Citizenship Education between Secular and Religious Nationalism:
A Case of Curriculum Reform in Turkey
1995-2012

PhD thesis submitted by Abdulkerim Sen
UCL Institute of Education

This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

November 2017
Declaration and Word Count

I, Abdulkerim Sen, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Word count (exclusive of appendices and references): 85,706 words

Signe
Abstract
This thesis provides a critical examination of the Turkish citizenship education reform from 1995 to 2012 drawing on interviews with key informants, archival and public policy documents, programmes of study and textbooks. A literature review finds that democratic citizenship education aims to make learners competent members of their multi-layered communities who are equipped with participation and deliberative decision-making skills, value the rule of law, democracy, human rights and diversity in pursuit of social justice. By contrast, national citizenship education promotes a monolithic national identity, conformity and obedience by transmitting abstract knowledge of political structures. Since the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe have supported democratic citizenship education based on international human rights standards.

In 1995, the Turkish Ministry of National Education responded positively to the UN Decade for Human Rights Education initiative and attempted to reform citizenship education that had been devised as a tool to consolidate secular nationalism. This marked the start of the curriculum reform that intermittently lasted until the repeal of the courses in 2012. Data analysis is informed by the conventions of critical discourse analysis, which suggests scrutinising micro-relations of language in the text against ideological power structures of the broader context. One significant finding of the study is that the forces of secular and religious nationalism in Turkey responded to the educational projects initiated by the UN and the CoE and introduced new citizenship education courses. However, they used these courses to consolidate their own and obliterate their rivals’ ideological discourses. By providing an in-depth analysis, this research aims to contribute to the institutionalisation of citizenship education in Turkey and the scholarly debate about the role of internal and external influences in citizenship education curriculum change.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Hugh Starkey, for his kindness, patience, guidance and, more importantly, unwavering belief in me from our first meeting up to the completion of this study. He provided teaching opportunities and encouraged me to present my research in various platforms. I would like to record my thanks to Avril Keating and Farid Panjwani for their illuminating feedback at the initial stage of this research. I am extremely grateful to John O’Regan for his feedback on the methodology chapter, which helped me a lot to understand my data analysis approach and apply it to the corpus of the present research in a more competent manner. Special thanks go to Angela Cooper for making stylistic corrections in the drafts of the thesis. I am also grateful to my friends at the UCL Institute of Education and elsewhere for providing platforms to discuss my ideas, being an outlet to vent frustration and commenting on some pieces of my dissertation. Warmest thanks go to the research participants for their trust and honesty with me. I also would like to record my thanks to the members of thesis defence committee, Yasemin Soysal, Paul Morris and Ken Spours. Special thanks are reserved for my family for their invaluable moral support throughout my study abroad. Finally, I would like to thank the Turkish Ministry of National Education for providing the financial support for my postgraduate study abroad.
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Chapter 1  Introduction

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s (the founder of modern Turkey) address to youth is hung on the wall of every classroom and included in the first pages of all textbooks. One of his modern-looking photographs accompanies his address to youth both on classroom walls and in textbooks. Atatürk's address starts reminding “Turkish youth” that “their first duty and raison d'être is to maintain and defend Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic forever.” It spells out malign intentions of internal and external enemies and the duties of youth to keep the Republic alive against enemies. It ends by encouraging youth, “the power that you need is already present in the noble blood running through your veins.” As a fundamental document expressing the ideological premises of modern Turkey, the address to youth paints a picture of a homogeneous secular nation. Its omnipresence in education hints at the persistence of the nationalising mission of education to transform the inhabitants of Turkey into a secular nation.

Citizenship education can be viewed as a sensitive barometer that shows the degree to which the Turkish educational system is committed to, or distanced from, the founding objective of building a secular nation. When the nation-building efforts culminated in the state-formation era (1923-1938), citizenship education presented an image of a modern, secular, homogeneous and hard-working society, even though that society was, in reality, ethnically and religiously diverse and economically disadvantaged. These characteristics of citizenship education continued with no substantial changes until the beginning of the 1990s. An interest in reforming the secular nationalist citizenship education curriculum first appeared in response to the United Nations’ (UN) call to the member states to introduce human rights education (HRE) in 1994. The Ministry of National Education (MoNE) acted on this call and decided to change the title of an existing course from Citizenship Studies to Citizenship and Human Rights Education (MoNE, 1995). This decision was followed by a revision of the course’s curriculum through the integration of some human rights themes. However, the rise to power of the religious nationalist Welfare Party [Refah Partisi, RP] ignited the long-smouldering tension between secular and religious nationalism and discontinued the reform efforts by 1996. In the following years, the tension between the rival sources of power, the elected governments and the secular state establishment, set the democratisation of citizenship education on a thorny path.
The coming to power of parties with the support of observant Muslim voters led to the emergence of discourses of religious nationalism in opposition to discourses of secular nationalism. In 1997, the ideological clash between the religious nationalist government and the secularist army escalated to the extent that the military staged a coup to topple the Islamist party-led coalition government. The coup took place, in an atypical manner, during the National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997. The military members of the council imposed measures on the RP-led cabinet members, including the prime minister. The measures aimed at re-establishing the ideology of secular nationalism in education. Even though the government complied with the military’s demands, such as the closure of conservative religious middle schools, the exclusion of graduates of conservative religious high schools from secular college programmes and the ban on wearing a headscarf in public spaces, including schools and universities, the unaltering military pressure led to the resignation of the government in June 1997. This military intervention was called the 28 February Coup or a postmodern coup, since it took place without a direct takeover of the government. The military’s ongoing influence after the coup was referred to as the 28 February Process.

In this period, the military’s interventions resonated in the curriculum policies. The citizenship education curriculum indicated a move away from democratic citizenship back to a more nationalistic citizenship. In the following years, the European Union (EU) integration reforms following the recognition of Turkey as a candidate for EU membership in the 1999 Helsinki Summit, again brought curriculum reform to the fore. Nevertheless, the rise of religious nationalism to power in 2002, with the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP], had an adverse impact since citizenship education became a part of the escalating power struggle. Despite the pressure of the secular establishment, the AKP has remained in power since 2002 and reconfigured the state ideology towards religious nationalism. The EU reforms enabled the religious nationalists to strengthen their grips on power and align the curriculum with their own ideologies. Under AKP rule, the MoNE was more interested in the Islamisation than the democratisation of curriculum. This reform agenda led the MoNE to repeal the citizenship education courses in 2012, a decision which put an end to the curriculum reform.

This thesis investigates the evolution of citizenship education from the start of the reform in 1995 to its end in 2012 by relying on multiple data sources, including interviews, archival and public policy documents, programmes of study and textbooks. It investigates the
evolution of the subject in relation to the ideological transformation of the country within the given period. The present research had two main characteristics which distinguish it from the existing studies on the evolution of citizenship education in Turkey. First, it does not solely rely on publicly-available curriculum policy documents (e.g. programmes of studies and BoE decisions) and published materials (e.g. textbooks), as has been done by the previous studies (Çayır, 2007; Çayır, 2011, 2014; Çayır & Bağlı, 2011; Çayır & Gürkaynak, 2008; Gök, 2004; Gülmez, 2001; İnce, 2012a, 2012b; Karaman Kepenekçi, 2005; Üstel, 2004). It draws on the perspectives of key informants and archival documents in addition to the mentioned sources. Secondly, the present research approaches the issue from a broader perspective by drawing links between the evolution of the subject and the balance of power between the dominant ideologies. These characteristics underline the originality and significance of this study.

This study investigates the nature of curriculum change in citizenship education in Turkey during the period when the two forms of nationalism were competing for control, and the role of the UN, EU and CoE in that process. The study shows the intensified military influence, in the wake of the 1997 military intervention, on a course introduced in response to the UN Decade for HRE project. It also shows how the EU reforms in the post-Helsinki period paved the way for the rise to power of religious nationalism by weakening the secularist military’s hegemony and how that political transition had significant implications for citizenship education. By documenting the evolution of the curriculum in a crucial period in which political power switched from one to another ideology, it sheds light on the ways in which a combination of external and internal influences shaped the curricula. In this respect, the present study intends to contribute to the literature on the power and role of international agencies, particularly the extent to which they have created a convergence in citizenship education towards a global model (See Section 1.6).

1.1 Personal Motivation

I was enrolled in primary school in 1991 and graduated from high school in 2002. I collected many instances of the clash between secular and religious nationalists which had a massive influence on the person I am today. The most unforgettable is that I was a student in a conservative religious high school when the military attempted to exclude the graduates of conservative religious high schools from secular colleges after overthrowing the Islamist government in 1997. The military’s measures after the 1997 coup subjected me to an entry requirement for secular colleges which was virtually unattainable. The coup left only one
choice for me: being an official involving religious services, either as an Imam or a religious education teacher. Nevertheless, I did not have any interest in doing a job involving religion, as I had never been an observant of Islam. After searching for a way out, I found that I could partly escape from this unfortunate situation if I became the top of my high school. In such a scenario, I would only compete with other top high school students to secure an entrance into a secular college programme.

I achieved this and was placed in a social studies teaching programme in a college of education in 2002. When I started college in a different city to my hometown, I noticed that it was not sufficient to just overcome the college entrance restriction. I would have to keep dealing with stigmas attached to being a graduate of a conservative religious school, no matter what I thought and how I lived as an individual. Even though I had never been a religious person, I faced social discrimination because of the high school from where I happened to graduate. In 2006, I was appointed as a teacher to İstanbul and began to teach citizenship, social studies and modern Turkish history courses. When I was a teacher, I observed a discrepancy between the curriculum I was teaching and the norms and values of my students. The citizenship education courses I taught reflected this discrepancy most acutely. The curriculum obliged the teaching of the characteristics of the Turkish nation, internal and external enemies, and the elements of national power to students who largely came from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, especially from Kurdish families living in the slum areas surrounding the middle school where I worked. The curriculum was a nationally imposed one, which did not take into account the particularities of schools where it was intended to be implemented, but it was designed for the transmission of an official ideology with a view to making students members of the Turkish nation.

After working approximately three years as a teacher, I was awarded a scholarship by the Turkish Ministry of National Education for postgraduate education abroad. In 2011, I started my Masters in the field of social studies education at Florida State University. During my Masters, I had the opportunity to look afresh into the educational issues with which I had dealt as a student and later observed as a teacher. As a graduate student in search of an academic passion, I was keenly interested in the political and ideological aspects of the Turkish educational system. I decided to pursue this interest in the field of democratic citizenship education, primarily because the appeal of the field was based on the universal principles of democracy and human rights.
I was also aware that Turkey was taking part in curriculum reform projects in collaboration with the Council of Europe (CoE) and the UN in respect of democratic citizenship. I want to contribute to the effectiveness of those reforms by gaining a sufficient level of knowledge and expertise in this area. Thus, I chose this academic path as I believed it was vital for the democratisation of national political culture and the creation of a culture of human rights in Turkey. As Parker (2003) underlines, “there can be no democracy without democrats, and democrats are made, not born” (p. 121). Schools are central places to make democrats. This potential of education inspired me to contribute to the making of democrats in Turkey by providing a critical account of the citizenship education reform. Therefore, at the end of the thesis, I made several recommendations with a view to contributing to the institutionalisation of democratic citizenship education that would help transform the asymmetrical power relations prevalent in the society into more egalitarian and just forms and create an environment more conducive to human flourishing and achieving a greater social justice (See Section 8.5).

1.2 Education and the Nation-State

A group of educational researchers who are subscribed to world society thesis proposed that there is an endless worldwide competition between various forms of social, political and economic arrangements. Those who win the competition survive, thrive, become world models and are eventually diffused from one context to another. The major advocates of this thesis, Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, (1997) explained their standpoint as follows:

Worldwide models define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping the structures and policies of nation-states and other national and local actors in virtually all of the domains of rationalized social life—business, politics, education, medicine, science, even the family and religion (p. 145).

According to this thesis, mass schooling emerged as a worldwide model of education in the 19th century in parallel to the emergence of nation-states as the most common form of political structure. Competition among the fledgling nation-states of Europe compelled them to establish mass educational systems for national development and progress. Ramirez & Boli (1987) argued that,

…in some cases, a military defeat or a failure to keep pace with industrial development in rival countries stimulated the state to turn to education as a means of national revitalization to avoid losing power and prestige in the interstate system. In other cases, when a nation moving toward a position of first rank in the system was challenged by rivals attempting to block its rise through military alliances and economic exertions, mass schooling was adopted as a means of achieving more comprehensive mobilisation to assure the continued success in the system (p. 3).
It seems in the both cases, a state turns to education as the panacea and expands it to a greater proportion of society in order to keep up with the interstate system competition. When mass education makes a noticeable contribution to the military, socio-political or economic status of that state, other states follow its footsteps, which in turn leads to the diffusion of mass education and standardisation of educational systems along the ways of curricular subjects, educational administrative units, educational track sequences and so on.

Based on the world society thesis, Meyer, Ramirez, & Soysal (1992) examined a set of historical enrolment data from over 120 countries belonging to the period between 1870 and 1980. They found that the sharp increase in mass schooling, especially after World War II, was affected only by countries’ “structural location in the world society” (p. 146). This study revealed the significance of exogenous factors with a conclusion that countries immersed in the interstate system and having linkages to world society first established the initial forms of mass educational systems. To support this conclusion, some studies were focused on revealing other aspects of cross-national standardisation and homogenisation in educational systems, such as the teaching of the same subjects like mathematics, natural sciences, social sciences and civics (Benavot, Cha, Kamens, Meyer, & Wong, 1991; McEneaney & Meyer, 2000; Meyer & Ramirez, 2009). Some studies put forward that while curricular subjects moved in the direction of international convergence, a single ideology came to dominate the whole educational processes, which advocates the individual, individual-centeredness, equality, democracy and basic human rights (Fiala, 2007; Meyer, 2007).

Prominent scholars of nationalism recognised the role of education in nation-building processes. Gellner (1998) argued that the industrial revolution altered fundamentally the division of labour and the occupational structure of agrarian societies. Contrary to the rigid structure of agrarian societies, fluidity became the defining feature of industrial societies. The fluid occupational structure entailed the standardisation of a population for it needed the existence of a workforce who could make a smooth transition from one job, city and workplace to another. Thus, education sowed the seeds of a common national identity, such as a common national language, national history, national sports, national symbols and traditions to ensure that standardisation. It played a pivotal role in making the culture of people congruent with the political authority by spreading a culture, “the distinctive style of conduct and communication of a community”, to all inhabitants of a given territory (Gellner, 1998, p. 92). From a different perspective, Anderson (2006) contended that,
following the development of print technologies and the increasing number of literate people, inhabitants of a bounded territory were able to imagine themselves as members of a larger community, which gave life to the intangible notion of nation. Hobsbawm (1992) paraphrased Anderson’s proposition that “common collective practices” fostered in education “give a palpable reality to otherwise imaginary nation [sic]” (p. 71).

In the post-World War II period, the foundations of international organisations and increasing demographic mobility and communication created new spaces where national education policymakers were exposed to transnational educational discourses that are usually originated in the developed Western countries and disseminated by a network of international organisations. The exposure of nation-state policymakers to transnational policy discourses through conferences, workshops and meetings and the participation of nation-states in international educational projects resulted in the production of “multi-layered” and “multidimensional” policy statements (Rizvi & Lingard, 2009, p. 14). This process of trans-nationalisation of educational policies began in the interwar period, saw a remarkable increase following World War II and reached its peak in the 1990s after the end of Cold War. In fact, in the 1960s and 1970s, curriculum change was driven by internal forces of a society, but after 1989, internal actors ceased to be agents of curriculum change, but became passive respondents to international pressures (Goodson, 2007). On the one hand, this new policy landscape made the nation-states actors unwilling to keep up with education policies of external agencies. On the other hand, it compelled education policy analysts to take into account the role of transnational influences in exploring national educational issues.

1.3 From Nationalist to Democratic Citizenship Education

As a building block of national educational systems, the original function of citizenship education was to promote a national identity, forge a loyalty to the state and transmit knowledge of political structures by encouraging conformity rather than active participation. In the post-Cold War period, increasing interactions between people from different backgrounds and the formation of international organisations limited the relevance of nationalist citizenship education and prompted a need for alternative models to raise citizens who competently act in the changing local, national and newly-emerging transnational public spaces (Hughes, Print, & Sears, 2010). Soysal & Wong (2007) list reasons for the renewed interest in citizenship education: the end of the Cold War, the hegemony of liberal human rights ideologies; liberal economic orders’ prevalence; the
changing perception of the world as a connected place; declining electoral participation in western countries; the entry of eastern European countries to the EU; immigrant integration policies; the need to support the legitimacy of the European integration project through education; the concern about ethnic and religious terrorism.

In an early attempt to propose a new citizenship education model, the Citizenship Education Policy Study project (CEPS), undertaken by a group of international researchers between 1993 and 1997, made a visionary observation that, “when the world was a simpler place, this [nationalist] conceptualisation of citizenship education may have served us well; but this is no longer the case” (Cogan, 2000, p. 1). The CEPS supported this observation saying that curriculum authorities around the world had devised new or revised existing citizenship education curricula that were underpinned by a nationalist conception of citizenship. The CEPS pointed out that an expanded form of citizenship was being practised and proposed that “multidimensional citizenship” must permeate new programmes to raise competent citizens for the 21st century (Kubow, Grossman, & Ninomiya, 2000, p. 133). The CEPS recommended that new programmes must conceive students as members of a global society, improve their ability to work with others, bear responsibility, recognise cultural differences, think critically, resolve conflicts peacefully, care for the environment, advocate human rights and participate in politics and civil society at multiple levels. This new approach heralded a new model of citizenship education as an alternative to national citizenship education. Afterwards, with the contribution of international organisations, such as the CoE and the UN, citizenship education has been redefined in consideration of “a far more complex set of purposes which broadly reflect changing conceptions of what it means to be a good citizen” (Johnson & Morris, 2010, p. 77).

Educational scholars of different persuasions have proposed several new citizenship education theories. My literature review found four distinct citizenship education theories. The first one aims to re-calibrate citizenship education to the emergence of a cosmopolitan society. I call this version universalist citizenship education. The leading proponents of this version put forward that human rights principles enshrined in international human rights instruments should be used as the main frame of reference for citizenship education (Osler, 2016; Osler & Starkey, 2003, 2005a; Starkey, 2017). Universalist citizenship education aims to impart commonalities in students and promote a shared sense of humanity that will contribute to the creation of a cosmopolitan society. This version is the closest to the version
of citizenship education promoted by international agencies, the CoE and UNESCO (Council of Europe, 2010; UNESCO, 2014).

The second group of citizenship education theories intends to use the subject to promote respect for ethnic, racial, religious, cultural and linguistic diversity. I call this theory multiculturalist citizenship education, which aims to help students improve their knowledge, skills and values to recognise differences and become competent members of diverse societies. This group of theories garner inspirations from the American Civil Rights Movement (Banks, 2008, 2011, Kymlicka, 2008, 2011). Unlike universalist citizenship education theory, multiculturalist citizenship education does not highlight human rights principles as central to citizenship education. Considering the fact that multiculturalist citizenship education theories are based more in the USA, the lack of reliance on human rights principles might be associated with the fact that human rights are not highly-regarded in the USA, as evidenced by the fact that the USA has not ratified the bulk of human rights instruments, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Osler, 2016).

The third group of theories is called democratic citizenship education which are concerned with improving the quality of social democracy by raising democratic, justice-oriented and active citizens. Recurring concepts of democratic citizenship education theory are participation and democratic citizenship. As one of the leading proponents of democratic citizenship education, Parker (2003) suggested that democratic citizenship education must give an equal regard to the issues of unity and diversity and critically engage students in public issues with an appreciation of group differences. He highlights deliberation as the most important concept of democratic education explaining that deliberation fosters dialogue across differences and initiates students into civic discourses of the national polity. In Parker’s (2003) view, deliberative education encourages students of diverse backgrounds to have sincere dialogues, express their opinions without self-censorship, listen to each other receptively, develop solutions to public issues and take the right course of action according to collective deliberations.

In a similar vein, Hess (2009) developed teaching techniques to improve students’ abilities to participate in a democratic society in a meaningful manner. She underlined the importance of controversial issues discussion by stating “democratic education without controversial issues discussions would be like a forest without trees, or an ocean without fish, or a symphony without sound” (p. 162). M. Levinson (2012) also contributed to the
theory of democratic citizenship education by developing innovative concepts: civic empowerment gap and civic opportunity gap. These concepts point out that students of disadvantaged backgrounds are deprived of skills and opportunities in comparison to their peers from privileged backgrounds. Situated in this group, Westheimer and Kahne (2008) viewed citizenship education as a tool to produce democratic citizenship by raising citizens who are committed to advancing a greater social justice by going beyond the existing legal structures when necessary.

The last group of theories is named critical citizenship education. These aim to educate students who can create a structural change to ensure a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and resources. Critical citizenship education theories regard the stories of oppressed and disadvantaged social classes as one of the core curricular themes of citizenship education. Giroux (1980) critiques citizenship education in the USA for not challenging the established power relations and proposes a model of citizenship education based on the principles of radical democracy, such as the recognition of differences and promotion of a sense of agency in the maximal sense. Johnson and Morris (2010) develop a model of critical citizenship education drawing mainly on critical pedagogy. According to this model, citizenship education must provide students with the knowledge, skills, values and dispositions necessary to stand against oppressions and injustices. Even though Michael Apple has not written specifically on citizenship education, his works (e.g. Apple, 2011, 2013) support critical citizenship education theory as he views education as an emancipating tool for the creation of a just and equal society.

In an effort to propose a consensual theory of citizenship, a panel brought together the leading scholars in the area at the University of Washington in Seattle in 2005 (Banks et al., 2005). The panel concluded that citizenship education must be underpinned by concepts of diversity, unity, global interconnectedness and human rights, and supported by experience and participation. The model proposed by the panel seems to be a combination of the first three groups of citizenship education theories which I summed up above. Emphasis on human rights reveals the influence of universalist citizenship education theory; the inclusion of diversity and unity tension points to the impact of multiculturalist citizenship education theory; the highlight of experience and participation might be seen as the embodiment of democratic citizenship education theory. However, the final report of the consensus panel does not include strong evidence that can be interpreted as the contribution of critical citizenship education theory. The consensus panel’s proposed model
did not offer a consensual model to the community of citizenship education scholars and practitioners. McCowan (2009) eloquently posited that citizenship education still “resists unifying efforts, and remains diverse and fragmented” (p. 5).

Since there is not one agreed-upon version of citizenship education, I forged a conceptual frame for the present research by naming the old version as nationalist and the new version, as democratic citizenship education. Nationalist citizenship education is underpinned by an official notion of citizenship tailored to maintain the interests of dominant social groups. It is grounded on a narrow and monolithic citizenship conception. It promotes a monolithic national identity, conformity and obedience to authorities by transmitting abstract knowledge of the political structure of the context in which it is taught. It encourages learners to take up subject positions set up by the dominant forces of society that perpetuate inequalities. Its primary goal is to raise citizens who serve the interests of dominant social groups as though they are serving the universal common good. The alignment of citizenship education with the governmental view of citizenship is an indication that it is designed to sustain the unequal power relations. National citizenship education curricula are produced in non-participatory ways in centralised curriculum authorities by curriculum designers from dominant social groups.

Unlike nationalist citizenship education, democratic citizenship education is underpinned by an inclusive and pluralistic notion of citizenship. It aims to make learners competent members of their multi-layered communities who are equipped with participation and deliberative decision-making skills, value the rule of law, democracy, human rights and diversity and contribute to the realisation of a greater social justice. It aims to develop learners’ abilities to challenge inequalities and to question authority in a pursuit of social justice. It can be transformative for individuals and society. It is based on an understanding that students are already-citizens who engage in citizenship acts, not citizens-in-waiting (Lawy & Biesta, 2006; Osler & Starkey, 2005b). From this perspective, it promotes universal human values, students' sense of agency, political participation and critical thinking skills. It aims to make learners recognise their agency and become critical of public discourses in the pursuit of a greater social justice. The alignment of citizenship education with an inclusive notion of citizenship is likely to encourage learners to recognise the citizenship struggle of those who do not fit into the official definition, such as ethnic, religious and sexual minorities.
The theorisation of citizenship education with a focus on the role of dominant ideologies and power relations supports the use of critical discourse analysis (CDA). The distinction between nationalist and democratic citizenship education is significant because it provides a theoretical model that can be analysed and evaluated through the use of CDA. CDA can reveal ways in which democratic citizenship education challenges asymmetrical power relations, while national citizenship education serves to maintain the status quo. Thus, the transition from nationalist to democratic citizenship education entails a constant push from the democratic forces of society. Below is a table which sums up differences between the two versions of citizenship education:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Citizenship Education</th>
<th>Democratic Citizenship Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Underpinned by an official view of citizenship</td>
<td>Underpinned by a more inclusive notion of citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourages conformity and obedience</td>
<td>Encourages participation and active citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes constitutional rights and responsibilities</td>
<td>Includes human rights besides constitutional rights and responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotes a monolithic conception of national identity</td>
<td>Promotes a pluralistic conception of democratic citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasises a duty-based citizenship</td>
<td>Emphasises a rights-based citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presents a homogenous view of society</td>
<td>Recognises and celebrates diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presents a static view of rights, democracy and citizenship as a finished business</td>
<td>Presents a dynamic view of rights, democracy and citizenship as an ongoing struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum development processes are non-participatory and non-inclusive</td>
<td>Curriculum development processes are participatory and inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students are citizens-in-waiting</td>
<td>Students are already citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.1: Two Versions of Citizenship Education**

This table presents a simplified binary model of citizenship education. In reality, there is likely to be a combination of these types. It is important to underline that national citizenship education is not the opposite of democratic citizenship education. Rather, there is a developmental hierarchy between the two. Democratic citizenship education represents the form of citizenship education most aligned to international guidelines. These two types represent the two opposite ends of an idealistic spectrum on which citizenship education can be placed depending on the degree to which it is aligned with universal human values or national ideologies. This distinction is also an idealistic spectrum on which I evaluate the curriculum reform of Turkey.
1.4 Nationalism and Citizenship Education in Turkey

Özkırımlı (2010) identifies four categories of nationalism. The first one is primordialism which considers nationalism as a natural element of human society since immemorial times. The second category includes modernists who think nationalism is a product of certain political, economic and socio-cultural transformations. The third group, ethno-symbolism, explains the phenomenon with an emphasis on the role of myths, traditions, symbols and values that keep people of the same descent together and united. The last group comprises post-structuralist theory that considers nationalism as discursive formation that has an identity claim (the national identity overrides all other type of belonging); temporal claim (a meaningful link to past and a particularistic construction of past in social memory); spatial claims (identification of a nation with a territory). According to post-structuralist theory, “nationalist discourse tends to establish its hegemony and naturalise itself, presenting its truth claims as ‘common sense’, and striving, if unsuccessfully, to obliterate alternative discourses” (Özkırımlı, 2010, p. 207).

