1. Introduction: What is diaspora? What is diaspora development?

In the year 722 Before the Current Era (BCE) Israel was destroyed by Assyria and the people fled to Judah, where they came to be known as Jews. When the history of this movement was written down between 640 and 610 BCE it was decreed of the Jewish people that “thou shalt be a diaspora in all kingdoms of the earth” (Deuteronomy 28:25). From these very specifically Jewish origins the term has spread to describe the general experience of large-scale geographical dispersion of human populations from a shared home-place as a result of violent and traumatic events. So, the scattering of Greeks after the Fall of Constantinople (1453), of Armenians after the First World War, or of Africans as a result of the trans-Atlantic slave trade are all seen as archetypal diasporas.

However, the term has continued to evolve to cover any population that has dispersed across many countries for whatever reason, not just ‘victim diasporas’ scattered as a result of violent trauma. Robin Cohen (2009) also identifies labour diasporas (such as communities of Indian heritage found around the world and derived from the movement of contract labourers), imperial diasporas (such as populations of British heritage found around the world in the wake of colonial occupations), trade diasporas (such as Lebanese and Chinese traders found around the world pursuing their business interests) and deterritorialised diasporas (such as the Roma, who trace their origins back to India, but who have lost all contact with those geographical origins and have no ‘home’ state to which they could imagine returning).

Most recently, ‘diaspora’ has entered the lexicon of international development with key organisations like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) using the term as a tool with which to frame a set of policies that developing countries, development organisations and donors should embrace in order to maximize the benefits of international migration (Dufoix, 2015). It is in this context that in 2000 The African Union declared in its constitution that the African diaspora was the ‘Sixth Region’ of the continent and defined it as follows:

“The people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union” (African Union, 2000).

In this extremely inclusive definition the reason that someone left Africa (whether as a slave, a contract worker, a soldier, a trader, a refugee, a student or a professional) is irrelevant, so too is the date (they may be the descendent of a slave forced out of Africa many centuries ago or they may have left by plane yesterday),
but a commitment to African development is seen as crucial. Individuals of African heritage are excluded from the diaspora by the AU if they are not committed to African development.

As readers of this book will be aware definitions of ‘development’ are many and diverse. For the purpose of this discussion, however, we want to keep the idea of development as broad as possible. We take development to include not only the deliberate planned activities that are labelled ‘development’ (programmes that explicitly focus on social and economic betterment in the Global South), but also those activities (such as migrants sending money to family in Africa, or investing in businesses in Africa) that might not be explicitly called development or be strategically or formally organized, but which can lead to profound changes in Africa. In addition, it is crucial to remember that ‘development’ in this broad sense doesn’t just occur in the places that the African diaspora leave behind, but also in the places that they move to. Research has shown, for example, how the African diaspora contributes to development in the places to which they move through entrepreneurial activities, paying taxes, and patronizing local businesses (Mohan 2002; Mazzucato 2008; Smith and Mazzucato 2009). In this chapter, we will briefly trace the history of the interest in diasporas in development studies and the making of the African diaspora over time, before considering the different ways in which the contemporary African diaspora engages with development on the African continent.

