ALBANIAN LANGUAGE MANAGEMENT AND THE GENERATION OF KOSOVO ALBANIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY SINCE 1945

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I, Justin Gregory Hamilton Elliott, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
ABSTRACT

This thesis is about the development of a national identity through the means of language, both as a terrain and a vehicle. This thesis argues the modern intellectuals’ sense of moral mission in colonial nation-building was a response to exogenous modernization, and involved imagining the people as Albanians separated from Albania. This was most clearly encapsulated in the adoption of the same standard language as Albania in 1968 and the intellectuals’ subsequent management and reaction to external constraint, which was imposed in such a way as to prove counterproductive and enhance the intellectuals’ status still further. Yet, because there are limits to the way in which imagination of a society can conflict with reality, the standard language has failed to bring political or linguistic unity. In arguing this, the thesis provides a new interpretation of the development of Kosovo Albanian national identity.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 4

Chapter One How the Modern Kosovo Albanian intellectual became possible 57

Chapter Two Writing as they hear: the Standardization of Albanian in the People’s Republic of Albania 95

Chapter Three Standard Albanian and how Kosovo Albanians became national 145

Chapter Four How Kosovo became imagined as a distinct Albanian territory 193

Chapter Five “To be or not to be”: Kosovo Albanians talking about language and deciding their identity 248

Conclusion 282

Appendix One Glossary of common words 292

Appendix Two How written Albanian changed in Kosovo 1960-1975 293

Appendix Three Linguistic confusion in Kosovo 298

Abbreviations 302

Bibliography 303
Introduction

While much has been written on the central place of nationalism and national identity in the recent history of Kosovo, very little attention has been paid to how Kosovo Albanians became nationally conscious, let alone nationalist. Events and movements in Kosovo are often treated as an extension either of those in Albania or Yugoslavia, without any appreciation of the distinctive way in which society has developed in Kosovo.

This thesis will discuss the development of national identity in Kosovo by examining the question of the development of a standard language in the period since 1945. The debate around the nature and status of the Albanian language has been central to how Kosovo Albanians have understood who they are. This is the case both because this debate centres on relationships with the state of Albania and because of the social and cultural context and political activity of those most centrally involved in this argument.

While this thesis focuses on language politics, it is not intended as a sociolinguistic study. Instead it approaches Albanian as the prime emblem and instrument of constructing and managing national identity, seeking to trace the debate over the nature and status of the language through the history of Kosovo since 1945.

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Consequently, this thesis aims to explain how Kosovo Albanians developed their national identity, arguing that it came as a result of modernization from outside and developed through a series of “microadjustments” and is still in a process of flux. In doing so, the thesis aims to cover more ground than language management, although it argues that language management is central to an understanding of how national identity developed in Kosovo. In doing so, the thesis uses as source material and subjects to critique the claims of the Kosovo Albanian intelligentsia who are central to both the imagination of the nation and the process of language management. By examining the creation of Standard Albanian\(^2\) in the context of Albania as well as its adoption in Yugoslavia, this thesis shows that the standardization of the language has been a site of continual struggle under the most totalitarian conditions to a greater extent and over a longer period than accepted. In the thesis as a whole we gain from Kosovo a more nuanced understanding about the formation and maintenance of national identity.

This thesis will concentrate on developments in Kosovo, but they cannot be examined in isolation from the social, political and linguistic situation in the rest of Yugoslavia. As the subject under discussion is an idiom, a symbolic code, invented in Albania for its own purposes, and as the debate before and after its adoption has been affected profoundly by developments in Albania, still less can we ignore the situation there. This thesis, then, will explore the ambiguity at the heart of Kosovo Albanian identity through its debate on language. Though it deals with national identity, the topic is inevitably transnational; all the chapters but the third pay close attention to Albania because, without Kosovo Albanian imagining of Albania and Kosovo’s place in it, there is nothing to discuss. Likewise, without understanding the way in which language both

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2 Standard Albanian, or gjuha standarde shqipe, is the term by which this thesis will refer to the literary form of the language agreed at the Congress of Orthography in 1972 which has been accepted since the fall of communism.
shaped and reflected national and political agendas more successfully than any other symbol, the way in which Kosovo Albanians relate to Albania, to Yugoslavia and to each other cannot be properly explained.

Kosovo and theories of nationalism, identity, modernity

It is tempting to think of the achievement of an independent state as the “natural” consequence of what Schmitt describes as a teleological process which “logically” had to end in conflict. But there was nothing inevitable either about conflict in Kosovo or about its political status, its ethnic or religious composition. Kosovo has only existed in its current, contested borders since 1945 and did not even exist as a provincial name before 1877. Some have questioned the legitimacy of writing about Kosovo at all, for example in the published correspondence involving Noel Malcolm, Aleksa Djilas and others. For the purposes of this thesis, Kosovo existed as an administrative entity with varying degrees of autonomy from 1945. During that time, for the administration, and those who were employed in or governed by that system, “Kosovo” was part of their daily life. There was, however, a complex process by which Kosovo came to be established as a “given” for its inhabitants through the institutions generated by this new reality.

But just as we should be wary of the dangers of teleology in thinking about how Kosovo came to be as it is, ideas about nationalism may also be prone to determinism. Primordialist theorists of nationalism view nations as being directly derived from

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5 This covers the whole of the period under discussion save for Chapter One.
existing groups with origins in kin groups, that nations are not constructions of modernity and that national identification is based on a strong belief in a shared history and common destiny. The contradiction between the idea of permanence and the evidence of contingency, however, presents a general problem for primordialist explanations of the nation.

Constructivist theories, on the other hand, show us how the elites of societies invent traditions and inculcate nationalism into their chosen populace – “nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round.” Constructivist theorists of nationalism have criticized the primordialists on the grounds that they have not taken sufficient account of the multifarious nature of pre-modern people’s identification of themselves and the contingent nature of nation-states’ coming into being. This change comes with the development of modern society, distinguished from previous periods by its relentless activity and thirst for destruction for the sake of improvement. These bring the conditions necessary for the advent of nationalism, industrialization, high culture and mass education according to Ernest Gellner, and the development of print-capitalism as suggested by Benedict Anderson. But, as Etienne Balibar shows, world markets have a tendency to transcend national boundaries in search of labour and markets; there is no one form of state that can be deduced from bourgeois capitalism.

Furthermore, Miroslav Hroch demonstrates that in Eastern Europe most national

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movements preceded industrialization. Hroch describes three phases whereby change is wrought, from a few intellectuals taking an interest in language in Phase A, to patriotic agitation in Phase B, to a mass movement in Phase C. Drawing on Hroch, Tom Nairn views the failure of nationalism to develop in Scotland in the eighteenth century as owing to the lack of a nationalist intelligentsia and bourgeoisie satisfied with the opportunities they had within the Union, thereby failing to reach either Phase A or B when the Industrial Revolution came.

In reviewing ideas about nationalism, besides the divergence between primordial and constructivist, theories variously stress the formation of the state, social development or cultural change. What all have in common is the central place of modernization in the formation of the nation. In our case, the problem is that such models are better suited to the experience of the West, to countries that have undergone the process of becoming a nation as independent states with mass education, industry, publishing and newspapers, to a large extent the product of capitalist production. Even Hroch’s model, which does not require industrialization and is designed specifically for Eastern Europe, still does not fit the course of events in Kosovo, where his phases are concatenated into one.

16 See, for example, Hroch, “From National Movement,” pp.6-7; Richard Jenkins, Rethinking Ethnicity, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2008), p.172.
17 See, for example, James, Nation Formation, p.190; Smith, Ethnic Origin, p.17. Aviel Roshwald is an exception: while he argues that nations existed in the ancient world, the nation was just one of several ways in which society could be organized. Aviel Roshwald, The Endurance of Nationalism: Ancient Roots and Modern Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.297; Laitin, Identity in Formation, p.29; Smith, Ethnic Origin, p.224.
As Reinhard Bendix notes, the contradistinction of “tradition,” characterized as being “spontaneous,” “natural systems” and “modernity,” associated with “standardization, conformity, uniformity,” in scientifically observable progress is one that goes to the heart of the practice of social science in the West. On the one hand, as Prasenjit Duara points out, there are many examples of “modern” behaviour centuries before modernity, such as the mediaeval expunging of foreign words from the Persian lexicon. Moreover, as Paul James observes, even “traditional” societies are constituted abstractly with “indefinitely stretchable links of clientship and kinship”; such imagined communities are not dissimilar to those of the nation. Along with the idea that forming the nation requires the community concerned to have reached some state of “modernity,” Bruce Berman remarks on the widespread assumption that nationalist leaders are expected to be thoroughly modern and secular. Yet, as we can see from Berit Backer’s description of Kosovo in the 1970s, at a time when national consciousness and aspirations were well-formed, intellectuals – who formed the major part of the Albanian elite – constituted an integral part of traditional households governed along pre-modern lines. In the case of Kosovo, it is clear that the relationship between “traditional” and “modern” is much more complex than many models of social development allow.18

So how can we account for the development of nationalism in the circumstances of an incomplete shift to “modernity”? Mark Haugaard disagrees with Gellner and Smith in saying that nation is not a Gesellschaft masquerading as a Gemeinschaft, but rather that Gemeinschaft remains transformed as social life remains a given. To take a major factor in “modernity” such as literacy as an example, Daniel Wagner shows that

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there is no “great divide” between the literate and the non-literate worlds, but that rapid social change can happen while cultural values change more slowly. Instead, what happens is that, where people see advantages in new courses of action, they change attitudes towards literacy even if they do not become literate themselves. This does not constitute a fundamental change in people’s identities, but rather an accommodation to new circumstances that entails some alteration in how people see themselves. In Kosovo, for example, the description of a still largely illiterate people as “education-loving” was, what David Laitin would characterize as a “microadjustment” in that part of social identity that can be more easily changed. 19 As we will see, it is these microadjustments that are the motor change towards national identity in Kosovo, challenging those theories which require a society to be “modern” before it can be national. 20

Hostility to outsiders, solidarity with real or fictional kin and collective territoriality are universal traits; Rogers Brubaker, Mara Loveman and Peter Stamatov draw on psychological research to show that people are drawn to their own group, no matter how arbitrarily chosen.21 Such fundamental choices constitute part of how we think of “identity.” But as Brubaker and Frederick Cooper point out, “identity” is a word of many definitions, which variously indicate the sameness, the character and the

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uniqueness of something, deemed by some to be essentially unchanging and by others to be fluid. Brubaker and Cooper suggest there are other ways to describe this process than an all-encompassing word like “identity” that avoid the debate between essentialist and non-essentialist debates on its nature.\textsuperscript{22}

While identification presumes an identifier, however, it does not get us past the problem of who the identifier is and whom he identifies. The identifier may identify himself, his group, people or groups to which he has close ties or alliances, people or groups about which he feels positive emotions, people or groups that feel alien, inferior or envious, people or groups that feel hostile or threatening, and people or groups on which he looks down, rejects, denies or demonizes. Indeed, he may have more than one of these feelings at the same time about the same people or group. At the same time, that person’s identity is also inseparable from the views of others (in similar gradations) towards him. Just as an identifier may claim an identity for himself, he may have one imposed on him by others. Both identifier and identified engage in a process of navigating the “webs of significance” in which they are suspended, “filling in” from stocks of tacit background “knowledge,” understanding the Self, the unknown or the Other at varying levels of aggregation in terms of existing cultural representations. In short, identity – the process of perceiving others in relation to oneself and oneself in relation to others and what is important to the self – like the nation, is not something that is thought, but thought with.\textsuperscript{23}

David Laitin shows that while modernity has enabled ever-increasing constituents of identity to be consciously chosen or reread, there are elements that remain inherent, such as age, parentage, sexual orientation and mother tongue, while others are still inherent though alterable with considerable human intervention, such as sex, skin colour, disability and so on. Beside these go constituents which have often been very hard to change without considerable social penalty to the point of seeming immutable, such as caste, ethnicity, and religion. While all these attributes may have a particular social construction placed upon them, may be ignored in the interests of greater social harmony or celebrated as “different but equal” contributors to the diversity of life, they are nevertheless markers which are used in the determining of the identity of oneself and others which the person in question may be able to do little or nothing to change. Alongside these attributes are factors which the person in question may be able to change more easily in developing their “real” identity, such as place of residence, political preferences, level of education and, in some circumstances, nationality.\textsuperscript{24}

Identity, then, is composed of that which is alterable and that which, at least, in given cultural circumstances appears to be inherent. As circumstances change, people “fill in” from their background “knowledge” in terms of existing cultural representations. By its nature, identity places the individual in society and, through the web of cultural meanings, assures them some form of survival by connecting them to the past and the future. While human beings may be very malleable, they are not infinitely so; the masses are not the “blank sheet of paper” that Mao Zedong supposed, able to realize any project simply through collective willpower directed from the

\textsuperscript{24} Laitin, \textit{Identity in Formation}, pp.20-21.
vanguard. Similarly, elites cannot make “emotive” appeals to the masses to build the nation unless there is something in the masses’ cultural understanding that excites such emotions when evoked. The sheer fabrication of languages, traditions and nations described by Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm is not sufficient to describe the emergence of nations. As Cathie Carmichael points out, if tartan was the product of English weavers and the British army, without prior significance to Highlanders, it is hard to see why the Hanoverians would have bothered to ban Highlanders from wearing it; rather, as Paul James notes, it was a new means of pointing out an existing Highland and clan differentiation. In the same way, appeals to Dutch national sentiment have used the image and example of the Watergeuzen; an appeal to an invented tradition of the Dutch as desert nomads would not have succeeded, however artful or sentimental. As Richard Jenkins observes, there is a distinction between the nation as imagined and as being imaginary. As with the ideas of “tradition” and “modernity,” then, it appears that a neat division between “primordial” and “constructed” origins of the nation is not so easy to make.

As modernization has not been complete in Kosovo, it presents a challenge to ideas about modernization and identity. In this thesis, then, we can use Kosovo as a laboratory for thinking about what “webs of significance” and stores of background “knowledge” Kosovo Albanians have and how parts of identity might change. This in turn helps us to bring nuance to theories of national identity.

In the case of Kosovo and the north of Albania, those existing cultural representations can be seen in the institution of customary law, best known through the Kanun of Lek Dukagjini. In the Kanun, and its variants, loyalty to agnatic kinship groups, known as fis (plural fiset) overrode national or religious beliefs, or were even identified as equivalent to local “culture.”28

While being centered on fiset, this is far from being a primordial kernel of nationhood. There had long been shared customs, laws, social organization and legends of common ancestry between the Albanian Malësorët and the Montenegrin Brđani; at the start of the twentieth century, both the Klementi and Krasniqi fiset were bilingual, part of a pattern of linguistic assimilation both of Albanian-speakers towards Serbo-Croatian29 and Serbo-Croatian speakers towards Albanian.30 Even those Kosovo Albanians who did not belong to multilingual fiset lived in a state of everyday polyglossia, whether in the use of Latin or Arabic, Persian and Turkish in religion, of Ottoman Turkish or Serbian in dealings with the state, or of any of the numerous alphabets designed for writing Albanian itself.31 The fis, then, enabled its members to survive shortage, political breakdown and social turmoil.32 These institutions were based around communal pastures and responded to the demands of dealing with the

27 A number of terms from Albanian and other languages will be used throughout the thesis; explanations for them can be found in Appendix One.
28 Since the advent of communist rule, urbanization and globalization in north Albanian lands, customary law is no longer the institution it once was and attempts were made in both Albania and Yugoslavia to prevent its use. For a discussion on the role of customary law in modern Albanian society, see Backer, Behind Stone Walls, and Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, “Albanians, Albanianism and the Strategic Subversion of Stereotypes,” in Andrew Hammond, ed., The Balkans and the West: Constructing the European Other, 1945-2003 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp.110-126.
29 “Serbo-Croatian” is used here in preference to Croatian and Serbian, BCS, or any other description to reflect the political decision by the communist regime to use that name during most of the period under discussion of this thesis. In Chapters Three, Four and Five, the thesis will discuss the effect on Albanian of the breakdown of this arrangement.
Ottoman state through the institution of the bajrak, a grouping that could run across fiset, which provided men for service in the Ottoman army.33

The way “microadjustments” affect identity in Kosovo can be demonstrated through the conversion of the population to Islam. While it provided immediate benefits through relief from taxes and the right to bear arms, it also affected identity in the Ottoman Empire where the Sultan’s subjects were distinguished by millet. While conversions were common, the practices and principal beliefs of the new religion often took several generations to become embedded, especially where there were few clergy and the formal structures of both Christianity and Islam were weak.34 Ger Duijzings points to the phenomenon of “incomplete conversion” in Kosovo; this not only applies to religion in the form of “syncretism,” but to language in the form, for example, of Slavophone or Turcophone Albanians, and the use of the customary law in preference to, or alongside, state law.35 These gradual cultural transformations in a state of social and political flux are instances of a series of “microadjustments” in identity, for example, from “Turcophone” to “Albanophone” or from the state of being “subject to customary law” to that of being “subject to state law.” People in Kosovo have been able to live with multiple identities that appear to be mutually exclusive, and it has taken relatively recent external action to persuade people of, or at least make them feign, their “real identity” as Albanians who cared little for religion.36 In Chapter One we shall see in more detail how structures and customs were pre-existing.

Kosovo Albanian nationalism was not simply a reaction to Serbian nationalism but was a series of adjustments in identity in the cultural landscape of Kosovo Albanians. As such, Kosovo Albanian nationalism is quite distinct from that of Albania. “Albanian nationalism” I define as the set of myths, symbols, values and ideas leading to the demand for an autonomous Albanian element as part of the Ottoman Empire, and though Albanian nationalists played a part, the creation of an independent Albanian state was dependent on the decision of the Ambassadors’ Conference in London based on the balance of power after the First Balkan War. Much of the work done in the creation of Albanian nationalism came after the independence of Albania.

The course of Albanian nationalism has been quite different from that of nationalism among Albanians in Kosovo. Ottoman Albanian officials, like Nairn’s Scottish intellectuals, were able to work throughout their empire at all levels, so it is little surprise that Albanian nationalism is one of the last national movements to gain traction there. It is notable that the first impulses to nationalism come from outside the Empire, from nationalizing states like Greece, Italy and Romania. As the Ottoman Empire lost territory and prestige over the course of the nineteenth century, especially with the Serbian seizure of the Sanjak of Niš and the Hercegovina Rising, this put the lands of Albanian fiset and landowners under threat of encroachment and their populations of extirpation at the hands of Slavs and Greeks. While print-capitalism in Albanian was very rare, it was nevertheless fundamental to the propagation of historical myths and symbols, like that of Skanderbeg, the flag, the map37 and early language

37 The map indicates a problem with applying Anthony D. Smith’s view of the ethnie becoming a nation: there is no consistent class structure throughout Albanian lands, no historic dynasty, no long-term “tribal confederation” and no revival of lost independent territory like the realms of King Tomislav, King Tvrtko or Car Dušan; it is instructive that the classical Albanian nationalist territorial demand is not for the lands of King Agron, Queen Teuta or the widest extent of Skanderbeg’s League of Lezha, but the four vilayets demanded by the League of Prizren – divisions created and decided in Istanbul, not by Albanians – made less than forty years before independence.
management, in attempting to unify the dialects of Albanian and create an alphabet on which all would agree. In linguistic terms, that meant making common cause with Albanian Muslims, Orthodox Christians, influenced by Greece, and Catholics, influenced by Italy. It is unsurprising that early Albanian nationalism saw itself as both Ottoman and Albanian with its goal as autonomy and security; independence was more a matter of circumstance and the populace, as we can see in the revolt of Haxhi Qamili, was sometimes rather unwilling. Much of the repertoire of Albanian nationalism was created in years before and after independence and centred on the Albanian state, especially rhetorical differentiation from the Ottoman Empire through orientalism.38 Albanian lands left outside were much more conservative and while some nationalism can be seen, the preference was more for not being ruled by Christians/Slavs than specifically for Albania, though rule from Albania was much more likely than the restoration of the Sultan.

Kosovo Albanian nationalism, on the other hand, is a “motherland nationalism”39 which shares many of the symbols, myths, values and ideas of Albanian nationalism and was also caused exogenously, but for quite different reasons. If one follows Anderson’s or Laitin’s models, nationalism in Kosovo is only explicable if one follows the “colonial” scenario in each case.40 The conditions for modern life (or for nationalism) for Kosovo Albanians in 1941 were all but nonexistent. There were a

38 For the purposes of this thesis, the stereotypical presentation of Eastern and Islamic culture and the associated valorization of Western culture.
40 This does not mean that I intend simply to follow either Anderson or Laitin’s views uncritically; there is little to be gained either in forcing the data to fit the theory or in my constructing any new grand theory based on the case of Kosovo. Nevertheless, their identification of the kind of situation closest to the case of Kosovo as “colonial” is instructive.
handful of modern intellectuals, no public education in Albanian, very little industrialization (which, in any case, seldom concerned Albanians), no participation in the nation-state through institutions such as conscription (or indeed experience of the state as anything other than an oppressor) and virtually no print-capitalism. (There was no publishing in Albanian, only a tiny minority could read and there was no imagination of the territory of modern Kosovo as it was not a territorial division that the state recognized.) Nevertheless, there are clear examples of nationalist ideas and practices with widespread popular support in the 1960s. And while there was a mass education system by then, the state was socialist rather than capitalist and the circulation of the Albanian-language press was in large part confined to the elite of intellectual and political actors. In 1941 Kosovo had virtually no capacity for modernization by itself: what happened was that modernization was done to Kosovo.

To state that Kosovo Albanian nationalism is distinct from Albanian nationalism in no way implies that the Albanians of Kosovo are any more or less Albanian than the Albanians of Albania. Quite the contrary; for Kosovo Albanian nationalism, the unification of all Albanians in a single state remains a pressing political goal. What these ideologies are are simply different ways of being nationally Albanian. That Kosovo Albanian nationalists see their ultimate goal as the union of all Albanians into a single state in which they will be provincials speaking and thinking just like Albanians in Tirana and everywhere else, however, does not detract from the distinctiveness of the two nationalisms. While Kosovo Albanians share the myths, values, symbols and customs of Albanian nationalism, they do not share the sense of the Ottoman Empire as the colonial foe, as that place in the Kosovo Albanian imagination is occupied by Serbia. Secondly, Christian Orthodoxy played an important part in Albanian nationalism with its heroes, such as Fan Noli, and martyrs, such as Papa Kristo
Negovani, whereas for Kosovo Albanian nationalism, Orthodox Christianity was the religion that justified and underwrote Slav persecution of Albanians. Thirdly, while the influence of the Catholic church and those educated through it was central to Albanian national symbols and myths, especially in the north-west, the Catholic element in Kosovo was much more marginal and Catholic symbols, such as Pjetër Bogdani, Shtjefën Gjeçovi and Mother Teresa, were all but completely secularized.

In order to understand Albanian and Kosovo Albanian nationalism, then, we need recourse to theory on nationalism. Yet because of external factors involved in Kosovo’s modernization and the way in which its Albanian population has adjusted to the disturbance of its habitus, the case of Kosovo Albanians illuminates how this works in a situation where nationalism theory can be an uncomfortable fit.

Language, language management and sociopolitical change

For creators and defenders of nations, language is a symbol like no other. As with identity and the nation, it cannot be neatly slotted into a “primordial” or “constructed” category. Languages change and are radically altered for political ends, something essential to the project of language standardization. Nevertheless, languages cannot be made into something they are not; even with the might of the Soviet Union under Stalin behind it, the Academy Institute of Linguistics in Chișinău, in its various pronouncements in 1950, was unable to make the Romance language of the majority of the population of the Moldavian SSR either a fully or partially Slavonic language.41 Languages can be revived, given a literature where none previously existed or used as the means by which a state promotes itself, yet languages which are not artificial do not

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have identifiable dates on which they emerged. Again, like the nation and like identity itself, language can be split in different ways because its hard and soft boundaries are dynamic; moreover, it can be expressed in different ways according to level of aggregation. Language also shares the quality of being a sign of the individual’s place in society while connecting both the individual and society to the past and the future. In short, language is central to society - whether “traditional” or “modern” - and the nation, because neither is possible without it.

One could object that history, religion and high culture are equally productive, essential-yet-malleable symbols. However, history, religion and high culture can only be articulated through language; not only that, but their content and the choice of language in which they are expressed serve to promote the cause of that language. Like a national history, a national standard language is an artificial creation designed to be taken for granted; both obscure “already forgotten” counter-narratives such as interethnic cohabitation in the case of history or non-standard dialects in the case of language. Both are collective, portrayed as the product of their people and, if the national project is successful, both are popular to the extent that the masses accept them as national. And while both rely on the classroom and the media for daily reinforcement, every word on every topic serves to make the national language a present and lived experience – the medium is the message. The power of language as a symbol is such that it is seen as an entity in its own right and, in some cases, language has such

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42 21; Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” p.226.
46 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.200.
mythic power that is taken to be the culture of a particular group. Language also acts as a tool of discrimination against outsiders — and insiders who do not conform to the standards imposed by the state, the education system or language activists — reinforcing the dominance of the nation as envisaged by the state. Beyond identity and the nation, language is not only thought with, but the stuff of thought itself.

In the Albanian case, history, geography, religion and social organization were all factors that could potentially be used to partition the land and people, and while the state remained a remote concept to most Albanians, the symbol of language was readily understandable. Language was the only factor capable of uniting all Albanians, providing them with a symbol not only of how they were distinct from their neighbours but also of how they were a people with an ancient heritage and a particular place in the Indo-European family. For the nationalist, the language is more than just a means of communication but an integral part of what makes Albanians unique.

This thesis uses the concept of “language management” to track the wider discussions of language (not just in terms of standardization) by both state institutions and private activists. “Language management,” as used by Bernard Spolsky, is particularly fitted to this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, while sharing with Spolsky the distinction between how language is represented and how it is used, language management places more of an emphasis on language policy than the “urge to meddle in matters of language” of Deborah Cameron’s “verbal hygiene,” which appears more useful in discussing non-institutional language activism and politicolinguistic history.

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51 It should be pointed out that not all who speak Albanian are accorded membership of the Albanian nation; while Ashkalis and others are excluded as members of distinct peoples, they are comparatively small proportion of Albanian-speakers, forgotten by nationalists and others who tend to treat the Albanian language and people as coterminous.
after standardization. Secondly, language management has greater stress on the non-linguistic goals involved than Einar Haugen’s concept of “language planning,” while it has tended to be strongly linked to institutionally-supported sociolinguistic development in the context of colonies and newly independent countries. Language management also supposes the active participation of managers, be they creators, supporters or in opposition to the state’s language policy. Moreover, Spolsky’s understanding of language policy stresses the importance of language ideologies, or beliefs about language, and language practice as well as language management; as we will see, especially in Chapters Four and Five, both of these have played a crucial role in the shaping of the debate about Albanian in Kosovo.

The management of a language takes two forms: that of the language’s status in relation to other languages and of the corpus of the language itself. On one hand, every language has a status which varies according to the sociopolitical situation in the area where it is spoken, ranging from being forbidden to being the sole language permitted by the state. There is a strong correlation between the status of the language in a state and the status of the people who speak it; as a child learns to talk and goes to school, especially if the language of the school is very different from that spoken at home, she learns the social place of her people. On the other, the standardization of the corpus comprises the choice of a writing system, orthography, lexicon, grammar, syntax and related matters: in short, deciding what is “good” and what is “bad” in writing or speaking that particular standard language. Although, as Joshua Fishman points out,

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such choices are invariably presented as natural, progressive and linguistically scientific, no intervention on language corpus is neutral but always an attempt at social engineering.\textsuperscript{54}

Noam Chomsky observes that all questions of language are basically questions of power.\textsuperscript{55} As the successor states to Yugoslavia have shown, the creation of a distinctive national language is often viewed as essential to the forging of a new nation; the (re)creation of a corpus for each language reflects the way in which the process was driven by debates over status in Yugoslavia from the 1960s. New national languages, then, do not emerge from nowhere; there is a great deal of difference between the speech of the illiterate masses and a standardized language. The rendering of folk speech into a civilized, intellectualized tongue capable of expressing the most complex of technical and philosophical ideas requires language management, essential for making language function effectively as a national symbol.\textsuperscript{56} Seen as a beneficial and culturally neutral exercise until the 1970s, language standardization involves a number of choices that are essentially political, chief among which is the choice of the dialect or dialects on which the standard form is to be based. These are usually connected to ideas of sociopolitical prestige and power, such as the regional dialect of the court in the case of French or of classical forms in the case of Arabic. The forms chosen often reflect


rural speech, seen as “pure” and free of the corrupting influence of cities full of cosmopolitan influence, as in the case of Uzbek. National identity is then embodied in the standard language which all must use. Only 2% of the population of Italy spoke Standard Italian at the Risorgimento; in the probably apocryphal words of Massimo d’Azeglio, “we have made Italy; now we must make Italians.”

Enshrined by its creators in dictionaries, grammars and other reference works, the standard language is promoted through the classroom, newspapers, broadcasting and high culture. Variation by class, region or subculture is rejected as “deviations” or “errors”; the standard language is the only acceptable and “correct” way to use the language. Imposed and policed by state institutions, intellectuals, teachers and language activists, the masses learn to make the adjustments necessary to incorporate the standard as part of their daily lives at work, in the classroom and in formal situations and as part of their national identity, as a prestigious mobilizing “standard” to look up to as the way of talking “grammatically”. Beyond informal social life, speakers of non-standard dialects are then put in a position of linguistic insecurity, feeling inferior to native speakers of the standard, continually monitoring their own speech for “mistakes.”

In the case of Albanian, early Albanian producers of descriptive linguistic works, such as George Pekmezi, were also involved in corpus management of the

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59 Throughout my time in Kosovo, I was often referred to as “speaking more grammatically” than most Albanians because I spoke Standard Albanian; my interlocutors did not consider the grammar of their own dialect, which they were using correctly, to be “grammatical.”
language. Descriptive study of the language was a consequence of attempts at language management, carried out to supply the raw data for an inherently political process. The proliferation of alphabets in the late nineteenth century was testament to the political nature of language management: the shape and pronunciation of each character showed acceptance of or resistance to the cultural and political influence of powerful players in the region, such as Austria-Hungary, Greece, Italy and the Ottoman Empire. We can see a similar process of descriptive linguistic work as part of an already existing debate on language management in the case of Macedonian, such as Venjamin Mačukovski’s Gramatika na българския език според македонското наречие. Altogether, this suggests that descriptive linguistics was not simply a matter of intellectual curiosity that was to develop into national consciousness; instead the idea of a nation among intellectuals gave rise to intellectual production describing “national” languages. In this respect, at least in terms of language, Hroch’s Phase A appears somewhat illusory.

In the case of Albanian in Kosovo, we cannot just look at the motivation of those taking part in the standardization process, but at the complex series of provincial, inter-Albanian and intra-Yugoslav actions of which it was a part; this is why, in Chapter Two, I explain the process behind standardization in Albania. As for the Yugoslav context, it was one in which, as the country decentralized, there was strong competition

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61 Much of the early description of the language in the nineteenth century was undertaken by foreign scholars, especially from Germany and Austria-Hungary, such as Franz Bopp, Gustav Mayer and Johann Georg von Hahn.


63 Hroch has written more particularly about the role of language in the Slavic world, the phases here being where language is celebrated and defended against assimilation, the language is standardized with a unified orthography and distinct language borders, the intellectualization of the language with the production of artistic and scientific literature, demands for the introduction of this codified and intellectualized language into secondary schools and demands for full equality of the language. Once again, in the case of Albanian, all these phases are concatenated into one – Miroslav Hroch, “The Slavic World,” in Fishman, Handbook, p.331.
among interest groups of different ethnicities which expressed itself in questions of both status and corpus management, made all the more intense because, for the great majority of Yugoslavs, it involved arguments over the construction and reinforcement of boundaries and distinctions among idioms so closely related as to be mutually intelligible. Albanians, then, were not unusual in using corpus and status as a means of hardening boundaries with Serbo-Croatian; like their counterparts in the rest of the country, those engaged in this work were engaged in social engineering in preventing assimilation and reinforcing identification of Kosovo Albanians with Standard Albanian. One the one hand, Albanian, the language of the majority in Kosovo, was, for most of the Yugoslav period, either suppressed or given inferior treatment; on the other, the ethnolinguistic vitality shown in the emergence of a standardizing, “civilized” Albanian language and associated culture in Kosovo in competition with the dominant and established Serbo-Croatian, coupled with the difficulties experienced by Albanians in integrating with wider Yugoslav society, enhanced a sense of association and loyalty to the cultural values of an imagined Albania over the elusive benefits of assimilating into Slavophone Yugoslav culture and society. As we will see below, the linguistic situation served to reinforce the direction of sociopolitical developments within the Kosovo Albanian intelligentsia.

This thesis, then, is about language management not only because of its importance to the construction of national projects but because, through language management, we can chart two sets of sociopolitical changes. In the context of status, language is the clearest and most responsive symbol of the legitimacy of the place of Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia and in Kosovo in particular. In the context of corpus, we can see how dissent among Kosovo Albanians has been expressed and how Albanian national ideologies have been policed. Because, in Yugoslavia, the primary
language of the state was not Albanian, status management has taken precedence over corpus management. Nevertheless, there are two factors worth noting here: firstly, that while much is written on the hardening of boundaries between ethnic groups in the national cause, the hardest fought struggles are those that happen within ethnic groups; 64 secondly, beside a little early intervention from outside, language management was and is a struggle that has taken place between Albanians in Albanian. Despite its central significance for the way in which Albanians, especially in Kosovo, view themselves, beyond a handful of sociolinguists it remains largely unknown and ignored in the outside world.

**Intellectuals talking about language (and the nation)**

“It all starts with those who deal with language,” said a Prishtina jailer to his inmate, the linguist Rexhep Ismajli. 65 Here, the jailer had perceived, correctly, that the discussion of language was a central part of a wider debate about the relative status of different ethnic groups in a multilingual society like Yugoslavia. While Hroch is right to identify linguistic discussion being one of the earliest manifestations of national sentiment, Fishman identifies debate over corpus as frequently being cover for talking about language status where this is politically difficult; 66 in the case of Albania, it is notable that there was lively debate about the form of the national language, especially the alphabet, at a time when it was severely repressed by the Ottoman authorities. Significantly, however, what unites Albanians discussing the Albanian language is that they are the same people as those seeking political change by mobilizing Albanian national feeling: Albanian intellectuals. While intellectuals play a crucial role in the

construction of the nation and its symbols such as language, in Kosovo this has been complicated by incomplete modernization and how the intellectual there has changed over time.

Intellectuals, to use Hobsbawm’s words about historians, provide the raw materials for nationalists: as Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy note, history as a raw material for nationalism is manufactured in daily newspapers, official commemorations and school textbooks, and we might add literature, ethnography, poetry, cartography, architecture, that serves to promote the cause of the national language. The propagation of these ideas to the rural masses by urban elites allows those elites to make a living, advancing their own position, while constructing alliances with elites in other countries, particularly in what Brubaker would term the “external national homeland” and geopolitically powerful countries. Violence may ensue either directly from the “ethnic passions” stirred or from more prosaic motives which can be “coded” as ethnic; these may then generate “civic unmixing,” leading to murder and the expulsion of the “Other” community while being used as a means of enforcing loyalty from the community’s own members.

However, these thinkers cannot necessarily be identified with the elite that makes political use of their ideas. There are also some intellectuals’ ideas that do not

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gain hegemony, ending as part of a counter-narrative, seemingly contradictory, forgotten and suppressed, or used by other nations; examples might include Mehmet Ákif Ersoy, the son of a villager from near Peja, who wrote the Turkish national anthem, the İstiklâl marşı, or Sami Frashëri, considered fundamental both to the development of Albanian and Turkish literature and political thought. We need, then, to define ways to think of these intellectuals.

As we have seen with identity and nationhood, being an “intellectual” can only be one out of many ways in which a person can identify. By the same token, identifying as such will vary depending on the local situation, according to the structure and level of development of society, according to the type and place of education afforded the intellectual and on the geopolitical situation. In short, the definition of “intellectual” must vary over time.

At the Serbian conquest in 1912, as in other colonized regions of the world, one might follow Toyin Falola in speaking of a “traditional intelligentsia” in Kosovo, composed of village elders, landowners, lahutars, storytellers and others, who (re)produced knowledge in the form of genealogies, histories, legends, mediating conflicts, exercising authority and training the next generation of traditional intellectuals. Alongside these was the literate “religious intelligentsia,” grounded in formal Catholic and Islamic education systems, with knowledge of Latin or Arabic,

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70 Where there is no standard word in English, I have chosen to call place-names by the current name used by the majority of the population in the country which they are situated. I follow the convention of putting Albanian place-names in the definite form for feminine names, and the indefinite form for masculine ones. Exceptions will be made for quotations, proper names and historical conventions, and where these differ from the usual names, they will be footnoted. In Kosovo, the choice of place-name is inherently political; the conventions I adopt therefore represent an attempt to avoid ethnic claims in my own writing.
Persian and Ottoman Turkish who provided education and acted as judges, mediators, ideologists, political representatives of their communities;\(^{73}\) in the first half of the twentieth century, some of the literature and much of the work done on the folklore, history, customary law and language of Kosovo was produced by clergy. While much of their work served to support or vindicate Albanian national claims in the area, the authors remained committed to a religious worldview which was not especially opposed to the dominance of the Ottoman Empire, Italy or Austria-Hungary; while much of this work sought to exalt the Albanians as a whole, often it remained local in character and interest.

The intellectuals that concern this thesis are what Falola calls “modern intellectuals” – though, in using the word “modern,” we should recall that they integrated into a society which is never fully “modern” – to describe those intellectuals with formal intellectual training who describe their work as “scientific.”\(^{74}\) How, then, does one define the modern intellectual? Zygmunt Bauman has said that all definitions of “intellectuals” are, by definition, self-definitions.\(^{75}\) As Bauman notes, the point of definition is to separate those in an in-group and an out-group, thereby legitimating separate status for those inside the group.\(^{76}\) This suggests that this task should be approached with caution, for many definitions seem to aim at excluding intellectuals of a particular kind, or point of view. Particularly relevant here are definitions from the

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\(^{74}\) “Scientific” (*shkencor* in Albanian) is closer to the German *wissenschaftlich* than the English meaning tied to the natural sciences.


former Yugoslavia, such as that of Dubravka Ugrešić, disregarding the bulk of those
“who perform an intellectual service to their governments, rulers and executives”; Milan
Ivanović’s distinction between intellectuals and “intellectuabili,” in the service of
political and economic power structures and Bogdan Bogdanović, who distinguishes
between the half-politicized intelligentsia and the over-politicized “half-intelligentsia,”
synonymous with half-educated, half-competent “cadre.” There are others who take a
more skeptical view in defining intellectuals and, in doing so, exclude themselves.

From the interviews I conducted in Kosovo, the commonest view was that an
intellectual was someone who stood up for what they believed, for a cause, especially
the national cause. Seldom did I come across anyone who allowed those who were loyal
to the Yugoslav state the status of intellectual; on the contrary, I was often told the work
of certain scholars was “very scientific, but they had not done much for Kosovo,”
plainly viewing this as a disqualification. Several informants said that they shared
Sartre’s view of engaged intellectuals; it is notable that Sartre’s views on intellectuals
were translated into Albanian and published in Kosovo as early as 1960 and were often
republished. It should be noted that, now that the war was over, a number of the
intellectuals who expressed these views to me had strong ties to political parties that
were or had recently been in power.

It appears, then, that making a successful definition of the modern intellectual in
Kosovo either from the ideas of Western or local thinkers is not that easy. While

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77 Dubravka Ugrešić, The Culture of Lies: Anti-Political Essays, trans. Celia Hawkesworth (University
jugoslawische Krise. Rolle und Wirken der postjugoslawischen unabhängigen Intellektuelle in Wien
(Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2003), p.67, citing Milan Ivanović, “Intelektualac i nacionalna svijest,” Revija
slobodne misli 7.31 (2001), 54; Džihić, Intellektuelle, p.69; Bogdan Bogdanović, Glib i krv (Belgrade:
Helsinki odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2001), pp.89, 145. Jasna Dragović-Soso neatly uses this
cleavage in considering Serbian intellectuals who became nationalist in the 1980s: “Saviours of the
viii.
79 Zhan-Pol Sartër [Jean-Paul Sartre], “Letërsija e angazhueme,” Jeta e re 3 (1960), 246-252.
Bourdieu’s view of the appropriation and exploitation of cultural capital is an attractive one, as Gvozden Flego points out, it is hard to think of former socialist countries in such capitalist terms. This cannot be stressed too heavily; as with Falola’s “modern intellectuals,” in Yugoslav Kosovo the intelligentsia was a phenomenon of the public sector, unattached to the traditional ruling classes of landlord, cleric and merchant; and as with many socialist countries, such a background was a distinct disadvantage. Under such conditions, we might think of the Kosovo Albanian intellectual as a person with a high level of non-religious education for the time who, in whole or in part, derives their reputation from intellectual (re)production.

Kosovo Albanian intellectuals involved in language activism – and therefore the construction of the nation – were subject to modernization through state socialism imposed from outside. Models of nationalism centred on capitalism, such as Paul Jones’s view of continuity-in-discontinuity in society forged in ever-increasing levels of abstraction, do not take extrinsic action on “traditional” societies sufficiently into account. Equally, models that examine capitalist colonialism, such as those of Bhikhu Parekh, do not equip us in understanding the impact of socialism in how modernity was done to Kosovo. Andrew Walder provides us with a key to how state socialist

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81 This does not just include those working in intellectual institutions. For example, Tahir Jaha, from the Partisan generation, who wrote prose, poetry and drama while running the Rilindja publishing house, had an incomplete secondary school education; it is rare to find literary figures of a generation later without at least one degree: Enver Gjerqeku, Ramiz Kelmendi and Hasan Mekuli, eds., Panoramë e letërsisë bashkëkohore shqipe në Jugoslavji (Belgrade: Enti për botimin e teksteve i Republikës Socialistë të Serbisë, 1964), p.409; Ali D. Jasiqi, “Shënime për autorin” in Tahir Jaha, Lulet e stinëve (Prishtina: Jeta e re, 1998), pp.87-88.

82 Politicians such as Mahmut Bakalli and Mehmet Hoxha were also involved in intellectual work, Bakalli as a lecturer in sociology, Hoxha producing translations and poetry. The first novel from Kosovo in Albanian, Rrushi ka nis me u pjekë, was attributed to the politician Sinan Hasani. At the general election of 2014, candidates with postgraduate titles featured them on their publicity.

83 James, Nation Formation, p.191; Parekh, “Ethnocentricity.”
societies become modern through what he calls “communist neo-traditionalism,” which bears a resemblance to the idea developed independently by Katherine Verdery of the “economy of shortage.” The “economy of shortage” is one that encourages bureaucratic expansion of resources in competition for access to resources as plans overstate productive capacities, hoarding materials and labour while demanding extra resources in anticipation of production problems or greater need. On the one hand, this leads to very great influence being wielded by the people responsible for allocating budgets at the centre and allocating them in individual centres of production. Furthermore, as Walder points out, this makes the workforce highly dependent on the enterprises to which they belong and their directors in particular. As a result, the Party and management require stable vertical ties created with a minority of cadres within the workforce. However, what appear to be political or professional incentives on the surface hide the allocation of material benefits to those cadres who are successful in the struggle for resources.84 In Kosovo, to be successful might have meant being linked through the Party or through family, fis or hometown ties; many of the complaints from Albanians before 1966 or from Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s are about failure or, more properly, exclusion of their group in the competition for allocation of bursaries, jobs and housing and the benefits awarded to those with nepotistic connections to decision-makers along with the overlooking of allegations of corruption and plagiarism.85 What made these complaints particularly emotive in Kosovo (and Yugoslavia more generally) was the allocation of resources through the ethnic key, which allowed the rivalry of different networks within

the Party and major institutions to be translated into ethnic grievances. This, in turn, meant that any challenge to the management of the allocation of resources was a potential threat to the ethnic stability of the whole society. As it was, for intellectuals such neo-traditionalism encouraged a level of institutional compliance, which in Albanology was already encouraged by nationalist gatekeeping, furthered by the desire of younger scholars to establish their own work in the tradition of their teachers and intellectual forebears as the price for admittance to or maintenance in the appropriate network, particularly in the case of publication in learned journals.

Yet there is another side to intellectual production under state socialism: what Czesław Milosz calls *ketman*, that is, false protestations of faith by intellectuals that deceive those who consume them while raising the reputation of those who produce them. With few exceptions, all intellectuals to some extent are constrained to produce *ketman* in order to maintain the institutional and personal relationships, central to neo-traditionalism, on which they depend as intellectuals. What makes the case of Kosovo so interesting in this respect is that, precisely because society was not already modern, Kosovo Albanian intellectuals had a duty to produce a kind of *ketman* for the wider public to satisfy its appropriation of the imagined Albania that these intellectuals had created; thus, intellectuals returning from Enver Hoxha’s Albania would lie about the social condition and prosperity of the country or face being accused of being Yugoslav spies. This, in turn, paved the way for what Liah Greenfeld might term the

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86 Speaking in 1969, Veli Deva complained of an assault at a factory in Ferizaj made far more difficult to handle because the two parties were of different nationalities, leading to five Slav engineers deciding to leave and the authorities having to rearrest the culprit after he was discharged by the courts for threatening brotherhood and unity: Veli Deva, “Medunacionalni odnosi i politička situacija na Kosovu,” in Ljubiša Stankov et al., eds., *Politička situacija medunacionalni odnosi u savremenoj fazi socijalističkog razvitka i zadaci Saveza komunista Srbije: diskusioni politološki seminar 11, 12 i 13 januara 1969*. (Belgrade: Institut za političke studije fakulteta političkih nauka, 1969), p.140.


resentiment felt by younger intellectuals after 1992 when the destitution of Albania became more widely known and experienced by Kosovo Albanians travelling there.\textsuperscript{90} This, however, did not seem to alter the Sartrean view of intellectuals common to all generations of Kosovo Albanian intellectuals whom I interviewed.

Verdery says that scholars compete for eminence and the institutionalization of their field, claiming to treat the nation and represent its values better than any other.\textsuperscript{91} In terms of the humanities in Kosovo, we cannot understand “field” as a discrete academic discipline but as a series of related topics – ethnology, folklore studies, history, literary studies and linguistics – that together make up Albanology. Claims to represent the nation are made on behalf of Albanology as a whole rather than for each individual discipline, and its practitioners have a joint sense of mission. These same claims, socialist in form and national in content, are held across the disciplines; for example, a linguist with this view will have predictable views on folklore, history or literary criticism that fit in with the albanological worldview. Moreover, just as he will publish not only on all aspects of linguistics but also on the other branches of Albanology, so non-linguists from other branches of Albanology may speak and publish on linguistic matters. It is Albanology as a whole and its associated worldview that lays claim to the moral right to “how the nation should think.”\textsuperscript{92} In viewing Albanology as a single “field” rather than as a series of related disciplines, it is significant that albanologists have repeatedly objected to the borrowing departamenti for a department of a faculty as

\textsuperscript{91} Verdery, \textit{National Ideology}, pp.69-70.
\textsuperscript{92} This does not contradict what Verdery has to say about Romania; the tradition of learning in discrete disciplines has a much longer history there than in Kosovo. Here, we are dealing with the first two generations of intellectuals, nearly all with experience either of secondary school teaching or journalism. They were also very small in number and struggling as a group for ascendency as a popular elite. It is therefore natural that, in such a position, they would make a claim for social reputation in terms of “scientific” knowledge in general as much as for their own discipline in particular. Verdery, \textit{National Ideology}, pp.54-55.
opposed to the Albanian word *dega*. *Departamenti* implies that there are barriers between disciplines that may or may not be related; *dega* ("branch") implies that the disciplines all connect to a single trunk, that of Albanology. To abandon this concept is to jeopardize the entire worldview.

Beyond the world of "scientific" institutions, there is another element to consider in the life of a Kosovo Albanian intellectual: his role in constructing, vindicating and suffering for the nation which, in turn, grants him respect from the masses. The suffering and struggle, or "sacrifices," of intellectuals such as Anton Çetta, Adem Demaći, Ukshin Hoti, Mark Krasniqi and Ibrahim Rugova for the sake of the nation have led to their appropriation, both by the political class in the form of monuments and commemorations, and by the masses in the form of folk songs and poetry. The international reputation of an intellectual, by contrast, carries less weight than his ideological choices; Oliver Jens Schmitt notes that Hasan Kaleshi, a world-renowned orientalist, is now largely forgotten in Kosovo, in part because his views on history and linguistics ran counter to albanological orthodoxy and in part because he was perceived as an assimilationist with views close to those of the Yugoslav government, choosing to lecture at Prishtina University in Serbo-Croatian.

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93 See, for example, Rexhep Qosja, “Gjuha e njësuar letare,” *Gjurmime albanologjike – seria e shkencave filologjike* 26 (1996), 65.

94 For example, Mehmet Kajtazi, “‘O prite, prite Anton Çettën…I!’,” *Rilindja*, 2 April 1990, p.14; Vëllezërit Litë e Biti, “Ukshin Hoti,” [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xS2sSbesM1ps](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xS2sSbesM1ps); Grupi Folklorik Hajvalia, “Këngë për Adem Dëmaçi [sic],” [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rh908DI8pos](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rh908DI8pos); Agim Gashi, “Kangë lamtumirëse për Akademik Mark Krasniqi,” [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfGRBi71ye](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfGRBi71ye); Vëllezërit Qetaj, “Ibrahim Rugova,” [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnRMAOrpwQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnRMAOrpwQ) [All last accessed 16 October 2016].

The social position of intellectuals

In order to understand the significance of this, we need to understand the social position of intellectuals in wider society in Kosovo. After regaining control of Kosovo in 1944, Yugoslavia invested heavily in the creation of modern intellectuals. As a state socialist country, it aimed to create a socialist “new man” and for that it needed a population free of the “backward practices” associated with a traditional and predominantly Muslim society. As a country aiming to develop and industrialize, it needed a productive workforce capable of bringing this about. The quickest way to achieve both these goals was to concentrate on mass education, which involved the mass production of teachers and the production of others, such as translators and journalists, to provide the reading matter to support them; at the same time, campaigns were waged against the traditional and religious intelligentsia in which the modern intelligentsia took a very active role. Thus far, the drive for the accelerated development of Kosovo through education seems similar to that in Albania. Kosovo, however, depended on Slavs for much of its government and most of its technical elite: by 1971 80% of the Albanian elite identified by Lenard Cohen were teachers, leaving Albanians in a subordinate role compounded by cultural and linguistic difference.

Before 1966, many Kosovo Albanians with further education and nearly all with postgraduate education had been trained at Belgrade University, though they were

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97 Bendix, “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered,” pp.418-419. Here, as in a number of other instances in the thesis there are occasions where actors appear to be engaged in the manipulation of the masses for self-serving and cynical purposes. However self-serving such actions may seem, even when these actions were associated with power, it was “associated with a formulation which connects that power to worthy purposes extending beyond the self and the historical moment. Nor can such a formulation be dismissed as a mere rationalization of personal ambition” but is rooted in “a larger image, a controlling image, of self and world.” Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality*, p.58.

outnumbered by Slav students from Kosovo. Under such circumstances of dependency, there emerged three responses within the elite, each with fundamentally different views of the place of Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia. Firstly, there were what I term “assimilationists,” particularly strong at the leadership of the Party in Kosovo before 1966 and after 1981, who saw Kosovo Albanians as Yugoslavs, a minority that spoke the Albanian language. Many of this group had been former Partisans, sharing the experiences, the goals and the comradeships of the National Liberation War. They were often married to Serbs, encouraged the use of and learning of Serbo-Croatian and themselves often spoke and wrote in Serbo-Croatian in preference to Albanian; to that extent, they were less interested in or resistant to the adoption of Standard Albanian. Despite their political success, this was dependent on non-Albanian support both in- and outside Kosovo; few were accepted among Kosovo Albanians and seldom were able to make a career outside Kosovo.

The second group was what I call the “Kosovar” elite, the bilingual intellectual and Party cadre who were most closely associated with the development of Albanophone intellectual institutions and with the adoption of Standard Albanian. Though the politicians among them used Serbo-Croatian at the federal level, the Kosovar elite was very active in speaking and writing in Albanian within Kosovo. It was the most common element in the intellectual elite and became the most powerful group in the Party in the years from 1966 to 1981. It saw Kosovo Albanians as Albanians who lived in Yugoslavia: although they were citizens of Yugoslavia, their

100 These are very broad categorizations; in each case, there was a spectrum of opinion within each category and, during times of general political change such as the mid-1960s and the late 1980s, shifts between one category and another.
101 Laitin, Identity in Formation, pp.57-58.
language and their culture was Albanian; as such, they were not a minority but a majority in the areas where they lived. This was the category that most closely fit the regional elite described by Abram de Swaan, keen to reinforce the regional language (in this case, Albanian) at the expense of the central language (Serbo-Croatian) which enhances their power, as they are able to communicate to their own people in the regional language beyond the reach of the centre, while using the central language to communicate with the central elites, who cannot reach the regional masses without the intervention of the regional elite. The dominance of the regional elite is threatened with the number of the regional masses who learn and use the central language. The standardization of the regional language, especially if associated with a state beyond the borders of the country, serves to increase its prestige in relation to the central language. In the case of Kosovo, it bolstered the view of Albanians as being Albanians who live in Yugoslavia rather than Yugoslavs who happen to speak Albanian. The political importance attached by Albanians to the public use of their language and the association of these ideas with politicians who had gained an autonomy for Kosovo in the manner of the titular elites in the Soviet republics of Central Asia, as opposed to assimilationist politicians who had flourished as subordinates to Slav rulers in the 1950s, further enhanced the prestige of standardization.

The third category was the dissidents of the illegal movement, the nationalist counter-elite that saw Albanians in Yugoslavia as being an integral part of Albania

103 Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p.47. As we will see in Chapter Four, while the younger generation of elite politicians in 1981 did not associate themselves with Kosovar elite members such as the Gjakova Group, the success of the Kosovar elite was such that its viewpoint of Kosovo Albanians being Albanians in Yugoslavia and the associated cultural policies were only challenged from outside the Albanian community and only with any effect after 1986.
under foreign occupation. While a large proportion of these had been dismissed or jailed for their beliefs, many had past links or continuing membership of intellectual institutions, especially the Albanological Institute. They were particularly involved in policing the boundaries of what was “authentically” Albanian, threatening and applying sanctions to those that refused to conform to the political and linguistic standards required. A major constituency among the gatekeepers of Standard Albanian, it was this category that, through the state of siege in the 1990s and the war of 1998-1999, came to dominate politics in post-war and independent Kosovo. These groups are significant because they are divided among themselves in terms of experiences and position, thus motivating debates about the nation and Kosovo Albanians’ place in Yugoslavia.

This thesis looks at how Kosovo’s intellectuals created and mobilized the nation through the vehicle of language. But how was this done? Nairn claims that, in general, “[t]he new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism […] had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation had to be written in a language they understood.” Each part of this statement bears examination in terms of Kosovo’s experience – and what Kosovo can tell us about wider theories of intellectuals and the nation. As we have seen, in the case of Kosovo Albanians, there is a problem with the description “new middle-class,” for while the intelligentsia was indeed new, the context would suggest that Falola’s designation “modern” would be a more fitting description. Secondly, it is hard to talk of a middle class in a province where, under capitalist royal Yugoslavia, the bourgeoisie in Kosovo was almost non-existent and, under socialism, intellectuals were created and dependent upon the state for their existence. With these qualifications, we can talk of an invitation into history by the modern intelligentsia.
If nationalism is the process by which the masses are “invited into history,” then this history is one where, to follow the ideas of Anderson or Smith, all Albanians share common descent as Sons of the Eagle, under the flag and arms of Skanderbeg, speaking the ancient tongue inherited from the Illyrians. As Albanians, *nder* is accorded to all male members of nation by virtue of their membership at price of acting for the nation as they would for the *fis* – to give it *besa* and work for it at whatever cost, to favour its members over strangers and to respond to its *kushtrim*; similarly, the nation accords all male members an ancient genealogy of heroes who leave their *amanet* to their descendents to unite and defend the nation. Nevertheless, the point is that *amanet*, *nder*, the *fis*, *besa* and the *kushtrim* are all preserved as institutions; in making the adjustments required to extend loyalty to the nation, the masses overcome the disruption to their habitus through the appropriation of its symbols, customs, myths and values. Nationalists appropriate the heroes of local historical ballads – even ones shared by more than one ethnic group, such as Millosh Kopiliq/Miloš Obilić in the Battle of Kosovo epic – as objects of devotion exclusive to their nation, thereby adapting traditional cultural values into a new social setting, much as the Catholic church adopted the gods of the people they proselytized as saints. The invitation into history, however, must be accepted by the masses in order for it to work; the refusal of Bosnian Muslims to accept that they were “really” Croats or “really” Serbs is another indication of the limits of manipulative imagining. It is worth noting, however, that this imagining elicited a response in national terms in the emergence of a distinctive Muslim ethnicity. As we shall see in Chapters Three, and Four, the refusal of the externally imposed

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106 *Nder*, and the other italicized words here, are explained in the Glossary in Appendix One.
identity of Šiptar is central to the domination of alternative Albanian identities in Kosovo.