In Turkey, two nationalist projects (secular and religious nationalism) have been in a fierce struggle to gain acceptance as common-sensical and natural. These two ideologies have had competing identity, temporal and spatial claims. For instance, each one is premised on a different vision of society (Bora, 2003). Secular nationalism holds that Turkish society is secular, modern and in the process of becoming a part of liberal western societies, whereas religious nationalism envisions a society with an emphasis on its Islamic past and status amongst other Muslim nations. Secular nationalists are identified with modern values and use liberal western societies and the Republican era of Atatürk as the primary frame of reference to legitimise their group beliefs and behaviours. Those who embrace religious nationalism use Islam, the Ottoman past and the Islamic golden era of the Prophet Muhammed as the primary frame of reference to justify their beliefs and behaviours.

The end of the Cold War made salient ethnic and religious identities that had been frozen under the ideological polarisation of the Cold War, which paved the way for the emergence of religious nationalism as the other dominant ideology. The discourses of religious nationalism have increasingly become popular in opposition to the discourses of secular nationalism. Although secular nationalism represents the founding official ideology of the state, it became popular in the 1990s in response to the rise of religious nationalism and Kurdish separatism (Özyürek, 2006). Secular nationalism grew in popularity amongst the urban middle classes who began to use symbols associated with Atatürk (his signature,
image, aphorisms, etc.) to signal their attachment to the secular constitution and modern liberal values.

Under the influence of these dominant ideologies, the intended curriculum of citizenship education courses in Turkey functioned as one of the public discourse production means that transmit certain norms, values and discourses to future generations. Citizenship education was historically used as a medium in the service of a citizenship regime, its status in timetable and content changed depending on political and ideological parameters. It was re-structured in conjunction with the direction of social change which dominant groups in power wished to take the country. The immediate responsiveness of the curriculum to the balance of power resulted from the fact that one centralised curriculum authority made all curricular decisions and approved all curricular materials in Turkey. This made citizenship education pivotal to the balance of power between the dominant ideologies. It arguably represented the school subject most sensitive to political context and therefore, may be considered as a bellwether of ideological impacts.

Citizenship education was initially developed at the service of secular nationalism. The result of decades-long programmes of civic education is that the ideology of secular nationalism is now widely accepted as a given in Turkey. One can even argue that, today, the Turkish national education continues to carry out the unfinished business of nation-building. After the AKP came to power in 2012, a second dominant ideology, namely religious nationalism, contested the hegemony of secular nationalism. The influence of other ideologies went unrecognised because the centralised curriculum authority allowed the most dominant ones to exert a discernible impact. These ideologies are mutually exclusive; the advance of the one is tantamount to the retreat of the other. The figure below illustrates the production of a citizenship education curriculum with consideration of the role of those ideologies:
The two dominant ideologies struggle for influence in the key state apparatuses which shape curriculum policies: the Cabinet, the Parliament, the National Security Council and the Constitution. The Board of Education (BoE) under the MoNE sets up curriculum development and textbook examination committees and oversees the pilot implementation of programmes of study. The intended curriculum of citizenship education is materialised in programmes of study, textbooks, student workbooks and teacher guides. The right arrow highlights the distillation of dominant ideologies into the citizenship education curriculum, while the left arrow indicates that citizenship education, in turn, functions as a force shaping the society. The timeline between secular and religious nationalist groups highlight the strengthening grip of religious nationalists and weakening the hold of secular nationalists on power from 1995 to 2012.

1.5 Research Questions

In this research, citizenship education refers to individual school subjects named with a title wherein the concept of citizenship is given priority. This version is not a well-established subject. For example, citizenship education is compulsory in secondary schools in England,
but there is no uniformity in the ways schools provide it. Some teach it as “a subject in its own right”, some offer it as cross-curricular themes “infused through other subjects”, some treat it as “a matter of school atmosphere and ethos” and others associate it with community service (Davies, 2012, p. 37). In the USA, citizenship education is treated as both “a curricular program and a school mission” (Parker, 2003, p. 15) because schools are “both curricular and civic spaces” (p. 41). Nevertheless, courses named with the concept of citizenship education has become more popular as evidenced by the fact that many countries have introduced citizenship education courses in the last couple of decades.

The definition of curriculum might vary depending on the context of use. It might refer to the whole educational process, student-teacher relations, school ethos, what is taught and what is learned by students. Morris & Adamson (2010) insightfully state that “Just as there are a variety of ways in which the term is used, there are many different definitions of the term curriculum” (p. 2). This variety in the uses and definitions of curriculum hints at the presence of a great variety of studies in the field of curriculum studies. The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement proposed a three-layered conceptualisation of curriculum: intended, implemented and attained (Travers & Westbury, 1989). The intended curriculum is written curricular texts that codify official intentions or system-level expectations, such as programmes of study and textbooks; the implemented curriculum is what is taught at schools; the attained curriculum is what is learned by students.

Morris & Adamson (2010) proposed an analytical definition of intended curriculum by stating that it is “the plan which spells out the intentions with regards to three key elements of the curriculum, namely what teachers should teach and pupils should learn, why, and how it should be organized” (p. 4). These scholars maintained that “the intended curriculum is an official plan of what those who have the power to make decisions want the younger generation to learn” (p. 4). This consideration of intended curriculum highlights its socio-political characteristics. It implies that the content of the curriculum, its organisation and its justification all are highly affected by the prevailing configuration of power relations in the broader society.

In this research, citizenship education is narrowed down to middle school eighth grade (13-14 year old students) citizenship education courses because the curriculum reform in the given period mostly targeted this grade level, and the subject was taught at this grade level
for the longest time. These two characteristics make the eighth-grade citizenship education courses the best medium to trace changes and continuities in the curriculum throughout the given period. This thesis is focused on the period from 1995 to 2012 since the citizenship education reform started in 1995 with the title change of Citizenship Studies course to Citizenship and Human Rights Education and ended in 2012 with the BoE’s decision to repeal the eighth grade citizenship courses. The key events that took place concerning the citizenship education reform within the period are illustrated in the timeline below:

Table 1.1: Key Events of the Period
To provide a comprehensive account of the citizenship education curriculum reform, this thesis aims to answer three central research questions:

1. How did the following considerations influence the Turkish Ministry of National Education’s citizenship education curriculum reform between 1995 and 2012?
   a) Internal political considerations
   b) European Union accession process
   c) The United Nations and Council of Europe
2. What changes and continuities can be identified in the content of the citizenship education curriculum in the given period?
3. What were the processes of developing the citizenship education curriculum in the given period?
The first sub-heading of the first question intends to explore internal influences and identify drivers of the citizenship education curriculum reform by throwing light on the interplay between the dominant ideologies and citizenship education. Since the EU membership bid, the UN and CoE memberships of Turkey played a role in the curriculum reform, the second and third sub-headings of the first question aim to explore ways in which these external forces affected the curriculum reform. The second question is raised to identify changes and continuities in the curriculum in relation to the changing balance of power. Finally, the third question aims to draw a link between the changing ways of curriculum development and the qualities of the curriculum on the assumption that the models of the former have a significant bearing on the latter. This assumption relates back to the distinction between national and democratic citizenship education (See Section 1.3). The ways in which citizenship education curricula is developed hint at the degree to which national citizenship education is transitioned to democratic citizenship education. Overall, the three questions are posed to reveal the ways in which citizenship education was affected by the power struggle and show the internal and external drivers of the curriculum reform.

1.6 Studying Curriculum Change in Citizenship Education

The citizenship education theories outlined in the previous section do not explain different theoretical and methodological orientations in citizenship education research. They represent attempts to re-conceptualise a new version of citizenship education with a view to ensuring some degree of standardisation around a particular form. Hence, the citizenship education theories point to the fact that citizenship education is now far from being a homogenous and standardised curricular subject, but in a process of transition. This ongoing curriculum change in the subject represents the main thrust of research in the field. A significant bulk of studies attempt to investigate the nature of this curricular change. My literature review found that the curriculum change discussion revolves around the issue of whether external or internal factors drive the curriculum change as well as whether or not there is an international convergence in citizenship education. I identified five strands in studies exploring the curriculum change in citizenship education:

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1 I use citizenship education in a broad sense here. My review of literature does not only include studies exploring specifically courses whose titles include the concept of citizenship, but all studies on the nature of curriculum change in social education subjects, such as citizenship education, social studies, history and world studies courses.
1.6.1 Studies of World Society Thesis

Studies in this strand rely on the world society thesis, explained above, and intend to document or explain how citizenship education curriculum change moved in the same direction across so many countries. These studies contend that the direction of curriculum change is similar worldwide as evidenced by the increasing emphasis on the same themes across many nation-states. The main argument of these studies is that the curriculum change in citizenship education is driven by exogenous factors, not internal dynamics of a country.

In one of the early studies in this strand, examining a cross-national dataset about the evolution of social science courses between 1900 and 1986, Wong (1991) found that social science courses cross-nationally replaced national history and national geography courses and epitomised the decline of nationalism in curricula. She elaborated on this finding in the following way:

The decline of traditional form of social science education, with its stress on the study of heroes, royalty and critical dates, may imply the breakdown of an older form of societal conditions and expectations. Its replacement with the new form of social studies, which focuses on the relationship of the individual citizen to the larger social and political environment, embodies the new rationalistic approach to social organization (p. 42).

Highlighting the relatively less importance attached to the social science courses in Eastern European countries, Wong (1991) argued that the cross-national trend in social science education is linked to the global dominance of the USA and international agencies efforts after World War II.

Rauner (1998, 1999) conducted a cross-national longitudinal study of curriculum change drawing on civics education materials from 42 countries belonging to the period from 1955 to 1995. She found a transition from national to a global model of civic education as evidenced by the cross-national increase in references to rights, global issues and the individual. She explained this increase by highlighting the effective role UNESCO played in the worldwide dissemination of the new civic topics. This argument is in line with the main proposition of the world society thesis that HRE is “a world-wide movement, rather than principally one located in a few nation-states” (Ramirez, Suarez, & Meyer, 2007, p. 32). Moon's (2009, 2013a, 2013b) research on cross-national adoption of HRE deepened the Rauner's (1998, 1999) studies by revealing that the best predictor of the adoption of HRE is neither a country’s economic development nor its western heritage, but its linkages to international human rights regimes. Countries with a high level of involvement in
UNESCO’s efforts represented the ones which created various provisions for HRE within their educational systems.

Moon (2009) argued that “rapid diffusion and wave-like adoption patterns” of HRE “have more to do with cultural-cognitive and mimetic mechanisms rather than with coercive or functional ones” (p. 63). From this angle, she underlined that UNESCO’s dissemination of HRE became more effective after the adoption of Recommendation Concerning Education for International Understanding, Cooperation and Peace and Education Relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1974. In the following years, nation-states began to introduce HRE in various stages of their educational systems, which dramatically increased with the start of the UN Decade for HRE in 1995. Moon (2009, 2013b) supported the world society theorists that HRE is an international phenomenon that is originated in the transnational education policy spaces and diffused by international agencies. She did not hesitate to state that “the diffusion of reforms such as HRE indicate that the world is heading in the direction of gradually accepting post-national dimensions of citizenship” (Moon 2009, p. 64).

Other longitudinal cross-national studies of the world society thesis shed light on various aspects of curricular convergence in citizenship education. Drawing on a cross-national dataset including 465 civics, history and social studies textbooks, Ramirez, Bromley, & Russell (2009) and Meyer et al. (2010) argued that the promotion of a monolithic national identity, which had been the main parcel of nationalist citizenship education, is evolving toward a more global notion of citizenship as evidenced by the increasing inclusion of themes on diversity and human rights. In another study, after examining 450 civic, history and social studies textbooks from 69 countries, Bromley (2009) concluded that citizenship education has globally become more supportive of cosmopolitan identities. Moon & Koo (2011) confirmed this curricular convergence by providing a detailed examination of South Korean textbooks. They concluded that human rights, democracy, diversity and global citizenship had had more mention, especially since the 1990s as a result of the South Korea’s keen engagement with the international human rights bodies and the support of grassroots human rights organisations.

Other studies in this tradition documented the worldwide spread of environmental discourses in social studies, history and civic textbooks (Bromley, Meyer, & Ramirez, 2011); the increasing incorporation of multiculturalism in social science textbooks (Terra
30

& Bromley, 2012); an increased emphasis on globalisation and global citizenship (Buckner & Russell, 2013); and cross-national expansion of rights discourses in textbooks (Russell & Tiplic, 2014). Finally, a group of scholars in this strand argued that changes in national educational systems follow the dominant models available in world society (Astiz, Wiseman, & Baker, 2002; Wiseman, Astiz, Fabrega, & Baker, 2011). These studies argued that educational changes show not only a trend of convergence around certain themes, but the decentralisation of educational administration as a result of the impact of the market economy.

Studies of the world society thesis well documented the increase in the themes pertaining to democratic citizenship education and argued that nationalism was diminishing in the curricula around the world. Nevertheless, a recent study disputed this argument. Examining 576 social science textbooks from 78 countries published between 1955 and 2011, Lerch, Russell, & Ramirez (2017) found that “textbooks continue to deploy nationalist narratives in an era of globalization and, further, that these emphases do not appear to diminish as countries become more politically, economically, or socially globalized” (p. 172). This finding led the authors to become critical of the findings of their previous studies and draw a more nuanced conclusion:

…an imagery of national narratives being replaced by global ones is too simplistic. Instead, the global and the national appear to co-exist in today’s textbooks: globalization has not resulted in the demise of the national in textbooks throughout the world (p. 172).

This conclusion is hugely important for the study of curriculum change in citizenship education since it calls for an in-depth examination of curricular texts in order to draw more reliable conclusions.

1.6.2 Qualitative Investigations of International Convergence

This group of studies aim to provide a qualitative examination of changing characteristics of citizenship education in order to judge the degree to which global discourses of citizenship education disseminated by the international agencies affected the curricula. In this strand, I identified three main arguments regarding the influence of global trends in citizenship education. The first one maintains that globalisation and international agencies had a massive impact and created a shift from nationalist to post-national emphases in curricula. Researchers of this persuasion have provided ample qualitative evidence to argue that national curricula are in the process of becoming more inclusive of diversity and human rights (Soysal, 2015; Soysal & Schissler, 2004; Soysal & Szakács, 2010; Soysal & Wong,
2007). These studies found a sharp increase in references to international human rights instruments, global issues and transnational political structures after World War II, and especially since the end of Cold War. They also found that militarist themes have dissipated, the authoritarian narration of history has shifted to a new version that employs a less authoritative language and foregrounds the socio-economic history of people, not that of rulers, military leaders and dynasties. Based on these findings, these studies concluded that citizenship education now promotes a notion of post-national citizenship underpinned by rights and responsibilities and detached from ethnic and religious connotations.

Bromley (2011) qualitatively examined the citizenship education curricula of British Columbia and found that the national identity promoted previously was redefined by incorporating human rights and multiculturalism into it. Now, the curriculum in British Colombia is not based on a single-voiced narration of historical events, but includes the experience of diverse parts of society within the national experience. It makes rarer attribution to military figures as compared with the previous curricula and presents international involvement of peacekeeping and aid, social and sports accomplishments as elements of national identity. Moon (2013) found that topics associated with multiculturalism and globalisation increased in South Korean civic textbooks over time. In regards to Taiwanese citizenship education, Hung (2014; 2015) found that the monolithic Confucianism-based moral philosophy was replaced with the Western liberal values of individualism and pluralism. These studies concluded that globalisation and international agencies successfully transformed nationalist citizenship education into more inclusive and global forms that recognise diverse and global identities.

The second argument in this strand voices a clear opposition to the main proposition of studies of the world society thesis by arguing that globalisation and international agencies have a limited impact on national curricula. Studies of this subgroup present ample evidence to show the ongoing intense influence of nation-state. They openly criticise studies of the world society thesis for paying inadequate attention to local and national conditions (Law, 2004; Law & Ng, 2009; Law, 2006). They find the transition from national to post-national citizenship as an oversimplification of a very complex situation surrounding the curriculum change debate. Drawing on curricular changes in China, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Taiwan, these studies put forward that local and national dynamics were still very effective in more complex ways due to globalisation and suggested that studies
must operate with a multileveled notion of citizenship in order to better see the internal and external influences.

Han, Janmaat, May, & Morris (2013) took a critical approach to the studies of the world society thesis on the grounds that they are focussed on “superficial features” and ignored “the more substantive issue of the values and norms promoted in the curriculum (…) because of the difficulty in investigating these” (p. 2). This study looked at whether there was an association between the level of centralisation in curriculum development and the degree to which citizenship education promotes human rights, democracy and individual autonomy in 16 Western and East Asian countries. The study did not reveal a meaningful association between the two variables, but identified a pattern that the countries with decentralised curriculum development systems tend to promote individualistic western values, whereas the countries with centralised curriculum development system are likely to place more emphasis on collective and moral values. It also underlined that countries with similar cultural characteristics tend to emphasise similar values irrespective of the ways of curriculum development.

The third argument in this strand represents a more nuanced approach. It does not completely reject the international convergence thesis, but argues that globalisation and international agencies had a limited impact on national curricula basically because national curriculum authorities are not legally bound to comply with international standards. These studies acknowledge that exogenous factors are effective with an important caveat that local and national influences remain highly influential in citizenship education curriculum change. Morris, Clelland, & Man (1997) examination of curriculum change in Hong Kong’s social studies education well exemplifies the third argument. After presenting a detailed analysis of the evolution of social studies curriculum, Morris, Clelland, & Man (1997) drew a nuanced conclusion, which well sums up the main propositions of this strand: Worldwide trends can provide both rhetoric and models for specific sorts of policy changes. At a micro level, however, conflict or competition among subgroups can modify or transform proposed changes, and the adoption and implementation of the changes are determined by a range of pragmatic considerations within schools (p. 43).

Cardenas (2005) drew a similar conclusion that the cross-national adoption of HRE eased by the fact that HRE provides nation-states with a source of prestige, legitimacy and respectability in national and international communities. Nonetheless, she underlined that the tension between HRE and the priorities of state authority gives way to symbolic changes
that eventually engender a gap between the promotion and implementation of HRE. B. Levinson (2005; 2004) made a similar observation that citizenship education in Mexico was designed via the appropriation of globally-flowing concepts of democracy and citizenship to help democratise the national political culture. The global discourses of international agencies gained different meanings after they were subject to national and local influences in Mexico.

A group of studies supporting the third argument looked at changes in citizenship education policies in European contexts. They acknowledged the influence of international agencies, but highlighted that citizenship education is still in the preserve of nation states and far from being a standardised and homogenous entity (Keating, 2009a, 2009b, 2014; Ortloff, 2005; Philippou, Keating, & Ortloff, 2009). Hahn (2008) eloquently posited that “civic education in particular serves as a wonderful window on a culture” (pp. 4-5).

A different group of studies investigated citizenship education policies of countries which are influenced by the CoE’s and UNESCO’s educational projects. These studies showed that there is a great variation, not homogenisation and standardisation, in citizenship education curricula of those countries and confirmed the limited influence of international agencies (Janmaat & Piattoeva, 2007; Piattoeva, 2009a, 2009b). Engel (2014) examined the most recent citizenship education courses in Spain to ascertain the extent to which human rights and global citizenship are included. He found a limited convergence, but concluded that human rights, diversity and other progressive themes are included superficially without making a remarkable transformation in the promoted notion of national identity. Munoz Ramirez (2015) explored the citizenship education reform of Spain and found that the CoE became influential, notwithstanding the ultimate power rested with the government, in the introduction and removal of the citizenship education courses. She highlighted the influence of a governmental change and subsequent mobilisation of grassroots organisations by the Catholic Church on the repeal of the course, which demonstrated the limited impact of international agencies and the prevalence of local and national influences.

1.6.3 Country-Specific Studies

This group of studies does not have any explicit concern about the influence of globalisation and international agencies. They provide an in-depth analysis of citizenship education reforms relying on local and national political and historical developments without making
clear attribution to the roles of international influences. There is an implicit assumption embedded in these studies that educational systems and curricula are grounded in the distinctive cultural values and characteristics of national societies. This group of studies views education as “a prime expression of culture” and educational systems as “distinctive and enduring”, “rooted in different historical and religious traditions” (Han et al., 2013, p. 6). For example, Kisby (2006, 2009) argued that the Labour government made citizenship education compulsory in England to encourage young people towards political participation since sustainable economic development requires it. Jerome (2013) put forward that the Labour government launched the citizenship education reform in an effort to improve the quality of democracy by fostering the democratic citizenship skills of youth in England. Kiwan (2008) explained England’s curriculum reform with reference to the needs of the multicultural society of the UK.

Pykett (2007) argued that citizenship education in England aimed to imbue young people with an understanding of security, civility and decency in line with the wishes of the then Labour government. She considered citizenship education as an instrument of governmentality that instils a habit of mind in students in line with the expectation of political power. She contended that citizenship education in England was used as a political instrument to bring citizenry in line with their political expectations. With a similar approach, Jaramillo and Mesa (2009) considered the introduction of citizenship education as a governmental response to fight youth violence and improve the culture of democracy in Colombia. These studies explored curriculum change in citizenship education by dwelling on local and national factors without taking a close look at the international influences.

1.6.4 **Studies of Neoliberal Citizenship Education**

This strand of literature takes a different approach to the study of curriculum change in citizenship education and focuses on the influences of neoliberal economic order. It maintains that citizenship education adapts young people’s minds to the neoliberal socio-economic order. As the leading scholar of this strand, Mitchell (2003; 2006) contends that the citizenship education policies of England, Canada, the USA and the EU aim at raising self-serving citizens who function well in the neoliberal economic system. She maintains that citizenship education in these countries fosters neoliberal subjectivities. Kennelly & Llewellyn (2011) argued that the Canadian civic education curriculum aims to foster self-regulating, self-serving and self-perfecting subjectivities. In a similar way, Pashby (2015)
concluded that there is a tension between the dominant conceptions of global citizenship and multiculturalism permeating the Canadian social studies education curriculum because both concepts are tailored to support the neoliberal socio-economic order.

### 1.6.5 Comparative Citizenship Education Studies

Comparative citizenship education studies adopt a similar approach to that of country-specific case studies. They do not carry an explicit concern to show the degree to which international agencies become influential in the shaping of citizenship education curriculum in national contexts. However, comparative citizenship education research is primarily interested in revealing cross-national similarities and differences. This strand of literature is best exemplified by the comprehensive long-running civic education survey by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). The IEA conducted the most comprehensive civic education study firstly in 9 countries in 1971; secondly, in 28 countries in 1999; and thirdly, in 38 countries in 2009 (Ainley, Schulz, & Friedman, 2013; Schulz, 2010). The IEA Study is primarily focused on students’ outcomes, such as students’ civic knowledge, attitudes, engagement and behaviour. The bulk of the IEA dataset is quantitative, but still comprises some qualitative insights into ways in which citizenship education is offered in the participant countries. For instance, the 2009 study reported that 19 out of the 38 countries offered citizenship education as a separate subject; 31, as integrated into other subjects; 27, as cross-curricular learning theme. Citizenship education is taught as a compulsory subject (separate or integrated) in 20 of the 38 countries. These cross-national findings demonstrate that citizenship education does not have a consensual way of teaching and status in curricula as science, math and language.

In addition to the comprehensive citizenship education studies, there are other studies in this strand conducted by one or a group of researchers. For example, Morris & Cogan (2001) explored the nature of civic values promoted in the curricula of Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand and the USA. These scholars found that the East Asian countries placed more emphasis on “national identity, moral behaviour and personal attributes (e.g., honesty civility)”, whereas the two western countries promoted “democracy, political processes, human rights, and free market economics” (pp. 113-114). Investigating citizenship education reforms in Australia, Canada, England and the USA, Hughes et al. (2010) recognised the rise in the interest in citizenship education in response to the growing need to foster democratic citizenship for the maintenance of liberal western democracies. Davies & Issitt's (2005) study on citizenship education in Australia, Canada
and England drew a similar conclusion that “three countries are concerned to promote knowledge, understanding and involvement for democratic purposes. They are concerned to promote diversity and democracy” (p. 399). Even though this conclusion supports the main proposition of the studies of the world society thesis, this particular study avoids making generalisations regarding the role of international agencies in citizenship education. It simply states what is different and common in the curricula of the countries it studied.

1.7 Where to Situate the Present Research?
I locate the present study in the third subsection of the second strand of literature, qualitative investigation of international convergence. The present research acknowledges that globalisation and international agencies play a distinct role in the introduction of democratic citizenship education courses. However, their impacts often do not penetrate under the surface, and the local and national influences become far-reaching in the content of citizenship education curriculum. An examination of policy rhetoric, policy pronouncements and content of curricular documents may find that human rights, globalisation, global citizenship, diversity, environmental discourses are incorporated into curricula, which signals an international convergence in citizenship education. Nevertheless, an in-depth analysis may contradict this by showing the underlying nationalist discourses are still effective.

In fact, the latest study of the world society thesis found that nationalism was not diminished, but remained unchanged in 576 social science textbooks from 1955 to 2011 (Lerch et al., 2017). This finding led the authors to state that global and nationalist discourses co-exist in citizenship education curricula, which makes it necessary to become more critical of the proposition of the studies of the world society thesis. This study demonstrated that the common contention that curricula are moving away from nationalist paradigms and becoming more global, democratic and aligning with the standards of international organisations is not well-founded. Indeed, an in-depth study of curriculum change might suggest that dominant ideologies profoundly shape the ways citizenship, human rights and democracy are presented, and changes are only on the surface-level. Therefore, the present study aims to provide an in-depth examination of Turkey’s citizenship education reform. Having said that, it must be noted that the present study has a concern to discuss the nature of curriculum change in Turkey in relation to international trends.
1.8 Organisation of the Thesis

The following chapter forges a theoretical frame by providing a historical account of citizenship and citizenship education in Turkey, which is preceded by a brief discussion on the concept of citizenship. It sketches the historical and socio-political context of citizenship education and identifies the weaknesses and strengths of the previous studies. Chapter 3 expands on the epistemological and methodological foundations of the research. The following four data analysis chapters answer the research questions in a chronological order. Chapter 4 looks at the influence of internal and external factors on the curriculum reform (the first question), the changes in the content of the courses (the second question) and the changes in the processes of developing the curriculum (the third of the research questions). It presents the discursive manifestation of the power struggle in the curriculum by an analysis of the main textbook. It ends by shedding light on the structural relationship between the military and education.