**What is the history of the interest in diasporas in development studies?**

In the 1960s the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (which later became the IOM) was running schemes that placed highly-skilled Europeans, displaced by World War II or the Cold War in Latin America as part of European development effort. In the following decade this was extended to help members of the Latin American diaspora in Europe to return to their home countries and, in the 1980s, the programme was extended to include those from Africa and Asia. The schemes were small-scale, and focused purely on the return migration of the highly-skilled to counteract the brain drain. In other words they paid little attention to those members of diasporas whom we would now probably describe as ‘transnational’ because of their long-term investment in the place they have moved to. IOM’s scheme continues up to the present under the label ‘Migration for Development in Africa’ (MIDA), which began in 2001. In the early 1990s civil society organisations, such as the London-based African Foundation For Development (AFFORD), started to lobby the British development sector to collaborate with the African diaspora. But, although development policy has had an interest in migration that goes back at least 50 years (Iskander, 2010, de Haas 2012), policy-makers did not start to think explicitly about how to formally enroll diaspora communities into international development until the early 2000s.
The emergence of formal diaspora engagement brought together multiple institutions. First, the European Council, meeting in Seville in 2002 started to develop the idea of co-development (that is policies that aim to benefit labour-export and labour-importing countries simultaneously), building on ideas that had emerged in France and Spain in the late 1990s (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2011). In the USA the Migration Policy Institute produced a highly influential report looking at the role of diasporas in poverty reduction in their countries of origin (Newland and Patrick, 2004). The UN’s Global Commission on International Migration, with which the IOM and World Bank were closely involved, ran from 2003 to 2005. It led to the formation of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD) at the UN in September 2006 and then to the establishment of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) later the same year, which now meets annually to bring together politicians, policy-makers, practitioners and analysts from governments, civil society and the private sector to identify opportunities, challenges and best practice for maximizing development benefits from migration. The UN’s flagship annual publication, the Human Development Report, focused on migration in 2009 (UNDP, 2009). The World Bank started to produce the bi-annual overview of global remittance data in 2006, as better data became available. There is now a dedicated Migration and Remittances team at the World Bank responsible for monitoring, forecasting and analysing migration and remittance flows. The World Bank has been at the forefront of developing policy measures to harness the potential of the African diaspora for African development, especially in the areas of remittances, investments and diaspora bonds.

The policies that have emerged from these fifteen years of discussions and experiments can roughly be divided into two types: those associated with labour-importing countries (typically, though not exclusively, in the Global North) and those associated with labour exporting countries. In labour-importing countries development ministries have generally aimed to support resident diasporas from other countries by providing: matching funds for their projects; capacity-building workshops to improve their human-resources; inventories of diaspora organisations to improve communication; networking fora and research funds for identifying best practices; market information to reduce the cost of remitting; and platforms for effective lobbying of governments. Key examples of such schemes would include Comic Relief’s Common Ground Initiative (largely funded by the UK’s Department for International Development) which has, to date, provided £25million of funding to small and African diaspora organisations. These strategies have also shaped USAID’s Diaspora Engagement Programme, and the Diaspora Engagement Alliance originally associated with (then) US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. It is, however, vital to emphasize that these policies represent a very small proportion of development spending, and often contradict
far more politically influential policies that seek to restrict immigration to countries of the Global North.

Policies in labour-exporting countries are more varied and more significant in scale. Alan Gamlen's (2006) review of more than 70 migrant-sending countries identifies three different types of diaspora policy: capacity building, extending rights and extracting obligations. What he calls ‘capacity building policies’ attempt ‘to produce a communal mentality amongst non-residents; a sense of common belonging to the home-state’ (Gamlen 2006, 7), for example by funding diaspora newspapers or websites, holding conventions for the diaspora at home, monitoring diaspora organisations overseas and ensuring that senior political figures meet with the diaspora when they travel overseas. These policies seek to actually create a national diaspora in order to then render them governable. The goal is to produce a means of communication through which a government can speak to its diaspora overseas. In contrast, the policies relating to ‘extending rights’ are about improving the political position of members of the diaspora in their home country, for example by allowing dual citizenship, voting rights at home, the possibility of standing for election and formal representation in parliament for the diaspora. The theory is that such improved political rights for the diaspora will generate goodwill and a positive relationship with those overseas and thereby protect remittance and investment flows. Thirdly, policies described as ‘extracting obligations’ seek to capture the economic potential of those in the diaspora. These include offering members of the diaspora preferential tax rates on investments at home, accelerated bureaucratic procedures in relation to land or other commercial acquisitions and capturing remittances for public goods via matching fund schemes, such as the well-known Mexican scheme through which the Mexican state adds three dollars to every one remitted from a Mexican overseas for specified development projects (Aparacio and Meseguer 2011). These policies can also leverage patriotism to extract mandatory payments and knowledge and skills transfers from members of the diaspora.

Overall this is a field with a clear policy goal and a lively history of policy ideas reflecting changing attitudes to the development-migration relationship. It is useful to draw a distinction between the policies developed by ‘donor’ states and organisations who ‘host’ diasporas and the policies developed by African states. Ultimately, it is important, however, to keep these policies in perspective: they are often under-powered both in terms of financing and politics, and there is often a gulf between policy goals and delivery.

