergara-Camus (2009), the changing social context and the "disrupt[ion of] the daily lives of peasants" also triggers a restructuring and new forms of political struggle.
Chapter 6
Aquaculture in Nayarit after 1990: Neoliberalism and Deregulation

1. Introduction

In general, I will discuss the consequences of what I call the neoliberal reform, or the Second Agrarian Reform as De Janvry has labelled it, which was marked by major changes to the Constitution and the laws related to the agrarian structure of the country and the structure of rural production.

These changes also seem to demonstrate the interrelation between the State and certain strata of the *ejido* peasantry (the strata identified as the most privileged in the conclusion to the previous chapter), which made no objections to the neoliberal reform, but on the contrary, sought a favourable deal in the new government policies, particularly insofar as it allowed them to obtain greater autonomy for their sections, now established as independent cooperatives. This autonomy guaranteed internal management of their revenues, and marketing channels outside the ‘La Única’ cooperative. This is what Rap (2004) points out in his monograph on the peasantry of the region associated with the affected areas. The strategies of the peasantry tended towards adaptation, and this adaptation involved negotiations between individuals and groups.

In the first part of the chapter I will deal with the re-structuring of the peasant organisations, but it is also worth noting that the new configuration of these organisations seemed to be geared towards the interests of the upper stratum of *ejido* aquacultural producers.

In reality, the new agrarian reform was an agrarian counter-reformation. This counter-reformation involved the deregulation of the peasantry's agrarian and fishery products and the privatisation of *ejido* land given to the peasantry to become *ejido* property. *Ejido* land could now be sold or become a part of a corporation or company.
This reform had a major impact on aquacultural farmers. Among the most important implications were the presence of private companies in the aquacultural sector in the region, and the deregulation of the cooperative movement to allow the exploitation of restricted species (including shrimp). This would give rise to a new sector of peasant producers: farmers, who were now linked to shrimp production, but with a higher capital investment, as advanced simple commodity producers.

At the same time, neoliberal policies altered the government's relationship with the *ejidatarios* and farmers. As a result of deregulation, private enterprise would have a greater presence, both in direct production (with its involvement in the use of land and resources) and in *financial* control of production and *marketing*. The *ejidatarios* and farmers would now have to negotiate with this new actor. Secondly, the end of the political hegemony of the PRI in the mid-1990s would change the political configuration and the patron-client relationships between the State and the peasantry in general.

The development of the farming system in Nayarit would create an emerging market for inputs and services for the exploitation of small private farms established mainly in San Blas and a few other districts along the north coast of Nayarit. Shrimp larvae and post-larvae companies constituted a new actor that entered into the dynamics of the industry, along with industry suppliers of raw materials. The development of a chain of services to meet market needs would emerge from the industrial processing of shrimp.

The ongoing conflict of interests between the old and new groups (or *power networks*) and actors would have important consequences. Indeed, a more complex system of peasant shrimp production would emerge, where the market and new regulations would determine the future of peasant enterprises. The battle for aquatic resources exacerbated the pollution of estuarine waters, the silting of canal systems and the spread of shrimp diseases. None of these phenomena had been present before.

In the framework of this chapter, of course, I will consider the consequences of this new configuration of shrimp production on the *corporate system* and the role of *power networks* (or groups) in the *political-economic* context of Nayarit.
2. The Cooperatives and New Farmers: Peasantry Support for the Agrarian Counter-Reform

2.1. Cooperativism after ‘La Única’

In spite of expectations that the enactment of a new agrarian law with a conservative tone would run against the interests of the peasantry, the deregulation of the rural peasant sector and the creation of ejido ownership, which would allow the sale, leasing and transformation of ejido property within the land market, did not meet with serious opposition from the peasantry in general.

The way in which ‘La Única’ disappeared, giving rise to a new set of independent cooperatives, seems to exemplify what was probably happening nationwide. The internal struggle had given rise to two opposing groups. These two groups held strong links with sectors of the government and of the official party, and the leaders of each group had developed a network of interests that extended far beyond the cooperative.

First of all, as noted in the previous chapter, towards the end of the 1980s the fiscal crisis had set the conditions for the future of peasant enterprises, and particularly for the peasant cooperatives of La Costa. In the last election for the chairman of the board of directors, in 1985, two factions confronted each another. This resulted in a total breakdown in relations between the traditional group (Group A) and Nayarit's governor of the time.

This situation conditioned the formal possibilities of the continued existence of the cooperative. Faced with its imminent collapse, the two factions sought to negotiate with the governor for the best conditions possible for their respective cooperatives.

A total of 37 new cooperatives were negotiated for 37 sections of ‘La Única’, but finally only 25 authorisations for cooperatives were obtained. Group A won the majority, while Group B, the dissidents, obtained only 5 authorisations for cooperatives. Each group was transformed into a new union organisation, so that in 1994 there were two cooperative union organisations grouping the cooperatives that had emerged in the wake of the disappearance of ‘La Única’.
This compromise between peasantry and government is symptomatic and characteristic of the process of deregulation of Mexico's rural peasant sector. The new agrarian law (1992) was linked to extensive negotiations between the different levels of government and the peasantry, which received a portion of the now privatised enterprises. However, this process of dissolution of public companies or companies financially supported by the government basically benefited the best positioned sector of the peasantry, which had been able to move up in the political structure into positions of political representation with the support of the official party. This process was favoured by the corporatism of the organisations of the official party, and by the extensive web of patronage relationships that characterised these relations.

2.2. Shrimp farmers, agrarian crisis and deregulation

Deregulation seriously altered the relationships between the peasantry and the government and its agencies. Now the only difference between ejido property and private property was that the ejido assembly assumed ownership of the land and resources within the ejido (Luiselli Fernández, 1992). However, this opened up the possibility of transforming ejido land into private property, if so decided by the assembly, and at the same time of using the land as collateral in trade agreements (Ley Agraria, 1992).

Apparently, the basic goal of the new Agrarian Act was to place ownership in the hands of the ejidatarios, so that they could use the land as collateral to obtain credit. The reform was aimed at creating a land market that would stimulate Mexico's dismantling of agrarian economy.

Associated with the new Agrarian Act, amendments to secondary laws established a wide-sweeping deregulatory process. The Fisheries Act was also amended to allow the deregulation of organisational forms, as well as to permit the exploitation of previously restricted species (including shrimp, but also others) not only by cooperatives, but by any kind of company.

Deregulation opened up the possibility of private companies entering the aquacultural sector or forming associations with *ejidos* to exploit marine resources or fisheries (Gil Díaz, 1991).

A consequence of the deregulation of the Fisheries Act was a boom in fish farming in the municipality of San Blas and the presence of new government agencies that sought to capitalise a sector of *ejido* members interested in investing in shrimp farming, mainly in the northern area.

The strategy of the government thus involved differential treatment of the peasantry: impoverished peasants would receive a direct subsidy in cash; the middle sector of the peasantry, with growth potential, were helped through subsidies in order to achieve their capitalisation; and a select group of *ejido* farmers were identified as creditworthy to obtain financing from private sources26 (Tellez Kuenzler, 1993).

In general, out of the deregulation of aquaculture arose two models for the relationship between the *market system*27 and the *ejidos*. The first was associated with a federal government prognosis of the possibilities for the development of a system of small farms and a classification of the *ejido* sector to assess the potential for capitalisation (see section 2.3 below). The second involved, quite simply, the leasing of common *ejido* land or the sale of *ejido* properties to private companies (see section 3.1 below).

### 2.3. The National Solidarity Programme (PRONASOL) and Peasant Farms (based on Interview with Rocío Valdés)

The deregulation and privatisation of the fishing sector in Mexico allowed the federal government to explore new directions for relationships with the peasantry in general. One of these was based on their intention to consolidate the business sector of middle-income peasants and those with potential for business development through financial aid.

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26 i.e., enriched peasants with an entrepreneurial culture.

27 In some cases the market system involved private companies profiting directly from *ejido* land, and in others it meant an injection of resources for small groups of *ejidatarios* for capitalisation.
This would be a way of opening up the process to the banking sector, traditionally distant and reluctant to participate in projects of this kind for fear of facing losses with no possibility of recovering the investment through a standard mortgage agreement.

The government created an agency called FONAES (Fondo de Empresas en Solidaridad), associated with their National Solidarity Programme (PRONASOL), which supported low-income earners through direct support. The experiment consisted of supporting ejido enterprises (in this case, aquacultural enterprises) formed by peasants who were willing to receive a loan ‘a la palabra’ (i.e., by verbal agreement). In other words, they were non-reimbursable loans. There would be no guarantee, as the peasantry did not yet hold deeds to their land in accordance with the new legislation. For this reason, participating ejidatarios or ejidos were required – as a prerequisite for the loan – to apply for the deed to their land through the Ejido Land Certification Process (PROCEDE, for its initials in Spanish).

Although the loans were by verbal agreement only, the government would no longer be financing producers for their whole project, but only a part of it. Out of a total of 30 million pesos to be handed out, the government would provide 19 million (for fixed capital); the other 11 million would be granted through credits from the Rural Development Bank (BANRURAL), which was also public, for working capital (variable costs and current assets).

One of the communities chosen to establish semi-intensive shrimp farms, the Francisco Villa community, was invaded when the project began by neighbouring ejido communities who some years earlier had claimed ownership of the land on which the community was located. The project suffered additional setbacks as further problems arose, now due to a lack of commitment from BANRURAL and other government offices. In other words, there was a boycott by a sector of the government linked to the interests of those who would not apparently benefit from the project and who wanted to renegotiate their access to it.

The production of shrimp grown on ejidos increased in these years, and an agency called the Aquacultural Services Producer of Nayarit (PROSANAY) was
Aquaculture in Nayarit after 1990: Neoliberalism and Deregulation

created, in an attempt to integrate the management of services for the aquacultural production of ejido enterprises.

PROSANAY soon began signing joint venture agreements to which FONAES contributed 35% of the capital, while the rest was contributed by the ejidos. The aim was to ensure the participation of the ejido farm partners in the governing body of PROSANAY (Ceja Ramírez, 2002).

The similarity with ‘La Única’ is evident, as again, PROSANAY is an enterprise that is apparently independent but that in reality maintains a close link to the federal government. The partners would be incorporated to the degree to which there was growing interest in the ejidos by receiving funding for the establishment of their farms with the support of PROSANAY, which thus played the role of mediator or intermediary.

A total of 21 projects were dedicated to shrimp production in the north of the state, specifically in the municipalities of Rosamorada, Tecuala and Santiago Ixcuintla. These projects were supported with capital and guarantees.

Due to the participation of the private bank BANAMEX (through the Banamex Social Fund), the involvement of BANRURAL was no longer considered necessary. In addition, BANAMEX granted funds in the form of loans that would not be reimbursable. BANAMEX lent money for working capital and other non-reimbursable resources (Valdés, 2000). However, the old interests that had plagued ‘La Única’ resurfaced when several groups claimed access to the loans for the creation of shrimp farms.

To make matters worse, as the first crops of shrimp were harvested, the ejido farmers faced a new problem previously unknown to them: shrimp diseases. For cultivation of shrimp crops, shrimp larvae and post-larvae needed to be grown, giving rise to a new industry to provide this raw material for cultivation on farms. However, the first suppliers of this raw material had been growing very quickly, and were not aware of the risks of intensive and semi-intensive shrimp cultivation. The Taura syndrome and white spot syndrome viruses took a huge toll on ejido ponds, and by 1997, whole harvests were being threatened by these diseases.
The private bank BANAMEX threatened to withdraw and claim its investment back. The spectre of insolvency loomed over the *ejido* farms, and to make matters worse new disputes arose within PROSANAY when a group of *ejidatarios* sued the agency for corruption in the construction of its ponds.

By 1998, the project had ceased to exist. Its life had been fleeting. From that point on, the farms already built suffered diverse fates. Some would be leased out, others would continue operating with difficulty, and the rest would be appropriated by *ejidatarios* who could potentially keep them operating.

**3. Private Companies and their Relationship with *Ejido* Members**

The other relationship model that arose with deregulation of the rural sector was that between the *ejidos* and private enterprise. The availability of private investment led to the possibility of new actors participating in semi-intensive and intensive shrimp production.

In the municipality of San Blas, a shrimp farm was developed with private capital. But the private investment would be limited by the number of aquacultural spaces available; thus, together with direct investment to establish private farms, there arose the possibility of leasing or purchasing *ejido* land to develop them. For the purposes of my research I am interested in exploring the second model, to determine its implications for the peasantry of the region.

**3.1. Aquaculture in the Municipality of San Blas: A Model of Land Expropriation for Common Use**

In the Boca Cegada area in San Blas, a private Mexican company, Aquanova, sought to invest capital to create a shrimp production centre over an area of 735 hectares. It was a huge project by national and even international standards. To obtain the fishing permit, the company filed the necessary paperwork with the federal authorities, and after receiving official approval it began to negotiate with two *ejidos* in the municipality: Isla del Conde and Política Agraria. From one it sought to buy the land for common use that the *ejido* was not using, while with the other it sought to execute a long-term joint venture agreement (in this case, profits from the project would be shared and
special shares would be delivered to the *ejidatarios* to receive these profits, along with other benefits. In both cases, the agreements were executed in accordance with the established procedure. In 1997, the company began operations in a 320-hectare pond.

**Map 6. Aquanova Farms**

Once again, problems soon arose. Some *ejidatarios* claimed for damages because they could not move their livestock across the production zones due to risks of contamination in the shrimp. Environmental NGOs complained about the environmental impact of the project, and sought endorsement from *ejidatarios* to support their movement. A lack of understanding of the legal instruments signed by the *ejido* members contributed to the confusion generated by the project (Camarena, 1999a, 1999b). The *ejidatarios* of both *ejidos* felt frustrated with the company because, for example, in order to be able to become members of the company pursuant to the joint venture agreements, the company itself had granted the *ejidatarios* a loan, which they had to pay back. As a result of their frustration, the *ejidatarios* supported the claims of the environmentalists. Meanwhile, very soon Greenpeace and the WWF threw their weight behind the protest by the local NGOs.
The environmentalists requested the intervention of the CEC (Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America, 2002) under the auspices of NAFTA. The government came firmly behind the company to support its continued operation, but the demands of environmentalists and the protests that almost spread throughout San Blas finally compelled Mexico's Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) to accept the evidence of environmental damage and the opinion of the CEC (Grupo Ecológico El Manglar, 2011). SEMARNAT then asked the company, Aquanova, to compensate for the damage caused to the ecosystem and to the local community. Finally, the company had to close its facilities. Thus, Aquanova’s short-lived existence came to an end.

Table 16. Shrimp Production 1987 to 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Tonnes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4,474</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3,356</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2,196</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2,594</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3,172</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6,730</td>
<td>1,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6,932</td>
<td>998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6,630</td>
<td>1,474</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Deregulation and Privatisation of Trade and Aquaculture

The development of ejido and private farms has allowed the development of a new sector of private investment in the industry, providing services associated with the safety of the process and with the larva and post-larva labs.

4.1. The ‘Labs’ (Hatcheries and Nurseries) and the Supply Chain for the Shrimp Industry (based on interviews with Robles Naya and Vivanco Pérez)

Méndez Murcia and Rodríguez Estrada (1999) suggest that when aquacultural activity began in Nayarit, existing norms prohibited the capture of wild post-larvae in areas adjacent to the production areas of the farms. However, it has been established that this was a practice that was spreading not only in Nayarit, but in the neighbouring states of Sinaloa and Sonora, due to the urgent need to supply raw material for production on shrimp farms.

With the emergence of the farm system, the need arose for the integration of laboratories with the shrimp farms, and more projects of this type were launched. As noted above, Aquanova fully integrated the production process, with its laboratories and companies in other states and in Nayarit. But smaller companies needed a constant supply of post-larvae.

The initial euphoria that accompanied the establishment of new shrimp farms obscured the risks that were being assumed with continuous production and with no control of living organisms. With the virtual abandonment of preventive health measures, the ponds on the farms were very soon being over-exploited. It was a shrimp-farming boom (Robles Naya, 2007).

Hatcheries and nurseries dedicated to the reproduction of aquatic organisms only began in Nayarit in 1992 with the establishment of two laboratories in the municipality of San Blas. In 1994, added to the inappropriate practices was the presence of fungi, bacteria and diseases imported from neighbouring countries,

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28 Hatcheries breed shrimp and produce nauplii or even post-larvae, which they sell to farms, while nurseries grow post-larvae and prepare them for the marine conditions of the growout ponds. The latter is essential for the production of shrimp on farms (Wikipedia: Shrimp Farm, 2011).
particularly from Ecuador. In 1995, the first shrimp diseases were detected in the area of Guasave, Sinaloa (mainly white spot syndrome and Taura syndrome). The presence of Taura syndrome was then detected in Nayarit. This disease spread quickly via the ocean currents of the Pacific coast to most of the shrimp farms, both *ejidos* and private.

By 1996, the number of hatchery and nursery centres was on the rise. Most collected input from wilderness areas, and yields reflected the serious impact of the diseases. By this year, the number of centres had grown to 35, but the disease epidemics in the 1997 cycle reduced that number significantly, to just 20 centres by 1998.

As shown above, in 1997 the *ejido* farms were devastated by the shrimp diseases Taura syndrome and white spot syndrome.

The government tried to tackle the problem by enacting sanitary measures that sought to protect the shrimp farms. Quarantine meant that it was no longer possible to import broodstock. Also prohibited was the transportation of organisms from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean and vice versa (Robles Naya, 2007).

### Table 17. Hatcheries and Nurseries in the Municipality of San Blas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>No. of Hatcheries and Nurseries</th>
<th>Production of micro-organisms (millions)</th>
<th>Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration with information from Menéndez Murcia and Rodríguez Estrada, 1999, and Vivanco Pérez, 2011.

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29 Broodstock are female and male shrimp used in the production of the *nauplii*, the first stage of larvae, which are transformed into larvae and post-larvae, essential for laboratories and for production on shrimp farms.
After several years of trying to eradicate the problem through the certification of companies dedicated to the sale of larvae and post-larvae, it was finally recognised that the problem was also related to poor practices among producers (Robles Naya, 2007). It was thus decided to place more emphasis on sanitary practices. To this end, the government created the Comisión de Sanidad Acuícola (Aquacultural Health Commission), and established Comités de Sanidad (Health Committees) in every state of the country (Ibid, 2007). This network of committees included SEMARNAP and various institutions of higher education and research.

A programme was implemented for the detection and investigation of diseases and the provision of health services on shrimp and fish farms and other aquacultural enterprises. PRONALSA (Programa Nacional de Sanidad Acuícola – National Aquacultural Health Programme) was initiated by the federal government, associated with the Ministry of Fishing (Rodríguez Martínez, 2011).

In 1998, PRONALSA launched the Red de Laboratorios para el Diagnóstico y Prevención de Enfermedades (Network of Laboratories for the Diagnosis and Prevention of Diseases), and in 1999, the Autonomous University of Nayarit became associated with this network. However, it was not until 2004-2005 that a team of researchers from the university began regular monitoring to detect and investigate diseases, mainly in shrimp (Vivanco Pérez, 2011).

Finally in 2007, aquacultural health services were transferred by the federal government to the SENASICA (Servicio Nacional de Salud, Inocuidad y Calidad Alimentaria – National Service for Food Health, Safety and Quality) under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA).

4.2. Deregulation and Privatisation of Trade in Aquacultural Products after PROSANAY

One of the aspects that have most influenced the development of Nayarit’s aquacultural industry since 1992 has been the deregulation of commercial shrimp sales and distribution. Severe concentration and centralisation of
marketing resulted in public monopolies over shrimp freezing, packing and transportation. In the case of shrimp production in Nayarit, it was the private company Empacadora de Escuinapa that enjoyed a monopoly, before being replaced by the public company PROPEMEX (which absorbed several private companies). In foreign trading, the firm Ocean Garden Products achieved a near monopoly over shrimp marketing in the United States.

Trade deregulation and privatisation was one of the factors that contributed to changes in the system for patron-client relationships in Nayarit. This was mainly because the sale of the shrimp to public freezing and packing companies constituted a means of control over financing for production. A network of economic (and political) interests was woven around every stage of production and marketing, from initial financing to the determination of shrimp prices. This had a direct impact on the income of producers.

The disappearance of public enterprises has led to national trade becoming controlled by Central de Abastos (particularly its Guadalajara branch, and to a lesser extent its Mexico City outlet), the largest national market for fishery products from the Pacific coast (Rendón, 2011). The small regional trade continued to be dependent on trade networks in the cities, or the so-called changueras.

The deregulation of trade has also unified the domestic and international markets in several segments. For example, it has meant the entry onto the market of shrimp from Southeast Asian countries, whose medium-sized varieties now compete with Mexican shrimp. But the real market is for the larger sizes of shrimp, and it is here that deregulation and privatisation have introduced new actors.

During the 1980s, Ocean Garden Products began to concentrate 90% of its imports to the United States on the west coast. By 2004, its share in the US import market had dropped to 4%, and its share in the Mexican market for export had been cut in half (Panorama Acuícola, 2004). This shows how deregulation had the effect of reducing the importance of public enterprises in terms of their control of Mexican foreign trade.
In the year 2005, the government sold off Ocean Garden Products, thereby concluding the process of privatisation of Mexican foreign traders in aquaculture. A recent study found that in the case of Sinaloa, Ocean Garden Products and Meridian, among other private companies, controlled the foreign trade of products; the situation would have been similar in Nayarit, which is highly dependent on Sinaloa's marketing channels (Dubay, Tokuoka and Gereffi, 2010).

The US market is the main regional market for Nayarit's exports, particularly the west coast. The price of shrimp in the US is associated with their size, the large sizes being those captured on the high seas by fishing vessels, which can often secure higher prices on the market. Recently, some farms have reached equivalent sizes and have begun to sell them in the United States: ‘(U10, U12, U15* and recently sizes such as 16/20 and 21/25) coming from aquacultural farms’ (CAMPRODUCE, A. C., 2009). The next segment is medium-sized shrimp (‘sizes 26/30, 31/40 and 41/50, converging with aquacultural shrimp sizes, in which the battle is for generic products’ [CAMPRODUCE, A. C., 2009]); the competition is very strong from producers in South Asia and Ecuador in this segment, and prices tend to fluctuate significantly depending on supply conditions. And last of all are the small shrimp sizes (‘up to 51*’ [CAMPRODUCE, A. C., 2009]).

The most profitable segment is obviously the large sizes, which enjoy more stable prices and in which Mexican shrimp acquires a premium price, depending on their characteristics.

As domestic prices converged with international prices due to the liberalisation of the shrimp market, the international trade situation for shrimp, particularly the US market, has affected the profitability of shrimp trading.

Since the mid-1980s, the international shrimp market has grown greatly, but the competition has also grown. The Taiwan farm crisis was followed by a shift in investments to Thailand, which dominated the international market in the early

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30 Ocean Garden Products was acquired by Aqua Tech, Acuicola Boca and Grupo Industrial Pesquero Mexicano, all of which belong to the corporate group of the Bours family, the richest family in Sonora, the northern state whose governor was Eduardo Bours (Panorama Acuícola, 2005; Ravelo, 2008).
The entry into the market of mainland China, combined with the crisis resulting from diseases that decimated Thailand’s shrimp farms, then led to China becoming the biggest shrimp exporter in the world, and more recently India has followed in its footsteps. As a result, during the 1990s the shrimp market grew considerably both in terms of supply (thanks to the rise of shrimp farming), and in terms of increasing international demand (FAO; several years).

Following 9/11, the crisis in the tourism industry had a heavy impact on the demand for shrimp in the United States (CAMPRODUCE, A. C., 2009). This was reflected in a sharp fall in international shrimp prices, affecting all shrimp sizes.

In general, an upward trend in shrimp prices can be identified since 2005, except for the year 2008, when the economic crisis affected the demand for shrimp. Thus, price levels have recently returned to pre-9/11 levels, although competition in small sizes resulting from aquacultural production has been exacerbated, with the entry of more countries into the market, especially Asian countries (CAMPRODUCE, A. C., 2009).

In addition, on March 2010 the US Department of State issued a resolution prohibiting sea-shrimp imports from Mexico (‘U.S. Withdraws Mexican Shrimp Importation Certification under Sea Turtle Protection Law’, 25 March 2010) because Mexican vessels were not in compliance with the protocol for Turtle Excluder Devices (TED). In October, this prohibition was lifted (‘U. S. Government Certification of Mexico Sea Turtle Conservation and Shrimp Imports’, 15 October). Nevertheless, the prohibition, together with the problems faced by the industry in 2010, reduced supply and raised prices in the United States.
The years following the Great Recession of 2007-2009 have been somewhat confusing. International and domestic prices have tended to decline and remained low until mid-2013, when a new disease decimated shrimp farms in Mexico and the Asian countries, pushing prices up to pre-09/11 levels for the first time due to the fall in the global shrimp supply (see black lines in above figure 2).

However, the drop in international and domestic prices and the dismantling or privatisation of the State-controlled marketing system had a negative effect on the structure of the Mexican market in the twenty-first century up to the appearance of the new disease that is currently devastating global production.

According to Rendon (2011), the primary market for the shrimp of Nayarit following deregulation and privatisation of the sector was the domestic market. Some private companies have managed to produce larger shrimp sizes, enabling them to export some of their production.

The dismantling of the public marketing system resulted in its replacement by wholesalers in Guadalajara and Mexico City. Other equally important markets are those related to major tourist centres such as Puerto Vallarta and Acapulco (Cervantes Bravo and Camacho Arciniega, 1996). A study released by CAMPRODUCE in 2009 explains the nature of the shrimp market in the country:

‘Shrimp is supplied by fishing camps dedicated to riparian shrimp fishing, as well as by the production of shrimp vessels whose
shrimp are not exported due their small size. Farms located in Sonora, Sinaloa, Nayarit, Colima and Tamaulipas are also a source of supply of this product. There are usually storage centres and/or entrepreneurs who collect the shrimp, which are sold to a dealer (‘introductor’) who transports the shrimp by truck with ice in plastic containers. This dealer may sell the products to other dealers who supply the main fish and seafood markets in the country, such as Mercado de Pescados y Mariscos (Fish and Seafood Market) in Zapopan, Jalisco, and La Nueva Viga in Mexico City, and to a lesser extent, to the markets in Bajío, Puebla y Monterrey. At these points of sale, wholesale transactions are made to retailers, who in turn supply fishmongers and public markets, and also make agreements to supply supermarket chains. This product is aimed at the middle and upper class segments of the population, as well as restaurants and the seaside tourist sector, where a wide range of dishes are prepared. The price of the product is dependent on its size.’ (CAMPRODUCE, 2009: Translated OW)

The study later continues:

‘There are few distribution centres in the country, which are located in the main urban centres: in Guadalajara is the fish and seafood market of Zapopan, Jalisco, where an estimated 43% of the country's sales are made, totalling approximately 67,332 tonnes; in Mexico City is the fish and seafood market ‘La Nueva Viga’, where an estimated 32,883 tonnes are sold, representing 21% of the national market. The remaining 36%, i.e., 46,372 tonnes, are sold in regional markets such as Monterrey and Puebla, and in the markets of medium-sized cities such as León, Morelia, Tijuana, Acapulco, Veracruz, Tampico, Oaxaca, Mérida and Cancun, to mention a few.’ (CAMPRODUCE, 2009: Translation OW)

Finally, the local market is supplied by a chain of retailers in Tepic and other cities (commonly women known colloquially as ‘changueras’), with political
intermediaries affiliated with the PRI (through the Confederation of Mexican Workers [CTM] or the National Confederation of People's Organisations [CNOP]), and with contacts with shrimp vendors, who market these products directly (Cervantes Bravo and Camacho Arciniega, 1996).

The marketing carried out by coyotes or intermediaries to supply the national markets in Guadalajara and Mexico City determines the technical aspects and handling of the product before it is sent to retailers and retail chains. The distribution network that connects the production areas with the fish and seafood markets in the main cities is now the source that feeds these markets. However, the Mexican market for shrimp in the sizes listed above is a market in constant expansion. And, in general, the production of farms will continue to grow compared with production in estuaries, bays and lagoons, whose levels had been stagnant for decades. The old methods of production, which depended on a particular kind of political-economic relationship, are rapidly disappearing.

The shrimp market has become extremely competitive, with the presence of producers of all sizes, social characteristics and nationalities struggling to survive. This is the result of deregulation.

5. From Early Simple Commodity Production to Advanced Simple Commodity Production in Aquacultural Enterprises

The previous section provides a clear picture of the organisation of a shrimp market that has grown in significance.

The gradual shift from early simple commodity production to an advanced simple commodity production replaced artisanal processes and cooperative labour with a growing organisation that depends increasingly on the market. Specifically, manual processes, the sale of dry shrimp (packed in traditional handmade containers called barcinas), the organisation of cooperative labour for the construction of weirs or enclosures for shrimp breeding, the use of the tides to organise these enclosures, the use of manually powered wooden boats, net weaving, etc., were all part of the labour that consumed significant amounts of energy and time during the year.
Early simple commodity production involved the sale of the shrimp and the cooperative and family production of work instruments, which formed part of the labour of peasant aquacultural producers.

This was radically transformed over the years and decades, as this research has shown.

First, the introduction of electricity and the construction of roads multiplied the possibilities for marketing peasant products, and the domestic and international market for the region's shrimp expanded. In the 1970s, a revolution took place in the food culture of Nayarit, as it now became feasible to incorporate the products of La Costa into everyday diets.

In the 1980s, the large-scale introduction of locally produced fibreglass boats began, as well as the use of outboard motors. Little by little, handmade materials began giving way to industrially manufactured materials and instruments.

In the 1990s, the new Agrarian Act transformed ejido possession into ownership, and the land became another exchangeable commodity. The establishment of farms for shrimp production also represented a definitive break with the natural production cycle, turning aquaculture increasingly into an industry in which the ejido peasantry would participate, but as just another consumer (another buyer) of industrial supplies. Although production would continue to belong to certain segments of the original producers, their dependence on the market for supplies and machinery, and of services previously unheard of, transformed the early simple commodity producer of aquacultural products into an advanced simple commodity producer.

The difference is not insignificant. The confusion of the defenders of the peasant economy lies in the fact that the original rural producers continue to exist; but the change they have undergone is qualitative rather than quantitative.

The pattern described above bears many of the features of agrarian development from below.
6. Conclusions

The Second Agrarian Reform brought about important transformations to Nayarit's rural sector. These transformations are associated with the way in which the government negotiated with the peasantry for their support of the reform itself by transferring part of the infrastructure and exploitation concessions to peasant cooperatives.

Certain elements proved key for this change: the property regime changed from possession to ownership by the ejidos; domestic and international trade of aquacultural products was liberalised; shrimp as a species reserved for cooperatives was deregulated, thereby opening up production to private enterprise; changes occurred in technology and production methods which intensified production, but at the same time affected the ecosystem and led to the appearance of previously unknown diseases; the single party system ended, giving rise to a range of political alternatives whose exponents interacted with the new cooperative organisations; and new kinds of relationships appeared between private enterprise and the ejidos, as well as new forms of resistance.

These changes accentuated the commodification and restructuring of peasant aquacultural production, and it could be argued that early simple commodity production gave way definitively to advanced simple commodity production, as suggested by Byres (1996). In other words, the profile of shrimp production has been completely commercialised and shrimp producers have been transformed into advanced simple commodity producers.

However, this commercialisation may have been accompanied by a greater internal stratification among the producers themselves. Among my initial hypotheses I noted the need to investigate the process of differentiation as a central element in the future tendencies of small-scale production. The new investments in private and ejido farms have shifted the dynamism of production and commercialisation towards this group of producers. What I am interested in determining is whether these investments have had a homogeneous structure or have accentuated socioeconomic differentiation, and if so to what degree.
As discussed in Chapter 6, shrimp production no longer depended only on the traditional shrimp regions, and the dynamism of the sector shifted towards semi-intensive farms, most with two productive cycles (see the New Ruralism in Chapter 2). A greater degree of centralisation of land used for aquaculture has also occurred due to the technology used. The presence of the farms has thus introduced a greater degree of differentiation among producers. The next chapter will assess this central theory of the study through the application of a survey to identify the consequences of neoliberalism for the producers themselves. I will also examine how the differentiation process developed during the period.
Chapter 7
Quantitative Analysis of the Survey: Advanced Simple Commodity Production, the Stratification of the Peasantry and What it Means

1. Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the sample of producers interviewed and the conclusions drawn from this survey. These results confirm that agricultural and shrimp production is highly commercial, both in terms of sales and in the purchase of inputs and related services. They also show that over the course of the Second Agrarian Reform, differentiation among producers has increased, indicating that there are groups of producers who enjoy qualitatively better conditions of production, technology and incomes than the average. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate this process in order to identify the consequences of neoliberalism in the region under study and at the same time to offer a final picture of the structure of producers in the La Costa region of Nayarit, by way of conclusion to the study. The initial study examining the First Agrarian Reform presented a structure of cooperative producers as a whole. This image of producers has changed substantially, and it is important to consider the existence of new segments of producers and how they interact with their agrarian environmental in general.

As a result, there has been an increasing stratification of producers (Araghi, 2009, mentions a particular method of displacement and dispossession as characteristic of the neoliberal period). In general, the data will show a growing change in the social structure of the aquacultural peasantry in line with the reflections of Bernstein (2009b) and the New Ruralists (see Chapter 2). This chapter examines the socioeconomic data, and the relationship of shrimp production with agricultural production and off-farm labour, as well as commercial and industrial activities (retail trading including shrimp trading, grocery stores, etc.). Information will be presented on the process of
stratification of shrimp producers, as well as a quantification of the size of each social stratum and its significance for the political economy of the region under study.

The results also show that the shift from early simple commodity production to advanced simple commodity production has been almost totally completed, or is at a very advanced stage. That is, the production of the cooperative members and shrimp farmers depends on the purchase of inputs and the hiring of services during the production cycle, and the incomes of the producers are determined by the sale of their production and/or their complementary activities.

This stands in contrast with the situation of more than half a century earlier, when inputs depended on artisanal processes of self-production (weirs, boats, nets, etc.).

Therefore, this chapter is fundamental for understanding the development of the commercialisation process that the activity of small-scale producers has undergone.

This chapter begins with a description of the main socioeconomic features of the producers of the region according to the censuses conducted by government agencies (section 2), after which I will analyse the data of the sample in an effort to establish the existence of criteria for a general stratification of the producers.

The first criterion of stratification identified is ejido membership. Being an ejidatario constitutes a huge advantage in terms of access to ejido land, and to its resources (e.g. agriculture, livestock or fishing). This is true both for farmers and for cooperative members, as well as for commercial and industrial activities. Non-ejidatarios are limited in terms of their economic activity to work related to commercial or industrial activities or wage labour.

The second criterion of stratification (section 3.3) is related to the type of activities engaged in by the different producers and the distribution of income they earn from them. Aquacultural income represents a major proportion of the total income for cooperative members without access to land, and for farmers in general. In other words, non-aquacultural income is only significant for the segment of cooperative members with access to ejido land.
The third criterion is related to the profitability (section 4) of the aquacultural activities of the different groups of producers. By comparing their income against their cost structure, it was possible to estimate the proportion of representation of each stratum within the overall structure of producers. Six strata appear clearly differentiated: three among cooperative members and three among farmers.