Chapter 5 explores how the changing balance of power during the EU accession process affected the citizenship education curriculum from 1999 to 2008. The ideological shift from secular to religious nationalism is shown through an analysis of the main textbook. Chapter 6 is focused on the background of the introduction of the citizenship education course in 2010. It covers the period from the re-emergence of the reform agenda in 2008 until the repeal of citizenship education in 2012. It includes an analysis of the main textbook as well. Chapter 7 discusses the evidence and limitations of the CoE's influence through the case of the Turkish citizenship education curriculum reform. Chapter 8, the conclusion chapter, provides detailed answers to the three research questions, one by one, outlines the general findings and discusses the main conclusions in relation to the relevant literature and ends with recommendations for the consideration of stakeholders and future researchers.
Chapter 2  Citizenship and Citizenship Education in Turkey

In order to forge a theoretical framework, this chapter starts with a brief discussion on the concept of citizenship, then expands on the historical evolution of citizenship and citizenship education in Turkey. It highlights the tie of dependency of citizenship/citizenship education on certain political factors. In the conclusion, after making a critique of the existing studies, I identify a literature gap and highlight the potential contribution of the present research to the existing scholarship on the Turkish educational system.

2.1  Theorising Citizenship

Citizenship can be defined as a type of membership to a political community wherein the nature of this membership varies with context. Isin and Nyers (2014) define citizenship “as an institution mediating rights between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong” (p. 1). “The subjects of politics” can be anyone, regardless of whether they hold formal citizenship status, while “the polity” might include any political arrangement where people engage with “social conflicts and social struggles” for the betterment of their conditions (Turner, 1990, p. 194). Competition for scarce resources drives the subjects of a community to come “together and engage in political and cultural activity” on the principle of “equal respect and dignity” (Starkey, 2002, p. 7). Such public engagement for improving the public good is a defining characteristic of citizenship. For this reason, the Ancient Greeks used citizenship to express the acts of free people to improve public life in contrast to idiocy, which they defined as an obsession with personal interests (Parker, 2003). This distinction suggests public engagement as an indispensable prerequisite to becoming a citizen.

Citizenship was most visibly practised in autonomous cities where “particularistic kinship systems” were dissipated with the development of “universalistic notions of the subject” (Turner, 1990, p. 194). The etymological root of the concept hints at its city-based origin. In urban public spaces, citizens came together and deliberated on their standard of living, jurisprudence and resource distribution in pursuit of a better society. In the age of nation-states, autonomous city spaces became part of national polities, and not all inhabitants of nation-states were recognised as full members, but many were discriminated against due to ethnicity, race, language, religion, ideology and gender (Shafir & Brysk, 2006). Nation-
state-sanctioned criteria for inclusion marked the faulty lines of citizenship, and the struggle of political subjects for equal membership drove the evolution of citizenship rights.

Regarding the criteria for membership in national polities, two citizenship conceptions became prominent: territorial-universalism and ethno-culturalism (Faulks, 2000; Heater, 2004). In territorial-universalist traditions, the inhabitants of a sovereign state are regarded as citizens as long as they are loyal to the state and work for the common good. Ethnic and religious differences are not seen as a barrier to full membership. This model was developed after the French Revolution to maintain the integrity of the newly-founded Republican French nation-state (Brubaker, 1992; Lefebvre, 2003). The inhabitants of France, who were previously the subjects of the monarch, were reconstituted as the citizens of the Republic. Citizenship was conceived as an adherence to certain norms and values rather than to a monarch since the concern was the unification of differences around a common national identity.

On the other hand, ethnic and religious differences stand in the way of full membership in ethno-cultural citizenship. Developed in Germany, this version functioned as a tool to gather the people of the same ancestry under the roof of a nation-state (Brubaker, 1992; Lefebvre, 2003). In this model, people of the same ethnicity were regarded as full citizens. The ethno-cultural model aimed to gather dispersed members of the same descent under the roof of a nation-state, whereas the territorial model aimed to build a nation within a demarcated territory. Because of this difference in method rather than goal, homogenisation through assimilation became the defining feature of territorial citizenship, whereas ethno-cultural citizenship was identified with homogenisation via exclusion of differences. Thus, the territorial model relied on an assimilationist, while the ethno-cultural model rested on an exclusionary notion of citizenship.

The balance of rights and responsibilities varies in the two prominent citizenship traditions: liberal and civic republican (Heater, 1999; Kuisma, 2008). The liberal approach is associated with a rights-based, whereas civic republicanism is identified with a duty-based approach. Liberal citizenship relies on the assumption that the common good is served better when people are encouraged to pursue their own interests. In contrast, civic republicanism highlights fulfilment of duties and participation as the main property of citizenship. It imagines a citizen as a political subject stripped of ethnic, religious and cultural differences when acting within the public space. It relies on an interventionist state
that maintains a rigid distinction between public and private spheres. Historically, England represented the paragon of liberal citizenship, while the civic republican model was identified with France.

The advancements in communication and transportation technologies and the widespread recognition of human rights after the Second World War paved the way for new forms of citizenship to gain prominence. As Brodie (2004) succinctly summarises, “the symmetries forged largely in the past two centuries between national states, national territory, and national citizenship rights, have been progressively fractured by transnational networks, flows, and identities” (p. 323). Similarly, Delanty (2000) holds that the four components of citizenship, rights, responsibilities, participation and identity, “are no longer united by into a coherent national framework [sic]” (p. 126). Based on empirical research, Soysal (1994) heralded post-national citizenship as having gained recognition in some European contexts where immigrants were recognised from the viewpoint of personhood instead of nationality. From a sociological standpoint, Sassen (2002) argued that there are now de-national and post-national citizenships. The former encapsulates state level citizenship that has been transmuted with the influence of globalisation, whereas the latter refers to citizenship as enacted on transnational platforms.

Focusing on the revival of local cultures, Kymlicka (2003; 2011) has developed a theory of multicultural citizenship on the supposition that minorities are now in a position to live autonomously without relinquishing their diverse identities. Kymlicka (2003) suggested three steps for making a transition from national to multicultural citizenship: “…repudiating the idea of the state as belonging to the dominant group; replacing assimilationist and exclusionary nation-building policies with policies of recognition and accommodation; acknowledging historic injustice and offering amends for it” (p. 150). Although these steps might lead to disintegration, considering that minorities have been suppressed for years in many nation-states, Kymlicka is not much concerned about this possibility. In a similar way, Parekh (1998) held national citizenship to scrutiny on the basis of the principle of equality. He argued that the principle of equality underpinning modern citizenship is conceived “in the context of a culturally homogenous society” (p. 408). Since Western citizenship conceptions were not imagined by taking into account Muslim identities, the increasing numbers of Muslims in Europe have brought into question the secular construction of the public sphere.
Relying on increasing interconnectedness of the world, Held (1999) envisioned that transnational forms of citizenship would gain traction leading to the emergence of a cosmopolitan world order. Held (1999) maintained that a multi-layered world government would make the idea of world citizenship a feasible possibility: “…cosmopolitan law would demand the subordination of regional, national, and local sovereignties to an overarching legal framework” (p. 107). In support of this position, Brodie (2004) put forward that globalisation has created “new spaces for political action and new ways of conceiving of collective rights that are neither exclusively nor appropriately the singular domain of national citizens” (p. 325). Similarly, Habermas (1994) proposed a theory of constitutional citizenship in which ethno-cultural differences are relegated to a secondary position in favour of creating a public space built on political, democratic and civic values. In this transnational public space, people of all backgrounds can act as citizens with rights and responsibilities guaranteed by a constitution.

In one of his latest works, Isin (2017) argued that citizenship is an institution that governs who can make rights claims and who can have the right to practise rights in any given polity. The defining feature of a citizenship act is that it must recognise the rights of others as universal. A struggle that has the potential to deprive others of their rights cannot be regarded as a citizenship struggle. Isin (2017) names this broad conceptualisation as performative citizenship arguing that it creatively expands the official view of citizenship, which favours dominant social groups, such as adults, white people, heterosexuals and those from dominant religious sects and ethnicities. Unlike the narrow focus of official citizenship, performative citizenship regards all acts of right-claiming and right-practising as citizenship, such as the struggle of sexual minorities, ethnic and religious minorities and political dissidents. People of all polities, whether democratic or non-democratic, can act as performative citizens. The distinction between performative and official citizenship is a useful heuristic device to deconstruct citizenship policies and practices and understand the multifarious and fluid realities of citizenship that do not neatly correspond to the conceptualisations mentioned above.

2.2 Citizenship and Citizenship Education in Turkey

Turkish citizenship has been predominantly studied by drawing on theoretical constructs that were originally developed to explore citizenship in liberal Western contexts. Based on certain binaries, such as civic-republicanism versus liberalism and territorialism versus ethno-culturalism, Turkish citizenship is judged to be civic-republican, not liberal; top-
down/passive, not bottom-up/active; and a combination of territorial-universalist and ethno-culturalist models (İçduygu, Çolak, & Soyarik, 1999; Kadıoğlu, 2005; Kadıoğlu, 2007; Yeğen, 2004). However, these conceptual tools fall short of providing an adequate account since Turkish citizenship has considerable differences from its western counterparts. For example, the term of citizenship in Turkish [vatandaşlık, yurttaşlık] bears little relationship to the English concept. The etymological root of the English version is related to the word “city”, whereas that of the Turkish term is derived from “homeland or country” [yurt, vatan]. The English version connotes public engagement, whereas the Turkish concept expresses loyalty to the state. The concept of citizenship in Turkish is associated with national independence rather than participation in national polity, partly because it evolved as a formula to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire rather than to improve the quality of participation in public affairs.

Citizenship education in Turkey traditionally served nationalist and statist objectives in Turkey, as evidenced by the fact that the courses, which were deemed as citizenship education, were not entitled with the concept of citizenship until 1949. They were named with concepts like motherland, homeland and civility since their primary aim was to spread the legitimacy of the new regime of republic, accelerate the pace of modernisation and help create a secular nation out of reminiscence of the collapsed multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Hours per week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of Civility [Malumat-ı Medeniyye]</td>
<td>1923-1924</td>
<td>2 and 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the Motherland [Malumat-ı Vataniyye]</td>
<td>1924-1930</td>
<td>2 and 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the Homeland [Yurt Bilgisi]</td>
<td>1930-1938</td>
<td>1, 2 and 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the Homeland</td>
<td>1938-1949</td>
<td>2 and 3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of Citizenship [Yurttaşlık Bilgisi]</td>
<td>1948-1969</td>
<td>1, 2 and 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship Studies [Vatandaşlık Bilgileri]</td>
<td>1985-1995</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated in Social Studies</td>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship and Democracy Education [Vatandaşlık ve Demokrasi Egitimi]</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.1: Middle School Citizenship Education Courses

The table shows the citizenship education courses which were taught in middle schools from 1923 to 2012. It shows that the citizenship course, named Knowledge of Civility, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, was re-named as Knowledge of the Motherland in 1924 and as Knowledge of the Homeland in 1926 (Gülmez, 2001; Üstel, 2004). In 1948, the course was retitled as Knowledge of Citizenship, which was later subsumed into Social Studies in 1969. In 1985, the Social Studies course was broken into three discrete courses, one of which was a citizenship education course, called Citizenship Studies. The course title became Citizenship and Human Rights Education in 1995, but the course was repealed in 2005 and a new citizenship education course, Citizenship and Democracy Education, was introduced in 2010, which was, in turn, repealed in 2012.

The concept of citizenship first appeared in the title of the course in 1948. This was associated with the pro-democracy international political context of the period. After World War II, the western bloc took several measures to promote international peace through fostering democracy and human rights. In this period, single party rule ended in Turkey and multi-party democracy was established. The changing title of the course shows the sensitivity of citizenship education to international developments. The course title included the concepts of democracy and human rights after 1995, which was also associated with the pro-democracy international atmosphere in the wake of the end of the Cold War. The changing titles of the course show that citizenship education was considered as a curricular space to teach global discourses of democracy and citizenship in Turkey.

One can argue that the trajectory of citizenship courses in Turkey follows closely the international trends identified by Wong (1991). This is because Wong (1991) found that there is a cross-national diffusion of social studies education courses, especially after World War II, replacing nationalist courses like history, geography (See Section 1.6.1). In Turkey, the introduction of social studies arguably reflects this worldwide shift. Nevertheless, the removal of Social Studies course in 1985 and the introduction of three new courses in place of Social Studies, which were National History, National Geography and Citizenship Studies, is a complete contrast to the international trend identified by Wong (1991) (Üstel, 2004). This is because replacing Social Studies courses with the mentioned courses represented a return to the nationalist narration of history. This suggests that the Wong’s (1991) observation lacks an explanatory power in the trajectories of social studies in Turkey.
I present the historical evolution of citizenship and citizenship education under three periods: the period of single-party rule (1923-1950), the period of military-controlled multi-party (1950-1999), and the period of civilian democracy (1999-2012). The first period is marked by the prevalence of an assimilationist citizenship regime; the second includes significant changes in the classic citizenship regime after the single party rule ended in 1950; and the third period starts with the 1999 Helsinki Summit in which the state showed indications of dispensing with the assimilationist citizenship regime. In each period, I first discuss the major characteristics of citizenship policies and practices, then shed light on the changes and continuities in the characteristics of citizenship education.

2.3 Period of Single-Party Rule (1923-1950)

After the collapse of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire in the wake of the First World War, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk emerged as the chief commander in the Turkish Independence War (1919-1922), and later became the founding leader and led Turkish modernisation by abolishing the Sultanate in 1922 and proclaiming the Republic in 1923. He was elected as the first president in 1923 and remained in power until he died in 1938. İsmet İnönü, one of his comrades, succeeded him as the president and continued the nation-building project until 1950. Since the Republican People’s Party [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP], founded by Atatürk, ruled the country from 1923 to 1950, this period is often referred to as the period of single party rule.

2.3.1 Citizenship Policies and Practices

Taking inspiration from the French nation-building experience, Atatürk aimed to build a secular nation composed of a citizenry stripped of traditional-religious norms and values and adopted the western way of rational thinking and decision-making in their everyday life practices (Berkes, 1998). From the Atatürk era onwards, secular nationalism marked the official ideology of the Republic of Turkey. Contrary to other non-western countries, where western colonisers established a secular nationalist order, modern Turkey was built on secular nationalism without being colonised by an industrialised power (Juergensmeyer, 2010). The founding fathers were a group of military elites or, “a small band of nationalist officers” in Zürcher's (2005) words, who were mostly from the Balkan and Aegean cities and graduates of the modern westernised military schools of the Ottoman Empire (p. 380). By virtue of the westernised founders, secular nationalism guided the Turkish nation-
building experience, and the westernised Ottomans, not the western colonisers, founded modern Turkey.

During the state formation era (1923-1938), the founding leaders of modern Turkey established secular nationalism, the dominant political ideology of western liberal societies, as the official ideology in an effort to create a secular nation equivalent to the European nations. Secular nationalism was kept alive “by legal rulings or the support of the army” (Göle, 2013, p. 42). In addition to the judiciary and military, education played a decisive role in entrenching it as the official ideology. In order to transform religious-traditional values, national education disseminated a new culture, which was invented drawing on supposedly ancient cultural traditions of Anatolia. Gellner (1998) contends that cultural homogenisation in nation-building processes generates some degree of secularisation. In some cases, a state secularises, even nationalises, a religion to consolidate its central power. In such cases, “the high religions, those which are fortified by a script and sustained by specialised personnel […] become the basis of a new collective identity…” (p. 72).

In Turkey's nation-building experience, the Sunni-interpretation of Islam, having a script and specialised personnel, was elevated to the level of state religion. Gürbey (2009) underlines that: “the state exercises the theological function of forming a domain of knowledge that defines what true Islam is and disseminates it in the private spheres of culture and education to secure the proper formation of its subjects.” (p. 376). The instrumental use of the official interpretation of Sunni-Islam to consolidate the state authority represents one fundamental characteristic of Turkish secular nationalism. Since the official ideology incorporates a secularised and nationalised version of Islam, it is judged to be “too secular for the Islamists, too Sunni for the Alevi, and too Turkish for the Kurds.” (Casanova, 2001, p. 1064). This is because the official interpretation of the Sunni-Islam associates the version of the religion practised by the local people with primitiveness, praises the secular lifestyle as an indicator of civilisation and favours the norms and values of secular Turkish groups.

Secular nationalism worked in two distinct ways in Turkey when compared with the major western examples. Firstly, it was established and maintained with the backing of the military. The founding leaders entrusted the supervision of the new regime to the military since there was no widespread support from society. They ensured that secular nationalism would entrench with the backing of the military until national education instilled secular
values in future generations. Thus, the military acted as the self-declared guardian of the secular nationalist order by intervening in politics to prevent the governments from reflecting the wishes of the conservative constituency.

The doctrinal version of Turkish secular nationalism is called Kemalism, which is comprised of six principles: nationalism, republicanism, populism, statism, secularism and reformism. These principles were first incorporated into the constitution in 1937 (Kili, 1969). Kemalism favours a duty-based conception of citizenship and conceives each individual as a cog in a gigantic machine whose responsibility is to serve the development of the nation-state. Even in the present constitution, nationalism and secularism are frequently referred to as the central precepts of the state. The ultimate concern is the presence of a powerful state, and the people is even placed in a secondary position in relation to the state. The overemphasis on state is arguably associated with the fact that Atatürk and other founding leaders saw the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in their lifetime.

The classic citizenship regime of modern Turkey is assimilationist in the sense that it intends to transform the inhabitants of Turkey into a secular, modern and homogeneous society by using ideological and repressive state apparatus in an Althusserian sense (Althusser, 2001). This citizenship regime favours a segment of society which can be described as ethnically Turkish, religiously Sunni and ideologically secular (Kadıoğlu, 2007). The rest is forced to abandon the traditional-religious norms and values incompatible with secularism, native languages other than Turkish and religious identities other than Sunni Islam.

This citizenship regime emerged as a product of strategic trade-off decisions taken at critical historical moments towards the goal of creating a nation-state. Mylonas (2012) argues that citizenship regimes, especially in the Balkan countries, take form under the influence of contextual parameters of inter-state relationships. Policies towards what he calls a “non-core group” are shaped on the basis of “whether an external power is actively engaged in mobilising it or not, as well as in light of its relations with the external power in question” (p. 45). Contextual parameters of interstate relations shape the state approach to non-core groups, and affect the quality of the whole citizenship regime. Assimilation, exclusion or accommodation decisions about non-core groups are made based on whether
they pose a threat to the national integrity due to the fact that national security concerns lie at the heart of citizenship regimes in the Balkan countries.

In Turkey, the common feature of non-core groups which entered into relations with external enemies and were held responsible for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was their religious identity: being non-Muslim. The experiences of wartime wherein different ethnic and religious groups played a part in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire by colluding with external powers shaped the dominant conception of citizenship. The religious identity of Sunni-Islam shared by the majority of inhabitants emerged as the most significant definer of Turkish citizenship. Exclusionary citizenship policies were directed at non-Muslims because they sided with external enemies.

In the Lausanne Treaty, the founding treaty of the Republic of Turkey, religious identity was recognised as the main criterion distinguishing minorities from those considered as Turkish (Oran, 2007). On that basis, Greeks, Armenians and Jews were given minority status, while all Muslim people of Turkey were regarded as Turkish. Population exchange agreements took religious identity as the essential criterion to distinguish who was Turk and who was not (Çağaptay, 2002; 2003). Because of this citizenship conception, the number of non-Muslim people in Turkey steadily decreased from that point onwards. One extreme case resulting from this peculiar citizenship conception was the exchange of a part of the Greek-speaking-Muslims of Greece with the Turkish speaking-Christians of Turkey.

While the state’s approach to non-Muslims illustrates the exclusionary characteristic of Turkish citizenship, the state’s approach to Muslim inhabitants exemplifies its assimilationist dimension. Since the founding leaders considered the presence of a homogeneous nation as the basic precondition for a powerful state, they attempted the Turkification of all Muslim inhabitants of the country. Ruling elites chose the most practical option for homogenisation and made the ethno-cultural characteristics of the majority the official cultural traits of Turkish citizenship. Being a full citizen was equated with speaking the Turkish language, being Sunni-Muslim and upholding secular values. To homogenise all Muslim components of society based on a monolithic national identity, the 1924 constitution recognised the ethno-cultural characteristics of ethnic Turks as the universal characteristics of Turkish citizenship (Aktürk, 2012). In the 1930s, one language, one culture, one ideal [tek dil, tek kültür, tek ülkü] was the official motto of the new regime (İnce, 2012). The settlement policies favoured Turkish-Sunnis over non-Turkish Muslims.
For Turkification purposes, the Kurdish people were dispersed and relocated across the country (Yeğen, 2004), while ethnically Turkish newcomers were settled in areas where the ethnic Turks did not form a majority ( Çağaptay, 2002; 2003). Mardin (1981) states that “Mustafa Kemal took upon a hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life in it” (as cited in Kadoğlu, 2005, p. 111). The settlement policies of single party rule period were designed to turn that “hypothetical entity” into a modern nation.

In the 1930s, the founding leaders attempted to purify the Turkish language from the influence of foreign languages by discarding words derived from mostly Arabic origins ( İnce, 2012; Üstel, 2004). The goal was to purge alien influences from the Turkish language. Proponents of the language purification movement went so far as to propose a theory, called Sun Language Theory, asserting that all languages originated from Turkish. A campaign launched in Istanbul University, called “Citizen! Speak Turkish”, was also a state-sponsored attempt to prohibit the use of minority languages in public. During the Second World War, the imposition of a wealth tax was also a measure of Turkification. The wealth tax required non-Muslims who had some degree of income to pay excessive amounts of taxes (K. Karaosmanoğlu, 2010). It resulted in the confiscation of the properties of those who did not comply with the law, which eventually forced non-Muslim minorities to flee the country.

Since the founding leaders thought that a citizenry living up to rationality was a precondition for a powerful nation-state, they introduced secular values to break the prevalence of religion. As a result, laicism became the centrepiece of Turkish modernisation. Çolak (2005) argues that laicism legitimised attempts “to control and domesticate Islam by institutionalising it under state control” (p. 244). For this reason, the new regime did not grant an autonomous space for religion, but made efforts to use a particular interpretation of Islam to consolidate its central authority (Gürbey, 2009). From the days of Atatürk onwards, it became interventionist in the private sphere in order to create “a ‘secular habitus’ in a Muslim culture” (Göle, 2013, p. 48).

Yavuz (1999) contends that “the Kemalist system, which is deeply rooted in the European Jacobin tradition, made nationalism and laicism its founding sacred precepts; it thus denied any role to Islam” (p. 199). To downgrade the role of religion, the founding leaders abolished the caliphate, repealed the Sharia law, adopted the Swiss civil code, prohibited religious titles and dress and outlawed Islamic lodges and shrines. The Latin alphabet was
introduced in place of Arabic scripts in 1928, official holidays were shifted to Saturday and Sunday from Friday (the Muslim holy day), call to prayer was Turkified and all religious symbols were banned, including wearing a headscarf in public spaces. One can argue that the laicist policies of this period made observant Muslims second-class citizens in the country.

The Unification of Education Act [Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu] put an end to all Islamic-traditional educational institutions and introduced mixed education in 1924 (Yavuz, 1999). There was no formal educational institution providing religious education and no religious courses taught from 1930 to 1949 (Bozan, 2007; Özgür, 2012). The phrase “secular church” best describes the role of education in this period (Green, 1990, p. 80). Finally, the Turkish History Thesis was promoted to enable the new nation to conceive of itself as one with a non-Islamic history. Indeed, the new regime made attempts to disconnect Turkey from the surrounding Muslim countries and its religious past.

The citizenship regime of the Republic brought significant improvements to women's rights. The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 gave women equal rights in marriage and inheritance (Arat, 2005). The granting of women's suffrage in 1934 was a breakthrough, given that women were not allowed political participation even in some European countries at the time. However, these reforms mostly remained on paper. Arat (2005) notes that “the founding fathers 'knew the best interests of women' and did not need to collaborate with them or expect their active participation in support of their rights” (p. 105). Aside from the failure to implement these reforms, the legislative framework itself remained to privilege men. The civil code regarded men as the breadwinner and the head of the family and required women to have their husband's permission to work outside (Arat, 2005). The citizenship law did not allow women to pass their citizenship to their non-Turkish husbands, while permitting men to pass their citizenship to their non-Turkish wives. Furthermore, laicist policies were excessively fixated on the external appearances of women rather than their status in society. For example, the headscarf ban aggravated the subordination of women in the male-dominated society since it deprived veiled women of their fundamental rights, such as the right to education and the right to work.

2.3.2 Citizenship Education

After the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the first radical attempt to embed the ideals of the new regime into the educational system was the passage of the Unification of
Education Act in 1924. The law subordinated all schools to the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) on the rationale that the neglected and fragmented educational system of the Ottoman Empire could not generate a national consciousness in young people, which led to the disintegration of the state. After the passage of this law, a committee was formed to bring school curricula into compliance with the ideological tenets of the new regime (Üstel, 2004). This committee jettisoned the Ottoman history from the curriculum, since it was associated with backwardness, decay and stagnation in the eyes of the founding fathers. The committee also changed the title of the citizenship course inherited from the Ottoman Empire, from Knowledge of Civility to Knowledge of the Motherland. Citizenship education courses were renamed as Knowledge of the Homeland in the 1926 primary education programme.

The objectives of citizenship education courses emphasised collective values and advised students to put the national interest before their own interest. Although the objectives were mainly promoting obedience, one objective was about teaching rights and responsibilities that students would have in “a democratic state” (p. 133). Attribution to democracy was a complete novelty, but Üstel (2004) reported that no textbook included the concept of democracy at all. The objectives overall aimed to make students believe that they were a part of an imagined community and urged them to identify with that imagined nation (Anderson, 2006). Generating a sense of loyalty to family, nation, state and homeland and instilling in students a sense of duty to serve the common good permeated the course objectives.

Citizenship education promoted a monolithic national identity that relied on the ethno-cultural characteristics of Turkishness (İnce, 2012b). The motto of the Republic, one language, one culture, and one ideal, was repeated, while the terms of citizen and Turk were used synonymously in textbooks (Caymaz, 2008). The ambivalence as to whether Turkish citizenship is based on the territorial-universalist or ethno-cultural model was reflected in citizenship education textbooks (Keyman & Kanci, 2011). In some learning contexts, citizenship was depicted as territorial, while, in others, it was associated with ethno-cultural characteristics. One textbook made a distinction between coming from the same nation [milletdaş] and living in the same country [vatandaş]. Based on this distinction, it described non-Muslim citizens as vatandaş, but not milletdaş (İnce, 2012). Other textbooks labelled non-Muslims as bad people; “faizciler (usurers), madrabazlar (swindlers) and muhtekirler (profiteers)” (İnce, 2012b, p. 122). In addition to these exclusionary views, textbooks also
included evidence that the citizenship conception promoted was based on the territorial model.

In citizenship education textbooks, the Turkish nation was characterised by soldierly qualities, such as an army-nation, a nation of soldiers or militant nation. This militarism was not unique to citizenship education, but pervaded all education. The 1924 physical education courses required military training for students (male and female), such as how to use a rifle (Caymaz, 2008). Military education courses that were taught by military officials in uniform became compulsory for male and female students alike in 1926 (Altınay, 2004). The new regime exalted a citizen-soldier model of citizenship and prepared everyone for national defence (Burk, 2002). Citizenship education textbooks spread a militaristic discourse that the lands in which students lived had been watered by the blood of their ancestors, and, therefore, were sacred and needed to be protected at any cost. Students were encouraged to sacrifice their lives with no hesitation for national independence, just as their ancestors did in the past. Here, these characteristics of the textbook show that the ideology of nationalism provided an identity for the nation, sanctified a bounded territory and imposed a national identity which overrode all other types of belonging (Özkırımı, 2010). In this way, citizenship education as an ideological state apparatus contributed to the discursive formation of nationalism by imbuing students with certain identity and spatial claims.