2. Where is the African diaspora?

The global dispersal of people beyond the African continent can be traced back as far as the fifth century BCE when traders, soldiers, domestics, slaves and others began to travel to Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Between 600 CE and 1900,
the trans-Saharan slave trade moved approximately 9 million Africans to the Muslim world from India to Yemen, while at the height of the Indian Ocean slave trade in the nineteenth century approximately 800,000 Africans were dispersed across the coastal plantations of the Red Sea and East Africa (Akyeampong 2000). However, the largest dispersal took place over the four centuries of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, when approximately 200,000 Africans were moved to Europe and between 11-12 million to the Americas (Palmer 1998). Brazil is now the country with the largest African diaspora, and there are significant African-descended communities throughout Latin America, Central America, the Caribbean and the USA.

Twentieth century movements by seamen and students, among others, were small by comparison to the trans-Atlantic slave trade. By the 1980s and 1990s, however, long-term economic decline on the African continent, precipitated by the debt crisis and the ensuing structural adjustment programmes, provided a new stimulus for emigration (Zeleza, 2005). This most recent, and on-going dispersal, was dominated by movements to the Eastern Bloc (before 1989), North America and Europe. However, following transformations in the world economy and increasingly restrictive immigration policies into the Global North there are increasingly significant new movements of Africans both within and beyond Africa. These include those moving within the African continent, who have moved and established communities in African countries away from home as refugees, traders and workers (Bakewell and Binaisa 2016, Mercer et al 2008, Van Dijk 2003, Zeleza 2005), those moving to Asia in response to new trade patterns and geopolitical developments (Bodomo and Ma, 2012; Bork-Hüffer et al forthcoming), and refugees fleeing countries such as DRC, Libya, Somalia and Eritrea to seek entry to Europe. The relationship between ‘refugee’ communities and diasporas are complex, the two terms are not synonymous. Not all diasporas are comprised of refugees, though many refugees (or their descendants) might ultimately become part of the African diaspora.

The extent to which all of these people actually describe themselves as members of an ‘African diaspora’ is an open question. Even when the term is used, it might signify quite different histories and affiliations. In North America, for example, first generation arrivals from Africa in the 21st century may well have quite a different understanding of the African diaspora from those who left Africa many generations previously as a result of the slave trade (Mohan, 2002; Waters et al, 2014). Nevertheless, there have been important movements, such as Pan-Africanism, that claim there is a shared universal ‘African’ experience among Africans living within and without Africa (Mazrui, 2005).

3. What are the developmental impacts of diasporas on the African subcontinent?
In the rest of this chapter we consider how to analyse the actually-existing development impact of diasporas in Africa. To do so we follow Van Hear (2015) in distinguishing between three different sites of diaspora engagement (1) in the household/extended family sphere, (2) in the known community sphere, and (3) in the imagined community sphere. As often happens with typologies it is important to emphasize that these spheres do not operate entirely independently of each other and there are often ways in which individual actors straddle these divides.

**Household/extended family sphere**

The household sphere refers to all developmental activities undertaken by the diaspora that are organised through kin networks. This includes both the everyday routines of diaspora life, such as the sending of remittances to family and friends at home, and also the involvement with more exceptional life course events such as weddings and funerals (Van Hear 2015). Historically, these large-scale capital transfers tend to have been dismissed as non-developmental as the money is consumed in everyday expenditures (food, rent, clothes, taxes, bills, school fees). However this flow of money can reasonably be considered as a source of development finance. For example, Mazzucato et al’s (2006) study of a Ghanaian funeral shows the significant role played by the family’s diaspora in the Netherlands in organizing and funding the funeral events at home, thereby putting considerable resources into local businesses in Ghana (see also Mbiba, 2010; Page, 2007).

To this list of family-level diaspora-development work through money-transfers we would explicitly draw attention to three other kin-based activities. First, house-building in Africa by members of the diaspora (Diko & Tipple, 1992; Melly, 2010; Ndijo, 2009; Obeng-Odoom, 2010; Sinatti, 2009; Smith and Mazzucato, 2009). Second, investments in education (McGregor, 2008; Kufakurinani et al, 2014) and third investment in income-generating activities for family members (Lindley, 2010; Mazzucato, 2008). In doing so our aim is to signal the wider developmental benefits of activities that are sometimes overlooked in discussions of diaspora contributions to development (Page and Mercer, 2012).