Nairn’s assumption that the invitation is written is problematic; Duara, for example, challenges the view that mass literacy is a prerequisite of nationalism.\textsuperscript{108} While it is true that literacy enables a people, or rather its leaders, to create authorized versions of their history, selecting and forgetting what suits their own purposes, the complex relationship between the written and the spoken word is often ignored as there is no easy contrast between official state history and “authentic” collective memory.\textsuperscript{109} As Wagner suggests, it is not so much mass literacy as mass attitudes around literacy that make the difference.\textsuperscript{110}

The final part of Nairn’s dictum is that the invitation be “in a language they understood.” Firstly, this implies that the language must be a vernacular, shared by the masses, even if those issuing the invitation are more comfortable in the language of the colonist.\textsuperscript{111} Secondly, it must be in a cultural form they understand: Fishta wrote the \textit{Lahuta e Malcis} celebrating the defence of Albanian lands in the 1870s, in the form of a heroic epic, while nationalists appropriated existing heroic and legendary ballads. Thirdly, the language must accord with the moral principles of the masses: without appeal to the collective values of \textit{amanet, nder, fis, besa} and \textit{kushtrim}, the principles behind “the culture” as enshrined in customary law, the masses, who had never before been wholly united as the Albanian people, would have lacked the means by which they could adjust to a common loyalty to the nation. Moreover, Verdery points to Eastern

\textsuperscript{108} Duara, \textit{Rescuing History}, p.76.
\textsuperscript{109} At least not so much in terms of Albanian history; in Yugoslav terms, we see such a clash in Chapter Three, cast in terms of whether publishing certain folksongs was appropriate.
\textsuperscript{111} Laitin, \textit{Identity in Formation}, pp.24-25. Just as De Valera had no Irish and Nehru’s Hindi was less than perfect, so Hasan Prishtina preferred to correspond in Ottoman Turkish.
European intellectuals’ historic sense of moral mission; it is this moral engagement in their calling as intellectuals to re-present the culture of the masses in a “scientific,” nationalized form through Albanology. This has two important consequences: firstly, such a moral outlook requires engagement in the nation, connected to society rather than seeking to achieve intellectual detachment; secondly, as in other instances of colonial rule, this prompts intellectuals to engage in the vindication of the nation through the celebration of its values, its heroes and resistance movements.\(^\text{112}\) Finally, the language needed to be politically comprehensible to the masses: Craig Calhoun criticizes state-centred theories on the grounds that if nationalism is all about the proper constitution of the state, then it is hard to see why such a movement should be any more emotive than those that do not centre on the state.\(^\text{113}\) If the state is remote, visible to the masses primarily through the imposition of taxes and the imposition of military service while day-to-day authority is wielded by other local actors, it is hard to see why an appeal to the masses on the constitution of the state would have much meaning. In the case of Albanian nationalism, it would seem that the argument was not so much about how the state should be constituted but who had the right to govern it: the demand for the four vilayets of the League of Prizren and subsequently was not for the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire, but for autonomy within it that would keep away the rule of Slavs and Greeks, as we shall see in Chapter One. As such, it was a demand not for the constitution of an ethnic Albanian territory but rather the constitution of an Ottoman territory \textit{based on} Albanian ethnicity; the Sultan would still have the right to govern, but with the interests of the Albanian people at the forefront.


\(^{113}\) Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” 219.
Top down and bottom up: the utility of colonial/postcolonial approaches

The invitation by Kosovo Albanian intellectuals to the masses did not take place in a vacuum, but within the framework of the Yugoslav state. In the case of Kosovo, colonial and postcolonial approaches help us to understand the wider structures of power within which Kosovo Albanian nationalism has worked.

We cannot see change in Kosovo society in terms of a radical transformation of an illiterate, traditional, folkloric society achieved solely as the result of the will of an elite. There is also agency from below, and selected aspects both of tradition and modernization are used to enhance status. Having a family representative at the University of Prishtina, for example, is not merely a “national duty” but a means of establishing direct contact between the rural household/village and the city/institutions of authority, thereby establishing new ties and possibilities for social advancement through the acquisition of new patrons, or closer access to existing ones, rewards for loyalty, placement in the hierarchy in that social order through casting off the stigma of being katundar. (This is a powerful reason why parents may be more enthusiastic for the benefits of literacy and education than their children who understand that the realization of these goals is more difficult that their parents think.) A poor rural household making allowance for fashionable clothes for a student member is not indulging a young man’s whim, but a sound investment in the family status.

The feeling of inferiority that comes from being katundar is not just a rural phenomenon; as Norbert Mappes-Niedieck observed, it is also the more general feeling of self-loathing imposed by a colonial power, though, as will be explained in the course

115 Wagner, Literacy, p.56.
116 Backer, Behind Stone Walls, pp.119-120.
of the thesis, that feeling of inferiority was not just felt towards Yugoslavia but also towards Albania. What matters here is that becoming national and modern for Kosovo Albanians was not just a matter of living in a state socialist society. Although, as I have pointed out, Anderson’s view in *Imagined Communities* is a poor fit for the case of Kosovo, Anderson refines his view in considering the development of nationalism in East Timor.\(^{117}\) Subject to formal government by Portugal, which for centuries extended no further than the main towns and points of easiest access, East Timorese society was a collection of ethnicities speaking many languages where patriarchally-ruled clans connected through strategic intermarriage and associations linked to the Catholic church. Though there were resentments that had grown out of the restrictions imposed during the later, more active, phase of Portuguese colonial rule (reflecting Portugal’s own development as a modern society), in 1974-75 there was little in the way of print-capitalism, industrialization or a modern society when the Indonesians took over. By the 1990s, however, East Timor had a popular nationalist movement prepared to make great sacrifices in the struggle for independence. Anderson attributes this change in the main to two factors: firstly, the unifying effect of the Catholic church, answerable directly to Rome, unifying the East Timorese people through its use of Tetum as a lingua franca, its unification of society through membership in its confraternities and as a symbol of the suffering of the people; secondly, and more importantly, the colonial gaze of the Indonesian state, much more intrusive into daily life than the Portuguese had ever been, which nevertheless did not include East Timor and its people as part of their imagined Indonesia. The common struggle of the Indonesian nationalists, of many ethnicities and mother tongues, uniting in their refusal of the penetration of the Dutch state and

language in the early twentieth century in favour of independence and Bahasa Indonesia was then mirrored by the refusal of the many ethnicities of East Timor of Bahasa Indonesia in favour of an independent East Timor and Tetum.¹¹⁸

A similar pattern can be detected in the case of Kosovo. Once a multiethnic region ruled with light control by the Ottoman Empire, society in Kosovo was dominated by the patriarchally-ruled fis. Toward the end of Turkish rule, there was a period of increasingly frequent confrontation between the people of Kosovo and the Sublime Porte, expressed in demands for autonomy and Albanian-language education. In 1912, Kosovo was conquered by Serbia. While Serbian historiography had focused on Kosovo as the hearth of Serb identity, this applied to the territory alone. The Albanians of Kosovo, both on grounds of ethnicity and religion, were viewed as essentially alien. Serbia and, after 1918, Yugoslavia viewed Kosovo as Old Serbia, with the Albanians as people to be, by turns, controlled, ignored, or transferred out of the territory. For their part, the Kosovo Albanians, led by religiously-divided clergy and a dwindling class of urban landlords, were more concerned with the survival of their culture and preservation of their lands than nationalist ideas of a Greater Albania. After 1945, the Yugoslav state intruded far more into the lives of ordinary Kosovo Albanians than it had before 1941, through the education system, conscription, self-management, the Party and associated mass organizations, none of which had existed for Albanians before the war. Yet the colonial gaze remained: while the territory of Kosovo was an integral part of the Yugoslav state, the Kosovo Albanians were not part of the imagined

Land of the South Slavs (whose flag bore the Pan-Slavic colours and whose national anthem was *Hej, Slaveni*).\(^{119}\)

As we will see in Chapter Three, constitutional, educational and linguistic arrangements demonstrate that Albanians in Yugoslavia lived in a society where South Slav, especially Serb, culture was promoted as universal while “minority” culture was particularist and exotic.\(^{120}\) What made Kosovo distinct from many colonial societies, however, was the fact that, because of the effective exclusion of Albanians from education under royal Yugoslavia, Western knowledge and the creation of a modern intelligentsia was not primarily associated with the colonial rulers but with Kosovo Albanians who had received education outside Yugoslavia and in particular the work of teachers from Albania in Kosovo from 1941 to 1948. The exclusion of Albanians from education by royal Yugoslavia also meant that, unlike many colonies, there was no generation of Kosovo Albanian intellectuals that had gained any benefit from assimilation. Lenard Cohen recalls that nationalism has been described as “the crisis of the intelligentsia”;\(^{121}\) if we think of this in terms either of a colonized people or of the experience of other peoples in the region, the clearest expression of that crisis is the conflict between what Roumen Daskalov terms the divide between “Westerners,” eager to adapt to the ways of the West, and “autochthonists.”\(^{122}\) What makes the case of

119 Dejan Jović may be correct when stating that Yugoslavia was only acceptable to Albanians when it “ceased to be South-Slavonic,” but this is also true the other way round: that was the only time that the Kosovo Albanians were seen by other Yugoslavs as “us” rather than “them.” Even then, the “us” applied chiefly to the Albanian elite entrusted who ran Kosovo through neo-traditional patronage, dependent on the maintenance of peace through the heavy repression of ethnic discontents: Dejan Jović, “Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism: from Tito to Kardelj,” in Dejan Djokić, ed., *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992*, (London: Hurst, 2003), p.163 n.12.
122 Autochthonism stresses “native” values, aiming to discover the nation’s past by idealizing an agrarian past; Roumen Daskalov, “Ideas about, and Reactions to Modernization in the Balkans,” *East European Quarterly* 31.2 (1997),148, 164.
Kosovo particularly interesting is Yugoslavia was not seen as the source of Westernization, in terms of occidentalist thought and adoption of a “scientific” worldview, but that both Westernization and autochthonism, stressing value in the traditions of the Albanian people, were represented by the state of Albania. Nevertheless, Kosovo Albanian intellectuals were encouraged to make high culture from folklore and “scientifically” appropriate it, though they were both encouraged and attacked by the authorities for doing so.

On the surface, such treatment was not peculiar to Albanians; their lot had much in common with that of other non-Slavic groups in Yugoslavia. The difference was that, unlike other non-Slavic groups, the Albanians a) were a majority in Kosovo and most of the other territories where they lived; b) had little history of consensual day-to-day engagement with a modern state; c) lacked the strong national identity in 1944 they were later to possess and were made the subject of a state-inspired identity project to distinguish them from Albanians outside Yugoslavia; and d) along with the Roms, had no powerful foreign country interested in their welfare to intervene on their behalf. Another feature not shared by any other non-Slav group was the change of the most common name in used in the language of the Yugoslav state for the Albanians of Yugoslavia. Royal Yugoslavia used the Turkish-derived 

Arnauti

for all Albanians; this was replaced by 

Šiptari

for the Albanians of Yugoslavia and 

Albanci

for those of Albania. This change should be interpreted as primarily territorial, as a means of justifying the separation caused by the border in terms other than brute force; this did not mean the inclusion of the Šiptari as an integral part of the imagined Yugoslav

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123 The use of the term šiptar has been justified on the grounds that this is what Albanians call themselves (shqiptar); see, for example, Milanović, Univerzitet u Prištini, p.14. The success of this argument can be judged by considering an equivalent ethnic marker in English: the word Yid (“Jew”), while derived from the Yiddish ייד (“Jew”) is similarly an approximation of the pronunciation in the original language and similarly perceived as pejorative.
people any more than the French colonial authorities’ changing the name of the section of the West African Gule people living in Cameroon to Djimi made them imagined Frenchmen.\footnote{Bawuro M. Bakindo, “The Mandara astride the Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary,” in A.I. Asiwaju ed., \textit{Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa’s International Boundaries 1884-1984} (London: Hurst/Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1985), p.38. It is worth noting that, where Šiptari were described as “ours,” that was frequently in their capacity as an unassimilable ethnic underclass, such as African-Americans in the 1960s: Mary Motes, \textit{Kosova Kosovo: Prelude to War 1966-1999} (Homestead, FL: Redland Press, 1998), p.57.}

As an essential element of the imagining of the colonial nation, both Anderson and Laitin point to the phenomenon of colonial unit isomorphism, a phenomenon repeated in the cases of East Timor, ex-Soviet Central Asia and Kosovo.\footnote{Laitin, \textit{Identity in Formation}, p.73; Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, p.114, p.57.} In the case of Albanians in Yugoslavia, the administrative, educational, judicial and security systems were all organized separately in Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro; even books and newspapers published in one republic were only obtained with difficulty in another.\footnote{“Bisedë me shokun Fadil Hoxha,” \textit{Flaka e vëllazërimit}, 5 October 1967, p.3; A. Aliu, “Klimë e përshtatshme për afirmimin e librit shqip,” \textit{Flaka e vëllazërimit}, 27 November 1967, p.1 (supplement).} While pilgrimage of Albanians from Macedonia and Montenegro to Prishtina was common, with the exception of studying at Skopje University, it was rare for Kosovo Albanians to seek education or employment in these other republics unless they were barred from working in Kosovo for “moral and political reasons.”\footnote{Albert, “Aspekte,” pp.223-225; Milanović, \textit{Univerzitet u Prištini}, p.285; Adem Ajvazi, \textit{Partia Nacional Demokrate Shqiptare në Llap (1949-1953)} (Podujeva: Adem Ajvazi, 2008), pp.148, 158.} All these phenomena served to create an understanding of Kosovo as a territory as daily reality in the imagination in a way that was not so for Yugoslav Albanians elsewhere. The entrusting of Kosovo to the Kosovar elite in the years after 1966 and their neo-traditionalist management, described as the “Albanianization” of the province’s institutions, made the imagination of Kosovo as a separate entity even easier. How Kosovo Albanians imagined Kosovo and Albania will be dealt with in detail in Chapters Three and Four.
What is important to remember about the modern intelligentsia is that, to a large extent, they have been responsible for the creation of nationalism in both Albania and Kosovo. A key part of that creation of the Albanian national in both these countries has, as elsewhere, been the standardization of the language and the struggle for its management. Like other countries, this is not simply the concern of linguists, but a matter that is central to the imagination of the nation; it is therefore the stuff of politics. It is especially true in Kosovo that the creation, defence, re-evaluation and criticism of the standard language has not been a matter just for linguists, and not just because there were not enough of them to go round, but a matter for the intelligentsia as a whole, a matter which, as Verdery suggests, is as much about moral guardianship as anything related to a pure "scientific" discipline. In the name of "science," the intellectual replaces the traditional intelligentsia as intermediary between the masses and the political and social centre, the masses and the world beyond the village\textsuperscript{128} (once the region, now the nation), the masses and the hereafter (once paradise, but now the continuing story of the nation's history). The intellectual's works promoted the moral obligations of the nation – the use of the standard language being high among them – and maintain its boundaries, especially from within. As we shall see in Chapter Five, the current generation, however, with the rise of globalization, the possibility of communication with Albania, the large growth of urban areas, exchange with the rest of the world outside the framework of Yugoslavia, the influx of ideas and educational experience from the West, has seen a shift away from moral national gatekeeping toward a more international, and hence more local, understanding of who they are and the society in which they live.

\textsuperscript{128} Falola, \textit{Nationalism}, p.7.
The shape of the thesis

Nick Miller observes that the nationalism of the Kosovo Albanians was “clearly a product of the Titoist system. This alone calls into doubt the simple generalization that these [Yugoslavian nationalist] movements reflected the return of prewar nationalisms. They obviously did not: they were conditioned by socialism in its Titoist variation in ways that have only begun to be explored.”129 Given the importance of nationalism in the recent history of Kosovo, it is curious that so little attention has been paid to its origins and development. Conventional historiography has assumed that nationalism in Albania and Kosovo are two parts of a seamless whole and that Albanianism has been the guiding force for national action uninterruptedly since the days of the Serbian conquest or even the League of Prizren.130 Yet as we have seen, Albanian nationalism arose from a relatively privileged group protecting its existence as the dynastic empire to which it belonged disintegrated. This was followed by the development of a national identity after the creation of the Albanian state. Kosovo Albanian nationalism, by contrast, was characterized by colonial resistance which adopted the symbols, myths and values of the Albanian state in its own struggle within socialist Yugoslavia. This is why much of Chapter One does not deal with nationalism or language in Kosovo: while many of the events it recounts trace the rise of Albanian nationalism, they only become so for Kosovo Albanian nationalism in retrospect, as the building blocks of an imagined Kosovo in an imagined united Albania. This being the case, we might reconsider Slavoj Žižek’s view that the nation is the means by which “organic” links dissolved and

constitutes “remainder of pre-modern in modernity,” for the dissolving of “organic” links came not through the nation but the imposition of modernity, particularly in its state socialist form, and globalization.\textsuperscript{131} Chapter One describes the political and intellectual events behind the emergence of myths, symbols, values and ideas common to Albanian and Kosovo Albanian nationalisms. In the case of Albanian nationalism, they quickly became important in the struggle to preserve Albanian dominance in Albanian lands\textsuperscript{132} and, after 1912, in the construction of the Albanian state; in the case of Kosovo, the significance of these events only became apparent with the absorption of much of Kosovo into occupied Albania during the Second World War and the creation of a mass education system by communist Yugoslavia. The case of Kosovo raises questions over the role of modernity in the development of nationalism. As in all colonial societies, all the elements of development must come at once, and the quest for “shortcuts” in development is accentuated by the ideological drives of state socialism.

Chapter Two deals with the development of Standard Albanian in Albania as both a reflection and an instrument of accelerating the national development of socialist Albania, following an ideal shared by Albania’s mainly southern communist rulers, that closely followed Soviet linguistic ideologies and practice. As such, the development of Standard Albanian was itself centrally planned and accelerated by an institutional leadership in close connection with Albania’s political leaders. Yet even under such totalitarian conditions, the development and implementation of Standard Albanian remained a site of contention.


\textsuperscript{132} I am aware there are objections to this phrase “Albanian lands” because it implies that Albania is the rightful possessor of these territories. In the case of many Albanian historians, this is true. For the purposes of this thesis, however, I use it with the intention of avoiding ethnic claims, to denote areas where the majority of the population is Albanian, whether their rulers are Ottomans, Albanians or South Slavs.
Chapter Three covers language politics in Kosovo in the period from 1945 to 1968. After the end of the Second World War, we see the socialist development of an indigenous national intelligentsia in replacing the traditional intelligentsia and, furthermore, led to the clear emergence of a distinction between Albanians and Turks in Yugoslavia, which, coupled with the discrimination experienced by Albanians in the 1950s and 1960s, led to the emergence of a Kosovo Albanian national identity. At the same time, the debate on language gradually altered from dealing with the immediate needs of the Albanian-speaking population of Yugoslavia, which allowed for relatively open dissent, to a close adherence to the Standard Albanian of the “mother state” while explicitly rejecting local Albanians’ own dialects as provincialist; it is noteworthy that Turkish in Yugoslavia went through a similar rejection of the local dialect for the “pure Turkish” of Turkey. In contrast to the experience of the Macedonians and other minorities throughout the state socialist world, the Yugoslav authorities made no serious attempt to “indigenize” either the Albanians or the Turks of Yugoslavia. On the contrary, the Šiptar identity never took root except among people who were not Albanian. As the period of Slav domination came to an end in the years after 1966, these developments, although crucial to the construction of Kosovo Albanian identity, were ignored by Slav officials and others for other expressions of Albanian identity and “Albanianization” that seemed more apparent to them. With the end of Slav domination came the political marginalization of the assimilators by the Kosovar elite closely connected to and encouraging of the adoption of Standard Albanian and the associated view that with standardization, Albanians in Yugoslavia were entitled to see themselves not as a “minority” but as a civilized people equal with any other in “their own home.”

Problems about language often herald problems about national identification. Chapter Four argues that, although what we see among the Albanians is paralleled
elsewhere in Yugoslavia, the self-perception of Albanians changed the dynamic in Kosovo. To other Yugoslav peoples, the movement was centrifugal within Yugoslavia, but, in the view of the Albanian minority, their own movement was a centripetal one within an Albanian sphere. Language was both an instrument and barometer of attempts to expand the ambit of language use during the 1970s; it also was a means of defence of Albanian community rights in the 1980s while it first became a site of contention in Slav eyes thanks to the appeals made to them in the struggle between the Kosovar elite and the revived assimilationists from 1981 onwards. Indeed, the discussion of Kosovo’s constitutional position, in which language played a central part, was a motor of both Slav and Albanian popular protest and of political change, which in the Kosovar case involved the ethnic separation of society, and for the Albanians the explicit assumption of control by intellectuals, including linguists, of the institutions of autonomy.

In any political project, particularly a national one, there is always a gap between the ideal and the reality. Language is a particularly useful way to examine this in the case of Kosovo and of Albania in general. If we go back to the idea of an imagined pan-Albanian community, its imaginary nature can be seen clearly in the way contribution from Yugoslavia was treated before, during, and after the Congress of Orthography in 1972. There was enthusiasm in the early days, but this also generated huge linguistic uncertainty. On the one hand, there was a feeling that people went to excess to fulfil the strictures of the standard; but on the other that experiences in the school system showed that the standard was not taking hold as hoped or expected. Chapter Five will argue that conflict over the standard language in Kosovo has been more political than linguistic right up until the present day. Those responsible for Standard Albanian in Kosovo use rhetoric concerning the use of language which invokes myths and moral and nationalistic language, including an ideology borrowed
directly from Stalinist Albanian linguistics. As such, it furthers the nationalist project by projecting onto their opponents that aspect of themselves which they cannot tolerate. As a result, the most energetic defence of Standard Albanian is socialist in form, national in content.

The collapse of communism in Albania allowed intellectuals in the north of the country to reject the cultural settlement imposed from the south by the communists. Encouraged by the work of Arshi Pipa, who represented to some extent the opinions of Albanian intellectuals in the diaspora during the communist years, these intellectuals sought redress in favour of the north, especially in language. This faced opposition from the linguistic institutions of Tirana and Prishtina, though for the latter this was principally about preserving national existence during a time when Kosovo Albanians were under existential threat. The changes of these years also enabled direct contact between the people of Kosovo and Albania, interrupted for nearly fifty years. Serbian persecution and nationalist fervour brought a number of younger intellectuals to Tirana. The shock of their experience caused the imagined Albania, and hence the imagined Kosovo, with which they had been raised by their parents to collapse, though it had already been under stress from the increasing distance between the rhetorical image of national unity through Standard Albanian and the reality of Kosovo Albanians’ poor mastery of the idiom in daily life. At the same time, and not coincidentally, the desired political future of Kosovo for most Kosovo Albanians changed from union with Albania to independence for Kosovo. This occasioned a reimagining of Kosovo as a Gheg entity, whether as a state by itself or shared with the Ghegs of northern Albania. These differences came to the fore after the war in the struggle between Kosovo Albanian nationalists and Kosovists. It would, however, be an oversimplification to think of the views of Kosovo’s intellectuals as being neatly divided with one camp in favour of a
stronger voice for Gheg and the other for Standard Albanian; globalization, especially Western influence, along with differences between and within institutions, has caused a division of views that, on the one hand, depends more on the individuals’ generation than on ideology, and, on the other, is shared on all sides with intellectuals from Albania though, in their case, often for different reasons.

In showing how modernization was done to Kosovo, this thesis aims to contribute to our understanding of how national identity can form under conditions of socialist colonialism and how the history of Kosovo took the course it did. In doing so, it aims to make a contribution to understanding of the history and breakup of Yugoslavia and the role of Albania in the region.
Chapter One

How the Modern Kosovo Albanian intellectual became possible

In Kosovo and Kosovo Albanian historiography, the story of Albanian national identity has always placed Kosovo at the centre of the struggle for Albanian statehood. This concept of Kosovo as an integral part of Albania was central to the adoption of Standard Albanian in Kosovo. However, if we examine the development of an Albanian national identity, we find that it did not exist at all until the end of the nineteenth century, and then in perfect accord with the idea of Albanians being subjects of the Ottoman sultan. A strong Albanian ethnic identity failed to develop in Kosovo by 1912 and did not emerge as a widespread phenomenon until the Second World War and after. In this chapter, I will explore the development of Albanian national identity and its myths and symbols, showing that, far from giving Kosovo a central role, these myths and symbols were developed elsewhere, while the people of Kosovo themselves were resistant to the nationalist message. In order to understand the debate over language in Kosovo, we need to understand the historical differences between Albanian and Kosovo Albanian nationalism. This is because, despite the belief of intellectuals involved in the debate that Kosovo is an integral part of Albania, nevertheless this very belief is reflective of Kosovo Albanian nationalism. As such, this chapter will show that Albanian nationalism developed prior to and distinctly from Kosovo Albanian nationalism. Part of that transfer of national identity is the rhetoric of “civilization” in terms of both the nation and language, originally as a mission carried out by educated members of the Ottoman administrator class from the south to the north (including Kosovo), but later from Albania to the people of Kosovo. This chapter demonstrates how these two missions emerge; in Chapter Three we will go on to see how they are
central to debate on the place of the Albanian nation in Kosovo and, in particular, to arguments around the adoption and use of Standard Albanian.

**Who were the Albanians of Kosovo?**

Let us begin by describing the people whom Albanian nationalists wanted to identify as Albanians. It would be hard to describe it as a people at all, as its chief characteristic was its polycentricity. In the mid-nineteenth century, Albanian-speakers were to be found in most of the vilayets of Shkodra, Kosovo, Bitola and Ioannina, and in many places in the south and west of the Balkans from Zadar to Istanbul, from Novi Pazar to Athens. Those areas were also inhabited by many other peoples and, as Oliver Jens Schmitt and Ger Duijzings note, experienced long periods of ethnic harmony.\(^\text{133}\) The lack of a historical state, such as the mediaeval Serbian or Bulgarian empires, to which nationalists could hark back, reinforced a lack of national awareness. Simply put, the lands of the Albanians had no clear boundaries, *Arnavut*\(^\text{134}\) being a geographic expression as well as one that denoted certain professions, irrespective of ethnicity. Even where Albanian-speakers were the great majority, communication was hampered by mountain ranges, swamps, and lack of metalled roads,\(^\text{135}\) as well as fear of banditry and blood feud. There were strong regional centres, but nowhere sufficiently large or important to act as a centre for all Albanians. Social customs varied greatly from area to area, from the patriarchal societies in the large estates of the south which submitted to religious law and the law of the state, to the *fiset* that controlled their own territory in...
the north, run by the elders of kinship-groups that submitted only to customary law.\textsuperscript{136} Albanian-speakers were also divided by religion, with the south mixed between Muslims, a minority of whom were dervishes, especially Bektashi, and Orthodox Christians. The north was mixed between kinship-groups in the mountains around Shkodra and the Albanian Alps, many of which were Roman Catholic, and the rest, particularly Kosovo, where Sunni Islam dominated. However, religious affiliation was marked by “syncretic” practice such as Christian polygamy.\textsuperscript{137}

Albanian self-understanding blurred what might otherwise have been considered clear regional/religious boundaries: in Shkodra vilayet, local Orthodox Albanian-speakers were described to Edith Durham as “not Christians, but Tosks.”\textsuperscript{138} In terms of language, while there was a dialect continuum between the north and south, Ghegs and Tosks wrote in different dialects, each cultural area most clearly marked by the use of its own alphabet.\textsuperscript{139} There was no feeling of communality between Ghegs and Tosks, and ethnic consciousness, apart from in the mountainous far north where Albanian Malësorët were in competition with the Montenegrin Brdani, did not exist.\textsuperscript{140} As a result, the Ottoman authorities often treated Albanian-speakers separately as Gheg and Tosk.\textsuperscript{141} There was therefore a wide range of different permutations of identity relating to native village or town, region, religion; profession, in terms of \textit{esnaf}; social

\textsuperscript{136} Clayer, \textit{Aux origines}, p.26.
\textsuperscript{139} Clayer, \textit{Aux origines}, p.32; Stavro Skendi, “Albanian Alphabet,” 263-9.
Albanian nationalism: “civilization” in defence of the empire

During the second half of the nineteenth century, a series of economic, political and social changes prompted from outside the Empire and from Istanbul led to the increasing fragility of the Ottoman periphery, which would ultimately lead to the introduction of “Albanianism” as a possibility. Besides the increasing burden of taxation and “de-development” (thanks to agreements with Western powers on highly disadvantageous terms), poor local technology and the lack of developed systems of transport and credit, Kosovo was particularly affected by the rise of the near-feudal çiftlik system, where nearly 40% of the land was in the hands of feudal families. The Ottoman reverses of the Russo-Turkish War also threatened the land and lives of the inhabitants of the northern Albanian lands, particularly in the case of the Serbian conquest of the Sanjak of Niš in 1878. Nationalists within the Serbian government decided to deport the Muslim population with a view to the creation of “a pure Serbian nation state.”

142 Clayer, Aux origines, pp.54-61. The meaning of the words in italics is explained in Appendix One.
143 None of this is to suggest that national identity was any firmer among non-Albanians in Kosovo; several fluid identities prevailed among Slavs, who, in the wake of Bulgarian independence, identified more with the Bulgarian Exarchate than the Serbian Orthodox Church: Schmitt, Kosovo, p.162.
Toplica areas while their crops were gathered by the Serbian army. While there were some attempts by local Serbian administrators to retain the Muslim population, merchants who tried to stay were murdered and mosques and tekkes were destroyed and the wood sold on. The refugees, known as *muhaxhirs*, settled in large part in Kosovo. The arrival of such a large number increased the competition for scarce land and resources but altered the ethnic balance of population in the region: of forty villages in the Prishtina area, *muhaxhirs* formed the plurality in seven, while another three went from being exclusively Serbian to being mostly *muhaxhir*. By the summer of 1878, the *muhaxhirs*, marginalized by their hosts, resorted to violence as the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin determined that the Ottoman Empire should cede further lands to Serbia and Montenegro; the local people refused to cooperate with the loss of their lands, threatening the stability of the whole western Balkans. The Porte responded by sending an expedition to Kosovo to enforce the handover of Plav and Gusinje but its leader was killed in a battle in Gjakova alongside his host.

The prospect of chaos in the northern periphery and the loss of further territory prompted the vali of Shkodra to decide on a local protest against the loss of territory and advised the vali of Kosovo to do the same. The notables contacted by Porte officials

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147 JCW Alvarez, writing to Consul-General JE Blunt on May 10th 1880 (FO 30/29/30/29/340), gave an estimate of between 50,000 and 65,000 refugees, of which the majority were in the sanjak of Prishtina and about a further 23,000 from Bulgaria: Destani, *Albania and Kosovo*, p.196. Schmitt (*Kosovo*, p.188) and Malcolm (*Kosovo*, p.229) estimate about 50,000 settling in Kosovo.
149 Blumi, *Reinstating the Ottomans*, pp.100-102.
150 The popular account of the death of Magjar Pasha, as the leader of the expedition is known to Albanians, demonstrates how much more personal and face-to-face local ideas of government were from the abstract, modern idea of the nation; in the folksong cycle, Ali Pasha Gucia, one of the leaders of those deemed responsible for his death, visits the sultan to apologize to his ruler. See Arbnora Dushi, “Kujtesa sociale dhe cikli i këngeve popullore për Magjar Pashën,” *Gjurmime albanologjike – seria Folklor dhe etnologji* 44 (2014), 305-320.
151 Gawrych, *Crescent*, p.45.
did not need persuading, as they feared not just losing their local status, but suffering the same fate as the *muhaxhirs* of the Sanjak of Niš. The landowners, officials, chiefs, ulema and a few Christians met in a madrasa in Prizren. All but two of the delegates were from Kosovo, northern Albania, Bosnia or the Sanjak and, being composed of both Albanians and Slavs, had no ethnic or national goals. The League of Prizren, later celebrated as a central moment of Kosovo Albanian history, was actually thus initially a creation of the Porte and, as its Albanian members failed to respond to the pleas of Muslim landlords in Bosnia or the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, it appeared to the outside world to be a chimeric affair, motivated by nothing more than the desire of the Porte not to cede territory. This movement became the focus for Abdyl Frashëri and other activists. They sought to control the League’s loose coalition and steer it toward the creation of a single, large province to be reformed and improved by full implementation of the Tanzimat, while assuring the region’s future loyalty to the Sultan under the guidance of Ottoman administrators such as Frashëri. However, this coalition foundered because the demands of the local notables were nearly all parochial and sought no kind of constitutional innovation, leaving Frashëri to abandon Kosovo for the south and for factions to emerge within the League. Consequently, the League of Prizren was neither an initiative of Kosovo Albanians nor particularly successful at cooperation between Albanians from north and south.


In 1898 a similar group, the League of Peja, emerged to counter foreign intervention. This grouping also had parochial demands and opposed constitutional change, and local committees were set up to enforce sharia and the kanun. A meeting convened to reaffirm the kararname invited only Muslim Ghegs to participate, Tosks being considered as “heretical Bektashis,” who were undesirable at a “meeting of true believers.” While the League had no southern participants, once again the League was the focus of activism from the south, from those who saw the generation of a common feeling of Albiananness as the best guarantee for the future of the Empire. The most notable manifesto to appear during this period was Sami Frashëri’s Shqipëria, ç’ka qenë, ç’është dhe ç’do të bëhetë, which was first published in Bucharest in 1899, in which Frashëri idealizes the League in national terms, and makes clear that while much had been achieved under the sultan, now that foreign elements were encroaching upon Albanian lands, they could no longer stay with the Ottoman Empire but would have to become enlightened, with compulsory, secular education, getting rid of foreign schools and capitalizing on the Albanian people’s qualities to prevent partition and bring the country out of poverty and ignorance.

Movements like the Leagues of Prizren and Peja were used by Ottoman administrators like the Frashëris, often Tosks on professional pilgrimage between Istanbul and the western Balkans, to carve out a place for themselves in seeking to “civilize” the rebellious areas through wide-ranging reforms. This job was made more difficult for three reasons: firstly, the Ottoman Empire’s precarious economic state was

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156 Isa Blumi has cast doubt on the identity of the author on the grounds that the sentiments expressed run counter to Frashëri’s desire for Islamic unity: Blumi, Reinstating the Ottomans, p.113.

exacerbated by the loss of revenue caused by the loss of territory; moreover, outside beneficiaries encouraged the strategic adoption of sectarianism by Catholic and Orthodox leaders; lastly, local leadership structures, through which the administrator class would have to work, were less than keen on the additional demands for revenue or convinced of the benefits they brought.\textsuperscript{158} The frustrations the administrator class felt would, as I shall discuss below, later form part of Albanian intellectuals’ narrative of “inviting” the Albanian “masses into history.”

The development of Albanian national identity as a defence was encouraged by the rivalry of Italy and Austria-Hungary. Their wish to prevent the expansion of Russia to the Adriatic ensured a decision to establish an Albanian state at the Ambassadors’ Conference in London in July 1913, albeit with frontiers dictated by the political situation rather than by geographical or ethnographic realities. The international recognition of a sovereign Albanian state quickly changed the dynamic of national identification in much of the new country, the very reverse of Dragnich and Todorovich’s description of this action as a “profoundly meaningless turn” in the history of Albanians.\textsuperscript{159}

While the Great Powers had a strong consular presence in the region, education was, for all the governments concerned, the chosen instrument of development of national influence. In Albanian lands, the Sublime Porte expanded its education system to “civilize” the elite among the local people, but the Ottoman concessions to the Great


Powers in preserving the *millet* system meant it faced competition, especially from Slav and Greek schools. The success of Orthodox penetration of education is demonstrated by their numbers in Rumelia in 1896/97: 1,296 Greek schools with 95,015 pupils; 821 Bulgarian schools with 29,846 pupils; 162 Serbian schools with 7,511 pupils and 80 Romanian schools with 3,678 pupils.\(^{160}\) There was also competition from the major expansion of the Ottoman state system, though the schools were insufficient in number and poorly funded, with a poorer reputation than the foreign and missionary schools.\(^{161}\) But while they were to become a powerful part of the Albanian nationalist myth, the secret Albanian schools celebrated by Albanian nationalist mythology had little effect. Without a distinctive *millet*, Albanian-language education only secured a stable existence through Austro-Hungarian influence, through the establishment of a network of Catholic churches and schools, to counter the offerings of their Slav equivalents.\(^{162}\) However, their numbers were very small, under great pressure from competing parties and unable to provide the quality of education found in the schools of the Ottoman state or sponsored by other countries.\(^{163}\)


The imagining of the Albanian nation

As elsewhere in South-East Europe, the discourse of the Albanians “awakening” as a distinct people who shared a national identity did not arise in the region, but in Western Europe, where such ideas were already current. The Arbëresh minority in Italy had participated in the Risorgimento and began the scholarly collection of oral and folk material of their own community. Loyal citizens of Italy, they were inspired to extend the Risorgimento across the Adriatic, publishing history and poetry based on the collected folklore of Albania, scholarly works on the antiquity of the Albanians as a people, and the first periodicals with articles in Albanian which, despite local censorship, found their way to the Balkans. By the time of the League of Prizren, the Albanian national feeling that had originated in Italy had spread to the Albanian diaspora, through a small group of intellectuals in Italy, Romania, Greece, and Egypt.164 Even then, this discourse, while valorizing the antiquity and culture of the Albanians, had the effect of promoting the strategic interests of the country where they originated. Some saw a common bond and possible dual union with Greece, forged by common origins in the Pelasgian people, and philhellenic activity received support not only from Albanians in Greece, but from Egypt, while the Arbëresh poet and journalist Francesco Crispi envisaged the Adriatic as an “Albanian and Italian sea.”165 Nevertheless, these figures in the “diaspora” were in contact with members of the Ottoman administrator class based in Istanbul and the region who were interested in developing Albanian identity as a counterweight to Greek and Slav encroachment on the periphery of the

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Ottoman Empire. These figures, many of them Tosk, believed this needed to be accomplished through state investment, notably in secular education and modernized government. Such policies, they thought, would bring “civilization” to the ignorant Malësorë of the north who might otherwise be tempted to revolt against the Porte and pave the way for other states to shrink the Empire further. To make the people of the north-west periphery of the Empire fit for the modern world, they would have to jettison their “backward” ways that made them, “like African or Australian savages,” prone to European tricks with beads; they must forget their “oriental” ways by which the Asiatic Turks held them back, and take their place alongside the other peoples of Europe.

How would this be achieved? Firstly, by recalling the Albanians’ genealogy from the days of the Pelasgians and Illyrians, and the collection and appropriation of folklore into high culture, such as Naim Frashëri’s epic poem on the history of Skanderbeg (1898). These factors would then be presented in readily-understood social terms, as a single super-fis, living in an imagined territory of which all Albanians were members and into which local allegiances were subsumed. Indeed, all other allegiances were secondary as the nation was tied together in familiar moral terms by the unbreakable bond of besa, with its clear political implications of readiness to fight and die for Albania. Elements dividing Albanians, such as religious strife, were denied, while those capable of uniting them through ties of blood were stressed, such as the cult of the heroic Christian with a Muslim name, Skanderbeg, with the eagle in “his”

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166 See, for example, Jeronim de Rada’s correspondence with Sami Frashëri in 1880-81, Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p.167.
167 Blumi, Reinstating, pp.80-81.
168 Sami Frashëri, Shqipëria, pp.131, 88.
170 Blumi, Reinstating the Ottomans, p.72, p.83
171 See, for example, Sami Frashëri’s play, Besä yâhut Âhde Vefä (1874); Gawrych, Crescent, pp.1, 4.
flag presented as a descendent of an ancient Epirot symbol. The unifying function of the flag was such that, as Albanian national consciousness grew, the flag was gradually to replace the Bible or Koran in the swearing of besa to defend the homeland.

The most important unifying factor, however, was language. The promoters of Albanian nationality believed only language could allow education to help the nation to progress to “civilization” once, as with regional or fis affiliations, the potential divisions caused by the multiplicity of alphabets and dialects had been ironed out into a single literary language. Yet if the Albanian national entrepreneurs were going to set Albanians apart from their neighbours through language, they would have to focus on how this was achieved. As printed matter became more common, the continuum in ways of speaking Albanian from the north to the south, once barely noted, turned into dialects that were thought as distinct as Spanish and Italian. Furthermore, foreign words needed to be replaced with Albanian ones. While Sami Frashëri’s primer contained exercises in both Gheg and Tosk, and Konica’s Albania carried articles in the two dialects, Albanian nationalists believed that many dialects would bring separation and dispersal. For Konica, what was needed was a gjuha letrare, or standard written language, which he thought could be achieved by using Tosk for prose and Gheg for poetry. A national congress in Elbasan in 1909 encouraged writers to use the dialect

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of Elbasan, an Albanian intelligible both to Ghegs and Tosks, thus setting the tone for language planning in Albanian until 1944.176

But uniting the dialects of Albanian would be little use unless its readers and writers employed a single alphabet. Since the fifteenth century, the script in which the language was written was divided by sphere of cultural influence, that is, Latin for the Catholics of Shkodra, Greek for Tosks and, from the early eighteenth century, the Arabic script for Muslims. By 1890, there had been at least fourteen different alphabets used to write Albanian, nearly all very short-lived.177 By far the most important was that of the Frashëris’ Istanbul society: Latin with a few additional characters, mostly drawn from Greek, being the most widely adopted. In 1899 and 1901, two further Latin-based scripts were produced in Shkodra, one finding favour with Italy and the other supported by Austria-Hungary. By 1908, both Catholic education and clergy were firmly split into two opposing groups, not so much the vanguard of the Rilindja as pawns at the disposal of international rivals.178 At a congress of clubs from the Albanian lands and the diaspora at Bitola,179 the Istanbul alphabet was approved, as it was so well known, together with a new alphabet.

At the end of Shqipëria, ç’ka qenë, ç’është dhe ç’dë të bëhetë, the author issues a rallying cry for the new nation: “God, Justice, Nation, Language! Albania,

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179 The congress is known as the First Congress of Manastir, the name of the city at the time.
Albanianism! Here is our goal! Here is our sacred task! Here is our besa!” 180 That Frashëri places God (Perëndija, related to the word perëndim, “West”) first in his list of ‘goals’ is testament to the capacity it had to divide Albanian nationalists. Indeed, all four words in that sentence were points of contestation. Yet they were the constituents of Albania and Albanianism, through the assurance of fealty through the sealing of besa.

Kosovo’s place in the Albanian nation

Those who imagined Albania were not, in the main, separatists from the Ottoman Empire, but rather seeking to create a bulwark for the Empire against further Slav and Greek expansion. In this sense, Albanianism took its place with Ottomanism and Islamism181 as strategies used with varying degrees of fluidity and pragmatism in the western Balkans. As long as the Ottoman Empire was a multinational state, Albanian nationalists did not necessarily see any conflict between identifying both as Albanian and as Ottoman. Sami Frashëri was known to the Turkish public as Şemseddin Sami, the author of the one of the first Turkish novels and the first Turkish encyclopaedia, who stated that “we are neither Arab nor Persian; we are pure Turks” whose ancestors came from Central Asia.182 Being a rilindës sat beside cultural and political engagement in the Ottoman Empire in favour of reform and, as with Albania, with the West as a model.183 The Albanian nation was intimately connected through ties of politics, religion and loyalty to the Turkish people. Writing and publishing in Turkish

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180 Frashëri, Shqipëria, p.132.
181 “Islamism” here means the political use of Islam as a binding agent for the Ottoman Empire.
183 Gawrych, Crescent, p.207.
enabled Albanian nationalists to engage on equal terms in Ottoman cultural and political life, to present Albania and its problems to a Turkish-speaking audience and to appeal to officials in Albanian lands, many of them Albanian, who used Turkish for reading and writing, but whose future lay in Albania when the sultan no longer ruled Rumeli.\textsuperscript{184} In the aftermath of Albania’s independence, there is little to suggest that “Albanian” and “Turkish” identities had become distinct. The criticism Ismail Qemali received about choosing “a crow instead of some beautiful verses from the Koran” as the symbol of the national flag and the refusal of the Muslims of Pogradec to parade with the flag on the first anniversary of independence is testament to this. More seriously for the viability of Albania as a state, the success of the revolt of Haxhi Qamili that overthrew Prince Wilhelm zu Wied’s principality was centred around its express desire to see the restoration of the sovereignty of the sultan.\textsuperscript{185}

It was only in the years after the First World War, and the emergence of a relatively stable Albania, that a distinctively Albanian identity was to emerge. Albania was a secular state, where the sharia courts were abolished, secularizing matters such as marriage and inheritance. The opinions of the elite, already secularizing by the end of the Ottoman Empire, were articulated by critics such as Branko Merxhani, who was consciously aspiring to imitate the West in a drive for “progress” and “civilization” while preserving Albania’s national culture. So strong was this drive that, by the late 1930s, the authorities and the Islamic community were collaborating on the gradual abolition of the veil.\textsuperscript{186} Mass education reinforced the sense of being Albanian, with

textbooks replete with patriotic verse and the formation of the League of Prizren stressed as an important moment in Albania’s history.\textsuperscript{187}

This separation between “Albanian” and “Turkish” did not, however, take place outside Albania. The primary conflict in Kosovo was instead between those within the Triune Nation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and those outside it. Few intellectuals in Kosovo did imagine Albania as a nation, such as the small number of Albanian-language teachers who had taught before the Serbian conquest or during the First World War; some of the leading figures of the kaçak movement that had interrupted Yugoslavia’s plans for the Slav colonization of the region and sought reunion of the Albanian lands; and the madrasa students and ulema who illegally distributed books in Albanian.\textsuperscript{188} For there was no mass education in Albanian in Yugoslavia, the only teaching available in the language being religious instruction conducted by rote. Other than in the few state madrasas permitted to continue after 1927, the only legal medium of instruction and information was Serbian.\textsuperscript{189}

Among the wider population, the idea of a Greater Albania and an idyllic view of Albania did become popular, but for different reasons than for intellectuals. What was desired was an alternative to Yugoslavia which offered more freedom to Muslims. The ideal would have been the return of the Ottoman Empire, but as there was no

\textsuperscript{187} Botim i Ministris s’Arsimit. Shqyrtue prej Komisjonit Teknik Nr.9, Vjersha të Zgjedhuna për klasën e III-i të Shkollavet të Mesme (Tirana: Kristo Luarasi, 1939); Gaspër Mikeli, ed., Njoftime Historike mbi Shqypní për klasët e eperme të shkollave fillore, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. (Shkodra: Zoja e Papërlyeme, 1932), pp.48-49.


prospect of this, Albania seemed the next best thing. Although nationalist ideas had become part of varying levels of identification during this period, they formed a spectrum closely tied to religious identity, for the nationalist ideas were Turkish as well as Albanian; for Atatürk’s triumph over his Christian enemies made him an inspiration for Bajram Curri’s attempt to forge a “sacred unity of Islam” in the zone around Junik liberated by kaçaks as well as for heroic folksongs.\(^\text{\(\text{190}\)}\) The emigration of Muslims from Kosovo to Turkey rather than Albania in this period shows, besides the relative economic capacity of the two countries to absorb the migrants, the lack of distinction in the eyes of so many of the migrants between being Albanian and being Turkish. This is underlined by the fact that so many succeeded in migrating to Turkey despite the fact that the Turkish state was not keen to absorb migrants with what it perceived to be such a different cultural background. However, by 1922, the Turkish government was already apprehensive about Albanian immigration and the Grand National Assembly subsequently forbade the entry of any Albanian with an Albanian or Yugoslav passport into Turkey.\(^\text{\(\text{191}\)}\) The migration to Turkey, in which landowners were among the first to move, together with Yugoslavia’s agrarian reform (which I will deal with later), and the change of the Cemiyet from a Muslim landowning interest group to one aiming to protect non-Slav interests before the party was outlawed in 1925, put great pressure on the once-dominant landowners.\(^\text{\(\text{192}\)}\) Although some effort was made to restore the


position of Muslim landowners during the Second World War, with the restoration of feudal dues by the Germans and Italians, the emasculation of their power led to the leadership of the traditional intelligentsia being passed to the Muslim and Catholic clergy as the few non-Slavs involved in education and intellectual production. Among Catholics, the tradition continued of promoting Albanian culture through the devotional and literary papers *Ylli* and *Drita* – the only literature in Albanian permitted by the government – and bringing the plight of the people of Kosovo to international attention.

During the Second World War, among Muslims, the clergy implemented sharia in local jurisprudence and through their domination of local instruments of government.\textsuperscript{193}

Although Kosovo Albanian historiography has often claimed that Kosovo has been the crucible of “Albanianism,”\textsuperscript{194} in fact it was a bastion of conservatism. Kosovo proved to be more resistant than any other Albanian land to the message of Albanian nationalism, defending their own interests, sometimes against the encroachment of foreign powers, sometimes against the encroachment of the Ottoman state. \textit{Malësorët} and local landowners benefited from autonomy and the rule of customary law in mountain areas, while Muslims enjoyed privileges such as permission to carry arms\textsuperscript{195} and exemption from \textit{haraç}. Even as the First Balkan War was on the point of breaking out, the leaders from Kosovo were instrumental in securing that autonomy be demanded rather than independence.\textsuperscript{196} The clearest summation of this attitude was the remark to


\textsuperscript{194} See, for example, Alfred Uçi, “Lidhja shqiptare e Prizrenit – faktor kulturor,” in Jusuf Bajraktari et al., eds., \textit{Lidhja Shqiptare e Prizrenit dhe vendi i saj në histori} (Prishtina: Institut i Historisé, 2008), pp.57-70.

\textsuperscript{195} Iseni, \textit{Question nationale}, p.174; Clayer, \textit{Aux origines}, p.81; Malcolm, \textit{Kosovo}, p.181.

Aubrey Herbert by Isa Boletini, now incorporated into the Albanian nationalist pantheon, that what the Albanians of Kosovo wanted was “not to be interfered with.”

197 Through the period from the mid-nineteenth century to the First Balkan War, people in Kosovo were consistent in their resistance to outside interference (whether foreign, as in the League of Peja’s alarm at Austria-Hungary, or domestic, as in the many tax revolts over this period), their support of Ottoman rule, and their rejection of constitutional innovation that would jeopardize their autonomy. At the same time, they maintained an openness to overtures from other powers in exchange for guarantees of the maintenance of their way of life, such as those between local leaders with Serbia or Montenegro in the years before 1912.

197 Zekeria Cana, Populli shqiptar, pp.99-106; Bartl, Albanische Muslime, p.182. Aubrey Herbert’s diary goes further, relating that in August 1912, three months before Albania’s independence, Boletini rejected both autonomy for the Albanians and any union with the southern Albanians who were too “educated and clever”: Destani and Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p.57.


199 Janjić, “National Identity,” p.127; Durham, High Albania, p.68. This dealing with external powers and the Porte by local leaders Isa Blumi identifies as a way the people of the region became modern by “copying” Europe and, through their actions, able to influence the wider policies of the Great Powers. He is correct that, in the case of the League of Prizren, the friction between muhaxhirs and locals led to lobbying and reevaluation by the Great Powers of strategies in the Western Balkans. However, this did not mean that those muhaxhirs and locals were in any sense modern in their ability to present their case, by “copying” Europe consciously, be it by petition or violence, to modern powers and thereby in their ability to work in a kind of system of international politics. This behaviour was not new: the ability of local traditional leaders to treat with great and small European powers and to use revolt and petition to attain their aims long precedes the modern period even in Western Europe, as can be seen in their diplomatic activity from 1594 with proposals to European powers to revolt against the Ottomans. The lives of ordinary people such as migrants helped mould the policies of Great powers, for example, in treaty-making in 1689. While Blumi is correct that the violence of 1912 was constitutive of Serbian national relations with the local non-Slav population, no Great Divide appears in the latter’s modern or national consciousness. Blumi, then, punctiously avoids the use of “Albanian” to refer to the non-Slav inhabitants of Kosovo prior to 1912, but drops that practice thereafter. While he is scrupulous in demonstrating the complexity of political thought and action prior to 1912, in the case of the resettlement/expulsion of “Turks” to Turkey, his argument has little nuance, depriving the Muslims of the Western Balkans of agency, the Turkish Republic of the plurality of views it held and overstating the importance of “Serbia’s most celebrated historian,” Vaso Ćubrilović. In short, in the period after 1912, Blumi runs the risk of falling into the very nationalist and oversimplifying traps he rightly accuses historiographers of the period before 1912 of falling into: Blumi, Reinstating, p.13.
In language, Kosovo was also conservative. It was prominent in resisting the use of the Latin alphabet. There were no delegates from Kosovo at the Congress of Elbasan and the people of Kosovo were especially reluctant to adopt the non-Arabic scripts agreed by the Congress of Manastir, with demonstrations staged and propaganda issued against the use of Latin letters. The parliamentary representative for Peja complained that the forcing of this alphabet was blind imitation of the West, while notables in Prishtina worried that adopting Latin letters would mean adopting Latin customs and beliefs.\(^{200}\) The Arabic script was to remain in (private) use for Albanian in Kosovo to the end of the Second World War.\(^{201}\)

As a result of Kosovo’s conservatism, its people were the target of disdain and frustration from Albanian national entrepreneurs, who accused them of being savage. Disappointed in Prizren, Abdyl Frashëri blamed the local people’s backwardness, while Ghegs in general were referred to as stupid and violent mountain tribesmen who were the enemy of the kind of “progress” that Frashëri and those who thought like him had in mind and in dire need of “civilization.”\(^{202}\) While some of the events that had led to the building of an imagined Albania, such as the League of Prizren, had occurred in Kosovo, that work of construction took place elsewhere. Despite the development of an Albanian national identity, especially in the centre and south of Albania, during the Rilindja, the only major cultural figure of the Rilindja active in Kosovo was Shtjefën Gjeçovi, a priest from the strongly Croat village of Janjevë who had been educated in Bosnia. While Gjeçovi was a collector of all kinds of folklore and very intellectually productive, he is best known for two things: his compiling and publishing the Kanun of


Lek Dukagjin, which reflected the traditional nature of Kosovo society, and his state-sponsored murder in 1929, which demonstrated the dangers faced by non-Slav activists in interwar Kosovo. As a rilindës, what he wanted for the people of the northern Albanian lands was clear: in a political work published in 1910, Gjeçovi wrote that Albanian national consciousness had to come through mass education in Albanian, something still lacking in Kosovo. Gjeçovi’s choice of a title was not an idle one: Agimi i gjutetniis ("The Dawn of Civilization").

After Serbia’s absorption of Kosovo, the Muslim population maintained hostility toward the prospect of “assimilation” through the education system, preferring the traditional, male-only educational Turkish-language schools until they were also closed. This was part of local non-Slavs’ general distrust of the authorities, particularly given that education might result in the next generation being taught as Orthodox Christian Slavs. As for secondary education, just 2% of Albanians who were eligible attended. Unless training for the clergy or illegally escaping to Albania, they had virtually no access to professional education. Although the authorities took care to give priority to Serb areas and to avoid setting up schools near the border, hostility to assimilation meant that skills such as literacy, and attitudes toward it, which would have helped broaden abstract concepts such as the nation beyond the traditional intelligentsia, were unavailable to the non-Slav people of Kosovo.

203 Cana, Populli shqiptar, pp.107-113; Redžepagić, Razvoj prosvete i školstva, pp.320-321.
Kosovo’s place in Yugoslavia

As long as they resisted “civilization,” Kosovo Albanians were looked down on by Albanian intellectuals. Within Yugoslavia, the option of “civilization” was never open to them. The nature of the Serbian and Montenegrin conquest made it plain that the new masters did not consider non-Slavs to belong to their new lands. A draft agreement had been made between Nikola Pašić and the Kosovo landowner Nexhip Draga on co-operation between Serbs and Albanians in the vilayet of Kosovo in which Albanians would join a Serbian state in which they would have freedom of religion, the use of Albanian in schools, their own courts and administration and retention of their old legal and judicial customs.206 However, what followed the Serbs’ and Montenegrins’ victory bore little resemblance to Pašić’s promises. The conquest, both by Montenegro and Serbia, was marked by the same ideological fervour that had marked the conquest of the sanjak of Niš. While officers were offered free land and others were motivated by bounty, there were other factors at work. Though the worst atrocities were committed by paramilitaries, intellectuals and “nationalist zealots,” the campaign was centrally directed. Following the pre-war propaganda campaign on the myth of Kosovo – a central feature of Serbian nationalist thought since the late nineteenth century – and the publicity in 1912 about the “lawlessness” of the Albanians preying on local Serbs, after the conquest Muslims were offered the alternatives of conversion or death by the Serbs in Luma and by the Montenegrins in the areas they conquered.207 The Serbian government organized the felling of timber and theft of

livestock and dismissed the Serbian prefect of Prishtina for refusing “to carry out the Government policy of the removal of the Albanian population.”

John Allcock, drawing on the work of Glenn Bowman on “constitutive violence,” suggests there is a ritual quality to such atrocities in the formation of the South Slav nations. The scale, direction and targets in Kosovo, northern Albania and much of Macedonia during and after the First Balkan War – remembering Pašić’s acceptance of 3,000 of the 112,000ha distributed to colonists at the site of Murat’s tomb on the Field of Kosovo and Serbia’s push to reach the Adriatic at Durrës – evinces the reconception of Serbia on a much larger scale than before, and as a worthy successor to the Nemanjić empire.