Although citizenship education textbooks published before 1929 did not include a definition of either nation or citizenship, after 1929 they defined a nation as a “political and social community formed by citizens bound by a unity of language, culture and ideal” (İnce, 2012b, p. 119). The definition made no reference to religion, which manifests the effort of the founding leaders to imagine a secular national identity for the nation in the making. Kadioğlu (2007) contends that the ruling elites used education as a vehicle for “the reproduction of oblivion” of “the multi-religious and multi-ethnic history of the lands that they inhabit” (p. 289). To this end, a set of secular values was promoted, such as “being hard-working, well-mannered, docile, obedient, trustworthy, brave, heroic and sacrificial” (Keyman & Kanci, 2011). Given the fact that the majority of the population lived in rural areas at the time, the textbooks included topics like hygiene, how to get rid of germs, how to dress, self-care and appropriate mannerisms (Caymaz, 2008; Üstel, 2004). This aspect was rendered more visible in textbooks intended for the use of students living in rural areas
since the aim was to replace the provincial mannerisms of children with the etiquettes of urbane life.

In line with the nationalising and civilising role of citizenship education, a duty-based conception of citizenship dominated textbooks. Üstel (2004) found that doing military service, obeying laws and paying taxes were the most-emphasised citizenship duties in textbooks. Casting a vote was added to these duties on some occasions. Rights and freedoms received little attention. In reference to the 1924 constitution, the right to petition, the right to liberty, freedom of thought and the press, freedom of travel, freedom of founding an assembly or association were included in textbooks. However, no provision regarding the implementation of these rights was mentioned (İnce, 2012). Furthermore, Caymaz (2008) found that rights and freedom were presented with an overly formalistic and rigid language and deliberately in small fonts in some textbooks. Based on the Durkheimian notion of organic society, students were encouraged to serve the common good by fulfilling their duties given by authorities. Even multi-party democracy was negatively depicted as the cause of disharmony and chaos in society. Finally, women were depicted as second class citizens whose main responsibility was to become a good wife and mother (Keyman & Kanci, 2011).

Citizenship education textbooks projected an idealised image of the Turkish nation. Atatürk himself dictated a citizenship education textbook, titled Civic Information for Citizens [Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler], which was the most important textbook taught in the 1930s (İnce, 2012; Üstel, 2004). This textbook included the Turkish History Thesis [Türk Tarih Tezi] and the Sun Language Theory [Güneş Dil Teorisi] in order to teach students the superior virtues of Turkishness (cite). The Turkish History Thesis put a favourable gloss on pre-Islamic history by claiming that the Turkish nation was one of the largest and oldest nations that had created most of the great civilisations in China, India, Mesopotamia and Egypt. The Sun Language Theory made futile attempts to prove that all languages were originated from Turkish. These efforts exemplify the temporal claims of Turkish nationalism as they sent a message that the nation had a golden past and would re-live that golden past under the leadership of the national hero Atatürk (Özkırımı, 2010).

Textbooks included ample information about the Treaty of Sevres, which was signed in 1920 to partition the Ottoman Empire between the Western powers, and maps that visualised this treaty (İnce, 2012). The Treaty of Sevres topics inculcated a xenophobic and
highly defensive security culture by urging students to be vigilant about the malevolent intentions of foreign powers towards Turkey. The 1936 objectives of the course accentuated the militarist objectives of citizenship education. The first objective stressed that citizenship education should make students love the Turkish nation and the Turkish military in a way that they would become “loyal and self-sacrificing citizens” (Üstel, 2004, p. 141). Concepts like the military and the Turkish soldier were mentioned for the first time in course objectives, which are linked to the international atmosphere of pre-Second World War. The concept of democracy was also removed from the objectives of the course. After 1936, citizenship education took on a political role to create a social base for the single-party rule. The six principles of doctrinal secular nationalism were inserted in textbooks. Since those six principles were known as the “six arrows”, Gülmez (2001) referred to the version of citizenship after 1936 as “six-arrow citizenship” (p. 218). “Six-arrow citizenship” was an outcome of the takeover of the state organisation by the ruling CHP towards the end of the 1930s, which changed after the transition to a multi-party system in 1946.

2.4 Period of Military-Controlled Democracy (1950-1999)

The catastrophic consequences of World War II (WWII) proved that “the nation state could become a bureaucratic killing machine on an unprecedented scale, via its own nationalist ideology” (Vincent, 2000, p. 120). In order to prevent such atrocities, attempts were made to build an international consensus based on democracy and human rights. The triumph of the Allies over the Axis powers did not only represent a military victory, but also ushered a new era in international politics. The foundation of the UN in 1945 and the announcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 are significant milestones in this respect. The resulting of WWII with the victory of liberal countries led the political values represented by them to rise to international prominence (Lewis, 1994). Unlike the 1930s, during which several governments ruled by repressive force, the new world order was not supportive of homogenisation policies.

In an effort to integrate Turkey into the new international order, the ruling CHP slackened the pace of top-down nation building policies by giving a green light to the transition to democracy in 1946. As a result, the Democrat Party [Demokrat Parti, DP] came to power in 1950, which brought significant changes to citizen-state relationships. Nevertheless, the rise of the DP to power did not end the hegemony of secular nationalism, but the secular state establishment, backed by the military, continued enforcing the assimilationist citizenship regime. In many cases, the state establishment and the elected-governments
subscribed to contrasting versions of nationalism, which engendered an ideological discrepancy. The state establishment adhered to secular nationalism, while the elected-governments, especially the ones coming to power without a coalition, advocated religious nationalism. This bifurcation in the source of political power had a considerable impact on citizenship policies and practices.

In an effort to maintain the secular nationalist order, the state establishment suppressed three dissident groups: communism, Kurdish separatism and religious nationalism. For example, the constitutional court shut down 27 political parties between 1961 and 2012 (Celep, 2012). The majority of the parties were disbanded on the allegations that they were involved in promoting either communism, religious or ethnic nationalism. To the same end, the military has staged two direct and two indirect coups since 1950 (Cleveland, 2004). It toppled the governments in 1971 and 1997, while directly taking over power in 1960 and 1980. Since the military had a dominant role until the recognition of Turkey as a candidate for the Europe Union (EU) membership in the 1999 Helsinki Summit, I call the period from 1950 to 1999 the period of military-controlled democracy.

2.4.1 Citizenship Policies and Practices

Turkish secular nationalism has been re-configured in parallel to the changing circumstances after the death of Atatürk in 1938 (Zürcher, 2004). Its bias towards the state-sanctioned Sunni interpretation of Islam became more manifest after the transition to the multi-party democracy in 1946. This was firstly because the state began to promote an officially-defined religious identity in the fight against communism in the Cold War period. In this period, religious identity was perceived as an instrument to de-politicise the youth who were divided into different ideological camps. Secondly, the majority Sunni-Turkish electorate gained the right to have a say in the country's administration, which led to an ideological rapprochement between the culture of the Sunni-Turkish majority and the secular state structure through the formations of governments relying on the electoral support of that majority. In other words, political parties responded to the wishes of the conservative majority in order to secure their support, which led to an ideological alignment between the culture of the majority and the secular state structure.

However, this ideological rapprochement happened in line with the traditional state approach viewing religion as an instrument to consolidate its authority (Gürbey, 2009). The process of making the majority’s culture congruent with the state structure was controlled
by the secular establishment. The instrumental approach to religion is best illustrated by the efforts to imbue citizens with the Islamic belief of martyrdom that they are to be rewarded in the afterlife when they sacrifice their lives for their homeland (Çayır, 2014; Gürbey, 2009; B. Türkmen, 2009). This belief, which found its expression in textbooks, was reiterated in the funeral ceremonies of soldiers who were killed in the armed conflict with the Kurdish separatists. Despite the promotion of this religious belief, the secular nationalists did not come to terms with the public visibility of women wearing a headscarf. This selective attitude shows the instrumental use of religion by the secular state establishment.

In the multi-party period, three key institutions (the military, the judiciary and the presidency) continued enforcing the assimilationist citizenship regime. The constitutions drafted under military supervision justified the oversight of the military over civilian politics. Highlighting the military’s overbearing role, Celep (2014) termed Turkish democracy as a “militant democracy” (p. 383). In fact, the secularist military toppled governments which it considered as undermining the state’s ideological foundations, while the constitutional court disbanded political parties associated with the promotion of ethnic, religious and ideological identities. Although the citizenship regime underwent remarkable changes, the bottom line was an ardent determination to not recognise ethnic and religious differences that had the potential to undermine the nation-building project.

The universal legitimacy of human rights created a dilemma for Turkey: either to carry on top-down homogenisation policies at the expense of isolation or comply with human rights standards. On the one hand, the unfinished nation-building project forced the authorities to ignore human rights principles, while, on the other, the widespread acceptance of human rights compelled the adoption of human rights in order to gain respectability in the international arena. These conflicting imperatives gave rise to a tokenistic approach. Human rights came to symbolise a “reform rhetoric” in the official discourse, with no sincere commitment to eradicating the root causes of human rights violations (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 2001, p. 59). The underlying concern was to gain international recognition and respectability (Hale, 2003; F. Türkmen, 2007). The slow evolution of human rights due to the Cold War conditions enabled Turkey to retain this tokenistic approach for a long while.
Babül (2012) argues that “human rights draw together two constitutive dangers for the Turkish Republic: the internal threat and the external enemy” because human rights reforms inevitably interfere with the assimilationist citizenship regime (p. 33). Therefore, Turkey has been reluctant to ratify international human rights instruments that had the potential to run counter to the nation-building project. Even though Turkey joined the UN as a founding member in 1945 and the CoE, as one of the first members in 1950, it selectively signed up to human rights conventions of these organisations (F. Türkmen, 2007). For instance, it delayed signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC) because these covenants included articles stipulating the recognition of minorities. This precautionous approach had to be revised after the application for EU membership in 1987 due to the EU accession requirements.

With the EU membership application, Turkey ratified the article of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1987, having previously placed reservations when the convention was signed in 1954, allowing individual citizens to sue in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (F. Türkmen, 2007). Turkey also fully recognised the jurisdiction of the ECHR in 1989 (Smith, 2007). In the 1990s, the ECHR was overwhelmed with the number of lawsuits brought against the Turkish government. Within the EU accession process after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey ratified the ICCPR and ICESC in 2003 with reservations on the articles that required the recognition of ethnic and religious diversity. Turkey is amongst the four member states of the CoE which have not signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, mostly because it stipulates governments to respond to the needs of minority students (Kaya, 2009).

The monolithic citizenship regime has been justified by national security concerns and the fear of disintegration (A. Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). With respect to non-Muslim minorities, exclusionary policies persisted in subtler forms in the multi-party era. For instance, depending on the course of the relationship with Greece, the Turkish citizens of Greek origin were subject to mistreatments (Oran, 2004). Galvanised by rumours spread by the media that Greeks were killing Turks in Cyprus and the house where Atatürk was born in Salonika, Greece, had been bombed, people in three major cities in Turkey, attacked the properties of ethnic Greek citizens on 6-7 September, 1955 (İnce, 2012). They were perceived as proxies of Greece and subjected to retaliation. The state approach to non-
Muslim citizens continued to be shaped by the contextual parameters of interstate relationships.

Following the transition to democracy, the multi-party regime formed a platform for the political participation of the religious majority whose voices had been silenced previously. With the advent of the multi-party democracy, because of electoral concerns, the ruling CHP was compelled to introduce elective religious education courses and open religious conservative schools (Eskicümbeli, 1994; Özgür, 2012). These reforms were expanded upon after the DP came to power in 1950, such as the reinstitution of Arabic as the language of prayer. Given the fact that the majority of the population was religiously conservative, most of the governments have been formed by centre-right political parties since 1946 (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007). The conservative governments, especially the ones ruling without a coalition, have kept attempting to extend the limits of what is possible in respect of religion. Also, the spread of communism amongst college students warmed up the secular establishment’s attitude to religion.

Intellectuals’ Heart [Aydınlar Ocağı], a think tank organisation formed by a group of academics from İstanbul University, played a significant role in the shift to religious nationalism. In an effort to help restore socio-political stability, the Heart came up with a doctrine called Turkish-Islam Synthesis, which highlighted religion as an indispensable part of national identity (Çetinsaya, 1999; S. Kaplan, 2006). By developing relationships with army colonels after the 1980 coup, the Intellectual Hearts exerted an explicit influence on educational reforms in the post-1980 coup period (Kurt, 2010). In this period, the number of conservative religious schools was increased and graduates from those schools began to be admitted to all college programmes. In addition, religious education courses became compulsory and history themes associated with the Turkish-Islam Synthesis were inserted into textbooks (Copeaux, 2006). Oran (2001) reported a rapid increase in the numbers of Quran teaching centres and student dormitories run by religious organisations after the 1980 coup. Şimsek and Yıldırım (2010) found that the evolution theory was removed from the curriculum in this period. Based on these indicators, Blad and Koçer (2012) concluded that the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis became “the new state ideology, replacing the Republican ethos of radical secularism” (p. 47).

The hegemony of secular nationalism has been challenged by religious nationalism and Kurdish separatism since the 1990s, which emerged as two major representatives of identity
politics. Armed clashes with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party [*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK*] and increasing electoral support for religious nationalist parties were not prevented by the secular establishment. Kurdish separatism did not have the potential to transform the official ideology, but aggravated the state’s centralist and nationalist tendencies. However, religious nationalism succeeded in weakening the dominance of secular nationalism. The Welfare Party [*Refah Partisi, RP*], a religious nationalist party, formed a coalition government in 1996. In response, the army intensified its suppression, which led to a coup on February 28, 1997. The coup was carried out under the pretext that the Islamist government had violated the constitutional premise of laicism (Cizre-Sakalloğlu & Çınar, 2003; Jenkins, 2007). Rather than directly overthrowing the government, the army colonels coerced the cabinet to take measures to stop the rise of religious nationalism. Military impositions included the strict enforcement of a headscarf ban for all female students, the closure of conservative religious middle schools and the indiscriminate exclusion of all graduates of conservative religious high schools from college programmes (Özgür, 2012). The headscarf ban forced female employees and students alike, in both public and private institutions, to uncover their head in order to continue their education or job. With these impositions, the coup leaders re-asserted the citizenship regime of the state formation era in order to eradicate the divisive influence of identity politics, which marked the hallmark of the post-Cold War era.

### 2.4.2 Citizenship Education

Even though the existing studies deemed the courses taught before 1948 as citizenship education, their titles did not include the term of either citizen or citizenship. Rather, the central concept was motherland [*vatan*] or homeland [*yurt*] in their titles. The main priority of those courses was to instil a sense of loyalty to the new state, the new regime and the ruling party. In 1948, the title of the course was changed from Knowledge of Homeland to Knowledge of Citizenship (Çelik, 2009). Thus, the course was entitled with the concept of citizenship for the first time. Even though the 1948 course objectives were not very different from that of the past courses, the changing content of the course after 1950 suggests that true citizenship education began in Turkey in 1948.

Researchers who have examined citizenship education of this era have diverged in their opinion about the significance of changes made after 1950. Üstel (2004) concluded that the advent of the multi-party regime was not reflected in the quality of citizenship education, mainly because the 1948 primary school programme remained in effect until 1968. She
maintained that the changes were not sufficient to conclude that citizenship education deviated from the official ideology of secular nationalism. On the contrary, she highlighted that perspectives on democracy in textbooks were authoritarian, and the underlying concerns were the same with the previous era, such as raising docile, obedient citizens who were expected to fulfil what authorities advised them to do.

However, İnce (2012) and Caymaz (2008) found the changes after 1950 significant, even though they agreed that the assimilationist citizenship continued to prevail without any mention of any ethnic or religious identities in textbooks. The first important change that they identified was that citizenship education textbooks started with a new unit, entitled “Democracy”, in which the multi-party regime was positively presented. It even included information about the major political parties. This stood in contrast to the single-party era when the virtues of the single-party system were exalted. Secondly, a more humanistic approach came to define the characteristics of a good citizen, more emphasis was placed on rights, and the state was depicted with obligations to protect citizens' rights. One of the statements by Atatürk, “peace at home, peace in the world”, was included in textbooks, while some introduced the full text of the UDHR in their appendices (İnce, 2012). Perspectives on non-Muslim citizens showed improvements, as textbooks noted that minority rights should be respected.

Reflecting the changing political atmosphere, a picture of a woman wearing a headscarf and standing by a ballot box was included in a textbook, while some other textbooks underlined the importance of foundations (İnce, 2012). The image of a veiled woman was significant in that the single party had eradicated all religious visibilities in education in the previous era. Nevertheless, some of these advances were reversed when the military toppled the DP government in 1960. The military's attempt to restore the system to its secular nationalist origins found its expression in citizenship education. The military government sent schools an official circular about how to teach citizenship education (İnal, 2004). Teachers were ordered to present the coup as a revolution and teach children the importance of the military. Textbooks published after the coup began to include a new unit, entitled 27 May Revolution. This unit hailed the coup as a revolution by denigrating the DP as a clique that ruled the country from 1950 to 1960. The coup was justified by accusing the DP government of violating the constitution.
As part of the transition from military to civilian government, a new constitution was adopted in 1961, which was considered as the most libertarian constitution of Turkey. The immediate impact of the new constitution was that the rights were emphasised more in textbooks (İnce, 2012; Üstel, 2004). However, Üstel (2004) stressed that this libertarian constitution had a tardy influence in education, which was rendered visible in the 1969 middle school programme. In fact, the 1969 programme made less attribution to topics associated with secular nationalism while placing more emphasis on democracy, international solidarity, universal values and libertarian and participatory perspectives. In this progressive programme, citizenship education courses were subsumed into social studies course. Citizenship education became a cross-curricular subject for the first time since its introduction in 1908. This was a progressive step given that citizenship education was identified with anti-democratic characteristics. Therefore, the removal meant a weakening in the indoctrinatory role of citizenship education.

Nonetheless, after the 1971 military intervention, the characteristics of citizenship education mentioned above began to prevail once again. Examining citizenship education textbooks of the period from 1970 to 1990, Oğuz (2007) concluded that citizenship education promoted “militant citizenship” (p. 158) and aimed to raise “loyal and self-sacrificing” citizens (p. 160). Good citizenship was characterised by being ready to sacrifice individual interests for the interest of family, nation and state. Another finding that Oğuz (2007) reported was that textbooks continued to promote a gendered-notion of citizenship in that women were portrayed in traditional roles, such as being a faithful wife or a good mother.

After the 1980 coup, a new constitution came into effect in 1982, which was drafted under the military rule and widely considered as a statist, nationalist and authoritarian constitution that overlooked basic rights and freedoms. The new constitution recalibrated the monolithic citizenship regime in more ethno-religious terms. This shift was echoed in education in three distinct ways. First, the education ideology of secular nationalism was reformulated as Atatürk Nationalism or Atatürkism, which included religious identity as one of its main components. The underlying goal was “to create a consensus around the primacy of the state” in order to de-politicise the youth who had been polarised along ideological lines (Kanci, 2009, p. 363). New topics associated with Atatürk Nationalism were added into the curriculum in 1986. Second, religious education courses were made compulsory in each year of compulsory education, until the end of high school. Furthermore, all textbooks were
revised in 1986 “to conform with the tenets of the Turkish–Islamic Synthesis [sic]. The new texts extolled the alliance between the military and religious as native to the Turks' cultural essence [sic]” (S. Kaplan, 2002, p. 120). Third, the MoNE began to spread a national security doctrine by infusing themes like external enemies and internal threats into the curricula. These characteristics became more prominent when the military attempted to suppress the ethnic and religious identities in the 1990s.

In 1985, citizenship education was reinstituted as a discrete subject after social studies was divided into three separate courses, National History, National Geography, and Citizenship Studies (Üstel, 2004). The objectives of the new citizenship education course included the term of “citizen” on only one occasion. The importance of state and nation was emphasised while the objectives glossed over the concept of democracy (İnce, 2012). The three characteristics of educational reform in the post-1980 coup period were reflected in the new citizenship education course. Firstly, the promotion of Atatürk Nationalism was manifested in the textbooks whose first pages featured a written version of the national anthem, a picture of Atatürk, and his address to youth. Secondly, the new textbooks included a new definition of a nation: “a unity of language, religion, race, history and culture” (p. 177). The inclusion of religion in the definition is significant considering the nation had been previously defined with no reference to religion. Thirdly, the promotion of the xenophobic national security doctrine made itself evident by the overemphasis on internal and external enemies. Turkey was depicted as though it was surrounded by many internal and external threats (Gülmez, 2001; İnce, 2012; Üstel, 2004). The textbooks implied ethnic, political and ideological groups demanding recognition from the state as internal enemies.

After joining an international educational programme, entitled the UN Decade for Human Rights Education, the MoNE changed the name of Citizenship Studies course to Citizenship and Human Rights Education. Following this change, Gülmez (2001) reported that some new topics associated with human rights were added to the existing citizenship education programme with a view to being taught in the 1995-1996 academic year. The MoNE also formed a committee to prepare a new programme for the new course. The committee ran for two years, during which a draft programme was prepared and sent to some organisations for consultation purposes. Regarding why the preparation of the programme lasted so long, Üstel (2004) pointed to the chaotic political context in which the Human Rights High Advisory Board [İnsan Hakları Yüksek Danışma Kurulu] was dissolved in 1996, which precluded the preparation of the programme.
The new programme of study for the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course was announced in 1998, which included many controversial characteristics. Its longest unit was entitled National Security and National Power Elements, which made up 30 per cent of the content (Gülmez, 2001). This unit depicted neighbouring countries and some groups within the country as threats to national security. Gülmez (2001) speculated that this unit might have been added after the committee finalised the programme of study, but did not give a clue regarding as to who could have added it and why. Üstel (2004) argued that new textbooks were based on an exacerbated account of the national security doctrine in which even religious nationalists were implied as one of the internal threats. Identifying many human rights issues in textbooks, Gök (2004) concluded that “the main goal is to impose and indoctrinate a militarist and nationalist ideology under the pretext of international threat, terror, and animosity” (p. 116). Similarly, Çayır and Gürkaynak (2008) pointed out an inconsistency that the textbooks included universal human rights principles, while promoting a “very particularistic, nationalistic, passive and authoritarian notion of citizenship” (p. 56).

2.5 Period of Civilian Democracy (1999-2012)

The EU’s recognition of Turkey as a candidate for membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit helped restore civilian democracy after the 28 February coup. In the post-Helsinki context, the EU integration reforms brought profound changes in the balance of power between the governments and the secular state establishment. In the aftermath of the 1997 coup, the secular-establishment’s suppression brought the religious nationalist movement into disarray. However, a group of young politicians within this movement stood against elderly politicians who were united under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. The opposition of the young politicians led to the establishment of a new political party in 2001, the AKP, which came to power in 2002. Even though the military was alarmed by the AKP’s rise to power, the political context did not favour an intervention, since the EU integration reforms “limited the military’s ability to exert political leverage through informal mechanisms” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 348).

With the ascendance of the AKP, a more conciliatory political discourse, unlike the radical discourses of the traditional religious nationalist movement, began to prevail. The AKP “repeatedly stressed its commitment to secularism and described itself as a ‘Muslim Democrat’ rather than an Islamist party” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 348). Nonetheless, the AKP did
not follow a line of politics similar to that of the conservative parties in Europe (Hale, 2005; Hale & Özbudun, 2010). Unlike the European conservative parties, it pursued anti-establishment and reformist policies to weaken the hegemony of secular nationalism. Since 2002, the AKP has remained in power and reconfigured the official ideology in many areas, including citizenship education, in line with the version of religious nationalism to which it has subscribed.

2.5.1 Citizenship Policies and Practices

The AKP government carried on the EU integration reforms launched by the previous coalition government in 2001. The EU reforms brought about important changes. Fundamental rights and freedoms were expanded; using derogatory expressions against minorities was criminalised; speaking, broadcasting, publishing and teaching in languages other than Turkish were decriminalised; non-Muslim foundations were permitted to own property; and the use of non-Turkish names were legalised (Kadıoğlu, 2007; Oran, 2004). A law passed in 2004 stipulated prioritising international human rights instruments over domestic laws in case of a contradiction between the two. Another important change was that a state-owned television channel launched public broadcasting in five minority languages: Arabic, Bosnian, Circassian, Kurdish and Zaza. Aktürk (2012) noted that the commencement of the state’s channel airing in the minority languages marked the end of the assimilationist citizenship regime.

Following the 2004 Brussels Summit, where the EU set a date for starting accession negotiations, the EU process stalled, mainly because the newly elected governments in France and Germany were not supportive of Turkey’s membership (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). While the secular establishment’s pressure was intensified with the slow-down of the accession process, a broad coalition of secularist forces launched a series of public demonstrations in 2007 called the Republic Protest (İnce, 2012). The protesters wanted to prevent the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, from being elected as the president. The presidency was perceived to be one of the key institutions for the continuation of the secular nationalist order. In the meantime, the military announced a memorandum warning the government to uphold the constitutional premise of laicism. This military memorandum was a type of military intervention in politics to prevent a religious person from being elected as the president of “secular Turkey”. Nevertheless, the military was unable to stop someone whose wife wore a headscarf being elected as the president of the country in 2007.
In March 2008, the constitutional court escalated the tension by attempting to disband the ruling AKP on the grounds that it had become the focal point of activities that violated laicism (Çınar, 2010). In this notorious case, only one vote rescued the governing party from closure. After surviving the constitutional court case, the government regained its confidence and launched more radical initiatives to bring the secular nationalist establishment under control. After 2008, the government deviated considerably from adhering to the military-sanctioned policy objectives. For example, the focus of foreign policy shifted away from the goal of EU membership. Socio-political and economic relationships were developed with countries in the Middle East, North Africa and East Asia (Öniş, 2008). The government also attempted to solve the perennial citizenship problems that had been untouchable by elected-governments. It launched two significant initiatives: the Kurdish and Alevi openings. The main purpose of the former was to persuade the Kurdish separatists to lay down arms on the condition that the state would revisit citizenship policies on the Kurdish people. The latter sought ways to accommodate the Alevi identity (the largest religious minority of Turkey) in a more democratic manner.