Officially recorded remittances to sub-Saharan Africa reached $32 billion in 2013 (World Bank, 2015), although this is likely to be an underestimation of the scale of remittances sent via all channels (including unofficial ones, such as hand carries and hawala networks). The largest remittance recipient in sub-Saharan Africa is Nigeria, which received an estimated $21 billion in 2014, accounting for two-thirds of remittances to the continent (World Bank, 2015). Official data on remittances reveals that there is a huge variation in remittance receipts between African countries. Nevertheless, according to Mohapatra and Ratha (2011), relative to other financial flows to Africa (including foreign direct investment and
official development assistance) remittances are beneficial from a macroeconomic and a microeconomic perspective. They provide stable, counter-cyclical financing and access to foreign exchange, they smooth household consumption during economic downturns or other shocks (such as conflict or famine), and they are associated with reductions in poverty and higher levels of health and educational attainment.

More fine-grained research in Southern Africa has demonstrated that the long-established circular migratory patterns from neighbouring countries to South Africa sustains poor households, but has not yet proved transformative in the developmental sense. Remittance money is not re-invested in entrepreneurial or other income-generating activities (Bolt, 2015; Crush and Frayne, 2007; Pendleton et al, 2006). In Zimbabwe, McGregor (2014) shows that money invested by diasporans buying houses serves to inflate the local real estate market in Harare and provides a mechanism for middle class reproduction. In contrast, Lindley's research in post-conflict Somaliland (2010) has shown how, in the city of Hargeisa, remittances are invested into local small and medium-sized businesses, land and property, gifts and social networks, education and investment in re-emigration - the sponsoring of family members. She argues that, while those families receiving remittances tend to belong to the middle- and upper-income families, nevertheless remittances put money into the local economy is recirculated through social networks. And yet, although remittances account for an estimated 23% of household income in Somaliland (ibid.), it has become much harder to send money home as international banks (in the US and UK, for example) have withdrawn retail banking and payment services from Somali money transfer companies because of the perceived risk that they may contravene new international regulations designed to prevent the financing of terrorism and money laundering. The efforts by donor governments to respond to pressure and find a ‘secure’ means of remitting money to Somalia is tacit recognition of their developmental significance.

The contrast between the Southern African, Zimbabwe and Somaliland cases demonstrates the diversity of impacts that remittances have across Africa and alerts us to the reproduction of uneven geographical development that is embedded in patterns of remittance sending and receiving. Research in Cameroon and Tanzania, for example, shows that remittance recipients tend to be located in better-off households and in better-off parts of the country (Mercer et al, 2008). Nevertheless, current development policy on migration is dominated by attempts to encourage more people in the diaspora to remit more money through more formal channels (Page and Mercer, 2012). Policy-makers draw attention to the fact that the cost of sending remittances to sub-Saharan Africa is the highest in the world: the average sender paid 11.5% transfer fees on a $200 remittance in 2014 (Watkins and Quattri, 2014; World Bank, 2015). Bringing down the costs of formal money transfers, as well as finding ways to encourage the diaspora to invest in
government diaspora bonds (see below), currently top the policy agenda (see e.g. Ratha et al, 2011).

Overall, the family sphere is probably the most significant for development in terms of the volume of capital it entails and the number of people it enrols. Yet, doubts persist about both the macro-economic impacts of household remittances and the precise route by which this money turns into ‘development’ at the local level. Crucially, it is important to remember that remittances are both socially and spatially uneven.

**Known community sphere**

The known community sphere describes social contacts beyond kin, but which do involve personal contacts. The people in these networks know each other as individuals. Typically this would be characterized as ‘associational life’ (Van Hear 2015). In the African diaspora the known community sphere includes professional associations, business associations, old school (alumni) networks, hometown associations and specific religious congregations. Around the world, for example, there are many small-scale informal health professional associations which bring together doctors and nurses from the same African country to socialise and to raise money for specific health projects or campaigns back at home (Chikanda and Dodson, 2013; Van Hear et al, 2004, Page and Tanyi, 2015). Similarly, many old school and university networks are enabled by social media such as email discussion lists and Facebook, allowing diaspora members to share news and updates and to organize periodic social events and fundraisers for their alma mater (Hofman and Kramer, 2015).