Now that the possession of these lands was a reality, Serbs described them as a land of opportunity, where the “desert” could be revived, and fields that had lain fallow for centuries could be put to work once more. Indeed, their possession was but a step towards the “liberation” of Shkodra and the Adriatic coast, for which Yugoslavia had aimed at the Paris Peace Conference and in Stojadinović’s talks with Ciano. Furthermore, gaining this territory would allow the “Albanized Serbo-Croats,” identified by scholars such as Spiridion Gopčević and Jovan Cvijić, to recognize their

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“true identity,”²¹⁰ as part of Yugoslavia’s “civilizing” mission over a “fanatical” people, unequal to the demands of an “independent existence.”²¹¹

These descriptions reveal the approach of the Yugoslav authorities towards the Albanians in their country which I would characterize as colonial. David Theo Goldberg maps out two fundamental approaches to colonial rule. Firstly, the “naturalist” view, taken by most European colonists up to the mid-nineteenth century, understand race as a natural, biological fact, and where colonists rule over their racial inferiors who cannot care for themselves. The other is the “historicist” view, which held that colonists governed peoples who were not inferior but less developmentally advanced, not yet capable of self-government, but who in time would realize their potential under the paternal guidance of their rulers. The naturalist viewed the colonial as incapable of intellectual achievement, a population to be kept in segregation from the colonizer, while the progressivist viewed the colonial as capable of amalgamation and assimilation, becoming civilized on acquisition of the law and custom of the colonizers. Naturalist colonialism was maintained through violence; historicist colonialism through education, coercion and manipulation. Both had the underlying threat of violence present, which betrayed the ambivalence inherent in colonial rule, each form containing the seeds of the other. To the naturalist, the colonial is outside history; his intellectual contribution resembles nothing so much as the “mimicry of the parrot.” To the

The time of royal Yugoslavia can be thought of as one of naturalist colonialism and that of socialist Yugoslavia, at least as far as the elite is concerned, as historicist. In the years during and after the First World War, when the Serbian retreat through Albania played a stronger role than the story of the Kosovo cycle as a founding myth, resistance of the local people to assimilation of any kind demonstrated to many that the non-Slavs of Kosovo were fundamentally alien, an anarchic people, who rejected the very idea of government, and so beyond those incapable as yet of managing their affairs. They were lazy, disease-ridden people, addicted to blood feud and of malignant disposition owing to their attachment to the *kanun*. They were to be kept apart with the assistance of the state, “backward, unenlightened and stupid.” What suffering would the Yugoslav state yet endure “with these savages?” Salvation would “come only from the Serbs, because [they] fear[ed] the Serbs alone.” They were “among the most savage people on earth,” a “permanent danger to the Serb inhabitants,” for whom


“killing a person is not just a game but a supreme satisfaction, and pillage is the only goal of their existence.”

The government also sought to reconstruct the land independently of the people by reforming land tenure and encouraging its colonization. By 1926, it was no longer possible to hold land in a village in which one did not reside. For many Albanians, who held small pieces of land in different villages, this led to families being registered elsewhere and breaking up. While waqf, like the owners of near-feudal land, were forbidden to receive compensation, this did not apply to state organizations, able to use agrarian reform to gain land to expand a primary school garden, or to Christian organizations, such as the monastery of Dečani, for which the upper part of the village of Isniq was confiscated, rendering forty families landless, causing severe friction. As part of the agrarian reform programme, about 40% of the land shared out was to participants in the government’s plan of colonization. Despite the establishment of forty-eight co-operatives in the region, and the granting of over 19,000,000 dinars of loans, due to poor conditions, malaria and the activity of kaçaks, many colonists returned to their native region. The government turned to the establishment of

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215 Srebreno-Dolinski, Réforme agraire, pp.74-5.
218 Spasoje Đaković, Sukobi na Kosovu, (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1984), p.18, p.21, p.24, citing Sreten Vukosavljević, commissioner of agrarian reform in southern regions, to Ministry of Agrarian Reform, 28th August 1919. This was certainly not the only state-sponsored programme of internal irredentism through colonization in Europe over newly-acquired territory following the First World War. A case with parallels to the situation in Kosovo is that of Czechoslovakia, which initiated a programme of Czech colonization of the Sudetenland, leading to discrimination against Germans and the perception among German nationalists of an interchangeability between colonization and denationalization, all of which served to intensify mutual distrust and discrimination: Hedva Ben-Israel, “Irredentism: Nationalism Reexamined,” in Chazan, Irredentism, pp.28-9.
219 Ivšić, Problèmes agraires, p.219, p.224; Roux, Albanais, p.194.
colonial settlements for “strengthening the Slav element” of the population. The colonies were given names associated with the Kosovo myth, such as Miloševo and Lazarevo, reinforcing the Slav, and specifically Serbian, nature of colonization. In the 1920s, more land was measured out and shared out and nearly three times as many families were settled in the district of Kosovo than any other district and more than twice as many houses built.

Besides trying to change the demographic makeup of the people of Kosovo, the authorities Slavicized the public sphere. In politics, representation in parliament largely disappeared through the banning of the Cemiyet and the KPJ and electoral violence, while the institution of illiterate people of poor background as village representatives by the authorities made a mockery of local representation. Drawing administrative districts to avoid Albanian majorities also helped ensure the authorities maintained control. Within these administrative units, the state required that surnames be Serbianized and Albanian be banished from public use. Benedict Anderson suggests the census is a powerful tool of the state to classify, and segregate, people into categories and both to gauge and affect their political size and strength. In the case of

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220 Ivšić, Problèmes agraires, p.214; Jusuf Osmani, Kolonizmi serb i Kosovës, 2nd ed. (Prishtina: Jusuf Osmani, 2010), p.102, a reproduction of “Kosovo i Metohija” Arhiv Jugoslavije, Ministarstvo Agrarne Reforme Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Belgrade, 1918-1941, file 96. There was an attempt by Hungarians and Germans from Vojvodina to settle in South Serbia in 1928/29, but this was stopped by the government: Vaso Čubrilović, “The Expulsion of the Albanians: Memorandum presented in Belgrade on 7 March 1937,” trans. Robert Elsie, in Elsie, Kosovo, p.416.

221 Ivšić, Problèmes agraires, p.215; Daković, Sukobi, p.23, incorrectly citing Aleksandar I. Stebut and Dobroslav B. Todorović, Ispitivanja kolonizacione sposobnosti ovčepolskog i pečko-prizrenskega reona, (Belgrade: Makarije, 1928). As a mirror image, colonies of refugee Albanians from Kosovo, bearing names such as Kujtim-Kosova (“remembrance of Kosovo”), where Kosovo Albanian traditions were promoted, were developed in central Albania with the assistance of American and British charity: Mark Tirta, “Migrime politike shqiptare nga trojet e tyre të ish-Jugoslavisë e përnuaje në Shqipëri (në mes të dy Lufërave Botërore),” Studime Historike 45/28.3-4 (1991/1994), 138; Joan Fultz Kontos, Red Cross, Black Eagle: A Biography of Albania’s American School (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1981), pp.104-5.

222 Horvat, Kosovsko pitanje, p.40.


the census of 1921, there is reason to believe that the number of Muslims was underestimated, perhaps by as much as one half, the population of Muslims in the lands conquered by Serbia and Yugoslavia having decreased by 54% since 1911. In education, Turkish and Catholic schools had been banned as dangerous to the state. In response to a complaint by three Catholic priests to the League of Nations in 1929 about the treatment of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia, Ivo Andrić stated the Yugoslav government’s position that the religious instructors still permitted could not be allowed to teach without a perfect understanding of Serbian, besides which there was no demand for schooling from the Albanians. While they accounted for under a third of Kosovo’s secondary school population, in secondary schools where non-Slavs were considered extraneous, such as a music school, or where they could pose a security threat, such as a military school, their presence was unwelcome. In religion, Islamic religious and educational authority was abolished, investing power in the justice minister, which affected the everyday lives of Muslims on such matters as marriage and charity. The government also expropriated the institutions that distributed charity; waqfs, mosques, tekkes and cemeteries were also destroyed or turned into Orthodox churches in Kosovo and Macedonia.

Royal Yugoslavia’s view of the non-Slavs of Kosovo as fundamentally alien culminated in the agrarian reform of the 1930s, as the Yugoslav government decided to

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remedy the failure of the colonization programme until then to shift the ethnic balance. In 1934, the Ministry of Agriculture, released 15,000,000 dinars for the purchase of private land in Kosovo and requested other branches of government to facilitate the vendors’ emigration. The following year, an inter-ministerial conference in Belgrade decided to detach Albanians from their land by declaring that all land which was not in the state’s cadastral records belonged to the state. Title deeds belonging to Albanians usually dated from the Ottoman Empire, and while no attempt had been made to reconcile the Ottoman records with the Yugoslav ones, most Ottoman deeds were declared to be forgeries. The land thereby gained by the state was then redistributed to Slav settlers. Obradović argues that a major intensification of this process took place in 1936, particularly in the areas bordering Albania, and around Peja and Gjakova, stating that most families were left with 0.4ha per family member, and many with no land at all.

The relative failure of the land colonization programme to attract colonists and change the ethnic balance of the region definitively in favour of the Slavs; the natural growth rate of Albanians in Kosovo; the threat of Italy, with Albania increasingly dependent upon it; and the severe effects of the Great Depression upon unemployment

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231 Horvat, Kosovsko pitanje, p.42; Doko Bojković, “Agrarna reforma,” p.304. The question of the validity of Ottoman title deeds was raised as early as 1913, when the monastery of Dečani claimed the return of land and villages it possessed before the Ottoman conquest: WD Peckham to Ralph Paget, 28th August 1913 (FO 371/1832), in Destani, Albania and Kosovo, p.355.
232 Milovan Obradović, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija na Kosovu (1918-1941) (Prishtina: Institut za historiju Kosova, 1981), pp.141, 231. Dogo attacks Obradović’s claims, saying his data includes the çiftlik broken up in the 1920s and not counted in the figures for 1939. Dogo points out that the figures for 1939 show that much more land was earmarked for colonization than was cultivated: Dogo, Kosovo, p.284; Dogo, “National Truths,” p.37. However, while including land for infrastructure, land owned by waqfs and churches, he does not take into account land sequestered by the state on the ground that the deeds were false, which was very common in the case of the great majority of Albanian owners who had small plots of land. Figures produced in 1939 would cover a period when the state had been extremely active in confiscating huge areas of land without allotting it to new colonists. Furthermore, Dogo points out that colonization was not on a sufficient scale to alter the ethnic balance of the region: “National Truths,” p.38. However, this was less to do with the intention of the programme than the obstacles it faced and, some thought, the enthusiasm of its prosecution.
and civil unrest all encouraged the view among members of the Serbian elite, as represented in the Serbian Cultural Club, that more decisive action must be taken. Emboldened by the examples of Germany’s measures against its Jews and the Soviet Union’s ability to deport entire peoples, it was clear to them that such action needed to be sweeping and audacious. Many have cited Vaso Čubrilović’s detailed memorandum on how the Albanians might be expelled altogether but, as Edvin Pezo points out, Čubrilović was of relatively minor importance at the time and there were others who commanded much more attention. Other plans were written by Ivan Vukotić, Ivo Andrić, Stevan Moljević and others; Pezo is right that the historiography of Kosovo places too much stress on Čubrilović because of his role at the end of the Second World War as a minister, but his views were shared by other Serbian intellectuals at the time. The point of these plans was to encourage emigration of Muslims to Turkey. For this purpose a covenant was signed between Yugoslavia and Turkey in July 1938 providing for the export of forty thousand Muslim families of “Turkish origin and language and of Turkish culture,” though not nomads or Roms, from rural districts of South Serbia between 1938 and 1944, with Yugoslavia gaining ownership of the land and all movables. That people “of Turkish culture” were mostly Albanian can be surmised from the districts mentioned in the convention, many of which had small Turkish populations in comparison with Albanians. Taken together with the harsher agrarian reform policy, Yugoslavia’s previous encouragement had become a policy of wholesale expulsion. Plainly, conditions for “civilization” and nationalist organization were no more promising at the end of royal Yugoslavia than at the beginning.

The destruction of the First Yugoslavia laid the foundations for what Burcu Akan Ellis calls the “coming of the Albanian soul” during the Second World War. This was in part the relaxation of the anomie of the interwar years, and in part the arrival of a ready-made package of national identification in which Kosovo no longer played the role of backward religious fanatic, but took pride of place in its “true identity” as the “cradle of Albanianism.” This laid the foundations for the expansion of Albanian national feeling among the masses after the Second World War. Incorporation of most of Kosovo into an enlarged Albania entailed the importing of secular and nationally-minded Albanian civil administrators, and especially the coming of over 200 teachers, many of whom were from Kosovo but had gone to Albania to obtain an Albanian-language education forbidden in Yugoslavia. The advent of these people, supplemented by the reactivation of those who had taught during the First World War, at a stroke imported an intelligentsia which strongly identified as Albanian.

The establishment of a mass education system for the non-Slav population during the Second World War enabled the importing and adaptation of an existing idea of an imagined Albania, in which Kosovo was no longer seen as a primitive backwater but, retrospectively, as the centre for the struggle for the freedom of the Albanian people. Historical events in Kosovo, and the people involved in them, such as the League of Prizren, the Frashëri brothers, Hasan Prishtina and Isa Boletini, were now garbed with a nationalist interpretation and significance. The names of Albanian heroes

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were used to rename schools and the main nationalist organization in Kosovo, affiliated to \textit{Balli Kombëtar}, adopted the name the Second League of Prizren. \textit{Kosova djepi i shqiptarizmit} (1943), by Hamit Kokalari, then employed at the Albanian consulate in Skopje, was the first book to recount Kosovo’s history from a nationalist perspective, stressing antiquity and priority, through a constant Albanian majority, even during the Nemanjić empire, to extracts from books and newspapers detailing the suffering of the Albanians since 1912.\footnote{Kokalari, \textit{Kosova}, pp.13,17-8, 42-3, 93-158.} As the title implies, Kokalari argues that Kosovo was the birthplace of the Albanian national movement. The idea that Albanians in Kosovo were not so much importing new ideas but rather appealing to tradition, a tradition strongly associated with the defence of home, place and honour, and by that tradition, enjoy pride of place in the Albanian national movement, was extremely attractive to Kosovo Albanians. Kokalari articulated a means of being Albanian that was beyond association with rural ignorance, and expressed the complaints of Kosovo Albanians in a new and systematic way, becoming very influential in the resistance movement against the communists at the end of the war and in the diaspora thereafter.\footnote{Keçmezi-Basha, \textit{Lëvizja}, p.180; Abas Ermenji, “Parathënie,” in Hamit Kokalari, \textit{Kosova djepi i shqiptarizmit} (Paris: Lidhja Kosovare, 1962), pp.11-56.} In a manner similar to David Lloyd’s analysis of Irish nationalism, by asserting pre-modern Kosovo as a site of eternal difference and eternal struggle with the Other through the invented traditions of the flag, the Illyrians, Skanderbeg and the League of Prizren, and buttressed by the moral values of customary law as collected by Gjeçovë, Albanian nationalism in Kosovo during the Second World War stressed the very elements considered by Yugoslavia as primitive, savage and rendering Albanians unfit to rule themselves. One of those elements was the Albanian language.\footnote{David Lloyd, “Outside History: Irish New Histories and the ‘Subalternity Effect’,” in Gurav Desai and Supriya Nair, eds., \textit{Postcolonialisms: An Anthology of Cultural Theory and Criticism} (Oxford: Berg, 2005), pp.414-415.}
The modern intelligentsia of teachers and administrators were able to persuade parents that education in Axis-controlled Albanian territory was not a route to slavicization. Schools were held in mosques and the *kulls* of notable families in preference to more suitable premises, as teachers associated in public with the men of the *kulla* and spoke in the important *odas* of their areas to encourage parents to register their children. The local status of the teacher was further enhanced by participation in *pajtim i gjaqëve*, leading to the settlement of 652 feuds during the war. Settlement of blood feuds was an activity of high reputation and moral status which was subsequently bequeathed to the teachers’ children, becoming both a characteristic activity and mark of status of the modern Albanian intellectual in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{240} Thus teachers and administrators were able to change attitudes about “assimilation” and literacy. Their dominance, high social and moral capital and their mission in “civilizing” the people of Kosovo, together with their continued availability after the war, enabled the modern intellectuals to replace the traditional elite. After the communist victory, those who were trained, and deemed ideologically suitable, presided over the training of new teachers, nearly all of whom were temporary and unqualified, to fill the great number of vacant positions. Once again, teachers used influential *odas* to persuade parents to overcome their reluctance to send their children, particularly girls, to obey the law and attend the Yugoslav schools, while using their comparative security to promote Albanian national identification.\textsuperscript{241} The spread of national identification was also helped by teachers


continuing to use wartime schoolbooks until books for Serbian children could be translated or a steady supply from Albania could be secured.  

Thanks to the communists, the old elite of large landowners was decapitated by land reform and collectivization. The modern intelligentsia was able to replace the traditional elite of the clergy, brought low by the campaign against religion and the surveillance of its membership, while taking part in Yugoslavia’s own civilizing mission against “backward practices.” Furthermore, while Albanian historiography claims that most of Kosovo’s Albanian intellectuals were killed by the communists at the end of the war, and Yugoslav historiography suggests that intellectuals in Kosovo were a creation of the postwar period, in fact many of those who came from Albania or who trained during wartime remained afterwards, and it was they who were able to step in as the nucleus of a new elite, the cream of which were educated in Albania or would attend Belgrade University, later forming the Albanian academic and technical intelligentsia.

Given the antipathy generated between Slavs and non-Slavs between the wars, Albanian support for the Axis powers had very little to do with wider geopolitical or ideological questions, but more to do with local antipathy. Nowhere is this more sharply clear than in the story of Emrush Myftari, a former volunteer with the International


244 Three-quarters of the notable teachers of this period mentioned in Koliqi, Historia, pp.496-502, were educated in Albania. Of the seventeen writers active at this time featured in Gjerqeku et al., Panoramë, eight were graduates of Belgrade University.
Brigades in Spain, who gave a speech of welcome to the German troops in Peja and was arrested later the same year for running a communist bookshop.\textsuperscript{245} The exclusionary nature of Yugoslav colonialism in Kosovo led to local leaders mirroring the measures taken against them back on the Slav population. Serbs and Montenegrins were forbidden from carrying arms, had their surnames altered and, in most of Kosovo, their children prevented from going to school in their native language. Pressure was put on them to leave unless they knew “how to behave themselves with Albanians.” Albanian units raided, burnt and looted Slav colonies and many were killed. Many businesses that were run by Serbs, including pharmacies providing basic medical care, were destroyed as tens of thousands were forced to flee.\textsuperscript{246} The shadowing of Serbian nationalism was so close that, even when faced with the overwhelming strength of the Yugoslav and Albanian communist governments, the second programme of the NDSH in Skopje in 1946 proposed the solving of minority problems through voluntary population transfer from areas where Albanians were over 60% of the population.\textsuperscript{247}

This in turn led to fear of revenge as the victory of the communists became more likely. Communism was identified with the Slavs, Serb communists as indistinguishable from the Četniks, and Albanian communists as having sold themselves to the Serbs.\textsuperscript{248} Unlike Albania proper, where communists, royalists and nationalists were fighting for dominance, in Kosovo Albanians were strong supporters of the nationalist Second

\textsuperscript{245} Myftari, Emrush Myftari, pp.54, 109; 150.
\textsuperscript{246} Jovan Pejin, Stradanje Srba u Metohiji 1941-1945 (Belgrade: Arhivski pregled, 1994), p.23; Stojković and Martić, National Minorities, p.34; Pirraku, Adem Guta, p.155; Hoxha, Fadil Hoxha, p.90; Fischer, Albania at War, pp.209, 238; Malcolm, Kosovo, p.305. Figures for the number of Serbs and Montenegrins expelled range from about 40,000 by April 1944: Mulaj, Politics of Ethnic Cleansing, p.37, quoting Hermann Neubacher, the German political officer in Belgrade, to about 100,000: Nenad Antonijević, Albanski zločini nad Srbima na Kosovu i Metohiji u Drugom svetskom ratu, 2nd ed. (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2009), p.27.
\textsuperscript{247} Ajvazi, Partia Nacional, pp.42-43.
\textsuperscript{248} Dogo, Kosovo, p.326; Kasem Biçoku, Falangat që rrezikojnë kombin shqiptar (Tirana: Ilar, 1999), p.123.
League of Prizren, founded by traditional leaders and affiliated to *Balli Kombëtar*, which advocated the union of Kosovo with Albania, bolstered by German and *Balli* propaganda that the success of the Partisans meant the return of Yugoslav rule and the violence of the Četniks. The KPJ did not make itself any more popular by leaning on the Albanian communist party (PKSH) to withdraw from an agreement to form a united front with nationalists and royalists, forcing the party organization in Kosovo to withdraw its Bujan Resolution, which promised the possibility of joining Albania if the people joined the Partisans and then acting to crush anti-Axis Albanian fighters. As for the Partisans, mostly Slav and many of them colonists, most felt that reconciliation was impossible; unless restrained, the “liberation” was accompanied by acts of murder, destruction and “revenge” against Albanians. As the new regime took hold, Fadil Hoxha, the military commander of the Partisans in Kosovo, was replaced by Sava Drlević, a Montenegrin with no experience in Kosovo, soon to be joined by many other Slav communist leaders unknown there. The Partisans conscripted Albanians to fight on the Srem Front and at Trieste but most were not prepared to leave Kosovo when their own lands needed protection. This problem escalated into rebellion; not only were the rebels crushed, but Albanian Partisans on their way to the front were also massacred.

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Yugoslavia’s adoption of socialist nationality policy and the ethnic key encouraged the perception of grievances through the prism of ethnicity. The province was incorporated into Serbia and its KPJ organizations merged, each of the Belgrade meetings involved being attended by a single Albanian, though Kosovo was granted nominal autonomy with a nominally bilingual administration. But while Albanians were more than two-thirds of the population, they were only one-third of KPJ members in 1945, three out of the ten members of Kosovo’s politburo, and a small and declining minority among the judiciary, police and secret services and then often in junior positions. As in the days of the kaçaks, there were Albanian nationalist groups carrying on rebellion against Yugoslavia; in 1947 UDBA believed there had been fifty-five in operation since November 1944. The main difference between these groups and the kaçaks twenty-five years before was symptomatic of the change in the Albanian elite of Kosovo; whereas kaçak leaders had been traditional leaders, the leaders of the later resistance groups were often teachers and students.\textsuperscript{252} This was far from the only reminder of the First Yugoslavia. In November 1944, Čubrilović, soon to become minister of agriculture, wrote another memorandum suggesting that the “disloyal minorities,” the Albanians, Germans and Hungarians, should be expelled through military tribunals, concentration camps, confiscation of land and forcible expulsion. Once Čubrilović was minister, “poverty committees,” mostly run by Montenegrin party members who were themselves colonists, distributed wartime opponents’ and rebels’ land to poor families, much of it to Montenegrins, the rest being taken by security forces

Many smaller Albanian peasants were deemed to be “kulaks,” their land was forcibly transferred and any surpluses confiscated, though there were serious food shortages. Lack of food was exacerbated by the collectivization programme as, once again, ideologically sound Slav colonists were settled with the aim of increasing the Slav proportion of the population.

The success of the intelligentsia in Kosovo who identified with Albania, coupled with the friction that revived or brought new causes for resentment against Yugoslav rule, was crucial in the promotion of a ready-made identity adapted to the needs of Kosovo. But as we have seen, this identification with Albania came not as a result of a local movement, but instead through a combination of outside intellectual movements, political conditions extraneous to Kosovo, and a reaction to Yugoslav exclusiveness. The non-Slav masses were, at last, able to accept the invitation of the intellectuals into history. We will see how this developed in Chapter Three.

Ragip Mulaku, the head of the Linguistic Section of the Albanological Institute of Prishtina, writing in 2009, said that the “unification of the Albanian literary language is rightly called the most valuable cultural, national and – why not – political work of the Albanians.”\(^{255}\) This sentence, however, means something rather different in the context of Kosovo and that of Albania itself. As a political achievement, Mulaku was reflecting on the unification of standard Albanian as something which included Albanians wherever they lived, including the Albanians of Yugoslavia. But although the purpose of this thesis is to discuss Albanian standardization and its consequences in Kosovo, the standard that Albanians in Yugoslavia adopted was inspired, decided and developed by Albanians in the People’s Republic of Albania for the use of their citizens. In language, as in other fields,\(^{256}\) Kosovo intellectuals imported a ready-made cultural product from Albania created to suit the cultural and ideological needs of the Albanian state without reference to Albanians elsewhere. To understand the “political work of the Albanians,” therefore, we need to understand the political generation and status of standard Albanian for the Albanians of the People’s Republic of Albania, its intended users. As this chapter will show, standard Albanian was the product of Marxist-Leninist thinking, closely linked to Soviet linguistics, and was not the product of a unilinear process of dialect convergence. The standard reflects the state’s preoccupations at various times in the process, reflecting its values as part of a wider


\(^{256}\) See, e.g., the standard work of Albanian historiography in Kosovo, Stefanaq Pollo and Kristo Frashëri et al., *Historia e popullit shqiptar* (Tirana: Universiteti Shetëror i Tiranës, Instituti i Historisë dhe i Gjuhësisë/Prishtina: Enti i Teksteve dhe i Mjeteve Mësimore i Krahinës Socialiste Autonome të Kosovës, 1969).
establishment of cultural policy fit for a new, socialist society. While it was adopted in Yugoslavia, it is crucial to understand that the creation of Standard Albanian and the arguments for the form it took were entirely local to Albania.

The standardization of Albanian was complex. The language was not one of education or government, nor was there widespread literacy, so that although there was a continuum of speech across the Albanian-speaking area, from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries written Albanian developed independently in the north and the south. Varieties of written Albanian coalesced particularly around the speech of Shkodra in the north-west and of Korça in the south-east. While the two dialects were mutually comprehensible, they could be considered as different, as Faik Konica said, as Spanish and Italian.257 The two dialects, Gheg in the north and Tosk in the south, are traditionally considered separated by the river Shkumbin, with a transitional area further south in Myzeqe and Shpat.258 The main features of the two dialects are quite different:

1. Vowels in Gheg vary according to length and nasality, whereas those in Tosk do not, e.g. gjâ/gjë, “thing.”259

2. Words with an intervocalic n in Gheg are very often rhotacised in Tosk and schwas between consonants are pronounced, which is not true of Gheg, e.g. Shqipni/Shqipëri, “Albania.”

3. Tosk retains the sounds of the consonant clusters mb, nd, ngj, whereas Gheg has a nasal form of m or n, e.g. (n)ner/nder, “honour.”

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258 While doubt has been cast on this traditional division, as perceived differences between Gheg and Tosk are an important part of this thesis, I shall continue to use it. See Kelly Maynard, “A Historical-Dialectological Approach to Convergence: Isoglosses of Balkan Convergence Area Features in Albanian Dialects,” unpublished PhD thesis, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, cited in Victor A. Friedman, “Vendi i gegnishtes në gjuhën shqip dhe në Ballkan,” Phoenix 1-6 (2003), 41.
259 In these examples, the Gheg example is given first, then the Tosk.
4. Gheg uses an infinitive, *me* + shortened participle, whereas Tosk usually uses the subjunctive and lacks the shortened form of the participle, e.g. *nuk mëj me shku(e)/nuk mund të shkoj*, “I cannot go.”

5. Gheg uses *kam* + infinitive to express the future, whereas Tosk uses *do* + subjunctive, e.g. *kam me ardhë/do të vij*, “I will come.” There are also different forms for the imperfect tense.

6. There are considerable differences in lexicon, e.g. *katund/fšat*, “village”; *këqyr/shikoj*, “look” (verb).\(^{260}\)

It should be noted that these are general forms. Tosk has somewhat less internal variation than Gheg, which has marked differences between the subdialects of central Albania, Shkodra and the north-west and those of Gjakova and Kosovo.\(^ {261}\)

**Early language management in Albania**

In common with other scholars in Albania, language managers saw their forebears as part of a unilinear trend emerging from the Rilindja. In the case of language, this involved the ever-greater convergence of literary Gheg and literary Tosk. From socialist times on, Albanian language managers have seen the history of their field as a dialectic between two competing theories. One was progressive, emerging from the drive to unity visible in the Shkodra Literary Commission and the many writers and journalists who, since the Rilindja, had continued to use Tosk. The other, according to the Albanian language managers, was that of “localist, particularist forces, anti-national,

\(^{260}\) For a fuller picture of the differences between the two dialects, see Gani Luboteni, “Ndryshimet ma të qensishme dialektore ndërmjet gëngishtes dhe tosknishtes,” *Përparimi* 1960, issue 10, 670-681 and issue 11, 748-769. Some of these features will be revisited as later they become politically significant.

\(^{261}\) These are broad outlines for the purpose of this thesis. For specifics, see Jorgji Gjimari et al., eds., *Atlas dialektologjik i gjuhës shqipe* (Tirana: Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë/Naples: Università degli Studi di Napoli L’Oriente, Dipartimento dell’Europa Orientale, 2007 & 2008).
anti-democratic and anti-historical,” led by the Catholic clergy who idealized antiquated religious texts and subdialects, bolstered by a feudal-bourgeois administration which cared little for the progress of the people and whose meagre efforts had to be imposed through private initiative. The Second World War, they believed, served merely to halt any serious work on standardization, as Albania was subject to fascist occupation determined to root out Albanian culture. The necessary conditions for the unification of the language could only be brought about by the final triumph of socialism. Language managers would then be grounded in Marxist-Leninist theory and ideology, particularly historical and dialectical materialism, and would profit from the experience of the most advanced knowledge in the world at the service of the new society: that of the Soviet Union. With the exception of the last sentence, this view remains the orthodoxy about pre-socialist efforts at standardization among language managers in Albania and Kosovo to this day.262

The development of written Albanian, however, was not so neat, although this story is still reflected in the rhetoric of the language debate.263 Visions of a unified written language went back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, to be revived during the Rilindja with Jeronim de Rada’s idea in the 1870s of an Albanian based on Arbëresh, reflecting the historic language of the Albanians who had come to Italy from


263 See Chapter Five.
both north and south. Lively debate continued at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially in diaspora journals, the most tangible achievement being the two congresses of Manastir in 1908 and 1910 which settled on a single Latin-based alphabet for the language. This period was brought to a head by the formation, at the instigation of the High Command of the occupying Austro-Hungarian army, of a literary commission based in Shkodra. This commission brought together mostly writers, some of whom had written on language, from the north, centre and south of Albania, as well as gaining the services of two foreign experts on the language, Rajko Nachtigal from Vienna and Maximillian Lambertz from Graz. Its members included partisans of a unified Albanian based on the dialect of Shkodra, such as Lambertz and Fr. Ambroz Marlaskaj, and that of Elbasan, such as Nachtigal and the only Albanian linguist with a relevant postgraduate degree, Gjergj Pekmezi; those in favour of a standard based on Tosk were a small minority. After linguistic expeditions by Lambertz in the north and centre of Albania, and by Nachtigal, Pekmezi and Fr Ndre Mjeda to the region of Elbasan, it was decided that the southern dialect of Elbasan, being central and easily understood by both Ghegs and Tosks, could act as a bridge between the two dialects and would be adopted as an administrative language, to be used in government and schools, on the understanding that artistic creation would continue in the writer’s own dialect. One objection raised was that there was little literature in the dialect, and that the main source would be Kostandin Kristoforidhi’s translation of the New Testament, sponsored by the British and Foreign Bible Society. However, the syntax of Kristoforidhi’s

266 Krasniqi, Komisia Letrare, pp.81, 76, 97. Some of the most influential writers in Tosk, such as Anton Zako Çajupi, Faik Konica and Fan Noli, were living outside Albania in countries under Allied control and therefore unable to participate in the Commission.
translation seemed nearer Tosk than the idiom of Elbasan; so his work Historia e shenjtësë shkroyë për dielmt “History of the Holy Scripture for Children” (1870), and his grammar (1882), and Gustav Weigand’s Albanesische Grammatik im südgegischen Dialekt: Durazzo, Elbassan, Tirana (1913) were chosen to provide the basis for the dialect. Because of certain features such as the dropping of final devoicing, it was also modified by what were called “improvements.” The main features were the spelling of feminine nouns with a final ë, where it is pronounced in Tosk; the spelling of the consonantal groups mb, nd, and ngj, rather than simply n or m as they would be in Gheg; the removal of signs of vowel length; and the restriction of accents denoting nasal sounds. A number of dual spellings were allowed. These rules can be considered concessions to Tosk from Gheg, including the Elbasan standard, largely for practical purposes. For example, the ë and consonantal groups were pronounced in Tosk, but not in Gheg; and reproducing the greater number of vowel sounds in Gheg would require Tosks to spell out sounds they did not have.

In describing prewar debate on the choice of a dialect on which to base the standard language, much has been made by linguists from Albania and Kosovo since the war of the Catholic clergy’s rejection of the agreement of the Shkodra Literary Commission and the continued preference for the dialect of Shkodra, even if for their own writings rather than for officials or schools. The rejection of the Commission by its former member Fr Ambroz Marland is prominently discussed, accused of being “provincial” and “anti-national.” However, Marland’s stance had less to do with “anti-

269 Anastas Dodi identifies fourteen phonemes in Gheg as opposed to seven in Tosk: “Kongresi I ndërkombëtar i studimeve ballkanike,” Studime filologjike 1966, issue 4, 244.
national” sentiment and more with difficulties experienced of Catholics in the northern
finding their place in a new, national state, as well as the Church’s own concerns
about its position, especially in education, in a secularist Albania.270 Although opinion
on the dialect base at Marlaskaj’s time was far from unanimous, most who expressed an
opinion, including many Catholic clergy and others from Shkodra, favoured the Elbasan
dialect and, if not that, one that reflected the speech of central Albania.271 In other
words, despite what later language managers have claimed, opinions of the Catholic
clergy were not monolithic. Moreover, attacks on the standard were at least as likely to
come from those in favour of blending all dialects into a standard, or from Tosks
championing their own dialect, as from Shkodrans. Even when associated with religion,
however, those arguing for Tosk as the base for the standard have never been
considered after the war to be provincial, reactionary or anti-national.272

Far from being purely private enterprise, efforts at standardization were the
product of a conversation between the state and the leading albanologists of the time.
The decision to adopt the modified version of the Elbasan dialect as the official
language for schools was reaffirmed by the Educational Congress of Lushnja in 1920,
supported by many leading intellectuals, including many who had served on the

270 Shefkije Islamaj, Gjuha dhe identiteti (Tirana: Toena, 2008), pp.171-176; P. Ambroz Marlaskaj, “Mbi
Ortografi të sotshme,” Hylli i Dritës 1921, issue 1-2, 112-118, and 1922, issue 3, 65-70; Raka, Historia,
p.195; Krasniqi, Komisja L termination, p.75; Besnik Pula, “State, Law, and Revolution,” pp.184-6, 279;
Orsino Orsini, “Ahmed Zogu parla al ‘Giornale d’Italia’,” Giornale d’Italia, 8 September 1927, p.6;
N.[Nikollë] Ivanaj, Historia e Shqipëniës së Ré, Pjesa e II-të e nëpër valët e sajë. Shqipënija e Klerit
Katolik. Përgjegjësisë e përkohëshmes “Hylli i Dritës,” (Tirana: Bashkimi, 1945), pp.11, 114. The articles
in Albanian in this note and for the rest of this chapter published before 1945 are all in parts V to XIV
Palok Daka, “Kontribut për bibliografinë e gjuhësisë shqiptare” covering 1911 to 1944, published in
Studime filologjike from 1965, issue 2, to 1967, issue 3.
271 Gustav Weigand, Posta e Shqypnies, 5 June 1918, pp.3-4; M. L. [Mati Logoreci], “Gjuha letrare
(Bisidime gjuhsore),” Vollneti i Polupulli, 29 August 1930, p.2; M. Kruja, “Mëndime mbi trajtimin e nji
gjuhe letrare shqipe,” Shkëndija, August 1940, pp.3-8; Beci, Probleme, p.21; Shkodrani, “Unifikimi
i gjuhës shqipe,” Gazeta e Re, 1 January 1929, p.3; “Nji botim i ri i Ministris s’Arsimit,” Tomori, 23 June
1942, p.2.
272 Bleta, “Gjuha letrare,” Tomori, 30 July 1940, p.3; Per Bashkim, “Gegënishte edhe Toskënishte,” Leka,
April-May 1938, pp.137-142; S.K., “Çështje e gjuhës s’önë,” Kultura Islame, September-October 1940,
pp.13-14.
Shkodra Literary Commission. This complemented the government’s decision in 1923 to make the dialect the official language of administration. Despite the anarchic conditions prevailing in Albania during the 1920s, this action by the state started debate on standardization, on the establishment of a scholarly academy, on the gathering of words and expressions from local people, on the standardization of terminology, on the replacement of foreign words with Albanian ones, on the compiling of dictionaries and grammars and the revival of the work of the Shkodra Literary Commission in Tirana.

While prominent participants in the debate made requests and suggestions to the government, these were often by people such as Karl Gurakuqi and Mati Logoreci who were likely potential members of any governmental commission. Albania’s shortage of qualified personnel and linguistic resources was understood, as was the need for assistance from foreign albanologists such as Norbert Jokl of Vienna to train a future generation of Albanian scholars able to standardize the language. This public conversation between albanologists and the Ministry of Education is acknowledged by postwar writers to have taken place in 1928-1930 and in 1935, though there is also evidence of very active debate in 1934-1936 and 1938. Despite the denial or most perfunctory references to work during the Second World War by postwar commentators, public linguistic debate was particularly lively in 1940 and 1943. Far
from the occupiers suppressing the Albanian language, the Royal Institute of Studies was engaged in the replacement of words from Romance languages by Albanian ones; their publication was interrupted at the letter P by the victory of the communists.276

Pace postwar linguists, failure to secure a single standard was not down to lack of will or to contempt for the people, but can be attributed to four factors: that even by 1944 the number of trained linguists in Albania was very small; the belief that, given the difficult political situation, mass illiteracy and the lack of trained personnel, standardization would necessarily be a lengthy process; a much greater tolerance than existed after 1945 for continuing to write in one’s own dialect; and the acceptance of a wide spectrum of views, including those of leading figures, that openly disagreed with those of the government and the consensus of opinion – a situation that would be quite different under the new order.

The decision to base the standard on Tosk

The government that emerged with the defeat of the Axis was a result of the victory of the Communist Party, whose strongholds were largely in the south of Albania, against nationalist and local forces in the centre and particularly in the north. The Communist Party saw itself as the harbinger of a new society; they saw it as their task to sweep away the vestiges of the old. What this meant in practice in the immediate postwar period was the purging of much of the northern intelligentsia centred around the Catholic church and based in Shkodra. Identified with support for fascist Italy and

with “reaction,” many who were still living at that time were shot or jailed. The Party also wished to rid Albania of other Albanian cultural practices seen as “backward,” such as blood feud, poor treatment of women and feudal forms of land ownership – practices the Communists in Yugoslavia also aimed to eradicate. In Albania, language reform was part of this movement.

While Albania had a modest number of linguists trained mostly in Western Europe, at the end of the Second World War, Albania was heavily dependent on Yugoslavia, then firmly part of the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union. Between 1930 and 1933, the ideas of Nikolai Marr came to dominate Soviet linguistics. Marr believed that language, being a product of society, was identifiable with the Marxist understanding of superstructure, and that its content was determined through class struggle, changing with the revolutionary victory of one class over another. Marr saw communication as originating with gestures and spoken language developing with the emergence of a class of religious ministers. Later, language would change with the coming of feudalism and capitalism. Different languages were identified as being at various stages, tied to the level of socio-economic development of their speakers as understood in terms of historic materialism. This was evident in the difference between the feudal and popular varieties of Armenian and Georgian, the feudal varieties of the two languages being closer to each other than the popular. What linguists should be studying, therefore, was not so much the language’s historic texts from the feudal epoch, but the speech of the most “progressive” element of the people which, in Albania, would be understood as Party activists, collective farmers or soldiers in the

National Liberation Army, all of whom were more likely to be from the south.\(^{278}\) That this message was understood by Albanian scholars was made clear by Manol Konomi, the head of the new Institute of Studies, in the first issue of the Institute’s journal, when he said the literary language must be that of the masses of the people who represent the most progressive part of the country. Konomi, who was also Minister of Education, set out how the revolution in language would be achieved through the compilation of a Serbo-Croatian-Albanian dictionary and an Albanian-Serbo-Croatian dictionary, both to be completed and published by the start of 1948, with a grammar and the first Albanian-Albanian defining dictionary appearing by 1950. As it was, besides producing the Serbo-Croatian-Albanian dictionary, the Institute failed to meet any of these targets and the political necessity of dictionaries linking the state languages of Albania and Yugoslavia soon disappeared.\(^{279}\)

The Albanian Communist Party’s link with these Soviet linguistic ideas was plainest in Sejfullah Malëshova. From 1944 to 1946, Malëshova was Minister of Press, Propaganda and Popular Culture and from 1946 to 1947 Minister of Education. A writer and poet, he had studied and taught at Lomonosov University in Moscow in the 1920s and 1930s and was the only Albanian at the top of the Party hierarchy with direct Soviet intellectual experience.\(^{280}\) Malëshova implemented the Marrist line through the official retirement of Gheg, which had been used in propaganda during wartime,\(^{281}\) but which


\(^{281}\) While Partisan propaganda aimed at national distribution was in Tosk, publications in Gheg were mostly regional, for central Albania, particularly in publications aimed at children, and for the north. See Christine Körner, *Entwicklung und Konzeption der Presse in Albanien und der albanischen Exilpresse* (Munich: Trofenik, 1982), pp.453-472.
disappeared from schoolbooks and the press in 1946. However, given Albania’s backward economic state, Malëshova believed immediate state expropriation of all private property and collectivization of agriculture would be counterproductive. A more gradual approach was therefore needed. Similarly, while he enforced the position of Tosk as the revolutionary standard language, Malëshova, at least in textbooks, provided space for the work of northern conservative Catholic writers to continue to be circulated. However, this did not coincide with views of the more hard-line Party leadership, and he was purged in 1947, and many of the leading writers and poets of the north were then banned.

The Party claimed that the influence of Malëshova had been extirpated, but in linguistic policy, this appears not to be the case. The Party line continued to be that Tosk was the new standard. Nevertheless, the new Institute commissioned Aleksandër Xhuvani, Kostaq Cipo and Eqrem Çabej, all of whom had been or were mooted as members of government linguistic commissions before the war, to produce a set of spelling rules, published in 1948 as *Orthografia e gjuhës shqipe* (“the Orthography of the Albanian Language”) as a project for discussion. The text, written in Gheg, followed the methodology with which its authors had been trained and sanctioned alternative

282 Textbooks in Elbasan dialect were replaced by ones in both dialects for the school year 1945-46 and those were replaced by ones in Tosk thereafter: Sterjo Spasse, “Shkolla e jonë dhe gjuha e shkruar kombëtare,” *Buletin për shkencat shoqërore* [hereafter *BSHSH*] 1952, issue 2, 109.  
283 Beci, *Probleme*, p.158; Enriketa Kambo, *Arsimi në Shqipëri (1945-1960)* (Tirana: Akademia e Shkencave e Shqipërisë, Institut i Historisë, 2005), p.184; Xhelal Gjeçovi et al., *Historia e popullit shqiptar*, vol. IV, 1939-2000 (Tirana: Toena, 2009), pp.181-2; Alfreda Cirka and Xhelal Gjeçovi, “Plenumi V i KQ të PKSH, Shkurt 1946,” *Fjalori Enciklopedik Shqiptar* (Tirana: Akademia e Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë, 1985), p.844; Enver Hoxha, “Të shtojmë vigjilencën revolucionare për të ruajtur fitoret e arritura, të vëmë të gjitha forcat për realizimin e detyrave të planit,” (closing speech of the extended 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, 13 October 1949) in Enver Hoxha, *Mbi letërsinë dhe artin (Nëntor 1942 – Nëntor 1976)* (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1977), p.37. There were a few pre-war northern writers, such as Ndër Mjeda, Luigj Gurakuqi and Migjeni, whose work was published by the communist regime, as they were seen as “progressive.”  
285 In Athens, Rome and Graz and Vienna respectively.
Tosk and Gheg forms. Among the comments on this orthography was another work of the same title produced in 1949 by Simon Shuteriqi, who also sanctioned dual forms of spelling, but explained that as most writing since the Rilindja was in Tosk and spelling would have to change greatly to accommodate Gheg vowel lengths, the phonetic spelling of Albanian should be based on Tosk. As the result of discussion Xhuvani, Cipo and Çabej published an expanded version of their orthography, retitled Ortografia e gjuhës shqipe in 1951. Speaking for the authors, Xhuvani wrote that, as with spelling in Russian, French and other languages, this reform would take a long time to bed down.

The authorities, however, were not so patient. During 1952, following the production of this grammar, a series of meetings was sponsored by the Institute and the Ministry of Education to decide on a basis for the standard language. The first, in January, was largely devoted to a lengthy article Stalin had published in 1950, rejecting the work of Marr. Stalin denounced Marr and his disciples as bourgeois idealists who had parted from Marx’s identification of speech with consciousness, arguing that language was not identified with the base or superstructure, and therefore class conflict, but with the historical development of society as a whole. Stalin echoed Lenin’s view that national languages were formed at the stage of the final victory of capitalism over feudalism, as the bourgeoisie sought the concentration of local markets into a single national market. It was regional dialects, therefore, rather than class argots, that were capable of being standardized, as they had a grammatical structure and a lexical fund.

286 A summary can be found in “Ortografia e gjuhës shqipe,” Bashkimi, 23 October 1948, p.5.
288 Aleksandër Xhuvani, “Ortografia e gjuhës shqipe (1951),” Vepër, p.70.
289 1952 saw a number of conferences to promote official thinking across the cultural sphere; see, e.g., “U mbledh konferenca e parë nacionale e muzikës,” Zëri i popullit, 15 January 1952, pp.1, 3.
Finally, Stalin held that Marr was mistaken in thinking language was changed by revolution, but rather that it changed gradually according to socioeconomic conditions. While hailed as a work of genius, Stalin’s article did not, however, appear to change greatly the Party line on a standard language. The meeting in January did not end with a conclusion on standardizing the language. It did, however, point the way to priorities for Albanian linguistics in how to go about it, particularly in the study of historical dialectology in tracing how the national language had been formed. The meeting concluded with remarks from the Moscow-trained historian Stefanaq Pollo, who said that a national language, which presupposed the gradual liquidation of dialects, would be based on Tosk with words, forms and expressions taken from Gheg. A second meeting was scheduled to take place in October. In the meantime, the Ministry of Education sponsored a conference of educators aimed at ensuring textbooks and teaching methods adhered more closely to the Party’s wishes, but also discussed the standard language. Once again, while asserting that the “Tosk opportunism” of Malëshova’s position was “almost liquidated,” this appeared to be putting forward a line very similar to his beliefs.

Indeed, in the keynote address to the meeting in October 1952 of linguists, writers and educators, Dhimitër Shuturiqi, head of the Union of Artists and Writers of Albania, argued that the standard language effectively already was Tosk. Shuturiqi, who had never previously been involved in linguistic matters, argued that the language had

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290 Rezo, “Veprat e shokut STALIN,” 31 January 1952, pp.4, 3; 1 February, p.3.
been converging since the nineteenth century, but that the majority of publications had been in Tosk, that the most progressive elements of society and in the country’s recent history had come from the south, and that most schools had been in the south. This demonstrated that basing the standard on Tosk could not be seen as a “language revolution.” Soviet experience had shown that languages based on an amalgam of dialects were artificial, but there might be some room for compromise to ensure this was a pan-national language, which fit the necessary criteria. An example was the Gheg infinitive, as used by Enver Hoxha in his speech to the Second Congress of the PPSH.294

Although the circumstances of Shuteriqi’s argument were new, many of its features were familiar to those present. In 1905, while still a student at the University of Athens, Aleksandër Xhuvani had written an article in Albania in favour of Tosk as the basis for a standard language. Xhuvani argued that standard languages were often based on one dialect, and that most writers were writing in Tosk, which was more mellifluous and easier to learn than Gheg, though the values of Gheg should be cherished and some of its features incorporated into the standard.295 Xhuvani himself had retreated from this position in 1906, and had been a powerful advocate for the Elbasan dialect at the Shkodra Literary Commission and between the wars, reappraising the role of Gheg in written Albanian since the Rilindja. As social and political conditions for developing Albanian had been unfavourable under Ottoman rule, Albanian had only been in common use as a written language for half a century; Xhuvani therefore felt that the convergence of the two main dialects should be allowed to take its natural course, a

295 Dok Sula [Aleksandër Xhuvani], “Për themëlrim të një gjuhë letrëtare [Per thémélim te gne ghuhe lëretetarë] (1905),” in Xhuvani, Vepër, pp.3-7; Bardhyl Graceni, Aleksandër Xhuvani (Jeta dhe Vepër) (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1980), pp.41-43.
process, as with other Balkan languages, that would take centuries. At the meeting Xhuvani accepted the new dispensation produced by the Communist victory, especially given the change brought about by the unprecedented use of Tosk since the war in the press and radio. Nevertheless, he joined the majority in rejecting the idea of a revolution in language. Questioning the statistics used by Shuteriqi, Xhuvani said that Stalin was right in saying that there were no “explosions” in language. Standard languages were not created overnight and had to be achieved gradually, over at least three to four generations with Tosk. He feared his own Gheg Elbasan dialect ending in a museum, suggesting that at least literary writers would find it hard to express themselves and their thoughts clearly in a dialect to which they were not accustomed. Trying to revolutionize the language under Albania’s current conditions meant that in the north teachers themselves often made grave errors in Tosk. Children in their first three years at school should be allowed to read and write in their own dialect, he said, before gradually introducing Tosk in the fourth, while older children should learn Gheg systematically through the works of Gheg writers.

While there was some support for Shuteriqi’s paper, mostly from Tosk writers and educators, the strong majority, particularly of linguists, rejected it as unscientific. Some even dared to call for basing the standard on the Elbasan dialect. Eqrem Çabej, the other major linguist at the meeting, was dubious, saying much study of the dialects

299 Kostaq Cipo had died in January 1952.
and history of the Albanian language was necessary before reaching a conclusion. He advocated the systematic collection of Albanian vocabulary, the production of an etymological dictionary and a dialectological atlas, the republication of the works of historical writers and works on the lexical links of Albanian to other languages. Çabej was almost alone in believing that such work did not just concern Albania but included Albanians wherever they lived, including the Arbëresh, the Arvanites and those in Yugoslavia. He also dissented from the official line in believing that no over-hasty steps should be taken, as there was value in “diversité dans l’unité”.300

Soviet influence on this process is evident from the attendance of the linguist Viktor Suhotin. While he did not make any specific recommendation, he suggested Shuteriqi had not provided enough evidence to prove his case and that more work needed to be done, although it did not constitute a revolution in language.301 The fact that the majority of the linguists, most educated in Western Europe, had rejected the official line in a Ministry- and Institute-sponsored conference opened by a writer and closed by a historian, resulted in the Party not entirely trusting their linguistic experts to enforce their decisions. The open forum of debating basic questions such as dialect base was thus never repeated. From then on, development of the standard language on a path of “convergence” was set down in the Five-Year Plan of the Institute, with the production of a manual and conference of orthography in 1953 based on Tosk and of the first standardizing Albanian-Albanian dictionary in 1954.302 These events, together with the orthographies published in 1956 and 1967, and the Congress of Orthography in 1972, are invariably portrayed by later Albanian linguists either as a smooth

300 Eqrem Çabej, “Detyra e gjuhësisë shqiptare në lidhje me gjuhën letrare kombëtare e probleme të tjera,” *BSHSH* 1952, issue 4, 115, 117, 116, 117, 118.
301 V.P. Suhotin [Viktor Suhotin], “Dr. i shkencave filologjike V.P. Suhotin,” *BSHSH* 1952, issue 4, 125-127.
302 “Asambleja e Institutit të Shkencave diskutoi mbi gjendjen e punës shkencore e planin 5-vjeçar për zhvillimin e më tejsëm të saj (Korrespondencë nga mbledhja),” *Zëri i popullit*, 15 May 1952, p.3.
convergence of the standard language ending in unification, or as the violent imposition of a pre-conceived standard in the service of the cultural genocide of the Ghegs, with not much happening in between. As we shall see, this was far from the case, as the nature of the standard language continued to be contested and the planning of its most important instrument ran into difficulties.

While all kinds of regimes do and undo language planning, the People’s Republic of Albania – which, since its break from dependency on Yugoslavia in 1948, had prided itself on its Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy – was operating from a clear ideological perspective in taking a firmer hand with standardization after 1952. Language planning was integral to the ideology of socialist construction. The nation, as Lenin had explained, was essentially bound by a common language as opposed to a common culture or fate, and it was through language, as “the most important means of human intercourse,” that the economic development of national movements was possible. Although identified with neither base nor superstructure, the development of language was intimately linked to the political and social development of the nation; as capitalism triumphed over feudalism, the bourgeoisie sought to unite national markets across feudal political boundaries, overcoming any obstacles to developing the language and consolidating its literature. Capitalism was characterized by the hegemony of towns over the countryside; in linguistic terms, this meant peasants would abandon their territorial dialects for urban argots with a closer relationship to the standard language of


the hegemonic dominant class. With the decisive triumph of socialism, the proletariat would gain hegemonic power for itself. As the dominant class, the proletariat would transfer power to the Soviets; the common national language would experience convergence from below. As the standard was the language of the ruling class, Soviet linguists argued that it was in the interest of the Party and the proletariat to minimize linguistic variation, particularly dialects, being remnants of the feudal epoch. The standard language is therefore the language of the proletariat and of the Party. It is a language of struggle and opportunity, opening the possibilities to all of full political, economic and cultural participation – national in form and socialist in content – and eliminating backwardness and difference through mass literacy campaigns bringing political education and an understanding of Marxism to the masses. Where there was no pre-existing standard, it would be based on the “living spoken popular language,” depending on which dialect’s speakers were preponderant, on whether they occupied a dominant position in the economic, social, political and cultural life of the nation, and on the features of their phonetic system. Because, as Marx and Engels observed, language is directly related to consciousness, the dialectic between thought and its


communication meant language directly affects how people think in every sphere of life, at every level, from the individual to the national, including the processes of work and production. What happens with language is an inextricable part of the social, political and economic life of a nation. As such, language is not just a major battleground of struggle but an indispensable instrument of socialist development.308

What did this mean in practice? Firstly, that the idea presented by Pollo at the meeting of January 1952 and by Dhimitër Shuteriqi in October was deemed to have been “victorious.” While Janet Byron points out that most of the communist leaders of Albania came from the south, she also notes that the idiom chosen was a northern Tosk not spoken by many of them. Besides the practical consideration that Tosk was more unified than Gheg and thus easier to standardize – though just how unified it was was contested at the meeting in October 1952 – there were also persuasive ideological reasons for selecting Tosk in making the eminently political decision of choosing a base for the standard.309 Convergence from below could be identified as a process originating with the writers of the Rilindja period. It was claimed at that time that Kristoforidhi had, through his dictionaries, done much to bring the two dialects together and been a great influence on the Tosk of Sami Frashëri and his brother Naim, now hailed by the regime as the “national poet.”310 The regime made much of the worries expressed by Kristoforidhi and the Frashëris about the future loss of the Albanian language and

309 Androkli Kostallari, “Rruga e formimit,” p.8; Janet L. Byron, Selection, p.105; Edwards, Sociolinguistics, p.54; Siliqi, “Reth gjuhën,” 86.
people through lack of national unity and the division between dialects, and their struggle for “një komb – një gjuhë” (“one nation – one language”). So if Kristoforidhi’s religious works were no longer a fitting base for the language of a socialist people, he and the Frashëris could still be mythologized as progenitors of a unifying national language in defiance of control by both Turkish occupiers and Greek and Catholic clerics.311 The written Tosk of the Rilindja period and subsequently was closer to the language spoken by ordinary people; nationalist writers aimed consciously at being understood by as wide an audience as possible while purging the language of foreign influences, particularly that of Turkish. In contrast, Gheg style not only had a history long preceding nationalist sentiment, but was erudite and artistic, heavily influenced by the Catholic church, replete with localisms, archaisms and classical references. Thus, even without Marrist views on the relative development of the north and south, the identification of Tosk with a united, patriotic and progressive tradition close to the people, relatively free of religion and wary of foreign influences, fit closely with Party ideals.312

The tightening of state control

Once the decision had been taken to base the standard on Tosk, Soviet experience showed the need and provided the expectation of speedy implementation. Pollo convened an orthography congress in 1953 to discuss Cipo, Xhuvani and Çabei’s *Ortografia e gjuhës shqipe*, to be chaired by the folklorist Zihni Sako, who had spoken

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in favour of Tosk as the existing standard language at the meeting in October 1952.\textsuperscript{313} While even after the “triumph” of the notion that there was already a standard based on Tosk, the congress saw objections to the pace of standardization being forced, a position associated with Xhuvani. Among other points, those present requested that letters such as \textit{dh} and \textit{gj} be looked at again for the sake of clarity to create be a better fit with phonetic spelling; and that a choice be made concerning the Gheg suffix -\textit{ues} and Tosk suffix -\textit{onjës}, as in \textit{mësues/mësonjës}, “teacher.” Other contested points included contracted forms of pronouns, the silent \textit{ë} and the spelling of foreign words, all of which would become politicized in later years.\textsuperscript{314} Following the congress, a new commission, consisting of Mahir Domi, Eqrem Çabej, Lirak Dodiba, Jup Kastrati and Aleksandër Xhuvani was established to produce another orthography to incorporate the points raised. Following Soviet experience, the Albanian alphabet, designed for use by both dialects, was to be a way of enforcing standard orthography and, therefore, a commission devoted to orthography would also be the primary means of defining standard grammar.\textsuperscript{315} The commission reported in 1956, confirming previous decisions such as rejecting Shuteriqi’s suggestion of incorporating the Gheg infinitive; and confirming the adoption of Gheg features such as the adjectival pronoun \textit{i vet} “one’s own” and \textit{i lexueshëm} “readable,” as opposed to \textit{i lexue(m)/i lexuar}, meaning “read” in Gheg, but both “readable” and “read” in Tosk.\textsuperscript{316} However, the orthography still provided many instances where both Gheg and Tosk forms were permissible. In keeping with the change in climate at the Institute after 1955, discussed below, the authors

\textsuperscript{316} “Ortografia e gjuhës shqipe,” \textit{BSHSH 1956}, issue 4, 59-62, 54, 58. As Xhuvani points out, such features had been incorporated into written Tosk before the war: Xhuvani, “Rreth gjuhës letrare;,” 68.
accepted that, owing to the dynamism of the language and the lack of theoretical
studies, this orthography would have to be re-examined many times over.317

The majority of the new commission, however, had been sceptical of the official
line in 1952. Worse still, in the eyes of the authorities, was the hasty production after
the congress of the Fjalor i gjuhës shqipe (FGJSH), the first Albanian-Albanian
defining dictionary.318 While it was received warmly by many linguists, it was hardly
mentioned in the press and Enver Hoxha omitted it from the summation in his speech to
the third Party Congress in 1956 of the achievements of Albanian linguistics to date,
talking instead of preparatory work for a new dictionary.319 The reasons for the poor
reception of the FGJSH will be discussed below.