The AKP also sought ways to repeal the rigid secularist impositions of the 1997 coup, such as the headscarf ban and closure of religious conservative schools. On this matter, the secular establishment showed a fierce resistance to the government’s attempts (Jenkins, 2007). The secularist military enforced the ban against cabinet members’ veiled wives by not inviting them to official ceremonies. After the third election victory in the 2011 general election, the 1997 coup measures were completely ended, and even replaced with opposite policies privileging the religious nationalist groups. The government was increasingly criticised for pursuing an agenda of Islamisation by utilising the ideological and repressive state apparatuses (Özbudun, 2014). The increasing number of religious courses in secular-track compulsory education epitomises the government's ideological agenda in education. After the Gezi Park demonstrations were suppressed in 2013, the ruling party was accused of authoritarianism, behaving as though electoral success legitimises anything.

2.5.2 Citizenship Education

In 2002, the European Commission funded a project to investigate whether school textbooks in Turkey were in harmony with human rights principles. After examining 190 textbooks, the first round of the project reported 4,000 instances of conflict with human rights principles (Tarba Ceylan, & Irzik, 2004). The project concluded that “the most serious problem observed in almost all textbooks is the underlying state-centred mentality.
that prioritises and indeed often sanctifies the state, the state authority, and national unity
over the individual's rights and freedoms” (Tarba Ceylan, & Irzık, 2004, p. 3). The project
team informed the MoNE about the findings. In 2004, the MoNE launched a curriculum
reform to restructure the whole curriculum on the basis of student-centred pedagogy
(Altinyelken, 2011; 2015). Based on the learning philosophy of constructivism, the MoNE
introduced a more participatory pedagogical approach, allowing students to construct
knowledge by taking an active part in learning processes. The aim was to dispense with the
teacher-centred pedagogy entrenched in the educational system. The curriculum reform
brought radical changes to the programme of studies, textbooks and pedagogical
approaches.

In an effort to reveal changes and continuities in the notion of citizenship and national
identity, Çayır (2009; 2014; 2015) examined textbooks published after the reform. He
concluded that the changes in the new textbooks were superficial and did not represent a
radical break with the past. On the contrary, he stressed that the assimilationist citizenship
and ethnoreligious national identity continued to permeate textbooks. In a more in-depth
manner, Kanci (2009) examined the new textbooks to ascertain changes in the prevailing
notion of national identity. She highlighted that the new textbooks used more neutral
concepts, like country and society, instead of concepts that carry ideological connotations,
like nation and homeland, which shows the weakening of the ethnoreligious national
identity promoted previously. Another novelty that Kanci (2009) identified was that the
new textbooks did not inculcate obedience in a commanding tone, but encouraged students
to take part in classroom activities and develop their independent research skills. However,
Kanci (2009) stressed that no reference was made to ethnic, cultural or religious identities.
Rather, differences regarding “physical traits, identification cards, feelings, thoughts and
hobbies” were covered in new textbooks (p. 370). Kanci (2009) found out that “the
underlying discourses in the new textbooks are similar in many respects to those found in
previous versions” (p. 370). She concluded that the ethno-religious citizenship regime was
still in effect, but in more subtle forms.

The MoNE decided to repeal citizenship education courses with the curriculum reform. It
decided to integrate citizenship education into social studies courses, as experimented in
1969. Examining citizenship topics infused in social studies textbooks, İnce (2012b) found
that a more individual-centred and less xenophobic approach began to prevail, which was
evidenced by the removal of topics associated with militarism and xenophobic national
security culture, such as national power and internal and external enemies. She also underlined that the new textbooks included some signs suggesting that religious pluralism was depicted in positive terms, even though there was still no mention of ethnic and religious identities. In 2010, the MoNE introduced a new course, named Citizenship and Democracy Education. Çayır's (2011) research on this new course suggested mixed findings. On the one hand, he highlighted that the new course did not include topics associated with militarism, national security, external and internal enemies and included some progressive aims, such as tackling discrimination and increasing students' awareness about gender equality. On the other hand, he highlighted that the new course was “still based on Turkishness with a single language and a single culture” (p. 27). The new course treated rights and freedoms in a superficial way without including any instances of human rights violations from Turkey.

2.6 Conclusion

Even though the military was periodically involved in ensuring that education remained loyal to the founding ideology of secular nationalism, a shift to religious nationalism took place in the citizenship education curriculum after the advent of the multi-party democracy in 1946 (İnce, 2012a; Üstel, 2004). After 1950, textbooks included a modified definition of the concept of nation, whereby religion began to be counted as a constitutive element of a nation (Üstel, 2004), an image of a woman wearing a headscarf (İnce, 2012a) and an ethnoreligious conception of citizenship based on Sunni-Turkishness (Çayır, 2015; Gök, 2004). Even though this shift to religious nationalism became more prominent following the 1980 coup (Copeaux, 2006; İ. Kaplan, 1999; S. Kaplan, 2002), the ideological transformation of the subject has never been as conspicuous as in the period after the AKP came to power in 2002.

The existing studies have predominantly described citizenship education as statist, authoritarian, ethno-nationalist, colour-blind, informative-didactic, militarist and sexist (Çayır, 2007, 2011, 2014; Çayır & Bağh, 2011; Çayır & Gürkaynak, 2008; Gök, 2004; Gülmez, 2001; İnce, 2012a, 2012b; Karaman Kepenekçi, 2005; Üstel, 2004). However, they have not investigated the evolution of the citizenship education curriculum in relation to the changing balance of power between the dominant ideologies. Rather, they have been focused on revealing the ways in which the official ideology of nationalism dominated the curriculum.
The present research had two distinguishing characteristics. First, as mentioned before, it does not infer the ideological message permeating the citizenship education curriculum solely from published materials, but draws on the perspectives of key informants and archival documentation in addition to the published sources. In this respect, it is the first critical analysis of citizenship education in Turkey based on a review of the archives of the MoNE and interviews with key players. Secondly, the present research approaches the issue from a broader perspective by drawing links between the evolution of citizenship education and the balance of power between the dominant ideologies. In this regard, the present study is in conversation with ethnographic studies exploring the political and ideological underpinnings of the Turkish educational system, such as S. Kaplan’s (2006), *Pedagogical State*, Altnay’s (2004) historical ethnography, *the Myth of Military Nation*, and İ. Kaplan’s (1999) study, *the Ideologies of the National Education*. Especially, the insights provided by the present research into the interplay between the dominant ideologies and the Turkish citizenship education curriculum have an explicit potential to contribute to this genre of scholarship.
Chapter 3  Research Methodology

The previous chapter concluded that the existing studies explored citizenship education without making an explicit relationship between the evolution of the subject and the changing balance of powers. Picking up from this critique, this chapter assembles “a toolbox of diverse concepts and theories” with the aim of studying the evolution of citizenship education in relation to the changing political parameters (Ball, 1993, p. 10). In the remainder, I start with a note on the epistemological foundation of the study, then develop a case study design. The rest of the chapter is organised into two parts. The first part looks into the data collection phase, and the second expands on the data analysis phase. In the latter part, I develop a data analysis approach by drawing on concepts and ideas from critical discourse analysis (CDA). The chapter ends with a discussion of ethical considerations, limitations of the study and a conclusion.

3.1  Epistemological Supposition

Neither knowing nor an object can exist without a mind to know it. We are born into a world of meaning. What precedes us in that world of meaning structures the way we know, think and behave. Crotty (1998) succinctly sums up this epistemological position by stating that “before there were consciousness on earth capable of interpreting the world, the world held no meaning at all” (p. 43). Knowledge is produced by “human beings as they engage with the world they are interpreting” (p. 43). The world of meaning into which we are born is the culture of our community. Humans could not function intelligibly without culture. Crotty (1998) contends:

For each of us, when we first see the world in meaningful fashion, we are inevitably viewing it through lenses bestowed upon us by our culture. Our culture brings things into view for us and endows them with meaning and, by the same token, leads us to ignore other things (p. 54). Variations in the ways in which the members of a culture know things are insignificant in comparison to variations in the ways people from different cultures know things. Even mono-cultural communities are composed of social groups that have distinct beliefs from other social groups making up a community. Despite the internal differences in communities, social groups within communities need to share a common ground. The common ground stores what is shared by all social groups, such as language, customs, traditions, religion and so on. The common ground provides the members of a community with “truth criteria” for developing consensual social beliefs, which amounts to knowledge of that community (van Dijk, 1998, p. 110). Social beliefs belonging to a particular group in a community and do not have acceptance beyond that social group can be described as ideological, whereas social beliefs that are shared by all social groups and identified with
the community can be regarded as knowledge. This operational distinction between knowledge and ideology will be further elaborated in Section 3.5.

3.2 Research Design: Case Study

Yin (2003) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). This definition indicates that the most significant rationale for conducting a case study is the difficulty of distinguishing the variables of a phenomenon from its context. Merriam (2009) underlines that “the single most defining characteristic of case study research lies in delimiting the object of study, the case” (p. 40). Accordingly, the case must be “intrinsically bounded” (p. 41). Gerring (2007) clarifies that a case refers to “a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time” (p. 19). A nation state, an institution or a policy can be regarded as a case as long as it is delimited by specific spatial and temporal boundaries.

According to these clarifications, a case study design is well suited for the current research because the evolution of citizenship education is inextricably entwined with its socio-political contexts. The citizenship education reform represents the unit of analysis within the spatial boundaries of Turkey and the temporal boundaries from 1995 to 2012. It signifies a temporally and spatially delimited phenomenon embedded in its real-life setting. The present research is an intrinsic case study because it only explores one single case without making generalisations (Stake, 2005). It is also exploratory in that no study has investigated either the curriculum development processes of not only a citizenship education course, but also a course in general in Turkey based on a review of the archival documents and interviews with key informants.

One can question why the present research is framed as a case study, not ethnography. The most defining feature of ethnography is the ability of the researcher to make participant observation because ethnography is mainly concerned with revealing characteristics pertaining to the cultural characteristics of a social group (Merriam, 2009). Unlike ethnographies, observation is not indispensable in case studies. Since it was not feasible for me to make participant observation, such as participating in the curriculum development committee’s meetings or other meetings where important decisions were taken regarding the curriculum reform, ethnography was not an option for me to frame the current research.
In addition, I frame the study as a case study because my aim was not to reveal cultural characteristics of curriculum development, but provide an analysis of the evolution of the citizenship education curriculum. These two main reasons led me to conduct a case study research instead of ethnography.

Finally, case studies are criticised for being subjective, too context-specific and providing little ground for generalisation. In response to this criticism, Gomm, Hammersley, and Foster (2000) argued that case studies look like a microcosm of a universe, so having an in-depth understanding of a part of the universe provides insights into other part of the universe. This is not to say that one case study’s findings can be generalised to other cases, but they facilitate to have a better understanding of other similar cases. In response to the same criticism, Flyvbjerg (2006) put forward that “a discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and that a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one” (p. 242). Deriving its justification from the ideas of these advocate scholars, this study aimed to produce “a thoroughly executed” case study of the citizenship education reform of Turkey and to contribute to the field of citizenship education to become an effective discipline.

3.3 Data Collection
The Board of Education (BoE), the national curriculum authority, is the main site for data collection since the curriculum reform was undertaken there from the beginning to its end. I was given access by the BoE to archival documents, including textbooks in August and September 2014. Interviews with key informants were undertaken from September 2014 to October 2015. I describe below data sources and underline their significance for the study.

3.3.1 Programmes of Study and Textbooks
Programmes of study and textbooks are the intended curriculum of citizenship education. The former contains an outline of the content, objectives, units, topics, teaching approaches and assessment criteria. Textbooks translate programmes of study into pedagogical forms by making official intentions expressed in them accessible to students. When the BoE decides to introduce a course, it first sets up a committee to prepare the programme of study. Curriculum development committees are often composed of teachers who are affiliated with the BoE. The committees run under the auspices of the BoE until the programmes are approved by the Board. Following the completion of a programme of study, authors are commissioned to write a textbook. Textbooks are the detailed versions of programmes of
study. After a textbook is completed, it is first examined by textbook examination panels, later sent to the Board for approval. The Board’s approval does not guarantee that it will be taught in schools. It needs to win a bid to be printed and distributed to schools. There are many textbooks for each subject that are approved by the Board, but only a few are used in schools.

There are two kinds of textbooks used in schools. The first version includes those authored by writers commissioned by the BoE and published by state-owned publishing houses. The second version is one written by authors commissioned by private publishing companies and published by private publishing companies. Both versions undergo the same process of approval as outlined above. The BoE exercises a tight control on the production of school knowledge, which exemplified the production of what Michael Apple calls “official knowledge”. Apple (1993) contends that “the decision to define some groups' knowledge as the most legitimate, as official knowledge, while other groups' knowledge hardly sees the light of day, says something extremely important about who has power in society” (p. 1). As the reified form of official knowledge, programmes of study and textbooks are underpinned by the dominant ideologies.

Two programmes of study for eighth-grade citizenship education courses were produced within the period from 1995 to 2012. The first one was announced in 1998 and the second, in 2010. I had access to the latest programme of study via the official website of the BoE. I obtained the past programme of study via the online archive of the Ministry of National Education Circulars Journal [Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Tebliğler Dergisi]. This journal is published bi-monthly as the official publication of the MoNE in which educational decisions made by various branches of the MoNE are made publicly available. Full texts of programmes of study are published in this journal. As for textbooks, I collected all editions of the citizenship education textbooks taught within the given period. I downloaded an online copy of the latest textbook from the official website of the BoE. I took copies of all editions of the old textbook from the library of the BoE and the National Library of Turkey during my fieldwork in Ankara.

3.3.2 Policy Documents
Policy documents refer to official texts issued by various branches of the MoNE in respect of citizenship education. The first group of policy documentation are decisions made by the BoE concerning the subject’s status and content. These decisions were accessed via the
online archive of the Ministry of National Education Circulars Journal mentioned above. The second group is archival documents which include the minutes of board meetings and correspondences between the branches of the MoNE, and the MoNE and external institutions, such as the Council of Europe (CoE). During my fieldwork, I talked to officials at the BoE about how I could be granted access to archival documents. I was directed to a board member to obtain the necessary permission. In my first meeting with the board member, he advised me to make a formal application along with certain documents about my research and myself. I applied to the BoE as instructed (Appendix 2), but my application was declined under the pretext that all the documents that I would need were available online (Appendix 3).

Nevertheless, I kept seeking ways to access the archival documentation, since I was informed that there were folders of documents in the BoE archive with respect to the curriculum reform. I was also informed that the minutes of the board meetings were kept at the BoE. After dealing with many bureaucratic obstacles, I was given one-day permission to look at the folders, which were checked beforehand and made available for me in a room outside the archive. Under the surveillance of two officials, I was instructed to skim documents and sort out the ones that I wanted to be photocopied. However, I insisted on photographing those I found useful. They eventually allowed me to do this on the condition that they would examine the photographs I would take. I accepted this and photographed roughly 900 pages of documents.

After the examination of officials, the photographs were given to me with a protocol signed by myself and a BoE official (Appendix 4). Although I managed to collect a part of the archival documentation, my attempts did not come to fruition regarding the minutes of board meetings. The department head of the concerned unit stated that, because of copyright and privacy issues, I could by no means be allowed to see the minutes without the permission of board members whose words were written there. Since it was impossible to have the written consent of all the board members whose statements were kept in the minutes, not least due to the fact that some of them may no longer be alive, my request was not accepted.

3.3.3 Interviews

In my application to the BoE to obtain consent for fieldwork, I requested the contact information of key informants who played a role in the curriculum reform. Although the
BoE refused to provide any information, I identified the names of key informants from public and archival policy documents and contacted them in my individual capacity via email and phone call. I arranged interviews with those who agreed to be a participant in my study. In this way, I carried out 17 semi-structured interviews:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Inter. Date</th>
<th>Interviewee Job</th>
<th>Period of Invol.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Interviewee 1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Civil Servant at the Board of Education</td>
<td>In-person Audio-recorded</td>
<td>20.07 min</td>
<td>8/09/2014</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>2006-ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviewee 2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Official at the Centre for Project Coordination Unit of MoNE</td>
<td>In-person Audio-recorded</td>
<td>18.22 min</td>
<td>3/09/2014</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>2006-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 3</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Curriculum development committee member</td>
<td>Phone Audio-recorded</td>
<td>87.21 min</td>
<td>29/08/2014</td>
<td>High School History Teacher</td>
<td>2007-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 4</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Curriculum development committee member</td>
<td>In-person Audio-recorded</td>
<td>51.17 min</td>
<td>26/08/2014</td>
<td>High School Philosophy Teacher</td>
<td>1999-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Curriculum development committee member</td>
<td>In-person Audio-recorded</td>
<td>40.14 min</td>
<td>2/09/2014</td>
<td>Teacher-Curriculum Designer</td>
<td>1995-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 6</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Curriculum development committee member</td>
<td>Online Audio-recorded</td>
<td>30.07 min</td>
<td>12/09/2014</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>2006-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 7</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Curriculum development committee member</td>
<td>In-person Audio-recorded</td>
<td>50.53 min</td>
<td>1/09/2014</td>
<td>High School History Teacher</td>
<td>2001-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 8</td>
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<td>Curriculum development committee member</td>
<td>In-person Audio-recorded</td>
<td>53.41 min</td>
<td>2/09/2014</td>
<td>High School Philosophy Teacher</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviewee 9</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Curriculum development committee member</td>
<td>In-person Audio-recorded</td>
<td>38.21 min</td>
<td>1/09/2014</td>
<td>Teacher-Curriculum Designer</td>
<td>2002-2013</td>
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<td>Interviewee 10</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Curriculum development committee member</td>
<td>In-person Audio-recorded</td>
<td>39.20 min</td>
<td>1/09/2014</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>2006-2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviewee 11</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Board member</td>
<td>In-person Audio-recorded</td>
<td>59.42 min</td>
<td>24/09/2014</td>
<td>Academic and Board of Education Member</td>
<td>2003-2014</td>
</tr>
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<td>Interviewee 12</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>NGO representative</td>
<td>In-person Audio-recorded</td>
<td>28.48 min</td>
<td>9/09/2014</td>
<td>NGO worker</td>
<td>2006-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 13</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>European Commission Delegate</td>
<td>Skype Note-taken</td>
<td>40.00 min</td>
<td>6/07/2015</td>
<td>Member of European Union</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 14</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>EDC/HRE Project National Coordinator</td>
<td>In-person Audio-recorded</td>
<td>44.31 min</td>
<td>28/07/2015</td>
<td>Academic Consultant to the Board of Education</td>
<td>1995-2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviewee 15</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Board head</td>
<td>In-person Note-taken</td>
<td>60.00 min</td>
<td>4/08/2015</td>
<td>Academic and Board of Education Member</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 16</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Council of Europe’s EDC/HRE Project Staff</td>
<td>Skype Audio-recorded</td>
<td>42.44 min</td>
<td>16/09/2015</td>
<td>Council of Europe Expert</td>
<td>1994-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee 17</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Council of Europe’s EDC/HRE Project Staff</td>
<td>Skype Audio-recorded</td>
<td>51.29 min</td>
<td>2/10/2015</td>
<td>EDC/HRE Expert</td>
<td>2009-2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.1: Details of the Interviews**

Since the overwhelming majority of key figures were no longer holding official positions at the BoE when I interviewed them, they did not need to have permission from the BoE for the interview. In order to reach more participants, I asked my interviewees to tell me the names of other key figures and provide their contact information if possible. In consideration of the objectives of the research, I prepared a pool of 15 interview questions:

**Interview Questions**

1. Can you please introduce yourself?
2. How do you describe yourself politically?
3. What role did you play in the citizenship education curriculum reform?
4. What do you think about the previous citizenship education curriculum?
5. Why do you think the curriculum reform was needed?
6. Why do you think citizenship education courses were repealed in 2005?
7. Is there a relationship between the government agenda and the 2010 curriculum reform? If yes, can you please expand on it?
8. What was the Board’s approach to the introduction of the Citizenship and Democracy Education course?
9. Why do you think the course was named Citizenship and Democracy Education instead of Democratic Citizenship Education?
10. How did the European Union accession agenda influence the curriculum reform?
11. How do you think the Council of Europe’s Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education Programme affected the curriculum reform in 2010?
12. How was the curriculum development committee formed?
13. Why do you think you were selected as a member of the curriculum-making committee?
14. How did you develop the 2010 curriculum? Tell me about the process:
   a. How long did it take?
   b. With whom did you consult, any non-governmental organisation, university or other institutions?
   c. Is there any intervention of the Board during the making and approval of the curriculum? If yes, how?
   d. Is there any direct or indirect influence of the Council of Europe in the curriculum-making committee? If yes, how?
   e. What were the main topics of discussion in the committee?
   f. What kind of citizen did you aim to raise by the curriculum you prepared?
   g. What do you think about the expression “the loyalty to the country” in the new curriculum?
   h. How do you think the new curriculum is different from the previous one?
15. Why do you think the Board decided to repeal the citizenship course in 2012?
Table 3.2: Interview Question Pool

Before each interview, I selected questions from the question pool depending on the role of the key informant I would interview. For instance, I asked different questions to those who worked in the curriculum development committees from those who did not take part in the committees’ work. I also had some fixed questions for all participants regardless of their differing roles.

During the interviews, some participants asked me questions about my background and my political opinion to ensure whether they could share their perspectives on politically sensitive issues. Some interviewees asked me to stop recording when they wanted to share an opinion that they thought politically sensitive. Furthermore, some did not even let me use an audio-recorder. The participants’ inquiry about me was a reflection of the political polarisation in Turkey and the fact that the members of social groups speak differently to in-group and out-group persons. Van Dijk (2006) underlines that “in talk with out-group members’ ideological beliefs may be censored or modified, e.g. in ‘politically correct’ discourse” (p. 124). In fact, ideological boundaries disappear in in-group communications because ideological perspectives are treated as knowledge shared by all members of the same social groups. During the interviews, those who considered me as an in-group person stated their perspectives more openly on the assumption that I might be sharing the same perspectives with them.

3.4 Data Analysis: Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was developed in the 1980s by a group of researchers (Roger Fowler, Robert Hodge, Gunther Kress and Tony Trew) in the University of East Anglia. Those scholars expanded Michael Halliday’s systemic-functional linguistic approach by incorporating social theory in their linguistic analysis (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000; Zotzmann & O’Regan, 2016). In addition to micro-linguistic aspects of text, they scrutinised the interplay among language, power and ideology. Following the footsteps of these early researchers, many analysts have adapted CDA to the object of their investigations through a variety of different approaches since the 1980s. CDA now carries influences from systemic functional linguistics; pragmatics; conversation analysis; sociolinguistics; Michel Foucault’s ideas on discourse; Karl Marx’s view on social classes; Mikhail Bakhtin’s concepts of genre, dialogicality and intertextuality; Luis Althusser’s theory of ideology; Antonio Gramsci’s conceptualisation of hegemony; the Frankfurt
School’s Critical Theory; Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and field; and finally, Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of Critical Realism.

CDA is an analytical approach to language “concerned with the production, circulation and interpretation of texts in which relations of domination and control may be said to be at stake” (O’Regan & Betzel 2016, p. 282). The interest of CDA in the use of language comes from the conviction that “every instance of language use makes its own small contribution to reproducing and/or transforming society and culture, including power relations” (Fairclough & Wodak, 2009, p. 273). Therefore, language signifies a medium through which to study the power struggle in societies. As relations of domination are legitimised through language, CDA aims to disclose hidden ideological aspects of text to help end the exploitation of disadvantaged social groups. CDA is interested in the analysis of public and political text and talk in order to unveil the opaque meanings that help perpetuate unequal distribution of social, economic and cultural capitals in Bourdieu’s terms (Bourdieu, 2004). In this respect, as Fairclough and Wodak (2009) highlight, CDA is not “dispassionate and objective social science, but as engaged and committed” (p. 258). By making the relationship between micro relations of language and macro relations of power in the broader context, it aims to bring about change towards a more just and equitable society.

Prominent CDA approaches include the dialectical-relational approach associated with Norman Fairclough’s work, the socio-cognitive approach represented by Teun van Dijk, the discourse-historical approach identified by Ruth Wodak and the post-structuralist approaches (Pennycook, 2001; Zotzmann & O’Regan, 2016. Each one of these approaches is underpinned by different epistemologies and designed to explore different phenomena in slightly different ways. Fairclough, Wodak, and van Dijk employ the term discourse in “the common linguistic sense as language in use” and ideology, as a particular set of social beliefs that are identified with social groupings (Pennycook, 2001, p. 82). These scholars put forward that there are ideological and non-ideological discourses. The analyst should reveal the ways in which orders of discourse are skewed for the interest of the powerful and make visible the ideological discourses that are invisibilised in the service of power.

The poststructuralist analysts dismiss the distinction between ideology and discourse by arguing that all discourses are ideological (Blommaert, 2005). They contend that power is dispersed and can be conceived of in both negative and positive ways. They subscribe to “a Foucauldian understanding of truth not as that which is obscured by power but that which
is produced by power” (Pennycook, 2001, p. 92). From this angle, they dispute the “critical modernist view that sees emancipation in terms of rational revelation of the truth obscured by ideology” because they think that a non-ideological truth does not exist (p. 92). Since I advocate democratic citizenship education, I do not draw on the post-structuralist approaches, but Norman Fairclough’s and Teun A. van Dijk’s ideas. I will first sum up these scholars’ approaches, then forge a synthesis approach by conceptualising the key constructs of CDA (power, discourse, ideology and knowledge) in reference to these scholars.

3.4.1 Norman Fairclough
In his ground breaking work, Language and Power, Fairclough (2001 [1989]) put forward that discourses are social practices that involve social conditions of production and interpretation of meaning. Discourses are historical, durable, stable and “flow into each other” (Fairclough, 2006, p. 30). Just as all other social practices, discourses are in a dialectical relationship with social reality and other discourses. They shape and are shaped by social reality in which they reside. They are produced and disseminated within a social structure. For example, the act of meaning-making (speaking or writing) happens within a social structure, which both reproduces the social structure with which it is concerned and is produced by the social structure.

Given that social structures often harbour asymmetrical power relations and relations of domination, discourses are produced in a site of a power struggle. The powerful often becomes effective in the production of discourses and exercises control on content (knowledge, assumptions and beliefs), relations (e.g. teacher-student relations) and subjects (which subject positions people are likely to occupy). The controlling or constraining of discourses is reflected in the ways in which three kinds of values are embedded in a text: experiential, expressive and relational (Fairclough, 2001). Experiential values are knowledge, beliefs and assumptions, expressive values refer to social identities, and relational values are crystallised in interactional context.

Discourses might be both ideological when they are identified with particular social groups and non-ideological when they become identified with the whole community. The primary function of ideological discourses is to generate consent for the perpetuation of existing power relations (Fairclough, 2013). Ideologies manufacture consent through non-violent
discursive strategies, such as legitimation, naturalisation, rationalisation and hegemony. Fairclough (2001) eloquently delineates the acquisition of ideological discourses:

Ideologies are most effective when its workings are least visible... And invisibility achieved when ideologies are brought to discourse not as explicit elements of the text, but as the background assumptions which on the one hand lead the text producer to 'textualize' the world in a particular way, and on the other hand lead the interpreter to interpret the text in a particular way (p. 71).

The naturalisation of ideologies is associated with the configuration of power relations in the broader context as the ideologies of dominant social groups often come to be regarded as common sense.