Across the African diaspora, hometown associations (which bring together those with ties to a shared homeplace) are the most common type of institution in the known community sphere. Hometown associations have a long history on the African continent, as circular and rural-to-urban migration brought migrants from the same villages together when they were away from ‘home’ working in mines and on plantations from the turn of the 20th century. With increased international migration over the last 30 years these migrants’ groups have been established across North America, Europe and beyond, in those places where there are sufficient members to come together for socializing, welfare support and (sometimes) for developmental efforts in support of the homeplace (Chauvet et al, 2015; Evans, 2010; Mercer et al, 2008).

Hometown associations first emerged in Africa in the early 20th century for the purposes of mutual support away from ‘home’, and only recently have they been recognised as development institutions that attempt to raise funds from their diaspora to support projects at home such as school building, health facilities, or cultural heritage (e.g. for traditional rulers). It is impossible to estimate the scale of the resources that hometown associations generate for their home places since
they operate informally (see Chauvet, 2015). Nevertheless, research has documented hometown associations’ contributions to, among other things, rural water supply projects, schools (Mercer et al, 2009), mortuaries (Page, 2007), orphanages (Lampert, 2012) and medical equipment (Mohan, 2006). Hometown associations provide an important linkage between the hometown and the diaspora that can channel resources and knowledge between the two places, and given their voluntary nature (their members devote time and resources amidst busy lives and multiple obligations), they can achieve small-scale successes.

The extent to which these associations can be effective agents of development has been much debated. Research has shown that hometown associations can reproduce existing social inequalities of class and gender (Lampert, 2012, Henry and Mohan, 2003), as well as reproducing existing inequalities between places (Mazzucato and Kabki, 2009, Mercer et al, 2008). They are also deeply interwoven with domestic political agendas at the local and national scale (Lampert, 2009; McGregor; 2009; and Sall, 2010). Research has also questioned the assumption, (which underpins the diaspora and development policy debate) that it is the diaspora who are located in North America and Europe that are most likely to transform their home communities in Africa. Rather, research has shown that it is more likely that diaspora groups located in towns and cities across Africa (the ‘domestic diaspora’) who are often more engaged in developmental activities at home (Lampert, 2014; Mercer et al, 2009). This is an important point which reminds us that there are resourceful and engaged diaspora communities within Africa as well as outside of it (Bakewell and Binaisa, 2016).

**The imagined community sphere**

The imagined community sphere refers to those activities which engage members of the diaspora beyond immediate circles of acquaintance. In this sphere the individuals who are engaged in development activities may not even meet each other, but can still participate in some kind of shared project or programme. Typically, this can be illustrated by reference to a nation. The members of the Sierra Leonean diaspora scattered around the world, for example, cannot possibly all know each other personally, however they can imagine a solidarity based on a common relationship to the home nation (Anderson, 1991). This solidarity can then be mobilised (by a government or organisation) to achieve a particular developmental goal - here we can consider diaspora taxes in Eritrea, diaspora bonds, and the challenges associated with mobilising these sentiments in a polarized nation such as Zimbabwe. However, in the diaspora-development field, the imagined community is not limited just to questions of nationalism, but might also include business or religious identities - illustrated here with reference to the Mouride Islamic brotherhood in Senegal.
One of the best-known diaspora mobilizations in the interests of the imagined national community is that of Eritrea. The liberation war (with Ethiopia, 1962-1993, and the further war 1998-2000) generated an Eritrean diaspora initially concerned to support the independence struggle they had left behind, and who contributed to it extensively. However, this practice of supporting the nation has since become institutionalized. Following independence, the Eritrean government introduced a 2% income tax on all Eritreans working abroad. Initially a popular move, the coercive measures later undertaken by the Eritrean state to collect the tax have since attracted criticism (Campbell and Afework, 2015; Tecle and Goldring, 2013).

Nevertheless, the international development policy community has identified the diaspora as a significant potential source of development finance for Africa, in which it is assumed that diasporic identification with a home nation will encourage diasporans to invest in development projects for the good of the nation through vehicles such as diaspora bonds (Ketkar and Ratha, 2010). Diaspora bonds are debt instruments which are issued by a national government, typically with five to ten year maturities. They offer governments an alternative to raising money from international financial markets, and they offer the diaspora an opportunity to make a patriotic investment in their home country.