In April 1955, the Central Committee of the Party at its Thirteenth Plenum
decided to act. Views dissenting from the enforcement of a single standard, based on
Tosk, with its own internal laws, were no longer tolerable, for division of the language
hampered the social struggle. Enver Hoxha denounced Tuk Jakova, who had been on
the Politburo until 1951 and Minister of Finance until 1954. A member of the Shkodra
group of communists before the war, Jakova was attacked by Hoxha for being a localist,
anti-Marxist, bourgeois nationalist. He had objected to schoolchildren in the north being
issued with a basic primer in Tosk because “people from Dukagjin would stay people
from Dukagjin,” ignoring the fact that countries like France had evolved and formed a
single standard language. In the long list of crimes compiled by Enver Hoxha that led to

317 “Ortografia e gjuhës shqipe,” 40 n.1, 43 n.1, 61 n.1 and n.2, 63, 39.
318 K. Cipo, E. Çabej, M. Domi, A. Krajni, O. Myderrizi, Fjalor i gjuhës shqipe (Tirana: Institut i
Shkencave, Sekcioni i gjuhësisë dhe i letërsisë, 1954); Pashko Geci, “Pasunia e leksikut të shqipes dhe
Fjalor i Gjuhës Shqipe. Disa vrejtje rreth fjalorit,” Buletin i Universitetit Shtetëror i Tiranës. Seria
319 “Nga puna e Institutit të Shkencave,” Zëri i popullit, 31 August 1955, p.3; Osman Myderrizi, “Rretë
ripunimit të Fjalorit të Gjuhës Shqipe,” BSHSH 1957, issue 2, 204; Ismajli, Pasionet dhe pësimet, p.136;
Enver Hoxha, “Nga raporti i Komitetit Qendror të Partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë mbajtur nga Sekretari i
parë i KQ të PPSH shoku Enver Hoxha,” BSHSH 1956, issue 3, 7.
Jakova’s expulsion from the Central Committee, his internment and later his imprisonment and death, the matter of the primer came immediately after the most serious charge. In his speech at the Thirteenth Plenum, Hoxha also said that standardization would not take place by decree, but through study and discussion. But this was not to be done as it had so far, by Western-trained linguists who were ideologically dubious and afraid to reveal their true opinions. They needed assistance from able people, trained by the Party. In other words, senior scholars were to give way to newly-installed and unquestioningly loyal servants of the state. The Institute of Sciences was to be reorganized, with the history section, under the politically reliable historian Aleks Buda, being merged with linguistics and literature to form the Section (later the Institute) of History and Linguistics. At the assembly meeting of the Institute of Sciences, the Deputy Head of the Council of Ministers, Manush Myftiu, reminded those present that one of their main tasks was study of linguistic material to discover the objective internal laws of Albanian and thereby to define the norms of standard Albanian. For its part, the Institute accepted that the two meetings of 1952 had not achieved the desired result. This was attributed to the theoretical confusion of many about the correct way of developing the standard, their lack of a healthy methodological base and lack of concern for the “people’s language of today,” besides the lack of work done on dialectology, the history of Albanian, or the internal functioning of the language which would permit “the concrete action of the internal

laws of development of the language, and on that basis, would solve the normalization problem of a single literary language.” Furthermore, the Ministry of Education held a conference of educators and writers complaining that the lack of a unified spelling was a serious obstacle to progress in schools and that work in this area needed to be improved.321

Following the Party’s wishes, the man appointed as deputy director of the new Section of History and Linguistics was Androkli Kostallari, who was to be the dominant language manager in Albania from 1955 until his retirement in 1990. Until recently, Kostallari had been a student at Lomonosov University, where he had edited a Russian-Albanian dictionary which, unlike the FGJSH, did receive a prominent review in Zëri i popullit. Although he was deputy director, and therefore Albania’s senior linguist, Kostallari’s junior status as a scholar was reflected in the fact that he was only a candidate member of the Institute, whereas Xhuvani, Çabej and Domi were full members. From the second issue of the Section’s journal after the Thirteen Plenum, however, Kostallari was one of only two candidate members to join the reorganized editorial board, where he remained for the rest of his career.322 In the following issue, Kostallari would lead the attack on the FGJSH. His attack, and the debate that followed it, would go right to the heart of what standardization was perceived to be and how it would be delivered. Yet, besides Xhevat Lloshi’s account of his own experiences in Albanian lexicography and Rexhep Ismajli’s account of those of Selman Riza, these


events have remained unexamined, yet they are important for us as a microcosm of the arguments waged in this supposedly seamless process.323

While the FGJSH set out to be a normalizing, defining dictionary, the compilers noted that there were limitations to what they could achieve. The large number of Turkish words reflected how the people spoke, or were of historic or folkloric value and, as with the number of foreign words, while it might be desirable to have fewer, in the first edition of such a dictionary it was difficult to do otherwise. Words had been included from all parts of Albania and while some were localisms, the compilers hoped that their inclusion in the dictionary would give them wider circulation. Nevertheless, the words were given in their Tosk form, unless the Gheg form presupposed a change of meaning or nuance, and the definitions were also in Tosk. In keeping with its normalizing duty, the dictionary took social, philosophical and ideological definitions from the Russian dictionaries of DN Ushakov and SI Ozhegov.324

Kostallari, however, did not accept that the FGJSH was either normalizing or defining. He accused the FGJSH of being a dictionary of the Albanian of half a century before, failing to keep up with the immense changes in the country brought about by socialism and relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, the FGJSH was filled with Turkish words like adet, “custom” and sebep, “occasion,” associated with feudalism, while lacking modern words like kolektivë, “collective,” and hozrasçot, “accounting.” While it was correct to base the dictionary on Tosk, as this corresponded perfectly to the objective path of the development of the standard, and correct to have words from all over the country feed into the standard, it was unacceptable to Kostallari for there to be

324 FGJSH, p.III, p.V.
two dialect forms side by side, as there was in the case of words like ambëlsi/ëmbëlsi, “sweetness,” and not even the fiercest defender of Gheg would replace Tosk as the base dialect of standard Albanian. The point of a normalizing dictionary, Kostallari thought, was not to reflect the way that the people spoke in dialect and folklore, but that the “living popular language” was the language of educated people. The point was not to produce a snapshot of the language as it was, this being an approach associated with the bourgeois and idealist linguistics of the West, but rather to produce a description of the language as an ideal; in Einar Haugen’s words, the language one was supposed to learn for admission to the world of learning. While dialect words could serve to enrich the standard, the FGJSH was merely a semi-regional dictionary, running against the principles of a standard language; what was needed was a tool for struggle and for the development of Albanian society.

Worse still, the compilers had mechanically copied other dictionaries, including ones in French, German and Italian. Confining the use of Ushakov’s and Ozhegov’s dictionaries to political, philosophical and ideological dictionaries was therefore incomprehensible; Marxism-Leninism was not confined to such subjects but encompassed all of life, the laws of development of society and the ideas and thinking of various classes, for, as Lenin had taught, no ideology could exist beyond or above class. It was therefore impossible for bourgeois dictionaries to give correct definitions; using them had led to serious errors. The primary role of a normative dictionary, Kostallari claimed, was to start from the position of Marxism-Leninism, to help the reader understand the world about him, the forces that acted therein and the

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326 Trained in pre-war Greece, Austria, France, Hungary and Turkey respectively.
changes taking place in Albanian society. Albanian lexicography needed a sound theoretical basis, by following Soviet linguistics in setting up a repository of Albania’s words and expressions with their various meanings and nuances. The dictionary was crucial in the battle for standardization; as Lenin had rejected the Russian defining dictionary by Dal’ failing to reflect contemporary language and requested its replacement, so Kostallari rejected the FGJSH with the same conclusion. In suggesting, in the midst of the Russian Civil War, that new compilers of a defining dictionary should receive Red Army rations, Lenin, as Kostallari saw it, was likening the battle for the language to the battle for the very existence of Soviet power.328

The language repository was established in 1955 and, as we have seen, Enver Hoxha looked forward to the publication of a new defining dictionary in his speech to the third Party congress in 1956. Indeed, for years afterward, Kostallari presented the sentence Hoxha devoted to the preparation of the dictionary and a new grammar as setting the programme for language management in Albania from then on.329 What that would mean in practice was unspecified. One of the compilers of FGJSH, Osman Myderrizi, wrote in defence of the dictionary, but couching it in the terms of what might be done with the next edition. While accepting that many improvements could be made, Myderrizi noted that, while little had been said in writing on FGJSH, there had been many oral complaints, which he attributed in large part to the disappointment felt by Albanian intellectuals used to large foreign dictionaries at one with only 18,000 entries. Nevertheless, if non-Tosk words and synonyms had been excluded from FGJSH, it would have included just 9,000 entries. While it had been agreed in 1947 that a

329 Kostallari, “Mësimet,” 80.
dictionary would take words from both dialects, giving definitions in Tosk, Myderrizi accused Kostallari of wanting a normative dictionary of Tosk rather than one for the whole language. Citing Ozhegov, Myderrizi stated that standardization of the language was not a job for scientific linguists, but rather for writers with the help of scholars, implying that the standard language could not be created overnight. He explained that because there were insufficient numbers of publications in Albanian, the compilers had had to use oral as well as written sources, taken from linguistic expeditions, such as the glossary of five thousand entries from the north of Albania published by Nikollë Gazulli in 1941. Kostallari’s complaint appeared to be that regional words and synonyms should only be from the standard language’s dialect base; otherwise they were simply unnecessary. The standard language, to Myderrizi, was not something whose objective laws awaited discovery, but a work in progress: in answer to Kostallari’s charge that the FGJSH did not include many words with suffixes such as –si or –ri that formed abstract nouns, he said these were of relatively recent origin and had not yet established themselves in common usage. In presenting a number of variations, including ones in written Tosk, the compilers were setting out alternatives in common use from which, as Ozhegov said, the most suitable for society could be chosen. Once again, the large presence of Turkish words reflected the reality of the language; many of them were now so part of Albanian they had lost all sense of being foreign, just as Russian had adopted many words from Tatar. However, Myderrizi said, many of the Albanian neologisms coined during the Rilindja had not survived and, in excising all words of Islamic origin in popular speech, the standard language risked becoming artificial.

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While Myderrizi had been careful to accept that much could be done to improve the dictionary, Xhuvani, who had been a consultant on the FGJSH, was rather more forthright. Xhuvani was able to do this because his position in Albanian linguistics was unique, and valuable to the regime. He was a scholar of international reputation, of which there were few in Albania. He was also a non-communist supporter of the regime whose son, Ptolome, had been a member of the pre-war Korça group of communists with Enver Hoxha and was killed fighting for the Partisans in 1943. Most importantly, he was a living link with the Rilindja, through his participation in the Shkodra Literary Commission, the Congress of Lushnja and his subsequent running of Elbasan Normal School; and almost all other rilindësit were politically unacceptable, in exile or dead. This gave Xhuvani much more licence to state his beliefs on language and to write in the pre-war standard; while other scholars from the pre-war generation could express themselves in Gheg for a literary or scholarly audience, Xhuvani was unique in being able to do so when writing in mass-circulation newspapers. Taking a similar view to Myderrizi that standard Albanian was not yet fixed, Xhuvani stated that the FGJSH was not a interdialectal dictionary and pointed out that it was not easy to decide on the standard form for words so easily, by choosing a particular work or translation, or the speech a particular town or village. Doubtless, the future standard language would be based on Tosk, but this stage had not yet been reached. Xhuvani opposed the clamour for the dictionary to reflect the language of the moment, because that would mean relying heavily on the poor language of the daily press, rather than the language of literary writers. As for Kostallari’s complaints about regionalisms, the lexical wealth of Albanian did not belong to any specific locality, but to all Albanians. However, there

were, Xhuvani argued, regional variants that needed to be respected, for two reasons: firstly, because of the psychological differences between what a Gheg understands by zani and a Tosk by zëri (“voice”); and secondly, because nobody yet knew which alternative would establish itself in the written language. Trying to excise Gheg from the dictionary, when it had been written since the sixteenth century and continued to be written, would be damaging from every point of view.333

Although the direction Albanian lexicography would take had become clear, there were still not enough Soviet-educated linguists at the Institute simply to jettison the FGJSH as a relic of the past. Pashko Geci, a translator at the Institute, staked out a compromise position, pointing out the difficulties under which the FGJSH had been compiled and that, despite its many weaknesses and the large number of Turkish words, the current state of the language provided few alternatives. Nevertheless, as the political system had changed, the number of Turkish words could only decrease. The value of the FGJSH was that it had opened the road for other dictionaries to come. With the climate of opinion on the dictionary changing for the worse, Mahir Domi, another of its compilers, took the opportunity of a general survey of the achievements of Albanian linguistics to describe the FGJSH as reflecting the development and growth of the Albanian lexicon in the last twenty years, clearing up many inaccuracies in Albanian lexicography and establishing sound criteria for lexicographical work. It is notable that hereafter important surveys of the progress of Albanian linguistics to date were written by Kostallari. The compilers of the FGJSH were marginalized and were not credited with playing any major role in the compiling of the dictionary, which would be based

on the “scientific perspective of the new linguistics,” the *Fjalor i gjuhës së sotme shqipe* (FGJSSH), the Dictionary of *Today’s Albanian*.334

The previous dictionary having been discarded, then, in 1961 Kostallari was able to announce definite plans for the creation of the FGJSSH. It would be a publication of about 60,000 entries, covering three to four volumes, closely following the model of Soviet defining dictionaries. This would be the realization of the dreams of the *rilindësit* for a single, undivided language while rescuing the many words and phrases which would otherwise be lost forever. To this end, nineteen dialectological expeditions had been made since 1958 and hundreds of written sources examined dating back to the second half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, about 750,000 entries had been made in the lexical repository, a figure expected to double by the end of 1963. Failure to follow the Soviet model had led to what Kostallari considered the subjective, limited, unscientific methods employed by all previous dictionaries.335 In keeping with Kostallari’s view of the place of the Soviet Union in Albanian language management, the Institute gave priority over the FGJSSH to the compilation of a 40,000-entry Russian-Albanian dictionary; the project was only abandoned long after this dictionary ceased to be politically useful.336 As it was, only in 1964 did the compilers of the FGJSSH begin work on the selection of words from the repository, which had still not reached 1.3 million entries. In keeping with the Party’s drive for mass action for socialist construction, a campaign was organized among teachers and others to collect dialect words and expressions; the number of external collaborators of the Institute

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expanded from 120 in 1963 to 22,000 by 1970, with instructions in the educational press on how to collect.337

Nevertheless, it was only in 1968 that Kostallari published the basic principles for selection. This was to ensure strict adherence to the Rregullat të drejtshkrimit të shqipes (projekt) of 1967 as the definitive orthography of the single standard language “in the final stage of crystallization” whose function in all spheres of social activity was no different from any other standard national language. Explaining that foreign domination of Albanian lexicography before socialism had served to promote political, economic, ideological and cultural influence over the Albanian masses by various countries, Kostallari said that now it would serve the standard language, an interdialectal language influenced by both dialects, now used by a people who had achieved “an ideological, political and state unity and compactness not only unseen in the history of Albania, but rare even in the history of the development of other socialist nations.”338 Words chosen would come from texts written since the Rilindja, which had found a stable place in literature, journalism, scholarly work, school textbooks, texts published by the Party and the state, the classics of Marxism-Leninism, and from the oral language where they added meaning or nuance. To be excluded were obsolete and “unnecessary” words, especially of foreign origin, narrowly technical terms, vulgarisms and anything which did not conform to the 1967 orthography – any aphorism, folk

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saying or quotation illustrating the use of a particular word would follow the “modern” rules, however they were pronounced in their dialect of origin.339

Kostallari’s close control of the project began to cause difficulties. Both Xhevat Lloschi and Selman Riza complained that Kostallari deliberately held back the development of an Albanian-Albanian dictionary for public use in favour of the multi-volume dictionary; Riza, working on morphology and syntax for the FGJSSH, complained that these issues were being managed by the general editorial board rather than the editorial committee of the relevant section. Riza was fired as morphology editor in January 1966.340 In its review of the year 1970, the Institute’s journal Studime filologjike was able to report that the editing of the first volume of the FGJSSH had been completed with work on the letters B and C finished in 1971. However, the final editing for the letter A was only completed in 1974, with the first volume finally completed in the following year. Although Lloschi complained that the public needed a dictionary and that the project suffered from “academicism,” he was overruled. By 1976, all the other works associated with the final standardization of Albanian, including a 35,000-entry spelling dictionary, had been published, but there was still no defining dictionary. The original conception of the FGJSSH was abandoned and a single-volume, 41,000-entry version was completed in 1977 and published in 1980, having abandoned many of the principles Kostallari had set out, though its explanations of words and expressions remained “based on Marxist-Leninist, proletarian ideology, on the positions of our socialist society”.341 A good example of this is the entry for bojskaut, “boy scout”:

339 Kostallari, “Parimet themelore,” 60, 62, 92, 126
340 Ismajli, Pasionet dhe pësimest, p.105; Lloschi, Mbështetje, p.37; Ismajli, Pasionet dhe pësimest, pp.320, 331.
341 A. Dh. [Ali Dhrimo], “Realizimet e sektorëve filologjike të Institut të Historisë e të Gjuhësisë gjatë v. 1970,” Studime filologjike 1971, issue 2, 181; Q.H. [Qemal Haxhisani], “Rezultatët e punës shkencore
Member of groups of children and youth created in bourgeois countries ostensibly for sporting activity, study and exploration trips in unknown areas etc., but in reality has political and military aims.\textsuperscript{342}

Examples given of the use of words were similarly ideological.\textsuperscript{343} The dictionary did not contain any of the promised quotations from literature, concentrated principally on material from the socialist period, and reproduced a number of the features for which Kostallari had criticized the FGJSH.\textsuperscript{344} An abridged version of the single-volume FGJSSH appeared in 1984, this time with Lloshi’s name removed from the list of contributors.\textsuperscript{345} There is still no official Albanian-Albanian dictionary with as many as 60,000 entries.

\textbf{Dialectic and the rules for Standard Albanian}

While the development of a defining dictionary is a clear indication of the struggles behind the development of Standard Albanian, it was not, of course, the only element in the process. Kostallari described the course of standardization as having had two phases: the first covered the 1952 meetings, the orthography congress of 1953, and the FGJSH, and ended definitively with the 1956 orthography. This, in his view, was a triumph of the dialectic of subjective and objective and the projection of trends into the future over the anti-historic fatalists who thought only time would tell which form of


\textsuperscript{342} Kostallari, \textit{FGJSSH}, p.162.

\textsuperscript{343} E.g., see the anti-religious examples of use of the word \textit{prift} “priest,” Kostallari, \textit{FGJSSH}, p.1545.

\textsuperscript{344} Kostallari, \textit{FGJSSH}, p.VIII; see, e.g., the one-word definition of \textit{bërdalec} “syphilis,” \textit{FGJSSH}, p.136, criticized in Kostallari, “Në rrugën e hartimit,” 48. \textit{Adet} survived into the FGJSSH; \textit{hozrasçot} was not included.

\textsuperscript{345} Androkli Kostallari et al., eds., \textit{Fjalor i shqipes së sotme} (Tirana: Akademia e Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë, Instituti i Gjuhësisë dhe i Letërsisë, 1984); Lloshi, \textit{Mbështetje}, p.39.
usage would win. Kostallari, and those who thought like him, were the descendants of Kristoforidhi, the Frashëris and the forces of progress who fought against feudal and religious obscurantists – especially the Catholic clergy of Shkodra – holding Albanian to ransom, whose descendents were trying to turn back the clock against the objective laws of the development of society. Sceptical opinions about how long it would take for the dialects to converge, held by those wedded to outmoded bourgeois theories who did not understand that standardization was about the development of the nation rather than the language, had been confounded. Thanks to industrialization, collectivization and the development of Tirana, these narrow views, based on dialects, had become outmoded.346

The second phase, which began more or less with Kostallari’s arrival at the Institute, would culminate with the approval of the final version of Albanian orthography, the *Rregullat* of 1967, indicating the final crystallization of the language. During the second phase, Kostallari explained, written Tosk had been incorporated into the standard and the two northern variants, the Elbasan and Shkodra dialects, which had been converging since the 1920s, were now at such a point of convergence that over 95% of works published in Albania were now in the standard. The second phase was therefore characterized by acceleration of unification as differences between the core and the periphery, town and countryside, mental and physical workers had been abolished, reflected and promoted by linguistic unity. Socialist development meant contradictions in both society and language had been surpassed and development in the second phase was therefore no longer a matter of the use of one dialect or another, but

of the internal structure of the new, supradialectal standard. All the morphological, syntactical, etymological, dialectological, historical and phonological work done during this period had been done with this in mind, placing Albanian on a scientifically sound basis.\textsuperscript{347}

So standard Albanian was, in Kostallari’s opinion, what sociolinguists would call a prestige language which did not conform to either dialect, but represented an equal partnership of both, although there was a marked predominence of Tosk koine in its phonetics. Historically created along a path of uninterrupted progress by the objective laws of development of Albanian society, it was an organic synthesis of homogeneous elements having 85 to 90\% of its structural elements in common with the written dialects: what Kostallari called a written \textit{koine sui generis}. It was thus more stable than either written dialect, capable of precisely expressing any intellectual idea while remaining close to the living popular language. While the lexicon of the dialects would continue to enrich the standard, they would eventually fall by the wayside; nevertheless, the socialist transformation of society meant that a large proportion of the lexicon was associated with neither dialect and belonged only to the supradialectal system. The standard would therefore strengthen national unity – in terms of Heinz Kloss’s model, a Status 1 language, the only official means of communication between citizens of Albania, a land without diglossia.\textsuperscript{348}

In the publication issued for discussion, the *Rregullat* of 1967 set out to remind its audience that just as language was an inextricable part of socialist development, so socialist development was intimately tied to language; as the first sentence had it,

The development of standard Albanian in the last twenty or so years of socialist construction in Albania is one of the many signs of the unparalleled and unstoppable blossoming of our people under the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania.\(^{349}\)

The *Rregullat* defined itself according to four major principles: “the founding principle is phonetic: words are spelled as they are pronounced”; the phonetic principle would be supplemented by that of morphology, that is to preserve the structure and unity of word forms; modern Albanian orthography would preserve and develop the traditions of written Albanian; and, “in accordance with the general trend of the development of written Albanian,” it would aim for unity based on common forms by eliminating alternative forms. In practice this meant a shift from two forms of writing Albanian, still permissible under the 1956 orthography, to just one. This entailed the removal of all accents denoting nasal sounds and vowel length; the enforced presence of rhoticism; that words of the class *ulli* “olive” would have not have the suffix –j to denote the plural, as used in almost all of Albania except the area of Korça and the transitional zone south of the Shkumbin, but –nj as used in that zone; and the removal of alternative spellings varying according to region. From this point onward, the language ceased to be the “literary language,” based on written Tosk, but was now “united literary Albanian,” a *unified koine sui generis* whose “common forms” happened to be much nearer written Tosk than Gheg.\(^{350}\) Kostallari, however, was not tolerant of dissent and, while technical points could be argued, Kostallari’s views and the general principles

\(^{349}\) Androkli Kostallari, Eqrem Çabej and Mahir Domi, *Rregullat e drejtshkrimit të shqipes (projekt)*, (Tirana: Universiteti Shtetëror i Tiranës, Instituti i Historisë dhe i Gjuhësisë, 1967), p.3.

outlined above were not up for debate. Questioning them would remain taboo until the end of the communist period.

Language management in the Cultural Revolution

Given the view of the Party and the chief language manager that linguistic and social development were inextricably linked, it would be worth considering the state of socialist Albania at the time that the *Rregullat* of 1967 were published. It was at a time of great upheaval in Albanian society, thanks to the influence of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. As in China, ranks in the army were abolished and a large proportion of state employees were sent to work in the countryside to combat bureaucratization. Major campaigns were launched against “backward practices,” leading to the closing of all places of worship, the destruction of religious objects and attempts to root out patriarchal traditions. Economic development was centered on the construction, with Chinese credit, of large-scale factories and two power stations.\(^{351}\)

For intellectuals, times were even more unsettling. Following Mao’s attack on “bourgeois elements” in the Party and the elite, intellectuals in China were characterized as “‘Smelly number nine’ bad element,” insincere socialists using their useless knowledge to ride on the back of the masses, instead of learning from them, in need of continuous criticism and self-criticism. In his report to the Fifth Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania, Enver Hoxha similarly singled out the intelligentsia as being out of touch with the masses, under the “influence of a whole alien ideology” underpinned by “social support from the former exploiting classes and their remnants, in the tendencies to petty-bourgeois spontaneity”. The intelligentsia were prone to conceit and disdain

for the masses, thinking they had the last word in scientific knowledge; intellectuals needed humbly to accept that their work was not too difficult for the masses to understand and that they should tie their work to that of the masses by continually taking part in physical labour themselves. While the Albanian government did not follow China’s example in shutting down secondary and tertiary education institutions, it did present a clear idea of how educational and cultural life was to proceed. For example, the five hundredth anniversary of the death of Skanderbeg, celebrated by an international scholarly conference, the remodelling of his tomb in Lushnja and the erection of a statue in the centre of Tirana, stressed the victorious struggle of a heroic Albanian leader surrounded by hostile empires; the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Congress of Manastir was presented in terms of progressive forces from across Albania uniting in opposition to the feudal conservatism of the ulema and the murderous anti-Albanianism of the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Orthodox Church. In the same way, the new folklore festival in Gjirokastra was to be an occasion “where the people and singers, with their çifteli and fyell by their pickaxe and rifle, at work and on guard duty, sing to our glorious party, to our beloved teacher and leader, comrade Enver Hoxha.” Schools and institutions of higher education were to reduce their hours of instruction as educators, students and schoolchildren participated in military training and direct participation in productive labour. In a major speech to the Politburo in March 1968, Enver Hoxha again attacked the distance of educators from

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the masses, warning against mistakes made by the Soviet Union and calling for the establishment of a central committee on education – of which Kostallari was to be a senior member – to enhance ideological content of education, replace petty-bourgeois ideas of personal achievement in gaining qualifications with the idea that they were a token of a particular ability with which to serve society and abolish all grading in education. As Mehmet Shehu, head of the central committee, explained, every educational text from the first reading primer to the university mathematics textbook would be examined for its ideological content “line by line, page by page, word by word,” to guard against the direction of Poland and Czechoslovakia, where ultrareactionary intellectuals in charge of education were in the vanguard of counter-revolution.354

The political climate was also to leave its mark on members of the Institute. Some, less favoured by the Party and the director, were sent into “circulation” for years in schools in the provinces. Those who had trained abroad, with the exception of those who had studied in the Soviet Union, were viewed with distrust. Even Albania’s most illustrious linguist after the death of Xhuvani, the Austrian-trained Eqrem Çabej, was considered of little value because he was judged to have abased himself before foreign scholarly authorities and to be ignorant of dialectical materialism. In 1967, he and Riza were each the subject of a threatening dazibao355 for perceived ideological failings. Riza was then subjected to a two-day session of criticism and self-criticism for suggesting that there was room for abuse because the director of the Institute, now Kostallari, was

355 Putonghua: “big-character poster”; in the Cultural Revolution, a wall poster used for propaganda and denunciation.
also the head of the Party base organisation. He was also accused of having doubts about the applicability of Marxist ideas on linguistics and of having criticized Kostallari’s decisions to prioritize the Russian-Albanian dictionary and delay the publication of a more modest FGJSSH. At the session’s conclusion, Riza was forced to give up linguistic work and was banished to Berat; some of his colleagues suffered similar fates.356

Such, then, was the atmosphere in which discussions of the Rregullat of 1967 were carried out. Discussions took place mainly in a series of seminars across the country under the aegis of the relevant district Party section for education and culture, at which speakers from the Institute, often led by Kostallari, would explain the project and interested locals, mostly teachers, would make their comments. This was supplemented by contributions by readers to periodicals such as the teachers’ newspaper Mësuesi and by members of the public writing directly to the Institute. In his keynote address to the Congress of Orthography in 1972, Kostallari said that the views the Institute had received were unanimous in their approval of the phonetic principle but were often contradictory, and did not conform to the basic principles of the 1967 orthography: being as clear and simple as possible, going further on the road of accepting common forms for the sake of unification, reducing rules and exceptions and doing away with alternative forms.357 What Kostallari was discarding were complaints from respondents in the north and the centre of the country, for example in newspapers and public meetings, that the Rregullat should reflect orthography nearer to how people spoke rather than to the language in literature and the press. Calls for a broader base for

pronunciation in general and the diphthong *ue/ua* in particular were made at the meeting held at the Institute.³⁵⁸ This violated what Kostallari meant by “common forms for the sake of unification”; following Soviet practice, the phonetic principle only came into play after the selection of the standard dialect. As the phonetic system was closer to Tosk than Gheg, “write as you hear” only applied to Tosks; for most Albanians, the system meant “write as they hear.”³⁵⁹ Some of the other common concerns included the plural of words like *ulli*; distinguishing the pronunciation of letters, or letter combinations, like *gj*, where *djegje*, “burning,” was pronounced *djeg‘je* but *lagje*, “neighbourhood,” was pronounced *lagje*; and the need for the letter *ë* in words like *punëtor*, “worker,” not because it was pronounced, but because it derived from *punë*, “work.” As Victor Friedman notes, Albanian spelling is more morphophonemic than phonetic; we might note that a purely phonetic orthography would make the claim of a “supradialectal” unified standard more difficult to sustain.³⁶⁰

Once the public discussion was over, a means of setting the seal on the process was necessary. By 1972, the political climate had changed a little as Albania’s relationship with China became less friendly, especially after Nixon’s visit there in February. During the approach to the sixtieth anniversary of Albanian independence, Enver Hoxha launched a new campaign against foreign ideology in art and culture, all of which had to have an Albanian character, mercilessly rooting out any traces of

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³⁵⁸ See, e.g., the second and third items in the footnote below.
bourgeois ideology. A series of important conferences were held which demonstrated the importance accorded by the authorities to Albanian culture: the first national conference on Albanian folklore in May and the first convention of Illyrian studies in October.361 The culmination was to be the celebrations of independence in Vlora three days after the Congress of Orthography, with the unveiling of the Independence Monument; the suggestions Enver Hoxha sent to its sculptors are indicative of the close attention by the Party to cultural matters.362 Thereafter, Albanian culture, national in form and socialist in content, would be presided over by the new Academy of Sciences, established by the Second Plenum of the Party Central Committee in June, which would include Kostallari, Çabej, Domi, Buda, Pollo and Dhimitër Shuteriqi.363 After the great organizational success by the newly-independent Institute of History of the convention on Illyrian studies, which promoted the officially sanctioned view of the origin of the Albanians, Kostallari and the Party sought to hold a meeting of comparable importance and worked closely together on putting together a congress of orthography. Kostallari, together with Party colleagues, chose the topics of the papers and participation was restricted to those who had shown their loyalty; major figures in Albanian linguistics and letters in exile were not invited. Riza was allowed to attend, but not to speak. As it was to be about the language of all Albanians, representatives from the Arbëresh and


the Albanians of Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro were invited and seats allocated to them on the Congress organizing committee. The organizing committee, however, was a formality: it met only two days before the congress, where Kostallari told those present what would happen and when. The Congress Resolution, whose drafting committee would include representatives from Italy and Yugoslavia, would approve the Rregullat without amendment, leaving language managers in Tirana to make any necessary changes arising from discussions at the Congress. Kostallari’s keynote address delineated many of the arguments of history, ideology and principles explained above about the newly united national standard: they were now free of elements of the former written variants, such as the Gheg infinitive, now replaced by the subjunctive as it was common to both dialects, if not to the same extent. Moreover, as with standard Albanian in 1952, among educated people and on Radio Tirana a standard pronunciation already existed. The pronunciation of Radio Tirana followed the Tosk pattern, although it was pointed out that it was still possible to discern the native dialect of radio announcers.

Once the proceedings of the Congress were over, Kostallari, in his concluding address, reminded his audience that just as the steam engine and electric light had encountered opposition, so it was with the unified standard language. In both cases, their opponents ignored the objective laws of development of society. At the point when the standard was fixed, the chief language planner provides a quintessential example of

Joshua Fishman’s observation that the “self-interest of the dominant is always dressed up as an untrammeled, universal, unifying, free-flowing principle,” whose opponents were “interfering with the laws of nature, of being manipulative, of acting out of self-interest, of manifesting the incivility of resisting the inevitable”. Furthermore, besides revealing the rudimentary state of sociolinguistics in Albania at the time, it also gives rise to reflection on Çabej’s view that studies on dialect needed to be thorough and forward strides in language management should be undertaken with great care.

Kostallari also pointed out that there were further areas for work, most notably in the relationship between the standard and the dialects. Study of dialect in Albania needed to branch out into social dialectology for, despite the efforts of the Institute’s dialectologists and the mass of lexicon collectors during the second phase of standardization, what had been gathered was the speech of passive generations of peasants which failed to reflect the real language of the modern Albanian village. As it was, the Institute set about completing the process of standardization by adjusting the Rregullat to fit the points raised since 1967. The definitive orthography rules were published in 1973, followed by the grammar, a school textbook and spelling dictionary in 1976 and the FGJSSH in 1980. The dialectological atlas, seen as a prerequisite in the 1950s, would have to wait until the twenty-first century to be published.

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368 Androkli Kostallari, Mahir Domi, Eqrem Çabej and Emil Lafe, eds., Drejtshkrimi i gjuhës shqipe (Tirana: Akademia e Shhkencave e RP të Shqipërisë dhë i Letërsisë, 1973); Mahir Domi et al., eds., Fonetika dhe gramatika e gjuhës së sotme letrare shqipe, 2. Morfologia (Tirana: Akademia e Shhkencave e RP të Shqipërisë, Instituti i Gjuhësisë dhe i Letërsisë, 1976); Androkli Kostallari, Emil Lafe, Menella Totonë and Nikoleta Cikuli, Gjuha letrare shqipe për të gjithë: elemente të normës së sotme letrare kombëtare (Tirana: Shëtëpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor, 1976); Androkli Kostallari, Mahir Domi, Emil Lafe and Nikoleta Cikuli, Fjalori drejtshkrimor i gjuhës shqipe (Tirana: Akademia e Shhkencave e RP të Shqipërisë, Instituti i Gjuhësisë dhe i Letërsisë, 1976); Jorgji Gjinari et al., eds., Atlasi dialektologik.
Conclusion

“Unified literary Albanian,” then, was a product of political choice, both a reflection and an instrument of the desire of the Party to remould society in the People’s Republic of Albania in a short space of time on the basis of Marxist-Leninist thought. Llosi, and others, view it as unfair to describe it as a political creation because it was the product of the best linguistic minds in Albania, which the Party exploited for its own use, and because the influence of the regime was not to make a positive choice but rather to interrupt the development of alternatives. This, however, does not account for the change in the approach of the Institute between Kostallari’s first and second phases, from a period when change was seen both as gradual and comparable to other European and Balkan languages, to one which followed the Soviet model so closely in the ideas that underpinned it and the speed at which it was accomplished. Although Stalin’s opposition to Marr is characterized by Llosi as a “forgotten curiosity,” this can hardly be justified when elements of Marr’s thought and much of Stalin’s thought – especially that which he took from Marx and Lenin – was seen as fundamental to the whole project of standardization. Forgotten, too, are the ideological advantages outlined above that the Party saw in the new standard which, as Byron notes, is typical for language standardization in that it uses linguistic managers to make a predetermined choice official. The importance the regime attached to the standard is plain through its use of schools, newspapers, the radio, theatre, cinema and all other means of communication, over all of which it had a monopoly, to promote and control the use of language. Kostallari’s satisfaction that 95% of works were published in the standard was not the result of chance. Although it was accepted that dialect forms could be used for poetry, for comical purposes or to portray reactionary characters such as priests, landlords and Zoguists, pressure grew against this use and in 1974 the Council of Ministers required
that everything produced in all media be in the standard. Kostallari exaggerated the role of the Party, to the extent of saying that even linguists who had begun their careers before the war were creations of the Party thanks to its teachings, because the reorganization of the Institute in 1955 had made that unnecessary. Once again, the history of the Albanian defining dictionary is worth noting: unlike the case of Hungary, where there was a well-established linguistic profession and a history of producing such works, there was no censorship by the authorities of resistant lexicographers for the simple reason that there was no need – that process was integral to the creation of any dictionary under the supervision of Kostallari. That so many years were devoted to the abortive creation of a multi-volume defining dictionary was indicative of the influence Kostallari had with the regime, given that, in a planned economy, it was highly unusual to allow matters to drag for years behind schedule. The discarding of the FGJSH and the production of a modest FGJSSH 26 years later also reflected the Institute’s internal problems, the small pool of competent professionals available in Albania, the marginalization of some of its best linguists, besides the ideological imperative to produce a defining dictionary as part of the accelerated establishment of the “new” standard. Even in Russia, with its much greater lexicographical resources, twenty years would elapse between Lenin’s rejection of the work of Dal’ and the production of the final volume of a new defining dictionary.

369 Lloshi, Mbështetje, pp.33, 53, 29; Byron, Selection, p.130; Gj. Sh. [Gjovalin Shkurtaj], “Seminar treditor për gjuhën letrare me arësimtarët, punonjësit e teatrit, të shtypit dhe me shkrimtarët e rrethit të Shkodrës,” Studime filologjike, 1972, issue 1, 184; Mehmet Shehu, “Vendim Nr. 50 dt. 8.3.1974 mbi ‘Masat për zbatimin e drejtshkrimit të njësuar të gjihës shqipe’,” Studime filologjike, 1974, issue 2, 3-6. E.g., in the film Operacioni Zjarri (dir. Muharem Fejzo, Albania, Kinostudio Shqipëria e re, 1973), the heroes speak in the standard while bad characters speak in Gheg.

In the aftermath of the Congress of Orthography, the state film studios released the documentary *Gjuha jonë*, “Our Language.” The film charts the progress of the Albanian language from the days of the Illyrians. Çabei reads from a manuscript about the convergence of the dialects from the earliest writings in Albanian, based on the language of the people, and the contribution of the Arbëresh is recalled as the Arbëresh scholar Josif (Giuseppe) Ferrari speaks of “one language” wherever Albanians live. The role of Naim Frashëri in laying the foundations of written Tosk and the contribution of other *rilindësit* such as Kristoforidhi and other heroes in developing the language and the alphabet is remembered, together with those who died for the cause of education in Albanian. Domi tells us of the patriotic achievement of the Congress of Manastir. The Shkodra Literary Commission, including Xhuvani, had noble goals, but their task was impossible in poor, divided and semi-feudal Albania, and in the struggle between the Catholic clergy and the popular literature of the 1930s, such as the newspaper *Bota e re* of the communist group of Korça, to which Enver Hoxha belonged. After the Liberation, however, the putrescence of centuries is swept away, as we are shown work gangs draining marshes and Xhuvani at work at his desk while both children and adults attend literacy classes in huts or the open air. Kostallari explains how Xhuvani, Cipo and others worked to solve the problem of Standard Albanian. Dhimitër Shuteriqi then tells us how the sessions of 1952 created the unity of opinion about the standard shared by linguists, writers and the general public. Against the background of language workers collecting lexical items from the masses and of books published on the standard and comments about it in newspapers, we hear of the results from the active participation of the people and the state. The mud hut has been replaced by a proper schoolroom as the teacher explains the new rules to her pupils. The film ends where it
began, with Enver Hoxha at the Congress of Orthography, with delegates reading their papers or signing the resolution ending the process of crystallization. Although we do not learn their names or hear their voices, we learn that some of the delegates are “scholars and cultivators of Albanian from among the Albanians of Yugoslavia.”

What had brought those delegates to the Congress? What was the Yugoslav contribution to the “distinguished scholars, our Albanian brothers from Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro” which Enver Hoxha said was to be considered as a “joint victory”? We shall find out in the next chapter.

Chapter Three

Standard Albanian and how Kosovo Albanians became national

In April 1968, Ali Hadri, one of the silent figures from Kosovo in the film Gjuha jonë, attended the Linguistic Consultation of Prishtina. There he delivered a speech, greeted with thunderous applause, that set the tone of the meeting and came to typify not just the linguistic, but also the social and political mood of the time. Hadri said that the Albanians had a long, tragic history of oppression and that those in Yugoslavia had been separated from the social and cultural development of their motherland. The Albanians of Yugoslavia were not a “minority,” but a majority in the areas where they lived, separated from Albania. Given the rapid political, economic, social and cultural change Albanian society in Yugoslavia was undergoing, he said, it was imperative that they immediately adopt the standard of the motherland – that is, Albania. “Një komb – një gjuhë letrare” (“one nation – one literary language”) should be their watchword. Yet, besides the inhabitants of a few villages around Lake Prespa, the Albanians of Yugoslavia were in fact Ghegs whose language was distant from the Tosk-based standard of Albania. While the literary language used in Yugoslavia did not reflect a Gheg that was specifically Yugoslav, it was, at least, recognizably Gheg.

What had brought those at this meeting to take what, at first sight, seems such an extraordinary step as adopting Standard Albanian? The answer has little to do with linguistics and much more to do with the political, social and cultural changes in Albanian society in Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, since 1945 and the role of the intellectual as both the agent and the object of those changes. Unlike the standardization

of Albanian in Albania, this was no matter of a body of linguists, enthusiastic or
reluctant, bringing to life the will of a centralized, totalitarian state. In Kosovo, while
the authorities paid attention to the status of Albanian relative to Serbo-Croatian, they
showed little interest in what form Albanian should be written. And while Standard
Albanian had been developed in Albania through a central institute of linguists, in
Kosovo this work was the product of the intelligentsia as a whole: Hadri, for example,
was not a linguist but a historian. To understand what brought the intelligentsia to this
point, we must examine how this group came into being in socialist Yugoslavia and
how it became the elite of the Albanians of Yugoslavia, shaping and developing their
national consciousness. In this chapter we will examine how Kosovo Albanians became
national as Albanians, the first tangible expression of which was the adoption of a
standard language developed for internal Albanian needs. I will argue that it was the
new modern intelligentsia, rather than the traditional and religious leaders or the Party
that were crucial to this change.

To do so we need to understand the sociopolitical situation throughout the
period from World War II up to Hadri and beyond. We must of course understand
contemporary arguments about linguistics, which can be split into arguments both about
the status of Albanian within Yugoslavia and the corpus of the language. Discussions
about the Albanian language were innately political, both because the political situation
influenced what could be said at any particular time about Albanian and what was said
about it, and also because changes in the language themselves had political
consequences. For ultimately, the Linguistic Consultation of Prishtina was not about
language but about who Kosovo Albanians were: Albanians undivided from Albania
rather than Šiptars. And if that meant importing the Stalinist ideology of the Rregullat,
then so be it. As we shall see, language was a means of forming and reinforcing the idea of who Yugoslav Albanians were in a way that no other factor can demonstrate.

The establishment of a new intelligentsia and the consequences for Kosovo Albanian identity

As we saw in the first chapter, at the close of the Second World War Albanian society in Kosovo was deeply traditional and, in the great majority, illiterate. The clergy (both Muslim and Catholic) and the waning landowning class, together with village elders, formed the non-Slavic elite in Kosovo in royal Yugoslavia. They, and their followers and tenants, were the target of official oppression and they responded, to some extent, by resisting. Despite the claims of Albanian historiography, this does not mean that, bar a small minority, they were nationalist or irredentist but rather, as Isa Boletini had said in 1912, that they simply wished not to be interfered with.376 It has been pointed out that Albanians refused Serbian-language education under royal Yugoslavia for fear of assimilation of the next generation as Orthodox Christian Slavs, but while this is evidence of ethnic identification, it is not in itself an indication of nationalism. And while people identified ethnically, among Muslims that identification remained somewhat fluid.

A number of modern scholars, such as Denisa Kostovicova, have written of Kosovo Albanians’ traditional reverence learning and for teachers. However, evidence for this before the Second World War – and even during the war – shows quite a different story, with low enrolment rates, poor levels of literacy in any language or script, and both literacy and knowledge of the wider world being confined to a small

376 Bartl, Albanische Muslime, p.182.
number of figures, many of them religious.\textsuperscript{377} Albanians have not always called their children Arsim (“education”) or Abetare (“primer”),\textsuperscript{378} evidence used by Kostovicova, but rather at one point such names became popular. In Albania, that point came in the years after independence as the state and cultural elite consciously embraced secularization, something which spread to Kosovo with any force only after 1941.\textsuperscript{379} Names like Arsim and Abetare are, in fact, evidence of \textit{change} in Kosovo. This move away from the religious to the secular was part of the orientalist nature of Albanianism, replacing the position of the clergy in education and society.\textsuperscript{380} That the KPJ also sought to secularize society and remove the position of intellectual and cultural ascendancy enjoyed by the clergy, and that it was committed to mass education in Albanian, demonstrates a strong commonality of interests between Albanian intellectuals as teachers and the Yugoslav authorities. That a number of intellectuals educated in Albania, such as Fadil Hoxha, had themselves taken a prominent part in the Partisan struggle in Kosovo, helped to secure this bond.\textsuperscript{381}

The new Communist Yugoslav government intended to remake Kosovo in accordance with their ideology. From their point of view, the crucial aim was to build a socialist society, meaning the end of class exploitation and the building of an equal society, not only within Kosovo, but throughout the country, both in terms of social and regional equality. To do so, they had to eliminate the elements they thought hostile to socialism, including the exploiting classes (the power of the landlords, clergy, and village elders). To that extent, the Communist authorities\textsuperscript{382} interfered in the lives of

\textsuperscript{377} Asllan Fazliu et al., eds., \textit{Kosovo nekad i danas/Kosova dikur e sot} (Belgrade: Ekonombska politika, 1973), pp.551-554; Backer, \textit{Behind Stone Walls}, p.92.
\textsuperscript{378} Kostovicova, \textit{Kosovo}, p.112.
\textsuperscript{380} Sulstarova, \textit{Arratisja nga lindjia}, p.245.
\textsuperscript{381} Hoxha, \textit{Fadil Hoxha}, pp.69-70.
\textsuperscript{382} As noted in Chapter One, the communist authorities in Kosovo were largely Slav.
Kosovo Albanians to an unprecedented degree; besides attacking customs and religious practice, they also replaced religious instruction with compulsory secular education (and public shaming of those failing to encourage their children) and customary law with the state’s courts.\textsuperscript{383} Moreover, as Communists they believed that rights, such as the right to administration and education in people’s own language, were invested in national groups in order to suppress the alienation of the oppressed.\textsuperscript{384}

A downside was that the Albanians had largely been resistant to the Communists during the war, and were also a large non-Slav group living on a foreign border.\textsuperscript{385} What that involved, then, was a repression of many of the people we have just discussed: people involved in security and administration during the war, and many teachers as well.\textsuperscript{386} Albanians were considered backward and untrustworthy, but at the same time they were members of a national minority and therefore had certain rights. So the Albanians were in a precarious position at the end of the war. Nevertheless the Communists, in order to bring about the transformation they wanted, had to work with the members of Albanian society they did not consider to be class enemies. That in effect meant politically acceptable teachers inherited from wartime and the large number of young people who were put through short teacher training courses.\textsuperscript{387} So if we look at whom we can consider Albanian intellectuals in 1945, the overwhelming majority were primary school teachers. The Party reached out to teachers and other intellectuals as authority figures, thereby investing them with further authority; and

\textsuperscript{383} Njazi Hamza, “Pse nuk më lanë prindët me vazhdue gjimnazin,” \textit{Rilindja}, 13 March 1952, p.3; Ramadan Vraniqi and Syrja Pupovci, “Këshillat e pajtimit në Kosovë e Metohi,” \textit{Përparimi} 1968, issue 5, 543.\textsuperscript{384} Gazmend Zajmi, “Ideja socialiste dhe barazia e gjuheve,” \textit{Përparimi} 1968, issues 8, 9, 10, 846.\textsuperscript{385} Edvin Pezo, \textit{Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten?}, p.331.\textsuperscript{386} Hivzi Islami, “Demographic Reality of Kosovo,” in Duijzings et al., \textit{Kosovo-Kosova}, pp.46-47.\textsuperscript{387} Teachers who had come from Albania were among those who continued working after the end of the war; Llunji, \textit{Beqir Kastrati}, p.36; Stojković and Martić, \textit{National Minorities}, pp.125-126; Redžepagić, “Školstvo i prosveta,” p.58.
because these teachers and intellectuals were regarded by the masses as holding an authority independent of Serbian rule and predating Communism, the masses considered them trustworthy. This was, in part, because teachers had continued the wartime practice of using the *odas* of families with standing as a base from which to appeal to parents to send children to school, with the assurance that they would not be assimilated as Slavs but that their customs and culture would be protected through their national identity.388 Later persecution, particularly of teachers of Albanian language and history, further enhanced their trustworthiness.389

At the same time, the Party was also continuing a program of agrarian reform, completely cutting out the landlord class, and making attempts at collectivization.390 It ran campaigns against religion and what it called “backward practices” such as customary law, undermining the authority of the clergy and village elders.391 Teachers enthusiastically subscribed to this. Whether consciously or not, their participation in programmes such as the campaign to remove the veil or against blood feud in one way fitted their own concepts of secularization and modernization,392 but at the same time it helped them supplant these other groups as the elite in Kosovar society. The Party was trying to reform a very backward region by a programme of mass literacy and a mass

390 Many landlords were Turkish-speaking town-dwellers, but many wealthier peasants, dubbed “kulaks” by the authorities, were also stripped of their land: Mehmet Halimi, “Uria,” *Rrëfime për Kosovën*, 15 March 2014, Kohavision, prod. Flaka Surroi, dir. Fatmir Lima; Backer, *Behind Stone Walls*, p.244.
production of teachers. The teachers on the other hand were trying to forge a new national culture from a more fluid existing culture.393

Unprecedented state interference and the ousting of the traditional and religious intelligentsia thus required the general population to make ever more “microadjustments” to their identity at the prompting of the remaining element in the elite, the modern intelligentsia. As a result, ethnicity played an increasingly significant part in Kosovo Albanian self-understanding. As education became compulsory, it was secular teachers who persuaded illiterate parents of the benefits of education in a new system that sought to turn children into new, socialist citizens with a particular national affiliation and to prevent, rather than encourage, their assimilation as Christian Slavs. Once in the classroom, the children would experience, at least in theory, a monolingual environment reinforcing their self-perception as Albanians from teachers who were the representatives of their ethnicity.394 Working through the commonality of language and the institution of the oda, steeped in the folklore of the region, the modern intelligentsia appealed in a cultural and political form understood by the masses. In stressing Albanianness, the masses’ loyalty to the Albanian state as a carrier of Muslim sovereignty adjusted to become loyalty through ethnic and cultural affiliation. Reinterpreting Kosovo’s past as an amanet to preserve Kosovo’s Albanian identity and position as the cradle of Albanianism, the modern intelligentsia could appeal in moral terms understood by the masses, reinforced by their “scientific” retelling of that past in the form of high culture and the disciplines in the field of Albanology.

393 Llunji, Beqir Kastrati, p.297.
394 Ellis, Shadow Genealogies, pp.80-81, p.83; Osmani, Sabit Uka, p.39, p.143.
Why Yugoslav Albanian was managed differently from Macedonian

With the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc in 1948 over the Cominform resolution, the position of Yugoslav Albanians became more precarious. The border with Albania was closed. Albania and Yugoslavia also began engaging in subversive activities against each other while engaging in a war of words in the press. For Kosovo Albanians, all this meant losing the teachers who had been sent from Albania, while textbooks imported from Albania were destroyed; in more personal terms, it meant contact across the border was forbidden and families were divided for decades thereafter. In the years after 1948, the Party made some attempt to create an alternative Albanian culture by creating and supporting alternative institutions. For example, new institutions such as the Albanological Institute of Prishtina and the regional library were founded partly to highlight the authorities’ efforts supporting political refugees from Albania in their struggle against the regime of Enver Hoxha. Yet at the same time, as we will see below, Albanians were under suspicion of disloyalty from the authorities as never before. It was in this atmosphere that the first attempts at standardizing Albanian took place in Yugoslavia.

While the circumstances for Kosovo Albanians, caught as they were between Albania and Yugoslavia, were similar to those of Macedonians between Yugoslavia and

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Bulgaria,\textsuperscript{397} in terms of relative status, they could hardly have been more different.

Nowhere is this better reflected than in the management of language. Since the October Revolution, state socialist countries had considered that nations existed objectively and that, for a nation to take its place in universal socialist culture, the state had to develop its national culture, including its language based on the Herderian ideal of a language for every nation. This occurred through standardization, the selection of an alphabet and the choice of a grammar, orthography and lexicon distinguishing it from its neighbours. However, this applied not just to peoples living entirely within the borders of the state, but also to peoples who inhabited areas straddling its borders. In these cases, socialist states engaged in “indigenization,” aiming to secure the control of potentially disputed areas and the loyalty of the transnational people within their borders. This was achieved by developing distinct languages, symbols and cultures to separate them from their erstwhile co-nationals on the other side of the border, and to prevent them associating its culture with that of a neighbouring state. Where the lands of the people concerned were in more than one state socialist country, such as the Uighur and Dungan in the USSR and China, they often found themselves divided by alphabet, grammar, orthography and terminology.\textsuperscript{398}

Almost without exception, Kosovo Albanian linguists argue that there was a similar attempt to impose \textit{šiptarski jezik}, the language of the \textit{Šiptars}, on the Albanians of Yugoslavia to differentiate them from Albanians in Albania, thereby separating them


into two distinct peoples. Rexhep Ismajli talks of the need in the 1960s for Kosovo Albanian intellectuals to have avoided the “Macedonian syndrome,” whereby a new language and people distinct from that of Bulgaria was created. It is therefore worth taking a brief look at the process of “indigenization” through the Macedonian language in order to understand what the “Macedonian syndrome” would have meant. While the name “Macedonian” had been used to describe the Slav dialects of Macedonia before 1945, Macedonian was often perceived, including by Macedonians themselves, as a form of Bulgarian. Under royal Yugoslavia, the state only tolerated the public use of Serbian in Macedonia while, during the Second World War, the Bulgarian occupiers only tolerated the public use of standard Bulgarian, based on dialects spoken outside Macedonia. Following the decision at the Second AVNOJ Conference in 1943 to recognize the Macedonians as a constituent people of Yugoslavia, the indigenization of Macedonian proceeded after the Liberation. As in the Soviet Union, the first changes were made to the alphabet, which took the shape of one little different from that designed by Vuk Karadžić, over the protests of those considering it too Serbified and too far from Macedonian tradition. Terminology, especially in grammar, turned explicitly away from Bulgarian dependence on Russian toward reliance on Serbian, while neologisms were coined using Serbian models and “Macedonianized” Bulgarian terms. The severing of relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in 1948 put a political seal on the increasing separation between Macedonian and Bulgarian. Such was the difference, especially in terminology – thanks also to a similar process of

399 However, the evidence produced in support of this usually dates from the time of the draft SANU Memorandum in 1986, nearly twenty years after the Prishtina Consultation.
indigenization in Bulgaria – that by the 1960s Bulgarian broadcasts in Pirin Macedonian were effectively unintelligible to Vardar Macedonian listeners.\textsuperscript{401}

To Yugoslavia, the indigenization of Macedonian was important because the Macedonians were a constituent people of the country, imagined as essentially Yugoslav. As a people, the Macedonians were promised a life of brotherhood and unity within the Yugoslav federation; while national minorities were assured of their equality, however, they were promised no more than that.\textsuperscript{402} With the languages of the nationalities, who were not constituent peoples but had some autonomous rights, Yugoslavia made no such efforts. In the case of Albanian, while the name \textit{šiptarski jezik} existed in Serbo-Croatian, there was no corresponding name in Albanian, the language being described as \textit{gjuha e shkrimit e Shqiptarëve në RFPJ}, the written language of the Albanians in the PFRY.\textsuperscript{403} One should note that it was the language of the \textit{Albanians} in Yugoslavia, not a separate people with a separate name, but of one people divided by an international frontier; as with \textit{šiptarski jezik}, there is no word that translates \textit{šiptar} in Albanian.