Fairclough (2001) suggests three phases for critical discourse analysis. The first is description level in which the analyst looks for ways in which the three types of values (experiential, expressive and relational) are embodied in text. This involves revealing the lexical and grammatical features that reflect these values in text. The second phase, interpretation, looks into the possible ways of the reception of the meaning by the interpreter. The analyst scrutinises the linguistic features of text to understand what message the producer wants to convey and what interpretation the producer expects the target reader to have. To communicate her message effectively, the producer chooses a discourse type, emphasises some points, leaves certain things implicit and uses certain lexical and grammatical forms to arrive at the interpretation she wants to create in the mind of her reader. The third and last stage, explanation, aims to link discourses identified in text to the power relations in the broader context.

Fairclough has later developed this model of CDA and named it dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough, 2013). According to this approach, there are social structures, social practices and social events. Social practices are situated between the general level of social structures and particular level of social events. They encapsulate both social structures and events. The semiotic dimension of social practices constitutes the orders of discourse, which are configurations of genres, discourses and styles. Genres are ways of acting, discourses are ways of construing the social reality, and styles are ways of being, namely identities. Combinations of genres, discourses and styles make up the orders of discourse that often favour the interest of the powerful.

Fairclough proposes a four-stage model of CDA. At the first level, the analyst must identify a social wrong, then find “a semiotic point of entry” to study that social wrong (Zotzmann
The analyst must construct his own researchable object by combining certain methods and theories in a transdisciplinary manner. In the second stage, causes and results of the social wrong should be predicted in order to identify the ways in which the orders of discourse are twisted to favour the powerful. At this stage, the analyst should select the best possible text for the study of the social wrong and carry out textual analysis. The analyst should draw links between the micro-linguistic relations in the text and the configuration of power relations within the broader context. In stage three, the analyst should ask whether or not the social order in question needs that social wrong to continue. The analyst should shed light on the ways in which the social wrong contributes to relations of domination. In the last stage, the analyst should make an explanatory and positive critique of the social wrong to help correct and transform it.

3.4.2 Teun A. van Dijk
The socio-cognitive approach, represented by Teun van Dijk, relies on the concepts of cognitive psychology in explaining the relationship between language and society (van Dijk, 1998, 2004, 2011). Van Dijk (1998) puts forward that individuals acquire discourses when they are learning language by way of constructing mental models. Mental models are cognitive representations of social events stored in the mind and recalled back in semiotic forms when needed. The way people narrate their mental representations of social events are called context models that are shaped by the norms, attitudes and social beliefs of the group to which they belong. Mental models integrate individual memory to the social memory of their groups, and individuals become part of the social. Combinations of mental models coalesce into abstractions, generalisations and attitudes, which eventually form beliefs of social groups and communities.

Discourses are ways of knowing the reality, while ideologies are “general systems of basic ideas shared by the members of a social group, ideas that will influence their interpretation of social events and situations and control their discourse and other social practices as group members” (van Dijk, 2011, p. 380). Ideologies can be seen as systemic configurations of discourses by social groups to advance their interest in the best possible ways. Ideologies are concerned with the perpetuation of group interests, “whether these are unjust privileges, or minimal conditions of existence” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 138). Therefore, they mirror a positive representation of the group they belong to and a negative representation of rival groups. They mitigate the negative aspects of the group they belong to and exaggerate the negative aspects of the groups they consider as a rival.
In Marxist tradition, ideologies are defined as the false consciousness of disadvantaged classes. It is acknowledged that the wealthy and powerful social classes deliberately “conceal, hide […] obfuscate the truth” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 138) in order to make the powerless classes subservient to their interests. Disadvantaged classes do not have a chance to develop their own beliefs based on their own socio-economic conditions, but are conditioned to serve the privileges of wealthy groups. False consciousness is planted in the social cognition of disadvantaged classes because powerful groups retain control of the public discourse production means, such as media and education:

By controlling the access to public discourse, only specific forms of knowledge and opinions may be expressed and widely circulated, and these may persuasively lead to mental models and social representations that are in the interest of the powerful. Once these mental representations are in place, the dominated group and its members will tend to act in the interest of the dominant group 'out of their own free will'. The dominated group may lack the knowledge or the education to provide alternatives, or it may accept that the dominance of the dominant group is natural or inevitable, and resistance pointless or even unthinkable (van Dijk 1998, p. 162).

Powerful groups sustain the conditions for domination through the ownership of public discourse production means. However, it is important to note that the ideologies of disadvantaged groups are not always false consciousness that is shaped by powerful social classes. Although the powerful is likely to be more influential in the production and dissemination of ideological discourses, those who struggle for justice can seize opportunities to change or resist the dominant discourses reinforced by the powerful. The status of a social group within the power structure of society might allow it “to create solidarity, to organise struggle and to sustain opposition” against the powerful groups (van Dijk, 1998, p. 138). Anti-racist, egalitarian and libertarian ideologies are the ideologies of disadvantaged groups that call for a struggle for social justice.

In contrast to ideologies, knowledge represents the common interest of the whole society. It is associated with the interest, existence and reproduction of the whole society. For example, despite having many disagreements, “racists and anti-racists agree that there is immigration in Europe, that there are countries with borders, that people may have passports” (van Dijk, 2004, p. 18). Given the fact that groups or communities are not static entities, but can be variably defined depending on the context in question, it can be concluded that there is no universally accepted knowledge. Knowledge of a community might be regarded as ideology, since the same social entity can be defined as a social group
depending on the standpoint of a definer. Van Dijk (2006) attempts to counter this risk of relativism through the following perspective:

Sometimes, ideologies become shared so widely that they seem to have become part of the generally accepted attitudes of an entire community, as obvious beliefs or opinion, or common sense. Thus, much of what today are widely accepted as social or human rights, such as many forms of gender equality, were and are ideological beliefs of the feminist or socialist movements. In that sense, and by definition, these beliefs thus lose their ideological nature as soon as they become part of the Common Ground (p. 117).

Although there are temporal and contextual variations in defining knowledge and ideology, one can talk of universal knowledge shared by all communities. One example of such knowledge is human rights, which are recognised beyond ideological boundaries. The universal acceptance of human rights exemplifies that ideologies originally belonging to certain social groups may be elevated to the level of universally accepted knowledge.

### 3.5 A Synthesis Approach for Data Analysis

In the present research, the concept of power refers to the capacity to play a role in the production of the citizenship education curriculum. In Turkey, two sources of power entertained the ability to control the citizenship education curriculum: the governments as formal and the military as informal power. The degree to which these powers become more influential in the construction of the curriculum depends on the balance of power between them. This view of power is in line with both van Dijk’s and Fairclough’s ideas as they conceptualise power as an oppressive force that shapes discourses. In contrast to the proposition of the post-structuralist approaches that all discourses are ideological, I subscribe to the view that there are both ideological and non-ideological discourses. I consider social beliefs that belong to a group and not in line with social beliefs of other groups as ideological and social beliefs that are shared beyond social groups as non-ideological.

On the basis of the identification of ideologies with social groups and the identification of knowledge with the whole community, it can be concluded that the transmission of the culture of society to future generations amounts to enculturation provided that the culture in question is not in contradiction with universal human rights and democratic norms. By contrast, the transmission of an ideology of a social group might be close to indoctrination. As a public discourse production means, education must ideally transmit what is stored in the common ground of society. Instead of the ideologies of powerful groups, it must spread knowledge stored in the common ground of society. According to this distinction, national
citizenship education is laced with influences from dominant groups, whereas democratic citizenship education is underpinned by the knowledge of the whole community that is in line with the universal human rights and democracy norms (See Section 1.3).

In Turkey, citizenship education curricula are configured in conjunction with the direction of social change towards which dominant groups in power wish to take the country. Citizenship education curriculum, which is developed when the forces of secular nationalism are in power, tends to promote the discourses of secular groups, and the reverse happens when the religious nationalist groups are in power. Relying on the evolution of citizenship education in Turkey, I hypothesise that the ideological tension between the dominant ideologies acutely resonates in the curriculum. In other words, the discursive shift in the citizenship education curriculum goes in parallel with the changing balance of power between the dominant ideologies.

Since I worked on a large dataset, it was not possible to provide a detailed analysis of short excerpts, as is the common way of analysis in CDA studies. Neither could I strictly follow the stages suggested by Fairclough nor the detailed analysis which van Dijk has exemplified with short excerpts. Instead, I followed a three-stage sequential path of analysis similar to the one proposed by Fairclough (2001, 2013). At the first stage, I scrutinised the lexical and grammatical features of the text, such as foregrounding and backgrounding of agents, use of modalities, tenses and pronouns and presuppositions. At the second stage, I linked the specificities of language use to the power relations within the broader context. I looked into the relationship between discourses in the text and the ideological structures in the context.

At the third stage, I attempted to explain how the discourses in the text contributed to or challenged the existing power relations. When the discourses were supportive of democratic citizenship education, as conceptualised in Section 1.3.2, I argued that there was a possibility of transition from national to democratic citizenship education, which had the potential to challenge the relations of domination. When the discourses were supportive of national citizenship education, I argued that the transition to democratic citizenship education was unlikely, but the main concern was to imbue young people with the dominant ideological discourses and perpetuate the existing power relations. I applied this sequential analysis to the textbooks and programmes of study, the policy documents and the verbatim interview.
In the presentation of findings, the research questions and my review of literature guided the selection of excerpts from data sources. When I focused on the background of the curriculum reform, I mostly drew on archival policy documents and interviews and selected excerpts which I thought as the best pieces illustrating how the changing political parameters affected the curriculum reform agenda and the curriculum itself. Since the selection of excerpts was also guided by the main findings of literature (See Section 1.6), I paid attention to the part of the dataset that best reveals the role of national and international influences in the reform process and the curriculum itself. In the analysis of the curriculum, I mostly drew on the textbooks and, in a limited extent, on the programme of studies since the textbooks incorporated the programme of studies as well. In selecting excerpts from the curricular texts, I chose extracts that best answered the research questions and seemed promising in relation to the international trends identified in the literature.

3.5.1 Programmes of Study and Textbooks
Textbooks are effective means for the dissemination of dominant ideological discourses. They legitimise “the cultural forms of the dominant group while implicitly and often explicitly suppressing alternative cultural forms or identities” (Osler & Starkey, 2010, p. 88). Textbooks suppress the voices and identities of marginalised groups by naturalising ideological discourses of powerful groups. Dominant ideologies find their expressions in textbooks because textbook production is often controlled by members of dominant social groups. Apple (2004) notes that text selection in education necessarily involves cultural politics since what is included in, or excluded from, textbooks legitimises one social group’s beliefs and disenfranchises another group’s social beliefs.

I analysed two programmes of study and three textbooks in total (Çiftçi et al., 2001; 2004; Özpolat, 2012). The programmes of study included significant details to answer the research questions, as they laid out the rationales behind the introduction of the courses and the courses’ objectives. There was only one single programme of study for each course, so I did not need to justify my selection of the programmes of study. However, a justification was needed for the selection of textbooks because there were private company and MoNE-published textbooks in circulation in the given period. I selected the MoNE-published textbooks firstly because I could not find any information regarding the dissemination of citizenship education textbooks in the given period. During my fieldwork and later, I requested that information from the concerned branches of the MoNE, but they were unable
to provide it. As I explained in Section 3.3.1, I collected all textbooks of the period available in the libraries. In order to select a sample from the textbooks I collected, I examined both MoNE-published and private company textbooks and did not find any discernible difference. This is because both MoNE and private company textbooks were subject to the same regulations, written based on the same programme of study and went through the same process of approval at the BoE. The units, themes, and topic titles were all identical in both versions of the textbooks. They only differed in the illustrations (layout and typeface).

The MoNE-published textbooks included information on how many copies they were issued, which gave a sense of how widely they were used at schools in the given period. The private company textbooks did not contain any details that would give a sense of the extent of their use at schools. I compared the number of textbooks against the number of eighth-grade students at the time when the textbook was in use. Thus, I managed to estimate the magnitude of the use of the MoNE-published textbooks. The first version of the MoNE-published textbook was printed five times from 1999 to 2003. Its first edition was printed 350,000 copies in 1999; second, 300,000 in 2000; third, 225,000 in 2001; fourth, 50,000 in 2003; fifth, 105,000 in 2003. The total number of the textbook reached to 1,030,000 by 2003 (Çiftçi et al., 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). Considering that the nationwide number of eighth-grade students was around 1,100,000 each year from 1999 to 2003 (MoNE, 2007), I made an estimation that this textbook was used at least by one-third of eighth-grade students in 1999 and by almost all eighth-grade students in the 2003-2004 academic years (Çiftçi et al., 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). It seems almost each student had one copy of the textbook in that academic year.

The revised version of the first textbook was printed 310,000 copies in 2004 and 312,000 copies in 2005 (Çiftçi et al., 2004, 2005). By 2005, it had 622,000 copies in circulation. When the textbook was in use, the number of eighth-grade students was around 1,125,000 (MoNE, 2007). If we assume that the first version was completely withdrawn from use, we

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1 The first Citizenship and Human Rights Education textbook, based on the programme of study of the course, was first published in 1999. Previous textbooks were based on the revised programme of study of Citizenship Studies course.
2 The number of primary school graduates were almost equal to the total number of eighth-grade students because primary school students graduated after completing Year 8.
can estimate that the revised textbook was used by more than one-third of eighth-grade students in the 2004-2005 academic year and by more than half of all eighth-grade students in 2005-2006 academic year. In calculating the number of the textbook, I assumed that previous years’ copies remained in circulation because, at that period, new students used to buy textbooks from stores or borrow them from previous year’s students. In most cases, the exchange of textbooks among students was organised by school administrations. This practice led to an increase in the number of textbooks in circulation.

As for the textbook of Citizenship and Democracy Education course, only the MoNE-published one included information of how many copies it was printed. The private company textbooks did not contain that information. When this course was being taught, the MoNE was distributing textbooks to students for free. Therefore, the first edition of the textbook was printed 1,311,951 copies in 2010, and the second edition was printed 1,358,541 copies in 2012 (Özpolat, 2010, 2012). The nationwide number of primary school graduates was about 1,226,473 in the academic year of 2010-2011 and 1,252,147 in the academic year of 2011-2012 (MoNE, 2016). These numbers suggest that the MoNE-published textbook was the only one used across the country from 2010 to 2012.

These statistical inferences show that the MoNE textbooks were the ones most-widely used nationwide in the given period. Therefore, I selected them as the sample of the present research. The table below shows details of the textbooks selected as the sample of the study:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Citizenship and Human Rights Education</th>
<th>Citizenship and Human Rights Education</th>
<th>Citizenship and Democracy Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit 1</td>
<td>State, democracy, constitution, citizenship, citizenship rights and responsibilities</td>
<td>State, democracy, constitution, citizenship, citizenship rights and responsibilities</td>
<td>Every human being is precious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit 2</td>
<td>Protection of human rights</td>
<td>Protection of human rights</td>
<td>Culture of democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit 3</td>
<td>National security and national power elements</td>
<td>National security and national power elements</td>
<td>Our rights and freedoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit 4</td>
<td>Problems faced when protecting human rights</td>
<td>Problems faced when protecting human rights</td>
<td>Our duties and responsibilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.3:** Comparison of Textbooks

I subjected the two textbooks in the first two columns to a comparative content analysis and found out that the second was the revised version of the first one. After comparing the
two textbooks line by line, I was convinced that the differences between the two were very significant even though they could easily escape the reader's attention since no information was found regarding this revision in the textbooks or elsewhere. The third textbook is the latest one, written based on the 2010 programme of study.

3.5.2 Policy Documents

Ideological discourses coded in policies can be decoded with an explicit recognition of the political context because policies are always “about the exercise of political power and the language that is used to legitimate that process”, (Codd, 1988, p. 235). Policy statements contain “meanings and signs that work to mask social conflict and foster commitment to the notion of a universal public interest” (p. 237). Nonetheless, contestations and compromises start “from the moment of appearance of an issue on the policy agenda, through initiation of action, to the inevitable trade-offs involved in formulation and implementation” (Rizvi & Lingard, 2009b, p. 6). This suggests that policy analysis is “a form of textual deconstruction in which ideological effects can be critically examined” (p. 236). This is because “conflicts over texts” hint at “proxies for wider questions of power relations” (Apple, 2014, p. 3).

In order to match discourses in policy documents with ideological discourses prominent in the political context, I first chronologically sorted out all documents and applied the sequential analysis outlined above. Even though I examined over 900 pages of archival policy documents and roughly 400 pages of publicly-available policy documents, I used a small part of them in answering the research questions. Especially, the correspondences with the CoE proved significant in answering the research questions. In general, both archival and public policy documents helped me to shed light on the emergence, evolution and abandonment of the curriculum reform agenda and the influences of the dominant ideology in power in the period.

3.5.3 Interviews

From a CDA perspective, I considered the national curriculum authority as a site of a power struggle where dominant social groups compete to shape not only the configuration of power relations within the organisation, but educational discourses to their interests (Mumby & Clair, 2009, p. 182). I transcribed all audio-recorded interviews and made a clean copy of notes that I took during the non-recorded interviews. I used the Nvivo 10, a qualitative data analysis software, to support coding, categorising, retrieval, and searching.
of interview data. I identified discourses significant in terms of the research objectives and selected excerpts representing the discourses identified. I analysed the extracts taking into consideration the role of the interviewee in question, his/her social group and political ideology. I particularly looked into how the interviewee's statements matched the norms, values and ideologies of his/her social group. I scrutinised their statements in consideration of the balance of power to identify the impact of dominant ideology in power.

3.6 Triangulation

Fairclough & Wodak (2009) describe CDA as an “engaged and committed” social science approach (p. 258). From this angle, they argue that the objectivity in a positivist sense is not a relevant concern for CDA research. Nevertheless, CDA studies are expected to produce a careful, meticulous, rigorous and systematic examination of socio-political issues. Rather than having to ensure objectivity by making fact-like conclusions and law-like generalisations, I strove to provide a reflective, rigorous and reasonable analysis of the citizenship education reform. With this concern, I compared respondents’ accounts on the same issue against each other and policy documents when clarifying ambiguities regarding the background of the curriculum reform. I mostly relied on policy documents in the event of a contradiction about factual events because interviewees might be inaccurate in their statements as they only relied on their memories when answering the interview questions. Policy documents are reliable testimonials to the background of the reform process. However, they could not be contextualised adequately without the interviews, as both sources complemented, validated and enhanced each other and were constantly cross-checked in supporting the findings. For example, the interviews included some inaccurate information regarding how the BoE and the CoE collaborated in the curriculum reform. On this issue, I mostly relied on the archival documentation in illuminating the background of the curriculum reform. The interviews also helped me identify the contesting discourses in the policy cycle. I used all data-sources in a comparative way in generating findings and drawing conclusions.

3.7 Ethical Considerations

The BoE initially rejected my research application without a convincing explanation. I went to the different branches of the MoNE, which I thought could help me have the permission to do my fieldwork at the BoE. However, my attempts did not yield any positive outcome. Before returning from fieldwork, I went to the BoE for a last time and talked to a department head who said she would talk to the head of the BoE about my request. When I was waiting
in her office, I was called to the head’s office and had roughly a one-hour conversation with the head about the details of my fieldwork. He first said he would not let me carry out the fieldwork on the grounds that there were no useful archival documents at the BoE. After I convinced him of the existence of archival folders, he asked some officials to make ready archival folders for my examination. In a room outside the archive, I was given one-day to skim a dozen folders comprising thousands of documents regarding the citizenship education reform. I photographed roughly 900 pages of documents, which were examined by the BoE officials and given to me with a protocol specifying the terms and conditions of using them (Appendix 4). I complied with the terms and conditions of the protocol, and did not use the image of the documents, but cited them with the name of the institution where they were produced and the date when they were issued, as in the following example: Board of Education, March 30, 2010 or BoE, March 30, 2010.

Although I managed to access the archival documents, the BoE was unable to provide the contact information of interviewees. In my own capacity, I identified potential interviewees and reached 17 key informants in total. I found some key informants’ contact information on the internet and reached others through them. Before the interview, I provided each interviewee with an information sheet and a consent form to make explicit the details about the possible use of data. The information sheet presented important aspects of the research (Appendix 5-6). The consent form asked the permission of participants in respect of ethical issues (Appendix 7-8). In compliance with what was promised in the forms, all information concerning the participants’ identity was kept confidential.

Quotes from the interviewees were cited with pseudonyms and the date of the interview, as in the following example: Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014. I quoted the interviewees on politically sensitive issues as anecdotal pieces without even mentioning a pseudonym. Throughout this thesis, in order to preserve anonymity, the interviewees are cited with the pronoun “he/his” in a way that is intended to be gender-neutral. I also quoted off-the-record statements as anecdotal pieces without citation. The ministry officials I consulted to gain permission for the fieldwork were not very sympathetic to my research. My experiences during the fieldwork made me approach the corpus of this research with caution. Therefore, I intended to use a nuanced and moderate language in reporting the findings of the research.
3.8 Limitations

The BoE did not grant full access to data sources in the archive which would have enhanced the quality of the study. Documentary data would have been richer if I had been given access to the minutes of Board meetings. The number of participants would surpass 17 if the BoE had provided me with the contact information of those who played a role in the curriculum reform. Furthermore, this study could not draw on perspectives from politicians who affected the curriculum reform because it is almost impossible to reach politicians without certain references. In addition, since the research topic had not been studied before, I did not have a chance to benefit from the experiences of previous researchers, but had to proceed with improvised methodological decisions. The final limitation of the study is concerned with translation from Turkish to English. Since the bulk of the dataset was Turkish, I had to translate them into English. All excerpts but a small part, which were in English, are my translation from the textbooks, programmes of study, interviews and policy documents which were originally in Turkish.

Translation is a significant issue because the use of language is the main element of analysis of a CDA research. The particularities of language use that reveal the interplay between power, ideology and discourse might get lost in translation. In order to prevent this and show warrant to support the findings, I did a close English translation of Turkish texts by paying attention to linguistic features that are of interest for CDA, such as passive/active construction, nominalisations, modalities, lexical choices, hyperboles etc. Also, I analysed the excerpts in their original language, mostly in Turkish, and tried to reflect discursive nuances in their English translation. In order to minimise the issues of translation, when necessary, I made explanations regarding Turkish grammar and lexical choices which I presented in their originals in square parentheses throughout the thesis. Finally, I present the Turkish and English version of all excerpts used in the thesis in Appendix 9.

3.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I explained how I combined the theoretical and methodological concepts and ideas with a view to providing a critical analysis of the curriculum reform in relation to the changing political conditions from 1995 to 2012. I started with a note on the epistemological foundation of the study, then developed a case study design and explained why I preferred a case study design to ethnography. After presenting the details of the data collection phase and describing the data sources, I developed a data analysis approach by drawing on Norman Fairclough and Teun A. van Dijk’s CDA approaches. I strengthened
the data analysis approach by showing how it is associated with the disciplinary frame of
the study. I argued that the transition from national to democratic citizenship education is
a topic of interest for a CDA study since it is closely concerned with the perpetuation or
 transformation of existing power relations. From this angle, I further argued that the
conceptual distinction between national and democratic citizenship education enhances the
application of CDA into the corpus of the present research. In the remainder of the chapter,
I reflected on the triangulation of data sources, the ethical considerations and limitations.
The following chapters present the findings of the research in a chronological order from
1995 to 2012.
Chapter 4  Militarisation of Citizenship Education (1995-1999)

This chapter investigates the evolution of the citizenship education curriculum in the period from 1995 to 1999. According to the periodisation of citizenship and citizenship education in Chapter 2, this timeframe corresponds to the last years of the period of military-controlled democracy (1950-1999), during which the military’s pressure to maintain the official ideology of secular nationalism culminated in the face of rising religious nationalism and Kurdish separatism. Just before the European Council’s recognition of Turkey as a candidate for membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the military capitalised on the instrumental value of education to suppress the dissident movements and consolidate the hegemony of secular nationalism. The selected period marks a symbolic timeframe to observe the impact of ideological struggle in the citizenship education curriculum.

Acting in response to the United Nation's (UN) Decade for Human Rights Education (HRE) Initiative, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) launched the citizenship education curriculum reform in 1995 by changing the title of citizenship education courses from “Citizenship Studies” to “Citizenship and Human Rights Education” (MoNE, 1995). This decision signified the start of the curriculum reform, but the democratisation of the citizenship education curriculum was disrupted in the following months because the 1995 general elections resulted in the rise of a religious nationalist party to power, the Welfare Party [Refah Partisi, RP]. This escalated the long-smouldering tension between the forces of religious and secular nationalism. The military, the protector of the official ideology, intervened in politics in the name of preserving the constitutional principle of laicism and staged a coup in 1997 to topple the first Islamist government of Turkey. The military’s attempt to revive the official ideology echoed in the citizenship education curriculum. The programme of study of the “Citizenship and Human Rights Education” course, which was drafted in the aftermath of the coup, was heavily influenced by the military’s ideological discourses. The military’s influence permeated the course’s main textbook published in 1999. To highlight the military’s impact, I refer to the evolution of citizenship education in this period as the militarisation of citizenship education.

In the remainder of this chapter, I start with a description of the political context, then look at the stages of the curriculum reform. I present a critical discourse analysis of interviews, public and archival documents in shedding light on the background of the curriculum reform. Here, I draw on archival documents more than the other sources because they
contained details more relevant to answer the research questions. Subsequently, I present the discursive manifestation of the ideological conflict through an analysis of the main textbook. Before the conclusion, I point out the structural relationship between the military and education. The changing aspect of this relationship in the following years is key to the democratisation of the citizenship education curriculum in Turkey. In all data analysis parts, I use the data sources (curricular texts, policy documentation and interviews) in a mutually-supportive way to strengthen my findings.

4.1 Context and Background

The secular nationalist state establishment used various mechanisms to ensure that Turkey remained a secular, territorially integral and culturally homogeneous country (Jenkins, 2007). To this end, the military played a continual role in politics through its constitutional autonomy, its representatives in key institutions and its informal influence on key decision makers in politics and bureaucracy. Since the military believed that there were internal as well as external enemies, it did not confine its duty to the protection of the country from external threats, but expanded it to the protection of the country from internal threats. Acting as the purveyor and protector of secular nationalism, it has staged four military coups within 65 years of multi-party history. It promoted a national security doctrine that external enemies were colluding with internal enemies to undermine the state authority (Jenkins, 2001). This doctrine originated in the Ottoman Empire as a repercussion of military defeats that led to the losses of vast territories (A. Karaosmoğlu, 2000). The Treaty of Sèvres, which oversaw the partition of the Ottoman territories among the Western powers after the First World War, hardened this xenophobic belief. According to the military, the common feature of all internal and external enemies is being against the principles of Atatürk since they all work to undermine the state authority. Therefore, the military has been inclined to consider all dissident movements critical of the official ideology as internal threats plotting with external enemies to harm Turkey.