These six strata appear to show, notwithstanding the size of the sample, that neoliberal policy has led to a greater concentration of certain productive resources in La Costa. The presence of shrimp farms has not only permitted an increase in production, but has also accentuated the stratification of producers on the basis of access to resources (ejido land, technology, better commercial relationships, better quality inputs, and greater production diversification), so that on the other extreme of the spectrum from shrimp farmers we find a group of producers with no access to land and with a need to combine their work in the cooperatives with wage labour. We also find that one segment of farmers concentrates the largest proportion of land for the most profitable crops (fresh fruit and vegetables) and a larger number of heads of cattle, while cooperative members continue to cultivate basic grains (e.g. sorghum, corn and beans), and depend more on their income from farming and livestock than from aquaculture (see Kay 2009 about pluriactivity).

2. What the Data Tells Us: Census Data and Sample of Producers

2.1 Socioeconomic Census Data

According to the official methodology, producers on estuaries and lagoons of Nayarit are considered ‘fishers’ (the same category as fishers in the sea or in rivers. For this reason, the information is separated with two methodologies used in different studies: one for ‘shrimp fishers’ (Dirección General de Ordenamiento Pesquero, 2010), and the other for ‘aquacultural farmers’ (CONAPESCA, INCA-RURAL, et al., 2012).

The information used to identify the general characteristics of ‘free’ (i.e., illegal in the strict sense of the word) fishers and fishers who hold fishing licences was taken from the census carried out in 2010 by the state and federal governments.
(Dirección General de Ordenamiento Pesquero y Acuícola, 2010)\textsuperscript{31}. In this census, which uses the category of ‘fishers’, the information presented is, in reality, on the cooperative shrimp-catching systems, i.e., the shrimp-catching systems that continue to be used on marine currents as a mechanism for shrimp fattening. However, as explored in previous chapters (particularly Chapters 4, 5 and the beginning of 6), cooperative organisation has suffered significant conflicts, mainly due to the lack of official recognition of certain production areas granted to them. As a result, illegal shrimp catching continues to be significant, although the quantities of its yields are difficult to establish. Thus, the census data for this group of cooperative producers separates ‘free’ fishers from those with fishing licences. In some cases the information is presented on all producers (both free and licensed), and in other cases it is not. This adds a complication to the information presented, and I will attempt to separate the groups in cases where separate information is available.

The following information is presented in this census:

**Table 18. Social Data for ‘Free’ and Licensed Shrimp Catchers in La Costa (2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Ages</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-20</td>
<td>21-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Blas</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago Ixcuintla</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tecuala</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosamorada y Tuxpan</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>287</strong></td>
<td><strong>765</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dirección General de Ordenamiento Pesquero y Acuícola, 2010

\textsuperscript{31} It is interesting to note that those who conducted the census talked to me about their surprise when they found out that in the neighbouring state of Jalisco, where they were required to conduct a similar analysis, so-called ‘free’ (illegal) fishermen did not exist.
Of the total of 4,727 fishing producers recorded in the 2010 Census, almost 80% are between the ages of 21 and 60. This is a very broad range, although 44.6% are between the ages of 31 and 50.

**Table 19. Level of Education of ‘Free’ and Licensed Fishermen La Costa (2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Without Any Study</td>
<td>Elementar y Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Blas</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago Ixcuintla</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tecuala</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosamora-da y Tuxpan</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>2,110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dirección General de Ordenamiento Pesquero y Acuícola, 2010

It is worth noting the difference between the number of fishers surveyed by age range and the number who answered the question on their level of education (4,727 vs. 4,665, and these numbers in turn differ from the 5,629 included in the *Ordenamiento Pesquero*, 2010, see Chapter 3). This could be explained by the low level of education among fishing producers. According to the census (2010), 85% have no schooling or completed only a few years of basic mandatory education (341+2,110+1,528=3,979 fishermen). Only 14.7% of the total have completed post-secondary education or professional training (foundation degrees or full degrees). This is therefore a segment of the population that has had little access to formal professional education. The
conclusion that can be drawn from this situation among producers is that they are highly homogeneous. That is, there is a low level of schooling among the vast majority of producers in the 21 to 60 age range. It would therefore be expected that there is a large proportion of the cooperative population who lack access to formal and technical education.

To better understand the features of production and income of cooperative producers, the sample taken of them only includes producers who hold a fishing licence. The results of the sample are shown in the following sections.

3. Results of the Sample of Producers and Cooperative Members

It is worth noting (as shown in Table 20) that a quarter of the interviewees (cooperative members) identify themselves as *ejidatarios*, while the other 215 (or 75%) self-identify as children of *ejidatarios*, while two are *avecindados*32 (community neighbours). This suggests that *ejidatarios* tend to involve their children in aquacultural activities.

In the interviews of farmers it was found that most of the farms had various partners: there was a total of 237 partners on the 99 farms where the questionnaire was administered, making for an average of 2.4 partners per farm. The interviewees were thus asked how many partners were *ejidatarios* and how many were not. Table 20 shows that among farmers the number of *ejidatarios* drops to 40 out of 237 (16.8%). This may reflect a skewing of the interviews given that only partners present on the farm when the interviews were conducted were interviewed. However, if it is an accurate reflection of reality, it is quite a remarkable statistic, as it means that although they are on *ejido* land, many farmers employ non-*ejidatario* partners.

**Table 20. Distribution of Interviews with Cooperative Members and Farmers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>No. of People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative member</td>
<td>Ejidatario</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewed</td>
<td>Other Status</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers(1)</td>
<td>No. of Partners</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 Inhabitant of an ejido town who is non-member of it. Without rights over lands.
### 3.1. General Results of the Cooperative Survey

The following tables summarise the information extracted from the sample in terms of the legal status of the cooperative members and other socioeconomic data.

Table 21 shows how many financial dependants each cooperative member has on average, and how many of the cooperative members are also *ejidatarios*. The interviewees reported having three to four financial dependants, as can be observed in column (c) of the table below. It is interesting to note that of the total number interviewed in the cooperatives, 215 stated they were children of *ejidatarios*, while only 70 cooperative members interviewed stated that they had full *ejido* rights (*derechos*).

The fact that the information shows that the children of *ejidatarios* are the main ones involved in aquacultural activities could be the result of factors such as: a) the demographic pressure to pass on the land forces them to diversify the activities of their children rather than divide up the inheritance\(^ {33} \); b) the marriage of their sons and daughters forces them to diversify their activities and thus

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\(^ {33} \) As was explained in Chapter 2, the *ejido* is an agrarian community that includes agricultural land and land for common use (generally used for grazing cattle and, in the case studied here, land for aquaculture), and a *fundo legal*, or town in which backyard activities are engaged in (chickens, small vegetable gardens, etc.). To have access to the agricultural land, the members of the *ejido* must have an *ejido* rights title ("*derechos a salvo*"), which can be transferred through inheritance to their descendants. This title is what can lead an *ejidatario* to divide his inheritance among his children, resulting in the division of land among the beneficiaries.
increase their family income; or c) the *ejidatarios* want to help their children who already have a family of their own to earn an income.

**Table 21. General Features of Cooperative Survey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/Farm (a)</th>
<th>No. of People Interviewed (b)</th>
<th>Average Members per Family (c)</th>
<th><em>Ejidatarios Entitled (With Derechos) (d)</em></th>
<th>Children (e)</th>
<th><em>Avecindados (Community Neighbours) (f)</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Nayarit</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llano del Tigre</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3,7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz y San Cayetano</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pescadero</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3,9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecilio Rendón-El Espino</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio R. Laureles</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3,7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerta de Palapares- Villa Juárez</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexicaltitan</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3,6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Felipe Aztatan-Union de Corrientes</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campo de los Limones</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boca de Camichín(*)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Barrios-Gorron Roberto</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejido Pajaritos-Andrés Sandoval</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Villa(*)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pericos</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Organisation/ Farm (a) | No. of People Interviewed (b) | Average Members per Family (c) | Ejidatarios Entitled (With Derechos) (d) | Children (e) | AVECINDADOS (Community Neighbours) (f) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Totals | 285 | | 70 | 215 | 2 |

(*) indicates special cases because their ejidos do not include land, but only access to rivers and lagoons. In strict terms they cannot have possession of the waterways because this resource is state-owned in Mexico, as noted in Chapters 4-6. For this reason, I classified them as non-ejidatarios.

The number of avecindados (community neighbours) among them is very low, as no more than two of them report holding this status.

**3.2. Access to Ejido Land**

Table 22 shows the structure of activities of the cooperative members plus farmers interviewed. Of the first (cooperative members), as shown in Table 21, approximately 25% (70+215=285 and 70/285) have land as ejidatarios (holding rights to the farm land and the livestock activities of the ejido). This 25% cultivates almost all the farm land of the cooperative members interviewed shown in Table 21. The other activities indicated (cattle, pigs, day labourers, commercial and industrial activities), are engaged in by both groups of cooperative members (with and without rights over the land).

**Table 22. Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Activities of Producers**  
(Cooperative Members and Farmers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Agricultural Land (Has)</th>
<th>No. of Heads</th>
<th>Day Labourers No.</th>
<th>Commercial and Industrial Activities No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-S*</td>
<td>A-W**</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>Pigs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Nayarit</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llano del Tigre</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz y San Cayetano</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pescadero</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecilio Rendón-El Espino</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio R. Laureles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Out of the 285 interviewees (cooperative members), 86 are day labourers and 53 are involved in commercial and/or industrial activities. This means probably that 30% (86/285) of cooperative members do not own their own lands or are in a situation of semi-proletarianisation and probably engage in aquacultural activities as a means of supplementing their income, and although most are sons of landholding ejidatarios, they do not have rights over the lands of their parents.

It is also worth noting that aquacultural farmers hold the largest proportion of farm land, particularly for the autumn-winter cycle (80%) based on the cultivation of irrigated land, while in the spring-summer cycle, in which rain-fed land predominates, they hold 45% of the total arable land.

Of the activities in which fishing (cooperative members and farmers) producers are involved it is clear that there is significant agricultural and livestock
production. Collectively, the interviewees hold a total of 1,225 hectares of farmland (703+522.5) used for both agricultural cycles (spring-summer/autumn-winter) and also own 611 heads of cattle and 224 pigs.

The Table 22 does not reveals a significant fact: all the cultivated farm land reported by those interviewed, 98% is held by cooperative members who are *ejidatarios*, while cooperative members who are not *ejidatarios* own very little farm land (only 2%, i.e., only 12 hectares of land, is farmed by these cooperative members). This data is astounding and shows a clear division between cooperative members who are *ejidatarios* and those who are not (i.e., do not own land because they lack the necessary rights\(^\text{34}\)).

The data suggests a situation characterised by a clear structuring of activities according to whether or not an *ejidatario* holds an *ejido* rights title (known as ‘derechos a salvo’). Being an *ejidatario* appears to guarantee access to land and, with it, the full range of farming activities. The absence of *ejidatario* status limits the range of income-earning activities to which a person has access. This seems to suggest a concentration of arable land in the hands of *ejidatarios*.

**Table 23. Distribution of Farm Land among *Ejido* Producers (Two Cycles)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperatives or Farms</th>
<th>Arable Lands (both cycles)</th>
<th>0 to 5 hectares</th>
<th>5,1 to 10 hectares</th>
<th>More than 10 hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of <em>Ejidatarios</em>*</td>
<td>Hectares</td>
<td>No. of <em>Ejidatarios</em> *</td>
<td>Hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperatives</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\) The data on the total number and land (1,225 hectares in table 22) of *ejidatarios* do not match up as some *ejidatarios* reported renting their lands, or the type of use given to them was not clear, or they were subsistence (self-consuming) producers (6 in total).

The previous and following tables show the distribution of arable land among the different strata of *ejido* producers (both cooperative and farm members).

\(34\) This situation arises, as has previously been mentioned, because they are children of *ejidatarios*, or because they lost their land through sale or due to some other circumstance.
The information is presented in absolute and relative figures in the interests of offering a clear picture of the degree to which different strata of producers can be identified both in cooperatives and on shrimp farms.

Of the total number of producers, properties under ten hectares are prevalent among cooperative members, while aquacultural farmers with arable land generally own property of more than ten hectares in size.

This tendency is accentuated if we look at the relationship between the different property strata with respect to the total amount of arable land.

**Table 24. Porcentual Distribution of Farm Land among Cooperative Members and Aquacultural Farmers (Both Cycles)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-operatives or Farms</th>
<th>Arable Lands (Both cycles)</th>
<th>0 to 5 hectares</th>
<th>5.1 to 10 hectares</th>
<th>More than 10 hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No. of Ejidatarios</td>
<td>Hectares</td>
<td>No. of Ejidatarios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms</td>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 25. Porcentual Distribution of Arable Land According to Production Unit Type (Both Cycles)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-operatives or Farms</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Arable Lands (both cycles)</th>
<th>0 to 5 hectares</th>
<th>5.1 to 10 hectares</th>
<th>More than 10 hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No. of Ejidatarios</td>
<td>Hectares</td>
<td>No. of Ejidatarios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperatives</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Here we see a clear concentration of land ownership in the sector of aquacultural farmers. The strata of farmers who own more than 10 hectares hold 91% of arable farm land (see table 24 and 25 above), while among cooperative members the concentration of arable land is lower, although no less significant, as the strata of members with more than 10 hectares (25% of the total) own 51.3% of arable land used for the two production cycles (table 25).

The following table shows the results of the survey with respect to *ejido* producers (cooperative members and aquacultural farmers) in relation to livestock production and other types of activity.

**Table 26. Number of Producers Involved in Livestock Production and Non-Farm Activity by Type of Producer**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of producer</th>
<th>Livestock</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Commercial and Industrial Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of Producers</td>
<td>Heads</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>No. of Producers</td>
<td>Heads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ejidalario cooperative member</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(50.0%)</td>
<td>(47.3%)</td>
<td>(38.4%)</td>
<td>(20.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-ejidalario cooperative member</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35.7%)</td>
<td>(18.4%)</td>
<td>(56.4%)</td>
<td>(17.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ejidalario Farmer(*)</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>209</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12.2%)</td>
<td>(34.1%)</td>
<td>(5.1%)</td>
<td>(61.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-ejidalario farmer(*)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>612</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) In the case of farmers it was impossible to establish which of the 9 wage labourers were *ejidatarios*. The same is the case of the 30 who stated that they engaged in commercial or industrial activities (see Table 22 above).
The above tables reveal an interesting situation: almost all farm land is held by *ejidatarios* with *derechos a salvo* (see footnote 33), who control the farm land either as direct producers or as lessors of land for both agricultural cycles. A total of 383 hectares of rain-fed (spring-summer cycle) *ejido* land plus 111.5 hectares of autumn-winter cycle land in the cooperatives, and 743 hectares (332 hectares of spring-summer cycle and 411 hectares of autumn-winter cycle) of land belonging to the farms are effectively under their control; in other words, all available farm land. Of the total of 237 farm partners identified in the survey, 40 (or 18%) control almost all of the farm land reported. *In short, both in the cooperatives and on the farms the ejidatario group controls farming activity.*

There is a very clearly defined segmentation of agricultural and livestock production according to the origin of the producers. The *ejidatario* group controls almost all farming and livestock activity (more pronounced in cattle raising than in pig raising). On the other hand, among non-*ejido* producers, wage labour activity is predominant.

This segmentation has its origins in the *ejido* system, which allows access to land only to *ejidatarios* with *derechos a salvo*. Thus, their children and other types of producers are excluded from the possibility of cultivating land unless they rent, buy or inherit it. This means that the arable land and some of the grazing land is practically segmented along generational lines.

What are the implications of this situation for the income structure of the population engaged in aquaculture? Their status as *ejidatarios* with *derechos a salvo* and therefore with access to land ownership allows *ejidatarios* to diversify their activities over the course of the year, and to enjoy a more balanced income structure. This makes them less dependent on income from their aquacultural activity.

### 3.3. Distribution of Aquacultural Income Compared with Non-Aquacultural Income and its Significance in the Determination of Different Strata of Producers (Cooperative Members and Farmers)

The following table shows the income percentages of the population interviewed with respect to the main income categories. The tables were constructed on the basis of Tables 34 and 35 of the Appendix, which contain
absolute values. For the following table (Table 27), values from the last three lines of Table 35 in the Appendix were used. The relative values of the aquacultural farms were taken and the relative values were calculated for the case of the cooperatives using the aforementioned Table 35. Table 27 is thus a summary of both tables that appear in the Appendix.

What is interesting about the table below is that it reveals a sector within the group of cooperative members engaged in fishing activity who do not have access to farm land, who are therefore compelled to diversify their activities in order to generate income outside the agricultural sector. For example, the last three rows of the table show an income segmentation in which the income of the ejidatarios depends more on agricultural and livestock activities than on aquacultural activities (78.69% vs. 21.31%), while for the group of non-ejidatarios, aquacultural income is essential (25.34% vs. 74.66%). Further below I will discuss the types of non-farming activities engaged in by each of the groups indicated.

The table 28 also shows that in the farmer group, dependence on aquaculture increases according to the size of the water surface owned. The greater the investment in land and water surface, the greater the dependence on income generated by aquaculture in the farm group.

In reality there are three or four social groups, each with their own view of aquaculture; i.e., their perception of the activity itself can be compared against other contextual elements in which each group appears to be immersed. I will attempt to describe the characteristics of each of these groups, beginning with cooperative members and then turning to aquacultural farmers.

Table 27. Summary of Income Distribution in Shrimp Cooperatives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperative</th>
<th>Non-Aquacultural Income</th>
<th>Value of Non-Aquacultural Income (Subtotal) (a+b+c=d)</th>
<th>Value of Aquacultural Income (Subtotal) (e)</th>
<th>Total Income (d+e)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ag. Incl. Livestock (a)</td>
<td>Commercial &amp; Industrial Income (b)</td>
<td>Day Wages (c)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EJIdatarios</td>
<td>88.40%</td>
<td>27.81%</td>
<td>16.01%</td>
<td>71.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 28. Distribution of Annual Income by Type of Activity of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation and Size of Farms</th>
<th>Non-Aquacultural Income</th>
<th>Aquacultural Income</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ejidatario cooperative members</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative members without land (non-ejidatario)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms with 0 to 10 hectares of water surface</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms &gt;10 to 30 hectares of water surface</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms &gt;30 hectares of water surface</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Farms</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 26 and Appendix, Tables 34 and 35, page 227 et passim.

- Non-ejidatario cooperative members: The first group is that of cooperative members without access to land, mainly because they lack the necessary rights granted by the Agrarian Act to ejidatarios with derechos a salvo. According to the data shown above, 215 of the interviewees (see table 21) are in this group, including all members of the Francisco Villa and Boca de Camichín cooperatives, because these communities do not have land included in the ejido grant, or because
farm land is scarce. This group obtains its income mainly from activities ranging from commercial and industrial activities working as day labourers in the agricultural sector and also in livestock activity in some cases earning 72% (see table 27, Commercial and Industrial Income Column) of the total income earned from the commercial and industrial activities of the cooperative members interviewed. Non-Ejidatario cooperative members reported only 28% (table 27, Non-Aquacultural Income Columns) of total income earned from non-aquacultural activities. Similarly, this group of fishers earns 84% (table 27) of the total income that cooperative members reported earning from wage labour (see too Appendix table 35, page 173).

In short, fishers in this group spend their time engaging in non-farming activities, because they have to find different forms of income. A large proportion of this group works in fishing, day labour, building or any activity that brings them an income during the shrimp catching off-season. On average for this sector of cooperative members shrimp catching in estuaries earns them 74.6% of their income (table 27), which is supplemented by livestock activities (pig and cattle feeding), which represent around 7% of their income; commercial activities (such as fish selling or fishing for scale fish), which represent 7.9%; and day labouring, representing 10% of their total income (see table 27).

- **Ejidatario** cooperative members: Their status as *ejidatarios* gives this group of shrimp producers the opportunity to diversify their sources of income. This group is responsible for 88.4% of agricultural income reported (table 27). Aquacultural activity is of less relative importance for this group than for the previous group, although this does not mean that they do not obtain significant earnings from shrimp catching in estuaries. As noted above, income from agricultural activity seems to be relatively more significant for this group than aquacultural activity (72.9% compared to 21.3%). However, it is still an important activity based on the percentage of income earned from aquaculture.

One characteristic of the type of agricultural activity in which these *ejidatarios* are involved is their preference for cultivating grains,
especially sorghum, but also beans and corn, for self-consumption in some cases. Many others also cultivate corn to use as fodder for livestock activities. This is also important for the farmer group, which is discussed further below.

It should also be noted that the status of ejidatario with derechos a salvo (or simply as ejidatarios, as the interviewees describe themselves) gives them access to another type of resources: political resources (as land ownership is the requirement for access to credit, direct support schemes, farming subsidies, etc.). Being an ejidatario thus provides benefits that non-ejidatario cooperative members are not entitled to.

- Small-scale farmers: The farmer group, an emergent sector in aquacultural activity, is made up of producers with varying economic capacities. Small-scale farmers with up to 10 hectares of water surface have a highly diversified income structure, although they obtain 54% of their income from aquaculture. However, they are also involved in agricultural activities from which they obtain 15% of their income, as well as commercial and industrial activities (small business), which represent 22%, and professional activities with much higher earnings as they are within the formal sector (teachers, workers in the US or bureaucrats). Overall, they obtain 10% of their income from wage-earning activities (see Appendix table 34).

In general, the farming activities of producers with farms involve farm produce with a higher added value in the market (fresh fruit and vegetables such as watermelons, cucumbers, tomatoes, tomatillos, chilli or fruits like mangoes). In contrast with farm producers who belong to cooperatives, the farming activity of these farmers also exhibits qualitative differences in terms of crop type and land quality.

- The next segment of farmers, those with a water surface of 10 to 30 hectares, is the most dynamic segment in the aquacultural sector. These farmers are dedicated almost exclusively to rural activities and obtain 23% of their income from livestock and farming activities, or maintain small industries for shrimp processing and sales that earn them close to
an additional 7% on their income. In general, this segment of producers generates the largest volumes of shrimp production (according to the sample, almost 1,500 tonnes per year, as much as the production of all the cooperatives combined). These farmers are small or medium-scale entrepreneurs and obtain 70% of their income from shrimp farming. However, although in relative terms they seem to depend more on aquacultural income, in absolute terms their income from other rural, commercial or processing activities is also significant (see table 34 in Appendix).

- The last segment of farmers, large-scale farmers with more than 30 hectares of water surface, seems to have specialised in aquacultural production. This sector does not appear to be as dynamic as the previous one; for example, of the 25 interviews conducted with producers in this category, the total income generated from their agricultural activities barely amounts to 130,000.00 pesos (USD 10,400.00), compared to 7,000,000.00 pesos (USD 560,000.00) for the previous group (see Appendix table 34).

Although the above paragraphs offer a clear description of the characteristics of the different segments of producers that can be identified, it may be possible to establish a more appropriate classification if we take into account the four main groups:

a) Non-ejidatario cooperative members;

b) Ejidatario cooperative members, who share some characteristics with farmers who own up to 30 hectares of water surface;

c) Farmers with 10 to 30 hectares of water surface. A dynamic sector, similar to the second group in some respects;

d) Farmers with more than 30 hectares of water surface.

In general, in all the segments of aquacultural producers, whether involved in agricultural activities or not, there is a clear and definitive commercial economy that determines the survival strategies of all producers. Only very few producers indicated that they use their land to grow corn for self-consumption: only 5
producers out of a sample of 384. This finding is highly significant, and I will return to it when discussing the conclusions of this research in the next chapter.

An outstanding feature of ‘artisanal’ aquaculture (the type of aquaculture used in estuaries, lagoons and canals), is that it has now been almost entirely automated. Ejido and non-ejido fishers depend on purchased outboard motors (Yamaha, Suzuki, etc.). All of the boats were bought by the fishers, and the inputs they need for fishing are also purchased (nets, cast nets, sinkers, fuel, shrimp bait, etc.). Lively commercial activity supports the annual shrimp seasons in the estuaries and lagoons, as suppliers of inputs and services and other vendors live off the goods and services they provide to fishers during the months of September and October. And shrimp buyers, the intermediaries who distribute the shrimp to the cities in inland Nayarit, or to the national markets in Guadalajara, Sinaloa or Mexico City, complete the marketing chain that begins with the sale of inputs.

The different characteristics of this commercial activity of shrimp producers raises the question: how does this activity affect the aquacultural sector of the La Costa region of Nayarit? What are the profit margins sustaining the sector for each segment of producers?

4. Profitability of Activity and the Advantages for Each Segment in the Shrimp Market

The following significant information can be drawn from the specific data provided by the producers in the interviews.

If we measure the yields of the producers in the cooperatives and compare them with production yields on shrimp farms, we can get a rough idea of how the two segments (cooperative members and farmers) are sustained and of the advantages and disadvantages of each one.

First of all I will to attempt to identify the characteristics of the activity of the cooperatives, and then I will provide an analysis of the farmer group in order to compare the results.
The sample of cooperative members reveals a very wide range of production yields reported by the different interviewees. The following table shows this variation in the yields reported in the survey.

**Table 29. Fishing Activity: Yield per Producer**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Yields per Producer*</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to 1 tonne</td>
<td>1 to 2 tonnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Nayarit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llano del Tigre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz and San Cayetano</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pescadero</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecilio Rendón-El Espino</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio R. Laureles</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palapares-Villa Juárez</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexcalitán</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Felipe Aztatán-Unión de Corrientes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campo de los Limones</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boca de Camichín</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Barrion-Gorroberto</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejido Pajaritos-Andrés Sandoval</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Villa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pericos</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cooperatives</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The yields are taken from data that can be validated. Some fishers preferred to give general information and avoided direct answers. In general, fear of taxation led a significant number of fishers to avoid providing yield data. In these cases, their right to withhold the information was respected.

Estuary fishing yields is a matter of considerable debate, as annual production ranges vary widely. One expert suggested to me that it was impossible to obtain
6 tonnes per year with a 48 hp boat unless using trawl nets, which is illegal. However, the data reported to me by the fishers show a wide range of yields. It is possible that in some cases producers were misrepresenting their results; on the other hand, illegal production and sale is significant in Mexico and the producers may have in fact provided reasonably accurate data if we consider that some shrimp sales are made on informal or non-institutional markets. In the chapter on the ‘La Única’ cooperative I pointed out the significance of illegal shrimp production, which in some years represented more than double the legally registered production. There is a strong possibility that this phenomenon continues to be widespread.

Moreover, if a day labourer brings in weekly earnings of 900 to 1,500 pesos (USD 72-120 at a rate of 12.5 pesos per dollar), a shrimp producer who works for only one season per year can be expected to annualise the income he earns in 2-4 months of work. In other words, we would expect a fisher to earn more than 40,000 pesos (USD 3,200) in the shrimp-catch season. This means that a fisher should bring in around 2 tonnes in production at a rate of 20 to 30 pesos per kilogram (USD 1.60-USD 2.40 per kg). And if market conditions allow a higher price, all the better.

In an effort to make the data reported as accurate as possible, I have averaged out the yields reported to me. However, more in-depth research is needed to determine the production yields obtained in Nayarit's estuary regions with greater precision.

In any event, there is clearly a wide variation in the production obtained by most fishers in cooperatives, which may be more or less than one tonne depending on the characteristics indicated. According to the interviewees, total production is determined by adding up the catches made each day. It is not unusual to bring in more than 1 tonne during the season, or even up to 2 tonnes. These figures cover 68% of the fishers who reported their production yields in the survey. The other 32% are fishers who reported average yields of more than 2 tonnes in the last few seasons.
Table 30. Production Cost Structure for Fishers in Cooperatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Producers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Working Capital</th>
<th>Fixed Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Feed/Baits</td>
<td>Fuels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejidatario cooperative members</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ejidatario cooperative members</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members (average)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix, table 36.

This data is interesting because it confirms the fertility of the estuaries which, although reduced by years of continuous production, destruction of mangroves and refuges for the shrimp, as well as sedimentation of canals and lagoons, continue to offer sufficient profitability to sustain a significant level of production and thus support a large group of fishers who live for part of the year on the income generated.

This type of activity generates a production cost structure in the cooperatives dominated by the costs that need to be covered for the fishing expeditions (see table 36, appendix).

As shown in the table, the cost of fuel constitutes the main component of total production costs – more than 2/3 of the total. Some estuary producers invest in bait to attract shrimp on fishing days (one kilogram or more). It is worth noting that wages do not represent a significant element in the cost structure. Every year, repairs need to be made to the boats and motors, nets (cast nets) need to be fixed or replaced and inputs need to be purchased. This also represents a significant average of more than 20% of annual costs.

In general, the cost structure depends more on working capital and fundamentally on fuel\(^{35}\). This expense increases depending on the distances

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\(^{35}\) The boats use a type of petrol mixed with oil that is more expensive than ordinary fuel. In some towns the sale of this petrol mixture is also a business for some fishers. The fuel costs around 11 pesos per litre or more, depending on the circumstances. Although regulations
from the fishing sites and the horsepower of the boat's motor. On the other hand, the length of the boat also increases the load capacity and thus reduces production costs.

Given the cost structure, estuary fishers will need some very good fishing days to cover the fuel costs incurred.

On the farms, the situation is quite different. In Nayarit, semi-intensive farms are the predominant farm type for shrimp production. These farms consist of ponds of varying sizes that need to be prepared in a manner very similar to the way that land is prepared for cultivation. The ponds need to be fertilized, and there are costs associated with ensuring that the pond is free of viruses and bacteria from previous seasons. The better the farmers perform these preparations, the greater the chances are of preventing diseases that can ruin the harvest and thus of preventing losses.

Table 31. Average Yields on Shrimp Farms according to Interviewee Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Farms</th>
<th>Surface (has)</th>
<th>Production (tonnes)</th>
<th>Average Yields (tonnes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cycle I</td>
<td>Cycle II</td>
<td>Totals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to 10 hectares</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>196.236</td>
<td>350.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10 to 30 hectares</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>452.028</td>
<td>952.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;30 hectares</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>85.476</td>
<td>267.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1.640</td>
<td>733.740</td>
<td>1.570.280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The farmer then needs to purchase the shrimp larvae, which are ‘sown’ in the pond. The fattening process begins, for which special feed must be purchased. Here supervision of the pond is essential, as the farms need workers to prevent birds (especially ducks) from making off with the shrimp. The specifications of the water also need to be monitored (particularly oxygenation, as well as temperature and other parameters). Technical support is also important, especially when diseases attack the shrimp in their different stages of growth.

prohibit the use of two-stroke engines like those described, the survey revealed they were being used daily, as were artificial weirs.
The shrimps are harvested once they reach a marketable size. The larger the size the higher the price that the product can achieve.

The table above shows the average yields for each farm segment. Not all of the water surface is used in annual production in the different production cycles; however, the data is provided for information purposes only.

Unlike shrimp catchers, shrimp farmers can obtain yields several times a year. There are normally two production cycles, but there are farms that get up to three cycles.

The production cost structure is shown in the following table. As the table shows, food and raw materials constitute the main production costs. On average these two elements represent more than 60% of total costs, and if we add fuel costs to these two we have more than 75% of overall expenses. Unlike estuary shrimp catching, wage costs constitute a significant proportion of shrimp farming expenses. Medium-sized farms with 10 to 30 acres were responsible for 54% of the wages on all farms. Finally, it should be noted that fixed costs do not represent a significant component of production costs on farms, averaging only 5% in the year that the survey was conducted. Therefore, as in the case of estuary fishing, working capital constitutes the biggest proportion of production costs.

**Table 32. Production Cost Structure on Shrimp Farms in Nayarit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Farms</th>
<th>Expenses in Working Capital</th>
<th>Fixed Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preparation and Fertilisation</td>
<td>Raw Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to 10 hectares</td>
<td>9,0%</td>
<td>19,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10 to 30 hectares</td>
<td>5,1%</td>
<td>22,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;30 hectares</td>
<td>5,3%</td>
<td>25,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6,1%</td>
<td>22,0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix, table 36(a) and 36(b).

If we compare the two cost structures, it is notable that in the case of the fishing activity by the cooperatives the largest production cost component is the fuel for
the motor boats used. In 99% of cases, motor boats have replaced manual rowing boats. In general, in these organisations the bulk of production expenses are associated with fuel and the bait used to attract shrimp when fishing, as well as the costs of net repair and associated inputs, which are nevertheless much lower than petrol expenses. Occasionally a major motor or boat repair is required, and in such cases the annual production costs rise accordingly. In other words, basically only working capital expenses are calculated (consisting of raw materials, fuel and occasional labour). Motors depreciate over a period of many years, and therefore do not represent a high proportion of production costs.

Fishers may share the earnings in thirds or halves with a partner. However, it was not always possible to identify this situation accurately because not all fishers answered this question. This sharing of the earnings from the catch seems to be a widespread practice. Going ‘halves’ or ‘thirds’ allows fishers to avoid having to pay wages; however, in some cases fishers also hire labourers who are paid a daily wage, although payment in kind is also a popular option.

Fishing in estuaries, rivers and canals is generally subject to the same principle as open sea or coastal fishing: the fisher may be lucky or may not catch as much as hoped due to a range of circumstances, which make certain fishing sites considerably better for fishing than others. In other words, the movement of the product from one location to another gives certain sites a natural ‘fertility’. Fishers therefore move to the sites where they expect to obtain better catches based on the experience they have gathered in previous years. But this does not necessary guarantee a good catch. Thus, for estuary fishers, luck and circumstances can have a big impact on results. A fishing expedition generally brings in anywhere from 80 kilos to up to a half tonne (with a lot of good luck), according to some reports. Other fishers reported that it is possible to catch close to a tonne in a single day, although these are exceptional cases and also depend on the size of the boat and its load capacity. Small boats would not have this possibility.

Fishers who engage in night-time expeditions once the season is open are just as subject to luck, as although full-moon nights are good fishing times, on other nights the catches are notably lower. Little by little, between bad and not so bad
days, over the months of September and October the fishers haul in the bulk of their catches. Under these circumstances, the information provided is somewhat tentative; there can be no certainty as to the data provided as catches generally tend to be underestimated while production costs tend to be exaggerated. There is no official accounting of this activity, and where there is illegal fishing and selling, these also play an important role.

In the case of farms, the situation is different. In these production units, control of the elements of production (raw material, inputs, water surface, labour, etc.) results in a greater control of the harvest, but at the same time raises production costs. Unlike the cooperatives, in which investments are only made in the catch (and certain preparations prior to the start of the fishing season), on the farms significant ongoing expenses are incurred. For example, larvae (shrimp in the larval stage) need to be purchased and sown in the pond. This entails land preparation costs, fertilisation costs, and the payment of occasional labour and for technical services to identify the main cultivation parameters (water properties), and then to cover other expenses in the event of diseases. Added to this are certain boat and net maintenance expenses. In short, although there is greater control of the harvest, and therefore greater yields, production costs reduce the earnings obtained.

To sum up, the competitive advantage enjoyed by cooperative members lies in the fact that they do not incur the costs of pond preparation, fertilisation, raw material purchases, and feeding and fattening the shrimp until it reaches a marketable size, all of which farmers do have to pay for. Labour costs are also different because the system of going ‘halves’ or ‘thirds’ obviates the need to pay wages. Although there is more production and therefore greater yields on a farm, production costs are also greater, and there is always the possibility of the loss of a harvest due to shrimp diseases. On the other hand, farms can coordinate their production so that it will be ready for sale at times of the year when prices are higher, such as the Easter holiday season.