There is no evidence that the management of Albanian in Yugoslavia in the 1950s constituted indigenization. Firstly, there was no attempt to Cyrillize or alter the alphabet agreed at the Congress of Manastir to one closer to Slav languages in the Latin script, for example by changing \textit{sh} to \textit{s}. This is not as minor a point as it seems: selection of the alphabet has always been a preoccupation with socialist language


\textsuperscript{403} “Rezolutë e Mbledhjes për caktimin e gjuhës së shkrimit të shqiptarëve në RFPJ,” \textit{Rilindja}, 20 November 1952, p.5.
planners, usually a “special alphabet” which fosters national imagining by separating one language from its closely-related neighbours, while cleaving speakers of the language within the state from those outside it.\footnote{Dešerijev, “Iz sovetskogo opyta,” p.440;} In light of the Soviet experience, Albanian in Yugoslavia seemed particularly suitable for changing the alphabet as the old cultural elite was being swept away and replaced by a modern intelligentsia; a new alphabet could be adopted to symbolize the overcoming of “backward practices” among a population that was, in any case, largely illiterate. Besides, as Branko Horvat noted, an Albanian precedent existed in the Agimi alphabet of 1901, which had many characters in common with South Slav Latin alphabets, making it easier to use typographically.\footnote{Andreas Frings, \textit{Sowjetische Schriftpolitik zwischen 1917 und 1941. Eine handlungstheoretische Analyse}, (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007), pp.397-398; Horvat, \textit{Kosovsko pitanje}, p.179.} Secondly, there was no attempt to ensure the wholesale importation of terminology either directly from Serbo-Croatian or in an “Albanianized” (Šiptarized?) form: none of the Serbo-Croatian terms set out in \textit{Rilindja} by the Albanological Institute\footnote{Instituti Albanologjik i Prishtinës, “Qendrueshmimi i terminologjisë shqipe,” 30 July 1953, p.5; 6 August 1953, p.5; 16 August 1953, p.5.} were translated in Dobroshi’s dictionary or later dictionaries by words relying on Serbo-Croatian or words not used in Albania.\footnote{Sokol Dobroshi, \textit{Rečnik srpskohrvatsko- albanski/Fjaluer serbokroatisht-shqip} (Prishtina: Mustafa Bakija, 1953).} Indeed, Kosovo Albanian writers of the time frequently discussed the dangers of lexical, grammatical and other linguistic contamination from Serbo-Croatian,\footnote{See, e.g., Redaksia, “Rreth gjuhës shqipe që e flasim,” \textit{Rilindja}, 24 August 1951, p.3; Salih Kolgeci, “Disa probleme të pastërës së gjuhës shqipe;” \textit{Rilindja}, 25 May 1952, p.5; Idriz Ajeti, “Pak vëretje përmbi gjuhën e së përmbiezhme Zani i Rinis;” \textit{Rilindja}, 13 June 1953, p.5; R.[Ramiz] Kelmendi and H.[Hasan] Vokshi, “Landë e mirë kërkon gjuhë të pastër;” \textit{Përparimi} 1958, issue 1, 55-62.} reflecting purist ideologies common to linguists throughout Yugoslavia.\footnote{George Thomas, “Lexical purism as an Aspect of Language Cultivation in Yugoslavia,” in Bugarski and Hawkesworth, \textit{Language Planning}, pp.176-188.} Although grammar books tended to use Serbo-Croatian as a model, this was to assist translators and did not amount to altering the structure of the
language itself. Another sharp difference from indigenization was that guidelines produced by intellectuals who attended the Prishtina linguistic meetings were recommendations; while deviations from them were criticized, they were not compulsory. Furthermore, the linguistic meetings were not overseen by a well-defined body showing strong interest in enforcing decisions and punishing those who ignored them. Rexhep Ismajli claims that the decisions of the Prishtina linguistic meeting of 1963 were not comprehensive and further matters would be dealt with by “competent federal and republican organs” which did not know Albanian, showing how much the authorities distrusted experts in Kosovo and interfered in the lives of Albanians, something they did not do with the languages of nations and nationalities. However humiliating it might have been for Albanians to entrust decisions to authorities that did not know the language, the identity of those authorities remained undefined. Yet there is no evidence that these bodies made any changes in what had been approved; the next commission to work on corpus consisted of Albanian language experts from Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro and produced the orthography of 1964. Finally, the attempt to construct a standard language in Yugoslavia had remained relatively close to the literary language introduced in 1941. The official Albanian of the time, based on the dialect of Elbasan; there was no attempt to follow Macedonian by basing the language on dialects spoken within Yugoslavia. If there had been any significant movement

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411 As the reaction of Albanians in Macedonia to the composition of the commission leading up to the meeting indicates, reliance on experts in Kosovo would not have been acceptable to Albanians from Macedonia. It is unclear how Ismajli justifies the claim that the federal and republican authorities did not intervene in others’ languages given the Novi Sad Declaration and the authorities’ intervention in the dispute between Matica hrvatska and Matica srpska; Ismajli, “Në gjuhë” dhe “për gjuhë”, pp.169-170. 412 “Të pranojmë aso rregullash që i përgjigjen shqipes letjare,” Rilindja, 20 January 1963, p.12; Ismajli, “Në gjuhë” dhe “për gjuhë”, p.172.
413 Dalibor Brozović is mistaken in calling the Gheg standard Albanian an Ausbau language in relation to “the Gheg-Tosk problem in Albania”; it was Standard Albanian that was designed to distance itself from literary Gheg, not the other way round. Dalibor Brozović, “The Yugoslav Model of Language Planning: A Confrontation with Other Multilingual Models,” in Bugarski and Hawkesworth, Language Planning, p.78.
away from this position to create a “separate language,” it occurred in Albania rather than Yugoslavia.

The distinction between the treatment of the languages of constituent peoples and others in Yugoslavia does not end with Macedonian and Albanian. No effort was made to alter the well-established standard “national minority” languages, such as Hungarian, Italian or Slovak. Turkish (which will be dealt with in more detail below) followed a path similar to Albanian, and Romani was subject to different language management projects within Yugoslavia. Efforts to standardize Rusyn occurred as Rusyns in the Soviet bloc were denied any national identity besides that of Ukrainian, while Vlach had to wait for the end of Yugoslavia for standardization efforts to begin.414

Peter Trudgill argues that using different names for languages in different states contributes to denying their heteronomy and increasing their autonomy, making them more vulnerable as speakers dissociate their ethnic identity from that of the “homeland” of the standard form of the language. However, Trudgill principally discusses Greece, where there was no attempt to standardize Vlach, Arvanite or Slav languages, and points to Macedonian, where there was, as we have seen, a program of socialist indigenization.415 Moreover, while a name existed for the Albanian of Yugoslavia in Serbo-Croatian, šiptarski jezik, an equivalent did not exist in Albanian; this stands in contrast to the language of the Arvanites, known as Arvanitika in Greek and arbërisht in Arvanite. One might argue that the same is true of the Arbëresh of Italy; however, as we

saw in the last chapter, unlike the Arvanites, Arbëresh were involved significantly in some of the earliest attempts to standardize Albanian as a whole. As we shall see below, the difference between _albanac_ and _šiptar_ had little to do with language and everything to do with politics.

The perception of Kosovo Albanian grievances as ethnic

Kosovo Albanians’ identification of themselves as an ethnicity was further enhanced by their perception of the establishment of Communist rule as brutal. Not only did it involve the elimination of the leading roles of the clergy, village elders and the landlord class, but incidents such as the massacre of Kosovo Albanian troops at Tivar on their way to the front in Slovenia. Moreover, Kosovo Albanians contended with the famine caused by the forcible gathering of agricultural “surpluses” concurrent with the attempt to collectivize land in a society holding land boundaries sacred.416

Socialist Yugoslav rule also appeared ruthless because of pressure for emigrations to Turkey, something not only reminiscent of royal Yugoslavia but which would have a profound effect in shaping the self-perception of both Albanian and Turkish communities in Yugoslavia. As we have seen, the division between Albanian and Turkish was blurred; many in the countryside identified in some fashion as Turkish even if they only spoke Albanian, while many urban Muslims identified as Albanian although at home they spoke Turkish.417 In the years immediately after the Second World War, those declaring themselves to be Turks were under suspicion as loyal to


Turkey and hence to the West, culminating in the Yücelciler trial in 1948 when four Yugoslav Turkish activists were shot. Unlike the intellectual connections Kosovo Albanians had forged with Albania in the years between 1941 and 1948, Turks in Yugoslavia had had relatively little contact with the fundamental reform of Turkish in the Turkish Republic, so that, when the Turkish-language newspaper Birlik was launched in 1945, written Turkish in Yugoslavia was difficult for Turks in Turkey to understand.\textsuperscript{418} The Cominform memorandum and the severing of relations between Yugoslavia and the rest of the socialist camp prompted Tito to repair relations with non-communist countries in the region, particularly Greece and Turkey.\textsuperscript{419} From about 1951, Muslims from Kosovo and Macedonia were encouraged to register as Turkish, Turkish institutions were set up by the authorities and Turkish schools established.\textsuperscript{420} There is evidence at the time of competition between Albanian and Turkish teachers for schoolchildren (who would then be acculturated into the appropriate nationality); and in Macedonia this was mentioned on the eve of the 1968 demonstrations, when local Albanian teachers were calling for the closure of Turkish-language schools because the children were Albanians.\textsuperscript{421} After an agreement with Turkey in 1953, the Yugoslav government encouraged large-scale Muslim emigration there.

Unlike Macedonia, where the authorities made little distinction between Turks and Albanians, senior Albanian figures in the Party in Kosovo complained about

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[420] The fluidity of national identity between Turkish, Albanian and other Muslim groups is demonstrated clearly in the large number of people who changed their identification from the 1948 to the 1953 census: Nabil Marovci ed., Statistički godišnjak SAP Kosova 1983 (Prishtina: Rilindja, 1983), p.28.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
emigration to Turkey, saying that while Turks should be allowed to go, Albanians should not. In Albanian historiography, this period has been characterized as one of genocide against the Albanian people of Kosovo by the Slav communists. Although it was not genocidal against Albanians, it was and is perceived as such. It also had the effect of removing much of the urban Turkish-speaking elite and a large number of Albanians identifying as Turkish. This is similar to what happened to people in Albania as Albania and the Ottoman Empire separated, when people were forced to choose between Albanian- and Turkish-speaking elites. In those days, the elite had been the Ottoman administrator class; now they were teachers. What had once been a local and national identification along a spectrum of Albanian-to-Turkish feeling, then, combined with Muslim religious identification, in Kosovo was now for the great majority reduced to the binary choice between Slav or Albanian. By hardening these boundaries, the policy of emigration forced ordinary people to make a decisive choice of national affiliation, enhanced by elite forging of an Albanian national culture and by a growing list of Albanian national grievances at the hands of the Slav Communists.

The extent to which the national Albanian and Turkish communities emerged in parallel can be judged in the two communities’ use of standard language. Although the Western Rumeli dialect of Turkish was distant from the Anatolian base of the modern Turkish standard language, the Yugoslav Turkish intelligentsia identified strongly with the Republic of Turkey, on the grounds that there was only one Turkish language used by all Turks. Although a Turkish grammar was produced in Yugoslavia in 1954, once copies ran out, all subsequent grammar books were imported from Turkey. The resulting attachment to Turkey, which we will later see reflected in Kosovo Albanian

linguistic attachment to Albania, resulted in the use of Modern Turkish neologisms forgotten in Turkey itself and a standard language that was “purer Turkish” than that of Turkish Radio and Television. While the relationship between Modern Turkish and local Turkish was a parallel case to that of Standard Albanian and the language in Yugoslavia, this phenomenon was also a sign of the creation of new distinctions among hitherto blurred ethnic, religious and linguistic social boundaries. In other words, to follow Judith Irvine and Susan Gal, the Turkish and Yugoslav-Albanian standard languages became iconic representations of the transformed relationship among Albanians and Turks; the opposition of the two languages through the campaigns of linguistic purification waged by the modern intelligentsia were fractally recursive; and the function of both the emigration to Turkey and the Albanian- and Turkish language schools was to erase the linguistic diversity that had existed hitherto, forcing further “microadjustments” on the non-Slavs of Kosovo.

Early Yugoslav Albanian language management

It was just as well that the Albanian teachers had an intellectual descent from Albanian culture in Albania, because, as we saw in the first chapter, there was little literary production in the Albanian language in Latin script in Kosovo. Besides people like Shtjefën Gjeçovi, the first attempt at modern intellectual “scientific” production in Albanian based in Kosovo came during the Second World War through the study-circle

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of Prizren run by Selman Riza. Riza’s *Tri monografina albanologjike*, published in Tirana in 1944, expounded his idea for a standard Albanian, which he had advanced in *Përpjekja shqiptare* in 1936. Riza proposed the written language with two levels. The official language would be a kind of pan-Gheg; beneath that would be two literary languages, a standard Gheg and a standard Tosk, which would be used in ordinary writing but not by the authorities. That way everyone would be able to use their own dialect. Eventually, he felt, the dialects would grow closer, to the point of unity.

Unfortunately for Riza, he was deemed a nationalist and an irredentist, and therefore undesirable, by Communists on both sides of the border; and he was arrested by Albania at the request of the Yugoslavs and eventually exiled to Sarajevo, where he taught at the university.

The post-war change in textbooks in Albania to Tosk did not immediately affect Kosovo. The teachers who had come from Albania during and after the Second World War taught the standard based on the Elbasan dialect, alongside teachers from Kosovo who had been educated either in Albania, or Yugoslavia reading texts smuggled from Albania. This was partly because the change in the language of textbooks was an initiative of the Albanian government for the Albanian state, but also because Kosovo severely lacked teaching materials. Wartime textbooks continued to be used, as well as Yugoslav socialist textbooks translated from Serbo-Croatian into the Elbasan-based standard. Teaching in this pre-war standard Albanian was thus a means of rupture with the pre-war regime, but also a means of association directly with Albania, through the teachers themselves, through the wartime unification with Albania and through

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426 Ismajli, *Pasionet dhe pësimet*, pp.6, 283.
textbooks. The breaking of relations in 1948 came too early for any significant changes toward Tosk to influence developments in Kosovo; although textbooks from socialist Albania were by now entirely in Tosk, they were very difficult for local authorities in Yugoslavia to obtain.\footnote{M. Divac in Doknić, Petrović and Hofman, \textit{Kulturna politika}, p.448.} Furthermore, the break with Albania enabled Yugoslavia to rid itself of teachers and textbooks from Albania, causing a differentiation of Albanians from Albania and Yugoslavia to develop and grow as more Albanian children passed through the school system.

In the years between 1948 and 1952, while we no longer see articles from Albania like that by Aleksandër Xhuvani in \textit{Përparimi},\footnote{Xhuvani, “Veshtrim i shkurten,” was published in 1948.} the only learned journal in Albanian in Yugoslavia acquainting Kosovo Albanians with the language debate there, we do see a desire to end the “linguistic anarchy” reigning in the Albanophone Yugoslav press.\footnote{Zekeria Rexha, “Dy fjalë mbi prishjen en [sic] gjuhës sanë,” \textit{Jeta e re}, 1949, issue 1, 14; Idriz Ajeti, “Rreth përdorjes së vetëtingullit ‘Ë’,” \textit{Rilindja}, 4 December 1952, p.5.} Not only was this in tune with Leninist nationality policy, it also enabled the Yugoslav government to point to this phenomenon – along with a number of other institutions – as developing an alternative Albanian society to that offered by Enver Hoxha’s Stalinism.\footnote{According to the politician and poet Mehmet Hoxha, the Prishtina meeting of 1952 “was a good answer to the traitors of Tirana, Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu,” who shouted about the assimilation of the Albanians of Yugoslavia while subjecting Albanian language and culture to intense russification: Mehmet Hoxha, “Inisjativë e mirë,” \textit{Rilindja}, 20 November 1952, p.1.} For local Albanian intellectuals, it provided an opportunity to exercise influence on their own environment and, seemingly, make their own contribution towards a united standard Albanian language.

The Prishtina linguistic meeting of 1952 aimed to end this “linguistic anarchy.” There were two spelling systems, and this situation was not helped by the large number of printing errors in books, partly due to typesetters lacking Albanian. The meeting in
1952 was sponsored by the Board for Education and Culture of the Autonomous Region of Kosovo; the official promotion of language planning was one of the social, cultural and economic plans to overcome the backwardness of the region. Corpus management was thus an attempt by Yugoslav Albanians to overcome their own backwardness, one that could not be achieved simply by importing findings or a finished product from Albania. It included “linguists” (in quotation marks because nearly all were undergraduates), translators, writers, journalists, and “well-wishers” of the language, as well as Vojislav Dančetović, head of the Albanological Seminar at Belgrade University, who was, along with Riza, the most senior expert there. The keynote address, of which no record survives, was given by Idriz Ajeti, a student of Dančetović; a discussion was held thereafter. What we retain from this meeting is its resolution, which was published in *Rilindja* and the literary journal *Jeta e ré*. There was unanimous agreement that, as the language of the Albanians of Yugoslavia was Gheg, its literary language should also be a unified Gheg. It also decided – and here the influence of Riza is notable – that the language should not be based on a local dialect, nor on the pre-war Elbasan standard, but should represent all elements of Gheg, thus keeping “particularisms” (features peculiar to the dialects of Kosovo and Debar) in check. There were a number of other, more contentious points, notably on ĕ and the use of apostrophes in personal pronouns, and a plan was set out to make Albanian terminology in Yugoslavia more


433 Ismajli, *Pasionet dhe pësimet*, p.87. Rexhep Ismajli believes that any idea of division was overcome by the need to protect Yugoslavia against accusations from Tirana of Albanian being endangered: “Në gjuhë” dhe “për gjuhë,” p.126.

434 Ajeti, “Rreth përdorjes”; Eshtref Kadiu, “Disa fjalë rreth përdorjes së zanores ‘Ë’,” *Rilindja*, 29 January 1953, p.3; Salih Kolgeci, “Prap mbi përdorimin e drejt të vetëtingullit ‘ë’,” *Rilindja*, 6 February 1953, p.3; “Peremënat pronore,” *Rilindja*, 11 January 1953, p.4 and 22 January, p.3. The last article was written by Budimir Perović and published in *Jeta e ré* 1952, issue 5-6, 371-381, whose editor, Zekeria Rexha, was opposed to Riza’s views and the conclusions of the meeting.
suited to the needs of a modernizing and socialist country. Two major projects appearing shortly after the meeting were the production of a Serbo-Croatian/Albanian dictionary, compiled by Sokol Dobroshi (a lawyer, not a linguist) and a Serbo-Croatian grammar by Selman Riza. Both would be of use to the growing class of Albanian teachers and administrators, but principally to translators of textbooks, works by Tito and other great Marxist figures, and Yugoslav literature; these items, in translation, formed the bulk of the printed works available to buy in Albanian at this time. The founding the following year of the Albanological Institute in Prishtina, where Riza was appointed the chief linguistic scholar, produced a series of articles in Rilindja about the development of Albanian terminology. It printed lists of words in Serbian in particular subject areas such as medicine or government, inviting readers to write in with suggestions for Albanian equivalents. The idea was eventually to produce an Albanian/Serbo-Croatian dictionary, along with a terminological dictionary covering several fields, and to reprint new editions of important past linguistic works to enable continuation of the project of language standardization. Scholars from Belgrade raised objections to this, to Riza’s being effectively in charge of the Institute, and to the idea of creating a standard language at all. Riza relied heavily on Albanian scholarship, which he considered undervalued, while the Belgrade scholars (who included Kosovar Albanians) insisted that the best Albanologist was the Belgrade-based

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Henrik Barić. For Riza, this was more than a technical issue, but one involving the dignity of the Albanian people.

Discussion of language in the small number of journals became lively. Besides terminological issues, two things are notable. First, each of the organs criticized the spelling of the others. Particularly interesting is the criticism by others of the Macedonian paper, *Flaka e vllaznimit*. We see here the start of a rift between written Albanian in Kosovo and Macedonia that lasted until 1968, during which Macedonian Albanian was noticeably closer to that in Albania. Though in agreement with the general direction taken from 1961 on, however, Macedonian Albanian linguists were offended that the 1961 commission only included people from Kosovo and that their contribution was not sufficiently valued. Albanian in Macedonia was consciously closer to the standard in Albania than Albanian in Kosovo; even at this time Albanians from Macedonia had disregarded the recommendations of the Prishtina linguistic meetings. This can be seen in the Albanian-language newspaper in Macedonia, *Flaka e vllaznimit*, which changed its name to *Flaka e vëllaznimit* in 1962; at the end of 1966, the paper went over entirely to the Albanian standard, thus changing its name to *Flaka e vëllazërimit*. Critics also stressed the reliance of this paper on the grammar produced

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439 Ivan Popović [Popović], “Nji sqařim,” *Jeta e ré* 1954, issue 1, 42-47; Hilmi Thaçi and Hasan Kaleshi, “Përgjegje” 48-49. While Barić was a noted scholar with decades of experience and did not take part himself in this controversy, this should not obscure a somewhat colonial attitude towards Kosovo Albanians on the part of some Serbian scholars, as in Dančetović’s claim that he was “Vuk Karadžić for the Kosovo Šiptars”: Miloš Đorđević, “Život i rad Vojislava Dančetovića,” *Baština*, 1996, issue 7, 142.


442 Hamza Reka, “Nji vështrim të shkurtë rreth problemit të gjuhës së përbashkët letrare shqipe,” *Flaka e vëllaznimit*, 13 January 1963, p.7. As it was, Dr. Petro Janura of Skopje University, the senior Macedonian Albanian language manager and himself a Tosk from Fier in Albania, was included on the 1963 commission.


by Cipo in 1948 in Tirana – not just because this was a Tosk grammar and therefore unsuitable for Gheg, but also because it was produced in Albania, an enemy of Yugoslavia, at a time when there was no communication between the two states. The subtext was of course to question the paper’s loyalties to the Yugoslav project. Moreover, the stream of articles about language stressed language purity. As with terminology, this stemmed from the realization that Albanian was ill-equipped to deal with the modern world, had a very limited abstract vocabulary, and, at a time when thousands of new words were needed, Albanian was in danger, as these intellectuals saw it, of being swamped by words of foreign origin, particularly from Serbo-Croatian. These articles pointed out the inappropriate use of Serbo-Croatian borrowings and calques, and accused polemical antagonists of “thinking in Serbian and writing in Albanian.” While at one level this was about modernizing and defending the Albanian language, it was also part of the Albanian intelligentsia’s drive to modernize and defend the Albanian national community in an environment where most Albanian professionals used Albanian only in a narrow social circle and where public life was almost entirely the domain of Serbo-Croatian.

përkrarher,” Flaka e vëllazërit, 2 February 1967, p.1 (supplement). In Kosovo, however, as the new orthography was somewhat more comprehensive than those of 1952 and 1957 – a reflection of the gradually increasing number of linguistic experts available – the changes were greeted with enthusiasm and as a significant achievement. Raka, Historia, pp.218-220.


Kosovo Albanian intellectuals under pressure

The improvement in the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1954 and 1955 meant that the propaganda war between the Warsaw Pact countries and Belgrade was scaled back. Yugoslavia therefore no longer saw a need to sustain the attempt to provide a cultural alternative to Albania in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians therefore found themselves subject to the nationwide campaign of Tito and Kardelj promoting the concept of Yugoslavism: that the cultures of the peoples of Yugoslavia were destined to merge into a single culture.\textsuperscript{448} Although this idea was resisted in particular by the authorities in Croatia and Slovenia, for the non-Slav minorities of the country who did not have the status of a people, Yugoslavism implied that they held no stake in the country. Under such circumstances, a major difference existed between, on the one hand, Albanian intellectuals loyal to the Yugoslav regime and some senior Albanians within the Party who did not speak at the crucial meeting on folklore in December 1955, and on the other the official line of the Party and those who attended the meeting. That difference was for the former that the folklore, literature, music, and general life of Albanians was that of Albanians who lived in Yugoslavia; but for the second group it was that of Yugoslavs who spoke Albanian. This was directly connected to the social and political difference between “assimilationists” and the “Kosovar” element among the elite that I described in the introduction. As we will see, this difference became politically very significant.

Folklore encapsulates the difficulties the Kosovar Albanian intelligentsia had with the authorities. Albanian culture in Yugoslavia, being largely illiterate, relied heavily on folklore in all fields of intellectual production. Folklore was a huge field of

\textsuperscript{448} Kola, \textit{Search for Greater Albania}, pp.113-114; Paul Shoup, \textit{Communism}, pp.207-211.
inspiration and source material for study of language, music, history, ethnography, and so on. It was also the culture of the masses; and by intellectuals using it in their own productions, it provided a means to adapt Communist agitprop to local conditions and thereby serve the needs of the Party. But at the same time it was also an appropriation of popular culture by the intellectuals as leaders of a national Albanian culture. It might not have been conscious, but this was yet again a way of staking a claim to national leadership. While the relationship between the Party and folklore was difficult throughout Yugoslavia, it presented particular problems in Kosovo.449

In 1954 Dančetović and his students Anton Çetta and Kadri Halimi presented for publication a set of heroic folksongs they had collected. A senior Albanian Communist wrote a series of articles in Rilindja complaining that some of the folksongs praised nationalist and bourgeois heroes; that they celebrated resistance against royal Yugoslavia other than that by the Communist Party; that such a publication was likely to corrupt young people into being nationalist; and that the authors had claimed what they had collected was Albanian, rather than Yugoslav, folklore.450 Dančetović, Çetta, and Halimi replied by saying that they had made faithful collections of the songs and were not responsible for their content. They said they were unlikely to corrupt the young because any capable teacher would be able to explain the context of the songs and the heroes they celebrated. Furthermore, they pointed out that it made no sense to describe the songs as Yugoslav, since, although they happened to be in Yugoslavia, they were created by Albanians for an Albanian audience in the context of Albanian

450 Asllan Fazlija, “Ram Bllaca në kangën popullore,” Rilindja, 10 October 1954, p.6; 14 October, p.4.
culture.\textsuperscript{451} Although the matter appeared to rest there, it is worth remembering that a collection of Kreshnik songs edited by the director of Jeta e rë, Zekeria Rexha, despite being presented as evidence of common Albanian and Serb class struggle in centuries gone by, was deemed so dangerous that all copies were destroyed.\textsuperscript{452} In December 1955, the Party in Kosovo held a major meeting devoted to the collection of folksongs produced the previous year, which ruled that while folklore had some positive aspects useful for deepening the socialist consciousness of the masses, it should not be valorized for its own sake as it was a thing of the past. It also called the songs recorded unsuitable for publication; while they might be studied by linguists, historians, and ethnographers, they should not be published for fear of perverting youth and exacerbating ethnic tension.\textsuperscript{453} The meeting not only prevented the publication of this collection, but also caused in the same month the closure of the Albanological Institute of Prishtina and the expulsion of Riza to Albania, leaving much of the work of the Institute uncompleted.\textsuperscript{454} Two years later, Rexha was also expelled to Albania.

Commenting on why the Institute had been closed, a leading official said it had been set up during the propaganda campaign after the breach of relations with Albania and was no longer necessary; and that any work the Institute might have done could always be imported from Albania.\textsuperscript{455} The message could not have been clearer that any Yugoslav


\textsuperscript{455} Shita, Zekeria Rexha, pp.94-95; Ismajli, \textit{Pasionet dhe pësimet}, p.98.
attempt at fostering a competing Albanian culture to that of the Albanian state had been abandoned.

The Albanian-speaking elites\textsuperscript{456} in the late 1950s were under considerable pressure from the government as the leaders of a minority suspected of disloyalty. For example, the secret police identified and followed subscribers to \textit{Rilindja}; songs performed on Radio Tirana or Radio Kukës were banned (though this only affected the small number of Albanians owning radios); at what became known as the “Prizren trial,” relatives of leading Albanian members of the Party were tried for subversion as agents of Albania.\textsuperscript{457} Disputes over the status of the Albanian language within Yugoslavia were part of this. While equality for the use of Albanian in education and public administration had been guaranteed by the 1946 and 1953 constitutions, this remained more of an aspiration than a reality.\textsuperscript{458} In practice, besides primary education, the language of public life was Serbo-Croatian. An example from 1957 illustrates this well. A local authority statute was put before the Regional Assembly in Serbo-Croatian only. An Albanian deputy pointed out that an Albanian version was also needed as well to ensure each would have equal force of law; however, it was ruled that a translation of the Serbo-Croatian would fulfil the criterion for equality.\textsuperscript{459} At the same time, there was a wave of articles in the press about the poor quality of teaching of Serbo-Croatian in Albanian and Turkish schools in the region. The main issue was that they did not prepare children for secondary school education, for which they needed fluent command of Serbo-Croatian, especially if they were to attend a vocational school or to go on to

\textsuperscript{456} Assimilationists were known for preferring to use Serbo-Croatian in public to express loyalty.
\textsuperscript{458} Gazmend Zajmi, “Pozita e gjuhës,” 558-560, 562-563.
university. In both cases, education would then be entirely in Serbo-Croatian. From 1953-4, many schools which taught in either Albanian or in Serbo-Croatian closed or merged; while this overcame the huge shortage of qualified teachers in Albanian-language schools, it also meant that instruction in many subjects was in Serbo-Croatian alone. Since education at all levels was assured in Serbo-Croatian but only beyond primary level for Albanian where conditions allowed, the authorities made it compulsory for Kosovo Albanian children to learn Serbo-Croatian, but voluntary for Slav children to learn Albanian. In 1958 there was a proposal, strongly resisted by teachers who taught in Albanian, to move towards mixed-language schools where, judging by the experience of the previous few years, Serbo-Croatian would dominate.

However, this is not evidence of a forcible attempt to Slavicize the people or to go back on Marxist ideas of the rights of a national group. In 1957, *Rilindja* was upgraded to a daily newspaper, and in the same year a deputy in the regional Assembly spoke of the importance of maintaining a regional Albanian-language theatre, even if, as he said, it would have been cheaper to buy every theatregoer theatre and train tickets to Belgrade and back. Therefore at this time there was an atmosphere both of increased difficulty and yet also of a continued commitment to the development of a national culture of Albanian within Yugoslavia. This was a consequence of the ambiguity at the heart of socialist Yugoslav rule in Kosovo: an ideological commitment to creating the


new socialist man while in practice seeing the use of Albanian, even by Kosovo 
Albanian Party officials, as a sign of untrustworthiness and the use of Serbo-Croatian as 
a sign of loyalty to the regime.464

This gap between declared intent and practice dominated the status of Albanian 
throughout the period of this chapter. Although the Party had enshrined full equality of 
languages in Kosovo as its guiding principle in all spheres of life in 1945, by 1950 
examples of bilingual administration in the state sector had virtually disappeared. State 
administration was carried out through a “favoured” language (Serbo-Croatian) and, 
where required – and often not even then – a translation in the “supplementary” 
language (Albanian) would be issued, though the authentic version would remain that of 
the republic of Serbia. Directives were issued in 1958 by the Executive Council of 
Kosovo to remedy failure to use Albanian, if not its inferior status, but in practice the 
use of Albanian seldom went beyond translations. Contrary to directives stipulating that 
a written request had to be answered in the language in which it was written, in 1965 
only 10% of official documents were issued in Albanian regardless of the language in 
which requests were made. Indeed, two years after the fall of Ranković, the court 
system in Gjakova was only just coming to terms with providing administration for its 
Albanian-speaking clients in their own language.465 As we will see in the next chapter, 
changes in the late 1960s and early 1970s put the two languages used throughout the 
province on a very different footing.

464 Rexhep Ismajli, Gjuhë dhe etni, p.346; Ksenija Cvetković-Sander, Sprachpolitik und nationale 
dygiuhësore,” Flaka e vëllazërit, 13 April 1967, p.4.
Linguistic orientation towards Albania

Such were the circumstances in which a second linguistic meeting was held in Prishtina in 1957. This meeting would establish a difference between those who wanted orientation towards Albania and those who wanted simplification of the norm as it stood. It noted that the reforms of 1952 had mainly succeeded, but there was still a growing diversity of ways of spelling. Furthermore, the delegates felt that the written language should be as close as possible to the language as it was spoken in Yugoslavia, although this did not entail a significant shift away from the broad-based Gheg of 1952 towards the dialects of Kosovo and Debar. The most significant changes were to use the silent ël only when necessary, the simplification of $tsh$ into ć, as in $i\text{sotshëm} > i\text{soçëm}$ (“today’s”) and the near disappearance of accents denoting length of vowels, such as $mirsi > mirsi$ (“goodness”). However, unlike the conclusions of the meeting of 1952, these met with immediate open resistance. Idriz Ajeti published an article objecting to the changes, especially to the change in the use of ël, because they ran against the trend of language reform, in that this always brought written dialects closer together. Rather than developing the language within their own context, Ajeti was arguing, Albanians in Yugoslavia should be moving towards unity with the Tosk-based standard of Albania. Although this appears a scholarly argument about the nature of language reform, it may have masked a more nationalist argument about identification with Albania which would have been highly dangerous at this point to express. Evidence for this can be seen in Ajeti’s complaint that such changes were foolish for the Albanians of Yugoslavia, because they had insufficient linguistic expertise, and that there had not been sufficient preparatory work on dialect and literature on which to base any decisions. If people in

Yugoslavia were not prepared to do that work, he said, they should adopt the solutions reached elsewhere – that is, in Tirana.\textsuperscript{467} Ajeti, who by then was a doctoral student, had not made these objections after the 1952 meeting, when they would have been equally pertinent. However, the situation was even more problematic in 1957, because two of the main experts and strongest guides to reform were unavailable, due to the banishment of Riza and Rexha and the closure of the Albanological Institute. There was, therefore, a conflict between those who defended simplification of the language and those, like Ajeti, who resisted such change.\textsuperscript{468} As a result of this dispute, by 1960 there were already calls for a new linguistic meeting, and in the following year the provincial Board for Education and Culture set up a commission, including Ajeti and some of his opponents, to draw up recommendations for discussion at the new meeting.\textsuperscript{469}

To understand the context of this, we need to review the situation of minorities after 1958. Thanks to Croat and Slovene resistance to the promotion of Yugoslavism mentioned above, and Tito’s and Kardelj’s need to gain their co-operation in securing economic decentralization, this campaign was abandoned soon after the Seventh Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists, and further steps were taken towards political decentralization, culminating in the new Yugoslav constitution of 1963.\textsuperscript{470} This meant that cultural expression became somewhat easier for minorities, not only in Kosovo, but also, for example, for the Italian minority in Croatia and Slovenia, who had faced similar difficulties to those experienced by Albanians, particularly in education.

\textsuperscript{467} Idriz Ajeti, “A ka gjâ mâ punë n’ortografinë e shqipes?” \textit{Përparimi} 1958 issue 7-8, 471-473.
\textsuperscript{468} For a view opposing Ajeti’s, see Sulejman Drini, “Mbi vërejtjet ortografike të Dr. Idriz Ajetit,” \textit{Përparimi}, 1958, issue 9, 595-603.
\textsuperscript{470} Paul Shoup, \textit{Communism}, pp.207-211.
(Italians already had a standard language, so this was less of an issue for them.)

Among other things, the closure of Albanian-language secondary schools and their replacement with mixed-language schools was abandoned, and moves were made to incorporate the teaching of Albanian history into school classes in the Albanian language. At an elite level, in what was still the only Albanian-language learned journal in Yugoslavia, *Përparimi*, in the mid-1950s most of the articles were translated from Serbo-Croatian, but around 1960 the majority were written by Yugoslav Albanians in Albanian. By this time there was also the first wave of Albanian university graduates and postgraduates, chiefly from Belgrade University, meaning more people were qualified to write scholarly pieces in Albanian. These were complemented by the students studying at new institutions such as the High Pedagogical School in Prishtina (founded in 1958) and the Prishtina extension of Belgrade University.

This greater openness also meant that the commission on language established in 1961 was able to examine the orthography produced in Tirana in 1956, which, although based on Tosk, provided for Gheg alternatives in footnotes. The commission’s recommendations were presented to the third Prishtina linguistic meeting in 1963. These followed the 1956 Tirana orthography much more closely; abandoned accents denoting the nasality and length of vowels; restored the use of ë between syllables (*mirsi > mirësi* “goodness”); and established a new commission to produce a definitive

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472 “Pakicat kombtare munden me u shkollue në gjuhën amnore,” *Rilindja*, 1 June 1958, p.1, p.3.
orthography for Yugoslavian Albanians, which was published in 1964. This orthography consciously aimed at approaching the standard in Albania, while aiming to maintain the central features of Gheg, namely the use of the Gheg infinitive as opposed to the subjunctive, the avoidance of rhoticism, the preservation of nasal vowels and of the diphthong \( \text{ue} \) as opposed to the Tosk \( \text{ua} \). In short, the 1964 orthography came as close as politically possible to the Albanian standard while maintaining its own sense of identity.

This greater openness was not confined to minorities, but could be felt across Yugoslavia. For the first time, the 1961 census allowed people to state that they were “ethnic Muslims” while patriotic songs, banned since the war, began to be heard again in Serbia in the mid-1960s.\(^{476}\) The fall of Aleksandar Ranković in 1966 removed the power of much of the secret police and further emboldened national expression. In Croatia, Matica hrvatska and other institutions representing many of the most important intellectuals of Croatia signed the Declaration on the Name and Position of the Croatian Language, questioning the Novi Sad Agreement of 1954 between Matica hrvatska and Matica srpska that Serbo-Croatian was a single language with two variants, asserting instead they were two distinct languages, Croatian and Serbian.\(^{477}\) Despite criticism from the press and Party – including from Tito on a visit to Prishtina – Matica hrvatska successfully stuck to its position, while breaking off working relations with Matica srpska. The reply from Serbian linguists, the “Proposal for Discussion,” while sarcastically pointing out some of the advantages Croatia gained by the arrangement in place, seemed to confirm that the Novi Sad Agreement was no more.\(^{478}\)

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\(^{476}\) Shoup, *Communism*, p.216.


Although Albanian commentators focus exclusively on the relationship between Yugoslav Albanians and the “motherland,” this successful attempt at striking an independent linguistic path must have had a profound effect on those who met the following year at the Linguistic Consultation of Prishtina. What the Declaration of 1967 told Kosovo Albanian intellectuals was that what had been cultivated as one language could be split into two. The Declaration had been condemned as nationalistic and an attack on the Yugoslav political settlement; this mattered because the Croats (and Serbs, Montenegrins and, from 1968, Slav Muslims) were constituent peoples of Yugoslavia. So any decision would have a lasting effect on the other peoples and on Yugoslavia as a whole. For Kosovo Albanian intellectuals, however, with the lower status of a nationality, any decision they took would not be of such importance to the country’s future. Even though šiptarski jezik had only ever existed in theory, the possibility of it existing in practice could be forestalled by adopting the Rregullat from Albania. However, šiptarski jezik was a minor point in comparison with the label of šiptar and the struggle to gain recognition for Albanians in Yugoslavia as part of a wider, more numerous group with the equality accorded to them in the constitution. In “Në gjuhë” dhe “për gjuhë,” Ismajli uses Glyn Williams’s juxtaposition of “struggle within language” and “struggle for language”\(^479\) to argue that in Albania, the struggle for standardization was within language, essentially one about the form of the language itself; in Yugoslavia, by contrast, it was for language, being primarily a struggle for status. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the use by Albanian intellectuals of the founding myth of their respective regimes, the National Liberation War, in arguing their case. In Albania, Kostallari argued that the war helped shape the

form Standard Albanian was to take, while in Kosovo, Gazmend Zajmi used the war to argue for the state’s commitment to the equality of the languages of its inhabitants.480

Ultimately, the decisions of the Linguistic Consultation of Prishtina had less to do with language than with the collective status of Albanians in Yugoslavia.

The fall of Ranković and a new freedom for Kosovo Albanians

The fall of Aleksandar Ranković in 1966 had, of course, a greater effect on public life in Kosovo than just language management. The investigation launched by the Party in the wake of the Brioni plenum exposed the extent to which the secret police and those under Ranković had been responsible for abuses. Those coming to power due to the departure of Ranković were the Kosovar elite rather than the assimilationists who had been prominent among Kosovo Albanian politicians to date – the kind of people who thought of themselves as Albanians living in Yugoslavia, not Yugoslavs who spoke Albanian.481 They openly acknowledged the persecution of Albanian intellectuals, particularly teachers of Albanian language and literature; that the Prizren trial had been staged; and that Albanian national rights had very much taken a second place to those of Serbs and Macedonians.482 They also believed that this situation needed to be rectified.

There were three elements to this change of mood among Kosovo Albanians. First, Albanians felt much more ease in expressing Albanian national culture and

national feeling than ever before. A neat encapsulation of the change in national self-perception taking place over this period can be found in the change in aims and orientation of the illegal movement. In the immediate postwar period, this movement was largely composed of village elders, clergy, teachers, and members of the wartime administration, who sought for Kosovo to be included in a non-Communist Albania. The illegal movement in 1964, by contrast, was consciously secularist, with its leadership largely based on professionals and students. It was still ethnically oriented, but was based on intellectual production emanating from Enver Hoxha’s Albania.483

Second, this identification with Albania in the illegal movement was shared by the bulk of the Albanian population of Kosovo. By the end of 1967, politicians from the Kosovar elite were saying that despite the two countries’ ideological differences, Yugoslavia needed to normalize relations with Albania.484 As we learned in Chapter Two, this was manifested in the participation of Kosovar scholars at a conference in Tirana in 1968 marking the 500th anniversary of the death of Skanderbeg, with scholars from Albania visiting a similar conference in Prishtina that May.485 Other signs of change were the republication of classic and contemporary works from Albania by the Rilindja Press and the official history of Albania in Yugoslavia, with a short supplement by Ali Hadri about Kosovo from 1912 to 1945.486 This was characteristic of the whole

relationship between Kosovo and Albania: Kosovo Albanians, both intellectuals and the general public, had a sense of inferiority to Albania and a romanticized vision of it. Those who were able to travel to Albania and found it worse than expected often preferred not to reveal the truth about Hoxha’s Albania when they returned home, for fear of being seen as Yugoslav collaborators.⁴⁸⁷ Such was the success of the Kosovo Albanian internalization of Albania’s civilizing mission that, from the months after the fall of Ranković in 1966 to the Linguistic Consultation of Prishtina, articles appeared by Kosovo Albanian intellectuals decrying features of their own speech that departed from Standard Albanian, such as the Gheg infinitive, as a “useless appendage” left over from a “phase of communicative primitivity” because, unlike the subjunctive, it does not specify person, number and tense.⁴⁸⁸

This period brought about many changes in favour of granting Albanians national rights. For example, as with the rest of Yugoslavia, there were constitutional changes, but in Kosovo they were particularly emotive. Kosovar Albanians were granted the right to use their own flag (which was the same as the flag of Albania) and national emblems which had been forbidden from 1946.⁴⁸⁹ A discussion on what place Kosovo should hold in the Federation also was held within the context of the League of Communists both in Kosovo and in Serbia. Whereas previously Kosovo – a name now changed from Kosovo and Metohia, the latter name referring to Orthodox church landholdings – had been subordinate to the Republic of Serbia, it would now to have its own direct representation as part of the Federation.⁴⁹⁰ There was, however, strong

opposition from Serbian Party members to this; while on the other hand Albanians, including the Party committee in Gjakova, the centre of the new dominant group in the Party, argued for Kosovo to have full republican status.491

Among these changes were two elements of importance in linguistic status management. A campaign was mounted to enforce the provisions for equality of languages in public administration, with the hiring of cadre in courts and municipal offices that spoke both languages, and the provision of Albanian lessons to monoglot Serbian and Montenegrin staff. This met with some resistance, notably among Albanians used to communicating in Serbo-Croatian or who used the language as a token of loyalty to the regime, but also among Albanians unwilling to teach the language to Slav staff, thereby diminishing the chances of employment for Albanians.492

The other major campaign was against the use in Serbo-Croatian of the word šiptar (denoting Albanians in Yugoslavia only) and its replacement as an ethnic signifier with the word albanac (denoting Albanians wherever they lived). It was plain that the issue of status mattered rather more than the issue of corpus management. On the one hand, creating a separate language for a separate ethnic group would have raised Yugoslav Albanians to the status of a full nation, with the right to self-determination up to and including secession; and there is ample evidence that this option was one that the authorities, both in Serbia and Kosovo, were keen to avoid. On the other, the difference between albanac and šiptar was political rather than linguistic: while official publications talked of radio broadcast schedules in “both” languages,493 Serbian

491 Mišović, Ko je tražio, pp.160, 249-251; Hoxha, Në vetën e parë, pp.360-361; Ilija Vuković, Autonomaštvo, pp.11-12.
albanologists such as Dančetović, Henrik Barić and Ivan Popović had never indicated that there was any fundamental difference in the Albanian spoken on either side of the border. The abandoning of this distinction was reflected in the view of the Kosovo Party leader from Gjakova, Fadil Hoxha, that Albanians of Kosovo were not a “minority” in a foreign country, but “in their own home” in lands settled by Albanians.

These changes, particularly those associated with the flag and the new national self-assurance of the Albanians, led to conflict with Kosovo Serbs and contributed to many Serbian professionals seeking jobs outside of Kosovo. They also fed a sense of grievance by the Serbs against Albanians and against the authorities, which compounded their feelings of unjust victimization as a result of the dismissals following the fall of Ranković. The euphoric feeling experienced by Albanians, on the other hand, is clearest in the demonstrations in November 1968, which, unlike those earlier in the year elsewhere in Yugoslavia, were focused particularly on national demands for a republic and an independent university, preparations for which were, in fact, already underway. It was no coincidence that they were timed for the eve of Albania’s Flag Day and for the 25th anniversary of the second AVNOJ conference. Unlike the


495 The phrase “in one’s own home” (“u sopstvenoj kući”) comes from a speech by Fadil Hoxha in 1971 in response to the accusation by Dragoljub Marković, the president of the constitutional commission of Serbia, that Hoxha’s – and, by extension, the Kosovar elite’s – position was ungrateful to Serbia. Hoxha later used the phrase as the title of a collection of his speeches which covers the period from 1966 as a suitable metaphor for Kosovo Albanians’ place in the new arrangements, translated as “Jemi në shëtpinë tonë” (“We are in our own home”). “Jugoslovenska zajednica naroda i narodnosti je od vitalnog interesa sve za njih,” Politika, 9 January 1971, pp.5-6; Hoxha, Jemi në shëtpinë tonë.


demonstrations in 1981, those involved were mostly students and secondary school pupils, although they enjoyed broader support among the populace, especially the intelligentsia.498 While they were treated by the Party as a manifestation of nationalism among Albanians hostile to socialist Yugoslavia, and caused much introspection among Albanian and Serbian politicians about such phenomena in their respective communities, it was crucial that Tito downplayed the seriousness of these events, thus enabling the process of “affirmation of the Albanian nationality” in Kosovo to continue.499

**Kosovo as part of a wider Albanian space**

For Kosovo Albanians, this “affirmation” of their nationality did not just involve having the same rights and opportunities as Slavs, but also involved membership in an imagined community of all Albanians and an understanding of their place, outside the frontiers of Albania, within it. This entailed loyalty to and desire for eventual union with the Albanian state that had promoted the national identity, the language, the interpretation of history, symbols and myths which Kosovo Albanians held dear during the period from 1941 to 1948. Yet it was these very attributes that had been suppressed thereafter by the Yugoslav communists who, at the same time, had still to work through


the Kosovo Albanian modern intelligentsia, the interpreters and guardians of those elements. So the modern intelligentsia was by turns encouraged and persecuted by the authorities, bestowing upon them and the national idea they promoted the kudos of forbidden fruit, especially through the “sacrifices” in jail or exile at the hands of the Yugoslav state. The šiptar identity manufactured by the Party as a new start away from “Greater Serbian hegemonism”500 and briefly touted as an identity in competition with that of Albania, was rejected by the Albanian people of Yugoslavia, associated as it was with suppression, assimilation and imposition from outside. This involved the erasure, or “having forgotten,” the counter-narratives of a spectrum of Albanian-to-Turkish religious, ethnic and local identity, together with any shared commonality with Slavs and Orthodox Christians. In this they were assisted both by the tendency of folklore, the source of much intellectual production, to divide protagonists between us and them,501 but also by the reification of the nation in the Leninist nationality policy of Yugoslavia.

For an imagined Kosovo in an imagined Albania, the publication in Prishtina of _Historia e popullit shqiptar_,502 with its Enverist historiography, portrayed lands in Yugoslavia as integral to Albanian history. The history aroused interest in the idea that Albanians were direct descendants of the Illyrians, an ancient and classical civilization, autochthonous throughout Albanian lands before the arrival of the Slavs. Particular

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500 Greater Serbian (bourgeois) hegemony, in the context in which it was used throughout the communist period, was a stock phrase to denote the ideology of royal Yugoslavia. The phrase sought to categorize royal Yugoslavia as a unitary, nationalist state divided by class, the antithesis of the brotherhood and unity of socialist Yugoslavia. In the context of Kosovo, the phrase also implied the liberation of national minorities through the National Liberation War and their achievement of equality through socialism. Thus Greater Serbian (bourgeois) hegemony was one of the forms of nationalism against which communists were enjoined to be vigilant, manifesting itself, e.g., in the valorizing of ethnic relations in Kosovo in royal Yugoslavia by such books as _Knjiga o Kosovu_ (Dimitrije Bogdanović, 1985, Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti) during the 1980s. While Jasna Dragović-Soso notes the use of the phrase by Albanian scholars in Kosovo to criticize such works she appears to take its meaning at face value, leading her in “Saviours of the Nation,” p.255, to an erroneous conclusion. For an explanation of the equivalence of the phrase with nostalgia for royal Yugoslavia, see, e.g., Xhemail Mustafà, “Nostalgji për tê kaluarên,” _Rilindja_, 24 July 1988, p.10.

501 Žanić, _Flag on the Mountain_, p.36.

502 Stefanaq Pollo et al., eds., _Historia e popullit shqiptar_, was published in 1969.
pride of place in this history was given to the League of Prizren, centred on Kosovo, and Kosovo Albanian heroes such as Isa Boletini and Hasan Prishtina who helped Albanians gain a state and paved the way for a “bourgeois-democratic revolution” in the 1920s. For the increasing numbers who had radios, however, the most immediate symbol of Albanian unity, as well as forbidden fruit, was the broadcasts of Radio Tirana and Radio Kukës, playing the folk music forbidden on Yugoslav radio and whose announcements in the Tosk-based standard language increased its prestige on the Yugoslav side of the border.

Yet for all the factors drawing Albanians in Yugoslavia to be an undivided part of a greater “ethnic Albania,” there were still elements that militated in favour of an imagined territorial division. As early as 1949 a Kosovar League had been formed in the diaspora to cope with the particular problems of anti-communist exiles from Kosovo, especially at a time when many in the Albanian diaspora looked favourably upon Tito as someone who might help them in removing Enver Hoxha from power in Tirana.503 Within Kosovo, ideas of the province as a distinct place were reinforced by maps, the census, the province’s institutions, its media and publishing, and, especially in the 1970s, school textbooks and history written for Kosovo. These made it easier to conceive of a future as a republic, as demanded by the demonstrators of 1968, but also as Kosovo seceding from Yugoslavia as a unit. Nevertheless, language was the most important symbol of all, because it was the first demonstrable and legal sign of a shared institution among a community of four million Albanians rather than as a small and relatively powerless minority in Yugoslavia.

In April of 1968, students packed the gallery at the Prishtina Linguistic Consultation. This meeting was not under the patronage of a state body like the Board for Education and Culture, but of institutions run predominantly by Albanians, the Albanological Institute of Prishtina (refounded in 1967) and the Department of Albanian Language and Literature at the Philosophy Faculty in Prishtina. Once again, Idriz Ajeti, now the professor of Albanian at the Philosophy Faculty, gave the keynote address, saying there was nothing standing in the way of complete unification with the standard as it stood in the Rregullat of 1967, with the exception of rhoticism, the \(ue/ua\) distinction and the Gheg infinitive. From the first speech by Fehmi Agani, director of the Albanological Institute, it was clear such obstacles were not going to be allowed to stand; every speech, especially that by Ali Hadri, expressing the urgency for abandoning all distinctions and immediately switching to the Tirana standard was warmly received.

While it was acknowledged there would be difficulties in implementation, these would surely be overcome with the good will of intellectuals, writers, journalists, teachers and students. Any kind of reservation, even indirect, such as that of Hasan Kaleshi, was greeted with hostility, and those who did not accept such a view, like Abdulla Zajmi, kept their counsel. This atmosphere was strikingly different from the previous Prishtina linguistic meetings; while the conclusions of previous meetings had been recommendations many ignored, it was clear that, even the conclusions of this meeting would also be presented as recommendations; failing to adopt the Tirana Rregullat of 1967 would not be tolerated. Moreover, while the conclusions of previous meetings had

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been sent to state and cultural bodies in Kosovo and Serbia, and the 1952 meeting had sent a celebratory letter to Tito, the Prishtina Linguistic Consultation sent a letter with their conclusions to the State University of Tirana and the Institute of History and Linguistics, making clear the primacy of the link between Albanians as opposed to their place in Yugoslavia.\(^{507}\) At the conclusion of the Linguistic Consultation, a delegation went to Fadil Hoxha, leader of the People’s Assembly, to convey their conclusions to him. He was the most senior figure of the Gjakova group of Kosovar elite politicians, which had succeeded in marginalizing assimilationist politicians such as Sinan Hasani and Ali Shukria in the aftermath of the fall of Ranković. Hoxha, who had previously advocated a further linguistic meeting, welcomed the change as part of the package of reforms, such as those about the national flag, ties to Albania, direct representation at federal level and the equality of languages, which accorded Albanians a stake in Yugoslavia.\(^{508}\) The attendees at the Prishtina Linguistic Consultation were not heady nationalists, but acting with the full approval of the politicians now at the head of the Party in Kosovo.

There was no coverage of the Prishtina Linguistic Consultation, even in the aftermath of the 1968 demonstrations in Kosovo, in *Borba*, *Književne novine*, *NIN*, *Nova Makedonija* or *Politika*.\(^{509}\) Interviews with Albanian politicians from Kosovo at the time made more frequent mention of language status than articles either from

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\(^{509}\) The news agency Tanjug (in English, 18.15, 24 April 1968) did cover Fadil Hoxha’s speech to the delegation from the Linguistic Consultation, in which he hailed their achievement as thanks to the “correct national policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Tito” and thought Albania should do more to celebrate Albanian creativity from Yugoslavia: *SoWB* 2, 4 May 1968, EE/2761/B/5.
Serbian sources or ones that referred to Slav grievances. What exercised Slav sensibilities much more strongly was the use of the Albanian national flag: Raduje Vasović published a four-part article in *Borba* which devoted one part to the problem of the flag while ignoring the language question altogether. The only mention in the Serbian press of the Prishtina Linguistic Consultation, together with the seminar on Skanderbeg, came from reports of the speech of the young Kosovo politician Mahmut Bakalli. The meeting at which Bakalli spoke, the Fourteenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, was dominated by the views of Dobrica Ćosić and Jovan Marjanović, both of whom were judged to have given vent to feelings of Serb nationalism, particularly in relation to Kosovo. However, neither Ćosić nor Marjanović mentioned the Prishtina Linguistic Consultation. Bakalli cited the Prishtina Linguistic Consultation and the seminar on Skanderbeg as events that could be taken advantage of by hostile Albanian or Serbian and Montenegrin nationalists; in this respect, they ranked as of no more importance than plays or displays of folk-dancing which had aroused similar passions.

It was thus neither a lack of political daring nor a lack of pliant language managers that prevented the authorities objecting to the unification of written Albanian. Rather, the status of Albanian was of far more interest to them than the contents of its corpus; and other symbols, much more readily apparent to non-Albanians, seemed to

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513 Ivanović and Popović, “SKJ mora biti spremna,” p.6; Louis Zanga, “Nationalist Excesses in the Kosovo-Metohia Region,” 30 May 1968. HU OSA 300-8-3-10244, *RFE/RL* at [http://catalog.osaarchivum.org/catalog/osa:92fb2a2-4ba0-41b3-95bf-6c0115a8f060](http://catalog.osaarchivum.org/catalog/osa:92fb2a2-4ba0-41b3-95bf-6c0115a8f060) [last accessed 12 June 2016].
them better at encapsulating their worries over the change in relative status of national
groups in Kosovo. Arguments and national sentiment over corpus management and the
unification of the standard were of far more pressing interest to Albanians and
overwhelmingly expressed in Albanian, beyond the ken or care of Slavs. What they
missed, therefore, was that in espousing what James Milroy calls “standard language
ideology,” the Albanian intelligentsia of Kosovo had, to a great extent, shown that they
had succeeded in forging a national Albanian culture out of a regional, more fluid
culture. Where newspaper and journal columns had once accepted variations in
language and prescribed more elegant ways to express oneself to be better understood,
now the point was that the language should be uniform, the implication being that there
was no difference between Albanians wherever they lived. Moreover, the standard
language was a canonical form of culture whose legitimacy was handed down in the
form of grammars and dictionaries, a possession of Albanian culture akin to the kanun.
It was something which could be used “correctly” or “incorrectly,” where users were
taught and adapted to the language rather than the language to the users, a variant
standing in high prestige as opposed to the “primitive” dialects of the people,
contaminated as they were with contact with foreign words and expressions, especially
from Serbo-Croatian.514

Furthermore, the Kosovar elite politicians and the Kosovo Albanian
intelligentsia had seized their opportunity almost as soon as the general political wind in
Yugoslavia had changed in their favour. Language, then, had become the first tangible
sign of unity with Albania that affected all, including the authorities in Yugoslavia, who
read or wrote in Albanian for any reason. In adopting the Rregullat, Kosovo Albanian

514 Hasan Kaleshi, “Disa vërejtje mbi gjuhen në shtypin tanë,” Jeta e ré 1949 issue 2, p.; Anastas Dodi,
534-535, 537-539, 547.
intellectuals had taken a step closer to an imagined Albania, something the Party had not done since repudiating the Resolution of the Conference of Bujan in 1944. To this extent, Ali Hadri’s point, which we saw at the start of the chapter, that the distance between Kosovo Albanian speech and the *Rregullat* was of little importance was correct. Indeed, the further the *Rregullat* were from Kosovo Albanian speech the more they marked out the language as a symbol of pan-Albanian identity, securing their political goal of national Albanian unity while underlining the rejection of anything that might divide Albanians in Yugoslavia from those Albania.\(^{515}\) Language was a permanent reminder that the Albanians were not a “minority” within Yugoslavia, but rather to be identified with all Albanians, wherever they lived, their standard language being evidence of a developed civilization with common literature, history and cultural values, equal to any other in Europe. It was not until the 1980s that political actors in Serbia began to appreciate the importance of this step.