Until the end of the Cold War, the military fought communists as the major internal enemy since the ideological polarisation of the Cold War period overshadowed the salience of ethnic and religious identities. However, in the post-Cold War period, religious and ethnic nationalism emerged as counter-movements against the official ideology. The end of the Cold War and the advancements in communication and transportation technologies contributed to the emergence of dissident movements by bringing about an unprecedented surge in the level of demographic mobility (Juergensmeyer, 2010, 2015). The post-Cold
War conditions created a risk of obliterating the traditional form of identification with the secular nation-state. In this period, in Turkey, religious nationalism was born as a reaction to the insufficiencies of secular nationalism and embraced as an alternative ideology by those who had been alienated by long-standing secularist policies.

In the 1990s, the military identified political Islamism and Kurdish separatism (crystallised by the outlawed-armed Kurdish Labourer Party [Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK]) as the two internal threats (A. Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). Even though the military was largely successful in repressing the PKK insurgency, it was powerless to stop the rise of religious nationalism. After the formation of an RP-led coalition government in 1996, the military intervened in politics by launching a concerted offensive on the grounds that the government had violated the constitutional premise of laicism (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Çınar, 2003). The military’s interventions culminated in the National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997 in which the military members of the council imposed several measures on the RP-led cabinet. In spite of agreeing to the military’s demands, the government was compelled to resign in the months that followed the National Security Council (NSC) meeting. In 1998, the constitutional court disbanded the RP for violating the principle of laicism and banned many politicians of the party from involvement in politics.

This military intervention was called the 28 February Postmodern Coup since it took place without the direct takeover of power. It signified the fourth coup in the 65 years of multiparty history in Turkey. The period that followed the NSC meeting was referred to as the 28 February Process because the military continued to operate as the informal political power behind the scene. Following the coup, the military interferences with politics became commonplace. It intervened in all policy spheres in the name of consolidating national security. Under the pretext that security threats were rampant in all sectors of society, “national security considerations” were “enshrined in legislation on antiterrorism, media, public order, political parties, education, civil rights, and liberties” (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Çınar, 2003, p. 321). In this period, the military was involved

...in making and breaking governments, initiating crucial policy decisions, becoming directly involved in political intrigue, issuing public demands and warnings to civilians, structuring new bills through its own research units and departments, launching campaigns to inform the public about the possibility that political Islam might be acting as cover for reactionary intentions, having the final say on whether or not the 1999 elections would be held, shaping foreign policy, and continuously impinging on the daily operations of elected governments (p. 321).
In order to suppress the religious nationalist movement, the military imposed several educational measures on the 28 February coup (NSC, 1997). With reference to the 1924 Unification of Education Act [*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Yasası*], the military aimed to re-establish the original education ideology. In order to dismantle the breeding ground of religious nationalism, it forced the government to shut down conservative religious middle schools, ban the graduates of conservative religious high schools from secular college programmes and enforce the headscarf ban in public spaces (Özgür, 2012). The coup's influence was not confined to conservative religious schools, but had a more profound impact, as evidenced by the revision of most textbooks during the 28 February Process in order to weave the military’s ideological discourses into the curriculum.

### 4.2 Stages of Curriculum Reform

In 1994, the UN General Assembly announced that the period from 1995 to 2004 would be the UN Decade for HRE (United Nations, 2015). Starting from 1 January 1995, the UN began to promote human rights through education in its member states. In Turkey, the state minister responsible for human rights acted on the UN’s call and began to sign protocols with individual ministries to promote a compliance with the UN’s initiative. It signed one such protocol with the MoNE in 1995 in an official ceremony where the prime minister, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs as well as the education minister and the minister responsible for human rights were present.

The signing of the protocol signified the starting point of the curriculum reform which intermittently lasted until 2012. The protocol included a decision that the title of an existing citizenship education course, “Citizenship Studies”, would be changed to “Citizenship and Human Rights Education”, and the curriculum of the course would be revised through the integration of human rights themes. This decision suggested that the citizenship education courses were seen as the best possible curricular space to offer HRE, which led to the revision of the curriculum of the citizenship education course:

**Excerpt 1:**
INTRODUCTION

Human Rights Age starts with the foundation of the United Nations (1945). Turkey, one of the founding members of the United Nations, is one of the first member states which signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Afterwards, it displayed its positive approach to human rights by ratifying a series of universal and regional human rights conventions.

Now, the fact our century gained recognition as the human rights age is known. While entering into a new century, new developments emerging in the world show that, as of today, the measure of developmental level of countries will be the importance that countries attach to human rights and the degree to which countries protect them.

(...) REGULATIONS THAT STIPULATE HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION

a. At the international level
b. At the national level

DECISIONS THAT WERE TAKEN CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION

1. “Citizenship Studies” course, which is still taught in the second stage of primary education institutions, shall be re-structured under the name of “Citizenship and Human Rights Education”.
2. (...)  
3. In order to avoid personal and political inculcations, as a principle, international human rights documents shall be taken as the basis for human rights education.

[Signatures]

State Minister Responsible for Human Rights  
Minister of National Education

(BoE, March 6, 1995)

The first part of the protocol lays out the rationale for the introduction of HRE in Turkey; the second part presents the regulatory basis from national and international law that stipulates HRE; the third part is the decisions which were agreed by the signing of the protocol. The main discourse of the protocol is that human rights are a defining mark of the modern world, so their implementation is a precondition to be seen or become a developed country. This nationalist discourse views human rights as instrumental to the national development of Turkey, but does not recognise an intrinsic value in them. The protocol implies that the introduction of HRE is a requirement of human rights instruments to which Turkey signed up and a vital step to become a developed nation. This rationale justifies the need for HRE through external references. By introducing HRE, the government intends to
elevate Turkey’s standing in international developmental rankings. This consideration of HRE as an instrument to boost Turkey’s international reputation is not likely to bring about a positive change to the unequal power relations in the broader society.

The introductory part of the protocol begins with an assertive statement: “the Human Rights Age starts with the foundation of the United Nations (1945)”. It is written in the present tense to make it sound like a fact. The phrase of “human rights age” is used as though a human rights age, equivalent to “Ancient Age”, “Medieval Age”, had a widespread recognition. After foregrounding Turkey’s significant role in the foundation of the UN, the second sentence highlights that Turkey is one of the first countries, which signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The third sentence underlines Turkey’s positive approach to human rights on the basis of evidence that Turkey signed international and regional human rights conventions. Based on a good record of signing international and national human rights instruments, Turkey is implicitly presented as a country where human rights are upheld outstandingly well.

Overall, the protocol is based on a discourse that a new century has just started, which necessitates giving importance to human rights in order to be seen as a “developed nation”. From this perspective, HRE is expected to help Turkey be seen as a developed country. This is repeated in the programme of study of the course, which the BoE would announce three years later. On the basis of this rationale, the rest of the document lists the national and international legal instruments which stipulate HRE and the decisions that were agreed by the parties who signed the protocol.

The Decision No.3 highlights that HRE in Turkey will be based on universal human rights instruments to avoid political and personal inculcations. Even though this decision seems to be a promising sign, it is arguably included in the protocol to provide a basis to avoid the teaching of Turkey’s human rights problems and offer a de-contextualised and watered-down version of HRE. This is because it is not possible to teach human rights and democratic citizenship by avoiding the discussion of political issues (Hess, 2009; Osler, 2016; Parker, 2003) In this regard, this decision accords with the dominant discourse of the protocol in that the introduction of HRE is a response to external conditions, not internal, so the teaching of human rights is not expected to include Turkey’s human rights problems, but an abstract narration of universal principles in a de-contextualised manner.
De-contextualised and de-politicised HRE relies on an abstract narration of human rights principles and democratic norms. For example, the Article 7 of the UDHR, “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law”, might be included in a democratic citizenship education curriculum without any reference to an instance of discrimination in the context where the curriculum is implemented (UDHR, 2017). When this principle is taught in a de-contextualised and de-politicised way, it could engender a sense of cynicism in students that that principle is just on paper, but there are many cases that contradict it in reality. It is unlikely to bring about a transformative change. However, when it is taught with relevant examples, such as discrimination against minorities in that particular context, democratic citizenship education can make a difference. From this perspective, the protocol gives an impression that the existing national citizenship curriculum is not likely to evolve towards democratic citizenship education underpinned by performative citizenship.

4.2.1 After the Protocol

After the protocol was signed, the MoNE changed the title of “Citizenship Studies” course to “Citizenship and Human Rights Education” and announced a revision of the citizenship studies course’s curriculum in 1995 (BoE, March 6, 1995; MoNE, 1995). The revision was the addition of some human rights themes to the already-crowded curriculum of the citizenship studies course without any change in the existing content of the course. Following this early step, the MoNE planned to prepare a new curriculum for the course, but the rise of the RP overshadowed the significance of the curriculum reform agenda by escalating the tension between the forces of secular and religious nationalism. In this period, the military began to intervene in politics under the pretext of upholding the constitutional principle of laicism. As a result, the interest in the democratisation of citizenship education disappeared.

The decline in the official interest is captured in a letter issued by the BoE in response to the CoE’s invitation to the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE) initiative. The letter explains in detail how good Turkey was at democratic citizenship education thanks to the Atatürk reforms and offers to help the other member states:

Excerpt 2:
This letter is significant since it shows how the official approach to the citizenship education reform evolved two years after the signing of the protocol. It includes an outline of the existing situation in terms of democratic citizenship education and seven suggestions concerning the EDC/HRE initiative. In contrast to the Protocol’s emphasis on external sources of motivation behind the decision to introduce HRE, the letter starts with a statement that upends the hierarchy between Turkey and Europe regarding democratic citizenship. Even though Turkey has been historically in a position to learn from Europe about democratic citizenship, this relationship is reversed in the letter by the following sentence “There are many things concerning democratic citizenship that Europe would learn from Turkey”. First of all, the sentence is written in the present tense to sound confident and bureaucratic. It does not include any modality that gives a meaning of nuance and possibility, such as “there might be something in Turkey which Europe can learn”. On the contrary, it is a blunt expression of an unusual view that Turkey is in a position to teach European countries about democratic citizenship. It strengthens the hierarchically higher position of Turkey by the use of “many things” [çok şeyler]. The statement that there are “many things” that Europe would learn about democratic citizenship from Turkey is supported through a peculiar narration of secularisation. It seems there is a confusion between the concept of citizenship and secularism in the letter because what is being conveyed is a revisionist version of Turkey’s secularisation history rather than citizenship.
Using citizenship and secularisation synonymously, the letter makes a contrast between “subjecthood [kulluk]” and democratic citizenship. It says the people of Turkey were stripped of their characteristics that made them “subjects” [kül] and became “democratic citizens” in a period of 150 years. The concepts “umma [ümmet]-congregation [cemaat]-religious community [millet]” are contrasted with “neighbourhood [ahali]-hometown [memleket]” in order to highlight the evolution towards democratic citizenship. The people of Turkey before the emergence of democratic citizenship are described with concepts that carry religious connotations like “subjecthood, umma, congregation, religious community”, whereas the people of Turkey after the emergence of democratic citizenship are associated with secular concepts like “neighbourhood [ahali]-hometown [memleket]”. In this regard, these contrasts reveal an underlying assumption that the concept of democratic citizenship developed in Turkey through a transition from a religious to secular society. According to this discourse, Atatürk is “the leader and teacher” who gave the final shape to democratic citizenship. The culmination of the development of democratic citizenship in the state formation era (1923-1938) makes it clear that secularisation is used synonymously to democratic citizenship.

This revisionist presentation of the historical development of citizenship in Turkey exalts the state formation era and the role of Atatürk. For example, the first sentence of the last paragraph exaggerates the role of Atatürk in the development of citizenship by placing his name as the main verb of the sentence: “the one who acted as both leader and teacher is Atatürk.” To support this claim, the letter provides evidence that one of the significant books of democratic citizenship, Civic Information for Citizens, was written with the request and contribution of Atatürk (See Section 2.3). The letter later suggests disseminating this book to member countries after translating it into French and English. It suggests introducing the book as a comprehensive source for democratic citizenship. However, this book, which was the main citizenship education textbook of the 1930s, is heavily under the influence of the secular nationalist ideology of the state-formation era (Üstel, 2004). The emphasis on it reveals the conception of democratic citizenship which the influential decision-makers in the educational policy cycle had in their minds. The suggestion to disseminate that book to other European countries reflects a lack of previous engagement with European organisations.

The overemphasis on the history of secularisation and the role of Atatürk are signs of reasserting the official ideology of secular nationalism in reaction to the rise of religious
nationalism. The foregrounding of secularist discourses in the letter manifest the emerging interest to use citizenship education as a tool to disseminate secular nationalism as a counter-ideology to rising religious nationalism. In fact, after the military toppled the government in 1997, this interest in the instrumental use of citizenship education became more visible. The military took advantage of the crackdown on religious nationalism and disseminated its own version of secular nationalism. In 1998, the BoE announced the citizenship and human rights education course’s curriculum of study while the military was playing an active role in redefining the ideological premises of the educational system in the aftermath of the coup (MoNE, 1998). The military’s ideological perspectives resonated in the new curriculum of the course.

The key informants confirmed the military’s role in the making of the programme of the study:

**Excerpt 3:**

**Interviewee 11:** The old curriculum was prepared at the end of the 1990s. Yes, it was because the United Nations. What was it? The Decade for Human Rights Education. However, in those years in Turkey, the 28 February Process was under way and there was a conspicuous domination of the tutelage regime over the educational system; therefore, I do not think academic circles, curriculum experts and those who prepared the curriculum, those who wrote textbooks and decision-makers of the time managed to cross the red lines drawn by the military people of the period and prepare a programme of study and textbook that is in line with human rights and democracy principles. I mean it is because it was a dark period of Turkey.

**Me:** Who prepared the programme of study? Of course, who approved it is identifiable because there is a board decision about it, but who really prepared it?

**Interviewee 11:** We were not able to identify those who really prepared it. What I can only tell you about the programme is that it was a programme of study promoting pure citizenship; appealing to a rigid understanding of citizenship encouraging obedience, submission, paying tax, joining the army, picking up litters; not grounded in an understanding of equality and a sense of mutual duty and responsibility in state-citizen relationships (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014).

The interviewee is a decision-maker who became influential in the education policy cycle after the AKP came to power in 2002. He\(^1\) did not hesitate to describe himself as an AKP bureaucrat. His statements show that he recognises “a conspicuous domination of the tutelage regime [vesayet rejimi] over the educational system” in the aftermath of the 1997 coup. The phrase of the tutelage regime [vesayet rejimi] is important in his statement since

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\(^1\) Throughout this thesis, in order to preserve anonymity, the interviewees are cited with the pronoun “he/his” in a way that is intended to be gender-neutral.
it is usually used by pro-government circles. The interviewee maintained that there were “red lines [kırmızı çizgiler] drawn by the military people of the period”. Even though he did not clarify the military’s influence in education, his reflections on the old curriculum give some ideas about the nature of military’s involvement with education. He casts doubt on who really prepared the old curriculum and describes the aftermath of 1997 coup as “a dark period of Turkey.” His description of the old curriculum as a curriculum that aims to raise obedient and docile individuals points to the military’s influence.

In support of the statements of Interviewee 11, Interviewee 5, who was one of the members of the committee which prepared the old curriculum, claimed that the curriculum had been modified in the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council (September 2, 2014). Regarding the intensity of militarist themes, Gülmez (2001) put forward that they might have been added after the committee finalised the curriculum. The Interviewee 5’s claim substantiates Gülmez’s (2001) suspicion that the militarist themes in the curriculum were added at the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council after the committee had finalised the programme of study. In fact, two ad hoc committees were formed in the post-coup period in order to monitor the conformity of education policies with the military’s expectations (NSC, 1997). The undersecretary of the MoNE was a member of one of the committees working in coordination with the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council. It seems that the military revised the citizenship education programme of study as a part of the collaborations with the MoNE to reinforce the implementation of its impositions in the post-coup period.

4.3 Textbook Analysis
The main citizenship education textbook is comprised of four units (Çiftçi et al., 2001)² (See Table 3.3). The first unit is entitled “state, democracy, constitution, citizenship, citizenship rights and responsibilities”, the second, “protection of human rights, the third, “national security and national power elements”, and the last one, “issues faced in the protection of human rights”. The longest unit is the third one, which is 29 pages and exceeds the total page number of the two units on human rights, which are 26 pages in total. Based on the intensity of the national security themes, one can argue that the citizenship and human rights education course’s curriculum was designed as the middle school version of

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² This citation refers to the main citizenship education textbook analysed in this chapter. It is the third edition of the textbook, whose first edition was published in 1999. To avoid repetition, the excerpts from it are cited with only a page number in the remainder of the chapter.
the high school course, *National Security Knowledge*. I below illustrate the military’s ideological discourses in it arguing that the democratisation of the citizenship education curriculum was disrupted because of the escalation of tension between the forces of religious and secular nationalism. As the rise of religious nationalism jeopardised the interests of secular nationalist groups, the power holders of the established system attempted to re-design the orders of discourse to their own interests. In contrast to the expectation that secular nationalist citizenship education would be transformed towards more democratic forms, the new curriculum showed a reverse trend by including many anti-democratic, exclusionary, ultra-nationalist and militarist perspectives. The citizenship education curriculum of 1998 represented a reversal in the democratisation of the subject. I illustrate the military’s ideological discourses in the textbook through three main identifiers: the representation of the Kurdish people, the representation of religious nationalists and the representation of the army and Atatürk.

4.3.1 Representation of the Kurdish People

The textbook includes statements that favour a particular configuration of power relations. It draws on the constitution in defining citizenship:

**Excerpt 4:**

> The boundaries of becoming a citizen are drawn in our constitution. According to it, “All people who are bound to the Turkish state through citizenship ties are Turkish. Those who are a child of a Turkish father and Turkish mother are Turkish. None of the Turkish people can be denaturalised unless they act contrary to the loyalty to the homeland” (p. 16).

By quoting the constitution, the textbook makes it explicit that an official conception of national citizenship dominates it. From a CDA point of view, this citizenship conception can be found as particularistic, narrow and based on the norms and values of dominant social groups (See Section 3.5). In the case of Turkey, the official citizenship reflects ethnically Turkish or more specifically secularised Turkish norms and values. It contrasts with performative citizenship which is a broad and inclusive definition that regards the struggle of non-citizens as citizenship acts (Isin, 2017). The citizenship law is underpinned by a territorial-universalist notion of citizenship in that the majority’s ethnic identity is regarded as the citizenship title for all people of the country, and all citizens are called Turkish regardless of their ethnic and religious identities. In this way, the dominant conception of citizenship in the textbook does not recognise the Kurdish identities, but names them as Turkish.
However, the notion of citizenship is not consistently based on the territorial-universalist conception, but the ethno-nationalist definition comes to the surface on some occasions:

**Excerpt 5:**

Atatürk summed up his love of Turkishness for a society that was in the process of becoming a nation in the following way: ‘if there is something superb in my nature, it is my being born as Turkish.’ We should all be proud of our country and society (p. 76).

Atatürk’s aphorism implies that Turkishness can only be acquired by birth, which represents an ethno-nationalist definition which does not view living on the same territory as an adequate prerequisite to be called Turkish. The ethno-nationalist citizenship presupposes acquiring citizenship by birth as Atatürk’s aphorism points out. There is a peculiar blend of the territorial-universalist and ethno-nationalist conception of citizenship which reinforces assimilationist and exclusionary discourses, which are largely directed at the Kurdish people. In other words, the textbook presents a peculiar combination of territorial-universalist and ethno-nationalist models, which has been identified as a long-standing characteristic of Turkish citizenship in other official texts, such as in the constitutions (Yeğen, 2004), official discourses (Kadroğlu, 2007;), policy documents (Çağaptay, 2003), and textbooks (Keyman & Kancı, 2011). The same paradoxical conception dominates the textbook, which does not allow the recognition of ethnic and religious diversity and imposes a narrow nationalist citizenship as the universal one.

While the differences of society are not mentioned by name, negative attributions are implicitly made to the Kurdish people. For example, they were blamed for the spread of PKK terror:

**Excerpt 6:**

In some places, citizens’ not reporting terrorists, unconsciously hiding them as a guest, abetting them, providing their needs for food and dress led terror to thrive. Leaving the fight against terrorism to officials shows people’s public unconsciousness. At the end of the day, we all suffer from the political, economic and social issues [created by the terror]. In such situations, people who feel responsible to their homeland both fulfil their citizenship duties, and by warning security forces, they prevent damages to be caused (p. 69).

In Excerpt 6, the authors of the textbook use a neutral and formal tone as though they were expressing a scientific fact. They list four negative acts in a nominal form by leaving vague who the subject of these negative acts is. What is being stated (the four negative acts) in nominal form (the first sentence of Excerpt 6) can be unpacked as follows:
• “Citizens’ not reporting terrorists”: Citizens in some places do not deliberately report terrorists.
• “Unconsciously hiding them as a guest”: Citizens in some places hide terrorists as a guest.
• “Abetting them”: Citizens in some places abet terrorists.
• “Providing their needs for food and dress”: Citizens in some places provide food and dress for terrorists.

These accusations are expressed in nominal form because they are unsubstantiated claims. In a vague way, “citizens in some places” can be understood as the subject of the negative acts, but there is no answer to the questions: who are exactly these citizens who aid and abet terrorists? Why are their criminal activities allowed? Why are they not penalised for committing those crimes? The textbook authors do not make any attempt to answer any of these questions, but direct the implicit accusation at the Kurdish people. This is because there were no widely-known terrorist organisations except the PKK terrorism in the Southeast Region. This accusatory discourse repeats the military’s perspectives about the spread of the PKK terror by portraying the state security forces as blameless victims of terror.

Excerpt 7, without mentioning the name of a terrorist organisation, makes references to the PKK terrorism by specifying the region where the terror was rampant at the time. It conveys a dominant military discourse: Countries that do not want Turkey to develop created the PKK terrorism. This discourse links the spread of terrorism to a dam construction project in the region and reduces the PKK terrorism to a matter of the manipulation by foreign countries. It insulates the PKK terror from its socio-political and ethnic dimensions and considers it as a security issue created by external enemies:

**Excerpt 7:**
The second paragraph of Expert 7 more explicitly conveys this discourse: External enemies “pit one brother against the other [kardeş kardeşe düşürerek]”. Through a family metaphor, this idiom depicts Turkish and Kurdish people as brother, and implies that they are in fight because external enemies set them against each other. This idiom is included to highlight that the PKK terror is supported by countries that are “jealous” of Turkey’s developmental pace. In the excerpt, enemy countries are demonised by an adjective (jealous) used for people (personification).

In other parts of the textbook, those who support terrorism are described as ignorant and uneducated accomplices of external enemies. The textbook sends a message that if they had been educated and knowledgeable enough, they would not have let terror spread in the region. Given the fact that the overwhelming majority of the region’s population is Kurdish, the textbook blames them for the spread of the terror. Even though the underlying reason is implied as the lack of education and enemy countries’ manipulations, the solutions that the textbook suggests for the prevention of terrorism repeats measures, which are ideological in that they aim at the continuation of the particular configuration of power relations. For example, the last sentence of Excerpt 7 addresses “Turkish youth” by assuming all people in the region as Turkish. The expression used in the quote, “Turkish youth to whom Atatürk entrusted the Republic of Turkey”, is a formulaic statement repeated frequently by secular nationalist circles, which can be found in a casual press remarks by the General Staff (Bora, 2003). The invocation of this statement conveys a message that the effective dissemination of secular nationalism in the region will stop the spread of terror.
Without making any suggestion of structural change as a solution to the PKK terrorism, the textbook reinforces the hegemony of secular nationalist groups. The following excerpt is a telling example of this discourse:

**Excerpt 8:**

The unifying idea for terror and anarchy that aim at the disintegration and fragmentation of the Turkish nation and the Turkish state is Atatürk’s opinions and ideas. One of the sacred duties of every Turkish child is to be united around the Atatürkist ideas (p. 66).

Excerpt 8 asserts that being against Atatürk’s ideas and thoughts is the common characteristics of terrorist organisations in Turkey. They all want to destroy Atatürk’s legacy. From this point of view, it presents a particular way of Turkification as the solution to the PKK terrorism. This Turkification requires uniting around “Atatürkist ideas [Atatürkçü düşünce]”, which is presented as “sacred duty” for “every Turkish child [her Türk çocuğul]”. The phrases, “Atatürkist ideas” and “every Turkish child” are the phrases of the official ideology of secular nationalism promoted by the military. The excerpt advocates the fact that the social beliefs of secular nationalist groups should be embraced by other social groups, in this case by the Kurdish people, as they are blamed for the spread of the PKK terror.

**Excerpt 9:**

Duties that fall onto individuals in the fight against terror:

- Being faithfully loyal to the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish society, and the Turkish national values and culture
- Being faithfully loyal to the regime of the republic
- Being proud of becoming Turkish (pp. 70–71).

Excerpt 9 conveys the same discourse on the Kurdish issue in a different way. In this case, the adoption of the norms, values and social beliefs of secular nationalist groups are presented as though it was a duty in the fight against terrorism. This discourse ignores the fact that the PKK have terrorised the country on the grounds that the Kurdish people had been forced into assimilation. Presenting the root cause of the issue, assimilation, as a solution to the issue itself, is a paradoxical ideological discourse promoted by the military. This discourse does not have the potential to bring about a structural change to the unequal power relations between the Kurdish and secular Turkish identities, but is likely to reinforce the privileged status of secular Turkish identities at the expense of the suppression of the Kurdish identities.
4.3.2 Representation of Religious Nationalists

The textbook makes a negative representation of religious nationalists. Considering that it was published in the aftermath of the 1997 coup, the inclusion of discourses that denigrate religious nationalists is an indication that the citizenship education curriculum had been prepared by secular nationalist circles allied with the military and had been functionalised to stop the rise of religious nationalism. The first indication of the denunciation of religious nationalists is seen in the modified definition of the concept of nation:

Excerpt 10:

| Nation is a group of people who mostly live on the same territory and share the same language, sentiment, ideal, history, culture and interest. The reality of nation relies on the premise of the existence, unity and continuity of the nation. The basic element of this is possible through the unification of Turkish citizens around the love of nation in every matter (p. 35). |

When compared with the definition in the main textbook of the previous period, the omission of religion from the constitutive elements of nation signifies an important shift (Dal, Çakiroğlu, & Özyazgan, 1986). The previous researchers considered the inclusion of religion among the constitutive elements of nation in the post-1980 coup textbooks as evidence of a shift towards more religious education (Copeaux, 2006; İ. Kaplan, 1999; S. Kaplan, 2006; Üstel, 2004). Therefore, its omission is a significant modification and linked to the military’s efforts to stamp out religious nationalism during the second half of the 1990s. The previous definition was ethno-nationalist and exclusionary in the sense that it implied those who did not believe in the same religion as not members of the nation. In this respect, the modified definition might be found more inclusive at first sight. However, it is not about teaching young people a more inclusive definition of nation, but an attempt to re-conceptualise the nation in a way that leaves out religious nationalists. The new definition is based on the characteristics of secular nationalist groups. Their characteristics are universalised as the characteristics of the whole nation. This consideration of the Turkish nation is more visible in the following excerpts:

Excerpt 11-12:

| In Turkey, there is not a chance for an idea that does not compromise with the historical past; does not agree with national culture and civilisation; does not comply with our moral values; and does not become integrated with our national ideals to succeed. The Turkish nation looks to the future with hope and is respectful of the past. It is open to innovations. It is loyal to its traditions. The Turkish nation is respectful to its faiths, rejects fundamentalism, and does not like bigotry. It is neither backwards-looking nor pious. It regards everyone who lives in our homeland as precious. It does not consider anyone as second class citizen. It is loyal to the ideals of Atatürk from the heart (p. 73). |
Divisive, destructive and reactionary groups have a goal of destroying Atatürk’s reforms and the regime of the Republic, which are the basic source of the existence of the Republic of Turkey (p. 77).