Although farms have greater control of production, they also run additional risks that shrimp fishers do not have to face due to the densities handled in the pond and the possibility of diseases affecting the product. In the case of cooperatives, while there is no control over the sizes that the shrimp may grow
to, and shrimp sizes may generally be smaller, their lower production costs allow them a reasonable income.

5. Stratification of Shrimp Producers

The information provided by the sample of producers described above reveals that the process of deregulation of the shrimp industry since the agrarian reforms of 1992 has led to the appearance of a sector of farmers who have contributed to a definitive increase in domestic production, but also to a process of economic stratification of the different groups of aquacultural producers.

As deregulation progressed, and after the first failures of the farms implemented by official policies in the 1990s, since the turn of the century a segment of shrimp farms has been developing, and with it a process of socioeconomic stratification.

In the case of cooperative members, in broad terms the stratification of producers is associated with their access to farm land. This access marks a very clear boundary between *ejidatarios* (or most of them), who are able to engage in agricultural activities and increase their income in this way, with access to credits for production and to government support programs, and non-*ejidatario* cooperative members, who have to pursue other activities and who constitute the majority of the day workers and wage labourers in general. While some non-*ejidatario* cooperative members have managed to diversify into commercial activities, or to break into the fishing sector (catching fish as well as shrimp or, as in the case of Boca de Camichín, working as oyster, fish and shrimp producers, and also engaging in commercial activities), the questionnaire shows that 99 of them are day labourers, out of a total of the 285 interviewed. Added to these is a segment of cooperative fishers who have an intermediate status, who engage in fishing as well as commercial activities; some are small-scale livestock breeders, and others catch fish or molluscs. In total this subgroup consists of 125 cooperative members out of the 285 surveyed.

Finally, there is a group of *ejidatarios*, most if not all of whom are engaged in a range of activities that appear to guarantee them a minimum income over the course of the year; 70 interviewees in the sample were in this category.
Although, as discussed earlier, the sizes of their properties varies, I will generally consider them a more or less homogeneous group (24 of those interviewed had less than 5 hectares while 6 did not report on the use of their lands = 30 ejidatarios).

Of the total, 19% of the fishers interviewed combine their aquacultural activity with paid labour in farming seasons or with other wage-earning activities, some of whom (although of course not all) are in financially precarious situations. They are really only differentiated by the type of activity they engage in and the fact that they have lost their access to farm land.

The next group, which is difficult to classify, is made up of cooperative members who combine a range of highly diverse activities. This group includes 125 interviewees, to which can be added 30 ejidatarios who did not specify whether their farm land was productive, and who share the need to diversify into non-farming activities. In total, 125+30 = 155 cooperative members in this category.

Next are the ejidatario cooperative members with more than 5 hectares of farm land. These constitute a more economically stable sector than the previous two.

The last category is that of the farmers. The category is that of producers on farms classified according to the water surface they control on their farms. In particular, the group of farmers with less than 10 hectares shares many similarities with the ejidatario cooperative members (the previous group), and these two could be considered as a single group. But for the moment I will keep the two categories separated.

My research has identified six more or less clearly identifiable subgroups of fishers. A significant sector of aquacultural producers (99+125, or 24%) has lost all access to land, while the rest still have some form of access to farm land or have turned their land into shrimp ponds.

The gap between cooperative labourers and farmers with more than 10 hectares of water surface has grown in the last 20 years in various ways, contributing to a wide difference in the income levels reported in the interviews (see table below, and Appendix table 34 and 35).

In short, it is feasible to suggest that the reforms implemented in Mexico in the 1990s in the agrarian and fisheries sectors have widened the economic gap.
between some subgroups of aquacultural producers who during the period of the ‘La Única’ cooperative may have exhibited some differences but were not so far apart. Deregulation has widened the gap between them. This data demonstrates that deregulation, the commercial opening up of the sector, the creation of ejido property, etc., and the whole process of neoliberal reform have contributed to this phenomenon.

Similarly, the data provided points to the existence of an active small-scale commercial economy that has turned small-scale aquacultural producers into buyers of industrial inputs to sustain their activity, including machinery and services right up to the sale of the product, mainly on domestic markets.

**Table 33. Posited Stratification of Producers and Quantification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratification of Producers</th>
<th>Number of Producers</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day Labourers-Cooperative Members</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>19,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative members without land (fishermen, retail traders, petty cattle breeder, etc.) + petty ejidatarios (less than 5 has of arable land or interviewee who could not explain the use of their lands).</td>
<td>125+30</td>
<td>29,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejidatario cooperative members (more than 5 hectares of arable land)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers: 0 to 10 has*</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>14,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers: 10 to 30 has*</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>25,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers: &gt;30 has*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Partners identified by the interviewees are included in the totals. For this reason, the figure does not match the total number of questionnaires administered.

The previous table, which is a summary integrating the information of Tables 22 to 32, shows the distribution of the subgroups according to the information provided in the tables preceding it. The data is only tentative, as the incomes shown for labourers and non-ejidatario cooperative members are based on estimates provided by the interviewees, which themselves were tentative.
However, it is clear that non-ejidalario cooperative members generate a higher level of production than ejidalario cooperative members. In other words, the importance they give to aquacultural activity seems to induce them to generate more income. On the other hand, the middle sector of the farmer groups generates a higher level of production than all the other producers. This is therefore the most dynamic sector in the productive structure of the region under study.

6. Conclusions about fishing activity and agricultural activities

The above data show the result of nearly 100 years of aquacultural activity in the region, where agrarian policy created a peasant sector tied to ejido property. Access to ejido land is an extremely important element in the determination of the different strata of the producers. Having access to ejido land makes a huge difference in terms of income and possibilities of access to other activities. The same is true in both the farmer segment and the cooperative segment.

The establishment of farms following the implementation of the neoliberal reforms has broadened the spectrum of producers, introducing in new elements to the picture: access to aquacultural land, to technology, to inputs and technical services, to marketing channels, etc., (see New Ruralists and Araghi 2009 in chapter 2).

It has been found that a high percentage of shrimp producers generally continue to engage in agricultural activities, although their financial capacity determines the type of agricultural activities in which they will be involved. In other words, there is a developing process of stratification that defines the possibilities of access to technology and markets and the overall chances of staying in the market.

The vast majority of producers exhibit similar characteristics, particularly if we combine the ejidalario cooperative members with the segment of farmers with fewer available hectares of water surface. Grain production predominates in these two strata. It is also the lower-middle sector on the scale of average shrimp producers. In the case of the cooperatives, members depend largely on
natural conditions to increase their yields and on the prices offered on the shrimp market.

As a result, the productive potential of both ejidatario cooperative members and small-scale farmers with less than 10 hectares of water surface is considerably more precarious than that of the segments of farmers with a larger water surface, for whom bulk purchases of inputs and access to better quality services favour higher yields. At the same time, the type of agricultural activities in which they are involved offer the potential for higher incomes (although they may also entail higher risks), as they include export products (e.g. fresh fruit and vegetables), and in some cases fishing is integrated with agricultural activities, thereby offering different income levels, a kind of pluriactivity where the risks are lower (Key 2009).

In any case, the existence of a middle sector of advanced simple commodity producers is evident. However, this sector has been rapidly increasing its volume of hired labour, resulting in the appearance within the farm sector of a group of medium-scale farmers engaged in entrepreneurial activity (with 10 to 30 hectares of water surface).

Finally, 19% of cooperative members are working as day-labourers, in addition to an undetermined but probably large number of illegal producers (see next page). These workers form part of the surplus labour, and the theoretical debate about its meaning (see Bernstein and Lewis, for example) in the context of a neoliberal agrarian world will be shaped by the future of the regional economy. Clearly, they are involved in the new farms and the old cooperatives as well as non-rural activities, so it is impossible to anchor them entirely to one or another reality. What does this mean, taking into account the objections of Bernstein to Byres, about labour surpluses in a context of the neoliberalisation of the rural sector, and the kind of agrarian transition that is taking place?

In general, the study and the data presented above demonstrate the commercial nature of both agricultural and fishing production in the region. Agricultural and fishing activities involving self-production and self-consumption are practically non-existent in the data, indicating that this type of production has become a rare exception. What predominates is production that essentially
depends on the purchase of inputs, tools and instruments and the hiring of labourers when necessary. In other words, self-production of the materials needed for production is a minor activity compared to purchasing of inputs, equipment and tools, and the sale of production to the market.

The existence of a collection of small workshops in the region dedicated to boat manufacture and small repairs suggests an industry of services associated with the activity of the farms and cooperatives.

In this sense, the agricultural activities support the general hypothesis that producers have been transformed into advanced simple commodity producers, and there is even evidence of their transformation into small-scale entrepreneurs who are increasingly diversifying their production. In other words, their activities have been fully integrated into the market both for the sale of their products and for the purchase of the elements needed for production.

Early simple commodity production entailed the sale of agricultural or fishing produce, but with self-production of inputs, as a family activity, i.e., small domestic-artisanal industry. The move from self-producing to purchasing production elements on the market is part of the process that transforms early simple commodity producers into advanced simple commodity producers.

This process appears to have sped up in Nayarit’s La Costa region in the 1980s and was accentuated with the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. It has been part of the process of automation of fishing activity (with the arrival of the outboard motor boat), and the subsequent replacement of handmade nets with synthetic nets.

Weirs are now also being replaced, as producers move from the use of material taken from the environment to the use of synthetic nets that prevent shrimp from passing but that also prevent the capture of other materials which, according to current environmental standards, contributed to sedimentation in canals and estuaries.

As a result, advanced simple commodity production contributes to the growth of the internal market and is therefore a mechanism for integration of this mode of production into the capitalist economy.
Last of all, the deregulation and liberalisation of the industry does not seem to have led to a reduction in pressure on the resources, as can be observed in the first period of study. Although I was unable to collect information on illegal fishing activity, the initial figure of 4,649 producers represents a 1 to 1 ratio of illegal producers to shrimp-catching licence holders. This is a huge number of illegal fishers, and it therefore cannot be asserted that the process of labour force absorption is over, as the labour force surplus continues to be a characteristic and particular feature of the process described above.

In the next chapter I will present the overall results of the research and the conclusions drawn from the study of almost a century of aquaculture in the La Costa region of Nayarit.
PART FOUR:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON STATE-MEDIATED CAPITALISM FROM BELOW IN NAYARIT

Chapter 8
Findings and Conclusions

1. Introduction: Return to Initial Research Questions

In this chapter I will discuss some of the results of the comparative analysis of the two periods that form part of the comparative research that I conducted in the La Costa region of Nayarit, Mexico. To this end, the research questions are restated below:

- Are there systematic signs of inequality in terms of income, technology, access to markets and/or loans, which might suggest a process of social and economic differentiation in Nayarit’s peasant aquacultural sector?

- Are there political institutions consolidating the economic differentiation in the region?

- Does the culture of patronage encourage this process of differentiation?

- How have these processes interacted with the promotion of investments in shrimp fishing infrastructure, new technologies and new products?

- Could a broader characterisation of the process described be applied – for example, following Byres (1996), as state-mediated capitalism from below?
• Are there signs of class struggle ranging from open struggle to the concept posited by Scott (1985) of symbolic struggle and of what he refers to as ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’

Are the research questions listed above aimed at addressing the variables that Byres and Bernstein (Byres, 2009) consider central for identifying the particular features of the different processes of agrarian development? If so, this research has explored the links between accumulation of capital (or investments), differentiation (stratification) between members of the peasantry (i.e., peasant enrichment or impoverishment), class struggle (ranging from open struggle to the concept posited by Scott [1985] of symbolic struggle and of what he refers to as ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’), and the role of the State, as proposed by Byres (1995; 1996; 2010), and its links with patron-client networks, based on the theoretical proposals of Lomnitz (1975; 2001), Lomnitz and Melnick (1998) Khan (2000) and others who have highlighted the importance of these types of clientelist relationships in order to study the development of social differentiation (i.e., differentiated access to strategic information and public resources) in a particular region of Mexico.

By answering these research questions, I have attempted to establish whether or not small-scale aquaculture shares features with peasant enterprises devoted to self-sufficiency.

I will divide the discussion into three main topics: a discussion of the methodology, and an analysis of the results obtained during the First and Second Agrarian Reforms. In the first part of the chapter I will present an overview of the methodological composition, i.e., the interaction between historical research, contextualisation and the organisation of the case study and quantitative approaches in the research process.

In the second part of the chapter (sections 3, 4 and 5), I will offer a discussion of the general process that leads producers from early simple commodity production to advanced simple commodity production, in an attempt to establish whether or not small-scale aquaculture shares features with peasant enterprises aimed at self-sufficiency (survivance). This process is contextualised within the capitalist development from below that has
characterised the region under study, while analysing each of the variables researched.

In sections 5 to 7, I will outline the main conclusions of the research and offer a description of the development process observed in La Costa, concluding the research with some suggestions as to the scope of the results.

2. The First Period of Study: Analysis of Variables and Hypotheses Posited

I began my research with the hypothesis that capital accumulation (which social class or agent directed and directs the capital accumulation process), class struggle, the process of social differentiation and the role of the State in the region constitute the variables that would help identify the kind of development that has occurred in the La Costa region of Nayarit (see chapters 1, 2 and 3).

The analysis of this process was conducted by comparing two different moments in time: the First Agrarian Reform, which initiated the process of *peasantisation*; and the Second Agrarian Reform, which altered the structure of *ejido* property and deregulated and liberalised *ejido* resources.

2.1 The Hypothesis on the Social Class that Has Defined the Process of Capitalist Development

I began with the assumption that the process of development in the region of La Costa has been a *process of capitalist development from below*. In other words, land ownership was not transformed on the basis of commercial development in the region (capitalism from above); rather, peasant (*ejido*) ownership constituted the mechanism that led to internal market growth (Chapter 2). Historical research made it possible to reconstruct the period following the Mexican Revolution of 1910-20, which in Nayarit gave rise to a struggle for political control of the region, culminating in the disappearance of the landed property system. Historical research was essential to be able to determine the social class that would spearhead the capital accumulation process. The cause was the political instability resulting from large-scale ownership, which was unable to establish a project for growth through a dynamic of capital accumulation that would promote capitalist development in the region.
It has been posited that following the Revolution, landed property could have driven capitalist development in the region, given that the outcome of the class struggle had still not been determined by the late the 1920s, when large-scale rural land ownership continued to be the basis of the agrarian structure in Nayarit (Tannenbaum, 1929), in spite of the severe political instability generated by the Revolution and its agrarian focus (see Chapter 4). However, from the 1920s on, ejido ownership began to grow, as reflected by the grants of the first agrarian units (Meyer, 2005), and the increase in regulations that gave the rural populations of La Costa in Nayarit and southern Sinaloa broad powers to exploit shrimp resources in the region.

The inability of large landed property to adopt a hegemonic position in Nayarit State led to the outcome indicated in the study, resulting in a reorganisation of local power.

The characteristics of the process described here suggest that any analysis of the possible solutions found in a region for its development should not be deterministic. Large landed property would have been able to lead a process of entrepreneurial development if landowners hadn't lacked the initiative to convert their vast commercial, productive, agrarian and property wealth (which gave them a hegemonic political presence) into sources of capitalist investment. The predominance of unproductive investment seems to have been the main reason for the decline of the haciendas according to some authors (Castellón Fonseca, 2000), and it seems to be the most likely cause of the agrarian reorganisation that occurred in the 1930s.

It is clear from the data outlined here and in previous chapters that the process of capital accumulation was associated with the concept that constitutes the core of my explanation of the historical process in the region: capitalism from below (Byres, 1996). Following the shift away from landed property during the 1930s, rural ejido property constituted the main player in the development of commercial relations based on peasant forms of organisation, in this case, cooperatives.

During the first period of analysis (the First Agrarian Reform), the forms of organisation for peasant production were the key factor in accumulation of
capital, although as noted in the chapters on the evolution of the cooperatives, they quickly came under the control of commercial capital. Low shrimp prices and the control of shrimp sales by the monopolies that determined the policies for the purchase and subsequent sale of shrimp on foreign or domestic markets prevented peasant organisations from achieving the autonomy they needed to grow and expand. Thus, from the beginning, the cooperative organisations lacked the revenue necessary to achieve financial independence. Commercial capital squeezed their profits and succeeded in arresting their development. For decades the cooperatives were incapable of increasing their production above the meagre level achieved in the decade of the 1960s. Consequently, by the time of the first harvest of the ‘La Única’ cooperative, indebtedness had already become a problem, and the packing company Empacadora de Escuinapa succeeded in having ‘La Única’ assume the liabilities of the different cooperatives that disappeared with the merger when the single cooperative was established.

This process of control by commercial capital determined the form taken by capital accumulation, which was limited to reproducing previous production and reproduction capacities from one season to the next, with no apparent growth in production. This means that the aquacultural peasantry apparently continued to subsist at the same level during the first decade of existence of the cooperative. Public banking capital also intervened in the process, but was unable to ensure the capitalisation of rural producers, and merely added its weight to the process described above. The legal system also determined the form of participation of banking capital, which was prevented from operating as rural property was nationalised during the period under study, i.e., during the First Agrarian Reform. It was thus impossible to operate a land market that prevented the full entry of private banking capital. Banking capital was limited to the granting of credits, occasionally providing working capital in small amounts and, given the business structure, it merely constituted an additional source of pressure on the already meagre rural revenues. However, the key factor in this situation was commercial capital, which quickly managed to subordinate rural producers to it.

This feature makes it possible to differentiate the development process of this region from other processes mentioned by Byres (1996). From the outset, this
process was subordinated to commercial capital, and as such the possibilities of accumulation and development of the internal market were restrained from the beginning. The result has been a hobbled growth process and the financial and commercial subordination of small-scale rural producers; however, as noted previously, it has also been characterised by the inability of these small-scale producers to grow and accumulate.

This feature of the process might lead us to the conclusion that development from below was constrained by commercial capital, and this has in fact been suggested by some authors (see above chapter 2); however, it does not appear to have been the case in Nayarit. The constant struggle for control of distribution had highs and lows, and the assertion that commercial capital exercised absolute control does not seem conclusive. Instead, it was the constant in-fighting among members of the same cooperative that appears to have had the most devastating effects.

2.2. The Ejido Peasantry as the Axis of the Accumulation Process: Capitalism from Below and State Mediation

Once large landed property had been expropriated, the State turned to the creation of a new hegemonic structure in which the ejido became the centre of the agrarian policy, in a process of capitalist development from below.

The artisanal nature of the first stage of the capitalist development process supports Byres' theory that the process evolved from a situation in which peasant production was based on early simple commodity production. Authors such as Bartra (1974), Foladori (1986) and Calva (1988) agree on this point, also viewing ejido ownership as the basis for rural growth (mainly farming and livestock), during the period after World War II in Mexico, although – as will be discussed below – they differ on the question of the existence of a dual structure in the development process and on certain elements that it will be important to address below.

The first stage of the process of appropriation by the ejido sector and the residents of La Costa was predominated by a system based on partial manufacture of production tools with a high artisanal content: weirs and shrimp enclosures built with branches, wooden instruments (boats, oars, etc.) and tool
production systems in which manual family or community labour (nets and other tools) was the main driving force (see Chapters 4 and 5). These same methods are described precisely by anthropologists who visited the region as late as the 1980s (Díaz and Iturbide, 1985). In some interviews, cooperative members also describe how they would construct these artisanal products (see especially the interview with Cecilio Rendón, 2011).

In other words, the elements – the variables – defined above converged in a social process that first of all led the region under study into a process of peasantisation that destroyed the socio-economic base and political force of landed property and secondly, an ad hoc (federal and state) government policy gave rise to forms of peasant organisation (cooperatives in the case of rural production), an aspect addressed in the second part of this thesis (Chapters 5 and 6).

The above constitutes the axis around which the first part of the comparative study is organised. It involves the analysis of the construction of a social system of capitalist development from below, but which at the same time reveals the limits of this social process in the sense that the rural peasantry became subjugated to commercial capital, with the erosion of peasant enterprises and their conflictive relationships with the federal and state governments, and the difficulties they had in marketing their shrimp led to increasing indebtedness, until finally government policy took a totally new direction (and here it is interesting to note the relationship between the state and federal governments, i.e., between the local and national levels).

This process also reveals the particular features that differentiate the process of capitalist development from below described by Byres (1996) from the situation in Nayarit: first, a relative labour surplus (Lewis, 1954) resulting from the peasantisation of the region; and second, the immediate absorption of the economic surplus by commercial capital. In other words, the limited presence of banking capital is significant, as commercial capital monopolised the commercial relationship of shrimp producers and substituted for banking capital by providing advances on production.
The huge labour surplus was an aspect that affected the economic viability of the cooperatives and was expressed in the form of illegal fishing. In addition, the increasing pressure produced by the population growth in the region led to constant friction between the *ejidatarios* who were being granted land and those who held permits for shrimp exploitation. This problem has not been resolved to date, as the presence of different cooperatives and of illegal fishers continues to be a particular characteristic of the region under study.

### 2.3. The Modes of Class Struggle in La Costa

The first stage of class struggle was open and had the objective of gaining control of the land. Peasants and landowners engaged in a political and sometimes violent struggle to secure legal access to the land. The need to bring an end to the political instability provoked by the large-scale landowners led Nayarit’s political class to introduce a radical reform of the property system. This gave rise to a change in the mode of class struggle, as the new relationship between the peasantry and the Mexican State allowed the development of an authoritarian cooperative system of vertical clientelist relations (Lomnitz, 1975). During this stage, the creation of a single large cooperative, ‘La Única’, constituted an experiment within this system of relations.

For several decades, the peasant cooperative members tried to win greater autonomy for their organisation, while at the same time seeking government support to improve their economic situation, which was affected by the increasing indebtedness of the cooperative. This new form of class struggle may be more in keeping with Scott’s (1985) notion of a struggle that does not necessarily have to resort to violent stances, but which is nevertheless expressed in a different way of thinking and perceiving the political context.

It is interesting to note how this kind of ‘muted’ struggle was expressed in specific victories such as the assumption of direct control of the management of the La Única cooperative, or in the conflicts between certain state and federal officials. The resistance against low shrimp prices in the face of pressure from the same government officials in collusion with Empacadora de Escuinapa is another clear example of how the interests of the *ejidatarios* came into open
conflict with the political authorities and, in this case, with the commercial monopoly held by the packing company.

This study points to the need for further studies to broaden this perspective on the class struggle, which the Mexican literature to date does not really seem to have taken much interest in.

2.4. Is there a Process of Differentiation during the First Agrarian Reform?

During the first stage (the First Agrarian Reform), an ideological principle underlying the support for small-scale peasant ownership and rural enterprises informed the objective to ensure a more homogeneous and egalitarian process of development. As shown in this study, this ideal could not be realized once the aquacultural enterprises fell under the control of commercial capital.

However, it was difficult to determine the extent to which the peasantisation of La Costa accentuated the stratification of shrimp producers. From the sample, the results of which are presented in Chapter 7, it is clear that the ejidatarios began to accumulate a significant arsenal of natural and institutional resources as a result of the agrarian reform. Wolf (1965) also notes how some aspects have tended to foster the presence of castes/strata within Mexico’s peasant communities, but not as a process of class differentiation.

In general, it can be postulated that there is no evidence of a process of differentiation during the first period of analysis in aquacultural activity except as indicated in the previous paragraph. At certain moments the structural transformations to the regions of production arising from the policies of promotion of shrimp production even affected traditional production groups and diverted production to inland regions of the state, changing the correlation of internal forces within the ‘La Única’ cooperative. This led to conflicts and the formation of opposing interest groups, which accentuated the conflictive nature of the region between rival groups that culminated in the disintegration of the mega-cooperative. From then on, cooperativism became more of a symbolic perception, and the focus shifted towards the establishment of shrimp and fish farms.

The struggle for cooperative autonomy was also driven by the desire of ejidatarios to enforce their possession of the land granted to them and claim
their right to all of its resources, including aquacultural resources. This gave rise to one segment of *ejidatarios* who were able to diversify their economic activities, and another group who, lacking the rights to *ejido* land, were limited to complementary activities. In other words, the presence of conflicting interests in La Costa explains more clearly why the neoliberal reforms did not meet with strong resistance. This points to the presence of a conservative peasantry, who saw in these reforms the possibility of maintaining certain privileges, such as those outlined above.

In particular, they saw the possibility of securing ownership of the land previously in their possession, and thereby preserving the *status quo*. Their other expectation was related to winning greater autonomy for their cooperative enterprises. The other aspects of the deregulation process were clearly not considered or even perceived by these *ejidatarios*. Nevertheless, it has been the *ejidatarios* themselves, along with private farmers, who have capitalised most on deregulation.

In short, the cooperatives' fight for autonomy that coincided with the dissolution of the existing mega-cooperative, ‘La Única’, and the deregulation of agrarian and rural policy in keeping with the neoliberal atmosphere that has prevailed in the country since the early 1990s (third part of thesis, Chapters 6-7) appear to have gone hand in hand with the process described above.

As a result, the deregulation process did not meet with opposition among small-scale shrimp producers. This highlights the fact that the neoliberal reform was able to be channelled by the state government so that it would coincide with the interests of these producers.

3. The Second Period of Study: The Deregulation Process and Its Effect on La Costa

3.1. Capitalism From Below During the Second Agrarian Reform

The general framework taken from Byres raises the question of whether the variables chosen are sufficient to characterise this process as capitalist development from below. The first aspect to assess, as discussed previously, is related to the assumption that production began as early simply commodity
Findings and Conclusions

production, whereby the producers sell all or part of their shrimp production while using family or cooperative labour to make their production tools.

The need for more monetary income drove the historical process that moved aquacultural production from artisanal production of tools and machinery to the purchase of these instruments. The transformation of artisanal tool production and human motor power occurred gradually, mostly during the 1970s and 1980s, as far as could be documented. This process has led to the greater dependence of aquacultural producers on the purchasing of the tools and machinery necessary to engage in shrimp production in estuaries and on farms. Together with this change, it was also confirmed that the expansion of the internal market occurred in conjunction with the modernisation of the artisanal production of cooperatives and farms due to the need to increase production and the fierce internal competition faced in La Costa as a result of the growth of the ‘fishing effort’. This internal competition was intensified by agrarian policy (particularly the agrarian reform) and by the internal battles within the ‘La Única’ cooperative.

The process gradually turned the early simple commodity producers in the shrimp sector into advanced simple commodity producers, thereby increasing their dependence on the markets not only for the sale of their products but for the purchase of their tools and for their production conditions. The position of shrimp producers is increasingly dependent on their productivity, on sales prices, on the technology used, and on the size of their area of exploitation, and less on the effort exerted by their families. Early simple commodity production has thus been transformed into advanced simple commodity production.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I showed how this process was accentuated during the neoliberal period. The economy in the region underwent profound changes that have accentuated certain features that emerged in the First Agrarian Reform. In particular, the commercialisation of shrimp production became the axis of the process as a whole, affecting all shrimp production both in cooperatives and on farms. As a result, the industry’s internal and external markets have continued to expand, showing all the signs of a fully commercialised economy. The particular features, however, continue to be the same: a labour surplus affecting the region, expressed in the presence of a significant contingent of illegal
producers, while the marketing of the shrimp continues to be the producers’ Achilles’ heel.

In the historical evolution of the conditions leading to this situation, we can assess the role that the variables played in the process of capitalist development from below.

3.2. The Variables under Study during the Second Agrarian Reform

**Capital accumulation:** during the second period under study, following the Second Agrarian Reform, the mechanism of accumulation underwent some significant changes: artisanal peasant property ceased to be the main means of accumulation, which shifted towards the semi-intensive aquacultural farm. In part this process arose from the need of *ejido* producers to find alternative forms of family income in the wake of the agrarian reform and as a result of the lack of growth of the agricultural frontier (Chayanov, 1986), by making more intensive use of the available land and thus diversifying its exploitation to include other activities; but it was also because the presence of private producers has driven investment into this sector. This is supported by various authors who note that one feature associated with globalisation is the development of pluriactivity, the diversification of strategies to boost peasant incomes, etc., and it seems that here aquaculture itself played this role of supplementing incomes from other activities (small businesses, agriculture and wage labour) (see Kay 2009; Vergara-Camus 2011, etcetera).

Following an initial failed attempt to stimulate *ejido* production, and subsequently large-scale capitalist production during the 1990s, since the beginning of the new millennium production has increased and investment has grown due to the conversion of land for common use on the *ejidos* into semi-intensive farms, enabling production to triple in a matter of years.

On the other hand, market conditions have not been ideal, as the convergence of internal and external markets has made shrimp prices dependent on international supply and demand, which have dropped due to the state of the market in the United States and Japan. In the case of Japan, this has been due to the slow growth observed in this country during the 1990s, while in the United States it has been due to the crisis at the beginning of the millennium, followed
by the events of 9/11 and the Great Recession of 2007-8. Combined with this has been the increase in supply from Asian countries (China, Thailand, India, etc.) and Latin American countries such as Ecuador, which has affected the structure of the shrimp market at both international and national levels. Point 2.3 in Chapter 2 shows the impact of globalisation and neoliberal policies on the rural sector in detail, indicating that the present study effectively confirms these effects.

Recently, the presence of diseases and the health situation in the sector have sparked a recovery in prices, but they have also reduced the income of a significant number of producers affected by the presence of viruses and bacteria that were unknown before the introduction of semi-intensive farming in Mexico.

Capital accumulation has increased during this period due to the liberalisation of the market conditions of the fishing and aquacultural sector, but this liberalisation has also contributed to the appearance of new phenomena. The creation of a subordinate market of services and inputs has broadened the market, and deregulation has eliminated the commercial monopoly that prevailed during the phase of the First Agrarian Reform. However, the market has lost the dynamism that existed in that first stage. Production in the region under study has been directed at the internal market in the area of fresh produce, while the market for semi-processed shrimp products has been rapidly cornered by Asian products.

However, notwithstanding the current conditions of the shrimp market and the changes it has undergone, large-scale capitalist production failed in its attempt to take control of the market following deregulation in 1992 (exemplified in the attempt by the company Aquanova in San Blas). Production has continued to depend on a segment of small and medium-sized semi-intensive farms that have increased their output, and which, unlike in the previous period, also includes a growing private sector, although it is still dominated by producers on ejidos or of ejido origin. In this respect, it appears to be this middle sector of aquacultural producers who have begun to turn this activity into what Wood identifies as a unique feature of capitalist production: maximizing profits on the basis of continuous business improvement.
CHAPTER 8

Meanwhile, cooperative production has stagnated and now lacks the support it had decades ago (see Vergara-Camus 2011, who correctly shows how the small-scale sector of the peasantry is fighting to survive).

Social differentiation: social differentiation is a key determining factor in the consequences of the process analysed here. In Chapter 7 (Table 33), I attempted to detail the specific criteria that have led to a greater stratification of shrimp producers. I have identified 6 strata among cooperative producers and farmers. Although further study is needed to explore this phenomenon further, it is evident that its existence is objectively founded.

During the second stage, deregulation has led to a rapid socio-economic differentiation among producers if measured in terms of income and the real appropriation of available land for shrimp production on farms. Production has been stratified and the presence of a segment of fishers without land has been consolidated as a result of the need for land for the diversification of family incomes. In particular, this situation is more the result of the inflexible nature of the ejido system, which would only allow the transfer of rights to the land by means of inheritance; this has created a generational appropriation of the land and has prevented land accumulation. The Second Agrarian Reform has liberalised this situation only partially, transferring the possibility of establishing full ownership of the land to the ejido assembly (denationalising rural property); i.e., to the consensus of the three quarters of ejidatarios who own land with protected rights (derechos a salvo).

The ejido system is still inflexible (Chapter 7), and except for regions close to urban centres, full individual land ownership is still very much an exception in the country, while as a general rule the ejido (the ejidatario assembly) has retained full ownership of the land. It is thus hardly surprising that the results of the questionnaire applied in the region should reflect this inflexible separation between ejidatarios and non-ejidatarios (even when the latter may be relatives or children of the former). Ejidatarios control the majority of the sources of income, and have first achieved greater diversification in the sources of their global income (farming, livestock and even aquacultural and fishing activities). Some ejidatarios have even managed to branch into selling shrimp and into commercial and industrial activities, as a significant sector of rural residents
have become landless wage labourers who are thus heavily dependent on aquacultural activities, such as cooperative producers or day labourers engaged in farming activities.

Once again the appearance of new strata within the group of producers engaged in aquacultural activity reflects the effects of the neoliberal policies previously identified by various authors (Kay, Teubal, etc.)

4. The Class Struggle, Social Differentiation and the Role of The State

I have separated this last topic from the other variables, particularly because of the importance that state mediation has had for the changes that have occurred in the region under study.

By way of responding to the first three research questions repeated at the beginning of this chapter, it can be asserted that the State has played a central role in the process, as the social groups engaged in activities in La Costa sought to control public policy that would be beneficial to them. The state government of Nayarit had a leading role in the development of the first stage of implementation of the agrarian policy that led to the dismantling of large-scale rural ownership. Its role was central to the expropriation of landed property as a sector of the local middle class kept the flame of agrarianism alive, until their efforts converged with the national policies that led to the process of agrarian reform in the 1930s (this process is explained in Chapters 4 and 5). In contrast with many other Mexican states, the process in Nayarit was extremely intense because it had the support of a large local base of agrarian ideologues who seized the opportunity when they had control of the local congress and the executive branch to enact a law to expropriate the large estates (latifundios).

Within a few years, this resulted in a radical change in both the agrarian structure and the power structure in the state. With the additional support of federal policies that promoted the organisation of cooperatives and granted fishing licences to riverside populations, these local populations acquired total control over shrimp exploitation in Nayarit.

The role of the State was thus decisive in the outcome. By the 1940s, large-scale rural land ownership had been practically eliminated in Nayarit and public
policies were being implemented to bolster *ejido* agrarianism. The importance of the State in the process, in the construction of agrarianist ideology and of the utopia of small producers, shaped the style of relations between these communities and the all-powerful government, to such an extent that the State itself appeared to extend into society through networks of interest groups that quickly evolved into networks of control in a corporatised society.

The class struggle of one segment of the peasantry was associated with the aim to break these clientelist ties that constituted the web of networks of political control. This shaped the nature of the class struggle that arose during the 1960s until the cooperative achieved a greater degree of administrative and managerial autonomy from the government; nevertheless, this greater autonomy did not eliminate the control of commercial capital over the cooperatives, which has been a constant throughout the two periods under study.

The inability of the ‘La Única’ cooperative to free itself from commercial control and its ultimate bankruptcy was also the product of a greater dependence of the peasant organisation on the fiscal resources of the government to be able to keep the cooperative alive. The federal and state governments’ fiscal crisis undermined the future of the cooperative and signalled its ultimate demise. The government then applied every legal and illegal mechanism in its power to liquidate the cooperative, bringing this process in line with the deregulation of the fishing and aquacultural sector, and with the deregulation of the rural property system that the government itself had promoted decades earlier.

In summary, the role of the State in transforming the conditions of production has been central in the region under study. The intersection with the interests of a segment of the radical middle class in the 1920s and 1930s was decisive in the regulation of the shrimp sector to promote *ejido* property and its related organisations. Later, the attempt to extend its control into the heart of the rural organisations themselves, a process that continued up until the 1990s, and subsequently the deregulation and privatisation of the activity, gave rise to changes in the structure of the shrimp market in the region and in the country as a whole.
The class struggle appears to have been determined by the changing role of the State in the social processes described.