\(^{515}\) See Weinstein, “Language Planning as an Aid,” p.115.
Chapter Four

How Kosovo became imagined as a distinct Albanian territory

At the Congress of Orthography in Tirana in November 1972, the Kosovo Albanian literary critic Rexhep Qosja chose as the theme for his paper Standard Albanian and the responsibility of the writer. He stressed that responsibility in implementing the standard was cultural and artistic, but first of all it was moral. As for the morally deficient, Qosja attacked these (nameless) writers whose self-defeating attitudes would result in their writings being swept away by history. Their moral duty as writers, as intellectuals and as Albanians was to follow the will of the majority of Albanians and write in Standard Albanian. Qosja said that cultural responsibility could only be realized in promoting linguistic unity for, as Ferdinand de Saussure said, dialects could only lead to further splitting of the language. Citing Karel Čapek, Qosja thought broadening and enriching Standard Albanian through writing should be at the highest level of national consciousness. Those that failed to attain this level should occupy themselves with hack writing for newspapers.516

These messages of the moral mission of the intellectual would dominate the approach of most intellectuals in Kosovo during the 1970s and remain highly influential today. This discourse advocates the promotion of nation with the intelligentsia at its vanguard, as well as the policing of dissent within the ethnic community and the boundaries of what was acceptable as “authentically” Albanian. At the time of his speech, Qosja was the director of the Albanological Institute of Prishtina and might be seen as a representative of what Shkëlzen Maliqi has called an “Albanological

worldview” (*botëkuptim albanologjik*). Maliqi described this worldview as the colonized trying to combat the mentality of the colonial occupier but instead becoming its victim; it defends values of the colonized such as tribalism, folklore and tradition, thus in fact helping the colonizer to put the colonized on a labelled reservation with a closed, non-productive culture, incapable of relating to the modern world. While this is the view of an ideological opponent of Qosja, it would certainly be true to say that intellectuals used Albanological studies for the creation and promotion of national symbols and the reinforcement of Albanian unity.

In this chapter I will consider how, during the period from the 1970s to the early 1990s, the processes of intellectual change intertwined with political developments both within Yugoslavia and outside it, in particular with relation to Albania. As both Qosja and Maliqi indicate in their different ways, there was no separation of the processes of linguistic change, and indeed intellectual engagement with politics, from wider political processes. Both the promotion of linguistic policy and the position of the intelligentsia itself within the political sphere came about through interactions with political agendas not always made by Kosovo Albanians themselves.

By the early 1970s the Albanian community in Yugoslavia seemed a strongly cohesive group, now stable in terms of self-identification and with attitudes clearly...
distinct from those of other Yugoslavs. But this was still far from a point where the desired outcome of intellectual language managers – the erosion of regional differences separating Kosovo and Yugoslav Albanians from those in Albania – seemed possible. Still less was the actual outcome – a parallel “Republic of Kosova” which managed the institutions of autonomy confronting the overwhelming force of the Serbian government – at this point even imaginable. However, as we will see in this chapter, over the next decades the role of language and the political and cultural leadership of intellectuals would hone an understanding of cultural distinction that would lead to political change. We will also see how language management played a role in the events that led to the further enhancement of the position of the intelligentsia within the Kosovo Albanian community, thanks to the attacks on Albanians and Albanian culture by Kosovo Serbs and, from the mid-1980s onward, by the Serbian authorities. In doing so, we will also chart the mobilization of the Kosovo Albanian masses by the intelligentsia and the Party, to the point in the early 1990s when interaction between Serb and Kosovo Albanian nationalisms made an independent Kosovo conceivable. Language reform, in other words, was central to processes helping to sharpen Kosovo Albanians’ understandings of their own political distinctiveness and the role of intellectuals as the leaders of their society. And as we will see, arguments leading to this sense of self were not only waged against Serbs, but also within the Albanian community itself.

This chapter ends in 1992, the time of three major turning points in the story. These include, first, the time between the declaration of the “Republic of Kosova” and the boycott of the Serbian general election of 1992, events that made it clear that Kosovo Albanians saw no future for Kosovo within Yugoslavia. The year 1992 also

saw the end of communist rule in Albania, the opening of the border, and the re-establishment of free communication between people on either side after an interruption of 44 years, a major cultural shock for Kosovo Albanians. Finally, this year saw the start of activity in Albania critical of Standard Albanian, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Throughout this chapter, because of the complex interactions of events with linguistic and cultural trends, it will be intermittently necessary to discuss the background of political history; often political history cannot be separated from the cultural change we will examine. To begin, I will briefly discuss events within Yugoslavia, and between Yugoslavia and Albania, in the most general terms, in order to understand the context of the events in Kosovo. It is, however, important to remember that language management played an important role in the hardening of ethnic boundaries throughout Yugoslavia, and this will be discussed in relation to events in Kosovo during the course of the chapter. In the end, we will see that linguistic discussion was a way of enacting a political vision. Although thinking of Kosovo as a place integral to Albania was not politically possible, thinking about the Albanian language was a way of imagining a reality that could not be stated politically. This was complicated, however, by political and cultural realities dictating the adoption of Tosk in a Kosovo used to speaking Gheg. The standard language was developed according to political and cultural realities in Albania, but the reasons for adopting it were local to Kosovo.
Background

As we saw in the previous chapter, 1968 saw the beginnings of a new relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Yugoslavia, one that was prepared to accept them (or at least the Kosovar elite) for who they felt they were, along with their written language, their chosen Serbo-Croatian name of albanac and their national symbols. It was also one that acknowledged that the people of Kosovo had a right to direct representation on matters affecting the federation without subordination to Serbia. In essence, the changes of this period made Yugoslavia more dependent on national groups and the politicians who represented them through their respective republics and autonomous provinces. As such, as Dejan Jović notes, Yugoslavia ceased to be primarily the state of the South Slavs but rather a confederation based on ideology.522 Yet, as a confederation, Yugoslavia had fundamental problems rooted in its conception of rights as accorded to the national group as opposed to the individual, with national rights associated tied to a specific territory.523

An increase in national demands led to constitutional change, which itself fed further national demands. A partial opening towards pluralism in the form of multi-candidate elections and the reforms to free the market in 1965 gave rise to demands by activists in Croatia to keep its share of foreign earnings rather than pay into a common development fund. The Party’s tolerance of such claims gave rise to further national demands, such as a separate army and a separate seat at the United Nations for Croatia, besides the Croatian abandonment of the Novi Sad Agreement discussed in the last

In order to head off such challenges to the system, a series of constitutional amendments were enacted from the late 1960s, culminating in the new constitution of 1974. While these instruments were designed to enshrine the protection of each republic from the others, they did away with all manifestations of pluralism and replaced it with “decentralization,” in which power was devolved to the republics and autonomous provinces with a strengthened role for the Party. The complex arrangements in the 1974 constitution were rendered more unwieldy still by the 1976 Law on Associated Labour. With limited mobility of labour throughout the country and lack of inter-regional investment beyond the national Development Fund, Yugoslavia was increasingly unable to deal with growing regional disparity, unemployment and inflation; Ana Devic’s description of “decentralization” as “autarkization” seems very pertinent.

Communist rhetoric failed to provide space for coherent opposition to the regime and there was no other legitimate vehicle for opposition. Consequently, nationalist demands for a different relationship to the state (be that at federal or republican/provincial level), or for the protection of national minorities outside their “home” territory, came to present a viable alternative in the face of the Party’s failure to address Yugoslavia’s mounting social and economic problems. In a situation where the central state was very weak, the political system was rigid and high political office

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largely confined to the Partisan generation, in every national group it was the intelligentsia who were the best placed to articulate that alternative.\textsuperscript{528} Thus instead of the Party bureaucracy being able to satisfy ethnic grievances, it was unable to prevent them from growing in number and scope.

Yugoslavia’s relationship with Albania is also of central importance to our story. While the relationship was affected by Albanian lands in Yugoslavia, this was certainly not the only issue of common interest. Strategically, in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, both countries were concerned to protect themselves from Soviet aggression. As a result, Albania pledged to come to Yugoslavia’s aid if attacked, repeating this assurance even after the crushing of the 1981 demonstrations. In terms of Kosovo, Yugoslavia initiated cultural contact, of which the Skanderbeg symposium and the republication of Albanian literary works, both mentioned in the last chapter, were two examples. With the foundation of the University of Prishtina in 1970, this cooperation was expanded to include the importing of Albanian university staff and textbooks as part of a somewhat one-sided cultural exchange between Albania and Kosovo. However enthusiastic Kosovo Albanian students were about the staff from Albania, relations between the two countries and their cultural representatives remained far more distant than they had been in the days of ideological friendship between 1945 and 1948.

Even this partial opening, however, came to an end in the wake of the demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981. The Yugoslav federal authorities severed all cultural

relations between Yugoslavia and Albania; the university staff were sent home and the importing of books and journals from Albania was banned as Yugoslavia accused Albania of fomenting the demonstrations. For its part the Albanian government accused Yugoslavia of a hypocritical campaign of oppression against its Albanian population. The regime in Tirana became ever more critical as it attempted to foster national sentiment at home as a distraction from the country’s economically parlous state. Nevertheless, it had no interest in encouraging Yugoslav Albanians to seek refuge in Albania; in the two years after the 1981 demonstrations, 249 such people were returned to the Yugoslav authorities. Even so, by the end of the 1980s, the gradual deterioration in Yugoslav-Albanian relations culminated in Ramiz Alia accusing Serbia of genocide at the United Nations and the first Socialist Party government in Albania recognizing the “Republic of Kosova.”

The scope of the chapter

How can we relate this more general political history to the specific issue of Kosovo Albanian identity and culture? The years following the Linguistic Consultation of Prishtina in 1968 were marked by what was called the “affirmation” of the Albanian nationality in Yugoslavia championed by the Party leadership in Kosovo. This was intended as an acknowledgement of the equal status of Yugoslav Albanians as being “in their own home” in a socialist Yugoslavia of brotherhood and unity. This affirmation would be achieved in three ways: firstly, through confirming the status of Kosovo as a federal entity largely independent of Serbia while pushing for greater status for the

529 Kola, Search for Greater Albania, pp.130, 137, 164, 163, 189, 206; Raymond Detrez, Kosovo: de uitgestelde oorlog (Antwerp: Houtekiet, 2002), p.94; Shkëlzen Maliqi, Nya e Kosovës: As Vllasi, as Millosheviqi (Ljubljana: KRT, 1990), p.222.
Albanian language; secondly, through the production and appointment of Albanian cadre to professional posts in the province; and lastly, through a series of events designed to celebrate Albanian identity within the context of Yugoslavia.

The desire of the Kosovar elite to secure the transfer of power, reflected in the periodic change in ethnic key and the haste of Slav professional cadre to leave the province, was met by much of the Kosovo Albanian nationalist intelligentsia with an impatience for greater equality, even if there were few Kosovo Albanians qualified to take up professional posts and the quality of their education sometimes left room for doubt. Though this situation was reminiscent of many processes of decolonization, in this case there was no prospect of any transfer of sovereignty.

The common portrayal of the 1970s as a period of positive change for Kosovo Albanians in fact masked a tale of disappointment and frustration. The changes made failed to bring any relative improvement in Kosovo’s position with respect to the rest of Yugoslavia, but rather saw it fall ever further behind in economic terms. Moreover, however keen Kosovo Albanian intellectuals were to participate as full equals in the cultural development of a common Albanian space, the regime in Tirana did not allow them to do so. The obstacles of existing conditions such as local dialect, so lightly brushed aside at the Linguistic Consultation, also proved rather more difficult to overcome. This attempt to affirm the status of the Albanian nationality, this struggle for decolonization without independence and the resulting disappointment and frustration, can be seen in a variety of areas with a particular focus on language.

After the demonstrations of 1981, the Kosovar elite was purged and replaced by assimilationist politicians of the Partisan generation who ran Kosovo in conjunction with younger politicians born and educated under socialism. As for ordinary Kosovo Albanians, however, the mass arrests and harsh repression following the demonstrations meant that, while Kosovo (and Yugoslavia) might no longer have been primarily South Slav, Kosovo Albanians perceived an increasing identity between Serb and Montenegrin interests and the Party line. After the “Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution”\textsuperscript{531} of the late 1980s, even Kosovo Albanians within the Party found themselves in an increasingly marginal position. From then on, the explicit aim by Serbia to restore the control it enjoyed over Kosovo before 1969, the constitutional amendments, the mass dismissals of Kosovo Albanians and their exclusion from the public sphere led to the establishment of two exclusive, parallel societies in Kosovo, the public society using Serbo-Croatian, run by and for Slavs, and the private, Kosovo Albanian society using Standard Albanian, controlled by the intellectuals. We will now turn to the way these trends played out in the linguistic sphere.

**Initial enthusiasm for Standard Albanian**

The aftermath of 1968 was one of great enthusiasm for the new linguistic changes in the direction of Standard Albanian. Some journals, such as *Përparimi*, changed to the new standard immediately; *Rilindja* followed suit in 1969, though the literary journal *Jeta e re* did not completely change over until 1971, possibly because of a backlog of unpublished articles.\textsuperscript{532} Titles from Albania which were republished by the

\textsuperscript{531} The street protests that succeeded in replacing the Party leaderships in Kosovo, Montenegro and Vojvodina with supporters of Slobodan Milošević.

Rilindja publishing house became best-sellers, not least as manuals of how to write in the new standard.\textsuperscript{533} Other works written in previous norms were republished in the standard.\textsuperscript{534} This was a conscious embracing of a pan-Albanian status and a conscious rejection of their own past and of areas where Kosovo was distinctive. For example, there were articles criticising the use of words like shitore ("shop") which were purely Albanian but were local to Kosovo. Indeed, this became so extreme that articles were published explaining that there were, in fact, Gheg words that writers were still allowed to use in the standard, and that they were in danger of being lost altogether.\textsuperscript{535} At this time the arguments of Kostallari in Albania were reproduced in various papers and journals, saying that Gheg would eventually die out not only as a literary form but also as a spoken one.\textsuperscript{536}

**Affirmation through language status management**

However, the use of Standard Albanian was of consequence in defining Kosovo’s status within Yugoslavia. As rights were tied to nationality and nationality to language and territory, the concept of the “state language” was central to how rights were perceived in socialist Yugoslavia. As the constituent peoples of the country were the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Muslims, Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian were the “state languages” of the Federation. Within the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the 1963 constitution designated Serbo-Croatian as the

\textsuperscript{534} Appendix Two presents five excerpts from one work republished in the standard, Azem Shkreli’s novel *Karvani i bardhë* in three editions from 1960, 1966 and 1975, tracking how the linguistic norm changed in each edition of the book.
\textsuperscript{536} Kostallari, “Gjuha e sotme letrare,” p.84.
“state language” while in the autonomous provinces the languages of nationalities such as Albanian or Hungarian, whose “home state” was outside Yugoslavia, were to be used officially alongside Serbo-Croatian, together with the languages of smaller nationalities such as Turkish in the municipalities where such groups lived. As mentioned above, the series of constitutional amendments in the late 1960s and early 1970s, while seeking to address ethnic grievances, had produced a renewed emphasis on ideology, thus making these designations more than mere formulae.

Under these circumstances, Kosovo Albanian intellectuals sought constitutional provisions that overturned the concept of “state language” in favour of the fullest expression of the “equality of languages and scripts of nations and nationalities,” which would not only prove more enforceable than the provisions before 1966, but expand the scope of the official use of Albanian beyond Kosovo to republic and federal levels. The legal scholar Gazmend Zajmi and others expounded this view, citing Lenin’s opposition to the concept of the use of Russian as a “state language” in Ukraine and to positions taken by Tito and the KPJ before and during the National Liberation War on the equality of the languages of nations and nationalities at all levels.537 Not all nationalities were equal, however. The size of the Albanian community in Yugoslavia was large, Albanian being the third largest language in numbers of speakers by 1971.538 Moreover, it was not the number of Albanians alone that was significant in their quest for wider rights, but that they were a homogeneous group in a single area straddling three republics. It was important that Albanian was accorded a role at an inter-republican and a federal level, particularly as the constitutional amendments until 1971, as Fatmir

Fehmiu argued, transformed Yugoslavia into a multinational community of equal nations and nationalities. Besides, as Dušan Popović wrote, if one were to extend the idea of “state language,” if for example the speakers of German, French and Italian in Switzerland were all treated as having a “home state” beyond the borders of the country, that would disqualify the Federal use of any language except Romansh.539

Serbian legal scholars such as Svetozar Polić objected that it was impossible for “minorities” to be equal with the sovereign nations of Yugoslavia; and even if such differences did not exist, granting rights at republican or federal level for one nationality would entail granting the same rights for all of them. Those who opposed Polić countered that it was discriminatory to treat a language as second class because it was not spoken by a Yugoslav nation, even though it was in fact spoken by a population larger than that of some Yugoslav nations. While the Federation was both a state and a self-managing community, it was increasingly taking on the character of the latter, which presumed the complete equality of the languages of nations and nationalities; focussing only on the politics of state and nationality would only lead to nationalism, as members of each group would consider any rights gained by one side to be rights lost by the other. In preparations for the 1974 constitution, discussion at all levels resulted in a solution, at least on paper, largely in the Albanians’ favour; Albanian would have complete and enforceable equality within Kosovo and the constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo contained no mention of the hierarchy of official use of languages.540

539 Popović, “Pozita e kombësive,” 874.
540 Fatmir Fehmiu, “Barazia e gjuhëve dhe e shkrimeve të kombësive në organët dhe organizatat që kryejnë punët me interes për federatën,” Përparimi, 1980, issue 6, 724, 731. Similarly, the demand of Croatian linguists for the language of Croatia to be called “Croatian” was recognized in the 1974 Croatian constitution as “the standard form of the popular language of Croats and Serbs of Croatia, which bears the name of Croatian or Serbian”: Ronelle Alexander, “Language and identity: the fate of Serbo-Croatian,” in Daskalov and Marinov, Entangled Histories, p.402.
As a barometer of how this worked among the Kosovo Albanian intelligentsia, let us examine articles published in learned journals in Kosovo. In the 1950s and 1960s the majority of articles in journals were in Serbo-Croatian, even those written by Albanians. By the mid-1970s, however, the majority were written in Albanian. In the earlier period, summaries of articles would often be in English, French, German, or Russian, and occasionally Albanian, but only if written by an Albanian; by the mid-1970s, although there were still foreign-language summaries, journals were much more careful to provide a summary in the Other language, whether the article was in Serbo-Croatian or Albanian. What is also clear from these journals is the dearth of inter-ethnic cooperation in writing articles, and, with the exception of scientific journals, the dearth of cooperation with scholars from outside Kosovo. While this is symptomatic of what was happening in other parts of Yugoslavia, where scholarly activity was equally decentralized (and thus parochial), the barrier of language made the isolation of intellectual production all the more pronounced.

The change in the ethnic origins of the contributors to such journals can also be linked to the change in the ethnic composition of the body of scholars and other professionals in Kosovo at this time. The ethnic key, which had provided for “equality” in provision for employment and other benefits between ethnic communities in the early years after 1945, was set at 50:50 Slav-Albanian at a time when, through lack of cadre

541 Invariably the Serbian variant in the Cyrillic script.
542 See, e.g., Glasnik Muzeja Kosova i Metohije, 1956, issue 1 and Zbornik filozofskog fakulteta u Prištini/Buletin i punimeve shkencore të fakultetit filozofik të Prishtinës, IV (1967).
545 Devic, “Ethnonationalism, Politics, and the Intellectuals,” p.395. Even where inter-republican cooperation was celebrated, it is noteworthy that for Kosovo it was restricted to the natural sciences, economics and the study of Marxism-Leninism and Tito: A.D., “Veprimtaria shkencore në Kosovë. Bashkëpunim i gjerë ndërrepublikan dhe ndër kombëtar,” Fjala, 1 April 1980, p.2.
with sufficient education, Albanians were often unable to gain 50% of places available. With the spread of mass education to the Albanian population, the growth of the Albanian population as a proportion of the total population of Kosovo, and the coming to power after 1966 of Albanian politicians at the head of major networks of patronage, the ethnic key began to shift ever further in the Albanians’ favour. According to Vujadin Milanović, at the University of Prishtina, it changed around 1970 to 2:1 Albanian: Slav, rising to 4:1 in the 1980s before changing to 3:1 in 1987. This change, described by many Serbs and Montenegrins as “majorization” or “Albanization,” was blamed for the additional problems Slavs faced finding work as well as for their being forced to leave the province altogether. As Veli Deva recounted in 1969, clashes that were commonplace if they happened between people of the same ethnicity had the potential to stoke ethnic grievance and reaction if they were between people of two different ethnicities. As Kosovo became more prosperous during the late 1960s and 1970s, and as the population of educated Albanians increased, there was greater competition for resources. By the late 1960s there were already reports of Serbs and Montenegrins being pressured by Albanians to leave Kosovo; the departure rate was especially high among professional experts in the kinds of jobs for which the ethnic key was of particular importance.

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546 President of the National Liberation Committee for Kosovo and Metohia to the Federal Commissar for Education, Belgrade, 1945, AJ; 317-48-71 in Doknić et al., Kulturna politika Jugoslavije, pp.342-343; Byron, Përzgjedhjet, p.205; Momčilo Pavlović, “Kosovo 1974-1990,” in Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert, eds., Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009), p.63; Milanović, Univerzitet u Prištini, p.31. As Kostovicova notes, the number of permanent teaching posts and managers at the university that Milanović reports show a ratio of 2.4:1 and 3.3:1 respectively, which suggests, Kostovicova believes, that reports of majorization were exaggerated: Kostovicova, Kosovo, p.62.

Slav resistance to Kosovo Albanian affirmation

In this atmosphere, language became a way for people to define the wider conflict. Besides the conflict for jobs and resources, Serbs and Montenegrins reported feeling increasingly in a foreign country. Albanian was not only increasingly used in public, but increasingly was the first language in public, including sites of daily life, such as shops, offices, bus stations, or doctor’s surgeries. Slavs reported being refused service if they could not or would not speak Albanian, and feeling slighted when Albanians who knew Serbo-Croatian insisted on translation. Although about 40% of Kosovo Serbs had at least a passive understanding of Albanian, their active use of the language was still very rare. Hitherto most Slavs had expected to conduct their entire lives in Serbo-Croatian. This was very different from the contemporary experience of Albanians, for many of whom, while they would use Gheg at home, Standard Albanian was replacing Serbo-Croatian (except when on military service) as the language of officialdom. That said, Albanians would often continue to use Serbo-Croatian at work if there were Serbs or Montenegrins present who could not speak Albanian.

On the Slav side, one can see at this time an increasing sense of grievance, although the linguistic aspect of this came out much more in the 1980s than the 1970s. But what is particularly noticeable is that neither Kosovo Albanian scholars nor the Party addressed these grievances at all. Two Kosovo Serbs who presented such grievances at the Provincial Assembly in 1971 were expelled from the central

548 Petrović and Blagojević, Migration of Serbs, pp.121-122, 124, 160-161.
committee, and a Serb professor at the University of Prishtina philosophy faculty who tried to set up a new political party was jailed.\textsuperscript{550}

Nevertheless, the implementation of the law and the ideological commitment to linguistic equality did not always live up to expectations. Official communications and decisions at federal level, between republics and within the armed forces still remained in Serbo-Croatian. Films shown at cinemas were not subtitled in Albanian and other government-produced documents such as lottery tickets, post office and railway registries of placenames, international treaties (including those involving entities in Kosovo, such as that between the universities of Prishtina and Jena), and the Official Gazette of the SFRY had no place for the Albanian language.\textsuperscript{551} Similar objections were raised in Slovenia, moreover, especially about Serbo-Croatian being the sole language of instruction and command of the armed forces, as well as the perceived threat posed to the future of Slovenian by immigration of Serbo-Croatian speakers unwilling to learn the “unreasonably difficult” language of the republic.\textsuperscript{552}

\textbf{Affirmation through corpus management and its limitations}

While language status for Kosovo Albanians was a site of affirmation within Yugoslavia, the development of language corpus entailed their relationship with

\textsuperscript{550} Kryesia e KK të LK të Kosovës, “Debat pa toleranci.” Although Jovo Šotra, one of the Kosovo Serbs in question, tried to imply a connection between the Kosovo leadership and the recently purged leadership of Croatia, it would be a mistake to think that the Party leadership in Kosovo were sympathetic to the free market and multi-candidate reformers among communists at the time. Of all the senior republican and provincial Party leaderships during 1971 and 1972, only those of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo emerged unscathed from the purges. Dragoš Ivanović and Nijaz Selmanović, “Oštara rasprava o jedinstvu u rukovodstvu,” \textit{Politika}, 23 December 1971, pp.7-8; Singleton, \textit{Short History}, p.259; Hoxha, \textit{Në vetën e parë}, pp.370-371.


Albania. The expansion of cultural relations, however, did not mean that Kosovo and Albania were participating on equal terms. Janet Byron and others mention that works of writers and linguists from Albania were published in Kosovo and vice versa; however, they have not noted that this traffic was very much one way.\textsuperscript{553} While much of the canon of Albanian literature was republished by the Rilindja publishing house in Prishtina, almost no books from Kosovo were reprinted by 8 Nëntori in Tirana. Rexhep Ismajli notes that while \textit{Jeta e re} and other journals accorded literature from Albania a special place in their columns, journals in Albania would treat the literary production of Kosovo Albanians like “Vietnamese literature,” that is, the literature of a friendly but definitely foreign people.\textsuperscript{554} The official \textit{Historia e popullit shqiptar} of Kosovo was merely a republication of the Tirana \textit{Historia e Shqipërisë} with a short appendix at the end of the second volume to account for the history of Albanians in Yugoslavia between 1912 and 1944. The introduction to the work refers to the preparation of the \textit{Historia e Shqipërisë} and the role of the PPSH while the index omits any reference to the appendix on Albanians in Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{555} In terms of language, the work of authors and linguists from Albania was regularly published in \textit{Rilindja} and featured in linguistic journals, but the publication of literary works by writers from Kosovo in Albania was much rarer. Apart from a series of articles that appeared connected to the Congress of Orthography and in 1981, at the time when cultural relations were broken, the number of journal articles from Kosovo Albanian contributors was very small. In reports from conferences where linguists from both countries took part, generally much more attention was paid in the Albanian media to contributions from linguists from Albania than to those from Kosovo.\textsuperscript{556}

\textsuperscript{553} See Byron, \textit{Përzgjedhje}, p.221; Raymond Detrez, \textit{Kosovo}, p.51.  
\textsuperscript{554} Ismajli, \textit{“Në gjuhë” dhe “për gjuhë,”} p.201.  
\textsuperscript{555} Pollo and Buda, eds., \textit{Historia e popullit shqiptar}, vol. 1, pp.8, 14; vol. 2, pp.793-813, 857-876.  
of Tirana, from the perspective of the Kosovo Albanians, they were one people, and therefore should be treated equally.

Kosovo Albanians’ secondary position in the process of standardization had been clear from the beginning. There was no official reaction by anyone in Albania to the Linguistic Consultation of 1968 in Prishtina. The first mention of it came in an article by Kostallari published in 1970, when Kostallari mentioned in passing that Albanians in Yugoslavia had met to decide on using Standard Albanian under the slogan “one nation – one literary language” and that they were now writing poetry and prose in Standard Albanian, of which he reproduced four examples.557 We have seen in Chapter Two the extent to which the preparation for the Congress of Orthography in 1972 was largely a domestic Albanian affair. There was, however, a two-volume publication of articles culled from various sources which was printed by the organizing committee of the Congress which reflected the debate which had been going on in Albania and Yugoslavia about the final form of Standard Albanian.558 Let us look more closely at this.

As we saw in Chapter Two, the authors of Standard Albanian in Albania were primarily concerned with linguistic and cultural management in Albania, where Albanian was unchallenged as the sole official language. In Kosovo, by contrast, Albanian had the status of a regional language whose speakers had embraced Standard Albanian to express their membership of a wider Albanian nation. Of the authors contributing to the preparatory materials for the Congress, who had been working on linguistic matters for many years, it is notable that a smaller proportion of those from

558 Komisioni organizues i Kongresit të Drejtshkrimit të Gjuhës Shqipe, Probleme të gjuhës letrare dhe drejtshkrimit të saj (studime dhe artikuj) (Tirana: Komisioni organizues i Kongresit të Drejtshkrimit të Gjuhës Shqipe, 1972), 2 vols.
Yugoslavia than contributors from Albania were actual signatories to the Resolution of the Congress; about a half of those from Albania were signatories, but only about a third of those from Yugoslavia, meaning that those from Yugoslavia were not considered sufficiently important to sign. Indeed, of the 88 signatories of the Resolution of the Congress, only eleven came from Yugoslavia (and one from Italy), the rest being from Albania. Moreover, it is clear that the spirit in which the Rregullat had been prepared in the ferment of Albania’s Cultural Revolution had not been transmitted to Kosovo. Some of the authors from Yugoslavia pointed out possible improvements, including particular forms that could be used as they reflected popular speech, by which they meant the speech of most Albanians, including those in Yugoslavia – in other words, Gheg.559 However, as we saw in Chapter Two, this in fact was not up for discussion, nor was it what language managers from Albania meant by “popular speech.”

Perhaps the most interesting document in the preparatory materials is an excerpt from the Conclusions of the Linguistic Consultation of Prishtina.560 This is because three of the nine conclusions had been omitted, thus giving the delegates from Albania a distorted view of what the Albanians of Yugoslavia had actually agreed. Rexhep Ismajli believes that this censorship occurred, at least over one of the points, because it mentioned “democratization,” which the regime in Tirana was not keen to foster.561 I believe at least two other factors are just as important. First, the omitted parts of the resolution talk about adopting the standard in terms of “correct socialist development,” and as the regime in Albania identified Tito’s regime as bourgeois, this was plainly problematic. Secondly, the resolution mandated the organizers to contact the Institute of

History and Linguistics in Tirana and the State University of Tirana, rather than the state and Party apparatus under whose guidance standardization was being carried out, thus implicitly minimizing the role of the Party and of the state which, as we saw in the second chapter, were accorded foremost importance during the Cultural Revolution in Albania.

The participation of Albanians from Yugoslavia in the Congress reveals much about their own position in these debates. On the one hand, it shows the internalization of standard language ideology coming from Albania, while on the other it demonstrates continuing conflicts within the Albanian community in Yugoslavia. The latter is demonstrated by the speech by the Macedonian Albanian linguist Remzi Nesimi, who claimed credit for the Macedonian Albanians for influencing the Kosovo Albanians to use the “melodious and resounding” southern idiom.\footnote{Remzi Nesimi, “Procesi i njësimit të shqipes letrape në Mqëdoni,” in Idriz Ajeti, Rexhep Qosja and Abdulla Zajmi, eds., Kongresi i drejtkrimit të gjuhës shqipe 20-22 nentor 1972 (Prishtina: IAP, 1974), pp.140, 141. In the run-up to the Congress, the terms northern idiom and southern idiom were promoted by the Institute of Linguistics in Tirana as replacements for Gheg and Tosk dialect, as dialects were destined to wither away with the advent of Standard Albanian: Hasan Vokshi, “Disa veçori të letrarishtes së sotme dhe drejtkrimi i sjaj,” in Komisioni organizues, Probleme të gjuhës letrape, vol 1., p.167.} In the main speech representing Kosovo Albanians, Idriz Ajeti referred to Skënder Riza's statement in 1944 in support of a pan-Gheg, while stating that, like the two heads of the eagle on the national flag, Albanian had two main dialects. In doing so, Ajeti condemned Riza’s words as fatalist and regionalist.\footnote{Idriz Ajeti, “Rruga e zhvillimit të gjuhës letrape në Kosovë,” in Idriz Ajeti, Rexhep Qosja and Abdulla Zajmi, eds., Kongresi i drejtkrimit të gjuhës shqipe 20-25 nentor 1972 (Prishtina: IAP, 1974), pp.129-138, p.132.} As Ismajli has pointed out, Riza had, in fact, originally made this point in an article in Përprjekja shqiptare in 1936 written in Tosk, in which he defended the right of Tosk as a literary language to claim an equal place with the Elbasan-based Gheg then in official use. In condemning Riza’s defence of the rights of a written dialect he himself supported, Ajeti was doing three things. Firstly, he was showing that
although he had once been strongly influenced by Riza, he was now repeating the words of Kostallari, who had made the same point in 1970.\textsuperscript{564} Moreover, this showed that the context of Riza’s work was less important than the political imperative of promoting the accelerated unification of both dialects in a form which would have nothing to do with the “anachronistic,” “fatalist” Islamic heritage of Albanian writing, “divorced from the people,” which, at least in Kosovo, had been literary Gheg. Lastly, while the importance of Riza’s work in the history of linguistics in Kosovo meant it could not be omitted from any account, it was unacceptable to treat a man who, as we saw in Chapter Two, had by now been banished to Berat and forced to abandon linguistic work as being of any value, except inasmuch as some of Riza’s pan-Gheg seemed to be close to written Tosk.\textsuperscript{565} However, nowhere was the subordinate and dependent position of Albanians outside Albania made more clear than in Kostallari’s fifty-page keynote speech at the start of the Congress, where he devoted a mere forty-four lines to the contribution of Albanians in Yugoslavia, only twice as much as he devoted to the much smaller Arbëresh minority in Italy.\textsuperscript{566}

Once the Conclusions and Resolution of the Congress had been signed, there needed to be a final definition of what the standard should be, including an orthography, a grammar and a defining dictionary, as discussed in Chapter Two. Whatever the rhetoric about a “joint victory,”\textsuperscript{567} the Kosovo Albanians remained excluded from the

\textsuperscript{564} Androkli Kostallari, “Mbi disa veçori,” 10.
\textsuperscript{565} Ismajli, \textit{Pasionet dhe pësimit}, p.73; Ajeti, “Rruga e zhvillimit,” pp.131, 133.
\textsuperscript{566} Androkli Kostallari, \textit{Gjuha e sotme letrare shqipe dhe disa probleme themelore të drejtshkrimit të saj} (Tirana: Akademia e Shkencave e RPS të Shqipërisë, Instituti i Gjuhësisë dhe i Letërsisë, 1973), pp.46-49.
\textsuperscript{567} Hoxha, “Populli shqiptar sot lufton,” p.2. Instead of the Congress being a “joint victory,” Enver Hoxha was more accurate when he said later that the Kosovo Albanians had “accepted” the unification of Albanian: Enver Hoxha, “Propaganda dhe krijuesit të ruajnë të gjallë në mendjet dhe në zemrat e njerëzve tanë jetën dhe vepërën e heronjve” – nga biseda në takimin ditor të sekretarëve të KQ të PPSH, 2 mars 1983, \textit{Raporte e fjalime 1982-1983} (Tirana: Instituti i Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste pranë KQ të PPSH, 1985), pp.322-323, quoted in Enver Hoxha, “Mendime të shokut Enver Hoxha,” 54.
work to finalize the details of Standard Albanian. While these publications used a few examples from Kosovo, these works were entirely produced in Albania by the Institute of History and Linguistics and republished in Kosovo. Even in the case of the dictionary, where there was a conscious attempt to gather lexical items from as many areas as possible, not a single person from Yugoslavia is credited in its production; in any case, study of Albanian dialect in Yugoslavia at this time had far from complete coverage.\textsuperscript{568} Indeed, by about 1980 complaints began to appear in journals from Kosovo Albanian linguists saying they thought they had agreed one thing at the Congress, but once the official grammar and orthography were published, something else appeared, and that perhaps this could be re-examined.\textsuperscript{569}

**Affirmation through corpus management in Kosovo**

However much or little Kosovo Albanians contributed to the final form of Standard Albanian, the idiom still needed to be adopted by the Kosovo Albanian population as a whole. When a language undergoes standardization, once a standard variety had been chosen and codified, it has to be implemented to ensure that the intended users adopt the standard language. According to Ana Deumert and Wim Vandenbussche, it is in this stage of implementation that standardization projects are most likely to fail.\textsuperscript{570} Implementation was much more difficult in Kosovo than in Albania for a variety of reasons. In Kosovo there was no totalitarian political force

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identified with and underwriting the project. Kosovo Albanians had experienced much less time during which a Tosk-based standard had been promoted. In addition, there was a lack of sociolinguistic expertise in judging how best to deal with the problems language managers faced. Lastly, Kosovo, of course, was home to a great majority of Gheg speakers whose speech was distant from the Tosk-based phonology of Standard Albanian. Because of these problems, especially the last, language managers in Kosovo decided to concentrate on implementing the standard primarily in the written language. It was claimed that this was nothing for the farmer or the artisan to worry about, as they did not need to use the written language much; however, users of the written language included schoolchildren whose attendance at school was compulsory, so it was envisaged that Standard Albanian would eventually become the language of all Albanians in all circumstances, without division of region, social standing or the formality of the occasion. It was claimed that this was nothing for the farmer or the artisan to worry about, as they did not need to use the written language much; however, users of the written language included schoolchildren whose attendance at school was compulsory, so it was envisaged that Standard Albanian would eventually become the language of all Albanians in all circumstances, without division of region, social standing or the formality of the occasion. Television and radio announcers were enjoined not to allow any trace of local speech into their words so that all might understand them (though as there were very few Tosks in Yugoslavia, the chances are that the announcer’s own local speech would have been more understandable), and all interviewees, including children and the elderly, were expected to speak Standard

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571 Mehmet Halimi, “Kultura i të folurit,” in Sulejman Drini, Mehmet Halimi and Shaqir Berani, eds., Çështje të normës letrare (Përmbledhje studimesh) (Prishtina: IAP, 1980) pp.66, 116; Mehmet Halimi, “Përvetësimi i normës së gjuhës letrare,” in Drini, Halimi and Berani, eds., Çështje të normës letrare, pp.126-127, 130; Mehmet Halimi, “Roli i mjeteve të informimit gojor në kultivimin e kulturës gjuhësore,” Gjuha shqipe, 1983 issue 2, 6. Albanian language managers in Macedonia disagreed, believing Standard Albanian was a language that could be mastered “by the simplest workers” and not just by intellectuals. The reasons for this difference of opinion are unclear, though it should be noted that written Tosk had been promoted in Macedonia for a little longer than it had been in Kosovo and that these views reflect the influence of the doyen of Macedonian Albanian linguists, Petro Janura, who was himself a Tosk from Fier in Albania: Petro Janura, “Disa mendime margjinale rreth ortografisë së shqipërisë,” in Idriz Ajeti, Rexhep Qosja and Abdulla Zajmi, eds., Kongresi i drejtshkrimit të gjuhës shqipe 20-25 nëntor 1972 (Prishtina: IAP, 1974), p.527; Remzi Nesimi in R. Zllatku, “Për një gjuhë kristale, stabile,” Flaka e vëllazërimit, 10 December 1972, p.13.

572 As it was, television reception between Macedonia and Kosovo was difficult. Nevertheless, most of Kosovo was able to receive television signals from Albania. This helped to cement a relationship between Kosovo and Albania in the minds of those Kosovo Albanians who had televisions which did not necessarily include Albanians in Macedonia or elsewhere in Yugoslavia: Rexhep Zllatku, “Fillon emisioni i RTV të Shkupit në gjuhën shqipe,” Flaka e vëllazërimit, 27 April 1967, p.4.
Linguistic realities and the border between Yugoslavia and Albania were of little consequence, then, when imagining Kosovo as already united with Albania, writing and speaking the language derived from the people as they (that is, Tosks) heard it. In practice, that meant that the task of the Albanologist in Kosovo was not the usual one of the language manager to codify popular speech and make the standard language close to it, but rather to make the local popular language become “civilized” and conform to the standard.

Given the difficulty of this task, despite the enthusiasm with which the young and the educated adopted Standard Albanian, there were still significant problems. Besides the failure of many businesses to conform to the new spelling in their work and their shop signs, and the problems associated with a people who had only recently become literate, the press, translators and especially schools were held responsible by language managers for allowing all kinds of mistakes, including hypercorrections, usually directly associated with the particular features of North-Eastern Gheg. What was needed to resolve this situation was more teaching time for the Albanian language to help pupils, teachers and workers rid themselves of their provincial habits and aim at producing a correct Albanian free of unwanted influences.

573 Halimi, “Përvetësimi,” p.115; Byron, Përzigjdhje, p.264.
Beside the unwanted influence of regional Albanian speech, these language managers complained of the undesirable effects of foreign borrowings into the language as it was used in Kosovo, mainly from Serbo-Croatian and Turkish. Albanologists singled out intellectuals and linguistic snobs as peppering their vocabulary with unnecessary foreign borrowings; these polluting, urban influences were contrasted with the “clean, fluent and natural” language of the idealized Albanian peasant untouched by foreign influence.\textsuperscript{577} The peasant’s words relating, for example, to animal husbandry or the weather were seen as a rich source for enriching Standard Albanian and providing inspiration for technical terms as those dialects gradually disappeared.\textsuperscript{578} Albanologists were thus deliberately conflating Standard Albanian with the language as a whole, as it was held that no foreign term could enter the language (not just the standard language) unless there was no Albanian equivalent and the prospective borrowing could fit into the rules of Albanian word formation.\textsuperscript{579} This conflation is part of the social engineering Fishman describes as part of language management,\textsuperscript{580} instituting Albanologists and associated experts as the gatekeepers of the language. This, they were no different from colleagues in the rest of Yugoslavia, though those in Kosovo faced problems Slav language managers did not. The realities of social, political and economic differences with Albania meant that Albanologists in Yugoslavia were faced with the task of

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\item Halimi, “Përvetësimi,” p.121. Ardian Vehbiu notes that the FGJSSH was replete with many terms collected from rural areas of dubious value or relevance to a modern standard language: Ardian Vehbiu, Fraktalët e shqipes. Rrëgjimi i gjeometrive të standardit (Tiranë: Çabej, 2007), p.129. There is as yet no systematic study on how successful the promotion of rare rural words in Standard Albanian has been.
\item Fishman, “Status Agenda in Corpus Planning,” p.50.
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finding words for things seldom seen or indeed heard of in Albania. This brought frustration in finding words in collaboration with experts in fields educated to use terms in Serbo-Croatian, as in the confusion among non-Albanologist experts between the Serbo-Croatian words *zaptivati* (“to seal”) and *zaptivač* (“gasket”) and the Albanian *zaptoj* (“I invade”) and *zaptues* (“invader”).581

While inter-republican co-operation may have been sparse, however, finding commonalities of interest was certainly not. Similar views on purism, also concentrating on the influence of Serbian, were expressed by linguists in Croatia. Radoslav Katičić, a Croatian linguist known to Albanians in both Kosovo and Albania for his work on Illyrian and the ancient languages of the Balkans, was one of the few non-Albanian sources cited for his work on standard language, in which he set out his views on purism and his uncompromising position on the primacy of the standard language.582

The atmosphere these standard language ideologies generated is perhaps best summed up by an article by Idriz Ajeti published in *Gjurmime albanologjike* in 1981. There, he contrasts the borrowing of German words and calques by Serbian as “natural” because Serbia was not ruled by German-speakers, whereas the German borrowings in Croatian were “artificial” because Croatia had been ruled by the Habsburg Empire, thus making clear the reason for waging an intense campaign against Serbian and Turkish words and calques in Albanian through the 1980s. In doing so, Ajeti cited the institutions doing this work for Slovenian, Macedonian and Serbo-Croatian and

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582 Radoslav Katičić [Katićić], “Antroponomia ilire dhe etnogjeneza e shqiptarëve,” *Studime filologjike*, 1972, issue 9, 77-82; Radoslav Katičić, *Novi jezikoslovni ogledi*, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1986), pp.73, 78-79: the first edition appeared in 1971. While Kosovo Albanian linguists were more likely to be trained in Prishtina than anywhere else, Milanović has shown that after 1970 Zagreb replaced Belgrade as the most popular destination outside Kosovo for all postgraduate study among Albanian staff at the University of Prishtina: Milanović, *Univerzitet u Prištini*, pp.292-293, 293-294.
demanded the same apparatus for Albanian.\textsuperscript{583} Besides being, given the circumstances of the time, a bold statement on the equality of Albanian and the “state languages” of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, this demand envisaged the establishment of a formal bureaucracy enshrining the power of Albanologists as gatekeepers of what they considered the central cultural asset of the nation.\textsuperscript{584} Furthermore, the demand contained no recognition of the desire of the managers of the other languages for Ausbau\textsuperscript{585} because their languages were close enough to be mutually intelligible. In relating to the other languages of Yugoslavia, then, the language managers of Albanian in Kosovo sought to combine the distance of Albanian from the Slav languages with the intensity of Ausbau the managers of the other languages practised against each other, using the Yugoslav system to enhance the emotional rejection of things Serbo-Croatian and the embrace of things Albanian.

Just as important for the gatekeepers was the policing of the internal borders of Kosovo Albanian language use. While it is extremely difficult to find public dissent against Standard Albanian in the period covered by this chapter, it is nevertheless visible in gatekeepers’ attacks against the “small minority” of “conservatives” who did not conform or who claimed that Standard Albanian was the same as Tosk. According to Rexhep Qosja, discussions on language could be fruitful, positive and intellectually worthwhile only if knowledge and adoption of the norm of Standard Albanian was understood. The anonymous figures who failed to comply were in his view beyond the

\textsuperscript{585} The construction and management of “an autonomous, standardized variety together with all nonstandard dialects from that part of the dialect continuum […] dependent on it”, for example the construction and management of Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian and Slovenian from the South Slav dialect continuum: Trudgill, “Glocalisation,” p.36.
pale of reasonable discussion. Furthermore, as the first issue of the Albanological Institute journal of language culture *Gjuha shqipe* made clear, keeping Albanian pure was a major task in managing the language; and failure to guard against foreign borrowings was a form of colonialism that would lead to the assimilation of Albanians as Slavs, as had been attempted with minorities in the Soviet Union. Yet there were some, again unidentified here, who apparently lacked any kind of responsibility or conscience towards their culture.586 Worst of all, there were young Kosovo Albanians who used Serbian daily greetings, endangering both the language and the nation.587

Of course, language status and corpus were not the only means by which Kosovo Albanians sought cultural “affirmation” within Kosovo. Thanks to several major conferences supported by the Kosovo authorities, Albanologists were able to promote the affirmation of the Albanian nation, although for them this meant more emphasizing ties with Tirana than with a common Yugoslav home. In his opening address to the Onomastics Symposium in 1977, Rexhep Qosja set the tone of the conference by stressing what he saw as the continuity between Albanian placenames and many of those used by the Illyrians, thus reinforcing Albanian claims to autochthony and primacy of settlement in Kosovo.588 Furthermore, the folklore Albanologists claimed could be associated with Illyrian heritage served to reinforce Albanian nationalist ideas about an irreligious people continually fighting national

587 As one of those using those greetings at that time, Ballsor Hoxha has written that, although he sensed that using Serbian and English was a kind of betrayal, its use reflected his and his friends’ cultural models and aspirations, dissatisfied as they were with the bland heroes on offer from Albanian intellectual production: Ballsor Hoxha, “Pse nuk di të shkruaj?” in Karmit Zysman and Ballsor Hoxha, eds., *Konsiderimi i të ardhmës. Perspektivat e ballafaqimit me të kaluarën në Kosovë* (Prishtina: Forum Ziviler Friedendienst, 2012), pp.27-28.
enemies. In historiography, Ali Hadri felt able to support Tirana’s view in stating his disagreement with the memoirs of the senior Partisan figure Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, while the celebration of the centenary of the “Albanian League of Prizren” in 1978 promoted the League as a founding contribution based in Kosovo towards the development of an Albanian state. In time, especially after 1981, it became difficult to see any recognition of a common space in Kosovo as Serb scholars and Kosovo Albanian Albanologists minimized each other’s history and culture in Kosovo.

1981: Language as a political tool in a struggle of Albanian against Albanian

For some Kosovo Albanians, the logical conclusion to draw from this rhetoric was that they were not Yugoslavs at all, but rather Albanians, and therefore wanted separation from Yugoslavia. The way this played out can be seen in the demonstrations of 1981. As Nebojša Vladisavljević notes, these demonstrations were of a different character from those of 1968 in that the demonstrators’ demands – in 1981 for Kosovo to become a federal republic – were not ones the authorities had any intention of fulfilling, and were seen by the Party and the state as a counter-revolutionary threat to Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. This was particularly true as, unlike in 1968, the 1981 demonstrations spread to a significant proportion of the Albanian working class in

592 Nebojša Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.105; Kola, Greater Albania, pp.160, 162.
Kosovo.\textsuperscript{593} Another factor in the government’s response was the absence of Tito. While the 1968 demonstrations were also treated as counter-revolutionary, as we saw in the last chapter, Tito's reaction – to downplay their significance – was crucial to the authorities’ response. As Alexei Yurchak argues about Stalin in the Soviet Union, Tito stood outside normal Yugoslav discourse as the unique embodiment of socialist Yugoslavia and the Partisan struggle, and therefore the definitive interpreter of how the authorities should proceed.\textsuperscript{594}

Tito’s downplaying of the 1968 demonstrations shut down possible reactions that could have been much harsher, or even could have reversed the changes that had occurred since 1966. In 1981, there was no such figure with the authority to stand outside Yugoslav discourse. The Socialist Republic of Serbia and federal leadership therefore resorted to similar understandings of the riots by reviving the idea of counter-revolution expressed in 1968. But because in 1981 there was no Tito, not only was there no such restraint, but indeed there was no other way the Party leadership could have reacted because to do so would be to deviate from the party path as set in the name of Tito. The slogan “After Tito, Tito,” while pledging continuation of Tito’s path of non-aligned, decentralized socialist self-management, also exemplifies the regime’s lack of capacity to find radically new solutions for the mounting economic and social problems it faced. As we shall see later on, this would develop further, as Yurchak pointed out for the Soviet Union, as an increasing sclerosis of rhetoric whereby ever more severe and


numerous problems could only be dealt with by continuing the policies that had led them to this juncture.\textsuperscript{595}

One of the most immediate tasks considered necessary at this point by the leadership was the purging of the Party in Kosovo. The most telling intervention in this case is that of Sinan Hasani, who gave a multi-part interview on his opinions to the Party newspaper \textit{Borba} in July 1981.\textsuperscript{596} Hasani’s interview was part of a successful attempt by assimilationist Albanian politicians, who had held little power during the 1970s, to displace the Kosovar elite, such as Fadil Hoxha and Mahmut Bakalli, who had dominated since 1966. Hasani was attacking the leadership for failing to respond to nationalism and separatism among Albanians, for failing to respond to the concerns of Serbs and Montenegrins, and for having lost control of the province. Far from echoing the views of some of the 1981 rioters, Hasani wished to assert that Kosovo Albanians were Yugoslavs first and foremost – a position not shared by Fadil Hoxha and the Gjakova group, who after 1966 had marginalized him and those who thought like him.\textsuperscript{597} In making these points in the Party newspaper, Hasani was aware that he was appealing to an audience outside Kosovo with little knowledge of the background to the debate. This was part of what was by this time a long-established tradition of appealing to various factions outside Kosovo to help Kosovar Albanians in their own internecine strife. In this instance, this was largely successful, in that Mahmut Bakalli and Fadil Hoxha were displaced from power, and Hasani and Ali Shukria secured powerful roles

\textsuperscript{595} Yurchak, \textit{Everything Was Forever}, pp.47, 60.
\textsuperscript{597} Sinani, “Kosova,” p.6.
within the provincial Executive Committee, with the tactical support of younger Albanian cadre at the top of the Party in Kosovo, such as Azem Vllasi.598

As part of his argument, Hasani expressed his unhappiness with the fact that the Albanian language had been unified at a congress in Tirana, when both dialects and their natural progress toward unification had once been tolerated, and that the newspapers and publishing had changed the language while he was abroad.599 This is cited by Rexhep Ismajli as evidence of official opposition to linguistic unification.600 Yet in fact it was a political point for Hasani; he was mentioning language as a means to attack his political enemy Fadil Hoxha, because Hoxha was specifically identified with the project of language reform and its official endorsement. Also worthy of note is what Hasani said next, something usually omitted in discussions of the interview: that he did not want to appear conservative and go back to the situation before unification. What this demonstrates is the extent to which standard language ideology and the rhetoric associating the standard language with “civilization” and “progress” had been successful in Kosovo. The struggle in 1981, then, was between Albanian and Albanian, not Albanian and Serb. It is significant that it is an Albanian, Hasani, who brought up the linguistic point; other than an article in Večernje novosti published on the first two days on which Hasani’s interview appeared,601 in general Serbs at this point were not

599 Unless Hasani was confusing the Congress of Orthography with the Linguistic Consultation of Prishtina, during which he was also abroad, the change resulting from the congress could not have been news to him. Rather, as an assimilationist who believed Kosovo Albanians to be primarily Albanian-speaking Yugoslavs, Hasani was stressing the political fact that the congress took place in Tirana rather than Yugoslavia and that the decision was in favour of a standard based on a dialect spoken and written in Albania, not in Yugoslavia. Hasani, “Kosova,” p.6.
600 Ismajli, “Në gjuhë” dhe “për gjuhë,” pp.186-188.
particularly interested in Albanian linguistic unification. As we shall see, this would change.

**Serbian attempts at Albanian language management**

Serbs would indeed become interested in the status of Albanian in the years following 1981. This occurred because of the integral place the language held in Kosovo Albanian identity. To understand how this developed, we again need to understand the wider political context.

Although there was no shift in ascendancy between Albanian and Serb in 1981, there was certainly a shift of dynamic in the politics of the province and how the province was regarded elsewhere, particularly in Serbia. Within Kosovo, those deemed most nationalist were purged from the party, including Ali Hadri, and a number of those judged to have sided with the demonstrators were dismissed from their jobs. 1981 served to focus Yugoslav attention beyond Kosovar elite politicians on a people still seen as outside an imagined South Slav land; worse, it attracted international attention by exposing the weaknesses in Yugoslavia’s claim to have overcome its nationality problem. This helped to strengthen boundaries between peoples, but also helped reflect the militancy of the Kosovo Serbs. Serbs in Kosovo demonstrated over their grievances, and were increasingly successful in gaining the support of Belgrade intellectuals and politicians. Following the Party line – that the demonstrations of 1981 had been counter-revolutionary, nationalist and separatist – this group increasingly viewed any clear expression of Albanian national identity as not only suspect, but hostile. By the end of the decade, the names of streets in Peja were being changed to remove almost any identification with Albanians, with such figures being designated as “enemies of the
people.” By 1989, 584,373 Kosovo Albanians, almost half the adult population, had been arrested, interrogated, interned or reprimanded.602

The most notorious of the publications contributing to this atmosphere was the draft Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986. A detailed examination of the relationship between Serbs and other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, the Memorandum attacked decentralization and the “regionalized” culture of the country. Taking up Hasani’s point about unification of language, the Memorandum accused Kosovar Albanians and intellectuals of adopting the standard, allowing the use of the national flag, and seeking greater autonomy, following the instructions of Tirana. What is significant about this document is that Serbs began to take real notice of the moves to unify the Albanian language, and to include them in a discourse about the creation of Albanian national identity in Kosovo. While this fitted in with the Party line about subversion from abroad and counter-revolution, it left no room for understanding that these innovations were initiatives from Kosovo itself, formed within the political environment of Yugoslavia.603 Although the forms of Standard Albanian were dictated by Tirana, the reasons for adopting them were local.

One of the prominent supporters of the Memorandum, the linguist Pavle Ivić, and other language managers apparently drew another lesson from the way the Albanians had united under the banner of Standard Albanian: namely, that it would be desirable for Serbo-Croatian speakers to unite themselves. Unlike the Croatian movement to call their language “Croatian” and seek to distance it from Serbian, Serbian language managers demanded a single orthography for Serbo-Croatian without

variants recognizing republican boundaries. In contrast to the Serbian criticism of Standard Albanian, Pavle Ivić and others put forward linguistic as well as political arguments for a unified orthography, such as a preference for using the infinitive over the subjunctive; nevertheless, as with Albanian, these arguments were made to advance a social and political agenda.604

This national turn was exploited by those who wished to reassert Serbian control over Kosovo.605 The first test of this in Kosovo was the purge of Fadil Hoxha and many of the Gjakova group from the Party in 1986.606 This move imposed the will of the Party in Serbia on Kosovo, and Kosovo Serbs would have supported it in any case, as would, for other reasons, the group surrounding Hasani and Shukria. The fact that the members around Azem Vllasi also agreed to this was due mostly to their own desire to remain in power, which could be achieved by buying off the Serbs. However, the Party in Serbia could not be bought off forever, and the eventual struggle for Vllasi’s political survival would prove decisive not only for the Party, but for the future of Kosovo as a whole.