Diaspora bonds could be used to fund investments in public goods. The World Bank estimates that sub-Saharan African countries could potentially raise between $5 and $10 billion a year by issuing diaspora bonds. They suggest that this policy might be particularly well-suited to countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia, which have large diasporas in high income countries, (Ratha et al, 2011). Ethiopia was the first African country to issue diaspora bonds in 2008 and 2011, both of which attempted to raise financing for national electricity generating projects. However, neither issuance matched expectations in terms of take-up in the diaspora, and the 2011 bond was more popular with domestic, rather than diaspora investors (Kayode-Anglade and Spio-Garbrah, 2012).

The difficulties experienced by the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments’ attempts to raise money from their diasporas underline the crucial importance of the politics of diaspora engagement, and specifically, the diaspora’s relationship to the political field in the home nation. JoAnn McGregor has shown this most clearly in her work on the Zimbabwean diaspora in the UK. She argues that the highly polarized nature of Zimbabwean politics between Robert Mugabe’s ruling Zanu-PF party and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change has been reproduced in the diaspora, paralyzing any broader attempt to engage in development at home for the national good (McGregor 2009).
At the other end of the diaspora engagement spectrum is perhaps the best known imagined community in the African diaspora, the Mourides brotherhood (Diedhiou, 2011; Diouf and Rendall, 2000), an Islamic sufi order which considers the Senegalese city of Touba as its spiritual homeplace. Within this brotherhood are many dahira (self-help groups), which have increasingly come to act as powerful development agents in Touba. Foley and Babou (2011) recount the experience of the Matlaboul Fawzaini dahira, which drew on contributions from its 60,000 members in Africa, Europe and North America to build a large hospital in Touba. The dahira raised a staggering US$10 million over ten years, built the hospital, and handed it over to local government. However, they also recount the project’s limitations, which included lack of technical knowledge and expertise in hospital construction. 80% of the original building had to be demolished and re-built as it did not conform to hospital specifications (such as doorways wide enough for stretchers) and the finished building had insufficient space for hospital operations. As one local doctor put it, “money and know-how are not the same” (Foley and Babou 2011: 82).

4. Conclusion

The African diaspora is profoundly diverse. It has grown over many centuries for many reasons to produce different communities in different places. It is still changing. Debates about the development impacts of African diasporas began in the 1960s with the rise of interest in the 'brain drain' and policies designed to encourage return migration of highly-skilled migrants. In the 1980s the argument reversed and analysts began to draw attention to the positive development impacts of remittances. By the early 2000s policy-makers were thinking explicitly about how to formally enroll African diaspora communities into international development, a move that was often prompted by lobbying from diaspora groups themselves.

The metaphor of a pendulum (de Haas, 2012; Gamlen, 2014) swinging between positive and negative attitudes to international migration within the development community is a useful one, not only because it captures those changing ideas about what is progressive and what isn’t, but also because it emphasizes a sense of continuity in the debate. This is a field where the sense of the potential ‘usefulness’ of the African diaspora to development policy-makers rubs up against the 'unruly' creativity and autonomy of the African diaspora themselves. The development work of African diasporas can usefully be assessed in terms of three different spheres: the household (eg. remittances within families) the known community (eg. diaspora associations) and the imagined community (eg. diaspora bond issues). However, such a tidy typology doesn’t really capture the sense that the policy-makers and African diasporas often seem to talk past one another and the potential development impact is greater than that which has been delivered. Policy-makers’ attempts to govern diaspora behaviour are often frustrated,
leading to a constant sense that the development impact of African diasporas is always in the future.

Yet we would go still further here and insist that we look for ways to break out from the circular debate about how to harness the African diaspora for developmental purposes. As Parvati Raghuram (2009) has persuasively argued, there are bigger questions at stake here about the politics and the geography of development that are revealed by the way we imagine diaspora-development debates. These revolve around questions of sacrifice and responsibility - the sacrifice that individual migrants must make in order to take on responsibility for the development of the countries they have left; and the blindness that renders migrants' contribution to development in the place of diaspora invisible. There are other questions too about the inequalities that are reproduced by remittances, and the unknown consequences for migrants of enrolling them into formal remittance channels. The question ‘what kind of development for what kind of diaspora?’ is still often unaddressed.

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