Since the 1990s, deregulation, privatisation and the opening up of aquacultural and rural activity has coincided with the development of a process of increasing social stratification within the rural communities, which has changed the already stifled and muted character of the class struggle, shifting it to the realm of the symbolic (Chapter 7). It has again become an economic struggle, as the government has dismantled the whole support system for small-scale rural production, including shrimp production. Specifically, in recent years the cooperative and farming segments have directed their demands towards aspects related to the organisation of the sector, the infrastructure available, heath and sanitation assistance for the farms, the improvement of shrimp-catch technology in order to increase shrimp sizes, etc.

This change in the type of demands, which are now less political, is a feature of the present, revealing that the context has changed, but also that small-scale aquacultural producers continue to assimilate the changes and adapt their forms of social struggle accordingly.

In short, the greater social stratification in La Costa (Chapter 7, Table 33) is the result of a particular kind of state mediation in agrarian processes, a mediation based on a widespread culture of patronage and corporatism that consolidated networks of interests, which were articulated in order to serve as a means of legitimising the system on which the public policy of the State itself was founded. These vertical clientelist networks (Lomnitz, 1975; 2001; Lomnitz and Melnick, 1998) offered the peasantry the opportunity to take advantage of them as channels for communication and making demands, but at the same time they prevented the consolidation of direct representation of the peasantry in the government’s decision-making agencies.

In this sense, the State sometimes acted in an authoritarian manner to impose the type of organisation and the terms on which peasant organisations were to be directed. As a result, the network of interests of the government agencies imposed different approaches that came to define the context of the region and the country. This fostered the development of privileges, and the construction of
particular relationships between the representatives of the peasant organisations (like ‘La Única’) and the representatives of the official party and the government itself.

Investments in infrastructure, the opening up of the internal and external markets, and the liberalisation of the sector as a whole have been aimed at developing the market economy of the region, associated with the idea of differentiating profitable producers from those who lack entrepreneurial abilities. These processes opening up competition within the shrimp sector have thus sought to favour the development of new products, and the infrastructure and assistance provided are designed with a market orientation intended to develop this entrepreneurial culture.

In this way, the state mediation is and will continue to be an important factor in the shrimp sector in La Costa.

5. The Scope of the Results about the Research in Light of Peasant Theory

The comparison of the two moments in time leaves no doubt that these two periods marked the aquacultural peasantry of La Costa in different ways, so the theory that supports each of them.

The general process of development described in this thesis as a process of capitalism from below, leading from early simple commodity production to advanced simple commodity production, has led to socio-economic stratification among producers in recent years but not throughout the whole period and it exhibits particular features that need to be considered as specific to the process described. For theoretical purposes it is important to consider whether this process can be characterised as unique and particular to the region or whether it can be generalised to include other regions of Mexico and different parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia.

It is clearly a different process from the classic processes outlined by Byres (1996) and Lenin (1964) as features of capitalist development from below, of which the classic example is the farmer economy of the northern United States. It can therefore be concluded that the development process in the La Costa region of Nayarit is different. How is it different? In the classic development
process described by Byres (1996), the shortage of labour was a condition for the use of family labour and, as an alternative, for the mechanisation of the activity. This led to a process coinciding with the development of productive forces whereby the process of transformation of the early simple commodity producer into an advanced simple commodity producer created a significant demand for machinery and industrialised inputs, and thus expanded the domestic market of the growing capitalist industry.

In La Costa, this condition was not present. On the contrary, the abundance of labour operated in the inverse manner, as the growing supply of rural labour resulting from the agrarian reform, in the context of fixed natural resources, launched a race for the marshes, and as the pressure on the resource led to overfishing as early as the 1960s, the effect observed led to a reduction in the individual incomes of cooperative members. The low revenues of the peasant organisations generated a vicious circle as they hindered the capitalisation of the producers and at the same time accentuated their dependence on commercial capital. This led to the insolvency of the producers and to their greater dependence on the State (to such an extent that in the 1970s the shrimp industry was practically a nationalised operation).

In the farmer economy of the northern US, the abundance of land and the growth of the agricultural frontier due to colonisation contributed to the development of a market that expanded as the movement towards the West and Midwest provided new farmland and increased the demand for inputs and machinery to meet the needs of the family farms. The internal market expanded constantly and favoured industrialisation in a process that fed back into itself.

In the region under study, the lack of new natural resources and the existence of a fixed natural frontier prevented expansion of the market for the artisanal aquacultural industry. The agrarian reform only further increased the number of people exploiting the already limited resources. This particular feature likewise hindered the development of the internal market, which remained small as it was impossible to increase the income derived from overfishing in the estuaries. At the same time, this restricted the possibility of intensifying farming, which would have entailed a growth in the market for inputs and aquacultural machinery for production.
The State partly fostered this dependence in order to achieve greater political control over rural producers. Indeed, the Mexican State exhibited a preference for political control and dependence of the peasantry of the region and its organisations through a model, whereby the peasantry became a subsidiary of the government’s fiscal resources, over the expansion of the internal market for capitalist industry.

The result was a small internal market and a huge dependence of rural producers and their cooperative organisations on government concessions and on regulation that favoured their interests. And this situation continued until the resources themselves were insufficient to sustain the model. The fiscal crisis of 1982 altered the direction definitively and led to a new relationship between the producers of the region and the government.

Privatisation and deregulation are consequences of the inability of the previous model to sustain itself financially, and have redefined the relationship between the State and the producers. Semi-intensive farms have sparked an increase in the demand for industrial inputs and machinery, as well as support services, thereby expanding the internal market. But the development of the internal market has been limited by access to import products, and external market possibilities have been limited by the lack of support from a State which now appears either reluctant or unable to support its rural producers. The consequence has been that while the supply of shrimp has increased, the domestic market is now also flooded with imports, which has increased internal competition and affected the incomes of shrimp producers.

More intensive shrimp production has been hindered by shrimp diseases and the inability to develop an effective response to the threat to the industry posed by such diseases. This constitutes one of the most significant challenges for the future development of the shrimp industry and for the development of semi-intensive and intensive farms.

It is reasonable to conclude that the development model adopted by rural producers in the La Costa region of Nayarit has been characterised by a process of capitalist development from below, but also by a surplus labour force fostered by the government itself to maintain political control of rural producers.
Findings and Conclusions

It is a process that stagnated for several decades (observable in the fact that for several decades annual production failed to go beyond 1,000 tonnes of fresh shrimp), and was characterised by the exploitation of artisanal shrimp producers by commercial capital.

This description is of great significance, as it recalls the first hypotheses on the theory of economic growth, where models such as Lewis’ model (1954) pointed to the importance of a surplus labour force as a feature of development processes in underdeveloped countries, but at the same time, the neoliberal world is changing the way we understand this surplus labour (see Bernstein 2009b) and the meaning of the ”classical agrarian question”. The final result of this process is not yet defined.

My research makes clear that this proposition is not out of keeping with the theory of a process of capitalist development from below, although unlike Lewis’ model, in my research the absorption of the labour force may also be conditioned by the role of the State, which can draw out the process in order to maintain political control over impoverished small-scale producers.

Another specific aspect is related to the immediate dependence that shrimp producers had on commercial capital. The control of the marketing chain prevented cooperative organisations from achieving relative financial autonomy; on the contrary, they never managed to free themselves from the problem of marketing their product. This led to the indebtedness and financial dependence of the cooperatives.

On the other hand, the absence of a rural mortgage market prevented the entry of private banking capital, although it did allow for the presence of public banking. However, the main source of exploitation of small-scale shrimp producers was commercial capital, which prevented the capitalisation of the producers and their organisations, forcing public banking capital to absorb part of the debts of the cooperatives until they were finally liquidated. Public banking capital operated in such a way that the fiscal resources of the federal government allowed it to provide rural enterprises with financing ‘a la palabra’ (by verbal agreement), with no mortgage security. This process therefore could not be characterised as a process of overall exploitation, as the control of
commercial capital over small-scale producers was a determining factor in the process, and the main source of commercial credit, which continues to be the basis for production.

It is also clear that we are dealing here with a development process *sui generis*, as it does not fit the classic models of farmer and Junker capitalist development described by Lenin. Although it has been a process of capitalist development from below during the last period of time (since 1992), its particular features reflect a process that generates little internal market due to the presence of a corporate, clientelist State tied to the interests (in this case and region) of commercial capital. However, this characterisation would not cover all of the many circumstances that could be found in the process of historical research into other regions of Mexico and other countries with similar characteristics.

Nevertheless, the notion of a national solution of the agrarian question is in doubt. Since the neoliberal reform in Mexico, the process of agrarian transition cannot be said to define the structure of national capitalism because the privatisation, opening up of the markets to foreign investment and trade, and the absence of State intervention in the rural sector have transformed how the agrarian question is to be addressed.

In the previous paragraphs, I have outlined the position of authors such as Bernstein, Araghi, and the New Ruralists, for whom the means of addressing the agrarian question has changed.

For these authors, globalisation and neoliberal policies have limited the possibilities of small-scale producers because they have been subordinated to global agribusiness. For Vergara-Camus (2011) the small-scale peasantry in Latin America is facing a crisis of survival.

State support for the peasantry has vanished, subsidies are non-existent, and the credits, the national markets and the whole political structure that gave life to a regulated and dynamic peasant economy linked to national industry has been disappearing.

In Chapter 2, I discussed the effects that globalisation and neoliberal policies have had on the peasant world. It is now possible to consider the points of Byres' theory related to the national structure that are debatable in light of the
enormous pressure that the peasantry has faced due to the withdrawal of government intervention and increased competition for resources of all kinds. It is also possible to argue that the fate of the *ejido* peasantry depends on its access to external markets and its ability to adapt to the global dynamics of those markets.

6. Conclusions: A Few Final Words

The results outlined in the previous paragraphs still require a great deal of further analysis. They suggest that theories of economic development cannot be limited to looking for variability in the historical processes currently under way in so many countries and regions of the world.

It is worth noting that a rural process like the one described above may be found in other regions of Latin America, where a surplus of labour goes hand in hand with clientelist vanishing governments, and thus with the possibility of producing the same conditions for development processes, with small internal markets due to the low incomes of rural producers who at the same time may be exploited by commercial capital or even directly by banking capital. However, the possibility of substantial differences from the process described here cannot be dismissed.

The methodological significance of this study lies in the fact that for the case of Nayarit cannot be understood without accepting that there are different models of capitalist development that still need to be researched, with differences arising from the predominance of large-scale ownership or small-scale *ejido* ownership as the basis of capital accumulation, as well as from the presence or absence of a clientelist State, regionally differentiated results of the class struggle and the degree to which social differentiation is occurring. Obviously, any country is composed of a set of historical circumstances that contextualise the existence of multiple regional models of capitalist development, which means there is a need to broaden the research to other regions of the country to contribute to a better understanding of the huge regional and social inequalities in the general development of a single nation and there is also the circumstance of the influence of global markets and neoliberal policies and their impact on different regional contexts.
It is my hope that the research outlined here may contribute to broadening the scope of rural and historical research into a country as large and complex as Mexico, with multiple agrarian histories, as Byres has pointed out (1995), in an effort to redefine the general history based on capitalist development models, while identifying their particular features, which is after all the *raison d’être* of the social sciences.


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TABLES
### Table 34. Summary of Income and Income Distribution on Shrimp Farms

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<th>NON-AQUACULTURAL INCOME (a+b+c=d)</th>
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<td>0 to 10 hectares</td>
<td>$2,102,447.50</td>
<td>$3,098,000.00</td>
<td>$1,350,000.00</td>
<td>$6,550,447.50</td>
<td>$7,614,036.43</td>
<td>$14,164,483.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 to 30 hectares</td>
<td>$7,019,320.00</td>
<td>$2,050,800.00</td>
<td>$317,520.00</td>
<td>$9,387,640.00</td>
<td>$21,443,013.06</td>
<td>$30,830,653.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 30 hectares</td>
<td>$128,400.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$128,400.00</td>
<td>$5,041,665.23</td>
<td>$5,170,065.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>$9,250,167.50</td>
<td>$5,148,800.00</td>
<td>$1,667,520.00</td>
<td>$16,066,487.50</td>
<td>$34,098,714.72</td>
<td>$50,165,202.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Absolute Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups by Water Surface</th>
<th>0 to 10 hectares</th>
<th>10 to 30 hectares</th>
<th>&gt; 30 hectares</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative Values</td>
<td>22.70%</td>
<td>60.20%</td>
<td>81.00%</td>
<td>40.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Values</td>
<td>75.90%</td>
<td>39.80%</td>
<td>19.00%</td>
<td>58.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.40%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 35. Summary of Income and Income Distribution in Shrimp Cooperatives. Absolutes and Relatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COOPERATIVE</th>
<th>FARM/LIVESTOCK INCOME (a)</th>
<th>COMMERCIAL &amp; INDUSTRIAL INCOME (b)</th>
<th>DAY WAGES (c)</th>
<th>NON-AQUACULTURAL INCOME (a+b+c=d)</th>
<th>VALUE OF AQUACULTURAL PRODUCTION (e)</th>
<th>TOTAL INCOME (d+e)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Absolute Values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Única de San Miguel</td>
<td>$1,623,290.00</td>
<td>$52,000.00</td>
<td>$44,400.00</td>
<td>$1,719,690.00</td>
<td>$248,550.00</td>
<td>$1,968,240.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Única de San Miguel (Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$85,240.00</td>
<td>$31,200.00</td>
<td>$32,400.00</td>
<td>$148,840.00</td>
<td>$222,000.00</td>
<td>$370,840.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Nayarit</td>
<td>$1,538,050.00</td>
<td>$20,800.00</td>
<td>$12,000.00</td>
<td>$1,570,850.00</td>
<td>$26,550.00</td>
<td>$1,597,400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Nayarit (Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$182,845.00</td>
<td>$21,600.00</td>
<td>$58,800.00</td>
<td>$263,245.00</td>
<td>$209,375.00</td>
<td>$472,620.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Nayarit (Non-Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$7,320.00</td>
<td>$21,600.00</td>
<td>$58,800.00</td>
<td>$87,720.00</td>
<td>$209,375.00</td>
<td>$297,095.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Nayarit (Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$175,525.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$175,525.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$175,525.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llano del Tigre</td>
<td>$512,700.00</td>
<td>$187,200.00</td>
<td>$190,760.00</td>
<td>$890,660.00</td>
<td>$1,163,451.94</td>
<td>$2,054,111.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llano del Tigre (Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$141,280.00</td>
<td>$187,200.00</td>
<td>$138,760.00</td>
<td>$467,240.00</td>
<td>$1,035,818.61</td>
<td>$1,503,058.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llano del Tigre (Non-Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$371,420.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$52,000.00</td>
<td>$423,420.00</td>
<td>$127,633.33</td>
<td>$551,053.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz y San Cayetano</td>
<td>$747,440.00</td>
<td>$21,600.00</td>
<td>$269,200.00</td>
<td>$1,038,240.00</td>
<td>$364,787.50</td>
<td>$1,403,027.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz y San Cayetano (Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$98,030.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$126,700.00</td>
<td>$225,630.00</td>
<td>$75,604.17</td>
<td>$301,234.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz y San Cayetano (Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$649,410.00</td>
<td>$21,600.00</td>
<td>$141,600.00</td>
<td>$812,610.00</td>
<td>$289,183.33</td>
<td>$1,101,793.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pescadero</td>
<td>$1,633,920.00</td>
<td>$105,500.00</td>
<td>$2,048,380.00</td>
<td>$3,196,150.00</td>
<td>$5,244,530.00</td>
<td>$8,440,680.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pescadero (Non Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$351,320.00</td>
<td>$46,700.00</td>
<td>$294,560.00</td>
<td>$692,580.00</td>
<td>$2,280,345.83</td>
<td>$2,972,925.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pescadero (Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$1,282,600.00</td>
<td>$58,800.00</td>
<td>$14,400.00</td>
<td>$1,355,800.00</td>
<td>$915,804.17</td>
<td>$2,271,604.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Célico Rendón Mora-El Espino</td>
<td>$486,230.00</td>
<td>$21,600.00</td>
<td>$21,600.00</td>
<td>$529,430.00</td>
<td>$165,162.08</td>
<td>$694,592.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Célico Rendón Mora-El Espino (Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$105,940.00</td>
<td>$21,600.00</td>
<td>$21,600.00</td>
<td>$149,140.00</td>
<td>$132,537.08</td>
<td>$281,677.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antonio R. Laureles</td>
<td>$380,290.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$380,290.00</td>
<td>$32,625.00</td>
<td>$412,915.00</td>
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<td>Antonio R. Laureles (Non-Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$264,570.00</td>
<td>$21,600.00</td>
<td>$64,800.00</td>
<td>$359,970.00</td>
<td>$357,225.00</td>
<td>$716,195.00</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$7,320.00</td>
<td>$21,600.00</td>
<td>$59,400.00</td>
<td>$88,320.00</td>
<td>$357,225.00</td>
<td>$444,545.00</td>
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<td>$10,800.00</td>
<td>$10,800.00</td>
<td>$359,480.00</td>
<td>$346,975.00</td>
<td>$706,455.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>$2,440.00</td>
<td>$10,800.00</td>
<td>$10,800.00</td>
<td>$24,040.00</td>
<td>$201,375.00</td>
<td>$225,415.00</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$335,440.00</td>
<td>$145,600.00</td>
<td>$481,040.00</td>
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<td>$52,800.00</td>
<td>$806,174.00</td>
<td>$1,253,320.42</td>
<td>$2,056,494.42</td>
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<td>$2,440.00</td>
<td>$235,200.00</td>
<td>$38,400.00</td>
<td>$276,040.00</td>
<td>$899,515.25</td>
<td>$1,170,231.25</td>
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<td>Mescalitán (Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$504,934.00</td>
<td>$10,800.00</td>
<td>$14,400.00</td>
<td>$530,134.00</td>
<td>$388,633.17</td>
<td>$888,366.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Felipe Aztatán-Unión de Corrientes</td>
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<td>$24,000.00</td>
<td>$193,800.00</td>
<td>$220,840.00</td>
<td>$439,761.67</td>
<td>$660,601.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Felipe Aztatán-Unión de Corrientes (Non-Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$2,440.00</td>
<td>$24,000.00</td>
<td>$188,400.00</td>
<td>$214,840.00</td>
<td>$439,761.67</td>
<td>$654,601.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Felipe Aztatán-Unión de Corrientes (Ejidatarios)</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$5,400.00</td>
<td>$5,400.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>$5,400.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field of the Limes</td>
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<td>[166,800.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>$969,030.00</td>
<td>$343,270.83</td>
<td>$1,312,300.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field of the Limes (Non-Ejidalarios)</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[46,800.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[46,800.00]</td>
<td>[120,562.50]</td>
<td>[167,362.50]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field of the Limes (Ejidalarios)</td>
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<td>[120,000.00]</td>
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<td>$922,230.00</td>
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<td>$1,144,938.33</td>
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<td>Camacho Camacho (Ejidalarios)</td>
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<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[169,200.00]</td>
<td>[840,899.50]</td>
<td>[1,010,099.50]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roberto Barrios y Gorroberto (Non-Ejidalarios)</td>
<td>[1,504,840.00]</td>
<td>[177,600.00]</td>
<td>[28,800.00]</td>
<td>$1,711,240.00</td>
<td>$71,400.00</td>
<td>$1,782,640.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Barrios y Gorroberto (Ejidalarios)</td>
<td>[186,300.00]</td>
<td>[57,600.00]</td>
<td>[28,800.00]</td>
<td>$272,700.00</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>$272,700.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Barrios y Gorroberto (Ejidalarios)</td>
<td>[1,318,540.00]</td>
<td>[120,000.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>$1,438,540.00</td>
<td>$71,400.00</td>
<td>$1,509,940.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ejido Pajarito - Andres Sandoval</td>
<td>[85,750.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[45,000.00]</td>
<td>[130,750.00]</td>
<td>[109,191.67]</td>
<td>[239,941.67]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ejido Pajarito - Andres Sandoval</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[45,000.00]</td>
<td>[45,000.00]</td>
<td>[109,191.67]</td>
<td>[154,191.67]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Villa (Ejidalarios)</td>
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<td>[48,000.00]</td>
<td>[177,000.00]</td>
<td>$229,880.00</td>
<td>$2,005,116.67</td>
<td>$2,234,996.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pericos</td>
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<td>[64,800.00]</td>
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<td>$785,796.67</td>
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<tr>
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<td>[64,800.00]</td>
<td>$100,430.00</td>
<td>$614,566.67</td>
<td>$714,996.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal Ejidalarios</td>
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<td>[362,800.00]</td>
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<td>[1,531,520.00]</td>
<td>$11,547,839.00</td>
<td>$11,789,203.95</td>
<td>$23,337,042.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COOPERATIVE</th>
<th>AGRICULTURAL INCOME</th>
<th>COMMERCIAL &amp; INDUSTRIAL INCOME ([^])*]</th>
<th>DAY WAGES</th>
<th>NON-AQUACULTURAL INCOME</th>
<th>AQUACULTURAL INCOME</th>
<th>TOTAL INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative Values</td>
<td>82.47%</td>
<td>2.64%</td>
<td>2.26%</td>
<td>87.37%</td>
<td>12.63%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejido Pajarito - Andres Sandoval</td>
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<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
<td>[85,750.00]</td>
<td>[0.00]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Villa and Boca de Camacho</td>
<td>[1,304,700.00]</td>
<td>[1,531,520.00]</td>
<td>[11,547,839.00]</td>
<td>[11,789,203.95]</td>
<td>[23,337,042.95]</td>
<td>[100.00%]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecilio Rendón Mora-El Espino (Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>92.10%</td>
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<td>Antonio R. Laureles</td>
<td>37.36%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antonio R. Laureles (Non-Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>1.64%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio R. Laureles (Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>97.94%</td>
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<td>Puerta de Palapares - Villa Juárez (Ejидatarios)</td>
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<td>Puerta de Palapares - Villa Juárez (Non-Ejидatarios)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puerta de Palapares - Villa Juárez (Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>69.73%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexcultitán (Non-Ejидatarios)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexcultitán (Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>56.81%</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Felipe Aztatán-Unión de Corrientes (Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>San Felipe Aztatán-Unión de Corrientes (Non-Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campo de los Limones (Non-Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>61.13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Campo de los Limones (Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>70.07%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boca de Camichín (Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Barrios and Gorrobeto (Non-Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>84.42%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roberto Barrios and Gorrobeto (Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>87.32%</td>
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<td>Ejido Pajaritos - Andrés Sandoval</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ejido Pajaritos - Andrés Sandoval (Non-Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejido Pajaritos - Andrés Sandoval (Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Francisco Villa (Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pericos</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pericos (Non-Ejидatarios)</td>
<td>2.13%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal Ejидatarios</td>
<td>88.40%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal Non-Ejидatarios (includes Francisco Villa and Boca de Camichín)</td>
<td>11.60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal Ejидatarios</td>
<td>72.93%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal Non-Ejидatarios (includes Francisco Villa and Boca de Camichín)</td>
<td>7.91%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>37.33%</td>
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</table>
Table 36. Summary of Cooperative Costs.
Working Capital
COOPERATIVES

Única de San Miguel
Única de San Miguel (Non
Ejidatarios)
Única de San Miguel (Ejidatarios)
Norte de Nayarit
Norte de Nayarit (Non Ejidatarios)
Norte de Nayarit (Ejidatarios)
Llano del Tigre
Llano del Tigre (Non Ejidatarios)
Llano del Tigre (Ejidatarios)

295

Santa Cruz y San Cayetano
Santa Cruz y San Cayetano (Non
Ejidatarios)
Santa Cruz y San Cayetano
(Ejidatarios)
Pescadero
Pescadero (Non Ejidatarios)
Pescadero (Ejidatarios)
Cecilio Rendón Mora-El Espino
Cecilio Rendón Mora-El Espino
(Non Ejidatarios)
Cecilio Rendón Mora-El Espino
(Ejidatarios)
Antonio R. Laureles
Antonio R. Laureles (Non
Ejidatarios)
Antonio R. Laureles (Ejidatarios)
Puerta de Palapares - Villa Juárez
Puerta de Palapares - Villa Juárez
(Non Ejidatarios)
Puerta de Palapares - Villa Juárez
(Ejidatarios)
Mexcaltitán
Mexcaltitán (Non Ejidatarios)
Mexcaltitán (Ejidatarios)

Feed/Baits

Fuels

Wages

Other

Subtotal

Repairs

Fixed Costs
Fishing
Other
Gear

Subtotal

Totals

100.00

63,300.00

100.00

0.00

63,500.00

8,300.00

25,000.00

0.00

33,300.00

96,800.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
10,000.00
10,000.00
0.00

41,300.00
22,000.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
333,160.00
295,260.00
37,900.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

41,500.00
22,000.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
343,160.00
305,260.00
37,900.00

7,300.00
1,000.00
4,300.00
3,000.00
1,300.00
35,800.00
29,800.00
6,000.00

16,500.00
8,500.00
7,400.00
6,400.00
1,000.00
43,100.00
37,600.00
5,500.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
66,500.00
66,500.00
0.00

23,800.00
9,500.00
11,700.00
9,400.00
2,300.00
145,400.00
133,900.00
11,500.00

65,300.00
31,500.00
11,700.00
9,400.00
2,300.00
488,560.00
439,160.00
49,400.00

16,320.00

31,246.67

150.00

0.00

47,716.67

13,200.00

10,520.00

5,800.00

29,520.00

77,236.67

2,590.00

11,700.00

0.00

0.00

14,290.00

8,500.00

5,070.00

1,500.00

15,070.00

29,360.00

13,730.00
34,200.00
22,200.00
12,000.00
0.00

19,546.67
507,572.50
410,850.00
96,722.50
57,600.00

150.00
15,600.00
12,000.00
3,600.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

33,426.67
557,372.50
445,050.00
112,322.50
57,600.00

4,700.00
104,130.00
78,530.00
25,600.00
14,800.00

5,450.00
76,520.00
47,150.00
29,370.00
20,400.00

4,300.00
0.00
5,000.00
228.00
9,500.00

14,450.00
180,650.00
130,680.00
55,198.00
44,700.00

47,876.67
738,022.50
575,730.00
167,520.50
102,300.00

0.00

50,400.00

0.00

0.00

50,400.00

13,800.00

10,400.00

9,500.00

33,700.00

84,100.00

0.00
0.00

7,200.00
78,150.00

0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00

7,200.00
78,150.00

1,000.00
24,100.00

10,000.00
12,800.00

0.00
17,500.00

11,000.00
54,400.00

18,200.00
132,550.00

0.00
0.00
12,400.00

78,150.00
0.00
32,750.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

78,150.00
0.00
45,150.00

21,900.00
2,200.00
13,800.00

12,800.00
0.00
5,650.00

16,500.00
1,000.00
64,600.00

51,200.00
3,200.00
84,050.00

129,350.00
3,200.00
129,200.00

12,400.00

31,300.00

0.00

0.00

43,700.00

6,800.00

3,150.00

53,650.00

63,600.00

107,300.00

0.00
28,840.00
25,690.00
3,150.00

1,450.00
321,530.00
218,620.00
102,910.00

0.00
28,250.00
28,250.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1,450.00
378,620.00
272,560.00
106,060.00

7,000.00
68,765.00
38,880.00
29,885.00

2,500.00
33,150.00
22,000.00
11,150.00

10,950.00
32,700.00
12,100.00
20,600.00

20,450.00
134,615.00
72,980.00
61,635.00

21,900.00
513,235.00
345,540.00
167,695.00


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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>San Felipe Aztatán-Unión de Corrientes</strong></td>
<td>43,200.00</td>
<td>69,900.00</td>
<td>12,000.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>125,100.00</td>
<td>11,100.00</td>
<td>7,090.00</td>
<td>2,850.00</td>
<td>21,040.00</td>
<td>146,140.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>San Felipe Aztatán-Unión de Corrientes (Non Ejidatarios)</strong></td>
<td>43,200.00</td>
<td>66,700.00</td>
<td>12,000.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>121,900.00</td>
<td>10,500.00</td>
<td>6,900.00</td>
<td>2,850.00</td>
<td>20,250.00</td>
<td>142,150.00</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>San Felipe Aztatán-Unión de Corrientes (Ejidatarios)</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3,200.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3,200.00</td>
<td>600.00</td>
<td>190.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>790.00</td>
<td>3,990.00</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Campo de los Limones</strong></td>
<td>1,920.00</td>
<td>37,795.00</td>
<td>12,000.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>51,715.00</td>
<td>5,600.00</td>
<td>3,500.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>9,200.00</td>
<td>60,915.00</td>
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<td>25,600.00</td>
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<td>27,520.00</td>
<td>2,600.00</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
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<td>4,100.00</td>
<td>31,620.00</td>
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<td><strong>Campo de los Limones (Ejidatarios)</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>12,195.00</td>
<td>12,000.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>24,195.00</td>
<td>3,000.00</td>
<td>2,000.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>5,100.00</td>
<td>29,295.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boca de Camichín</strong></td>
<td>600.00</td>
<td>509,640.00</td>
<td>20,000.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>530,240.00</td>
<td>43,820.00</td>
<td>46,170.00</td>
<td>6,500.00</td>
<td>96,490.00</td>
<td>626,730.00</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Roberto Barrios y Gorroberto</strong></td>
<td>70.00</td>
<td>35,200.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>35,270.00</td>
<td>1,700.00</td>
<td>4,060.00</td>
<td>700.00</td>
<td>6,460.00</td>
<td>41,730.00</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Roberto Barrios y Gorroberto (Non Ejidatarios)</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1,560.00</td>
<td>1,560.00</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ejido Pajaritos - Andrés Sandoval</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>9,350.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>9,350.00</td>
<td>3,400.00</td>
<td>6,300.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>9,700.00</td>
<td>19,050.00</td>
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<td><strong>Ejido Pajaritos - Andrés Sandoval (Non Ejidatarios)</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>9,350.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>9,350.00</td>
<td>2,000.00</td>
<td>5,800.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>7,800.00</td>
<td>17,150.00</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ejido Pajaritos - Andrés Sandoval (Ejidatarios)</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1,400.00</td>
<td>500.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1,900.00</td>
<td>1,900.00</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Francisco Villa (Ejidatarios)</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>233,600.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>233,600.00</td>
<td>23,320.00</td>
<td>52,100.00</td>
<td>30,300.00</td>
<td>105,720.00</td>
<td>339,320.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pericos</strong></td>
<td>900.00</td>
<td>113,000.00</td>
<td>25,000.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>138,900.00</td>
<td>8,100.00</td>
<td>2,150.00</td>
<td>17,050.00</td>
<td>155,950.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pericos (Non Ejidatarios)</strong></td>
<td>900.00</td>
<td>113,000.00</td>
<td>25,000.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>138,900.00</td>
<td>6,800.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4,200.00</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal Ejidatarios</strong></td>
<td>28,950</td>
<td>342,524</td>
<td>15,750</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>387,224</td>
<td>85,385</td>
<td>78,660</td>
<td>37,878</td>
<td>201,923</td>
<td>589,147</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal Non Ejidatarios (Incluye Francisco Villa y Boca de Camichín)</strong></td>
<td>$119,600</td>
<td>$2,095,470</td>
<td>$97,360</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$2,312,420</td>
<td>$298,850</td>
<td>$281,900</td>
<td>$206,550</td>
<td>$787,300</td>
<td>$3,099,720</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>$148,550</td>
<td>$2,437,994</td>
<td>$113,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$2,699,644</td>
<td>$384,235</td>
<td>$360,560</td>
<td>$244,428</td>
<td>$989,223</td>
<td>$3,688,867</td>
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</table>
### Table 37(a) Summary of Farm Costs: Cycle I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Farms</th>
<th>Working Capital</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>Fertilisation</td>
<td>Raw Materials</td>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Medicines</td>
<td>Fuels</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to 10 hectares</td>
<td>$585,200.00</td>
<td>$148,800.00</td>
<td>$1,589,501.00</td>
<td>$3,284,000.00</td>
<td>$71,000.00</td>
<td>$1,056,000.00</td>
<td>$76,800.00</td>
<td>$602,200.00</td>
<td>$284,200.00</td>
<td>$7,697,501.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 10 to 30 hectares</td>
<td>$651,500.00</td>
<td>$265,000.00</td>
<td>$3,983,750.00</td>
<td>$7,669,400.00</td>
<td>$237,000.00</td>
<td>$2,095,300.00</td>
<td>$267,000.00</td>
<td>$1,188,800.00</td>
<td>$458,800.00</td>
<td>$16,816,550.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 30 hectares</td>
<td>$183,000.00</td>
<td>$102,000.00</td>
<td>$1,330,000.00</td>
<td>$2,514,000.00</td>
<td>$30,600.00</td>
<td>$481,000.00</td>
<td>$396,000.00</td>
<td>$200,000.00</td>
<td>$5,221,600.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>$1,419,700.00</td>
<td>$515,800.00</td>
<td>$6,903,251.00</td>
<td>$13,467,400.00</td>
<td>$338,600.00</td>
<td>$3,569,300.00</td>
<td>$391,600.00</td>
<td>$2,187,000.00</td>
<td>$943,000.00</td>
<td>$29,735,651.00</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Farms</th>
<th>Fixed Costs</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Fishing Gear</td>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>Cycle I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to 10 hectares</td>
<td>$64,600.00</td>
<td>$48,200.00</td>
<td>$249,200.00</td>
<td>$26,500.00</td>
<td>$388,500.00</td>
<td>$8,086,001.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 10 to 30 hectares</td>
<td>$113,700.00</td>
<td>$80,800.00</td>
<td>$827,900.00</td>
<td>$124,000.00</td>
<td>$1,146,400.00</td>
<td>$17,962,950.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 30 hectares</td>
<td>$15,500.00</td>
<td>$17,500.00</td>
<td>$45,000.00</td>
<td>$5,000.00</td>
<td>$83,000.00</td>
<td>$5,304,600.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>$193,800.00</td>
<td>$146,500.00</td>
<td>$1,122,100.00</td>
<td>$155,500.00</td>
<td>$1,617,900.00</td>
<td>$31,353,551.00</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

### Table 37(b) Summary of Farm Costs: Costs Cycle II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Farms</th>
<th>Working Capital</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>Fertilisation</td>
<td>Raw Materials</td>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Medicines</td>
<td>Fuels</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 to 10 hectares</td>
<td>$457,700.00</td>
<td>$127,100.00</td>
<td>$2,506,000.00</td>
<td>$5,668,800.00</td>
<td>$82,000.00</td>
<td>$1,366,600.00</td>
<td>$178,000.00</td>
<td>$1,032,400.00</td>
<td>$502,600.00</td>
<td>$11,921,200.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>&gt; 10 to 30 hectares</td>
<td>$768,500.00</td>
<td>$329,500.00</td>
<td>$6,184,000.00</td>
<td>$15,947,000.00</td>
<td>$308,000.00</td>
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<td>$464,000.00</td>
<td>$1,576,800.00</td>
<td>$779,000.00</td>
<td>$28,328,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>&gt; 30 hectares</td>
<td>$138,000.00</td>
<td>$145,000.00</td>
<td>$1,940,000.00</td>
<td>$4,072,800.00</td>
<td>$79,600.00</td>
<td>$285,000.00</td>
<td>$89,000.00</td>
<td>$290,000.00</td>
<td>$132,000.00</td>
<td>$7,171,400.00</td>
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<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>$1,364,200.00</td>
<td>$601,600.00</td>
<td>$10,650,000.00</td>
<td>$25,688,600.00</td>
<td>$469,600.00</td>
<td>$3,622,800.00</td>
<td>$731,000.00</td>
<td>$2,899,200.00</td>
<td>$1,413,600.00</td>
<td>$47,420,600.00</td>
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<tr>
<th>Size of Farms</th>
<th>Fixed Costs</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Boat</td>
<td>Fishing Gear</td>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>Cycle II</td>
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<tr>
<td>0 to 10 hectares</td>
<td>$70,700.00</td>
<td>$41,600.00</td>
<td>$289,300.00</td>
<td>$14,500.00</td>
<td>$416,100.00</td>
<td>$12,337,300.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>&gt; 10 to 30 hectares</td>
<td>$231,400.00</td>
<td>$51,500.00</td>
<td>$400,000.00</td>
<td>$140,000.00</td>
<td>$822,900.00</td>
<td>$29,150,900.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>&gt; 30 hectares</td>
<td>$3,000.00</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>$30,000.00</td>
<td>$10,000.00</td>
<td>$44,000.00</td>
<td>$7,215,400.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
QUESTIONNAIRES
I. CO-OPERATIVES

A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Name of Interviewer: [name]

2. Date of Capture: [day/month/year]

3. Place of Interview:

4. Co-operative: [name]

5. Number of family members that live with or are economically dependents on the co-operative member: [number]

6. Observations:

B. AGRARIAN ACTIVITIES

AGRICULTURE

7. The Interviewee is an Ejidatario or owner of private land: [yes or no] ________ If the answer was "no", please go to question no. 38 [page 4]. If the answer was "yes" go to next question.