A particular emphasis throughout the 1980s within the Party and among Kosovo Serbs was placed on preventing further emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo even if, by that time, most Serbs and Montenegrins who had left had had the idea of leaving before 1981. While the evidence shows that the rate of emigration was

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605 The language debate was not confined to living languages. The traditional clash of opinion between Albanian scholars who thought Albanian was descended from Illyrian (and so autochthonous to Kosovo) and Serb scholars who thought it was descended from Thracian (and therefore foreign to the region, with the Albanians likely to have entered Kosovo after the Slavs) revived in the early 1980s; unlike the differences of opinion in the 1950s, however, it was not just discussed in learned books and journals but in the press and on the floor of the Congress of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1982. For an account of this debate, see Cvetković-Sander, Sprachpolitik, pp.310-315.

already slowing by this point, Albanian demographers pointed to the economic causes of emigration and to the fact that similar rates of emigration could be found to the “home republic” of other peoples of Yugoslavia, such as Serbs from Bosnia, or from the south to the north of Serbia, during the same period.\textsuperscript{607} On the other hand, research from Serbia showed that much of the emigration from Kosovo, particularly in settlements with high Albanian populations, was involuntary. Paradoxically, it was Kosovo’s remoteness and backwardness as a cultural and economic region of Yugoslavia that benefited the position of the Albanian language. Although the increasing use of Albanian in the public sphere and the linguistic slights against Serbs and Montenegrins mentioned earlier contributed to the feeling of Kosovo becoming a “foreign” place to them, given the small space it is accorded in Serbian accounts of the Slav exodus, language does not seem to have been a major contributing factor in people’s decision to leave the province.\textsuperscript{608} Had Kosovo’s cultural attractions and economic vitality been such as to attract mass immigration from other parts of Yugoslavia, as had happened in Belgrade and the Dalmatian coast, it would have been highly unlikely that these immigrants would have found any need or desire to learn Albanian, a language of lesser prestige. In such circumstances, Albanian in Kosovo might well have suffered a similar fate to that of Estonian in Narva or Basque in Bilbao.\textsuperscript{609}

While most Slavs in Kosovo had passive or no understanding of Albanian, especially among the young, it was nevertheless alleged in the media in Serbia that Kosovo’s bilingual status had caused a mass exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, as Kosovo Albanians were given higher salaries for being able to use both

\textsuperscript{607} Petrović and Blagojević, \textit{Migration of Serbs}, p.188; Malcolm, \textit{Kosovo}, pp.330-333; Roux, \textit{Les albanais en Yougoslavie}, p.386.
\textsuperscript{608} Petrović and Blagojević, \textit{The Migration of Serbs}; Mišović, \textit{Ko je tražio republiku}, p.264.
\textsuperscript{609} See Deprez, “Diets, Nederlands, Nederduits,” p.274.
languages. While the media gave the impression that this affected a large number of employees, in fact there were few jobs which required knowledge of both languages, and even then this provision was often ignored. Despite accusations that official documents were produced in Albanian alone for Serbo-Croatian speakers, an investigation by the People’s Assembly of Kosovo showed that in the period 1982-1986 more monolingual documents were issued by government and self-managing organizations in Serbo-Croatian than in Albanian. In seeking to redress the balance in favour of Serbo-Croatian, the authorities in Serbia appealed to Article 246 of the constitution of the SFRY, which stated that while the languages of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia were in official use, those of the nationalities such as Albanian were in accordance with the constitution and with federal law. The authorities interpreted this to mean that official documents such as Party membership booklets could only be printed in Albanian in conjunction with Serbo-Croatian. While Kosovo was portrayed in the Serbian media as a place where speaking Serbo-Croatian and displaying it in public was no longer possible, the only named instance of discrimination was the signage and key fobs of the Grand Hotel Prishtina, which omitted the Serbo-Croatian spelling of the name of the city. Although politicians such as Vllasi pointed out that meetings would take place in Serbo-Croatian even if all but two or three in a room were Albanian, the Constitutional Court of the SFRY ruled in May 1987 that Articles 5 and 236 of the constitution of Kosovo did not conform with Article 246 of the Yugoslav constitution and would have to be amended accordingly, while it also eliminated the provisions for bilingual workplaces in many self-managing organizations.610

610 Petrović and Blagojević, Migration of Serbs, pp.99-100; Blerim Reka, “‘Gjuha shtetërore’ – relikt i kohëve të perënduara,” Rilindja, 23 May 1987, p.6; Cvetković-Sander, Sprachpolitik, pp.315-320; “Gjuha
This issue was resolved in the amendments to the constitution, discussed below, put forward by Serbia in 1987. These proposals were aimed, in the words of Borisav Jović in the preamble to the amendments, at “regaining for Serbia what it had lost” through previous constitutions, namely the restoration of Serbia’s primacy over its autonomous regions, the use of Serbian as the official language of the Socialist Republic of Serbia throughout its territory, and, in areas inhabited by minorities, the use of the minority language after that of Serbian. They also curtailed the scope of the autonomy of the autonomous provinces, and their use of flags, emblems, and other national symbols. These changes were regarded elsewhere in Yugoslavia as an attempt to reverse the decentralization of Yugoslavia in progress since the 1960s. This naturally did not just affect Kosovo, but also, for example, Croatia and Slovenia, which were also hardening their own national differences with Serbia at this time. In Slovenia, the dominance of Serbo-Croatian as a nationwide language was perceived as a threat to Slovene sovereignty in terms of the near exclusive use of Serbo-Croatian in the armed forces and its use for inter-republican communication, denying the rights of Slovene, as they saw it, to function fully as a “state language.” As with Albanian, Slovene nationalism was centred around language; the perception of a vital threat to Slovene interests meant that, as a constituent people, the threat was not just to Slovene national pride but the unity of Yugoslavia itself.

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Language as a tool of Kosovo Albanian resistance

As the Kosovo Albanians began to respond to pressure from Belgrade and from Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, the central place of language in Kosovo Albanian identity ensured that language management would become a tool of Kosovo Albanian resistance. Within the Party in Kosovo in the late 1980s, there was increasing division along national lines between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians, with younger Albanian politicians, such as Azem Vllasi and Kaqusha Jashari, increasingly under pressure from Belgrade. Most historians describe the constitutional changes and loss of autonomy and the loyalist demonstrations of the miners against them as the first mass expression of Albanian national feeling in opposition to Serbian initiatives.613 However photogenic the miners’ marches might have been, it is clear that their origins lay less in the organization of the aristocracy of the working class and more in the efforts of Kosovo Party politicians to forestall the destruction of their power base, efforts which are almost entirely missing from the historiography. Even the most thorough commentator on nationalist mobilization in Kosovo, Vladisavljević, devotes just one sentence to this; Branka Magaš’s account, produced for Labour Focus on Eastern Europe one year after the events, is the only work in English to explore these meetings in any depth.614 In these efforts, Vllasi and Jashari presented their own set of amendments in the Kosovo Assembly, which effectively reproduced the status quo. They then organized meetings through the Socialist League in every workplace in Kosovo to discuss these Serbian and Kosovar amendments side by side. One of the main subjects of discussion at these meetings was that Kosovo Albanians had been reduced to second-class citizens, one of

614 Vladisavljević, Antibiureaucratic Revolution, p.182; Magaš, Destruction of Yugoslavia, p.228. The significance of the meetings have been apparent to those actors in Kosovo most closely affected: Azem Vllasi, “Unë jam truni i protestave të minatorëve te 1989,” Sonte, RrokunTelevizion, 29 October 2012 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=1ISOxAX8Sao [Last accessed 14 April 2013].
the clearest indicators of which was the newly subordinate status of the language. The overwhelming consensus was that the arrangement of the 1974 Constitution should be preserved with Albanian and Serbo-Croatian, and their respective scripts, having equal status – despite the inaccurate objections of Serb participants that, for example, there were no states anywhere in the world with multiple official languages.615

These meetings were important because, as events sponsored by the Socialist League and supporting amendments proposed by the Kosovo Assembly, they gave Kosovar Albanians the right to state their own views while being seen as loyal to the system. They also encouraged the expectation that their views might be taken heed of. The miners’ meeting happened only when it became clear that that was not going to happen.616 As Vllasi and Jashari were removed from the leadership of Kosovo and replaced by Rrahman Morina, the former head of Kosovo security, Kolë Shiroka, one of the Partisan generation, and Hysamedin Azemi, the miners felt emboldened in November 1988 and February 1989 to protest by marching to Pristina. However, the way they protested was to demonstrate their loyalty by carrying Yugoslav flags tied together with Albanian ones, carrying portraits of Tito, and shouting slogans in favour of the Party of Tito, of Vllasi, and “of the heroic Serbian people.” Although the Kosovo leadership had played no direct role in instigating these protests, it is nevertheless clear that the constitutional meetings gave Albanian people in Kosovo permission to make their own voices heard while claiming loyalty to the system. As Shkëlzen Maliqi argued

616 “Përkrarje aksionit pa presion,” Rilindja, 18 November 1988, pp.1, 11.
at the time, this may not have reflected the demonstrators’ individual beliefs about their Serbian and Albanian rulers.617

Any threat to the principle of the equality of languages in the education system was also likely to become a focus for Kosovo Albanian resistance. Since the 1960s it had been part of the settlement of equality of languages and scripts of nations and nationalities that learning the language at school of the other major community in Kosovo would be encouraged but remain voluntary. However, while knowledge of Serbo-Croatian was essential for any Albanian to gain social mobility, very few Serbs and Montenegrins were interested in being taught Albanian. There is evidence of protests by Slav parents in the late 1960s against their children learning Albanian.618 However, in the interests of brotherhood and unity, the authorities in Kosovo identified this as a cause of division between the two communities; so the regionaauthorities proposed to make learning the Other language compulsory from the autumn of 1987. Unfortunately, by this time Slav suspicion of Albanians was such that it was taken as a means of forcible “Albanization”; and at the time of the constitutional meetings there was a general school and university boycott of classes by Serb and Montenegrin students because of the prospect of learning Albanian, and in some places of sharing school facilities with Albanians, at times accompanied by violence.619 One of the common arguments Serbs used was that learning Serbian language, history, and culture was one thing, because Serbs and Montenegrins were constituent peoples of Yugoslavia; Albanians, on the other hand, belonged to a national homeland outside Yugoslavia, and therefore study of Albanian language, history, and culture belonged in

Tirana, not Prishtina. Although we have of course seen that Kosovar Albanians followed the lead of Tirana in language and other cultural matters, this was seen by them as a voluntary choice, one related to their understanding of themselves in relation to their own land, but also as a continuation (and therefore an integral part) of the Albanian nation that lived in Albania. For Serbs to make this point was to deny Kosovo Albanians any role within Kosovo, which Serb rhetoric had come to stress as the sacred centre of Serbdom. It is noteworthy that around this time the use of the word šiptar reappeared in Serb discussion of Albanians in Yugoslavia in general usage and in the press and publishing. While claiming that Kosovo Albanians had a homeland outside Yugoslavia, at the same time many Serbs linguistically distinguished them from Albanians in Albania, so that they were not even accorded the status of a foreign people. There were also arguments from Serbian and Macedonian scholars that Albanians were late invaders in the lands they currently occupied, a backward people speaking the “language of shepherds.”

Failure of the attempt to introduce compulsory learning of the Other language was followed in 1988 by a ruling to limit places available in secondary schools. This set the number for each ethnic group so low that it deprived many Albanian children of the chance to progress in their education, while allowing for more Serbian and Montenegrin children to attend than actually existed. By 1989, only half the number of Albanian students passing the matura examination were allowed to go to university while three-quarters of Serbs and Montenegrins who passed could attend. Albanian scholars protested that this was a deliberate attempt to return the Albanian people to a state of

620 See, e.g., Milanović, Univerzitet u Prištini, p.191: Vujadin Milanović himself was a scholar of Shakespeare.

illiteracy. With responsibility for the Kosovo education system passed to the parliament of Serbia in 1990, education was completely segregated; the subsequent mass dismissal of teachers was to leave Albanian-language teaching in the hands of the “Republic of Kosova.”

At this juncture, however, there were problems the Slav and Albanian communities still had in common. These included the high level of unemployment, galloping inflation, scarcity of food and fuel, and deteriorating working conditions. The fact that politicians were more concerned about national symbols, differentiation, and their own status instead of basic living conditions was also a source of grievance for all communities. A number of stoppages and disputes involved workers from both Serb and Albanian communities; even as late as 1990, the newly-founded Association of Independent Trade Unions contained members from all ethnic groups. However, this does not diminish the fact that there were also many workplaces and communities where members of each major ethnic group saw the others as adversaries. For example, at the Integj textile combine in Gjilan, meetings over work conditions were organized separately for Albanians and Serbs, and they were treated very differently.

As this example shows, the sharpening conflict between Serbs and Albanians at the end of the 1980s was played out in cultural terms, including in terms of language. The Serb national revival had always had a cultural dimension, as we have seen earlier with the revival of interest in the Kosovo myth and of Serbian history and culture. There was a tendency for both Serb and Albanian intellectuals to describe each other’s work

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almost *a priori* as tendentious and unscientific; this can be seen in confrontations aimed at undermining the other’s culture. For example, from 1959 the Board of Education and Culture in Kosovo had awarded the annual December Prize commemorating the Conference of Bujan at the end of 1943 and start of 1944, which founded the National Liberation Movement of Kosovo and Metohia. Although anniversaries of this conference had been celebrated by the authorities of Kosovo in what Albanians considered their darkest times in the early 1950s, by the late 1980s Serbian historiography had judged the conference to have been an example of the unceasing war to separate Kosovo off from Serbia and join it to Albania. In consequence, in 1988 almost all Serb recipients of the December Prize still living returned the prize, as they did not wish to be associated with “Albanian nationalism and irredentism.”624 Similarly, in the last direct meeting between Albanian and Serb intellectuals before the end of autonomy, the meeting between the Society of Serbian Writers and the Society of Writers of Kosovo in Belgrade, each side complained of the cultural wrongs committed by the other. It broke up when the Society of Serbian Writers walked out of the meeting. Subsequently, Serb and Montenegrin members of the Society of Writers of Kosovo resigned from their association. The Society of Serbian Writers then stated that the Society of Writers of Kosovo was an illegitimate organization because it only contained writers from one nationality.625

Kosovo’s language managers create a new republic

As the example above shows, intellectuals could no longer afford to be seen as silent. In March of 1989 the Party leader of Kosovo, Azem Vllasi, was arrested and the Central Committee of the Kosovo Party announced its conclusions on the miners’ strikes of November 1988 and February 1989. The Central Committee not only nullified one of the principal demands of the miners by reinstating Morina, Shiroka, and Azemi, but also characterized these demonstrations of loyalty to the Party as a continuation of the Albanian nationalist and separatist counter-revolution. This effectively brought about a situation in which the Party line was identified with Serb national demands, and supported only “honourable” Albanians (that is, Albanians allied to the regime) alien to the Albanian population of Kosovo. As for the Albanian population itself, other than as an instrument of repression, the League of Communists had ceased to have any real meaning. With the Gjakova group purged, Vllasi arrested, and Jashari forced out, political leadership for the Kosovo Albanians would have to come from outside the Party.

Who was there to fill the vacuum? There were two possible contenders. One was the tradition of the illegal movement. Although Albanians were the majority of political prisoners in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, this did not necessarily reflect the strength or capacity of illegal organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the established order.

Furthermore, the Yugoslav authorities had been relatively successful in the violent suppression or elimination of a number of figures in the movement at home and abroad. Moreover, as most illegal organizations claimed to be Marxist-Leninist, it was unclear where they would gain funding and support unless from a destitute Albania. The figure in the illegal movement with the greatest moral authority, Adem Demaçi, would remain in prison until April 1990 and was thus unable to provide clear guidance.

The other possibility could be found among Kosovo’s Albanian intellectuals. Many of these had been Party members themselves and linked to leaders of the Fadil Hoxha or Mahmut Bakalli type, whose star had fallen during the 1980s. Many were also Albanologists and had had scholarly and intellectual links to Albania. They also included scholars who had experience of study in the West. As we saw in the previous chapter, intellectuals had been successful in reshaping Kosovar Albanian society; and the institutions that they had created, namely mass education through Albanology, acceptance of universal literacy, the Academy of Arts and Sciences of Kosovo, the University of Prishtina, and the unified standard language, at the same time all acted as status symbol, means of social advancement, cultural and economic development, and reinforcement of national culture for Kosovo Albanians. As we also saw in the last chapter, building these new institutions, creating a national Albanian identification in Kosovo, gave these intellectuals social capital among the population at large, even if seen as of poor quality by standards in the rest of Yugoslavia. What they were doing was not only building a society which had a national Albanian identity, but providing it with institutions about which they could feel a sense of prestige.

630 Murtezai, *Fadil Hoxha*, pp.136-137.
Scholars have pointed out the great imbalance in the student population in Kosovo between humanities students and those in the sciences.\textsuperscript{631} Indeed, this reflects comments made by Party leaders anxious to reinforce the idea that they did not approve of learning for its own sake, but for the sake of the economic, social, and cultural development of the people. While this is true, Kosovo’s circumstances need to be taken into account. If we look back to the years after 1945, the most important task was the mass teaching of basic literacy, and consequently the teaching of people able to teach literacy. It is therefore unsurprising that in 1968 an overwhelming proportion of the elite were teachers, a large proportion of whom were teachers of Albanian language and literature. It is also not surprising that the university and teaching colleges were full of students destined to be teachers in humanities subjects. As Kosovo developed, as Backer notes, there was a shift towards study of medicine and economics,\textsuperscript{632} and after the demonstrations of 1981, the authorities contributed by curtailing university places in the humanities and increasing them in subjects with more direct economic productivity. However, a corollary of the success of teachers instilling Albanology into their students was the development of a sense of national Albanian culture, resulting in the study of Albanian language and culture being seen as a national duty. It might be said that the focus on Albanology was unproductive and self-isolating; but on the other hand we must consider both its high status within the culture and also its role in the reproduction of national culture. Schooling and learning in Albanology was seen by the people who undertook it as a patriotic obligation, while the state saw it as unproductive. This was an area where the position of intellectuals was much more easily understood by the people than it was by the government.


\textsuperscript{632} Backer, \textit{Behind Stone Walls}, p.245.
The symbolic capital these intellectuals had created on the one hand, and the beliefs formed by the general population in response, meant that intellectuals, particularly those associated with the Society of Writers of Kosovo, the Albanological Institute, the Philosophical Faculty of the university, and the Academy of Arts and Sciences, were in a position to fill the vacuum in leadership left by the Party. However, to do so they would have to provide an approach which distinguished them from both the League of Communists and the illegal movement. This approach was what was called “the Kosovo alternative”: a group of political parties and civic organizations formed by intellectuals, similar in nature to the pluralist alternatives springing up at this time in other parts of Yugoslavia. The path of non-violent democratic resistance appeared to be the only realistic alternative, and the support of Adem Demaçi after his release from prison in April 1990 after 28 years’ imprisonment provided the moral authority which made it difficult for people in the illegal movement to oppose this approach.633

In 1989-1990, democracy in and of itself was not a longstanding Albanian national demand, and it had not been among the demands of the miners when they went on strike.634 The collapse of autonomy and the imposition of Serbian rule meant that the defence of Albanian interests through the Yugoslav model of decentralization was no longer possible. Unlike the Kosovo Serb movement, the Albanians could not appeal on national grounds to anyone else in Yugoslavia, as Albanians elsewhere in the country were in an equally precarious situation, while Albania was in no position to provide practical support. Although moral support was forthcoming from Slovenia and

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634 Vladislavjević, Antibuereaucratic Revolution, p.205.
elsewhere, there was no sign that this could ever translate into practical assistance in the form of aid to keep Kosovo’s economy afloat. Even had it been forthcoming, the mass dismissals of Albanians and the importing of Serbian “experts” meant that, even in those enterprises which had not gone bankrupt and closed, any aid would be of no benefit except to the newly-employed “experts” and the Serbian enterprises absorbing the assets and stock of their counterparts in Kosovo.

Pluralism as an alternative basis for assertion of national interests had already been promoted as a cultural and political ideal by intellectuals with a firm understanding of developments elsewhere in Yugoslavia and in the West, such as Ibrahim Rugova, Shkëlzen Maliqi, Muhamedin Kullashi, and Rexhep Ismajli. Besides offering freedom of cultural and political expression, pluralism would also give Albanians qua Albanians a voice legitimized by the vote of the people, especially in Kosovo, where Albanians were a large majority. Moreover, multi-party democracy had long been championed in the West in opposition to communism. Adopting the mantle of democracy was likely to be of much greater effect in appealing to the West, to countries more powerful than either Albania or Yugoslavia, and securing international intervention to deliver the Albanians from Serbia at a time when the Albanians were in no position to liberate themselves. Indeed, democratic movements throughout Eastern Europe had succeeded, or were succeeding, in overthrowing sclerotic communist regimes. In particular, national movements in the Baltic Republics were waging a struggle in the name of democracy against a powerful Slav enemy with federal power and overwhelming military might. It was these national movements that enjoyed the support of the Western

world, which keenly followed their progress. One of the aspects of Kosovo Albanian politics which most worried the Party was thus any attempt by Albanians to try and internationalize their plight in Kosovo. Intellectuals, again, were particularly well placed to do this as many had studied in the West and spoke Western languages. This gave them access beyond the networks of the growing Kosovo Albanian diaspora in the West.\textsuperscript{637}

The need to appeal to the West in this way helped to bring about the abandonment of the long-held aims of the illegal movement to unify all Albanian lands with Albania. It was apparent from the contemporaneous developments in other parts of the world that the international community had a more favourable attitude toward secessionist movements than irredentist ones. Repositioning the “Kosovo alternative” as a non-violent secessionist movement, in contradistinction to what it characterized as an authoritarian, expansionist, and brutal Serbia, was therefore a stance designed to maximize Western support. The “Kosovo alternative,” and Rugova’s LDK which soon broke away from it, started as a movement in favour of initially the restoration of autonomy, then full republican status, and finally a demand for an independent state.\textsuperscript{638} This meant, however, an independent Kosovo, not the unification of the Albanians of Yugoslavia as a whole.

New nations need founding fathers. In his work on the Soviet Union, Mark R. Beissinger describes how local nomenklatura “converted” to become “fathers” of their nation.\textsuperscript{639} In the case of Kosovo, it was not senior Party officials, but intellectuals,

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though many had been Party members and “converted” from communism to nationalism. It would be wrong, however, to follow Nick Miller in suggesting that Rexhep Qosja had been the only intellectual consistently in favour of union with Albania and that others, such as Shkëlzen Maliqi, had “converted” to this point of view. Firstly, a number of intellectuals had openly expressed the desire to unite with Albania, such as Adem Demaçi, Ukshin Hoti and Bajram Kosumi and, unlike Qosja, they had been jailed for their beliefs. Secondly, Qosja had been a Party member and a cultural administrator with the trust of members of the political establishment like Fadil Hoxha. Thirdly, as we saw at the beginning of the chapter, Maliqi and Qosja had very different worldviews which had resulted in Maliqi ceasing to be the editor of *Fjala* and mutual hostility thereafter. Miller cites a statement from Maliqi that the best solution to the crisis in Kosovo would be union with Albania. However, Miller does not take into account that Maliqi had been involved in the Kosovo branch of UJDI, the last serious attempt by Kosovo Albanians to preserve Kosovo within Yugoslavia. The quotation, moreover, comes from an interview given to a South Slav audience in a book published in 1996, explaining that the options for retaining Yugoslavia had run out, and that this was the best solution for Kosovo.640 While union with Albania might have been an ultimate goal, as we have seen, independence for Kosovo was more easily attainable.

What the intellectuals did, whenever they “converted” to the national project, was, as Shkëlzen Maliqi points out, to take on some of the functions of the autonomous province as it once had been.641 In this way, the “Republic of Kosova” declared in 1992 ran a parallel education system, a parallel University of Prishtina, and, through the Nëna

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Tereza charity, a parallel health system. This institutional framework also included non-governmental organizations, such as the Union of Independent Trade Unions and the Kosovo Football Federation. Even non-material institutions such as the movement to reconcile blood feud were organized in this context. This movement, though originating with former political prisoners wishing to save Albanian lives at a time of great national crisis, was led by Albanologists, Anton Çetta in particular. Such men and women were using their authority as people known for their knowledge of customary law and Kosovo Albanian culture, and for their status as civic leaders through their scholarship. The Albanologists were thus taking a traditional institution – the process of reconciliation of blood feud – that had been appropriated and adapted by the League of Communists, and repurposing it as a tool of resistance against Serbian oppression. In this they were harnessing Kosovo Albanian culture to unite ordinary people behind the national project.

Naturally, language was part of this cultural politics. In the explosive meeting between the Societies of Writers of Serbia and Kosovo, mentioned earlier, the linguist Besim Bokshi presented a defence of united Standard Albanian as a great cultural and spiritual achievement of the Albanian people, both of Yugoslavia and Albania. This sort of intellectual production characterizes the work of linguists and scholars in other fields at this time. The point was not so much to produce new knowledge, but to defend
the nation and keep intellectual production alive. As it was, many senior scholars were engaged in activity that left little time for scholarship. For example, Idriz Ajeti was for a time chair of the Helsinki Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, and Rexhep Ismajli was an active senior member of the LDK. For them, this was not a time for scholarship, but for action.

By 1992, the heady days of 1974 and the push for greater linguistic rights in the Constitution were far in the past. Since the loss of autonomy, officially Albanian and indeed the Latin alphabet had all but vanished from the official sphere. Within the parallel state and the Albanian private space, however, Albanian assumed a primacy perhaps never experienced before. Moreover, Standard Albanian at this time, even more than in 1968, served as a banner not only of national identification and of a developed society, but of a united but embattled one: the emblem of a state in the making. Gorani is partially right to suggest that a narrative of “victimization – chiefly at the hands of the Serbs – precipitated the development of the Kosovar (Albanian) identity.” Albanians in other parts of Yugoslavia, including those of the Preševo valley in Serbia, had their own tales of victimization. What distinguished Kosovo from these other areas was the possibility of imagining the province as a separate entity, be

648 Xhevat Lloshi has identified the English usage of “standard” as in “standard language” with “flag” (of national identification), as which he argued Standard Albanian acts for Albanians: Lloshi, *Mbështetje*, p.33. Although the English usage of “standard” in “standard language” is in the sense of “canonical, normal” the link between the flag and the language connects two very potent symbols in Albanian national thinking.
that within or outside Yugoslavia, as part of Albania or as an independent state. That came about through political boundaries and administration but also, as Anderson might say, through their being imagined separately by cultural institutions such as the Writers’ Society of Kosovo, Prishtina Radio and Television and the Rilindja press and publishing house, particularly as intellectual production in Albanian from one part of Yugoslavia was not readily available in others.\(^{650}\)

That year, a number of senior linguists from Kosovo attended the symposium to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Congress of Orthography.\(^{651}\) This involved two changes. The first was a pleasant one: Albania had opened its borders, and cooperation with scholars from Albania was again possible. The other change to Kosovo Albanian linguists seemed as unpleasant as it was baffling. It was a challenge to the very legitimacy of the standard itself. This we will discuss in the next chapter.

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In welcoming participants at a conference on Standard Albanian in 2010, Ragip Mulaku set down a few rules. He said he expected all contributions to be mature and dispassionate and that linguistic matters would be argued scientifically. They would then be clearly distinguished from the primitive and uncivilized pseudolinguists and semi-intellectuals who sought to destroy everything, inspired by self-regard and ill-will in spreading their anachronistic propaganda aimed at splitting the nation.\(^\text{652}\) Mulaku’s distinction between the dispassionate science of defenders of Standard Albanian and his exclusionary, intemperate criticism of its opponents is reflected in contributions in the Albanological Institute journal *Gjuha shqipe*, where what has been characterized as a “pseudo-debate” has in recent years taken up the majority of space in that journal.\(^\text{653}\) In both we see an apparently contradictory mixture of scientific enquiry and emotional polemic side by side. What can we learn from this rhetorical style about the role of the debate about language and the place of the intellectual in the discussion about identity among Kosovo Albanians?

This chapter covers the period from where the previous chapter ends, in 1992, to the present day. While the debate over language took place outside Kosovo before the 1998-1999 war, the remainder of this period is to some extent typified by a continuity of argument. The fundamental issues of language and identity, such as the structure of Standard Albanian and Kosovo remaining outside Albania, have remained unchanged.


with none of the participants in the debate seeing their political and linguistic goals achieved. As intellectuals in Kosovo were mostly engaged in other matters than the language debate before the 1998-1999 war, I shall concentrate on the twenty-first century. In this chapter, I argue that political events have spurred arguments both for continuity, such as those of Ragip Mulaku, and arguments for re-examination of Standard Albanian with a view to some form of change. As we will see, language ideologies and political views intertwine in this period, but in a rather more complicated way than might at first be expected. This affects both Albania and Kosovo in different but overlapping ways. As we have seen in the last two chapters, in Kosovo the standard language has been identified as a banner of national identification as Albanian, a token of resistance against Slav domination, while pro-Gheg activists have used the dialect to express a regional identity. In Albania, meanwhile, defence of the standard language has been closely associated with the people and institutions were responsible for creating and enforcing it, who now no longer enjoy the power they had under the communist regime. While criticism of Standard Albanian has been heard throughout the north of Albania, in Albania it is most identified with intellectuals and the Catholic church in Shkodra as a symbol of anti-communism as well as regional identity. As a result, the same arguments are used by allies in the language debate in both countries, but for different, local reasons.

In this chapter I will discuss the rhetorical strategies used by the various parties who have discussed and continue to discuss the standard language. I will argue that the end of communism in Albania and the end of Serbian rule in Kosovo meant that Standard Albanian was no longer the effective instrument of revolutionary change and control it was designed to be, nor was it the banner of resistance against a Slav occupation that no longer existed. For post-communist, post-war politicians, matters
that concerned intellectuals were of less importance than maintaining power and
guiding their territory along the path of “Euro-Atlantic aspirations.” Politicians have,
therefore, been disinclined to intervene on linguistic matters, especially if using Gheg
helps them to maintain a rapport with their voters.

However, language managers who support the decisions of the Congress of
Orthography, particularly those old enough to remember the enthusiasm surrounding it,
have adapted differently to their new circumstances. Maintaining their standard
language ideology, they have adapted Marxist rhetoric to serve the cause of political
union between Albania and Kosovo and thus the “solution” of the “Albanian question.”
In this way the origins of the standard in Albania continue to assert themselves. For
those language managers outside this group, who are mostly younger, pluralism,
globalization and (directly or indirectly) Western education have widened the scope of
different ways of being Albanian.

**Historical background**

We need of course to understand how political events in the period since 1992
have affected the language debate. For Kosovo Albanians, the fall of the communist
regime in Albania meant the Albanian border was opened, allowing them to visit the
country for the first time since 1948. While many Kosovo Albanians visited the country
of which they had dreamt and for which they had sacrificed so much (including
sacrificing their dialect), they were shocked to discover the reality of Albania’s
economic plight and social turmoil.\(^{654}\) The meeting of Albanians from the two sides of
the border was also not all the Kosovo Albanians had hoped. Kosovo Albanian

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intellectuals such as Migjen Kelmendi and Agim Morina found that not only were Kosovo Albanians seen as provincial by people from Albania, but that even though Albania had greater economic and social difficulties than Kosovo, cultural life in Tirana was much richer and more tolerant of difference, especially as those who had been silenced by the communist regime were now allowed to speak. This provided an alternative to what they perceived as the monolithic culture inspired by Albania’s national-Stalinist culture which, for the sake of national unity, still prevailed in Kosovo. This reaction among these intellectuals led to a sense of ressentiment against that culture in Kosovo. Further, the removal of Serbian oppression after the war of 1998-1999 and the perceived need to embrace “Euro-Atlantic” aspirations and values had important effects. For some, this removed the need for further “sacrifice” in the name of national unity against a common threat, while the prospect of self-government with the possible final status of independence provoked a debate about the existence of a “Kosovar” identity. The tools for constructing such an identity had already been laid down before the war, including the writing of Kosovo Albanian pioneers of the Gheg revival such as Migjen Kelmendi and Halil Matoshi.

During the 1990s, however, it was events in Albania that spurred the language debate. The end of the communist regime had signified a transfer of power from the communists, whose power base was the south, to the Democratic Party, whose strength lay in the north. The end of communism also meant the ability for all to express their


657 See, e.g., Halil Matoshi, N’zanafillë (Shëja stilistike për gjânat e (pajharrume), (Prishtina: OM, 2013), pp.71-72.
opinions freely, especially those who had been silenced and persecuted under communism. Most prominent among these was the Gheg-using Catholic cultural centre of Shkodra. With the fall of communism in Albania, the longstanding opposition to the direction of standardization by leading writers of the diaspora, recipients of a pre-war Catholic education in Shkodra, whose works were banned in Albania and unpublished in Kosovo, became known among intellectuals in the north of Albania.

The most prominent of these diaspora writers was Arshi Pipa, whose book, *The Politics of Language in Socialist Albania*, characterized Albanian socialist linguistic policy as an act of cultural genocide on Western-minded Ghegs by orientally-minded Orthodox Tosks. These Tosks, he said, were inspired by the linguistics of Marr and Stalin, in which Kostallari treated Gheg like a separate language to Tosk. Pipa also accused the creators of Standard Albanian of “enriching” its vocabulary through outlawing the Gheg variants of common words, and pillaging words from Gheg’s comparatively rich lexicon and making them Tosk, so that they fit with their conception of the standard language. The interaction between writers like Pipa and Shkodra intellectuals culminated in the Declaration of Shkodra Linguists in 1992. This said that Standard Albanian as it stood had deliberately confused problems of orthography with those of creating a national literary language, in a campaign to ban literary Gheg and the harmony between Tosk and Gheg that had existed before the communists. Standard Albanian should be reexamined after much more linguistic research, as Çabej had

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658 Kolec Topalli, “Persekutimi komunist në shkencat albanologjike,” *Hylli i dritës* 39.1 (2010), 8-17
requested in 1952 while literary Gheg should be allowed alongside it. In turn, the Gheg revival among intellectuals in the northern half of Albania inspired those Kosovo Albanian intellectuals feeling ressentiment against the orthodoxy in Kosovo that the imposed uniformity of Standard Albanian was dangerous to Albanian unity, which would be better served by accepting diversity of expression.

The Shkodra intellectuals’ perception of Standard Albanian as an act of violence done to Gheg by a totalitarian state launched a debate on the historiography of the creation of Standard Albanian which persists to this day. Many defenders of Standard Albanian deny this in intention and effect, arguing it was rather a patriotic and scientific creation of the finest minds of Albanian linguistics, based on the most suitable dialect, which brought about Albanian unity. The view that Standard Albanian was based on Tosk was itself one of the areas in which even the most ardent defenders of the standard language retreated from positions espoused by Kostallari – in this case, that Standard Albanian was supradialectal – which no longer appeared scientifically or ideologically tenable. The compartmentalization of the roles of language managers and of the Party involved in this reassessment denies the intense interest with which the Party viewed language management, examined in Chapter Two; it would be hard to imagine the Party conceding the kind of delays needed to produce all the research Çabej had wanted in 1952 or for the language managers to have reached substantially different conclusions.

662 David Luka, Arshi Pipa and Mentor Quka in the name of 420 signatories, “Deklaratë e gjuhëtarëve të Shkodrës,” Albanica, 1992, issue 3-4, 121-123.
The debate on the historiography of the standard language

In any debate on historiography and the nation, it is well to look for areas where myths have been created. Three figures important to Chapter Two, in which I discussed the creation of Standard Albanian, were Xhuvani, Çabej and Kostallari. While Xhuvani was used as a link to the linguistic planners of the Rilindja, the memory of his significance as a pioneer in Albanian linguistics and education was tailored to suit the needs of his successors in promoting the Tosk-based standard. Writing and conferences in his honour during his lifetime, as well as his obituaries, discussed the wide extent of his achievements, particularly noting the Normal School at Elbasan and the Shkodra Literary Commission.\textsuperscript{666} As the Congress of Orthography neared, however, this emphasis changed; collections of Xhuvani’s work gave prominence to his 1905 article in favour of Tosk as a base for the standard, and, at the conference held in 1971 on the tenth anniversary of his death, the 1905 article, “which,” according to E.H., “strongly argued, from a correct and healthy position, the need for a single national literary language, raised above particularist and regional bias,” was solemnly read out at the conclusion of the conference.\textsuperscript{667} The 1905 article received increasing prominence, to the extent that, among Standard Albanian gatekeepers’ articles today, this short article is the


most frequently mentioned of his works, almost to the exclusion of his other achievements.668

Çabej has been appealed to by both supporters and detractors of Standard Albanian. Among supporters of the decisions of the Congress of Orthography, the criticism he faced in the 1960s discussed in my second chapter is forgotten as he is celebrated as the “chief architect” of the standard language as an ideologically palatable alternative to Kostallari.669 Among detractors of the standard, Çabej is remembered for his endorsement of the pre-war Elbasan-based standard in 1939, his demands for extensive linguistic work before committing to a choice of dialect base in 1952, and his plea at the Congress of Orthography for the delegates not to be “dialectophobes” and to remember they were establishing a standard language not just for a few thousand people but for four million Albanians.670 Yet his warnings to proceed “with leaden shoes” in forming standard Albanian orthography have been used as a stricture to be wary of any changes to the standard now that it has been created. This diversity of views is neatly illustrated by a book celebrating the ninetieth anniversary of Çabej’s birth: containing both a Kostallarian account of the history of Albanian next to a contribution on Çabej’s thought from a Shkodra linguist familiar with modern Western theory, the articles provide discussions of the man that are almost mutually exclusive.671

Lastly, Pipa and other pro-Gheg writers identified Kostallari as the central figure behind the creation of the standard language as it was, blaming him for what they saw as cultural genocide. In the 1990s there was considerable effort by supporters of the standard in Albania to distance themselves and the standard from Kostallari. However, there have been recent moves to rehabilitate Kostallari while omitting any reference to his Marxism or inspiration from Soviet linguistics.\(^{672}\)

The mythologization of Standard Albanian’s historiography has not been confined to Albania. Supporters of the standard in Kosovo have stressed the participation of the Yugoslav state in language management before 1968 while minimizing Albanian agency. While many compare criticism of the standard today to the existence of šiptarski jezik,\(^{673}\) some have identified the achievements of Albanians in Yugoslavia before 1968 as the state-run implementation of šiptarski jezik.\(^{674}\) Such commentators have elided the brief period we saw in Chapter Three, where the Yugoslav authorities tried to set up an Albanian centre in competition with Tirana, with the Serbian attempt at Albanian language management we saw in Chapter Four. Meanwhile, some opponents of the standard have also viewed the pre-war Elbasan-based idiom as a ready-made Gheg standard, although there is no argument about why that is any better or worse than the linguistic norms created in 1952, 1957 or 1964. As it is, supporters of Gheg in Kosovo write it in many different ways, usually strongly related to daily speech.\(^{675}\) There is at present no Gheg standard.


\(^{673}\) For an explanation of šiptarski jezik, see Chapter Three.


While historiographical problems tarnished the image of Standard Albanian for some, a number of practical difficulties were also associated with the standard. As the first days of enthusiasm for the unified language had faded in Kosovo, parents who tried to bring up their children speaking the standard language were rare. Commentators thought that children were insufficiently exposed to the standard before reaching school age, when they would be taught Standard Albanian as if it were a foreign language, using obsolete teaching methods. Students and teachers both reported it as difficult to master.676 In both Albania and Kosovo after 1999, financial difficulties meant Albanian lessons were dropped from most secondary education. Linguistic mistakes are common at all levels, including in newspapers and in the work of members of the Academy of Arts and Sciences.677 While diglossia certainly exists between local dialect and the standard language, there is also a general sense of linguistic confusion as people mix the dialect with the standard, sometimes using different forms in the same piece of writing.678

Once again, this situation has led to conflict. On one side are traditional defenders of Standard Albanian, who take a prescriptive view of language management and believe that any problems are due to a failure of schools and the Albanian people in general to fulfill their duty to implement the decisions of the Congress of Orthography.


678 Ardian Vehbiu, “Shqipja deledash,” Gjuha shqipe 2013, issue 2, 89-94. Examples of linguistic confusion in Kosovo can be found in Appendix Three.
On the other are Gheg revivalists, who believe that the problems reflect the distance of Standard Albanian from Gheg daily speech and that it is the standard that needs changing to suit the people. To these strands of opinion, however, we must add a third: those of some intellectuals, often younger and trained in the West since 1999, who take a descriptive view of linguistics and an interest in daily language use. They are especially interested in language in large cities, given the great increases in population in the main cities of Albania since the fall of communism and in Kosovo since the end of the 1998-1999 war. These intellectuals tend to follow Rexhep Ismajli in believing there is room for greater freedom within the standard. They feel linguistic function, rather than the internal structure of the language, should be the principal guide to how Standard Albanian works. I will discuss this further below.

The Interacademic Council

In an attempt to remedy these conflicts, a conference in 2002 to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the Congress of Orthography concluded that a joint representative commission should be formed between Albania and Kosovo to help raise the standard of language. No further action was taken until June 2004, when the Academy of Arts and Sciences of Kosovo published its “Orientations,” stating that, while the Congress of Orthography was a great achievement, it was inevitable that the socioeconomic circumstances of the previous three decades had caused profound changes in Standard Albanian, not least in its relation to Gheg, some elements of which might gradually find their way into the standard. The Academy would form a

commission to make Standard Albanian more flexible and acceptable to its speakers.\textsuperscript{680} To calm the situation, the Academy of Sciences in Albania joined in December 2004 with the Academy in Kosovo and representatives of the Albanians in Macedonia and the Arbëresh to form the Interacademic Council of the Albanian Language “with authority to examine all matters linked to the development and use of Standard Albanian.” Suspended after a few early meetings, ostensibly because of the reorganization of the Academy in Albania, but also because it was the target of criticism from linguists and institutions that had felt excluded, the Interacademic Council was expanded in 2010 to include new representatives, mostly from Kosovo and the north of Albania. Its meetings since then have been the occasion of sensationalist coverage in the press in Albania and a boycott by some linguists opposed to any change, such as Emil Lafe, one of the original members from Albania.\textsuperscript{681}

The recommendations of the Interacademic Council have so far not made any concessions to the inclusion of dialect features. For that reason, they have been viewed as largely cosmetic by those who want significant change. On the other hand, ardent defenders of the standard, especially of the generation associated with its approval at the Congress of Orthography, have been sharply critical of the recommendations as directives intending to split and destroy the language. Such disagreements have also revealed splits among linguistic institutions in both Albania and Kosovo. In Kosovo, for


example, the Academy of Arts and Sciences and the University of Prishtina have been more enthusiastic than the Albanological Institute; while it does have a member on the Interacademic Council, the Institute’s journal *Gjuha shqipe* has included boycotters of the Council and their supporters on its Editorial Board, including its Editor-in-Chief. The problems with the Interacademic Council have been reflected in participation at major conferences. Although earlier conferences, such as the one in 2002, had included both supporters and opponents of Standard Albanian as it was, by 2010 two conferences were held, one by supporters of the standard without change and the other including those open to broadening the standard, which was boycotted by the former.682 For all its problems, however, the Interacademic Council put linguists from Kosovo and Albania on an equal footing, something no language management body had done before.

**How linguistic ideology translates into politics**

To what extent do these positions on Standard Albanian translate into political positions? For traditional defenders of the standard and pro-Gheg activists, there is a clear connection, which can be seen in the rhetoric used to discuss language and its political resonance. Discussion of language is a means of dealing with the past and the future and, moreover, this discussion both maintains positions rooted in past situations and brings to the fore issues new to the scene after independence. The links between political and linguistic positions are more complex than might at first appear.

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682 Leonard Veizi, “Xhevat Lloshi: ‘Këshilli Ndërakademik, ‘jeniçeri’ me prapavijë politike që kërkon shkatërrimin e shqipes standarde. Ja pse dështoi,” *ResPublica*, 12 August 2015, at [http://www.respublica.al/2015/08/12/intervista-xhevat-lloshi-k%C3%ABshiilli-nd%C3%ABrakademik-%E2%80%9Cjeni%C3%A7eri%E2%80%9D-me-prapavij%C3%AB-politike-q%C3%AB- k%C3%ABrkon](http://www.respublica.al/2015/08/12/intervista-xhevat-lloshi-k%C3%ABshiilli-nd%C3%ABrakademik-%E2%80%9Cjeni%C3%A7eri%E2%80%9D-me-prapavij%C3%AB-politike-q%C3%AB-k%C3%ABrkon) [Last accessed 7 April 2017]; Gazmend Bërlajolli, “Standardi asht ‘shoku’ i deridjshëm që tash asht ba ‘zotni’,” in Shkëlzen Gashi, *Gjuha e képutun*, pp.59-71, pp.70-71; Ardian Marashi, remarks, Kolec Topalli et al., eds., *Shqipja në etapën e sotme*, p.388.
In broad terms, a group of Kosovan Albanian nationalists supports the standard as it is. They think of the Albanian national project as unfinished, that the standard represents the nation, and that the standard is a symbol of the Albanian people as a whole. Changing the standard, therefore, puts the whole nation into question. Opposing them are supporters of Gheg, whether that means “opening up” the standard to Gheg grammatical and lexical features or changing the base dialect of the standard to Gheg. For them, the dialect is a symbol of regional expression and freedom, whether that be for Kosovan or for the whole Gheg-speaking area. The third group consists of those who see language in terms of function rather than symbol. For the first two groups, as we shall see, the debate is plainly about more than language, but about political identity as well.

While both defenders of the decisions of the Congress of Orthography and their opponents claim to be supporters of democracy, for example, the former, especially in Albania, are often nostalgic for the communist past when they had institutional control over the implementation of the standard in education, the media and government, and could direct the purging of the lexicon of “unnecessary” foreign words.683 Twenty intellectuals, mostly linguists, wrote to the prime minister of Albania in 2015 to demand the withdrawal of funding to the Interacademic Council; in doing so, they characterized the period after the end of communism as one of disastrous decline for the language in comparison with the years of dictatorship.684 Some have expressed their nostalgia about

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684 Emil Lafe and nineteen others, “20 intelektualë i shkruajnë letër Edi Ramës: Ndalo shkatërrimin e shqipjes së njësuar nga ‘akademikët!’” *Pashtriku.org*, 4 May 2015, at [http://www.pashtriku.org/index.php?kat=47&shkrimi=2734](http://www.pashtriku.org/index.php?kat=47&shkrimi=2734) [Last accessed 7 April 2017]. Evidence suggests that, in some areas of northern Albania, Standard Albanian did not take root successfully during the dictatorship and it is younger people who are more likely to mix dialect speech with the standard language: Monica Genesin, “Situazione linguistica in un’area dell’Albania settentrionale: alcune osservazioni alla luce di un ricerca sul campo,” in Monica Genesin and Joachim Matzinger, eds.,
language by relating it to other areas they do not feel so highly prized since the advent of democracy, such as realist drawing and “clean” music. Indeed, democracy has its limits. Nationalist supporters of the standard have consistently opposed a free press permitting the expression of views hostile to theirs, or the publication of anything in dialect other than literature. Qemal Murati, for example, quotes the late politician Arbën Xhaferi, a likeminded supporter of the standard, who said a number of issues pertaining to the nation cannot be subject to debate: in the same way, he believed, that the Americans would never debate the values of the Founding Fathers.

Just as both defenders and would-be reformers claim to be democrats, both accuse the other side of being communists. The standard’s gatekeepers accuse their opponents of Titoism and Bolshevism in their arguments, painting their opponents as the children of communists bent on serving the longstanding schemes of Serbia to split up the Albanian nation. This style of rhetoric is what Ardian Vehbiu describes as “totalitarian Albanian,” based on the communist court system. This form of address is emotional, seeking to denigrate the enemy as much as to argue the case, which is often caricatured. For example, the number who want a separate Gheg-based standard for Kosovo as opposed to Albania is, in fact, very small and even then conditional on there

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685 See, for example, Shpëtim Çuçka, “Le të triumfojë më në fund shqipja vulgare mbi shqipen letrare!,” Gjuha shqipe 2013, issue 3, 87.
688 For example, Migjen Kelmendi’s father Ramiz, as head of the Rilindja publishing house, was a Party member. Once an enthusiastic supporter of the standard, he seems to have come round to his son’s views: Jusufi, “Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung,” p.75; Enver Rolbi, “Ramiz Kelmendi përgjigjet në 40 pyetje;” Koha ditore, 12 October 2011, pp.24-25, p.24.
being no progress towards a Gheg-based standard in Albania.\textsuperscript{690} A paranoid style prevails where the speaker “unmasks” who “is behind” such treachery, and formulae are produced to express and exact loyalty to the standard language of the type that existed under communism.\textsuperscript{691} I will explore these elements in greater detail below.

Defenders of the status quo also retain a number of specifically Marxist beliefs about linguistics, such as Lenin’s view that it is the advent of the national market and the development of capitalism that brings about the creation of a national language from the rural, feudal dialects.\textsuperscript{692} While such rhetoric may be socialist in form, however, it is national in content. Gatekeepers of Standard Albanian take a Herderian view of language and nation: that language is a symbol of one’s ethnic belonging, or, as Qemal Murati puts it, “language is the real biometric identity card of the Albanian.”\textsuperscript{693} This identity is innate to the Albanian; to bring up the topic of national identity is “anachronistic” at a time when “the formation of nations is being replaced by the creation of states.”\textsuperscript{694} Besides acting as a simple means of communication, the language unites all Albanians with the ultimate goal of uniting them all within a single state. By insisting on the unity of the language through the standard, the argument goes, Europe will recognize that the Albanians are one nation who should live in the same administrative unit.\textsuperscript{695} As yet, however, the national goal remains incomplete.\textsuperscript{696}

The work of the intellectual, then, is to defend the standard. To assist in the completion of the goal, gatekeepers argue, the language must be kept free of

\textsuperscript{691} Vehbiu, \textit{Shqipja totalitare}, p.101.
\textsuperscript{692} See, for example, Islamaj, \textit{Gjuha dhe identiteti}, p.51.
\textsuperscript{693} Qemal Murati, “Shqiptari është shqiptar vetëm përmes gjuhës,” \textit{Gjuha shqipe}, 2013, issue 1, 52.
\textsuperscript{694} Baliu, “Diskutimet për standardin,” 290.
\textsuperscript{695} Qosja, “Gjuha e njësuar,” 65; Rami Memushaj, “Gjuha standarde krijesë kombëtare dhe jo totalitare,” \textit{Gjuha shqipe} 2013, issue 3, 33.
\textsuperscript{696} Baliu, “Diskutimet për standardin,” 291.
“unnecessary” foreign borrowings (a sentiment which, in the Albanian case, is apparently distinct from that of purism). This, however, has been disrupted, according to this position, by the lack of nationalism of those who fail to respect the standard, as “insufficient will to master the standard, ignorance, short-sightedness, lack of conscience […] are displayed by those who act differently”. Standard Albanian’s gatekeepers charge their opponents with being forgetful of the past and motivated by spite, failing to bequeath the achievements of the Congress of Orthography as a sacred treasure of the nation, won by the sweat of generations and passed as an amanet to the current generation. In arguing about this heritage, the standard’s supporters appeal to antiquity: for example, to the oldest surviving book in Albanian from 1555, in which Gjon Buzuku wrote ujë (“water”) with a silent ĕ, whatever the Interacademic Council might discuss now. To ensure the protection of the standard, however, many defenders of the standard want disregarding the rules of language to be punishable by law, just as rules in other matters of state are. Though some consider such a step as coming into line with France “and other civilized European countries,” such legislative protection of the standard language is actually more characteristic of former communist countries.

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697 Hajri Shehu, “Rreth anglicizmave në mjetet e sotme të informimit masiv,” in Bulo et al., Shqipja standarde, p.337.
700 Qemal Murati, “Shqipja standarde dhe tribalizmi linguistik,” Gjuha shqipe 2013, issue 2, 30, 28. The issue of spelling masculine nouns with or without a final silent ĕ has been raised at the Interacademic Council.
Defenders of Standard Albanian as it is claim to speak for the nation and the overwhelming majority of its intellectuals. In doing so, they accuse pro-Gheg activists of betrayal, emulating Esat Pasha Toptani, the quintessential traitor of the Albanians to the Serbs, who was assassinated by a patriot in 1920. It is here that totalitarian Albanian, as experienced in both Kosovo and Albania, with the added impact in Kosovo of the illegal movement’s rhetoric of trust and betrayal, come to the fore. In this rhetoric, the sole aim of those arguing for the use of written Gheg in areas other than literature is to split the Albanian people up. Who is behind this? The rhetoric is that this has been an age-old aim of the Serbs, to the extent that the use of Gheg to form the standard for Albanian in Yugoslavia before 1968 was part of a Slav plot against the Albanians. The fact that some of Standard Albanian’s critics have taught at the Albanian Language Seminar of Belgrade University is deemed evidence for this. The decision by Kosovo to adopt Standard Albanian instead was one of “sacrifice” for the sake of national unity, preparing the way for the Congress of Orthography, described by these language managers as one of the greatest events in Albanian history, equivalent to the Congress of Manastir. As Idriz Ajeti and Emil

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703 Mulaku, “Gjuha standarde,” p.23.
704 Aliu-Tahiri, Gjuha dhe lufta, p.17. Given the historic ties of many supporters of the standard language as it is to the PDK and of some of those who disagree with them to the LDK, it should be noted that, as Oliver Jens Schmitt points out in the case of historiography in Kosovo, accusations of betrayal should not always be treated as idle. Jusufi, “Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung,” p.71; Schmitt, “Historiography,” p.63.
705 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, “The bequest of Illegalja: contested memories and moralities in contemporary Kosovo,” Nationalities Papers 41.6 (2013), 966.
707 Vinca, “Gjuha e sotme letërare,” p.90. This argument echoes those of Greek supporters of Katharevousa at the beginning of the twentieth century in their opposition to the demoticists, who thought that the Greek standard language of the time was too difficult to master and should approximate daily usage more closely. Peter Mackridge, “Katharevousa (c.1800-1974): An Obituary for an Official Language,” in Marion Sarafis and Martin Eve, eds., Background to Contemporary Greece (London: Merlin Press/Savage, MD: Barnes and Noble, 1990), p.31.
Lafe said, the Albanian language is “the blood nourishing our national consciousness and nobody is allowed to use it as a means of division.” Language managers often talk about the crowning achievement of constructing the standard at the Congress of Orthography, yet elide this artificial creation with the language as a whole, especially in attacking those with different ideas about Standard Albanian. As Damir Kalogjera might point out, this elision is controversial in places like Kosovo, where urban and regional dialects are still strong. This rhetorical device denies any distinctiveness to people who speak and write a different dialect and therefore may claim for themselves a different identity, as users of that dialect, from the single, national identity the standard language provides for them. Rather, such people are cast outside the language altogether, as using the “Not-Albanian” language.

Not only do the gatekeepers of Standard Albanian characterize pro-Gheg activists as traitors, but also as pre-Rilindja savages. Recounting the efforts of the rilindësit to bring the language together, they accuse their opponents of going back to the days of the bajraktar, or reflecting a demand for “a village or tribal standard language, where every village, region or fis will have its own standard.” The defenders thus see themselves as continuing the work of “civilization” of the rilindësit we saw in Chapter One, with the standard language bringing Albanian up to the level of the most advanced languages of the world. By “civilized” and “advanced,” what is

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Gjuha shqipe 2012, issue 1, 80. While this version of events casts language managers in a heroic light, this assessment is not shared by intellectuals in other professions. In the current edition of the relevant volume of Historia e popullit shqiptar, the Congress of Orthography receives a brief mention in an account of the cultural history of the period and is omitted altogether from the timeline of major events summarizing the period: Xhelal Gjeçovi et al., Historia e popullit shqiptar, vol. IV: 1939-1990, 2nd ed., (Tirana: Toena, 2009), pp.291, 460.

Ajeti and Lafe, “Njëzet e pesë vjet,” p.22.


Islamaj, Gjuha dhe identiteti, p.72.


meant here is European, but these arguments display a lack of understanding of the attitudes of European states toward standard language management. Within the context of the former Yugoslavia, however, the current position of enthusiasts in Kosovo for Standard Albanian as it stands is closest to that of the Republika Srpska between 1993 and 1998. In 1993, the authorities made Ekavian the favoured pronunciation in the territory to be closer to Ekavian-speaking Serbia, while the local population of all nationalities spoke Ijekavian. This move was confirmed in legislation in 1996 but overturned by the court in 1998.  

Further afield, some “highly developed” European states, such as Switzerland, provide state support for research and publication in dialects. Furthermore, while conservative opponents of the Interacademic Council are fond of pointing out where spelling reforms in languages such as German and Czech have “failed,” this occurred because of quite different circumstances than those in the Albanian-speaking world. As Tore Kristiansen argues, adverse reactions to proposed spelling reform in such societies is due to the absolute acceptance of the existing norm. A vivid example of this is that, following the French government’s announcement in 2016 that schoolbooks in France were to adopt the spelling reforms of 1990, some French people rejected the right of the Académie française to alter the spelling of the standard norm which was itself a creation of the Académie française.