8. Land held in ownership or possession: [hectares]
### Spring-Summer Season

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</tbody>
</table>

16. Leasehold lands leased out by Interviewee in spring-summer season: [hectares]

17. Leasehold land that is rain fed: [hectares]

18. Leasehold land that is irrigated: [hectares]

### Autumn-Winter Season

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<td>b.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

26. Leasehold lands leased out by Interviewee in autumn-winter season: [hectares]

27. Leasehold land that is rain fed: [hectares]

28. Leasehold land that is irrigated: [hectares]
LIVESTOCK ACTIVITY

29. Heads of livestock held by interviewee: [number]

30. Number of these that are cows: [number]

31. Number of heads of livestock that are free grazing: [number]

32. Number of pigs: [number]

33. Number of these that are female: [number]

34. Other types of livestock (horses, chickens, goats, etc.) [names and number]:

Observations:

B. NON-AGRARIAN ACTIVITIES: SALARIED, INDUSTRIAL OR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>35. Salaried activities</th>
<th>36. Industrial activities</th>
<th>37. Commercial activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[name]</td>
<td>[description]</td>
<td>[income per week, two weeks in mxn]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[name]</td>
<td>[description]</td>
<td>[Income]</td>
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<tr>
<td>[name]</td>
<td>[description]</td>
<td>[income]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[name]</td>
<td>[description]</td>
<td>[income]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
C. AGRARIAN ACTIVITIES OF RESIDENTS WHO ARE NOT LAND OWNERS
(NEITHER EJIDATARIOS NOR PRIVATE OWNERS)

38.- If the interviewee is not an *ejidatario*, indicate status in the town:

- *avecindado*
- child of *ejidatario*; 
- grandchild of *ejidatario*; 
- other

39.- The interviewee leased land or took land for sharecropping during the last year (2012): [yes or no] __________ If the answer was “no”, please go to question no. 54 [Page 5]. if the answer was “yes”, go to next question.

### Spring-Summer Season

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>40. Name(s) of the crop(s) harvested for spring-summer season: [name(s)]</th>
<th>41.- Land taken for sharecropping or as a lessee during spring-summer season (rain-fed land): [hectares]</th>
<th>42.- Lands taken for sharecropping or as a lessee during spring-summer season (irrigated land): [hectares]</th>
<th>43.- Crop yield of rain-fed land: [output per hectare]</th>
<th>44.- Crop yield of irrigated land: [output per hectare]</th>
<th>45. Prices of spring-summer crops, rain-fed land [mxn per kg.]</th>
<th>46. Prices of spring-summer crops, irrigated land [mxn per kg.]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
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<td>b.</td>
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<td>c.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Autumn-Winter Season

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>47. Name(s) of the crop(s) harvested for autumn-winter season: [name(s)]</th>
<th>48.- Land taken for sharecropping or as a lessee during autumn-winter season (rain-fed land): [hectares]</th>
<th>49.- Lands taken for sharecropping or as a lessee during autumn-winter season (irrigated land): [hectares]</th>
<th>50.- Crop yield of rain-fed land: [output per hectare]</th>
<th>51.- Crop yield of irrigated land: [output per hectare]</th>
<th>52. Prices of autumn-winter crops, rain-fed land [mxn per kg.]</th>
<th>53. Prices of autumn-winter crops, irrigated land [mxn per kg.]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
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<td>b.</td>
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<td>c.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
LIVESTOCK ACTIVITY BY NON-OWNERS

54. Heads of livestock held by Interviewee: [number]

55. Number of these that are cows: [number]

56. Number of heads of livestock that are free grazing fed: [number]

57. Number of pigs: [number]

58. Number of these that are female: [number]

59. Other types of livestock (horses, chickens, goats, etc.): [names and number]

Observations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>60. Salaried activities</th>
<th>61. Industrial activities</th>
<th>62. Commercial activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[name]</td>
<td>[description]</td>
<td>[income per week, two weeks in mxn]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[name]</td>
<td>[description]</td>
<td>[Income]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[name]</td>
<td>[description]</td>
<td>[Income]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NON-AGRAHRIAN ACTIVITIES: SALARIED, INDUSTRIAL OR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

60. Salaried activities

61. Industrial activities

62. Commercial activities
D. AQUACULTURAL ACTIVITIES BY CO-OPERATIVE MEMBER

63.- The interviewee holds a fishing licence?: Yes______ No______

64.- Indicate the federation of co-operatives that the interviewee belongs to?: [a=federación adolfo lópez mateos; b=federación del norte de nayarit; c=federación lázaro cárdenas, d=none].
   a.______
   b.______
   c.______
   d.______

65.- Length of time as member of the co-operative: [years]

66.- Name the rivers, estuaries, lakes or channels where Interviewee usually catches shrimp:

67. Average crop yield during the last three years [kg or tonnes per season]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
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68. Average prices (2012 only) [mxn per kg]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
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69.- Interviewee is also an aquacultural farmer: Yes______ No______

70.- Amount of loan received to buy aquacultural equipment during the last year (2012): [mxn]

71.- Loan received last year (2012): [mxn]

72.- Loan repayment time: [years]
73.- Number of *atarrayas* (individual nets for shrimp catching) owned by interviewee: [number]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>74. Type of fishing boat used:</th>
<th>75.- The fishing boat has an outboard motor:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1=fibreglass; 2=panga (wood); 3=none]</td>
<td>[1=yes; 2=no]</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</table>

Observations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>80.- Amount spent on oil during the last season: [litre per week or month and unit cost, or money spent per unit of time (day/week/month)]</th>
<th>81.- Amount spent on purina (shrimp food) during the last season: [kilograms per day/week/month and the unit cost, or money spent per unit of time (day/week/month)]</th>
<th>82.- Amount spent on wages during the last season: [mxn money spent per unit of time (day/week/month)]</th>
<th>83.- Boat maintenance expenses: [mxn]</th>
<th>84.- Fishing gear expenses: [mxn]</th>
<th>85.- Other expenses: [mxn]</th>
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</table>

86.- Interviewee received money in advance from the buyer of the harvest: [yes or no]

87.- Name(s) of the main buyer(s) of harvest: [name(s)]

88. Buyer(s) pay(s) the cooperative in advance to buy inputs or to pay wages?: [yes, no or do not know]

89. Main shrimp market(s): [place(s)]
II. FARMS

A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1.- NAME OF INTERVIEWER: [name]

____________________________________________

2. Date of Capture: [day/month/year]

____________________________________________

3. Place of Interview:

____________________________________________

4. Farm: [name]

____________________________________________

5. Observations:


B. AGRARIAN ACTIVITIES

6.- Number of Partners: _____________________________________________________________

7.- Number of Partners who are Ejidatarios: ___________________________________________

8. Number of Partners involved in Agrarian Activities (Agriculture and/or Livestock):

________________________________________
### AGRICULTURE

#### Spring-Summer Season

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16. Leasehold lands leased out by Interviewee in spring-summer season: [hectares]

17. Leasehold land that is rain fed: [hectares]

18. Leasehold land that is irrigated: [hectares]

#### Autumn-Winter Season

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26. Leasehold lands leased out by Interviewee in autumn-winter season: [hectares]

27. Leasehold land that is rain fed: [hectares]

28. Leasehold land that is irrigated: [hectares]

Observations
LIVESTOCK ACTIVITY

29. Heads of livestock held by interviewee: [number] ______________________

30. Number of these that are cows: [number] ____________________________

31. Number of heads of livestock that are free grazing: [number] ______________

32. Number of pigs: [number] _____________________________

33. Number of these that are female: [number] ____________________________

34. Other types of livestock (horses, chickens, goats, etc.) [names and number]:

_____________________

Observations:

NON-AGRARIAN ACTIVITIES: SALARIED, INDUSTRIAL OR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>35. Salaried activities</th>
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</table>

[Page 3]
C. AQUACULTURAL ACTIVITIES FROM ON FARMS

38.- Type of Farm: [private/ejido/other]

39.- Year when the Farm started Operations: [year]

40.- Initial Investment: [mxn]

41.- Land received or leased by Partners: [hectares]

42. Water Surface Area: [hectares]

43.- Shrimps Health Issues (diseases) experienced in the past [white spot/tauра/other]

GROW-OUT PHASE

44.- PRODUCTION DURING THE FIRST ROTATION: (MARCH-MAY)

SIZES OF SHRIMPS HARVESTED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIZE IN GRAMS</th>
<th>YIELD CROP [KILOGRAMS PER HECTAREA]</th>
<th>FARM-GATE PRICES [MXN PER KILOGRAM]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 grams</td>
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<td>9 grams</td>
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<td>11 grams</td>
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<td>12 grams</td>
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<td>More</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

45.- PRODUCTION DURING THE SECOND ROTATION: (JUNE-NOVEMBER)

SIZES OF SHRIMPS HARVESTED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIZE IN GRAMS</th>
<th>YIELD CROP [KILOGRAMS PER HECTAREA]</th>
<th>FARM-GATE PRICES [MXN PER KILOGRAM]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 grams</td>
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<td>12 grams</td>
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<td>More</td>
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</table>

Notes:
## COST OF PRODUCTION

### 46.- INPUTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>FIRST ROTATION (MXN)</th>
<th>SECOND ROTATION (MXN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Preparing the ponds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Feeding and Fertilization of ponds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>III. 1. Cost per Unit of Larvae</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>III. 2. Volume of post-larvae (Millions of PL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IV. Feed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>V. Probiotics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VI. Oil and Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Other inputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR COSTS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VIII. Temporary workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. Technical Supervision</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

### 47. MAINTENANCE EXPENSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>FIRST ROTATION (MXN)</th>
<th>SECOND ROTATION (MXN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For Boats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>For individual nets (atarrayas)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>For equipment and machinery (pumps, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MARKETING

48.- Name(s) of the Buyer(s) of Interviewee’s Harvest: [name(s)]

49.- Buyer(s) pay the Farm in Advance to buy Inputs or to pay Wages: [yes, no or do not know]

50.- Main Market(s) for Shrimp: [place(s)]
La cooperativa Única se formó el 14 de julio de 1961.

Documentos del Año 1961

1. Oficio 11/I/1961 a Francisco H. Matar Director de Fomento Cooperativo. Asunto: se le solicita...
saber si los activos de los anteriores cooperativas se hace inventario físico y se consideran como "aportaciones que cada una de las secciones haga a esta cooperativa Única en calidad de entregas a cuenta de Patrimonio Social."

Firma el oficio en calidad de gerente general Silvestre Chávez Pérez.

2. 13 de julio de 1961. Al director general de fomento cooperativo: Se menciona a los ejidos parte de la cooperativa: "Santa Cruz, Cuautla, San Andrés y otros ejidos de aquella zona". Asunto: Se comunica designación CC. Lics. Alejandro Rea Moguel y José Luis González Robles para representar este Departamento asunto se indica (para que en representación de esta Dependencia intervengan ante esa dirección general de fomento cooperativo, dirección general de Pesca, y demás Dependencias de esa Secretaría en todo lo relacionado con la integración correspondientes. Firma: Prof. Roberto Barrios Jefe del Departamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización.

3. Florentino Lora Sánchez y Manuel García Ibarra, como presidente y secretarios del consejo de administración solicitan la constitución de la Sociedad con domicilio en Casa # 82 de la calle Hidalgo Oriente de Tepic. 15 de julio de 1961.


5. Secretaria de industria y comercio. Informe sobre las investigaciones relativas a los arts. 1o. y 18 de la ley de la materia correspondiente a la proyectada cooperativa que se cita. 26 de julio del 61. El informe da cuenta de la viabilidad de la Cooperativa que se formará. EDUCACION COOPERATIVA.- Se celebraron juntas previas a la realización de la Asamblea constitutiva, en las cuales se estudió con los socios los principios doctrinarios del cooperativismo; se dió a conocer en lo fundamental la Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas y sus disposiciones conexas, explicando en forma amplia los derechos y obligaciones a contraer en su futura situación de co-asociados. VIABILIDAD SOCIAL.- En relación con lo estipulado en el artículo 1o. de la Ley antes invocada, es obvio que por integrarse la proyectada Sociedad con los miembros de las Sociedades Cooperativas de Producción Pesquera José María Morelos, SCL, Prof. Roberto Barrios, SCL, Pescadores del Norte de Nayarit, SCL, La Nueva Sirena, SCL, Gilberto Flores Muñoz, Pescadores Unidos del Campo de los Limones, SCL, Pescadores y Ostioneros de San Blas y Boca de Asadero, SCL, Costa de Chila, Peñitas y Boca de Ameca, SCL, y Fraternidad de Pescadores SCL..." Firma el visitador general "H" Rubén Narváez Martínez.


8. Existen documentos que dan cuenta de adeudos en Tecuala: el señor N. Rubio se queja de
adeudos por la facilitación de pinturas para canoas por $3,000.00, la Sra. Ma. Elena Hernández Carrillo por $11,000.00 debido a adeudos por cajas mortuorias y ataúdes y la Sra. Alicia Alonso Robles y Cía. S de R L de C V por $16,000.00 por llantas, cámaras y efectos de ferreterías. La queja es un documento enviado al Presidente de la República con fecha de nov. del 61.

9. Acta firmada por los socios de la sección José María Morelos al gerente con fecha de 30 de octubre de 1961. Se le describe el sistema asignación de áreas en los sitios pesqueros entre los socios (150) a través de la rifa de los mismos. A este procedimiento le llaman "Borlote". Mencionan que el señor Miguel Zavala dispuso a su antojo de los sitios ya que no se van a explotar por la sección. Esto los dejó fuera de su derecho de contar con sitios.

10. Al Secretario, General de la Liga de Comunidades Agrarios y Sindicatos Campesinos del Estado de Nayarit, Flavio Gómez Fernández. Firman un grupo de pescadores del poblado de Río Viejo de Tecuala, Novillero. Se solicita se reconozca oficialmente a la sección: firman 83 gentes. "Como el año es 1959 hicieron las gestiones correspondientes en Cooperativa y las que no dieron resultado favorable por las negativas que encontraron..."

Firman el Presidente, Secretario y Tesorero del Ejido: Andrés Venegas Segobia, Tomás Rodríguez Jacobo, etc.

11. Fecha 25 de noviembre de 1961. Posteriormente el mismo dirigente de la Liga de Comunidades Agrarias envía un escrito al Presidente de la República solicitando que sean incorporadas las secciones: El Pimientillo, San Andrés, Santa Cruz, Puerta de Palapares, Boca de Camichín, Boca de Asadero, Aticama, Santa Cruz, Cuautla, Pescadero, Platanitos, Peñitas, San Blas, Tecuala, Quimichis y San Cayetano "Inicialmente el funcionamiento de la ya expresada cooperativa Única se desarrolló en forma normal y se tuvo la esperanza por parte de los grupos campesinos afectos a la pesca y también por los conglomerados campesinos de todo el Estado que han estado y están atentos al funcionamiento y desarrollo de aquel Organismo corporativo, de que como corresponde rápidamente se integrarían las secciones de la multicitada Cooperativa las cuales habrían de comprender a los siguientes poblados:"


Año 1962

13. Hay otra solicitud con fecha del 20 de enero del 1962. Se envía al Gerente de la Única; la solicitud es de los ejidatarios de Novillero.

14. Oficio del 26 de enero del 1962 en que 66 personas solicitan la creación de la sección Boca de Camichín. La aportación de cada socio es de $100.00 por lo que el total asciende a $660.00.

15. Con fecha de 30 de enero del 1962 se envía al Gerente de la Única la solicitud de los ejidatarios de Novillero.

16. 13 de marzo del 1962: Se convoca a asamblea General Ordinaria para el día 31 de marzo del 1962 para tratar el tema de la admisión provisional de socios por el Consejo de Administración y para excluir otros.
17. Oficio de fecha 22 de marzo del 1962. A la dirección General Jurídica de la Oficina de Cooperativas de la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio por parte del Lic. Juan de Dios Solórzano. Director de Delegaciones Federales. Asunto: El art. 73 de las escrituras constitutivas de la Única plantea que la sociedad asumirá los pasivos y los activos de las cooperativas al disolverse. Se autoriza intervenir en las liquidaciones de las extintas cooperativas a fin de conocer y depurar todos y cada uno de los conceptos que forman los pasivos. (Subrayado OW).


19. Oficio del 17 de abril de 1962 de Silvestre Chávez Pérez a Francisco H. Matar, Director General de Fomento Cooperativo sobre el uso que siguen haciendo de las instalaciones de la antigua cooperativa del Norte de Nayarit algunas personas empleando la denominación anterior.

"Los que encabezan y se dedican abiertamente apoyados por la Empresa Empacadora Hielo y Congelación de Escuinapa, Sin., son Jorge Hangis que fue contador de la Sociedad, Abraham Rubio, Teléforo Loera y otros..."

20. Oficio dirigido por el Subgerente Efraín Deciga González al Sr. Francisco H. Matar del 27 de abril de 1962: asunto, liquidación de los adeudos de los comerciantes "nos permitimos manifestar que esa H. Dirección a su merecido cargo que la organi... nada puede hacer al respecto en tanto no se efectúen las liquidaciones correspondientes de las anteriores sociedad que se disolvieron."


22. Oficio al Sr. Juan Hernández de Quimichis, Nay de Manuel García y José Moreno del Consejo de Administración (Presidente y Secretario). Asunto: se le expulsó de la sociedad. 9 de abril de 1962.

23. Oficios sobre decomisos de camarón en Escuinapa (180 sacos con 6,412 kgr.).


25. Oficio del Subgerente Efraín Deciga González a Francisco H. Matar el 14 de mayo del 1962: Asunto: se están efectuando estudios correspondientes a fin de ver la posibilidad de que los pescadores de Novillero y Santa Cruz.

27. En un oficio previo el Sr. Adalberto Garza (28/junio/1962) había sido nombrado Gerente Especial mismo que quedó sin efecto. Allí se menciona el oficio de Raúl Salinas Lozano e que nombra a Silvestre Chávez Pérez Gerente General (20 de julio de 1961).

28. 28 de julio de 1962 hay un manifiesto de la sección de Mexcalltitán dirigido al Lic. Raúl Salinas solicitándole la remoción de Miguel Zavala

29. El Consejo de Administración de la Cooperativa estaba integrada por: Presidente del Consejo: Manuel García Ibarra; Presidente del Consejo de Vigilancia: Miguel Zavala Ruvalcaba; Gerente: Silvestre Chávez Pérez; Secretario, José Moreno Cortés.

30. El conflicto en Quimichis, en agosto de 1962, buscaba el reconocimiento de todos los socios que habían pertenecido a la anterior cooperativa en liquidación: el gerente de la Única no quería reconocerlos en tanto que el director de pesca los apoyaba.

31. Oficio dirigido al Sr. Roberto Palencia el 12 de agosto de 1962 por ejidatarios de Quimichis: Asunto: fueron perseguidos cuando practicaban la pesca a la que tienen derecho según la ley de cooperativas "que señala el derecho a pescar a los campesinos rivereños, cantidades de camarón para nuestra subsistencia nos encontramos con que se desató una persecución inhumana con despojo ilícita de nuestras tarrayas."

32. ¿1962?: "La creación de la Cooperativa Única mediante el reagrupamiento de las once (sic) que funcionaban independientemente hasta hace un año en la región camaronería de esteros en Nayarit, debe considerarse como un éxito muy importante de la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, desde el punto de vista económico y social. No es necesario hacer hincapié sobre la situación anterior en la que la gran dispersión de las cooperativas encarecía los costos administrativos, las debilitaba frente a los compradores del camarón y era propicia para mantener la corrupción de los dirigentes, fomentar el contrabando y crear un malestar y problemas constantes."

33. ¿1962?: De los datos se observa que el Quimichis el asunto fue alimentado por la empresa empacadora de Escuinapa "manejada por un señor Julio Verdegüe -yerno del Dr. Antonio Sacristán Colas, de la Sociedad Mexicana de Crédito Industrial S. Á. y del Banco Mexicano, S. A.- empresa que todavía en 1961 obtuvo utilidades calculadas conservadoramente en $20 millones de pesos, de la congelación de más de 3,000 toneladas de camarón entregado por las cooperativas de Sinaloa y Nayarit. Este dato fue checado confidencialmente en pláticas que tuve con el señor Jorge Copel, propietario de una planta similar a la de Escuinapa y además propietario de más de 30 barcos modernos en Mazatlán, Sin." Enrique Guinea Rivero. La Secretaría de Pesca parece que apoyó a los inconformes también.

34. Oficio de Silvestre Chávez Pérez a José Luis Guilbot Bouillet con fecha de 8 de octubre de 1962. Es el nombre del subgerente especial para la zona norte.

35. Oficio dirigido a Director de Fomento Cooperativo (8 de octubre de 1962). Solicitan sea reconocida la sección de Boca de Camichín dentro de la Cooperativa Única. "ha trabajado normalmente y dentro de las normas y disposiciones de la cooperativa Única desde enero del presente año, fecha en que fuimos aceptados, como sección y hasta ahora no se nos ha registrado o reconocido oficialmente."

La Única: 1o.- La existencia de nueve organismos cooperativos que creaba conflictos y agitaciones, sobre todo por la delimitación de las zonas de pesca de camarón y la determinación legal de su membresía. 2o.- La acción monopolística de la empresa "Empacadora de Escuinapa", S.A., para acaparar toda la producción de camarón de la zona e imponer bajos precios de adquisición al producto, lo que había generado un estado de descontento general.

37. Argumenta que el Señor Napoleón Cárdenas representante de la Dirección de Pesca apoya a los disidentes. Se refiere a un adeudo que se tiene con el banco por la cooperativa por un monto de $2,680,000.00 (280,000.00 en créditos refaccionarios) por créditos para evitar ser habilitados por la Empacadora de Escuinapa en el periodo 1962/63.

38. En 1963 es nombrado como Director de Fomento Cooperativo el Sr. Roberto Palencia.

39. Oficio de Roberto Palencia a la Sociedad Cooperativa (18 de enero de 1963) para conocer su opinión. Se recibió una solicitud de Boca de Camichín para incrementar el número de trabajadores autorizados para la captura de ostión. Actualmente hay autorizados 18 trabajadores.

40. El Director General de Pesca es el Almirante Antonio Vázquez del Mercado.

41. La argumentación de los disidentes se basaba en los siguientes puntos:
Dirección de Pesca e Industrias Conexas, Director Alm. Antonio Vázquez del Mercado a Lic. Hugo B. Margain. asunto: Observaciones personales respecto a la sociedad:

1. Apoya la creación de la Sociedad 2. Existe intransquilidad entre los pescadores de la citada Cooperativa... PROBLEMAS DE CARÁCTER INTERNO DE LAS BASES CONSTITUTIVAS.- Su redacción en muchas partes es confusa y hasta contradictoria y en muchos casos no han sido observadas." Se menciona que al 31 de diciembre de 1961 no había un balance general que se hubiera presentado al Consejo de Administración.

La cláusula 27 establecía: "CLÁUSULA 27.- La Dirección, Administración y Vigilancia de la Sociedad estarán a cargo del Gerente General que será nombrado por el c. Presidente de la República, sin perjuicio de las funciones que les corresponden a la Asamblea General, al Consejo de Administración al Consejo de vigilancia y alas diversas Comisiones que a efectos e constituyan, en o que no opongan a las facultades y obligaciones que estas Bases Constitutivas otorgan a dicho Gerente General..." "La Cláusula 28 otorga al Gerente General facultades sin límites y sin control y respecto a sus obligaciones, existen razones fundadas para creer no ha cumplido con las señaladas en la propia cláusula.

"...CLÁUSULA 30.- La Sociedad adopta el sistema de asambleas por Delegados en los Términos del Artículo 27 de la Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas, por el hecho de que los socios son en número mayor de quinientos y además, varios residen en localidades distintas al domicilio de la Sociedad"

"lo cierto es que durante más de 8 meses, la sociedad contó únicamente con 26 socios" [¿Porqué se asentó más de quinientos? OWG]

Una serie de documentos más da cuenta de las faltas en que se incurrió en la integración de la sociedad. La conclusión es:

"URGE.- 1o.- La revisión o aclaración en su caso de las Bases Constitutivas; 2o.- Que el gerente atienda únicamente a la Sociedad Cooperativa a su cargo; 3o.- Que se controle las actividades del Gerente y que en casos delicados antes de resolver, consulte a las Autoridades Superiores [sic]; 4o.- Que la Sociedad cumpla con las disposiciones legales y reglamentarias; y 5o.- Que se convoque a una Asamblea Extraordinaria y se hagan presentes sin distinción a los Socios de las Antiguas Sociedades Cooperativas hoy disueltas. PROBLEMAS DE CARACTER EXTERNO .....
Uno de los puntos básicos de la disputa era la definición de la política general en materia de pesca en el Estado de Nayarit: "La Dirección General de Pesca tiene amplias posibilidades de planear la actividad pesquera y orientar a a Sociedad Cooperativa Única; lo que se requiere es que ésta última, estime la orientación que se le dé y no pretenda constituirse en autoridad en materia de pesca; que observe los lineamientos y ordenamientos que se le fijen y no de crédito a opiniones espontáneas". Es evidente que siendo la única empresa en el estado tendría que surgir una disputa de autoridad entre el Director de Pesca y el Gerente de la Única.

42. Hugo B. Margáin envía la Secretario de la Defensa Nacional (Agustín Olachea Avilés) oficio (623.2(723.2)/6.0) solicitando su intervención en Nayarit para protección de los pescadores de la Única en Tecuala.


44. Oficio de Antonio Toussaint Director General de Empacadora de Escuinapa, S. A. solicita a Roberto Palencia Director de Fomento Cooperativo copia del acta constitutiva de la Única en razón de concluir el contrato de habilitación o avío y compraventa de camarón, julio de 1963.


46. Convocatoria a Asamblea General Extraordinaria a celebrarse 30 y 31 de julio de 1963. El punto 8 del orden del día establece la lectura de las solicitudes para la formación de nuevas secciones: Boca de Camichín; Palmar de Cuautla; Puerta de Palapares; Santa Cruz (Santiago); Novillero; La Bayona; Miramar; Estero del Arco (Tecuala); Jarretadera (Compostela)

El punto XII "Informe del C. Daniel León Guevara, Gerente General de la Cooperativa sobre el resultado de las gestiones que realizó para obtener del Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo el crédito por la cantidad de $2'250,000.00 para la ejecución de los trabajos preliminares que se están llevando a cabo así como el para el financiamiento de la presente temporada de camarón y Plan de Trabajo a seguir."

48. DOCUMENTO. Fecha: ¿1964? Asunto: Relación de errores graves que se considera ha cometido el gerente General C. Lic. Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez

1.- Falta de organización en las oficinas centrales
2.- Erogación de Fondos para elementos del PPS que él a infiltrado en la administración y que sólo se presentan a cobrar sus sueldos.
3.- Falta de cumplimiento en la aplicación de los créditos como es el que autorizó el Banco de Fomento Cooperativo para la siembra de concha por la cantidad de $50,000.00 de los cuales se aplicaron sólo $18,000.00 con la inconformidad general de los socios que integran las secciones ostrícolas.
4.- Autorización para la captura de camarón a todos los ejidios vecinos a las zonas productoras.
5.- Autorización de permisos a compradores que siempre han sido enemigos de la cooperativa.
6.- Dar entrada a solicitudes de ejidios que han capturado camarón para que se constituyan en secciones.

49. CAJA NO. 11/LEGAJO NO. VIII. De: Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez; Para: Director General de Fomento Cooperativo. Tipo de Documento: Oficio; Fecha: 26/II/1964

Asunto: El oficio da cuenta de la existencia de pescadores libres y los convenios existentes con ellos "Los pescadores libres son, por otra parte, en su totalidad, ejidatarios humildes que
explotan los esteros y marismas que intermitentemente se forman dentro de su dotación ejidal (OWG); son dueños en términos del Código Agrario de sus respectivas parcelas y este hecho los hace concebir la idea de que pueden libremente explotar todos los recursos que estas les ofrezcan. Tradicionalmente han trabajado con violación al artículo 35 de la Ley de Pesca que reserva a las Cooperativas, entre otras especies, la captura de camarón. Por esa razón con la participación de los Consejos hemos otorgado convenios a los Pescadores libres con el propósito de someterlos a control de la cooperativa y para que su producción no vaya a beneficiar a comerciantes deshonestos que aprovechándose de su situación irregular, les arrebaten el producto adjudicándolo a bajísimos precios.


Asunto: "Fue en nuestro poder el superior oficio que arriba se cita y en debida contestación manifestamos a esa Dirección General ... que consideramos que los CC. Anselmo González Ismerio y Julián Arámbula , que fungen como Presidente y Tesorero de Consejo de Administración, no es necesario salvo su mejor parecer, de que caucionen su manejo de fondos, toda vez que dichas personas por radicar el primero en Tecuala y el segundo en San Cayetano, propiamente no tienen a su cargo el manejo del numerario de la sociedad y el que se verifica en esta ciudad de Tepic, es a través de la Gerencia General o de la Subgerencia.

51. CAJA NO. 10, LEGAJO NO. VI. De: Antonio del Mercado Director General de Pesca e Industrias Conexas; Para: Roberto Palencia. Tipo de Documento: Oficio. Fecha: 26/VIII/1964

Asunto: "esta Dirección a mi cargo no tiene inconveniente alguno en que se autorice el funcionamiento de la referida sección, siempre y cuando no llegue a motivar disputas por zonas pesqueras con las demás secciones que integran el organismo citado, así como que no pretendan operar en aquellas aguas autorizadas o concesionadas a otros permisionarios o cooperativas...


Asunto: "En atención a que por acuerdo del C. Presidente de la República, en ejercicio de la facultad que le concede la cláusula 27ava de las bases constitutivas ... se designó con fecha 15 de junio del año en curso, Gerente General d la misma, al C. Lic. Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez, se fija en la cantidad de $7,500.00 el sueldo mensual que debe percibir dicho Gerente General con cargo a esa mismo cooperativa, más $1,000.00 también mensuales, por concepto de pasajes y viáticos.

53. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11. [14/623.2(723.2)/1], 8 de septiembre de 1964.

La Secretaría de Industria y Comercio determina que se integre la Cooperativa Boca de Camichín "a la Única, animando a evitar disputas con las otras secciones por el uso de zonas pesqueras.

"Apercibida esa Sociedad de que en caso contrario se le aplicarán las sanciones a que se refiere el art., 84 de la Ley Gral., de Sociedades Cooperativas". Firma el Director Roberto Palencia.

54. Legajo XXII Caja 13. 8 y 14 de septiembre de 1964. Sobre la incorporación de Boca de Camichín a la Única. Boca de Camichín fue aceptada posteriormente como se verá en las notas.

55. CAJA NO. 10, LEGAJO NO. VI. De: Roberto Palencia; Para: Sociedad Cooperativa. Tipo de

56. Tipo de Documento: Convenio de la Unión con pescadores del ejido Unión de Corrientes. Fecha: 8/IX/1964
Asunto: Convenio que autoriza a los pescadores que se enlistas (encabezados por Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez) para capturar camarón exclusivamente durante el periodo del 1 de sept al 30 de noviembre.

Asunto: Igualmente confirma la aceptación para integrar la Sección de Boca de Camichín.

Asunto: Se comunica la incorporación de la Sección de Boca de Camichín a la Sociedad cooperativa con 53 socios.
"[...] me permito comunicar a esa Dirección [...] que tanto la Gerencia de mi cargo como los Consejo de Administración y de Vigilancia de esta Sociedad, han tomado debida nota del acuerdo de esa superioridad en el sentido de que queda aceptada como Sección de la Cooperativa Única, el grupo que integran los Pescadores de "Boca de Camichín" y por lo tanto a partir de esta fecha serán 10 las Secciones que pertenezcan a la Cooperativa en vez de 9.
"Como la integración de esta nueva sección, es debida a que la Asamblea General que tuvo verificativo el 30 de abril del presente año, consideró que les asistía el derecho de que fuera escuchada su petición, y a delegar sus facultades a la Asamblea en esa Secretaría ara que a través de las Direcciones Generales de Pesca y Fomento Cooperativo, resolvieran la admisión de la misma desde luego le manifestamos que dentro del término de 5 días hábiles a que se nos conmina para contestar tanto la Gerencia como los Consejos, se encuentran satisfechos por su resolución en favor de los pescadores del "Grupo Camichín".


Asunto: Solicita:
a).- Se nos conceda la autorización de los ganchos de la sección "Gilberto Flores Muñoz" de San Cayetano, Municipio de Tecuala, que como decimos antes se han venido instalando en forma tradicional, desde hace muchos años y cura solicitud al respecto, obra ya en poder de esa dirección.
b).- Que se haga una investigación en la que participe la Cooperativa Única y en su caso se nos autorice el tapo que se denomina "La Palmita" [Esto demuestra el uso normal de tapos en las zonas estuarinas, OW].
c).- Que dicte... órdenes para que se nos cancele las actas de infracción levantadas por las Oficinas de Pesca de Esquínapa y Teacapán, Sin., que aducen como motivo de las infracciones la no autorización del tapo "La Palmita" y de los ganchos en la sección "Gilberto Flores Muñoz, respectivamente.
2.- Por lo que toca a la transportación y recolección, pedimos a esa Dirección lo siguiente:
a). Que se nos den facilidades por parte de las Oficinas de Pesca respectivas, para que, previa documentación legal y pago de impuestos, la transportación del producto sea lo más ágil posible.

b). Que de ser factible, esa Dirección [...] apoye a esta Gerencia y a los Consejos de Administración y de Vigilancia, en su gestión para que no se utilice la vía fluvial a "El Mezcal", e inclusive se impida el tránsito por dicha vía, que viola la Ley de Pesca, al no salir el producto con la guía correspondiente.

[...]


Asunto: "En contestación a su escrito de fecha 3 de marzo del año en curso, en el que informa que solamente los CC. Gerente General y Sub-Gerente de esa sociedad manejan los fondos y bienes de la misma y no los CC. Anselmo González Ismerio y Julián Arámbula, Presidente y Tesorero del Consejo de Administración del citado organismo cooperativo, se le manifiesta lo siguiente:

De conformidad con las cláusulas 27 avá y 28 avá de las bases constitutivas de la Sociedad Cooperativa [...] el Gerente General es el responsable de la buena marcha del organismo, porque es el único que está autorizado para dirigir, administrar, vigilar y representar la Sociedad cooperativa en todos los negocios de la misma, sin que deba intervenir en estos casos el Consejo de Administración, a quien únicamente le están reservados los asuntos que no competen al citado Gerente General, de conformidad con la cláusula 47a de la expresadas bases constitutivas.

En consecuencia, en atención a lo dispuesto por los artículos 15 fracción X de la Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas y 3o, fracción XII de su Reglamento, el Gerente General debe caucionar el manejo de fondos y bienes con la cantidad mencionada en el oficio #1672 de 21 de febrero del presente año.

Además, [...] el Subgerente maneje también fondos y bienes de la Sociedad, caucionará igualmente su manejo en los términos del oficio citado e el párrafo precedente.

Por lo tanto las personas que ocupen los cargos que se mencionan, deberán gestionar las fianzas correspondientes, de las que enviarán una copia para los efectos legales, fijándose un plazo de 30 días hábiles contado a partir de la fecha de recibo del presente oficio, para que se cumpla lo ordenado con apercibimiento de que de no hacerlo se les impondrán cualquiera de las sanciones establecidas por el artículo 84 de la Ley en la Materia.

[...]

Para conocimiento del Presidente del Consejo de Vigilancia de la Sociedad ... y a efecto de que sirva vigilar el cumplimiento de lo ordenado en el artículo 41 de la Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas.


Asunto: Ante la casi conclusión de la zafra se han suscitado eventos.

"II.- Que una proporción considerable de socios a partir de estas fechas, debido al descenso de la producción hacen su traslado a otras actividades fuera de la pesquera originándose así, la ruptura del equipo de trabajo.

III.- Que en esta misma fase de clausura, ha existido la costumbre de practicar la captura de camarón en forma particular, trayendo como consecuencia una deficiente comercialización del producto y un rompimiento del sistema cooperativo. (Itálicas OW).

Por lo antes expuesto, esta Gerencia comunica a ustedes lo siguiente:

1/o.- A partir del próximo primero de noviembre y hasta finalizar la presente zafra, se suprimen
los anticipos fijos que a razón de $20.00 diarios se han venido proporcionando en forma
decenal y en su lugar se retribuirá con base en el volumen de producción, a razón de $2.00 por
kilogramo de camarón verde, entregado a la cooperativa.

2/o.- Lo anterior no significa compra del producto sino un anticipo del valor del mismo, de esta
manera el socio y la cooperativa se beneficiarán al buscar una mejor comercialización del
producto; de otra forma, con la práctica denominada "Borlote" el beneficio del socio es relativo,
la Cooperativa pierde el control de la producción y sobreviene así, como antes se dijo un
quebranto del sistema cooperativo. (Itálicas OW).

64. CAJA NO. 10, LEGAJO NO. VI. De: Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez Gerente General de la Única.
Asunto: El gerente general le solicita liquidar a Empacadora de Escuinapa el adeudo de avío
que contrajeron sin tener que pagar sobre los saldos pendientes con el banco por esta única vez.. "El crédito inicial que Empacadora de Escuinapa nos proporcionó de acuerdo con el
contrato de avío fue por la cantidad de $1,000,000.00 y posteriormente recibimos anticipos por
la suma de $560,000.00.

Como la Empresa de referencia no nos siguiera refaccionando a cuenta de nuestras
liquidaciones futuras, nos vimos en la necesidad de recurrir ante el Gobierno de Nayarit, con el
cual contrajimos un compromiso de $2000,000.00 que también estamos en condiciones de
liquidar, por lo que con los otros adeudos que esta Sociedad tiene contraídos, consideramos
que el monto total de nuestras deudas, por el presente año, sobrepasan un poco los
$2,000,000.00"

Solicita:
"1.- Que por esta única vez, se nos permita liquidar a Empacadora de Escuinapa, la totalidad
del Crédito de Avío y los anticipos que nos proporcionó por la cantidad de $1,560,000.00

2.- Que todos los descuentos que por concepto de saldos insolutos de zafras pasadas, tanto a
"Empacadora de Escuinapa" como el Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo S. A. de C.V.,
no se nos apliquen en ésta ocasión, ya que sería muy salvable para esta Sociedad Cooperativa que la habilitación de la presente zafr, había sido cubierta totalmente,
sobreviniendo un clima de confianza e interés de todos los socios para su Cooperativa.

3.- Que por lo que toda a los $250,000.00 que a BANFOCO, tenemos que cubrir en la presente
zafr del crédito por la suma de $500,000.00 que otorgó en el mes de abril ppdo. , desde luego
manifestamos que de igual manera estamos en condiciones de liquidar, tan pronto como se
efectúan las liquidaciones con a Empacadora de Escuinapa.

65. CAJA NO. 10, LEGAJO NO. VI. De: Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez. Para: Hugo B. Margain. Tipo

Asunto: Solicitan la renuncia de los señores don Guevara y Andraca Malda de la administración
anterior y quienes no fueron sustituidos con la llegada del nuevo gerente general.

68. LEGAJO VII CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 28 de febrero de 1965.
1 marqueta de Camarón ≈ 2.268 kg.
Camarón de Exportación (total cooperativa).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marquetas</th>
<th>Kilos</th>
<th>Valor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.875</td>
<td>31.468,500</td>
<td>$578,482,26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
69. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 1, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. La Secretaría de Industria y Comercio enviará inspectores o investigadores a las Asambleas seccionales (uno a cada sección) y a la Asamblea General.

70.- LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. Abril 1965.
Los problemas planteados ente la Confederación Nacional Cooperativo de la República Mexicana CCL y la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio señalan posibles derramamiento de sangre en caso de que la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio no intervenga. El conflicto es por la posible separación de la Sección Norte aparentemente promovida por la Confederación. El caso sigue hasta enero de 1966 y posiblemente más adelante.

71. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 9 de abril de 1965.
Los pescadores de la Norte se dirigen al Consejo de Vigilancia denunciando al Consejo de Administración y acusan a Anselmo González Ismerio de tratar de deshacer la Cooperativa (del Norte) y de conseguir financiamiento aparte, de pretender operar por su cuenta señalando que la cooperativa de Escuinapa estuvo en esa junta y acordó dar su apoyo.

72. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 10 de abril de 1965. El Consejo de Vigilancia se inconforma ante el de Administración por eso.

73. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 13 de abril de 1965. Se sigue disputando la salida de la sección Norte por parte del Consejo de Administración y la Sección Norte se defiende ante la Confederación Nacional Cooperativa de la República Mexicana, señalando que si la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio no interviene adecuadamente seguramente habrá derramamiento de sangre.

74. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 20 de abril de 1965. Declaración de Principios de la Cooperativa y conflicto con la Sección del Norte.

“... Se celebró en Tecuala la Asamblea de las secciones de San Cayetano, la Nueva Sirena (Quimichis), Mexicaltítán, San Andrés y Tecuala. El representante de Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, a quien no se esperaba, propuso (y se acordó) asistir a la Asamblea General de Secciones.
Pide que se dé otra oportunidad al gobierno federal para poner orden en la cooperativa.

El representante del Consejo de Vigilancia de la Cooperativa del Sur de Sinaloa, se mostró interesado en desinflar a la Única. Pidió cordura a la Asamblea para escuchar quejas.

76. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1].

Los del Norte controlaban el Consejo de Vigilancia, pero no el de Administración. De esa manera ambos consejeros pugnaban por el derecho a convocar, desconocer, etc.

En oficio del 28 de abril del 65, el Consejo de Administración hace referencia a otro del 10 de abril y argumenta que el Consejo de Vigilancia no tiene atributos para convocar a Asamblea General por lo que desconoce las medidas tomadas argumentando con base en la Ley...

77. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. Abril 28 de 1965.
Informe que da cuenta de la relación entre la Gerencia de la Cooperativa y funcionarios de la Dirección General de Fomento Cooperativo.
De la Federación Regional de Sociedades Cooperativas de la Industria Pesquera del Sur de Sinaloa y Estado de Nayarit.

78. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 12 de junio de 1965.
Acerca de la situación financiera y relación con la Empacadora de Escuinapa y el Banfoco [Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo] más la relación entre la Gerencia General con la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio.

79. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 17 de junio de 1965.
Se dirigieron al Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores para solicitar autorización para hacer modificaciones a las bases Constitutivas antes de la Asamblea General. Después decidieron que no era necesario hacer tales modificaciones en la Asamblea misma.

80. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1].
Tapo: Arte fija de pesca construida a base de palizada que se utiliza para la captura de productos marinos en esteros, bocas de mar y brazos de río. El uso de esta arte fija puede considerarse primitivo, pues los chinos ya se servían de él, desde el siglo II. Definición en “Informe Anual correspondiente al ejercicio 1964”, Sociedad Cooperativa, Tepic, Nayarit, julio de 1965.

81. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 6 de julio de 1966, es excluido el socio Juan Hernández Quintero.

82. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. Julio 2, de 1965.
Previamente al dictamen anterior la Sec., de Boca de Camichín se dirigió a la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio para solicitar su respaldo de integración a la Única ya que pretendan, los de la Única, que no tuvieran en la Asamblea del 31 de julio, para el nombramiento de representantes.

83. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. El 10 de julio de 1965 convocan a Asamblea para cambio de Consejos y Comisiones de la misma. Firman:
Anselmo González Ismerio, Presidente.
Julián Arámbula Castro, Tesorero en funciones de Secretario del Consejo de Administración,
Miguel Calderón Trinidad, Consejo de Vigilancia.
Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez, Gerente General.
En esa Asamblea acordaron por unanimidad que no era necesario reformar las Bases Constitutivas de la Sociedad.
Fue la Cuarta Asamblea General Extraordinaria de la Sociedad representando las 10 secciones que la integran.
Nota: Se reunieron en la Presidencia Municipal. Sele mando copia del acta al Secretario de Industria y Comercio.

84. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 31 de julio de 1965.
Se realiza Asamblea donde se acuerda incorporar a nuevos socios en c/sección así como exclusiones por incumplimiento. Consejo de Administración en ese momento:
Miguel Calderón Trinidad Presidente.
Las diferentes secciones dan cuenta del estado que guarda la relación de socios destacando 4 rubros: bajas por fallecimiento; bajas por renuncia voluntaria; causas graves contra la sociedad y; bajas por no prestar sus servicios a la cooperativa. Éste último es el más amplio en todos los casos.

Sección Costa de Chila, Peñitas y Boca de Ameca, Chacala Municipio de Compostela (24 casos);
José Ma. Morelos, Mexicaltítán (3 casos).
Fraternidad de Pescadores; Tuxpan (6 casos).
Pescadores del Norte de Nayarit, Tecuala (10 casos).
Pescadores y Ostioneros de San Blas y Boca del Asadero (78 casos).
Prof. Roberto Barrios, San Andrés, Municipio., de Santiago (3).
La Nueva Sirena, Quimichis, Municipio., de Tecuala (10 casos) + 9 defunciones + 5 excluidos por causas graves en perjuicio de la Sociedad.
Miguel Hidalgo, Campo de los Limones, Municipio de Santiago Ixc., (3 casos).
Boca de Camichín, Boca del Camichín, Nayarit (4 casos).
Gilberto Flores Muñoz, San Cayetano, Municipio de Tecuala, Nay. (3 casos).

El Director de Fomento Cooperativo, Ing. Luis Mata Sinta, ante el comunicado de la Única de “haberse vendido por anticipado la producción de esta Sociedad Cooperativa, se le manifiesta que para resolver lo que proceda deberá remitir en término de 10 días el contrato correspondiente.

Esta Federación Regional Pesquera se constituyó el día 31 de julio de 1940 en cumplimiento a la Convocatoria girada por la Secretaría de la Economía Nacional (hoy de Industria y Comercio) para agrupar a todas las Sociedades Cooperativas que se encontraban funcionando en la parte Sur de Sinaloa y en el Estado de Nayarit, ello de acuerdo con lo ordenado e el artículo 72 de la Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas que en su texto dice: "Las Sociedades Cooperativas deberán formar parte de las Federaciones y estás de la Confederación Nacional Cooperativa". La Autorización para funcionar concedida a una Sociedad Cooperativa o a una Federación implica su ingreso inmediato a la Federación a la Confederación Nacional según el caso.
"Las antiguas Cooperativas que existían en el Estado de Nayarit formaban parte integrante de esta Federación y al fusionarse estas en una sola por razones económicas creemos que es deber nuestro dirigirnos a ese H. Consejo de Administración..."

Igualmente reclaman el pago de cuotas para la Federación y la Confederación Nacional Cooperativa.

Asunto: Se solicita la intervención del Director para lograr que la Única se incorpore a la Federación Regional de Sociedades Cooperativas de la Industria Pesquera del Sur de Sinaloa ya que así se establece en el artículo 72 de la Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas.

Asunto: Solicitud para reemplazar al Gerente General:

"Cuando el señor Lic. Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez asumió la gerencia general -15 de junio de 1964-, y no obstante que ya desde entonces rea evidente la precaria situación económica de nuestra Cooperativa, confiamos en observar a corto plazo un cambio radical e su Administración. Lamentablemente en lugar de presenciar dicho cambio, hemos visto con desengaño que la situación de la Cooperativa se ha convertido en ruinosa, pues la producción de camarón ha disminuido de mas de 1,000 toneladas a menos de 150 toneladas anuales, con lo cual los gastos de administración vienen a superar cualquier otro renglón económico de la cooperativa.

[...]

... "el señor Lic. Tovar Rodríguez ha guiado todas sus actividades apartándose diametralmente de nuestros legítimos intereses, ya que permite y autoriza a grupos de pescadores libres, la captura del camarón, en zonas señaladas exclusivamente para los socios de la Cooperativa Única. Obran en nuestro poder múltiples pruebas para considerar que esta actitud del señor Lic. Tovar Rodríguez obedece al deseo de satisfacer los propósitos políticos de destacados miembros del Partido Popular Socialista que el mismo ha infiltrado paladinamente en la Administración de nuestra cooperativa y a quienes ha llegado a favorecer económicamente, sustrayendo los recursos que pertenecen legítimamente a nosotros.

Por otra parte, el señor Lic. Tovar Rodríguez ha incurrido también en el gravísimo error de estimular, mediante el clásico soborno, el contrabando del camarón de Nayarit, con el consiguiente perjuicio para nosotros, al autorizar constante y permanentemente la intervención de las gentes que en el Estado se han identificado tradicionalmente como enemigos del Movimiento cooperativo, otorgándoles los permisos correspondientes para que adquieran a espaldas de nuestra Organización, los productos que capturan grupos antagónicos a la Cooperativa Única.

Finalmente como el señor gerente General tambien en completo abandono la responsabilidad que le ha sido encomendada, a pesar de las altas e inmecedas remuneraciones que recibe, las cuales ya no es posible sostenerlas en virtud del estado de bancarrota que sufre la precitada Cooperativa..."

Eutimio Tovar adiciona el anterior con las respuestas. En particular la 3a y la 4a son interesantes:

3) Autorización ara compra de camarón a personas que han sido enemigos de la cooperativa.- La contrata con de la venta del camarón seco se hizo de común acuerdo con los propios consejos a los cuales se les informó lo ventajoso de la operación pues jamás se había logrado un precio tan favorable como lo que es esta ocasión se obtuvo. La afirmación a personas que han sido enemigos de la Cooperativa" los allí presentes no lo pudieron probar, y lo que es mas no supieron a ciencia cierta el origen del cargo.

4) Autorización para capturar camarón en aguas de la Cooperativa.- La existencia de
pescadores libres es una realidad impuesta a la cooperativa que ha originado serios problemas a la misma, pudiéndose mencionar entre ellos el fuerte contrabando originado por la venta que los pescadores libres venían haciendo a comerciantes clandestinos, esta contrabando ha sido disminuido considerablemente a partir de cuando la Cooperativa pro medio de convenios con diversos ejidos y de común acuerdo con los Consejos de Administración y Vigilancia celebró para que capturaran en zonas marginales y entregaran el producto así obtenido a la misma. La cooperativa con esta practica no persigue un fin lucrativo sino una medida de control por ello consideramos que los pescadores libres son jurídicamente hablando trabajadores asalariados que realizan un trabajo extraordinario y cobran por destajo situación prevista e el artículo 62 de la Ley de la Materia.

5) En cuanto a la acusación estar formando ejidos, considera la acusación infundada.

Asunto: Queja sobre el desempeño del Lic. Eutimio Tovar, Gerente General de la Única.

92. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 9 de febrero de 1966.
El Director General de Fomento Cooperativo, Jorge Montufar Sánchez, comisionó a Lic. Pedro I. Millán Loaiza para que inspeccione el funcionamiento de la cooperativa.
Se analizará:
1º. Relación de socios y su evaluación desde el inicio a esa fecha.
2º. Utilización de personal asalariado para actividades sociales o administrativas en los términos de la Ley de Cooperativas.
3º. Inventario del mobiliario y equipo señalando cuáles de estos bienes pertenecen a c/u de las cooperativas extintas que integran la asociación.
4º. Si ha sido constituido los fondos de reserva y previsión social.
5º. Si se ha formulado el Reglamento Interior de Trabajo de la Cooperativa.
6º. Si se han practicado los balances generales correspondientes de los ejercicios sociales de 1963 y 1964.
7º. Si la elección de directivos se realizó en Asamblea General, etc., legal.
8º. Si los Consejos celebran juntas reglamentarias.
9º. Si la contabilidad se lleva en libros precisando situación de ingresos y egresos.
10º. Si las personas que tienen a su cargo fondos y bienes de la cooperativa causando el manejo de los mismos.
11º. Si ha corregido las irregularidades en su funcionamiento encontradas en la inspección anterior.

93. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. Sólo 7 de los 1274 socios han cubierto sus certificados de aportación, etc. En el informe se da cuenta de que no se han atendido esos puntos y se ha contravenido la Ley

94. LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1].
Dato: Además de la Dirección de Fomento Cooperativo existía el Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo SA de CV el cual se hacía cargo a través de un interventor, en apoyo a la Cooperativa, marzo de 1966.

95. CAJA NO. 11, LEGAJO NO. IX. De: Luis Bravo Aguilera, Director General de Industrias.

Asunto: "Por ser asunto de su competencia, anexo a la presente escrito de fecha 1o. de febrero del actual, de la Sociedad" [...] "solicitan la destitución" del Gerente General de la Cooperativa única de pescadores Lic. Tovar Rodríguez.


"Acordamos lo siguiente:

1.- Suspender los trabajos de buceo de Ostión en vista de que los ingresos que estamos dejando, el Gerente General de la Sociedad los está invirtiendo para agitaciones dividiendo en varias secciones a los socios, creando en nuestros compañeros un gran perjuicio poniendo en peligro a nuestros coasociados hasta ver que haya sangre. En la sección José María Morelos de Mexcaltitán se presentó un sañarrancho a consecuencia de los dineros que el Lic. Tovar proporciona a elementos que compren la conciencia de socios a base de embragarlos, como lo podemos comprobar con el cheque que le fue extendido a Miguel Zavala Ruvalcaba por la cantidad de $1,000.00 que lleva el No. 2078282 del Banco Nacional de México SA sin poder precisar las cantidades que ha venido distribuyendo desde el día 27 del de enero a esta fecha, valiéndose de socios débiles que se restan pata entorpecer las gestiones de los consejos de Administración y Vigilancia.

2.- Los trabajos de buceo de Ostión acordamos reanudarlos en el preciso momento en que las autoridades correspondientes ordenen el cese del Lic. Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez como Gerente General de esta Sociedad Cooperativa, porque consideramos que es la forma que vuelva la tranquilidad en las secciones. Firman Juan Pérez Altamirano y Juan Ponce Herrera.


Asunto: Litigio en contra del Gerente General.

"Acordamos lo siguiente:

1.- Suspender los trabajos de buceo de Ostión en vista de que los ingresos que estamos dejando, el Gerente General de la Sociedad los está invirtiendo para agitaciones dividiendo en varias secciones a los socios, creando en nuestros compañeros un gran perjuicio poniendo en peligro a nuestros coasociados hasta ver que haya sangre. En la sección José María Morelos de Mexcaltitán se presentó un sañarrancho a consecuencia de los dineros que el Lic. Tovar proporciona a elementos que compren la conciencia de socios a base de embragarlos, como lo podemos comprobar con el cheque que le fue extendido a Miguel Zavala Ruvalcaba por la cantidad de $1,000.00 que lleva el No. 2078282 del Banco Nacional de México SA sin poder precisar las cantidades que ha venido distribuyendo desde el día 27 del de enero a esta fecha, valiéndose de socios débiles que se restan pata entorpecer las gestiones de los consejos de Administración y Vigilancia.

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Asunto: Desconocimiento de un grupo llamado Consejo de Defensa de la Cooperativa Única con aproximadamente el 20% de los socios mediante acta del 21 de febrero de 1966. "Porque dado que las firmas no están debidamente protocolizadas ante autoridades reconocidas, han sido enviadas a la dependencia del registro nacional cooperativo para que revise la
autenticidad de las mismas, también para que certifique si los firmantes son socios de la Cooperativa.


Asunto: "III.- Hacer del conocimiento de la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio y de la Dirección de Fomento Cooperativo, nuestra inconformidad total con la actuación del gerente de esta sociedad, Licenciado Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez, en vista de la precaria situación en que vive la misma y del ambiente de agitación que priva en todas sus secciones en contra de dicho Gerente, pidiéndose al C. Secretario de Industria y Comercio a inmediata destitución del Lic. Tovar Rodríguez, sin perjuicio de que se interrumpa la Auditoria que se está practicando... IV.- En vista de la labor divisionista que han venido desarrollando los socios Miguel Zavala Ruvalcaba, Alejandro Estrada Guzmán, Luis Loza Miramontes, Medardo Muñoz González, Albano Virgen González, Refugio Lerma Rivera y Eligio Rivera Ramírez, este Consejo acuerda su exclusión cuyo efecto deberá someterse a la consideración de la H. Asamblea General, para que sea ella quien resuelva en definitiva."


Asunto: "De acuerdo a lo estipulado en el Capítulo VI de las Bases Constitutivas que rigen a nuestra Cooperativa, nos estamos dirigiendo a Ud. basados en la Cláusula 28 y de fracción XII que dice:

"Deberá formular el Balance General al fin de cada ejercicio social con la obligación de darlo a conocer al Consejo de Administración de la Sociedad, a más tardar un mes después de terminado el mismo."

"Como hasta la fecha han transcurrido más de 37 días de los señalados por las bases constitutivas y Usted no ha dado cumplimiento, nos estamos permitiendo dirigirle la presente para que nos informe los motivos por los cuales no lo ha hecho."


Asunto: Se les excluye de la Cooperativa por faltas en los estatutos.


Asunto: Eutimio responde a las "calumnias" de que ha sido objeto.


Asunto: Informe sobre el funcionamiento de la Cooperativa en donde recomienda la destitución del Gerente General.


Asunto: Reiteran sus comunicados anteriores para solicitar que "deje de ser Gerente General de nuestra Cooperativa el Sr. Lic. Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez".
Asunto: solicitan un crédito por habilitación, para la preparación de los trabajos de la zafra: $784,300.00.

Asunto: Suplican su intervención en relación al Sr. Aarón Castillo (Comisionado interventor del Banco de Fomento Cooperativo), quien se ha coludido con el Gerente General y además ha pretendido disponer de $146,000.00 como producto de la venta ilegal de camarón. no se ha acreditado ante el presidente y el consejo de administración en general y porque varias veces a llegado en estado de ebriedad.

Asunto: Entrega un guión de actividades para mejorar la organización de la Única.

Asunto: Informar de lo siguiente:
1o. El valor de la producción pesquera de esta cooperativa presenta en la actualidad la siguiente composición:
   a) Camarón ....65%    b) ostión...........26% c) Otras Especies....9%
2o. Por cuanto al volumen, costo y valor de la producción camaronera se refiere, su tendencia ha sido la siguiente:
   TENDENCIAS DE ZAFRAS CAMARONERAS
   AÑOS VOLUMEN ANTICIPOS COSTO TOTAL
3o. Como se podrá observar en tanto la producción marca una tendencia descendente, la inversión en términos generales ha sido estable y por la consiguiente los costos has sido ascendentes.
   La situación anterior ha originado, en la producción de camarón los resultados siguientes:
   5o. la causa de estos resultados, como ya se vio en el cuadro anterior, se debe a una producción decreciente que, contando con una inversión fija genera costos crecientes.
   6o. Para corregir lo anterior se tiene el propósito de modificar sustancialmente el suministro de anticipos, sustituyendo el sistema de anticipo fijo por día, por el de anticipo fijo por unidad de producción entregada por cada Sección productora; de esta manera la erogación que haga la cooperativa estará en función del producto que reciba y su inversión estará asegurada.
   7o. La cooperativa Única, desde 1961 en que fue constituida por el gobierno Federal, ha venido recibiendo créditos de habilitación para sus zafras camaroneras de las siguientes instituciones:
   8o. Es necesario hacer notar que toda producción por más aleatoria que sea, si la inversión que se hace está debidamente planeada y el mercado del producto asegurado, la inversión estará plenamente garantizada.*
   Por las razones anteriores solicitan un crédito de habilitación de 3'000,000.00

110. CAJA NO. 11, LEGAJO NO. IX. De: Eutimio Tovar y el Consejo de administración. Para:

Asunto: Debido a que la producción original ha descendido de 1500 ton anuales a 600-800 tons, debido al azolvamiento de Bocas, Canales y Esteros, solicitan se les auxilie con una draga para desazolvarlas.


Asunto: Le dirigimos el presente escrito en representación de las Secciones camaroneras "La Nueva Sirena", "José Ma. Morelos", "Pescadores del Norte de Nayarit", "Prof. Roberto Barrios" y "Fraternidad de Pescadores", integrantes de la Cooperativa... para respectivamente exponerle lo siguiente:

Finalmente informamos a usted que con motivo del dinero que los Presidentes de los consejos e Interventor repartieron en las cuatro Secciones camaroneras, se ha originado lo siguiente:

1o.) La derrama de dinero se llevo a cabo con finalidades de propaganda política para la próxima Asamblea General.

2o.) Debido a lo anterior el dinero se repartió a socios que hasta esa fecha no habían participado en los trabajos, par que desde el punto de vista de los propósitos de los Consejos les convenía.

3o.) En cambio a los grupos que no les eran afectos, no le proporcionaron un sólo centavo, no obstante que en algunas secciones, como la Nueva Sirena, que se llevaban más de cuatro decenas trabajadas y se han hecho trabajos muy importantes a la fecha no han recibido absolutamente nada de anticipos.

4o.) Nosotros esperábamos que al regreso del Gerente se nos pudiera resolver nuestro problema pero se nos ha informado que debido a un Convenio ha perdido sus facultades para resolver por sí sólo los problemas como antes lo venía haciendo, esta situación no la entendemos toda vez que las Bases Constitutivas de nuestra Sociedad están vigentes.

Expuesto lo anterior de la manera más atenta pedimos a usted:

1o) Se le den instrucciones al Interventor para que resuelva favorablemente nuestra petición con la urgencia que el caso requiere, ya que de parte del Gerente, según nos lo ha manifestado no hay inconveniente.

2o) Que esa Institución a su muy digno cargo [...] Presidente que los pagadores sean socios, a condición de que llenen los requisitos de otorgar fianzas y sea supervisada la aplicación correcta de los fondos proporcionados."


Asunto: Con esta fecha recibí carta del Presidente del Consejo de Administración de la Sociedad ... cuyo contenido me permito transcribir a usted:

"Por medio del presente le estoy comunicando a usted de manera muy atenta, lo que estaba ocurriendo en la Sección José Ma. Morelos, Norte de Nayarit, Nueva Sirena y Prof. Roberto Barrios respectivamente. En las secciones de referencia se esta llevando a cabo un fuerte tarrayo por habitantes de esos lugres y como debe entenderse perjudican grandemente los intereses de nuestra organización ya que dicho camarón no esta debidamente desarrollado así como obstaculizan el paso libre de las avenidas de las larvas que e estos meses están entrando en los esteros y cañadas. Creo justificado y por demás necesario mandar de inmediato la vigilancia para evitar la fuga de dicho crustáceo."

"Cada año se viene presentando el mismo problema, razón por la cual le Dirección General de Pesca amplía su vigilancia para detener la captura de camarón durante la época de veda ya que en su mayor parte este crustáceo no ha llegado a su completo desarrollo..."

Asunto: Solicitan que revoque los nombramientos que expidió el 22 del presente [de representantes] y nos preste toda clase de facilidades para llevar adelante la ejecución de los trabajos previos a la zafra camaronera que se aproxima.


Asunto: El interventor contesta un oficio anterior en donde se le acusa de estar creando problemas y obstáculos a la empresa.

"Como las facultades que la Cláusula 27 le otorgan, las ejerce usted en forma unilateral y omnimoda, se olvida de las obligaciones que ha contraído como Gerente de esta Cooperativa y actúa unipersonalmente, pretendiendo ignorar la situación irregular que usted mismo ha creado en la Cooperativa.


Asunto: Falta de cumplimiento del Gerente General: En escrito que dirigí al Lic. Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez, Gerente General de la Sociedad Cooperativa, con fecho 25 del presente para que me informara sobre la venta que hizo de 6 toneladas de camarón seco comprometiendo la producción de la próxima zafra, y la distribución total de ese dinero que fueron $120,000.00

Esta venta la hizo sin tomar encuentro ni a los consejos de Administración y Vigilancia de la Cooperativa, ni al Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo, ni a la Empacadora de Escuinapa, digo estos dos últimos de acuerdo con los contratos que el mismo tiene firmados en 1965.

Señor Ministro, me atrevo a pedirle cuentas al Gerente, no obstante las cláusulas 27 y 27 de las Bases constitutivas [...] Apoyándome en la cláusula 5 de las mismas bases que dice ..."El Consejo de Vigilancia ejercerá la supervisión de todas las actividades de la Sociedad y como hasta la fecha no he tenido respuesta y el dinero de esta venta esta fuera de control de la Cooperativa según informes del Contador el cual dice que no ha sido pasado ese dinero a Contabilidad para proceder a su registro, me dirijo a Usted [...] ya que todos los Gerentes que ha tenido la Cooperativa han sido nombrados por la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, de acuerdo con la Cláusula 28 de las Bases Constitutivas de la Sociedad, estos no han tomado en cuenta los puntos: 10 que dice ..."depositará el numerario de la Sociedad en una institución de crédito ..., y 11 que dice ..."el Gerente de la Sociedad debe caucionar su manejo."


Asunto: Se le solicitan cuentas al Gerente General por la venta que hizo de 6 toneladas de camarón seco por $120,000.00.


Asunto: Niega haber tenido conocimiento de la transacción a que alude el Sr. Eutimio Tovar. Esta transacción, se menciona en el oficio, fue realizada a espaldas del Interventor. Considera como dolosa la información que ofreció Eutimio Tovar.

Asunto: "La Secretaría de Industria y Comercio mandó un Inspector a que se enterara de los hechos y quedó comprobada nuestra acusación, favoreciéndonos a los Consejos de Administración y Vigilancia; para mejor satisfacción de las propias autoridades de Industria y Comercio los consejos pedimos al Banco de Fomento Cooperativa de acuerdo con sus intereses, que esta Cooperativa maneje, se hiciera una Auditoria formal para conocer a fondo todas las lacras de nuestra Sociedad, pues los únicos informes para nosotros son las Memorias y Balance de los Gerentes, esta auditoria costó a la Cooperativa $115,000.00 lo que aparenta ser muy caro, pero que al fin resultó benéfica porque encontró una deuda de $750,000.00 que la Empacadora de Escuinapa SA no quería reconocernos, y en las aclaraciones que hizo el Auditor, fueron reconocidas al fin y servirán para el abono de la misma Empacadora, además fueron confirmadas nuestras sospechas y aunque a al fecha no tenemos la Auditoria en nuestras manos porque se encuentra en poder de Banco de Fomento Cooperativo y de la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, ahí tenemos conocimiento por parte que nos fue leída que las Responsabilidades al Gerente pasan de $1,000,000.00."


Asunto: Esta Gerencia se permite comunicar a Usted lo siguiente:

1o. En Julio de 1961 ...

2o.- Posteriormente dentro de la zona concesionada a la cooperativa Única, surgieron dotaciones ejidales viniendo a provocar un conflicto (OWG), por cuanto a la especie reservada del camarón se refiere, en virtud de que los nuevos núcleos de población reclaman para sí e camarón que capturan dentro de los perímetros ejidales.

3o.- La existencia por tanto, e los pescadores libres ha sido una realidad impuesta a la cooperativa, que ha originado entre otros problemas, el fuerte contrabando de camarón seco en la Entidad.

4o.- La cooperativa con el propósito de combatir este contrabando, ha iniciado en las últimas dos zafras un cercamiento con los pescadores libres celebrando convenios para que capturen temporalmente en algunas zonas marginales y entreguen el producto a un precio convenido a la sociedad. Con esta medida tomada se ha dado un fuerte golpe al contrabando, pues en el primer año se lograron controlar 152 toneladas con un valor de $2,300.00, generando una utilidad de $742,913.45; y en la zafra 1965 a pesar del desastre ocurrido en la zona debido a las fuertes inundaciones, se lograron controlar 100 toneladas con un valor de $1,907,544.50 originando una utilidad de $1,020,206.00"

[Nota OWG: En el conflicto entre el Gerente General y el Consejo de Administración uno de los aspectos esenciales residía en la función del Gerente General como "representante" de los pescadores. Muchas veces una persona ajena a la idiosincrasia y cultura de la gente. El gerente general era por lo regular una persona de fuera de Nayarit nombrado por el Secretario de Industria y Comercio por lo que generalmente respondía a los intereses del "centro". Este mecanismo ha operado en la historia política de México desde la época de Porfirio Díaz. Ha sido la forma tradicional por medio de la cual los "caciques" y hombres fuertes se aseguran el control de las organizaciones].


Asunto: El gerente general solicita urgentemente girar instrucciones a fin de que el interventor del Banco suspenda sus actividades que no le corresponden como son: haber suspendido la derrama de dinero que en las sección; que suspenda actividades de carácter administrativo que corresponden directamente a la Gerencia; que se limite a la supervisión de los trabajos de campo y no a su ejecución.
121. Sin Fecha. Asunto: En el conflicto entre el Gerente General y el Consejo de Administración uno de los aspectos esenciales residía en la función del Gerente General como "representante" de los pescadores. Muchas veces una persona ajena a la idiosincrasia y cultura de la gente. El gerente general era por lo regular una persona de fuera de Nayarit nombrado por el Secretario de Industria y Comercio por lo que generalmente respondía a los intereses del "centro". Este mecanismo ha operado en la historia política de México desde la época de Porfirio Díaz. Ha sido la forma tradicional por medio de la cual los "caciques" y hombres fuertes se aseguran el control de las organizaciones.