In comparing themselves to “highly developed” European countries, these language managers address Kosovo’s “Euro-Atlantic” aspirations. Just as European nations have been coming together, goes the complaint, those that seek to review the standard are trying to drive Albanian speakers apart. Yet this position does not take account of the development of regional identity across Europe and the Western world since the 1960s. Moreover, as the work of Trudgill might suggest, the rise of regional identity in Kosovo and Albania is the result of globalization which encourages macro-regionalism in the form of “Euro-Atlantic aspirations.” This, in its turn, encourages micro-regionalism as the importance of national borders grows relatively weaker; in the Albanian case, the union of all Albanians may be achievable as citizens of the European Union, if not of a single state. Contact with the rest of the world after many years of isolation, in the case of Albania, and after colonial domination, in the case of Kosovo, has led gatekeepers to point out that globalization has had negative consequences. These come chiefly in the flood of foreign words, mainly English, but also Italian and German, entering the language. To meet the challenges of globalization, gatekeepers argue that Albanian must be suitably protected like French or any other Western European language. However, in France resistance to the traditional protectionist approach has been on the increase since the 1970s, the 1990 reforms of the Académie française have been voluntary, and fears for the future of French no longer concern so much English and regional languages and spelling as cultural links with the Arab Mediterranean.

718 See, for example, Baliu, “Diskutimet,” 285.
Louis-Jean Calvet shows that languages change as a result of and as a symptom of socioeconomic change; unless socioeconomic circumstances cease to favour the importing of foreign words, there is little managers of languages like Albanian can do to prevent them. Tullio De Mauro in turn has noted that the proportion of frequently used words from a foreign language is not necessarily cause for concern.721 Some linguists who support Standard Albanian, such as Ardian Vehbiu, accept these arguments, though he appears to be in a minority.722

Language managers’ concern over the great increase in foreign influence has led to the view that Albanian is an endangered language, threatened by foreign words, especially from South Slav languages and Turkish. More recently, the role of threat has passed to English, leaving Albanian “in danger of becoming like Canadian – a language with English grammar and American vocabulary – translated respectively into Albanian.”723 In Kosovo, this is not just a matter of the global reach of English, but has particular local political resonance: English is cast by those in favour of greater protection as the language of colonial domination through the international protectorate that existed until 2008. In this, English took over the role in the argument of Serbo-Croatian in the days of Yugoslavia, thus highlighting the need to “complete” the Albanian national project and unite the Albanian lands in one state.724 This, however, is difficult to reconcile with the Interacademic Council’s view that Albanian has fully

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723 Qemal Murati quoted in Malvina Tafçiçu, “Pastrimi i shqipes nga fjalët e huaja dhe disa rrugë të mënjanimit të tyre,” Gjuha shqipe 2013, issue 3, 113.
724 Aliu-Tahiri, Gjuha dhe lufta, p.120.
maintained its identity in the face of competition from English and that its influences are mostly in terminology in restricted fields.\footnote{Reagon Këshilli Ndërakademik.}

Such rhetoric is not exclusive to Standard Albanian’s defenders. Gheg activists accuse the gatekeepers of the standard of Enverism and “bunkerism” and their own “Ghegophobe” version of regionalism that reproduces the xenophobia and totalitarianism of the communist period.\footnote{Bekim Lumi, “Gegërishtja është trajtuar si gjuhë e huaj,” in Gashi, Gjuha e këputun, p.56; “Morina, ‘Nji shqipe e për bashkët,” p.13, Llugaliu, Gjuhsi e letrarizueme, pp.29-30.} The defenders of the standard as it is are characterized as intolerant, unsuited to the democratization of life.\footnote{Bërlajolli, “Standardi asht ‘shoku’,” p.71} Ymer Llugaliu has described them as communist internationalists working against Albanian nationalism, portraying Kostallari as a Greek by calling him “Androklias Kostaqis.”\footnote{Llugaliu, Gjuhsi e letrarizueme, pp.11, 138, 147.} Pointing out that most Albanian-speakers are Ghegs, they also stress the antiquity and richness of literary Gheg, and Gheg features excluded from the standard language, chief among which is the infinitive, as used by Gjon Buzuku in 1555.\footnote{Llugaliu, Gjuhsi e letrarizueme, p.236.} Once viewed by supporters of Standard Albanian as a primitive relic, the infinitive has become a symbol of Gheg resistance to the standard language.\footnote{Ahmet M. Kelmendi, “Për pranimimin,” 476; Kadire Binaj, “Paskajorja dhe ideologjia,” paper given at 33\textsuperscript{rd} International Seminar for Albanian Language, Literature and Culture, Prishtina, 28 August 2014.} Following from linguists like Rexhep Ismajli and Fadil Sulejmani, who said in the 1980s there might be a place for the infinitive in the standard norm, the infinitives’s more recent partisans have expended much effort in showing that, despite the traditional claims that the infinitive can be fully substituted by the subjunctive, there are in fact many uses for the infinitive that require the user of Standard Albanian to adopt a wide variety of alternative means of expression.\footnote{Rexhep Ismajli, “Mbi normën gjuhësore,” 48-66; Fadil Sulejmani, “Çështje të normës letrare,” in Ajeti et al., Probleme aktuale, pp.95-96; see, e.g., Shaqir Berani, “Paskajorja e tipit me punue nuk është formë sintetike,” Rilindja, 11 July 1980, p.13; see, e.g., Nuhi Veselaj, Paskajorja – çështje e shqipes standarde (vështrim sinkronik) (Prishtina: Dardania Sacra/Shtufi, 2000), p.56.}

archetypal expression of the difference involved is the phrase “to be or not to be,” rendered in Gheg Me qenë a mos me qenë (literally, “to be or not to be”) and in Tosk and Standard Albanian Të jesh a mos të jesh (literally, “that you are or you are not”). Clearly, one does not completely substitute for the other, and particular attention is drawn by some critics to Anton Pashku’s modernist novel Oh (1971), which deliberately used the infinitive for its impersonal qualities that the subjunctive cannot reproduce. Furthermore, some supporters claim, the infinitive acts as a symbolic bridge between Albanian and the languages of Western Europe, whereas the subjunctive ties Standard Albanian to the Balkan Sprachbund.

For those who oppose the standard as it is, the language is also in danger, but the endangerment comes not from the threat of “unnecessary” foreign words, but from what they consider an attack on civilization in the form of a campaign waged against Gheg by the former regime and Standard Albanian’s current defenders. The civilizing mission of the pro-Gheg activists is rather to restore part of the Albanian national culture banned in Albania and ignored in Kosovo for the sake of national unity. Migjen Kelmendi raises the concern that Gheg will no longer be readable as, he believes, Standard Albanian’s gatekeepers take the language backwards through their “attempt at glottocide of Gheg.” However, the rhetorics of endangerment found among the partisans of the standard language and their pro-Gheg opponents have little in common with the real prospect of the death of Arbëresh in Italy. It is notable that, given the prognosis for the variant’s survival, primers in local dialect have been introduced by local communes in

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733 Veselaj, Paskajorja, p.108; Ardian Vehbiu, “Vratat e rehabilitimit të gërnjheqjes së shëndetit të Prishtinës e në Tiranë,” in Gashi, Gjuha e këputun, p.41.
conjunction with the universities of Calabria, Florence and Palermo into Arbëresh primary schools in Calabria and Sicily.\textsuperscript{735}

For supporters of the Congress of Orthography, then, and to a great extent for their pro-Gheg opponents, the rhetoric of detached science is in fact mixed with emotional appeal, socialist in form and national in content, designed to achieve political aims, whether in correcting perceived injustice toward Ghegs or uniting all Albanians together. It is not so much that a scientific debate has been politicized, but that language continues to operate as a powerful symbol in a debate about what kind of nation the Albanians should be and what the place of Kosovo Albanians is within it. The forum for that debate is the intelligentsia as a whole.

**Linguists and non-linguists in the language debate**

Alongside other rhetorical tropes concerning the relation of Albanian culture to “civilized” European cultures is the practice of professional linguistics itself. In the clash between worldviews supporting the use of Gheg and Standard Albanian as it is, it is small wonder that representatives of each group accuse those of the other of being “antiscientific” and of politicizing what should be a matter of science.\textsuperscript{736} However, claims are often made about Western knowledge or Western ways of doing things (which ought therefore to be imitated) which are in fact untrue. Lindita Aliu-Tahiri, for


example, presents Anderson’s concept of imagined communities as a term promoted for political reasons linked to a common European identity, linked to globalization, global culture and Americanization rather than having anything to do with nationalism. Gjovalin Shkurtaj claims that the American authorities at every level ensure punctilious adherence to *The Elements of Style* by William Strunk and E.B. White and advocates a similar manual be used by the Albanian government, although Strunk and White has never had official status of any kind. However, if words of Western thinkers do not fit an intellectual’s worldview, they may be dismissed *a priori* as having no connection with Albanian because the research was carried out in a non-European society speaking a language unrelated to Albanian.

Alongside promoters of Gheg and of the current form of Standard Albanian, however, there now exists another group, that of the directly or indirectly Western-trained, largely descriptive linguist. Claiming to be professionally rather than politically-minded, they share much intellectual ground among themselves, although their political views differ; for example, Rexhep Ismajli is a prominent member of the LDK in Kosovo while Ledi Shamku-Shkreli is a Socialist deputy in Albania. What unites them is a view that language is chiefly a means of communication rather than a political symbol. Of course, their being Western-trained and “scientific” is in itself a political position related to the professionalization of linguistics among Albanians. There is, however, considerable crossover between descriptive linguists and supporters of Standard Albanian as it is, as well as those who favour change to include a greater element of Gheg. Ardian Vehbiu, for example, opposes the work of the Interacademic

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737 Aliu-Tahiri, *Gjuha dhe lufta*, p.15; Shkurta, “Prof. dr. Gjovalin Shkurtaj.”
738 See, for example, Balu, “Diskutimet,” 289-290.
739 Lumnije Jusufi categorizes Shamku-Shkreli as wanting to create a new standard, but this misses the point of Shamku-Shkreli’s argument that literary and standard language are not the same thing: Jusufi, “Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung,” p.76; Shamku-Shkreli, *Standard dhe neostandart*, pp.206-261.
Council as misguided and inopportune. On the other hand, Rrahman Paçarizë, a member of the Interacademic Council, is a strong supporter of including within the standard the infinitive and especially the shortened participle form associated with Gheg. In explaining their views, they are careful to eschew emotional, political rhetoric and confine themselves to “scientific” argument.\footnote{740 Ardian Vehbiu, “Male me barrë,” Peizazhe të fjalës, 15 April 2013, at http://peizazhe.com/2013/04/15/male-me-barre/ [Last accessed 7 April 2017]; Rrahman Paçarizi, “Jo folësit në shërbim të gjuhës, por gjuha në shërbim të folësve,” in Gashi, Gjuha e këputun, p.98.}

In terms of the linguistic profession, Albania and Kosovo are very different places than they were in the days before the Congress of Orthography. Today there are many more people with linguistic training and consequently a different relationship between linguists and other intellectuals – such as writers, educators and journalists – who were involved in earlier decision-making processes. Linguists of all persuasions have sought to exclude or discount non-linguists from discussing language, although pro-Gheg activists often say they are simply pointing out a problem that ought to be dealt with by linguists.\footnote{741 Xhevdet Shehu, “Gjuha shqipe e sulmuar – Në prag të 40-vjetorit të Kongresit të Drejtshkrimit të Gjuhës Shqipe dhe debatit për standardin,” Gjuha shqipe 2012, issue 1, 87; Rrahman Paçarizi, remarks in Topalli et al., eds., Shqipja në etapën e sotme, p.640; see, e.g., Bërlajoll, “Standardi asht ‘shoku’,” p.64.} While members of the Interacademic Council, which includes various shades of prescriptivist and descriptivist opinion, expect there to be consultation with non-linguist intellectuals involved with language before any recommendations become decisions about how the language should be written, some more authoritarian linguists see the role of non-linguists as simply to implement the decisions that linguists have made.\footnote{742 “Reagon Këshilli Ndërakademik”; see, e.g., Isa Bajçinca, “Diskutim rreth referimit të Bahri Becit ‘Gjuha letrare shqipe dhe baze e saj dialektore’, dhe të Mehmet Çelikut ‘Problemet të diskutueshme rreth ‘Drejtshkrimit të gjuhës shqipe’ të 1973’,” in Seminari XVII ndërkombëtar për gjuhën, letërsinë dhe kulturën shqiptare 17 (1996), 746.}

Despite the connection between rhetoric about language and politics, the relationship between pro-Gheg activism and “Kosovar” identity or support for the
decisions of the Congress of Orthography and the union of Albania and Kosovo is not as straightforward as it might seem. While there are Gheg activists such as Halil Matoshi who desire a distinct political identity for Kosovo, some, like Agim Morina and Kastriot Myftaraj, would prefer to see Albania and Kosovo become a single state.\textsuperscript{743} Among the wider cultural elite, the position on language held by an individual is not necessarily indicative of that person’s political views. Nevertheless, as we have seen, in a wider sense this discussion is innately political, not least through the rhetoric used and ideas about the relationships between language and society.

We have seen throughout this thesis how intellectuals have led the way in both identity formation and language management. However, as I will discuss in the conclusion to the thesis, since the 1998-1999 war intellectuals have been losing their power as the leaders of political change. With the removal of an external enemy to resist, a plurality of views has become more possible and there is certainly no uniformity about how the language should move forward. Between 2011 and 2013, Enver Robelli interviewed one hundred members of the cultural and political elite for a column in \textit{Koha ditore}. As the same forty questions were asked in each interview, it is easy to compare them. Among the questions asked was whether Gheg had been damaged as a result of the standard language and whether it should be changed. While there is no suggestion that the hundred people were a scientific representation of Kosovo Albanian intellectuals, it is notable that only 21 said there should be no change at all; 24 said the standard of 1972 should be looked at again; 5 said it should be changed to include more Gheg words; 29 replied that the standard should be changed to

reflect Gheg better; 5 believed the base dialect of the standard language should be changed to Gheg; and the remainder either did not know or had no opinion. Among the interviewees, we find those who want the base dialect changed to Gheg but are in favour of Albania and Kosovo uniting, and those who wish them to remain separate who are happy with the standard language as it is, as well as the political positions more commonly associated with each linguistic ideology.\(^7\) Similar findings can be found in Shkumbin Munishi’s research on another hundred people, of whom 34 thought Standard Albanian was fine as it was, 65 thought it should be expanded or changed in some way, and one person thought it should be changed completely.\(^7\) Furthermore, an Ipsos opinion poll for the University of Oslo in Albania in 2011 found that 53% of those asked in northern Albania thought Standard Albanian should be revised to make it closer to the “northern dialects,” while just 21% in central Albania and 6% in southern Albania agreed.\(^7\) It is clear, then, that there is no common position, and that support for Standard Albanian in its current form is far from universal. Any standard language depends on the support of the elite and counter-elite in its use, and language managers cannot simply command them to use it and reproach them when they lapse. This lack of support means the standard may lose prestige in Kosovo in relation to local forms of expression.\(^7\)

\(^7\) See, e.g., Enver Robelli, “Ag Apolloni përgjigjet në 40 pyetje,” Koha ditore, 8 August 2012, p.28; Enver Robelli, “Arben Zharku përgjigjet në 40 pyetje,” Koha ditore, 2 May 2013, p.28.

\(^7\) Shkumbin Munishi, Probleme të shqipes standarde në Kosovë (Prishtina: ZeroPrint, 2013), p.103.


\(^7\) Ana Deumert and Wim Vandenbussche, “Research directions in the study of language standardization,” in Deumert and Vandenbussche, Germanic standardizations, p.459.
While the standard retains a wide level of overt prestige among Kosovo Albanians, the Gheg vernacular and the urban idiom of Pristina in particular have a wide level of covert prestige and are considered by Julie May-Kolgjini to be gaining overt prestige. Gheg is now commonly heard on radio and television (especially on Migjen Kelmendi’s television channel Rrokum), and in the speech of politicians of all persuasions, and seen in advertising, on the internet, in journalism and campaigning, particularly when aimed at young people. Much pop music is in Gheg, even when the subject of the song is Albanian unity; rap is particularly associated with Gheg, which has helped the dialect gain popularity in Tirana and other parts of Albania, and which Ledi Shamku-Shkreli argues has a great influence on the renewal of the standard language. For the descriptive linguist, such as Shamku-Shkreli, the standard language should be broad enough to cope with a variety of linguistic domains and change according to how Albanian-speakers use the language. Prescriptivists, however, maintain that the chief distinction in domain is between speaking and writing, so the rules of the Congress of Orthography should be adhered to as strictly when writing a text message as a newspaper article. Furthermore, they believe no change can happen in the standard language that is outside its own internal structures, leading Shamku-Shkreli

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748 Overt prestige is a “type of prestige attached to a particular variety by the community at large that defines how people should speak in order to gain status within the wider community,” Julie May-Kolgjini, “Mundësia e përdorimit të paskajores në standardin e gjuhës shqipe,” in Kolec Topalli et al., Shqipja në etapën e sotme, p.221, quoting Nick Cippolone, Steven Hartman Keiser and Shravan Vasisth, eds., Language Files: materials for an introduction to language and linguistics (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998), p.480.

749 Covert prestige is a “type of prestige that exists among nonstandard-speaking communities that defines how people should speak in order to be considered members of those particular communities,” May-Kolgjini, “Mundësia,” p.221, quoting Cippolone, Keiser and Vasisth, eds., Language Files, p.474.

750 Munishi, Probleme të shqipes standarde, p.98; May-Kolgjini, “Mundësia,” p.221.

751 Ledi Shamku-Shkreli, Standard dhe neostandart, pp.251-252. Lumnije Jusufi argues that, while the use of the dialect or the standard is no longer a marker of musical genre, it still functions as a marker of musical nationalism through the use of Standard Albanian: Lumnije Jusufi, “Die aktuelle Debatte um sprachliche Albanizität zwischen Gegisch und Toskisch,” in Christian Voh and Wolfgang Dahmen, eds., Babel Balkan? Politische und soziokulturelle Kontexte von Sprache in Südosteuropa (Munich: Sagner, 2014), pp.203-204. Nevertheless, it is not hard to find examples of songs in Gheg celebrating the union of all Albanians, such as Shkurte Fejza, “Thrret Prizreni mori Shkodër,” 2009, YouTube, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nBrZE-qpBrk [Last accessed 14 May 2017].
to state that, by insisting on the rules of 1972 without allowing the language to develop by itself, the prescriptivists are digging their own graves.752

Gazmend Bërlajolli has noted a difference in attitude on preserving Standard Albanian as it is between those born around 1972, the year of the Congress of Orthography, and those born beforehand.753 Among Enver Robelli’s interviewees, those who were secondary school students or adults at the time of the Congress of Orthography were somewhat more likely not to want changes in the standard than those born afterward. There seems to be a generational change which ties in with a more professionalized generation of linguists. Linguists or not, they are also too young to remember the wave of enthusiasm about Standard Albanian of the 1970s. Of the other questions Enver Robelli asked, those who were old enough to remember were somewhat more likely to want political unification between Kosovo and Albania than those born later. The younger generation were born after the period when Albanian identity became entrenched and Kosovo had been imagined as a distinct territory.

Standard Albanian in Kosovo today

That sense of Albanian identity, however, has prompted a sense of inferiority among Kosovo Albanians towards Tosk speakers which does not exist, say, among German speakers in Austria and Switzerland, arising out of the lack of contact between Kosovo Albanians and Tosk speakers and the stigmatization of Gheg by the cultural elite following the Congress of Orthography. This sense of inferiority has been explored by Rrahman Paçarizi in psycholinguistic terms, whereby Kosovo Albanians view

752 See, for example, Jolanda Lila, “Mbi disa aspekte të komunikimit virtual,” Gjuha shqipe 2013, issue 2, 73-77; Vehbiu, Fraktalët e shqipes, p.14; Shamku-Shkreli, Standard dhe neostandart, p.232.
themselves as being unable to speak their own language properly.\textsuperscript{754} While many advocate the compulsory study of written Gheg at school to remove this sense of inferiority, this runs into two different conflicts. The first is with ardent gatekeepers of the standard who are still convinced that, bar the feeding of words and expressions into Standard Albanian, dialects are fated to die.\textsuperscript{755} Nevertheless, differences in the vernacular in Kosovo and Albania remain strong, and the potential for mutual incomprehension between the two has been satirized for years on Top Channel’s television show \textit{Portokalli}.\textsuperscript{756} If William Fierman is correct, the potential language managers have for reducing those differences is small, as the political will and societal control promoters of Standard Albanian once had no longer exist.\textsuperscript{757} As for the position of Standard Albanian in Kosovo, Paçarizi suggests that its current form is hampering the education of native Gheg-speakers, while Besnik Pula compares its function to that of Latin for Catholic clergy: a lingua franca for the culturally initiated.\textsuperscript{758} Even Standard Albanian as written in Kosovo and Albania is distinct; as Amalia Arvaniti shows in the case of standard Greek in Greece and Cyprus, ignoring that distinctiveness or simply treating it as deviance from the standard language may lead to it widening.\textsuperscript{759} The second problem with compulsory teaching of literary Gheg arises if it is successful in removing the sense of inferiority Kosovo Albanians feel; they may prefer their own ways of speaking and writing even if they keep to the same standard language, and thus

\textsuperscript{755} See, for example, Vehbiu, \textit{Fraktalët e shqipes}, p.42; Mehmet Çeliku, “Shqipja standarde, kur ka filluar dhe evoluimi,” \textit{Gjuha shqipe} 2013, issue 2, 118.
\textsuperscript{757} Fierman, \textit{Uzbek Experience}, pp.267-268.
\textsuperscript{758} Paçarizi, \textit{Shqipja standarde}, p.259; Pula, “Kombi,” p.28.
deepen the division between Kosovo and Albania, as has happened between Dutch-speakeners in Belgium and the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{760}

The period covered by this chapter is one of immense political change: the end of communism in Albania to the 1998-1999 war and the end of Serbian rule in Kosovo, the international protectorate and independence of Kosovo. Yet the question of language remains important, although now in a very different form than before 1992. It is precisely because there is more than one worldview available that identification with Albania through Standard Albanian in its current form is no longer something with which most Kosovo Albanians identify. As we have seen, intellectuals are divided on this question. Moreover, now that Albanian is no longer an officially subordinate language, it ceases to function as a banner of the nation. This is in contrast to Macedonia, where the standard language still represents Albanians in confrontation with the language of the Slav majority.\textsuperscript{761} In Kosovo, the debate about language instead now represents the struggle between two visions of Kosovo: Kosovo as a region in a larger Albanian space – “Ethnic Albania” – and Kosovo as a country with strong ties to Albania, but ultimately with its own future as an independent state, united with Albania in the pluralist, democratic institutions of NATO and the European Union. Though ties have grown stronger between Kosovo and Albania since the war and independence, there is still much that separates them; it is not possible, for example, to buy Tirana newspapers in Prishtina or Prishtina ones in Tirana.

\textsuperscript{760} Deprez, “Diets, Nederlands, Nederduits,” p.296.
\textsuperscript{761} For an account of the status and debate on Albanian in Macedonia, see Arsim Sinani, (Mos) Zyrtarizimi i gjuhës shqipe në Republikën e Maqedonisë (Tirana: UET Press, 2015).
The internalized civilizing mission from Albania, when combined with the moral mission of the Kosovo Albanian intellectual we encountered in Chapter Four, means that it is hard for intellectuals of that worldview to accept resistance to their views as moral or even rational. But in the breakdown of the certainties of Slav and communist rule, the younger generation is no longer so interested in passing on a sacred national treasure. Language, for many – especially those who remember neither communism nor the war – no longer comes with a set political agenda, but is simply a means of communicating, where Standard Albanian might be simply the most formal register among many.

With the imagining of Kosovo as a distinct territory, and now the reconfiguration of Kosovo as an independent state, simply being Albanian is no longer sufficient for many Kosovo Albanians. But as yet there is no imagined Kosovo Albanian identity that is separate from Albania and Albanianness. Insistence on a new identity with a new state will find it hard to overcome the now longstanding attachment of the majority of people of Kosovo to Albania. Yet forcible insistence on there being no difference between Albanians on either side of the border may provoke reaction in those that see their identity choices as under threat. These political views are all intimately intertwined with visions of Kosovo within the region and within Europe that make the debate over language so intractable.
Conclusion

At first glance the fact that language has played an integral part in the development of national identity in Kosovo may not seem very surprising. It is well known that national movements, for example in western and central Europe in the nineteenth century, have often focused on management and unification of language. But in fact the role language played in the development of national identity in Kosovo, and the way development played out more generally, is not necessarily typical.

This thesis argues that national identity in Kosovo has developed in ways somewhat different from those in other European countries. This is important for our understanding of the more general history and theory of national identity, but also for our understanding of the history of Kosovo and the wider region. Many historians who have looked at the history of Albanian identity have assumed that Albania and Kosovo have had a unitary story, with Albanian identity developing in the same way on both sides of the border. But in fact that is not the case.

I argue here that Albanian national identity in Kosovo was developed by Kosovo Albanian modern intellectuals as a form of colonial resistance under conditions of modernization imposed from outside. This is not to say that the identity is the same as that in Albania, but that Kosovo Albanian national identity involved imagining Kosovo Albanians as being Albanians separated from Albania. This has involved the modern intellectuals importing myths and symbols (of which language is foremost) from Albania for use in their own struggle with Yugoslav rule. The elite position of modern intellectuals in Kosovo Albanian society, and the commitment of those intellectuals to presenting their case through the “scientific” field of Albanology, interacted with the external political pressures to which Kosovo was subject. Together, they affected the
course of microadjustments in identity among the general non-Slav population which had been occurring since the early twentieth century as a result of political change imposed on Kosovo from outside. These resulted in the great majority of non-Slavs ethnically identifying with the Albanian state, albeit one which they had never seen and of which they knew very little.

As we have seen, Kosovo Albanians developed a sense of national identification with the state of Albania. This was precipitated by the arrival of a modern intelligentsia from Albania during the Second World War. Although there had been events, such as the League of Prizren, since the nineteenth century that had taken place in Kosovo which would contribute to Albanian national sentiment, they only formed part of a Kosovo Albanian nationalist discourse once they had been introduced to Kosovo by Albanian nationalist intellectuals acting as teachers and administrators during WWII. The modern intellectuals from Albania encouraged parents to send their children to school, where they were educated to venerate the national symbols of Albania, through whose offices the general non-Slav population had been delivered of colonialist Yugoslav rule.

At the end of the war, the communists re-established Yugoslav rule and engaged on a programme of mass education in Albanian to create socialist citizens while fighting “backward practices” such as religion. The communist persecution and destruction of the older Muslim and Catholic religious and traditional intelligentsia left the modern intelligentsia, both from Albania and locals who adapted their worldview, as the elite of Kosovo Albanian society. This group was largely supportive of the programmes of the Party, yet this group saw its origins not in Yugoslavia or the Party, but in the advent of Albanian intellectuals during the war. The socialist Yugoslav policy of granting rights to citizens according to national group meant that the elite (who were mostly primary
school teachers) were seen as representatives of their ethnic group and the people they served as those they represented; mass education, which took children from a multilingual into a monolingual environment, served to enhance this tendency. However, Yugoslav policy after 1948, which revived feelings of persecution experienced under royal Yugoslavia, stoked grievances which were perceived in ethnic terms. Albanian ethnicity was seen by Slav authorities as a sign of untrustworthiness with teachers of Albanian language and history coming under particular suspicion.

Because the Yugoslav government defined Albanians as an ethnic group, the intellectuals sought to raise the status of that group, from the time of the expansion of tertiary education in Albanian in the 1960s, Kosovo Albanian intellectuals sought to “affirm” the status of their ethnic group through expanding the rights of Kosovo as an autonomous province and the status of the Albanian language within it. As part of this effort of affirmation, with the support of “Kosovar” politicians, they sought contact with Albanologists in Tirana, the main centre of Albanological production which had been forbidden to them since 1948. Relatively few in number and anxious to identify with the Albanian state, the intellectuals had a sense of inferiority toward the scholarship and the emotional pull of the “mother state.” That the products of Albanological work, including the standard language, had been produced as instruments of revolutionary change and control to suit the Albanian state without reference to Albanians elsewhere was of little importance in comparison to the affirmation of the Albanians, wherever they lived, as a single people and not an exotic “minority” as the Yugoslav state supposed.

As Katherine Verdery points out, intellectuals in Eastern Europe have claimed for their discipline the moral right to represent the nation. I argue that in the case of Kosovo the “discipline” is extended to the whole field of Albanology. For the Kosovo
Albanian intellectual, as a representative of the nation, there is a duty not to be detached from mundane affairs but rather to engage as the guardian of the nation, promoting the obligations of the Albanian people of Kosovo towards the nation. Prime among these obligations is using Standard Albanian.

As we saw in Chapter Three, the decision in 1968 to adopt the standard language created for the purposes of the Albanian state was the first tangible sign of unity of all Albanians, so the intellectuals at the Linguistic Consultation of Prishtina believed, a permanent reminder that Albanians were a civilized people with common values in a uniform language with “grammatical” usage based on southern Albanian rather than Tosk speech, serving to reinforce the connection with the “mother state.” The Stalinist ideological base of Standard Albanian was of no importance in comparison to the national prize that adopting this norm offered, even if, as we saw in Chapters Four and Five, adopting it was to entail the use of Stalinist ideological underpinning and Stalinist rhetoric in defending it and policing its use. This decision was not a microadjustment in itself, but a symbol that one had taken place, an irreversible commitment to an Albanian nationality common with the people of Albania. Yet, thanks to the relatively light touch of Yugoslav language regulation, the years of debate that had led to this decision had been held in Albanian, from the late 1960s with direct influence from intellectuals from Albania, with little interference from the authorities and little interest from Slavs. In pointing this out, this thesis rejects considering the development of Kosovo Albanian national identity as part of a simple Slav/Albanian dichotomy.

Kosovo Albanian national identity was thus already a motivating factor at the Linguistic Consultation of Prishtina in 1968. At the same time the Kosovo authorities upgraded the Albanian language from a language with second-class status it had in the 1950s to a status of near-equality in the 1970s. This change in the status of the language
and of Albanians in general, through demographic growth and educational advancement, made the Albanian population more competitive for resources, however, and thus provoked a reaction from local Slavs. So although the position of Kosovo Albanians had been temporarily alleviated, this led ultimately to a sharpening of conflict expressed in ethnic terms.

As the local Slavs’ interests increasingly were harnessed by the Yugoslav state in the mid-1980s, the symbolic importance of the status of the Albanian language became clear. This formed the basis of a legal Kosovo Albanian resistance to pressure from Serbia during the constitutional meetings of October 1988. The subsequent rejection of Kosovo Albanian protest by Serbia eventually paved the way for their turning their back on Party and seeking a pluralist alternative with the aim of creating an independent state of Kosovo. Thus, although the adoption in Kosovo of Standard Albanian, especially as a spoken language, was patchy at best, its importance as a political symbol alongside other Albanian national symbols such as the flag, was central to Kosovo Albanian political identity.

The role of Albania in this story is complicated by the lack of contact between Albanians on either side of the border for all but a small number of the elite. This meant that the realities of life in Albania were hidden to most people, and that those who went felt unable to disabuse the idealistic notions of their compatriots. Thus the myth of Albania longed for by those unable to go there led to shock when the communist regime fell in Albania and Kosovo Albanians were able to see for themselves the plight of the country they had venerated. Faced with this, a small group of people began to question the worldview with which they had been brought up, including standard language ideology. This ressentiment against the ideals of their parents’ generation was to form
the nucleus of the movement after the 1998-1999 war in Kosovo to “open up” the standard language to the influence of Gheg.

When we look at arguments over the standard language today, among language managers there is a clear correspondence between those who support the 1972 standard language as it is and supporters of the unification of all Albanians in a single state. However, this correlation between linguistic and political goals does not necessarily hold in the wider cultural elite. This group remains divided over its aspirations for the political future of Kosovo, with the younger generation more likely to favour Albanian unity within the context of Euro-Atlantic institutions and to want some form of revision of the standard language in favour of a greater element of Gheg.

Both the linguistic and political situations are thus at the moment in a state of flux. What we can say, however, is that although intellectuals continue to be at the forefront of discussions about language, language is no longer so central to debate over political identity, and the leaders of that debate are no longer so likely to be intellectuals. Following the 1998-1999 war, politics has been led chiefly by groups emerging from the illegal movement and the armed conflict. The standard language is not a priority for these groups, as can be seen, for example, in their lack of interest in taking a public stance on draft legislation to protect Standard Albanian. At the same time, the more recent influence of European and global priorities occupies the minds of both linguistic and political activists.

Although these developments remain unfinished, the trajectory we have traced in this thesis shows through the lens of language management that the relationship of Kosovo to the Yugoslavian centre can be seen in colonial terms. In many ways the Yugoslav government failed to regard the Kosovo Albanians as part of Yugoslavia, not
just in terms of language. Kosovo Albanians were seen as the Other. An element of the
historiography of Yugoslavia suggest that national movements existed before the
Second World War and were revived as the socialist period wore on, but I argue that in
the case of Kosovo a mass nationalist movement only existed under socialism. I also
argue that Kosovo Albanian nationalism is distinct from that in Albania, and has used
Albanian symbols for its own purposes. Moreover, because of the nature of Kosovo,
which had its own government and cultural institutions, this contributed to the
conception of Kosovo as an independent territory in its own right, as opposed to being
part of greater Albanian whole within Yugoslavia. The story of language management
reveals the complexity of the development of Kosovo Albanian identity beyond the
starkness of a Slav/Albanian divide.

Language is a particularly effective symbol through which to read the history of
Albanians in Kosovo. As I suggested in the introduction, it is an essential but malleable
phenomenon, the stuff of thought itself, without which no project of modernization is
possible. Furthermore, it is language that has been the principal factor by which the
Albanian nation could be created. As Stephen May might have put it, the
identification of the majority of the people of Kosovo with the Albanian nation has
therefore been dependent on the extent to which Kosovo Albanians have defined
themselves by the language. In a period of fluid ethnic identity and multilingualism,
such as existed under the Ottoman Empire and royal Yugoslavia, when there was very
little in Albanian to read and very few who could read it, identity was more by place and
religion than by language. The civilizing missions of Albanian-speaking modern
intellectuals mounted by Axis-controlled Albania during the Second World War and
socialist Yugoslavia thereafter, in providing education that did not lead to conversion to

762 Stephen May, Language and Minority Rights, p. 35.
Slav Orthodoxy, were able to change attitudes towards the value of education and thus towards the place of Albanian in the identity of the families of children at Albanian-language schools. The choice forced by the largely Slav authorities on the Muslim population between Albanian and Turkish led those in both camps to identify still further with their chosen language and “home state” while nursing a sense of grievance against the Yugoslav state. A national identity developed slowly, and it developed out of Kosovars having things done to them, rather than doing things themselves.

This identity developed out of a form of imagined – or imaginary – community. When faced with a choice of Turkish or Albanian language and identity, Kosovo Albanians were also faced with two different situations. Albania was different from Turkey because the state of Albania was inaccessible, in particular because at this time it had tense relations with Yugoslavia. Any reciprocated relationship with Albania was not possible. Even after 1966, when small numbers of the Kosovo Albanian elite were allowed to go to Albania, they were constrained by people’s expectations to give a falsely rosy picture of what they had experienced. In Albania, policy, including language policy, was being made as an instrument of revolutionary change and control. Kosovo Albanians, because of their understanding of Albania chiefly as a place where they could be free to be Albanian, were willing to adopt aspects of this ideological standpoint, alongside political symbols and mythology, for national reasons. Thus what Albania aimed to create was national in form, but socialist in content; what Kosovo adopted was socialist in form, but national in content. This explains why the discourse about language even today retains motifs rooted in Marxist-Leninist linguistics. Kosovo Albanians had been working for years on managing the language themselves; yet they were willing to reject their previous efforts for the sake of “national unity.” Yet Albania itself had little interest in this.
The adoption of Standard Albanian was not just an assertion of membership of a “civilized nation” of Albanians wherever they might be, however, but a rejection of the possibility of membership in the Yugoslav community, which expressed cohesion at the federal level through Serbo-Croatian. This stance, which was taken at the same time as the formal rejection of the political label of Šiptar, was a statement of being Albanian, but was also a repudiation of the Slav state that ruled them: the first successful repudiation of a common Yugoslav destiny. The desire to replicate the language institutions of other parts of Yugoslavia in the 1980s was an intensification of this rejection. It combined the intensity of mutually-intelligible language-speakers seeking to establish Ausbau between themselves with the distance that already existed between Albanian and Slav languages.

In relation to both Albania and Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians have felt a sense of inferiority which was consonant with the concept of the “civilizing” missions undertaken on both sides at various times. This has been connected to the development we have discussed of national identity as something springing largely from things done to Kosovo, rather than done by its inhabitants. Language again is good example of this. Albania came to be seen as somewhere where the language was spoken properly, rather than simply the home of another dialect. Gheg even now is often considered by many Kosovo Albanians to be less correct than the standard. The political resonance of this is evident from the monolithic conception of the state by gatekeepers of the standard, compared to a perception of acceptable diversity on the part of current activists for Gheg in Kosovo and the north of Albanian.

As this example suggests, language activism is always intertwined with political issues; and talking about language is often a proxy for discussing uncomfortable political issues. Gatekeepers in Kosovo now talk about language in terms of a rejection
of globalization and a vision of the foreign powers greeted as liberators in the 1998-1999 war as colonial powers. Thus even now, with no Slav opposition against which to form an identity, some Kosovo Albanians have found a new argument to keep their national goals alive.

In this thesis we have seen how language formed a crucial political symbol and means through which Kosovo Albanian identity began to develop. This took place much later and through different means than historians have usually argued. By understanding this process as a colonial one, we are able to illuminate different perspectives on the cultural, and thus political, interaction of powers in the region, the role of intellectuals in that process, and the way Albania, without intending to, helped contribute to the causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia.
Appendix One – Glossary of common words

Words are Albanian unless followed by (S-C – Serbo-Croatian) or (T – Turkish)

Amanet  Something entrusted to another; last wishes before death
bajrak (T) Flag; group raised by Ottoman army
Bajraktar  Standard bearer; provider of men for a bajrak
Balli Kombëtar National Front – Albanian nationalist force which both resisted and collaborated with the Axis
Besa  Pledge, given word
Brđani (S-C) Mountain people
Cemiyet (T)  Society; Yugoslav political party representing southern Muslim interests, abolished 1925
Çifteli  Two-stringed lute
Çiftlik  Near-feudal form of land tenure
esnaf (T) Guild
fis (plural fiset)  Agnatic kinship group
Fyell  Fife
haraç (T) Poll tax on non-Muslims exempting them from military service
İstiklal marşı (T) Indepedence March – national anthem of the Turkish Republic
kaçak (T) Outlaw, specifically Albanian rebels 1919-1926
kararname (T) Decree; list of demands
Katundar  Villager; yokel (pejorative)
Kulla  Tower – a fortified multi-storey house peculiar to Kosovo
Kushtrim  Battle cry summoning warriors
Lahutar  Singer of epics who accompanies himself on the lahuta, a one-stringed instrument
Malësorë (plural Malësorët) Mountain people
Mëhallë  City quarter, collection of households which might form an exogamous part of a fis
Miqësi  Friendship, alliance
muhaxhir (T) Refugee
Nder  Honour
Oda  Room reserved for men where guests are entertained
pajtim i gjaqëve  Reconciliation of blood feuds
rilindës (plural rilindësit) Activist in the Rilindja
Rilindja  Renaissance; Albanian national movement from the mid-19th century to the 1920s
Rregullat të drejtshkrimit të shqipes Rules of the orthography of Albanian
taraf (T) Faction; sphere of influence through lineages, or with those with allegiance to same personality, sheikh or chief
Yücelciler (T) The Exalted Ones – Turkish activist group in Yugoslavia 1945-1947
Appendix Two
How written Albanian changed in Kosovo 1960-1975

The best means of illustrating how written Albanian changed in appearance and form is to examine work that appeared in several editions, each time being “translated” to fit the new linguistic norm. This appendix presents a series of five excerpts from Azem Shkreli’s novel *Karvani i bardhë*, which appeared in 1960, with subsequent editions in 1966 and 1975. These excerpts therefore document the linguistic norms of 1957, 1963 and the pan-Albanian standard of 1968/1972. The changes marked are linguistic changes only: editing changes are ignored.

Key

*Change from 1960 to 1966*

*Change from 1966 to 1975*

*Different in 1966 only*

*Different in all three*

Excerpt One:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1975</th>
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<tr>
<td>Por dëshira e kësaj ose asaj, për <em>tu takue</em> me <em>atë</em>, <em>gjindarin</em>in, ka qenë vetëm <em>gyrsa</em> e punës. <em>Gjysa</em> tjetër, <em>më</em> me <em>randësi</em>, ishte, nëse <em>këtë</em> e pëlqente edhe ai, përdryshe, dëshira mbetej <em>andërr</em> te sa sosh. Por nëse ai ia vente <em>synin ndonjanës</em>, e kjo nuk ndodhë rrallë, atëherë <em>ishte e kryme tanë</em> puna, sepse cila guxonte <em>me pritë gjindarin</em>, mos <em>me e pranue</em>, kur ai dalldisej epshesh, harlisej.</td>
<td>Por dëshira e kësaj ose asaj, për <em>tu takue</em> me <em>atë</em>, <em>gjindarin</em>in, ka qenë vetëm <em>gyrsa</em> e punës. <em>Gjysa</em> tjetër, <em>ma</em> me <em>randësi</em>, ishte, nëse <em>këte</em> e pëlqente edhe ai, përdryshe, dëshira mbetej <em>andërr</em> te sa sosh. Por nëse ai ia vente <em>synin ndonjanës</em>, e kjo nuk ndodhë rrallë, atëherë <em>ishte e kryme tanë</em> puna, sepse cila guxonte <em>me pritë gjindarin</em>, mos <em>me e pranue</em>, kur ai dalldisej epshesh, harlisej.</td>
<td>Por dëshira e kësaj ose asaj, për <em>t'u takuar</em> me <em>atë</em>, <em>xhindarin</em>in, ka qenë vetëm <em>gyisma</em> e punës. <em>Gjysma</em> tjetër, <em>më</em> me <em>rëndësi</em>, ishte, nëse <em>këtë</em> e pëlqente edhe ai, përdryshe, dëshira mbetej <em>ëndërr</em> te sa sosh. Por, nëse ai ia vente <em>syri ndonjerës</em>, e kjo nuk ndodhë rrallë, atëherë <em>ishte e kryer e gjithë</em> puna, sepse cila guxonte <em>ta presë xhindarin</em>, mos <em>ta pranojë</em>, kur ai dalldisej epshesh harlisej.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Translation:
The wish of this or that person to meet with him, the gendarme, was only half the matter. The other, more important, half was that it also please him, otherwise the wish would remain the dream of so many people. But if he laid his eye on someone – and
such a thing was not rare—then the matter would all be over, because whoever dared to meet the gendarme would not accept him when he ran wild with unrestrained lust.

Excerpt Two:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Pritšin</em> furtunën e parë për të <em>dergue</em> dikend për lidhje. Dhe si <em>me pritë</em>?</td>
<td><em>Pritšin</em> furtunën e parë për të <em>dergue</em> dikend për lidhje. Dhe si <em>me pritë</em>?</td>
<td><em>Pritnin</em> furtunën e parë për të <em>dergjar</em> dikend për lidhje. Dhe si <em>të pritet</em>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Translation:

They waited for the first storm to send someone to liaise. And how would they wait?
Spending the whole day playing and singing. They livened up the gush of the *odas* and made time pass more quickly. For once, all their troubles, all the past was overcome.
Even the future. They dived in, almost completely; they could only see what was close. They forgot almost everything. They only saw and only knew about each other. About each other and about the cave. This was their whole world, through which everything seemed far away, unobtainable.
Excerpt Three:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Të gjithë marrin frymë prej fundit, <em>simbas ndonj</em> pune të <em>randë</em> e të qëndrueshme dhe u vjen keq që <em>kanga</em> nuk ka qenë <em>më</em> e gjetë. Lëkundë nga vendi, të <em>mpimë tue ndejë</em> pa <em>leviz</em> dhe e <em>shiqojnë njani</em> tjetrin si të <em>dojshin me i thanë</em>:</td>
<td>Të gjithë marrin frymë prej fundit, <em>simbas ndonj</em> pune të <em>randë</em> e të qëndrueshme dhe u vjen keq që <em>kanga</em> nuk ka qenë <em>ma</em> e gjatë. Lëkunden nga vendi, të <em>mpimë tue ndejë</em> pa <em>levizë</em> dhe e <em>shikojnë njani</em> tjetrin si të <em>dojshin me i thanë</em>:</td>
<td>Të gjithë marrin frymë prej fundit, <em>si mbas ndonjë</em> pune të <em>rëndë</em> e të qëndrueshme, dhe u vjen keq që <em>kënga</em> nuk ka qenë <em>më</em> e gjetë. Lëkunden nga vendi, të <em>mpirë duke ndenjur</em> pa <em>levizur</em> dhe e <em>shikojnë njëri</em> tjetrin si të <em>donë të thonë</em>:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qe, kështu <em>bajnë</em> trimat. A pave <em>çka u bë</em>. A <em>ndjeve</em> se si <em>vringlojshin</em> shpatë dhe hudheshin <em>krenat</em> si kungujt?! E na? Çka do të kishim <em>bë</em> po të <em>+gjindeshim n‘at</em> rreth të _hatashëm?...</td>
<td>Qe, kështu <em>bajnë</em> trimat. A pave <em>çka u bë</em>. A <em>ndjeve</em> se si <em>vringëllonin</em> shpatë dhe hudheshin <em>krenat</em> si kungujt?! E na? Çka do të kishim <em>bërë</em> po të <em>gjendeshim në atë</em> rreth të _hatashëm?...</td>
<td>Qe, kështu <em>bënë</em> trimat. A pave <em>çka u bë</em>. A <em>ndieve</em> se si <em>vringëllonin</em> shpatë dhe hudheshin <em>krerët</em> si kungujt?! E na? Çka do të kishim <em>bërë</em> po të <em>gjendeshim në atë</em> rreth të _hatashëm?...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Translation:

They all took inspiration from the last one, a difficult and persistent affair and they were sorry that the song had not been longer. They shifted in their places, numb from not having moved and looked at each other as if to say: “That is what brave men do. Did you see what happened? Did you feel how they brandished their swords and chopped off heads like pumpkins? And us? What would we have done if we had found ourselves in that terrible company?”
Excerpt Four:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kudo cikronte njisaj, ngadalë, dhimbshëm e kandshëm – njihëri, lehtë, tue përkkëdhelë moshat puhihsëm, me nji ritëm tejet të fjetun, gadi të vdekun, që ban të kotesh në kuftime të lashta, t’harueme, të jetojshe në çaste të perëndueme, të fërfllueme larg, përtej stinëve. E këto janë kuftime sa t’idhta – aq edhe t’ambil, joshëse, s’ dj për ç’arsye duken të këtilla. Ndoshta pse me to kalon edhe nji pjesë e kohës, nji copë jete që nuk kthen kurrmë. Tani njeriut i duket se asht përrtri, vetëvetiu, pa ia thane këte as vedit. Dhe bresh gadi instinktivisht nëpër t’kaluemen tue dëshirue me gjetë në të gjurmët e veta – e n’gjurmë vedin, me u takue me vedin, me u njofë. Çastet e këtilla kalojnë shpejt, por jetohen shpesh, pothuej në çdo interval luftë me jetën.</td>
<td>Kudo cikronte njisaj, ngadalë, dhimbshëm e kandshëm njihëri, lehtë, tue përkkëdhelë moshat puhihsëm, me nji ritëm tejet të fjetur, gati të vdekun që bën të kotesh në kuftime të lashta, t’harrueme, të jetojshe në çaste të perënduara, të fërflluara larg, përtej stinëve. E këto janë kuftime sa të idhta – aq edhe të ëmbla, joshëse, s’ di për ç’arsye duken të këtilla. Ndohta pse me to kalon edhe nji pjesë e kohës, nji copë jete që nuk kthen kurr. Tani njiriut i duket se asht përrtri, vetëvetiu, pa ia thane këte as vedit. Dhe bresh gadi instinktivisht nëpër t’kaluemen tue dëshirue me gjetë në të gjurmët e vetë – e n’gjurmë Vedin, me u takue me vedin, me u njofë. Çastet e këtilla kalojnë shpejt, por jetohen shpesh, pothuej në çdo interval luftë me jetën.</td>
<td>Kudo cikronte njësoj, ngadalë, dhimbshëm e këndshëm – njëherit, lehtë duke përkkëdhelur moshat puhihsëm, me një ritëm tejet të fjetur, gati të vdekun që bën të kotesh në kuftime të lashta, të harruara, të jetosh në çaste të perënduarë, të fërflluara larg, përtej stinëve. E këto janë kuftime sa të idhta – aq edhe të ëmbla, joshëse, s’ di për ç’arsye duken të këtilla. Ndoshta pse me to kalon edhe një pjesë e kohës, një copë jete që nuk kthen kurr. Tani njeriut i duket se asht përrtri, vetëvetiu, pa ia thënë këtë as vetes. Dhe bresh gati instinktivisht nëpër të kaluarën duke dëshiruar të gjëjë në të gjurmët e vetë – e n’gjurmët veten, të takohet me veten të njihet. Çastet e këtilla kalojnë shpejt, por jetohen shpesh, pothuaj në çdo interval luftë me jetën.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Translation:

Everywhere it drizzled just the same, slowly, painfully and sweetly at once, caressing the ages with a breeze, with an overly sleepy, almost dead, rhythm that makes you doze in ancient, forgotten memories, live in bygone moments, resonating far away, through the seasons. And how bitter, yet how sweet and charming those memories were; he didn’t know why they seemed so. Perhaps because they brought back a point in time, a piece of life that would never return. Now the man saw himself as himself again, without him even having told himself so. He wandered almost instinctively through the past, wanting to find his own traces, and in those traces, to meet and know himself. Such things pass quickly, but are experienced often, in almost every period of struggle with life.
Excerpt Five:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mos më prek, Osman Mala. S’ka nevojë. Preke kokën <strong>tande. Tanden</strong>, Osman! Secili le ta **preki kokën e vet, le ta trokisi mirë dhe n’e pastë vetëm një lugë tru në të ka me pa sa <strong>asht</strong> ora. Por <strong>këtë asht dashtë ta bâjmë herët</strong>, atëherë kur kemi vë gishtin në çark dhe kemi hapë gurrat e gjakut. Sepse <strong>me marrë jetên nuk asht trimni as urti, trimni asht me e falë atë, me e shpëtue.</strong></td>
<td>Mos më prek Osman Mala. S’ka nevojë. Preke kokën <strong>tande. Tanden</strong>, Osman! Secili le ta **preki kokën e vet, le ta trokisi mirë dhe n’e pastë vetëm një lugë tru në të ka me pa sa <strong>asht</strong> ora. Por <strong>këtë asht dashtë ta bâjmë herët</strong>, atëherë kur kemi vë gishtin në çark dhe kemi hapë gurrat e gjakut. Sepse <strong>me marrë jetên nuk asht trimni as urti, trimni asht me e falë atë, me e shpëtue.</strong></td>
<td>Mos më prek, Osman Mala. S’ka nevojë. Preke kokën <strong>tënde. Tënden</strong> Osman! Secili le ta **prekë kokën e vet, le ta trokasë mirë dhe n’e pastë vetëm një lugë tru në të do të shohë sa <strong>është</strong> ora. Por <strong>këtë është dashur të bëjmë herët</strong>, atëherë kur kemi vëne gishtin në çark dhe kemi hapur gurrat e gjakut. Sepse <strong>ta marrësh jetên nuk është trimëri as urti, trimëri është ta falësh atë, ta shpëtosh.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Translation:

Don’t touch me, Osman Mala. There’s no need. Strike your own head. Your own, Osman! Let everyone strike their own head, let them hit it well, leaving just a spoonful of brains by which to tell the time. But we ought to have done that earlier, when we put our finger on the trigger and opened up fountains of blood. Because taking a life is neither bravery nor common sense; bravery is sparing, saving a life.

Sources:


1. For rent.

Four notices of property for rent taken on the same day in nearby streets in central Prishtina in August 2014. The Standard Albanian for “for rent” is *jepet me qera*; the local Gheg form is *ipet me qira*.
2. We translate French

Two roadside advertisements for the same translation business taken on the same day as the notices above. Among the languages on offer is French in Standard Albanian, frëngjisht (albeit without the diaresis on the e) while on the other French is in Gheg, frangjisht. Note also that on the second sign that the second, silent ë is omitted from the word përkthejmë (“We translate”).

3. Hypercorrection

Photograph taken the same day of a shop sign. Tregëtar is a hypercorrection, adding an unnecessary ë to tregtar (“trading”).
4. A notice in Standard Albanian

Photograph taken in April 2015 at Prishtina football stadium containing a number of spelling errors and hypercorrections related to Gheg dialect. Note also kupaqka, a borrowing from Serbo-Croatian, kopačke, “football boots.”

In Standard Albanian, the advertisement should read as follows (my amendments to the original are noted in italics, thus):

“NË KËRKIM TË TALENTEVE TË FUTBOLLIT

- Menaxheri gjerman Paffrath në bashkëpunim me shkolën e futbollit kërkojmë talentë.

FC Amikos më 20/03/2015 deri më 24 mars, 3 ditë, zgjasin stërvitjet. Ditën e tretë klasifikohen disa prej tyre për ditën e katërt. Ata lojarë që përzgjidhen për ditën e katërt klasifikohen një herë. Të përzgjedurit udhëtojnë për në Gjermani. Në këtë stërvitje mund të marrin pjesë të gjithë nga mosha 8 deri në 18 vjeç.

- Të gjithë lojarëve do t’iu dhurohet nga një top nga menaxheri gjerman. Po gjithashtu ka menduar t’iu ofrojë drekën falas të gjithë lojarëve. Stërvitjet do të mbahen në Kolovicë te fusha DERBI-QAMILI te Bunari i Hajratit në Prishtinë.

- Numri i kontaktit XXX XXX XXX. Stërvitjet fillojnë në orën 09.00 kursë përfundojnë në orën 15.00.

- VËREJTJE: nuk lejohen stërvitjet me këpucë futbollit me thepa.

Të gjithë të interesuarit janë të obliguar të paguajnë 80 Euro.”

Translation:
IN SEARCH OF FOOTBALL TALENT

- The German manager Paffrath, in cooperation with the school of football, are looking for talent.

On 20 to 24 March 2015, for three days, FC Amikos will be holding training sessions. On the third day some of those will be selected for the fourth day. There will also be a selection made from those players who are chosen for the fourth day. Those chosen will travel to Germany. All those from the ages of eight to eighteen may participate in these training sessions.

- The German manager will give all players at least one ball. He has also thought to give all the players dinner without charge. The training sessions will take place in Kolovica at the Derbi-Qamili field at Bunar i Hajratit in Prishtina.

- The contact number is XXX XXX XXX. Training sessions begin at 09.00 and end at 15.00.

- ATTENTION: Football boots with studs are not allowed at the training sessions.

All those interested must pay 80 Euro.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVNOJ</td>
<td>Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSHSH</td>
<td>Buletin për shkoncat shoqërore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSHT</td>
<td>Buletin i Universitetit Shtetëror të Tiranës. Seria shkoncat shoqërore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGJSH</td>
<td>Dictionary of the Albanian Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGJSSH</td>
<td>Dictionary of Today’s Albanian Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAP</td>
<td>Instituti albanologjik i Prishtinës</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGJL</td>
<td>Akademia e Shkoncave e Shqipërisë, Instituti i Gjuhësisë dhe i Letërsisë</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPJ</td>
<td>Communist Party of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDK</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFRY</td>
<td>People’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKSH</td>
<td>Communist Party of Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPSH</td>
<td>Party of Labour of Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFE/RLI</td>
<td>Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest [Electronic Record]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANU</td>
<td>Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoWB 2</td>
<td>Summary of World Broadcasts Part 2, Eastern Europe (Caversham Park: Monitoring Service of the BBC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoWB IIB</td>
<td>Summary of World Broadcasts. Part IIB. Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania (Caversham Park: Monitoring Service of the BBC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDBA</td>
<td>State Security Administration – Yugoslav secret police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography of Works Cited

Bibliographical notes

Because of the nature of this thesis as directly related to people who are engaged in intellectual production, it is hard in many cases to separate primary from secondary sources. While they are listed separately, attention is drawn to the fluidity of these categories.

As there were very few outlets for learned articles in the years in Kosovo in the years after the Second World War, many of these were carried by newspapers. This is a tradition which has continued to this day. I therefore include newspaper articles I have cited in the main list of the bibliography.

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——. “Bisedë me shokun Fadil Hoxha,” Flaka e vëllazërimit, 5 October 1967, p.3


——. “Migration of Experts a Serious Burden for Kosovo,” 26 March 1969, HU OSA 300-8-3-205; *RFE/RL* at [http://www.osaarchivum.org/greenfield/repository/osa:23a92df8-4d99-4219-b6b7-9fa3b6e43957](http://www.osaarchivum.org/greenfield/repository/osa:23a92df8-4d99-4219-b6b7-9fa3b6e43957) [last accessed 12 June 2016].


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