Asunto: "Con relación a Memorándum de fecha 17 del pasado mes de junio que esta Gerencia sometió a la atenta consideración de Usted, me permito hacer referencia especial a la última consideración expuesta e el escrito de referencia y que se refiere a que se precise cuáles deben ser las facultades: del Gerente General, de los Consejos y del Interventor; y para tal caso me permito hacer las siguientes consideraciones:

1o.- de la Gerencia General.

De conformidad con el artículo 63 de la Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas, la Cooperativa Única es de Intervención Oficial, esta Intervención se efectúa a través del Gerente General quien por disposición de las cláusulas 27a y 28a de las Bases Constitutivas, es designado por el C. Presidente de la República asumiendo las facultades de dirección, administración y vigilancia de la Sociedad en su conjunto. El Gerente General es el vehículo mediante el cual el Gobierno Federal interviene de manera directa en la cooperativa; pugnando por su desarrollo y vigilando la explotación racional e integral de los bienes que por mandato de nuestra Constitución son del dominio directo de la Nación, bienes que simplemente se concesionan a las Cooperativas por su explotación y beneficio.

2o.- De los Consejos de Administración y Vigilancia.

[...]


Asunto: El gerente general solicita urgentemente girar instrucciones a fin de que el interventor del Banco suspenda sus actividades que no le corresponden como son: haber suspendido la derrama de dinero que en las sección; que suspenda actividades de carácter administrativo que corresponden directamente a la Gerencia; que se limite a la supervisión de los trabajos de campo y no ha su ejecución.


Asunto: Nuevamente se solicita la intervención del Presidente para la destitución del gerente General y se extiende la acusación al anterior Presidente del Consejo de Administración.


Asunto: En reunión en Cañada del Tabaco el 2 de mayo de los miembros de esta organización apoyan las demandas de los pescadores de la Única de destituir de manera inmediata al Gerente General.
127. CAJA NO. 11, LEGAJO NO. IX. De: Todos los funcionarios de la Única y el interventor. Tipo de Documento: Acta. Fecha: 13/VII/1966

Asunto: Se acordó que los fondos que se reciban de las secciones deberán ser manejados con firmas mancomunadas del Gerente, el Presidente del Consejo de Administración e Interventor.


Asunto: Solicitan audiencia con el Presidente de la República para mostrarle las prueban en contra del Gerente General.


Asunto: Valoración del cambio a las Bases constitutivas de la Única. Solicita que sea el Subsecretario B de la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio quien valore si debe modificarse o no los artículos 27 y 28 en donde por razones políticas especiales de la administración anterior se le otorga al presidente de la república facultades que violan la Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas al otorgarle facultades para nombrar al Gerente General con funciones amplísimas.


Asunto: "Me estoy dirigiendo a usted en mi carácter de Presidente dl Consejo de Administración de esta Sociedad... para informarle que en junto de Consejos Celebrada el día 15 del presente mes, según consta en el libro de actas, se tomó el acuerdo de suspender el sueldo que percibe como Gerente General de esta Sociedad, al Lic. Eutimio Tovar Rodríguez, de acuerdo con la suspensión de facultades como Gerente que fue dictada el día 11 del presente mes por la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio."


Asunto: Me permito comunicarle que por instrucciones expresas del C. Secretario del Ramo, se confirma a usted que continúa siendo Gerente de ese organismo cooperativo, con todas las facultades y obligaciones inherentes al nombramiento que le fue expedido con fecha 15 de junio de 1964, por el entonces Subsecretario B, C Lic. Hugo B Margin."


Asunto: Se nombre como Auditor Interno a Esteban González Garza.


Asunto: Solicita al Gerente General que sea retirado el interventor pues desde que fue reinstalad en sus funciones estos se la han pasado discutiendo "estamos enfrascados en una serie de penosas discusiones, viéndonos obligados a levantar actas circunstanciadas dada la gravedad de los hechos; como fue el caso de que le señor Interventor una vez que supo mi
reinstalación, sustrajo todas las formas que se requiere para el manejo de la producción, ocultándolas en la Oficina de los consejos y después en las gavetas de su escritorio,..."


Asumo: Proyecto de actas y Bases Constitutivas de la Sociedad Cooperativa de Producción Pesquera "Unica de Pescadores del Estado de Nayarit..."

En el proyecto el art. 27 queda redactado de la siguiente forma: "La dirección, administración y vigilancia de la Sociedad estarán a cargo del Gerente General..." En suma no cambia las funciones del Gerente General.


Asunto: "Tuve a la vista el Informe del Movimiento de Fondos habido ... apareciendo en el referido informe, partidas por concepto de ventas de camarón, que usted efectuó sin conocimiento y consentimiento del suscrito."

NOTA: para dirimir en la controversia entre el Interventor y el Gerente General se nombró a Jorge F. Mantufar S. El interventor y el Consejo de Administración manejaron fondos de la Sociedad en tanto que se instruyó por parte del Banfoco a la Empacadora de Escuinapa, para que se rectifique el que el Gerente General no podrá hacer ningún retiro de fondos sin la autorización de los consejos y en cambio estos últimos sí podrán hacerlo el Interventor y el Consejo de Administración.


Asunto: Disputa con el Gerente General. Interpusieron Amparo en contra de la decisión del Secretario para reinstalar al Gerente General mismo que fue resuelto por el Juez 2o. de Distrito a favor del Consejo de Administración. Se ordenó que las cosas quedaran en el estado en que se encontraban. Solicitan por ello el manejo de los fondos y la producción, etc. Sin embargo, la situación era que el Juez "niega la suspensión definitiva solicitada por la Sociedad Cooperativa". En este sentido, el Gerente General continuó en funciones.

Hacia diciembre de 1966 se habla de una reestructuración completa de la Sociedad, ordenada por la Dirección de Fomento Cooperativo.


Asunto: Ven con buenos ojos la reestructuración de la Sociedad: "estamos enterados de la buena voluntad de esa dependencia ... para practicar una auditoría y la depuración de la Sociedad ya que consideramos que dadas las circunstancias por las que atraviesa esta Cooperativa, en la reciente zafra que acaba de terminar, hubo demasiados derrames de dinero sin lograrse ningún provecho de los mismos.- Derrame que hizo Empacadora de Escuinapa de acuerdo con los Representantes Seccionales, sin tomar en cuenta la Administración de esta Cooperativa."

Solicitan que se envíe I mas pronto posible a la Comisión auditora y depuradora.


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Asunto: Obran en poder de la Empacadora documentos que acreditan la venta de Camarón apastillado en venta directa a los señores con fecha de 25 de octubre (9,276 kgrs.). Esto viola los contratos de la Sociedad con la Empresa que obliga a esta a vender la totalidad de los productos a Empacadora de Escuinapa. "Queremos recordarle también que sobre estas ventas, la Cooperativa deberá reportarnos los descuentos que señalan nuestros contratos por abono de los créditos que se nos adeudan."

139. LEGAJO I BIS. De la Sección de San Blas y Boca de Asadero se registro en la zafra 1966 un remanente total de $28,278.99 c/u (59 socios).

Sec. Norte $310,323.41 c/u (16 socios)
Sec. Roberto Barrios $1,700.00 c/u (169 socios)
Sec. Gilberto Flores M. $768.56 c/u (42 socios)
Fraternidad de Pescadores $800.00 por cada uno (24 socios).

Promedio de días trabajados durante la zafra: 95.

2. The epoch of the council of administration: a different corporatism.
(AGN: Boxes 11 to 13)

2.1. The Transition (1967 1973)

Entre enero – mayo de 1967 se consolida la reestructuración desapareciendo la figura del Gerente General. En mayo se destituye a todos los representantes seccionales y se nombran otros.


Asunto: "Como miembros de la agrupación que acertadamente dirige ...
"En más de 33 años de cooperativismo pesquero en Nayarit, personas sin escrúpulos han intervenido para traficar y corromper a nuestros dirigentes y miembros de base; un grupo de socios conscientes se que la riqueza ... hemos venido luchando hasta el presente periodo administrativo en que por primera vez logramos expulsar del poder a los elementos corruptos que mal dirigen a nuestra cooperativa.

Durante nuestra gestión administrativa (dos años) que está feneciendo, logramos importantes avances en beneficio de los socios ... es la primera vez que no hubo pérdidas y logramos el reparto de utilidades ($1,043, 210.84) que fe entregado con equidad entre los socios nuestros.

[...]

Los motivos que nos obligan a distraerlo de sus ocupaciones, por el momento, es solicitar el apoyo para nuestra sociedad por ser miembro de esa nuestra querida central la CNOP y evitar la acción de elementos aventureros ligados a los intereses de traficantes de camarón como los caos recientes de un individuo de nombre Jesús Delgadillo Salazar, que se dice periodista, par encubrir sus actividades pagadas por esos negociantes y el caso de una señora Josefina Cárdenas, en contubernio con el Diputado Francisco Andraca Malda, representante del Estado de Guerrero, hermano del Sr. Othon Andraca Malda, este último expulsado por nosotros del puesto Subgerente de esta cooperativa por sus inescrupulosos manejos en el año de 1964. Estas personas aliadas a otras que denunciaremos ante usted personalmente, están creando agitaciones y divisiones, alentando grupos campesinos con el pretext de organizarlos en cooperativas para que saqueen nuestras pesquerías y sus productos..."
141.- Lista de Asistencia a la Asamblea General Extraordinaria celebrada el 20 de junio de 1967:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sección</th>
<th>Asistieron</th>
<th>No. de Miembros de la Sección</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boca de Camichín</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel Hidalgo</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraternidad de Pescadores</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa de Chila y Boca de Ameca</td>
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<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Nueva Sirena</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Nayarit</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Roberto Barrios</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Ma. Morelos</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostonioneros de San Blas y Boca de Asadero</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilberto Flores Muñoz</td>
<td>[42]</td>
<td>[42]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>828</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,216(*) 1,257</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) No contabilizaron en el cálculo a la sección de Gilberto Flores Muñoz. El paréntesis cuadrado corrige el total.

142.- En julio 10 de 1967 (junio 20), se celebró la Asamblea convocada por los Presidentes de Administración y Vigilancia. El 20 del mismo mes, se celebró la Asamblea por los disidentes en donde se nombraron otros funcionarios. Se destituyó igualmente a los anteriores: los nuevos funcionarios del Consejo de Administración son:

Presidente, Eligio Rivero Ramírez,
Secretario, Alejandro Estrada Guzmán,
Tesorero, Jesús Cisneros Prado,
Del Consejo de Vigilancia:
Presidente: J. Félix Inda Durán,
Secretario: J. Jesús Ramírez
Secretario: Genaro Castañeda Ruiz,

143.- Los nuevos funcionarios (legalmente) elegidos el 10 de julio (o 20 de junio), son:

Consejo de Administración:
Presidente: Francisco Galindo Beltrán,
Secretario: Pedro González Beltrán,
Tesorero: Santos Soto Ceja.
Del Consejo de Vigilancia:
Presidente: Alfonso Andrade,
Secretario: Martín García Salazar.

LEGRAJO I BIS
2 de diciembre de 1967.
Sr. José Jiménez Martínez es nombrado representante general de la Sección del Norte, siendo presidente de la Cooperativa Francisco Galindo Reyes y Gobernador del Estado Julián Gastón Mercado.

LEGAJO I BIS. Julio de 1968.
Conflicto: Destitución de Francisco Galindo Reyes como Presidente de la Cooperativa siendo Pedro González Beltrán y J. Santos Soto Ceja Secretario y Tesorero respectivamente.

LEGAJO I BIS. [¿1968?]. La sección Flores Muñoz estaba en San Cayetano.

LEGAJO I BIS. [¿1968?]. Controlaban también permisos para ostión.

LEGAJO VII CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 8 de julio de 1968.
Conflicto entre la Cooperativa y Ejidatarios de Santiago Ixc., para otorgar permisos afectando a 305 ejidatarios

LEGAJO VII, CAJA NO. 11, [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. [¿1968 Julio?] Los problemas con Galindo comenzaron por mal manejo de recursos, plantea mermas en el remanente que se explican por pagos al personal. (incluye camarón y escama).

Nota periodística (julio de 1968) en El Sol de Tepic, sobre conflicto en la cooperativa por malos manejos de los representantes y compadrazgo. (Sección Norte)

8 de septiembre de 1968.
Servicio de Vigilancia Oficial a nuestros representantes para que no los molesten a uds., (Ejido de Santa Cruz y Anexo, Puerta de Palapares, Municipio., Santiago) en la captura de camarón, mismo que será entregado a la cooperativa al precio de $10.00 por kgr., quedando un remanente de $3.00 que será entregado al final de la temporada.
Atentamente,
Consejo de Administración.

Acta de exclusión de socios Félix Inda Durán y Juan Hernández Quintero.

30 de septiembre de 1968.
Conflictos. Se priva a la Sec. José María Morelos de Mexcaltitán, la captura. Se taparon los canales por instrucciones de los directivos.

1968: El camarón se entrega al Consejo de Administración y a la Empacadora de Escuinapa SA.

LEGAJO I BIS. Septiembre-agosto de 1968.
Acerca de la estructura y las funciones del Consejo de Administración y etc., de la cooperativa.

156.- LEGAJO I BIS. [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. Octubre de 1968.
Conflicto por mal manejo del camarón en Sección Norte.

157.- LEGAJO I BIS. [14/623.2(723.2)/1]
Noviembre de 1968. Sueldo para el interventor de la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio en la Cooperativa: $3,000.00 + $150.00 para viáticos.

158.- LEGAJO I BIS [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 4 de noviembre de 1968.
Se otorga permiso a la Cooperativa para la captura de Tortuga.

159.- LEGAJO I BIS [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 31 de diciembre de 1968.
La CNC (Augusto Gómez Villanueva) interviene para solicitar a través de la Dirección de Fomento Cooperativo de la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, “a fin de lograr un entendimiento para la captura de camarón dentro de los linderos de los ejidos del Municipio, de Santiago Ixc., Nay. (fue aceptado).

160.- LEGAJO I BIS. [14/623.2(723.2)/1]. 21 de enero de 1969.
Los informes de las zafras se dirigían a la Dirección General de Fomento Cooperativo por la Confederación Nacional Campesina, después se enviaba para su conocimiento una copia a la misma cooperativa con Dirección en E. Zapata 216 norte, Tepic.


162.- Agosto 30 del 69 (De la Asamblea del 17 de julio).
**Nuevo** Consejo de Administración:
Presidente: José Santos Soto Ceja,
Secretario: Ignacio Pérez Tello,
Tesorero: Enrique Fernández Rodríguez
Comité de Organización de la Producción: Martín García Salazar,
Comité de Contabilidad e Inversión: Epitafio Rodríguez Castro.
Consejo de Vigilancia:
Presidente: Vicente Sandoval Jiménez,
Secretario: Marcelino Márquez Uribe,
Vocal: Julián Arámbula Castro.

163.- LEGAJO I BIS. 23 de diciembre de 1969.
Causa efecto el recurso de amparo promovido por la Cooperativa contra la sentencia dictada y promovida por autoridades para “cancelar los permisos de pesca que se habían otorgado y los cuales estaban en vigor, así como los actos que de manera inminente tendían a otorgar permisos de pesca sobre la misma zona marítima a ejidatarios de la comunidad agraria de Santa Cruz. Se puso fin al amparo el 5 de junio del 68.”
164.- Un comentario importante:
Durante todo el periodo fue reiterada la queja de la pesca ilegal. Algunos documentos mencionaban que del total de la producción del Estado de Nayarit aproximadamente la mitad de la producción total registrada oficialmente era ilegal.
Durante todo el periodo fue recurrente el asunto de los pescadores libres.
En 1970, 500 firmantes del ejido de Pericos solicita formar una Cooperativa. Antes se habían suscitado problemas en Santa Cruz, Cuautla, etc.

165.- 25 de marzo de 1970. Caja 13
La Federación Regional de Sociedades Cooperativas pide intervención de la secretaría de Industria y Comercio para que la Única aporte sus cuotas.

166.- 5 de julio de 1970. Caja 13
Protocolización del acta de asamblea del 3 de julio de 1979.

167.- Con Echeverría como Presidente de la República, fue nombrado el Lic. Jorge F. Mantufer Sánchez como Director General de Fomento Cooperativo.

168.- Asamblea General del 27 de julio de 1971.
CONSEJO DE ADMINISTRACIÓN
Presidente.- Silvino Lora Martínez, Destituido en noviembre.
Secretario.- Ignacio López García, Sustituyó a Silvino en noviembre como Secretario en funciones de Presidente.
Tesorero.- Ramón Aguirre Moreno.

CONSEJO DE VIGILANCIA
Presidente.- Enrique Hernández Rodríguez,
Secretario.- Martín García Salazar,
Vocal.- Cayetano Gómez Navarro.

169.- 21 de marzo de 1972. Caja 13
La cooperativa acordó transformarse en Cooperativa de Participación Estatal. [Pero este cambio no parece que fue aceptado por las autoridades, sin embargo expresa el ambiente prevaleciente a partir del cambio de administración federal]

170.- 23 de marzo de 1972. Caja 13
Diario Oficial. Copia donde se les entrega el distrito de acuacultura a la Única.

171.- 24 de marzo de 1972. Caja 13
Se reforman las bases constitutivas en el sentido de convertirse en Cooperativa de Participación Estatal.
172.- 3 de noviembre de 1972. Caja 13
Conflicto de la sección José María Morelos.

CONSEJO DE ADMINISTRACIÓN
Presidente.- Ignacio López García.
Secretario.- Margarito González Ponce.
Tesorero.- Juan José Martínez Serrano
CONSEJO DE VIGILANCIA
Presidente.- Miguel Calderón Trinidad.
Secretario.- Gabino Guzmán.
Vocal.- Ramón Montes Cárdenas.

Compre-venta de camarón por terceros. Exportaciones (copia 117-118).

176.- 22 de septiembre de 1973. Caja 13
Compra venta de la producción de la Única.1973-1974 con Representaciones Pesqueras A.P.

177.- 1973. Caja 13


Problemas ejidales
El ejido de Santa Cruz pide su incorporación de socio como una sección más. Ya tenían antes una cooperativa, “Amador Reyes”. Reclaman el uso de los recursos por dotación ejidal del 12 de agosto de 1936 que les autorizó el usufructo de aguas saladas, marinas y esteros.... comprendidos dentro de los límites del ejido. (folio 77).


Las autoridades piden que demuestren que todo está en regla acerca de la compra-venta de tortuga.

182.- Caja 13
El ejido de Mexcallitán se queja por que no los apoyan. Pide que ingresen más socios en su cooperativa. El documento da muestra de la retórica de los líderes en general.
3. The new bureaucracy, clientelar relations, and agrarian struggles

184.- Caja 13. Acerca de la captura de otras especies.


187.- 1975. Caja 13
Estados financieros y de resultados. Incluye datos de la empacadora

188.- Marzo de 1975. Caja 13
Las secciones se dirigen al gobernador Gómez Reyes y al Director de Capacitación y Fomento Cooperativo y Pesquero para inconf ormarse porque no se han presentado informes de los consejos de administración y de vigilancia.

[Nota: En otras ocasiones se dirigieron en grupo o individualmente al Presidente de la República, para otros casos y en los casos registrados siempre hubo algún tipo de respuesta. Este tipo de procedimientos da cuenta por una parte de la falta de responsabilidad de los representantes, de los líderes, pero también de la fuerza de los gobernantes y las formas de ejercer el poder directamente sobre las bases de las organizaciones. Presidencialismo por un lado, priismo como una vía para integrar a “las masas”. OWG].

189.- Junio de 1975. Caja 13
El legajo también contiene convocatorias de asamblea del 3 de julio de 1975.

190.- 1975. Caja 13
Solicitud de crédito para la ampliación de la empacadora

SECRETARÍA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISIÓN SOCIAL. Acta de Asamblea General del 2 de marzo de 1972. Cambios en cláusulas:

La Sociedad se denominará; el objeto de la sociedad; los acuerdos se podrán tomar por al menos 2/3 partes de los Socios; El representante del Gobierno Federal tendrá derecho a vetar la resolución que dicte la Asamblea General o el Consejo de Administración y que considere perjudicial para los intereses económicos de la propia cooperativa o del Gobierno Federal ...

192.- 11 de diciembre de 1975. Caja 13
Fomento Cooperativo envía oficio a Productos Pesqueros Mexicanos, señalando:
(... "su filial Empacadora de Escuinapa" [...]) se hace referencia al contrato con la Única desde el 27 de septiembre de 1975.

193. - 1976  Caja 13 Legajo XIX.
El legajo XIX contiene también documentos de reuniones del Consejo de Administración de la Federación Regional de Sociedades Cooperativas de la Industria Pesquera del sur de Sinaloa y Estado de Nayarit. Sin embargo no hay nada relevante para Nayarit.
Asistían por la Única: Elías calvillo Pérez, Miguel Palomares P. Y Melesio Rojas Ibarra.

194.- 28 de marzo de 1976, Caja 13 Legajo XIX. Asamblea General ordinaria.

195.- 29 de marzo de 1976, Caja 13 Legajo XIX.
Sobre la solicitud de ingreso del grupo Salinero Vicente Guerrero.

196.- 1 de abril de 1976, Caja 13 Legajo XIX.
Asunto: solicitud de ingreso de un grupo Salinero Vicente Guerrero (lo rechazan y es motivo de atención por mucho tiempo. Se localiza el caso en Tecuala).

197.- junio de 1976, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
Aspectos técnicos relacionados con las vedas. Refutan a la Delegación de Pesca.

198.- Caja 13 Legajo XIX
La cooperativa donó equipo para Escuela Técnica Pesquera.

199.- 15 de julio de 1976, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
Murió el tesorero y se nombra otra persona.

200.- 24 de agosto de 1976, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
Acerca de los precios del camarón. Presidente: Miguel Calderón Trinidad.

201.- Agosto de 1976, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
Contrato con BANFOCO para compra-venta por parte de VLAD-L International.

202.- 28 de octubre de 1976, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
Expropiación de la superficie para la construcción de la Planta de Chilapa.

203.- 14 de enero de 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
Problemas con los changueros.
204.- 14 de marzo de 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX.
También aquí hay datos de la asamblea general de esa fecha.

205.- 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
Estados financieros de 1976 a enero de 1977 (copia de algunos datos y texto).

206.- 3 de marzo de 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX.
Los de Jarretadera se inconforman y el consejo de administración rechaza el planteamiento.
Interviene la Confederación Nacional de Cooperativas de la República Mexicana.

207.- 10 de marzo de 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX

208.- Caja 13 Legajo XIX.
Más sobre los informes de 1973 a 1975. El legajo contiene toda la parte contable pero no se copió.

209.- 14 de marzo de 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
Asamblea General

210.- 29 de marzo de 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
Autorización para levantar la veda sobre producción de escama.

211.- 15 de junio de 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
El Departamento de Pesca comisiona a varias personas para que realizan visita de inspección a la cooperativa

212.- 1 de julio de 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
El departamento de Pesca responde a Presidente, Secretario y Tesorero de la Única. Piden auditoría a la Única y asignan contador.

213.- 21 de agosto de 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
Asamblea de secciones y asamblea general del 24 de agosto.

214.- 13 de agosto de 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
Convocatoria a asamblea general del 21 de agosto.
Oficios de comisiones a las asambleas seccionales por la Secretaría del Trabajo.
215.- Septiembre de 1977, Caja 13 Legajo XIX
La Secretaría del Trabajo rinde informe sobre situación de la Única.

216.- Legajo XX, Caja 13. 9 de febrero de 1978.
1977-1978
Al interior de la Secretaría del Trabajo se comenta situación problemática de la Única y que el departamento de Pesca investiga porque presionaron a la secretaría del Trabajo (copias 108-109).

217.- Legajo XX, Caja 13. abril de 1978
Convocatoria a asambleas seccionales

218.- 10 de mayo de 1978, Legajo XX Caja 13
Acta de asamblea general
Consejo de administración:
Presidente, Alfredo Castillo García
Secretario, Emilio Beltrán
Tesorero, Aurelio Virgen González

219.- Legajo XX Caja 13
El legajo también contiene:
Reconocimiento al Presidente López Mateos y al Gobernador Flores Curiel por la Promoción de las cooperativas.
Convocatoria por secciones
Asamblea generales: no hubo quórum.

220.- Legajo XXVI caja 14. 17 de mayo de 1978
De Los Pinos, envían oficio a Fernando Rafful M, Jefe del Departamento de Pesca, dando instrucciones de parte del Presidente de la República (López Portillo) para que se agilice la solución al problema de San Felipe Aztatán, en la Sección Fraternidad de Pescadores.
Este es un antecedente de lo que sucedió en 1981.

221.- Legajo 35. Caja 16.
1979: informe y Balance General.


223.- Legajo XXIV. Caja 13. 3 de Julio de 1979
El legajo contiene: Asamblea General Informativa y de Balance

224.- Legajo XXIV. Caja 13
Los del Norte se inconforman ante la secretaría del Trabajo

225.- Legajo XXIV. Caja 13
Solicitudes de ingreso

226.- 6 de julio de 1979, Legajo XXIV. Caja 13
Ingeniero Alfredo Castillo García, presidente del consejo de Administración se dirige a la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores para avisar de cambios en las bases constitutivas (copia folio 43-45).

Asamblea seccional de la sección Norte del 2 de julio, previa a la General. Solicitudes de ingreso.

228.- Legajo XXI. Caja 13. 1979
Convocatoria a asamblea general del 13 de julio de 1979
Orden del día:
- Balance del ejercicio social al 31 de diciembre de 1978
- Informe del consejo de administración del período 1978-79
- Reforma a las bases constitutivas
- Posible ingreso de socios
- Problemas de reemplazo de socios (ingreso de hijos de los socios)
- Problemas de socios morosos

229.- 16 de agosto de 1979, Legajo XXIV. Caja 13
Sobre la admisión del Grupo Pimientillo

230.- Septiembre de 1979, Legajo XXIV. Caja 13
Los pescadores de Pericos protestan por su situación y piden ingresar. Denuncia con carácter urgente.

231.- 14 de noviembre de 1979, Legajo XXIV. Caja 13
Grupo de Pimientillo solicita intervención de autoridades por problemas para realizar sus actividades. Solicitan ingresar a la cooperativa.

Aparecen en el legajo documentos de la Cooperativa de Alta Mar “La Perla”.

350
233.- Legajo XXIII caja 13. Solicitudes de ingreso

Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social.
Registro de acta de Asamblea General del 3 de julio de 1980, sobre modificación de Bases Constitutivas: algunos aspectos:
Las Asambleas serán ordinarias y extraordinarias, las primeras una vez al año, en mayo y las segundas, cuando las circunstancias lo requieran.
AQUÍ TERMINA EL LEGAJO 35 Y LA CAJA 16.

235.- 30 de junio de 1980, Legajo XXIII caja 13
Nuevo consejo de administración
Presidente, Valentín López Arreguín
Secretario, Ignacio López García
Tesorero Cándido Cervantes Mora

236.- Legajo XXIII caja 13
El Consejo de administración envía documento al Presidente José López Portillo para solicitarle apoyo para la cooperativa.
Se presentan antecedentes de la conformación de la cooperativa y su situación actual. Se mencionan problemas financieros y técnicos. Señalan problemas por la intervención de representantes de la Secretaría del Trabajo.

La cooperativa se integra por 3,000 socios y 10 secciones.

238.- Legajo XXVI caja 14. 10 de marzo de 1980
El presidente del comisariado de Río Viejo, Tecuala y miembros de la cooperativa (Sección Norte), solicitan al Secretario del trabajo Pedro Ojeda Paullada, intervención en el problema que confrontan y que se refiere a la jurisdicción del área laboral. Asimismo solicitan la presencia de un inspector.
Envían ese mismo documento al presidente de la república.

239.- Legajo XXX caja 15. 30 de abril de 1980
Los de la sección Norte se inconforman porque sus delegados no han informado sobre la próximas asamblea general y piden que se incorporen sus necesidades de información sobre la aplicación de fondos y gestiones de créditos en el orden del día de la próxima asamblea.
Desconocen a sus delegados Alfonso Andrade y Vicente Sandoval. Piden que se reconozca a Jesús Rodríguez Barrón y Cándido Cervantes R.
Se envía el oficio al Consejo de administración y copia al Subdirector del Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo, al Secretario del Trabajo, al de Patrimonio y Fomento Industrial y al Subdirector de Promoción Pesquera.
240.- Legajo XXX caja 15. Marzo de 1980 (aprox.)

Del grupo disidente (miembros de la Sección Norte) al Director de Fomento Cooperativo.

Sobre los problemas que vienen suscitándose desde hace aproximadamente 7 años.

1. Que se les permita a todos los socios de los ejidos de Tecuala y Acaponeta llevar a cabo los trabajos en las riberas de las lagunas y esteros de su jurisdicción, ya que a partir de 1973 a la fecha, socios de la misma sección que están radicando en la ciudad de Tecuala, han venido obstaculizando estos trabajos.

2. Que el producto que entregan nunca llega a su destino

3. Piden cambio de ubicación de la oficina a uno de sus ejidos “El Aguaje”, municipio de Acaponeta.

4. Que no hay reporte de rendimientos por el trabajo realizado, lo que da cuenta de malos manejos. “Actualmente tenemos un déficit de 6,000,000.00

Como solución plantean la intervención de SECRETARÍA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISIÓN SOCIAL para que se lleve a cabo una visita de inspección e investigación.

C.C.P. José López Portillo, Presidente y Secretarios relacionados.

Hasta aquí el legajo 30 y la caja 15.

241.- Legajo 30 Caja 15. 30 de abril de 1980

Los de la sección Norte se inconforman porque sus delegados no han informado sobre la próximas asamblea general y piden que se incorporen sus necesidades de información sobre la aplicación de fondos y gestiones de créditos en el orden del día de la próxima asamblea.

Desconocen a sus delegados Alfonso Andrade y Vicente Sandoval. Piden que se reconozca a Jesús Rodríguez Barrón y Cándido Cervantes R.

Se envía el oficio al Consejo de administración y copia al Subdirector del Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo, al Secretario del Trabajo, al de Patrimonio y Fomento Industrial y al Subdirector de Promoción Pesquera.

242.- 27 de mayo de 1980

Asamblea General Informativa y de Balance para nombrar representantes durante el período 28 de mayo de 1980 a 29 de mayo de 1982.

Luego se llevó a cabo una segunda convocatoria con el mismo orden del día para el 30 de junio de 1980.

El Consejo de Administración saliente:

Presidente, Alfredo Castillo García

Secretario, Emilio Beltrán G.

Tesorero, Aurelio Virgen Estrada

El Consejo de Vigilancia saliente:

Alfonso Andrade G.

Candelario Moreno Gutiérrez

La primera y segunda convocatorias se hicieron también a nivel seccional.

243.- 4 de julio de 1980, Legajo XXX caja 15
Los pescadores de Pericos solicitan que se les permita pescar en la zona, ya que ellos no cuentan con suficiente superficie ganadera... (folio 474-465)

244.- Agosto de 1980, Legajo XXX caja 15. Caso de la incorporación de Pericos, San Miguel y Francisco Villa

245.- 8 de septiembre de 1980, Legajo XXX caja 15
El consejo de administración se inconforma ante fomento cooperativo porque fue aceptado el ingreso de nuevos socios de Francisco Villa, San Miguel y Pericos (502 personas) y piden que se les incorpore a todos en una sección más de la cooperativa, en los límites señalados por la Sección Fraternidad de Pescadores de Pimientillo, Rosamorada (copias, folios 780-81).

246.- 30 de septiembre de 1980, Legajo XXX caja 15.
Solicitan a fomento cooperativo el dictamen sobre los acuerdos de la asamblea reciente (noviembre) (folio 785).
Podemos suponer que la respuesta es el oficio del 17 de diciembre de 1980 que se mencionó anteriormente (folio 783 y 816).

247.- Legajo XXV. 27 de octubre de 1980.
Convocatoria y lista de firmas de las secciones a asambleas seccionales para proponer la asamblea general extraordinaria del 8 de noviembre de 1980.

248.- Legajo XXV
Aurelio Virgen González, secretario del consejo de administración firma las listas de asistencia del día 8 de noviembre en Chilapa.

249.- 23 de noviembre de 1980, Legajo XXV.
Hasta entonces la cooperativa integraba 10 secciones:
Robert Barrios
José María Morelos
Gilberto Flores Muñoz
La Nueva Sirena Fraternidad de Pescadores
Norte de Nayarit
Miguel Hidalgo
San Blas y Boca del Asadero
Costa de Chila y Peñitas y Boca de Ameca
Boca de Camichín

250.- 8 de noviembre de 1980, Legajo XXV.
Acta de asamblea general.
Se trata el caso de la exclusión de Ignacio López García y Cecilio Rendón Mora (del Norte)
Se nombró a Anacleto Ceja Aurelio Virgen estrada.
251.- 1 de noviembre de 1980, Legajo XXV.
La Federación Regional de Sociedades Cooperativas de la Industria Pesquera del Sur de Sinaloa y Estado de Nayarit, miembro de la Confederación Nacional de Cooperativas de la República Mexicana, envía documentos de la Única a Fomento Cooperativo, sobre convocatoria, actas de asamblea, listas de asistencia, etc. a petición de la Única.

252.- 17 de diciembre de 1980, Legajo XXV.
La Secretaría del Trabajo toma nota de acuerdos de la asamblea general del 8 de noviembre de 1980. Se desconocen los acuerdos señalando que el motivo es que no fueron resultado de asambleas seccionales y que las personas electas en los concejos son gente del gobernador. (folio 783).

Solicitudes de ingreso de diferentes secciones.
Las solicitudes tienen fecha de 1981. Señalan una aportación de $100.00 para ingresar (para presentar la solicitud) adquiriendo un certificado de aportación.

254.- Legajo XXVI. 19 de enero de 1981.
Anacleto Ceja reconoce a los 502 socios que antes no reconocían, en oficio al Director de Fomento Cooperativo (folio 784).

255.- Legajo XXV. Caja 13. 15 de enero de 1981
El legajo contiene documentos de otra cooperativa.
Por parte de la cooperativa se presenta solicitud de intervención del presidente de la República ante la Secretaría del Trabajo para calificar el acta de Asamblea General del 8 de noviembre de 1980.

256.- 2 de febrero de 1981, Legajo XXV. Caja 13
Miembros de la cooperativa exponen queja en contra de ejidatarios del ejido de Pericos que han estado obstruyendo trabajos de la cooperativa. Solicitan intervención

257.- 4 de febrero de 1981, Legajo XXV. Caja 13
La Secretaría del Trabajo responde desconociendo los acuerdos.

258.- Legajo XXV. Caja 13

259.- 7 de julio de 1981, Legajo XXV. Caja 13
Los socios de Boca de Camichín Solicitan cambio de su representante de sección ante el presidente del consejo de administración, pidiendo que reconozcan a Natividad Angulo Rojas.
260.- 1 de septiembre de 1981, Legajo XXV. Caja 13
Telegrama a Pedro Ojeda Paullada denunciando al consejo de administración encabezado por empleado de Pesca. Firma el diputado federal Ernesto Rivera Herrera (folio 786).

261.- 3 de octubre de 1981, Legajo XXV. Caja 13
La sección Fraternidad de Pescadores promueve cambio de domicilio de la oficina de la cooperativa y de la sección Fraternidad pero no es aceptada por la dirección de fomento cooperativo, ya que eso amerita cambio en las bases constitutivas. Este va a ser un motivo de modificación de las bases constitutivas que se aprobó posteriormente en 1982, cuando entró Anaclet Ceja.

262.- 26 de octubre de 1981, Legajo XXV. Caja 13
Antecedentes históricos de la Sociedad Cooperativa. Comprende situación geográfica de las secciones que la comprenden y situación actual a esa fecha de los miembros (folio 801-814)

Asamblea General número 2. En Tepic, 10 delegados de las secciones que conforman la Cooperativa.
La mesa de debates estuvo integrada por Anacleto Ceja como Secretario y Aurelio Virgen como Presidente.
Se hicieron cambios en las bases constitutivas que incluían ampliar los criterios del quehacer de la cooperativa y su Consejo de Administración.

264.- Legajo 32 caja 15. [¿1982?]
El legajo contiene los documentos de las asambleas seccionales previas y la notificación de los acuerdos a la Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, a la Dirección General de Fomento Cooperativo.

265.- 22 de enero de 1982, Legajo XXV. Caja 13
Conflicto entre pescadero y Francisco Villa (copia folio 759-758)

266.- 4 de febrero de 1982, Legajo XXV. Caja 13
Oficio sobre el caso de baja de la cooperativa del Sr. Eliseo Medina Moraiba.

267.- Legajo 30. Caja 15
Contiene el mismo tipo de información que el legajo 31 más copias de los documentos del legajo 32 sobre la asamblea donde se cambiaron las bases constitutivas en 1982 (12 de febrero).

Asamblea General número 2. En Tepic, 10 delegados de las secciones que conforman la Cooperativa.
La mesa de debates estuvo integrada por Anacleto Ceja como Secretario y Aurelio Virgen como Presidente.

Se hicieron cambios en las bases constitutivas que incluían ampliar los criterios del quehacer de la cooperativa y su Consejo de Administración.

269.- Legajo 32 caja 15: El legajo contiene los documentos de las asambleas seccionales previas y la notificación de los acuerdos a la Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, a la Dirección General de Fomento Cooperativo.

Contiene las convocatorias y listas de asistencia de las asambleas seccionales (20 de febrero de 1982) previas a la general del 20 de marzo.

271.- Legajo XXVIII. Caja 14
La Secretaría del Trabajo toma nota de los acuerdos de la asamblea general de regularización del 28 de julio de 1982. En ella se cambió la mesa directiva y entró Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez como Presidente. También se modificaron las bases constitutivas.

272.- Legajo XXVIII. Caja 14
Aparece el conflicto de los del Norte con socios vecinos. Piden Fernando Raful Miguel (Dirección General Fomento Cooperativo, Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social) lo siguiente:

-Cambio de ubicación de la cooperativa (de las oficinas)
-No hay reparto de rendimientos desde hace 7 años
-Solicitan visita de inspección.

273.- Legajo XXVIII. Caja 14
El legajo contiene las actas de asambleas seccionales previas a la general de regularización del 28 de julio, donde se renovó el consejo de administración y el de vigilancia y se ratificaron los acuerdos de las asambleas del de febrero y marzo, donde se incorporaron nuevos socios.

274.- Legajo XXVII
Todo el legajo contiene expedientes de las asambleas seccionales previas a la general del 28 de julio de 1982, con listas de firmas de todos los asistentes. Sólo eso contiene.

275.- Legajo XXVI. Caja 14
Además de actas de asambleas seccionales contiene el acta de la asamblea general extraordinaria de regularización del 28 de julio de 1982.

Dato: Al nombrar los consejos de administración y vigilancia se propusieron dos planillas. Se acordó que la que tuviera más votos fuera el de administración y la que tuviera menos fuera el de vigilancia. Ganó la de Anacleto Ceja el consejo de administración y las comisiones especiales. El consejo de vigilancia lo encabezó Cecilio Rendón Mora .... De aquí para adelante (después de ese período administrativo) se presentó el conflicto a nombre de los disidentes (que tenían en esa ocasión el consejo de vigilancia).
276.- Legajo XXIX. Caja 14. 1982
Presidente: Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez
Secretario: Rodrigo Partida
Tesorero: Miguel González E.

Asambleas seccionales para nombrar representantes a los Consejos de Administración y de Vigilancia en la siguiente Asamblea General.

278.- Legajo 32 caja 15. 9 de septiembre de 1982, Año del General Vicente Guerrero.
SECRETARÍA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISIÓN SOCIAL toma nota y reconoce las reformas que fueron aprobadas en la Asamblea General extraordinaria del 12 de febrero de 1982.

Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social toma nota de acuerdos de asamblea general extraordinaria del 20 de marzo, en la cual se incorporan en la Única las siguientes nuevas secciones:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secciones</th>
<th>Localización</th>
<th>Número de socios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palmar de Cuautla</td>
<td>Santiago Ixc.</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anacleto Ceja R</td>
<td>Unión de Corrientes, Tuxpan</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz de Miramar</td>
<td>Santa Cruz, San Blas</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 de Julio de 1982</td>
<td>Villa Juárez, Santiago Ixc.</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lázaro Cárdenas</td>
<td>Santa Cruz, Santiago Ixc.</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicente Guerrero</td>
<td>Los Murillos, Tecuala</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 de Junio</td>
<td>Pericos, Rosamorada</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Gómez Reyes</td>
<td>Puerta de Palapares, Santiago Ixc.</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Escutia</td>
<td>Francisco Villa y Pescadero, Rosamorada</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>San Miguel, Rosamorada</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novillero</td>
<td>Novillero, Tecuala</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignacio López García</td>
<td>Antonio R. Laureles, Tecuala</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Y se integran nuevos socios a las secciones ya existentes de:
Pescadores del Norte de Nayarit
La Nueva Sirena
Profesor Roberto Barrios
Miguel Hidalgo
José María Morelos
Boca de Camichín y
Fraternidad de Pescadores

280.- Legajo XXIX. Caja 14. 9 de septiembre de 1982, Año del General Vicente Guerrero.
El Legajo contiene también las solicitudes de esos nuevos socios.
Hasta aquí el legajo XXIX de la caja 14.

SECRETARÍA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISIÓN SOCIAL toma nota y reconoce las reformas que fueron aprobadas en la Asamblea General extraordinaria del 12 de febrero de 1982.


El subdirector de organización de cooperativas envía oficio al Subdirector de Supervisión y dictamen, acerca de las modificaciones de las bases constitutivas de la Cooperativa, señalando y recomendando:

- Que en el objeto social se incluye la acuacultura (cláusula 4ª.), por lo que se requiere que la SEPESCA exprese que por lo menos ha llegado en principio con los fundadores de la cooperativa para concederles derechos de explotación en los términos de la ley de cooperativas, por lo que es recomendable obtener la opinión y autorización especial.

- Acerca de la construcción de muelles: que es materia de la secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes y para construir dichos muelles en zona federal corresponde emitir opinión a la Secretaría de asentamientos Humanos y obras Públicas, por lo que se recomienda que realicen las gestiones correspondientes.

- Que se establezca (cláusula 25ª.) el tanto por millar que se destinará para fondo de previsión social.

- Distinguir atributos y responsabilidades de los Consejos de administración seccionales (delegados, comisionados, encargados) con respecto a los del Consejo de Administración propiamente dicho.

- Modificación de la cláusula sobre responsabilidades de cada sección de pago de créditos que le sean suministrados, sin embargo, es el consejo de administración el único autorizado para suscribir contratos a nombre de la sociedad. Por lo tanto, se recomienda modificar esa cláusula.

- Se omite (cláusulas de la 29 a la 48ª.) señalar el límite, máximo autorizado al Consejo de Administración para operar y lo que requiere la aprobación de la asamblea general. Se recomienda revisar.

282.- Legajo 30. Caja 15

El legajo contiene también el documento para registrar esos cambios en la secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.

283.- Legajo XXIX. Caja 14. [¿1982?]

Contiene también oficios de la Secretaría del Trabajo a la Cooperativa, autorizando libros sociales y de contabilidad a la cooperativa y a algunas de sus secciones en particular. Son libros donde asientan las actas.

284.- Solicitudes de ingreso de diferentes secciones.

Las solicitudes tienen fecha de 1981. Señalan una aportación de $100.00 para ingresar (para presentar la solicitud) adquiriendo un certificado de aportación.

285.- Legajo 30 Caja 15

Contiene el mismo tipo de información que el legajo 31 más copias de los documentos del legajo 32 sobre la asamblea donde se cambiaron las bases constitutivas en 1982 (12 de
febrero).

286.- Legajo 30  Caja 15
El legajo contiene también el documento para registrar esos cambios en la secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.

287.- LEGAJO XLI CAJA 17
La ocupación que señalan en las solicitudes: es la de pescador (cooperativa Única) o dicen ejidatario. Otros señalan que su ocupación es jornalero.
Los de Zomatlán, Municipio., de Rosamarada dicen que son jornaleros. En las de 1983 todos dicen que son pescadores.
Los que firman recomendándolos a veces dicen: pescador/agricultor/jornalero.
El lugar de origen es de la misma localidad o del Estado de Jalisco (Zomatlán y Caimanero), Pamasolo, Veracruz (jornalero), Resbalón, Nay., (jornalero).

288.- Legajo 32 caja 15. 1 de noviembre de 1983.
El subdirector de Procuración Agraria envía oficio a la Dirección General de Registro de Asociaciones y Organizaciones Cooperativas:
... “Debido a que el núcleo ejidal de referencia ha solicitado nuestra intervención …. Por invasión de su dotación… La Única….
 Solicitan que se les proporcione copia del acta y de las bases constitutivas. No dice cuál ejido.

15 de diciembre.- En junta del Consejo de Administración de informa que se ha estado atendiendo el problema de reparación de la Planta Empacadora de Chilapa y se pone a consideración las solicitudes de las 2 secciones proyectadas. Por unanimidad se acepta y se acuerda que en Asambleas General se ratificará.

290.- Legajo XLIV, Caja 18. [¿1983?].
El legajo contiene copias de actas de nacimiento de los socios y certificados médicos.

291.- Legajo XLIV, Caja 18.
Además:
1983.- Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez es Presidente del Consejo de Administración.
Noviembre.- se proyecta y justifica la incorporación de las Secciones de Llano del Tigre, Municipio. de Rosamarada con 258 solicitudes de admisión, y Juventino Espinoza, San Felipe Aztatlán, Tecuala, con 104 solicitantes . La solicitud se había hecho desde 1983 y venían trabajando.

Contiene convocatorias y actas de las asambleas seccionales preparatorias de la Asamblea General de Regularización, programada para el 28 de septiembre de 1984.

Octavio González envía un oficio a Roberto Gadaga de la Dirección General de Fomento Cooperativo. Asunto:

Solicitud de apoyo en capacitación cooperativa a la Única y sugiere estrategia:

- Los pescadores están preparados por la veda que se levanta hasta septiembre. Esto permitirá a tender las 22 secciones y las 5 nuevas que habrán de integrarse este mismo año.

- El tipo de capacitación solicitada por el gobernador a la Secretaría del Trabajo es la que se refiere a Cooperativismo. Teoría y organización cooperativa. Además en coordinación de la Secretaría de Pesca y el propio gobierno del Estado se podrían impartir cursos sobre administración de cooperativas pesqueras. Los aspectos técnicos de la pesca serían responsabilidad de SEPESCA.

- Se impartirían cursos elementales y en una segunda etapa de capacitación los más sobresalientes serían capacitados como instructores.

Señala algunos datos sobre la cooperativa: “La cooperativa cuenta con 5,000 socios aproximadamente. La sección con mayor número de socios es la 28 de junio de Pericos, Rosamorada, con 818 socios; la sección más pequeña es la Gilberto Flores Muñoz de San Cayetano, Tecuala con 89 socios. Existen 5 secciones que tienen entre 100 y 150 socios, 5 entre 150 y 200, dos secciones entre 200 y 250, 3 secciones entre 250 y 300, una con 399, una con 405, una con 507 y dos entre 90 y 100 socios.

Argumenta más sobre la necesidad de apoyo para capacitación considerando la petición del Gobernador y la importancia económica de la Cooperativa.


Denuncian la intromisión de algunas personas y Horacio Haro Benítez, éste último es el Delegado Federal de Pesca [...] personas que han creado el divisionismo en las secciones de la Cooperativa tratando a toda costa de imponer como presidente del Consejo de Administración al Sr. Aurelio Virgen González actual Gerente de la planta Empacadora de Chilapa, quien apoyado por Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez que funga como Presidente del Consejo de Administración desde el 27 de julio de 1982, ha hecho mal uso de fondos, comisiones y aportaciones destinados a amortizar el pasivo de la Sociedad Cooperativa ante PPM36, S.A. de C.V. y el Banco Pesquero y Portuario S.A. Además de retener las liquidaciones y entrega de remanentes de las secciones de la Cooperativa por producción registrada en la planta de Chilapa y exportados por Ocean Garden.

(Anacleto jamás ha celebrado Asamblea para informar sobre la contabilidad de la Sociedad).

Anacleto y Aurelio Virgen González orientados por Sergio Villasana Delfín, Mario Rivero Zea, Horacio Haro B. y Ramón Contreras, actual Gerente de la Planta Empacadora de Chilapa, tomaron arbitrariamente las oficinas de la Cooperativa en Tepic, desapareciendo los archivos de la sociedad y originando grandes pérdidas de productos almacenados en la Planta Congeladora, operada en este tiempo por PROPEMEX [...] (ese el grupo) tienen más de 30 días posesión de las pesquerías, capturando y desviando la mayor parte a compradores particulares mientras que la mayoría de los socios permanecen sin pescar para evitar enfrentamientos.

Ante esto nos permitimos solicitar la intervención de la Confederación Nacional de Cooperativas de la República Mexicana para

1.- que suspenda en sus funciones a Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez, que la Dirección General de Fomento Cooperativo declare nulas las Asambleas del 26 de julio de 1984 y 28 de agosto del mismo año por haber sido saboteadas en 2 ocasiones las Asambleas de Fraternidad de Pescadores de Pimientillo, al no enviar convocatoria y la 2ª. Por agresión de un grupo de 36 agentes a funcionarios de la Secretaría del Trabajo del Gobierno del Trabajo del Estado [de Nayarit].

Además, la sección Roberto Barrios comandado por Aurelio Virgen abandonó la Asamblea

36 Productos Pesqueros Mexicanos.
para evitar quórum legal. En la 2ª. Asamblea los responsables de la SECRETARÍA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISIÓN SOCIAL y de Gobierno del Estado, tomaron la convocatoria y las listas y se dieron a la fuga, abandonando la Asamblea y sus obligaciones [...] fuera del marco de la Ley (y todo lo demás que ya se ha dicho)

2.- Que la Controlaría de la Federación practique auditoría al manejo de Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez por el periodo 27 de julio de 1982 a septiembre de 1984 en Oficina Central, Administración de Empacadora y Congeladora de Chila; manejo de fondos de la Federación de Bienes Pesqueros y Portuarios y PPM y de Ocean Garden.

3.- Integrar, comité para el manejo de documentación (de todo).

4.- Una vez realizada la auditoría se formule el calendario de Asambleas Seccionales para la designación conforme a la Ley, su reglamento y bases constitutivas...

Los comisionados de las secciones:

Fraternidad de Pescadores: Cecilio Rendón Mora.
Boca de Camichín: Santiago Ignacio López G.
R. Gómez Reyes.- Puerta de Palapares, Vicente Martínez G.
Lázaro Cárdenas.- Santa Cruz, Santiago; Vicente Medina Díaz.
Roberto Barrios, San Andrés, Santiago.- Andrés González Virgen.
Palmar de Cuautla, Palmar de Cuautla, Santiago.- Francisco Ceceña.

Acta de Asamblea General Extraordinaria y documento del informe de Anacleto Ceja R. al salir del Consejo de Administración.

.... “Ramón Contreras Ramos (gerente de la planta)... que hizo posible la Planta de Chilapa”...

Señala (Anacleto en su informe) que uno de los mayores problemas es el changueo de camarón y que las estrategias que se diseñaron para controlarlo costaron mucho dinero a las oficinas centrales. Una consecuencia de esto ha consistido en decomisar producto por inspectores federales de pesca.

Plantea que el camarón decomisado sea rematado por las autoridades a la propia cooperativa y que esta lo comercialice, pero había problemas de almacenamiento.

Se pronuncia por el reconocimiento del apoyo por parte del Gobernador Emilio M. González Parra.

... “logramos la consolidación de adeudos con PPM y sus filiales...” ... también con el Banco Pesquero y Portuario...

... después de gestiones realizadas en septiembre de 1983, se logró en 1984 que fuera devuelta a la Cooperativa la Planta Empacadora y Congeladora de Chilapa y nuevamente se hizo un contrato con Ocean Garden (firmado en Copladenay) con asistencia de Delegados Seccionales, el representante de Pesca y de Gobierno del Estado. Se acordó: que por parte de dicha empresa se daría un precio de garantía como anticipo para la seguridad de los pescadores. Al final el precio salió más bajo que lo acordado, por lo que hubo desconcierto.

... “se nos obligó a mandar el producto de las diferentes secciones a la Planta de Chilapa (con baja capacidad de congelación y a más de los problemas de mermas. Todo esto se tradujo en una caída del precio par la mayoría de las secciones, basados en el convenio de Copladenay.

A la fecha (septiembre de 1984), la Planta se encuentra operando al 90% de su capacidad.

El informe se envió a la Dirección General de fomento Cooperativo; se reconocieron los Acuerdos.

Copia del oficio enviado a Gerardo Gómez Castillo Presidente del Consejo de Administración de la Confederación Nacional de Cooperativas al Director General de Fomento Cooperativo por miembros activos de la Cooperativa en el que solicitan que sea suspendido el Sr. Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez.

297.- 6 de noviembre de 1984.
Se contesta queja relacionada con Asamblea Seccional. De R. Gallaga a Cecilio Rendón M.

[...] “se encontró que está cumple con los requisitos que al efecto ésta establecen la Ley General Cooperativas por lo que se les tomó en cuenta al dictaminar la Asamblea General Extraordinaria que celebró la cooperativa el 28 de septiembre de 1984.

298.- Legajo 35  Caja 16.
El legajo contiene las actas de las Asambleas seccionales.

Cecilio Rendón y otros interpone juicio de Amparo en relación a lo anterior.

Alejandro Peniche de Contraloría Interna envía oficio a Arsenio Farell Cubillas informándole el resultado de la elaboración del Estudio Socio Económico Operativo y Financiero practicado a la Cooperativa del 12 al 15 de diciembre de 1984.

Datos: 5,000 socios; 22 secciones, 160 embarcaciones menores; producción anual de camarón de 1,353 toneladas e ingresos aproximados de $1'500,000.00.

Ante el conocimiento de que la Asamblea realizada para renovar su cuerpo directivo surgieron serios problemas de carácter interno se consultó al Lic. Roberto Gallaga Garay a fin de determinar si existía algún impedimento para la realización del trabajo, quien consideró conveniente consultarlo con el Gobernador del Estado, ya que fue él quien personalmente intervino como mediador entre los grupos en pugna. Posteriormente fuimos enterados de que el gobernador estaba de acuerdo con la participación de la SECRETARÍA DEL TRABAJO Y PREVISIÓN SOCIAL.

Al realizar la auditoría el Presidente. del Consejo de Administración recibió a los auditores; manifestó estar de acuerdo, sin embargo, expresó que en esos momentos la sociedad no había llegado a conformar su estabilidad social ya que algunas secciones disidentes estaban en contra de la actual Administración por lo que el control de la producción tampoco se había consolidado.

[...] Que la intervención del personal de la Secretaría podría ser aprovechado por el grupo en desacuerdo para aumentar la inestabilidad, → Solución: prórroga de 45 días.

301.- Legajo 35  Caja 16. ¿1984?.
El acta de la Asamblea General de esa misma fecha señala, además de lo que se ha mencionado [...] Aurelio Virgen G. (Presidente del Consejo de Administración) somete a aprobación del Programa de Construcción de Granjas Camaroneras 1984-1986 y a futuro, ya que la producción de camarón mediante el sistema de granjas representa una de las mejores opciones para que la cooperativa normalice a un plazo más corto sus condiciones sociales, económicas y financieras, toda vez que al complementar los sistemas actuales de producción con las mismas se obtendrán mayores volúmenes de captura por temporada, además de que la construcción y mantenimiento de las que se dará ocupación adicional a los socios. ( se aprobó por unanimidad).

Se aprobó también la adquisición de 10 barcos para la captura de camarón y pesca múltiple,
pangas y motores fuera de borda por créditos para la ampliación de algunas áreas de producción de Chilapa, como construcción de drenaje, capacidad de congelación, gestión de financiamiento para cultivos ostrícolas para Boca de Camichín, Villa Juárez, 4 de Julio, Campo de los Limones y San Blas.

302.- Después de Anacleto entró como Presidente del Consejo de Administración Aurelio Virgen Estrada.

Hasta aquí el legajo 34.

303.- Legajo 33, Caja 15.

Contiene expedientes de las secciones con convocatoria y listas de presentes y ausentes a la “Asamblea Seccional de Regularización del 20% o más de sus socios”. Esta Asamblea fue el 20 de septiembre de 1984, previa ala General Extraordinaria, donde Anacleto Ceja informó y salió y donde entró Virgen Estrada.

4. The end of La Única (Boxes 16 to the end).

304.- 15 de febrero de 1989.

Los disidentes exponen al Director de Fomento Cooperativo y Organizaciones Sociales y trabajadores de la Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social.

• La Sociedad Cooperativa Única Presidente Adolfo López Mateos fue constituida el 14 de julio de 1961 y autorizada para funcionar el 27 del mismo (registro cooperativo nacional 2133-P).

• El 22 de abril del 1972 por disposición del Ejecutivo Federal se creó el Distrito de Acuacultura de esa manera la Cooperativa Única tiene concesionadas 279 kms de litoral con 192000 has de esteros y lagunas más toda la franja del mar territorial comprendida entre la desembocadura del estero de Teacapán en el Estado de Sinaloa y la desembocadura del Río Ameca en el Estado de Jalisco.

• Desde el 20 de marzo de 1982 por acuerdo de la Asamblea General Extraordinaria, la cooperativa funciona con 22 secciones y está integrada por 4,720 socios.

• El Próximo 14 de julio la cooperativa cumple 28 años de haberse fundado sin que hasta la fecha se haya consolidado como organización en la producción camaronera de la que concesionaria absoluta en el Estado de Nayarit.

• A partir de la temporada 84-85, al no convenir a nuestros intereses la forma en que administrativamente el Consejo que representó el Sr. Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez, comprendido del 27 de julio de 1982 a julio de 1984, el cual se prologó hasta el 27 de septiembre del mismo año, periodo en que jamás informó del Estado contable.

• Por unanimidad de 9 grupos de las Secciones Fraternidad de Pescadores, Roberto Barrios, Lázaro Cárdenas, R. Gómez Reyes, San Miguel, Juan Escutia, Grupo Francisco Villa, Ignacio L. García, Grupo el Espino, la Nueva Sirena y Gilberto Flores Muñoz, durante las últimas 4 temporadas mediante acuerdo del 26 de agosto de 1985 en la sala de juntas de la Secretaría de Pesca en México DF, ante la presencia de Pedro Ojeda Paullada (ex Secretario), Emilio González Parra (ex Gobernador), Mario Moya Palencia (ex Presidente de Ocean Garden) José Luis Cubréa Palma (ex coordinador general de la delegación federal de pesca), Ing. Cuauhtémoc Espinoza Jaime ex Subdelegado Federal de Pesca en Nayarit Aurelio Virgen González del Consejo de Administración de la Cooperativa y Cecilio Rendón Mora en representación del Grupo disidente. Se llegó a la siguientes acuerdos:

1. Ocean Garden otorgaría créditos para trabajos previos a la temporada de captura.

2. Nuestro grupo procesaría en una Planta Empacadora y Congeladora que la Empresa determinaría en el Estado de Sinaloa.
3. Al negarse el Consejo de Administración y Vigilancia a firmar y sellar boletas de traslado y facturas, la oficina de Administración de Pesquerías en Nayarit bajo su firma y sello autorizó esta documentación ininterrumpida hasta la temporada de 1988/1989. El Consejo de Administración firmó y selló esta documentación. Bajo este acuerdo nuestro grupo ha producido 1994 tons de camarón verde c/cabeza; destinado al mercado de exportación vía Ocean Garden 1,977,885 libras de camarón sin cabeza, verde, congelado 333 tons de rezaga congelada para el mercado nacional; cabe señalar que nuestro grupo destinó 1 sesión [donación] por kilo de camarón exportado para fondo de capitalización que responde por saldos que alguna de nuestras secciones no alcanzara a cubrir en alguna temporada. De esa manera el grupo mantuvo inversiones a plazo fijo diferentes cantidades que suman $179,262,962.00 en el Banco Nacional Pesquero y Portuario, SNC, sucursal Mazatlán, Sinaloa.

Sin embargo, los últimos 3 Consejos de Administración y Vigilancia han sido electos al margen de la Ley utilizando procedimientos que van desde regalías de motores fuera de borda, bebidas alcohólicas, secuestro de socios para que no asistan a Asambleas Seccionales y compra de voto. Jamás se nos ha notificado por escrito, ni existe constancia de que hayamos firmado de enterados cuando se han convocado las Asambleas Seccionales con los grupos que comulgan con los Consejos de Administración y Vigilancia. Ningún delegado del trabajo en la entidad ha estado presente certificando que los asistentes sean socios legítimos.

El 4 de julio próximo pasado acompañados por el Jefe del Departamento Cooperativo de Fortalecimiento hicimos acto de presencia ante esta Dirección General de Fomento Cooperativo para manifestar inconformidad sobre la Asamblea General Extraordinaria del 23 de junio de 1988 (ver atrás es lo mismo) prometiéndonos que no se tomaría nota de las acuerdos. Sin embargo el Lic. Raúl Nocedal Moncada, el 25 de noviembre de 1988 toma nota (además) sin notificarnos pues hasta hace 2 días tuvimos conocimiento. [...] 28 de diciembre de 1988 el Consejo de Administración lanza convocatoria (sigue todo el reclamo que ya se documentó).

[...] se requiere la anuencia de las 2/3 partes de la sociedad. Es claro el propósito de ingresar más socios al seno de esta, lo hacen con el fin de adquirir las 2/3 partes, porque con el padrón de 4,720 socios en 22 secciones nos encontramos divididos en 2 grupos que comprende mitad y mitad.

Acuerdo de la reunión que se mencionó al principio (11 de enero de 1989):

2. Elegir al Consejo de Administración y Vigilancia y Comisiones Especiales, presentando una planilla única con elementos de ambos grupos.
3. Los Consejos y Comisiones que así resulten se abocarían a la revisión de los pasivos de la Cooperativa y a la reestructuración general de la Cooperativa.
4. Dichos acuerdos serían transitorios por un periodo no mayor a 40 días tiempo suficiente para desahogo de la reestructuración, susceptible de prórroga cuando ese propósito no se hubiera desahogado.
5. En esa Asamblea General se integraría un Comité representado por ambos grupos que se abocaría a la revisión de los pasivos de la Cooperativa y para consultar a la base, sección por sección sobre la disolución de la Cooperativa y convertirnos en cooperativas autónomas.

[...] Se pide a las instituciones relacionadas que intervengan para que se cumplan tales acuerdos o que sus grupos sean legitimados como secciones en una nueva cooperativa en el Estado de Nayarit.

Al final el fallo es en contra de los disidentes.

305.- Legajo XLII Caja 17. 14 de marzo de 1989.  
Asambleas seccionales (diciembre de 1988) y convocatoria para Asamblea General Extraordinaria para discutir y aprobar la solicitud de Llano del Tigre y Juventino Espinoza.  
Para elección de Consejo de Administración y Vigilancia y Comisiones.  
Gestión de créditos (respaldo al Presidente, Secretario y Tesorero y Consejo de Vigilancia para eso).
Nombramiento de Comité qué efectuará auscultación y concientización a la base sobre el futuro de la organización.

Arturo Calderón Estrada (Presidente).

306.- Legajo XLIII. Caja 17.
1989.- Es donde viene el documento donde Cecilio Rendón Mora y co-agraviados se siguen inconformando y piden a Fomento Cooperativo de la Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, que les muestren la lista de los 950 socios aceptados y todo aquello.

307.- Legajo XLIII Caja 17. Después de febrero de 1989
Aquí se sigue el conflicto anterior apenas con algunos oficios que ya se revisaron de otros legajos y se conforma éste sobre todo de solicitudes y actas de nacimiento de aspirantes a socios.
Hasta aquí caja 17.

Se menciona en oficio al Director General de Fomento Cooperativo "existe el acuerdo de la base para la modernización de nuestra organización convirtiendo las actuales secciones en Sociedades cooperativas y ala vez, creando una Federación regional o estatal.
Consideran la inclusión de las sociedades proyectadas de Llano del Tigre y Juventino Espinoza en tales mejoras.
Presidente del Consejo de Administración, J. Carmen Cervantes Zurita.

Juicio de Amparo promovido por Cecilio Rendón Mora y co-agraviados, reclaman sobre las autoridades que fueron supuestamente electas como Consejo de Administración y Vigilancia que fueron electos en Asamblea Extraordinaria del 15 de enero de 1989.

310.- Legajo XLI Caja 17. [¿1989 Después de octubre?]
Los inconformes son de Lázaro Cárdenas, R. Gómez Reyes, San Miguel, Grupo A Gilberto Flores Muñoz, El Espino, Juan Escutia, Francisco Villa, Roberto Barrios, La Nueva Sirena, José María Morelos, Fraternidad de Pescadores, Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez.

311.- Legajo XLV Caja 17. 26 de enero de 1990.
La Dirección de Fomento Cooperativo comisiona a representantes de la Dirección para apoyar la Organización y Constitución de las Proyectadas sociedades cooperativas que se pretenden desglosar de las Secciones integrantes de la Única (nombran 10 gentes).
Desde mi punto de vista a partir de estas fechas (diciembre de 1989-1990) se empieza a manejar veladamente la desintegración de la Única.
Todavía es Presidente J. Carmen Cervantes Zurita.

312.- Legajo XLV Caja 17. 1991. Proceso de cómo se proyectarán las nuevas cooperativas y actas de sus asambleas seccionales.
313.- Legajo XLVI. Caja 18. 1º. de Diciembre de 1990.
1.- Lista de asistencia de los Delegados.
2.- Nombramiento del Presidente, Secretario y Escrutador.
3.- Tratar la disolución de la Única.
4.- Como quedarían los diferentes activos de la Sociedad Cooperativa proponiéndose la conveniencia de crear una S. A., en las que las 25 secciones sean socios capitalistas y cómo quedarían sus pasivos.
5.- Acuerdo de la Asamblea General en el que se establezca que sea la Federación […] la que con base en los acuerdos tomados se comprometa a hacerse parte de la Comisión liquidadora de la Única.
6.- Acuerdos de las Áreas de captura que quedaría para cada una de las 25 sociedades cooperativas que habrán de crearse.
7.- Tratar lo relacionado con las renuncias como socios de la Única de las personas que formarán las nuevas cooperativas.
8.- Clausura.

314.- Continuación del Legajo XLVII Caja 18. 7 de febrero de 1991.
1º. Asamblea General en la que se plantea la disolución de la Única (copia sin lista de socios. Excluidos 2-11p. del acta.)

315.- Legajo XLV Caja 17. 7 de febrero de 1991.
Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez firma como Presidente de la Asamblea Extraordinaria.

316.- Legajo XLVI. Caja 18. 3 de septiembre de 1991.
Se realizaron Asambleas Seccionales convocadas por el Consejo de Administración el 11 de enero de 1991.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secciones</th>
<th>Lugar</th>
<th>No. de Socios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lázaro Cárdenas</td>
<td>Santa Cruz, Santiago Ixc.</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel Hidalgo</td>
<td>Campo de los Limones, Santiago.</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa de Chila, Parita y Boca de Ameica</td>
<td>Chacala, Compostela</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 de Julio</td>
<td>Villa Juárez, Santiago</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anacleto Ceja Rodríguez</td>
<td>Unión de Corrientes, Tuxpan</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Blas y Boca de Asadero,</td>
<td>San Blas, San Blas</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lic. Roberto Gómez Reyes</td>
<td>Puerta de Palapares, Santiago</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boca de Camichín</td>
<td>Boca de Camichín, Santiago</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novillero</td>
<td>Novillero, Tecuala</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
28 de Junio  |  Pericos, Rosamarada  |  617
Juan Escutia  |  Pescadero, Rosamarada  |  271
Ignacio López García  |  Antonio R. Laureles, Tecuala  |  195
José María Morelos  |  Mexcalititán, Santiago Ixc.  |  399
San Miguel  |  San Miguel, Rosamarada  |  146
Total  |  |  3,152

Continuación del Legajo XLVII Caja 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secciones</th>
<th>Lugar</th>
<th>No. de Socios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palmar de Cuautla</td>
<td>Palmar de Cuautla, Santiago Ixc.</td>
<td>176</td>
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<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz de Miramar</td>
<td>Santa Cruz de Miramar, San Blas</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Nayarit</td>
<td>Tecuala, Tecuala</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Nueva Sirena</td>
<td>Quimichis, Tecuala</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicente Morelos</td>
<td>Los Morales, Tecuala</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilberto Flores Muñoz</td>
<td>San Cayetano, Tecuala</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Barrios</td>
<td>San Andrés, Santiago Ixc.</td>
<td>282</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fraternidad de Pescadores</td>
<td></td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A este total hay que agregarle los socios aproximados de las secciones que no aparecen y que están en el Legajo XLVI Norte de Nayarit, La Nueva Sirena, etc., lo que nos daría una cifra cercana a 4,815 socios.

CONSEJO DE ADMINISTRACIÓN
Presidente.- Carmen Cervantes Zurita.
Secretario.- Serafín Medina Salas.
Tesorero.- Diego Delgado Rincón.
Comité de Educación y Propaganda.- Salvador Hernández Mendoza.
Organización de la Producción.- Everardo Fausto García.
Oficina Central en Chilapa, Rosamarada.
La Subsecretaría B, la Dirección General de Fomento Cooperativo y Organización Social para el trabajo, emite opinión: las Asambleas Generales Extraordinarias del 21 de diciembre de 1990 y 14 de enero de 1991:
• Se contravino lo dispuesto en la Ley y no presentar listas de notificados.
• Las listas integran presentes y ausentes => se contravino la Ley.
Por lo tanto, no se tomó nota por la Dirección de Fomento Cooperativo de los acuerdos adoptados en la Asamblea General del 14 de enero por que el acta no fue asentada en el libro 3 de Asambleas Generales. No reconocen validez.
Después se hizo una inspección y se reconoció el Acta de 27 de marzo del 1991.

El Comisariado Ejidal de Palma Grande promueve juicio de amparo por el uso de terrenos por parte de la Única (en disolución). (Más de lo mismo). La instancia a la que se presenta el asunto es la Secretaría del Trabajo.