Excerpt 11 paints an image of one homogenous Turkish nation who has a distinct history, national culture, national civilisation, moral values, and national ideals. An idea should be compatible with “the distinctive characteristics of this nation” if it is going to be embraced by this nation. This compatibility approach is associated with a secular nationalist discourse that religious nationalism was doomed to failure because their ideas were incompatible with “the distinctive characteristics of this nation”. Based on this discourse, the rest of the excerpt makes a personification of the Turkish nation to emphasise its good qualities. In both excerpts, the lexical choices reveal the ideological message of the excerpt. The descriptors, fundamentalism [köktencilik], bigotry [taassup], backwards-looking [gerici], pious [yobaz] and reactionary [irticai] are the pejoratives that were used to denigrate religious nationalists. These descriptors are laden with ideological connotations. In this respect, the excerpts universalise the characteristics of secular nationalist groups as the normative features of the entire nation by exalting the characteristics associated with secular nationalists and denigrating the characteristics associated with religious nationalists.

The secular nationalist discourses against religious nationalists is an effect of the fight between the two groups over wealth, resources and recognition. As the secular nationalists were in power at the time when the textbook was written, the centralised curriculum authority weaved their ideological discourses into it. The following excerpts exemplify the different discursive manifestations of animosity between the two groups:

**Excerpt 13-14:**

Modernity is the opposite concept to primitiveness and bigotry. This means things that are modern, alive in today’s world, new and precious, stripped of primitive and rude measures are the understanding embraced by the overwhelming majority of society. There are many things that are described as modern in today’s world. However, to be able to taste the intricacy and beauty of modernity, it is necessary to install modernity in the human mind. Bigoted and primitive thoughts stand against modernity and every type of innovation (p. 79).

What would be the dangers of people’s interpretation and practice of the freedom of conscience and religion in their own way? (p. 74).

Excerpt 13 makes a contrast between “modernity [çağdaşlık]” and “primitiveness [ilkellinin] and bigotry [bagnazlık]”. The secular nationalists tend to present themselves
with secular identities as western, modern, and liberated while they employ the latter descriptors to denigrate religious identities as primitive, backwards, bigoted and intellectually-retarded. By way of employing the ideological descriptors, the religious nationalists are portrayed as “primitive” and “bigoted” people who are against “modernity” and “innovations”. The lexical choice in the question in Excerpt 14 (“dangers [sakıncalar]”) and the grammatical feature of asking the question (it is a “what” question, “what would be”, not a yes or no question like “is there any danger of”) sends a message that if a person interprets the freedom of conscience and religion according to his own understanding and practises it in his own way, it would be a dangerous thing. The lexical choice and the way the question is posed lead students to think that the principle of the freedom of conscience and religion should not be interpreted and practised individually, but individuals should live up to the interpretation of authorities. This discourse is associated with the heated debate of the post-coup period over the state’s interpretation of laicism. In the post-coup period, wearing a headscarf was banned by the secular nationalist establishment on the grounds that it is a violation of the constitutional principle of laicism. The question asked to students inculcates the particularistic interpretation of laicism. This manipulative question encourages students to advocate the state’s interpretation of the freedom of conscience and religion and not to think of an alternative interpretation.

The textbook includes this discourse in order to justify the measures of the post-coup period. The same applies to the following excerpt:

**Excerpt 15:**

…because political parties that commit racism, sectarian discrimination and divisiveness might attempt at violations towards the state’s order, citizens, when they are joining political organisations, have to be conscious of these sorts of political parties. This sort of organisations that have a danger of dividing people into camps as “from us – not from us” must be precluded.

When political organisations that have the potential to divide people into various camps come to power, by appointing people whom they describe “from us” to state positions, they might attempt to create cliques within the state structure (p. 94).

The excerpt repeats the accusations made against the religious nationalist parties by the constitutional court (Celep, 2014). Religious nationalist parties were accused of committing “sectarian discrimination” and “divisiveness” and dividing people as “from us and not from us.” The term “political organisations” can be replaced with “religious nationalist parties”, considering the political atmosphere of the context in question. In this regard, the excerpt represents another example of the inculcation of the secular nationalist interpretation of
laicism, which was intended for the suppression of religious nationalism. It attempts to legitimise the shut-down of political parties by the constitutional court in the aftermath of the coup.

4.3.3 **Representation of the Army and Atatürk**

The textbook makes a virulent and effective propaganda of secular nationalism through the hagiographic depiction of the army and Atatürk. Many formulaic expressions that can be read in a casual press statement by the General Staff are seen in the textbook. According to the official ideology of secular nationalism, the army is “identified with Mustafa Kemal and his mission” and “the ‘true owner’ and personified symbol of nationalism” (Bora, 2003, p. 437). This discourse relies on the exaltation of military power around the cult figure of Atatürk. In order to reinforce the discourses of the official ideology, the textbook takes a peculiar approach about militarism and national security. First of all, the textbook, which is an HRE textbook, legitimises weapons in the following excerpt:

**Excerpt 16:**

Mankind needed weapons as much as food and drink since the first day of his existence (p. 68).

Excerpt 16 presents a weapon as a basic need equivalent to food and drink. It legitimises the need for weapons by a claim that that need exists since the beginning of history. It might be reasonable to say that people needed weapons to protect themselves, but when this is expressed with the vague subject of “mankind [insanoğlu]” and without specifying a rationale for it, it gives a meaning that individual armament is a normal thing. In addition to the presentation of the weapon as a basic need, the textbook makes a positive representation of the military power on many occasions:

**Excerpt 17-18-19:**

At present, the Republic of Turkey sustains its territorial integrity despite various dangers. If Turkey has not gone to a general war since the foundation of the Republic, it is thanks to the power and deterring influence of the armed forces. The Turkish Army is one of the most powerful armies in the world. With this power, it deters its enemies. It ensures the happiness and safety of the nation (p. 63).

The Turkish people founded many states throughout history thanks to the importance they attach to military power. This situation in the Turkish states indicates that military power comes before everything else and it reaches the level of sovereign power in the society. Our army is the source of peace, safety and pride for our nation. Our army is also the guardian of our republic that is a democratic regime (p. 62).
The second sentence of Excerpt 17 presents hypothetical information as facts. The assertion that Turkey has not gone to a general war since its foundation thanks to its military power represents a refutable opinion rather than a fact. This is because Turkey’s avoidance of a general war is attributed solely to the power of its army, which is an opinion, not a fact. There might be many other reasons for this. Excerpt 18 is based on the same ideological discourse that exalts the army as the most vital institution of Turkey. This discourse places all other institutions, such as the Grand National Parliament or the cabinet, in a secondary position. Again, hypothetical claims are presented as factual information in Excerpt 18, too. The first sentence of the excerpt makes a claim that “the Turkish people founded many states throughout history thanks to the importance they attach to military”. In the rest of the excerpt, the army is portrayed as an institution that founds states, protects the regime of democracy and ensures the happiness of citizens. However, these are again refutable opinions. The importance the Turkish people attaches to the military power might be one of the reasons, not the sole reason, why the Turkish people founded states in history. The statement, “military power comes before everything”, expresses the same discourse that the military is the most vital institution in Turkey.

The last statement of Excerpt 18 includes a phrase identified with the military circles who describe the army as “the guardian of the Turkish democracy [sic]”. This is based on a discourse that democracy was only possible in Turkey with the preservation of laicism. It equates the continuance of Turkish democracy to the continuance of laicism. Therefore, this discourse regards the army as “the guardian of the Turkish democracy” since the army is widely recognised as the key force maintaining the official ideology of secular nationalism. In a learning context on the military’s relations with democracy, one might expect to see an attribution to the military coups, but the textbook does not include any sign in this regard. Excerpt 19 delineates a citizen-soldier model of citizenship that is identified with the civic-republican traditions (Burk, 2002). In these traditions, the future of democratic order is portrayed as dependent on the presence of a powerful army and the promotion of duties in the armed forces is seen as vital, since students are regarded as future...
citizen-soldiers who would maintain the independence and republican order. From this perspective, the excerpt aims to make military service appealing for students and delineates duties in the armed forces as duties for the homeland that must be fulfilled with love and pride.

The other dominant discourse regarding the military is that states cannot run the risk of waging war against each other because rapid advancements in the weapon industry have made war almost impossible, which made terrorism the only viable alternative. With this argument, the textbook implies that foreign countries that do not wish Turkey to develop use terrorist organisations to keep it under control. This claim is strengthened with an argument that Turkey’s geopolitical location makes a possible war against Turkey impossible since it is in an extremely critical location in terms of the balance of world power. Since a war against Turkey may spark a regional or even world war, enemy countries support terrorist organisations to achieve their goals in Turkey. This discourse permeates the following excerpt:

**Excerpt 20:**

| Turkey has a very significant geopolitical location in terms of the world and regional balances. For this reason, many countries have aspirations on our country. Therefore, we are a country, which is under a constant risk. Places where terrorist organisations that aim to destroy our country were sheltered mostly are neighbouring countries outside Turkey that we think as an ally. A possible attack to our country, which has a very vital location in terms of the balance of world power, will jeopardise world peace (p. 80). |

The excerpt draws a link between external enemies and internal terror organisations and brings “neighbouring countries” under suspicion for aiding and abetting terrorist organisations against Turkey. “Neighbouring countries outside Turkey that we think as an ally” are implicitly portrayed as external enemies who use internal enemies as their operatives within Turkey. This learning context is a typical one, instilling the xenophobic national security doctrine in students. When students are convinced that terrorism is inevitable and Turkey is under threat, they will automatically recognise the vital importance of military power and the hegemony of the army.

In addition to the exaltation of the military, Atatürk is presented as a celestial figure, his aphorisms and pictures are included all over the textbook. The following two excerpts are illustrative in this regard:

**Excerpt 21-22:**
The recognition of women’s rights [in Turkey] is not a consequence of a movement of thought and social evolution as in some European countries. The rights granted to women in our country are a consequence of Atatürk reforms that took place in the state formation era. Reforms undertaken under the leadership of Atatürk opened up new horizons for Turkish woman (pp. 25-26).

Excerpt 22 presents the entitlement of women to their rights as an individual success of Atatürk. Explaining such remarkable social progress through Atatürk’s charismatic leadership overshadows the agency of women who struggled for their rights. The other issue in Excerpt 22 is the underlying assumption that reforms on paper were sufficient to end women’s subordination. There is no reference to the real conditions of women and no discussion on whether the legal changes made a difference in reality. In fact, setting aside the actual conditions of women, the legislative amendments of the state formation era did not foresee equality between men and women on paper (Arat, 2005). Excerpt 22 overlooks women’s agency in order to emphasise the hagiographic virtues of “the great leader Atatürk”.

One can argue that Atatürk’s reforms did not take into account, but went against the Turkish women’s actual conditions. They were imposed upon religious-traditional women, as evidenced by the prohibition of wearing an Islamic dress in spite of the fact that the majority of women were wearing Islamic-traditional dresses at the time. Finally, there are certain phrases that illustrate the adulation and veneration of Atatürk as an incontestable national hero in the textbook. He is referred to by “our great father said” (p. 76), “the Turkish state which Atatürk founded” (p. 78), “Great leader Atatürk” (p. 79), “the Republic which Atatürk established” (p. 80), “Turkish youth to whom Atatürk entrusted the Republic of Turkey” (p. 81), “the goal of transcending the level of contemporary civilisations that Atatürk set” (p. 81), etc. With these phrases, Atatürk is portrayed as the paragon of a leader, soldier, citizen and commander to whom all citizens should aspire, and his statements are cited as though verses from a holy scripture.

4.4 Structural Relationship between the Military and Education

On the basis of the findings of this chapter, I argue that the military benefited from the instrumental value of education and used it to transmit secular nationalism and the national
security doctrine to future generations. It achieved this through three mechanisms: Board of Education, Educational Legislation and National Security Council.

4.4.1 Board of Education

In Turkey, a centralised curriculum authority, the Board of Education, makes nationwide-binding decisions regarding all aspects of school knowledge. The board approves what is taught in educational institutions and determines individual school subjects, programmes of study, textbooks and weekly course schedules. The authority was established in the state formation era in 1926 to ensure curriculum policies’ compliance to secular nationalism. The number of members serving on the board has changed over the years (currently eleven including the head), but its highly-centralised structure has been preserved up to the present with no major change (MoNE, 2012b). According to established practices, the members of the board are appointed by a tripartite decree, signed by the Minister of Education, Prime Minister and President. It still operates as the sole curriculum authority and makes decisions regarding all aspects of the curriculum. It is the only authority to approve what is taught in all formal and informal educational institutions, including military high schools (General Staff, n.d.). I consider it as a key interface mechanism that mediates the military’s ideological influence on education.

Although the title “Board of Education” is used here to convey meaning in English, its original name is Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu, whose close translation would be “Board of Training and Discipline”. The connotations of the words “training” [talim] and “discipline” [terbiye] are authoritative and militaristic. The evidence presented above suggests that the BoE is monitored and controlled by the military, namely by the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council. This is because the military maintains “close ties with elements of the bureaucracy responsible for policy in which it had a particular interest…” (Jenkins 2007, p. 344). The military can develop close ties with board members thanks to its political autonomy and monitor the agenda of board meetings. Considering that the BoE approves not only the curriculum of normal schools, but that of military schools, the military’s close ties with the BoE seems inevitable.

In the given period, the closed and hierarchical structure of the BoE enabled the military to have a lasting ideological influence on the curriculum. Unlike the Higher Education Council, where the general staff formally appoints one member, there is no military-appointed member on the BoE (Higher Education Council, 1987; MoNE, 2012b).
Nevertheless, the military exercises a tight control through informal means. For example, board members are appointed through loosely-defined regulatory criteria. In the regulation concerned, there is a considerable vagueness about the appointment procedure of the BoE members. According to established practices, board members are appointed by a tripartite decree, signed by the Minister of Education, Prime Minister and President. This established rather than constitutional procedure allows the military to have a say in the appointments of board members.

4.4.2 Educational Legislation

The Basic National Education Law on which educational legislation relies was originally a product of a political context in which the military was acting as the dominant actor in the aftermath of the 1971 coup (MoNE, 1973). This law was amended in 1983 in a political context wherein the military was the dominant political force in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. This law is still in effect without any major change in its ideological character. Educational and curriculum policies strictly comply with this law. The BoE follows a series of regulations derived from this law, and the textbook examination committees control the suitability of textbooks based on criteria derived from this law. The first article of the law lays down the general goals of education as follows: “The general goal of the Turkish National Education is to cultivate all individuals of the Turkish nation as citizens who are loyal to Atatürk reforms and principles and Atatürk nationalism expressed in the constitution…” (Article 1, MoNE, 1973). The law sets the inculcation of “Atatürk reforms, principles and Atatürk nationalism” as the first goal of the Turkish educational system. Article 10 of the law stipulates education to promote “Atatürk reforms, principles and Atatürk nationalism” as the central objective of education (Article 10, MoNE, 1973).

Article 11, entitled “Democracy Education”, reads as follows: “…political and ideological inculcation that is not in line with Atatürk nationalism expressed in the constitution and involvement in daily political events and debates of this sort can be by no means tolerated in educational institutions” (Article 11, MoNE 1973). Inculcation [*telkin*] is a vague word, especially in Turkish, and it is hard to specify what is counted as inculcation and what is not. “Atatürk nationalism” is also open to interpretation. Considering these vague restrictions placed on democratic education, one can argue that the law encourages ideological indoctrination rather than democracy education. The fundamental difference between education and indoctrination is that the former is concerned with developing students’ “thinking and reasoning” abilities, whereas indoctrination is “an attempt to get an
individual to believe something regardless of evidence or reasoned argument” (Haydon 2006, p. 19). Undoubtedly, the law bans all kinds of political discussion in schools that could be deemed as contrary to “Atatürk nationalism”. The title of the section contradicts its content, since the article prohibits political debates in the name of democracy education. This law was enacted and amended when the military was fighting communism in the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, the law aims to keep the impressionable youth from a possible indoctrination of communism at the expense of curtailing the possibility of realising a democratic education.

The incongruence between the title and content of Article 11 is also true for Article 12, which is entitled “Laicism” even though its content reads as follows: “Laicism is the fundamental principle of Turkish national education. Religious culture and moral instruction is among compulsory courses taught in primary schools, high schools and equivalent schools.” (MoNE, 1973). This article makes religious education compulsory under the title of laicism. This article is an emblematic manifestation of the official ideology redressed in the post-1980 coup to promote state-defined Sunni-Islam against communism. The law stipulates educational institutions to spread secular nationalism without the military’s enforcement. The military’s interventions are necessary when the BoE deviates from the legislation or governments make a change in the law against the promotion of secular nationalism.

4.4.3 National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) is one of the highest executive bodies where the President, cabinet members and military chiefs gather to deliberate on national security issues (Cizre-Sakallioğlu, 1997). The NCS was established with the 1961 constitution, and its status was strengthened with the 1982 constitution. While the NSC decisions were initially advisory to the executive, the 1982 constitution obliged the cabinet to give priority consideration to the NSC’s recommendations. The 1982 constitution also increased the ratio of military members in the NSC. The NSC members now include the President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief of the General Staff and the commanders of the land forces, navy, air forces and gendarmerie. If we consider the President as neutral, this membership distribution gives “the military members of the NSC a 5:4 majority over the representatives of the government” (Hale, 2003, p. 120). After the 1982 changes, the NSC arguably became the other leg of the executive in addition to the cabinet.
The NSC has a Secretariat General, called the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council. In this unit, over 400 officials work, the overwhelming majority from the military (Jenkins, 2007). The Secretary-General was supposed to be an army colonel and determine the agenda of the NSC meetings. Its main responsibility was to draft “briefing documents and background papers for distribution to the members of the NSC…” (p. 344). There is plenty of evidence showing the NSC was involved in education. For example, the 18 impositions of the 1997 coup, most of which were on education, were an NSC decision. The military members forced the cabinet to accept the educational impositions in the NSC meeting (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997). The NSC decisions were involved in specifying “proper attire in schools (such as hair styles, beards, turban, etc.)” (Altınay 2004, p. 140). Some decisions were concerned with detailed curricular issues, such as offering Arabic as an elective course or not. The findings of this study revealed that the citizenship curriculum of 1998 was examined in the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council. This indicates that the military controlled the ideological characteristics of curriculum through this institution. The NSC allowed the military to affect curriculum policies. Some of the characteristics of the NSC and its Secretariat-General changed with the EU integration reforms, but its ideological role in curriculum policies remains intact.

4.5 Conclusion

In 1995, the government gave an impetus to the citizenship education reform by joining the UN Decade on HRE Programme (National Committee on the Decade for Human Rights Education, 1999). The state minister responsible for human rights signed a protocol with the MoNE to ensure that the requirements of the UN programme would be reflected in the citizenship education curriculum. The protocol recognised the need to bring the content of the subject in line with the universal principles of democracy and human rights (BoE, March 6, 1995). After the protocol was signed, the title of an existing citizenship education course was changed from Citizenship Studies to Citizenship and Human Rights Education, and new human rights themes were added to the content of the existing course (BoE, March 6, 1995; MoNE, 1995). Nevertheless, a new curriculum was not announced until 1998, because the tension between the military and civilian government escalated after an Islamist political party formed a coalition government in 1996. The growing power struggle between the military and the Islamist government cast a long shadow over the prospect of curriculum reform.
The new curriculum appeared after the military overthrow of the Islamist government in 1997, when the military was committed to rooting out major dissident ideologies that had challenged the supremacy of the official ideology: Kurdish separatism and religious nationalism. The military's intent on suppressing religious nationalism and Kurdish separatism shaped the citizenship education curriculum of 1998. The reform efforts that culminated in the participation in the UN initiative ended with the production of the 1998 curriculum, which placed the militaristic discourses at the centre of citizenship education. This experiment made manifest the traditional set of interface mechanisms the military used to control curriculum and brought into the open the ideological forces shaping the citizenship education curriculum. Therefore, the curriculum reform of 1998 demonstrated what was necessary for the democratisation of citizenship education and signified both a retreat and a restarting point for the curriculum reform.

The evolution of citizenship education from 1995 to 1999 also showed that citizenship education reforms that are launched with no recognition of specific human rights and democracy issues are unlikely to promote democracy. The curriculum reform between 1995 and 1999 ended with the military’s instrumentalisation of the subject arguably because it was launched with no recognition of Turkey’s human rights and democracy problems. In the following years, after Turkey’s recognition as a candidate for membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the militarised content of the subject marked an obstacle in the way to EU membership. In the post-Helsinki period, citizenship education was perceived as a significant tool to improve human rights and democracy. Thus, the political developments pressed for the democratisation of citizenship education, which I explore in the following chapters.
Chapter 5  Citizenship Education in Transition  (1999-2008)

The instrumental value of citizenship education to disseminate the military’s ideological discourses was rendered visible in the aftermath of the 1997 coup. The military infused certain ideological discourses in the curriculum with an intention to functionalise the subject in the service of the suppression of Kurdish separatism and religious nationalism. Shortly after the announcement of the militarised curriculum, the European Union (EU) recognised Turkey as a candidate for membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, which created a significant change in the official approach to the citizenship education reform. After the Helsinki Summit, the EU accession reforms required curbing the role of the military in politics, which gave impetus to the democratisation of citizenship education. In parallel to the weakening of the military influence, the military-sponsored citizenship education curriculum underwent a transformation.

After the Helsinki Summit, the Board of Education (BoE) showed a positive approach to collaboration with the Council of Europe (CoE). The burgeoning interest in the curriculum reform was changed after the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP], considered to be the successor of the disbanded Welfare Party [Refah Partisi, RP], came to power in 2002. After 2002, the BoE showed a willingness to cleanse textbooks of the militarist discourses, since the military-represented secular nationalism was anathema to the government party subscribed to religious nationalism. In 2004, the main citizenship education textbook was revised to tone down some of the exclusionary ideological discourses (See Chapter 4). Although the BoE, under AKP rule, was willing to remove the militaristic discourses from the curriculum, it was reluctant about introducing democratic citizenship education for reasons that I elaborate in this chapter. As an expression of the aversion to citizenship education, the BoE decided to end the discrete status of citizenship education courses in 2005. In the following years, the subject was taught as a cross-curricular theme integrated into the content of other courses, notably the content of social studies education courses.

In this chapter, I look into the evolution of citizenship education in relation to the changing balance of power from 1999 to 2008. I first describe the political context with a focus on the changing aspects of the three interface mechanisms which enabled the military to shape the 1998 citizenship education curriculum (See Section 4.4). In the second part, I look closely into how the changing balance of power affected the citizenship education
There, I outline the preparatory efforts undertaken in collaboration with the CoE by considering that collaboration as a barometer showing the level of interest in the curriculum reform. In this section, I shed light on the background of the curriculum reform and the repeal of the course through a critical discourse analysis of interviews, public and archival documents. Before the conclusion, I present an ideological discourse analysis of the main textbook.

5.1 Context and Background

The EU's positive approach to Turkey's membership came to the surface at the 1998 Cardiff Summit and became conspicuous in the 1999 Helsinki Summit, where the EU recognised Turkey as a candidate (Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Öniş, 2000). Subsequently, Turkey was required to meet certain political criteria for opening accession negotiations (Hale, 2003). The EU accession requirements helped to restore democratic order given that the military hijacked civilian politics after the overthrow of the government in 1997. The EU accession reforms from 1999 to 2004 run as the engine of democratisation, which brought about substantial changes in the configuration of military-civilian relations. The military’s status in the system as “the guardian of Atatürk’s ideological legacy and the mystical embodiment of the Turkish nation” was redefined in consideration of the EU criteria (Jenkins, 2007, p. 354).

Although the EU integration reforms required the military to relinquish its dominant role, the military did not willingly comply with the EU requirements, but chose to apply pressure on the government not to advance the reforms in the way expected by the EU authorities. The military circles looked for ways to maintain their privileged status under the veneer of some superficial changes. In 2001, the Deputy Prime Minister's lashing out at the military revealed the tension between the government and the military in respect of the passage of the EU reforms. The Deputy Prime Minister blamed the military for afflicting Turkish politics with "national security syndrome" by prioritising "the invisible and secular character of the regime as more important than the need for democratic reform" (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 2003, pp. 213-214). The Deputy Prime Minister contended that the military damaged the prospect of Turkey’s EU membership. His reaction made manifest the military’s pressure on the government regarding the EU accession reforms.

Despite the tense course of civilian-military relationships, the coalition government advanced some reforms at the expense of the military’s influence. An amendment in 1999
removed military judges from the state security courts (Jenkins, 2007). In October 2001, the composition of the National Security Council (NSC) was reconfigured by including the Justice Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in the NSC, which increased the ratio of civilian members in the NSC (Hale, 2003). The constitutional imperative that the cabinet would give priority consideration to the NSC recommendations was replaced with that of the cabinet merely evaluating the NSC recommendations. In addition to these important changes, the state of emergency regime in some cities in the southeast part of Turkey, where the armed forces acted as the highest authority, was repealed in 2002 (Müftüler-Baç, 2005). The death penalty was abolished and the ban on broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was lifted. Commenting on the amendment of the NSC membership, the Chief of General Staff was quoted remarking that “if they want 100 civilians as members of the National Security Council, so be it” (Dunér & Deverell, 2001, p. 3). His reaction implied that the military’s influence did not result from the numerical overrepresentation of army colonels in the NSC, but that it was too deep-rooted to be shaken by some constitutional amendments.

The limitation of military’s power provided religious nationalism with a fertile ground on which to thrive in the post-Helsinki period. The democratising impact of the EU accession reforms benefitted the religious nationalist movement which was thrown into disarray following the 1997 coup. A group of young politicians within this movement founded a new political party in 2001, the AKP, which came to power in 2002 by ending the more-than-a-decade-long period of coalition governments. Even though the military was alarmed by the AKP’s rise to power, the political context did not favour military interventions (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Çınar, 2003; Hale, 2003) since “changes in the political environment had already limited the military’s ability to exert political leverage through informal mechanisms” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 348). Unless the AKP pursued policies that were explicitly in contradiction with laicism, “there was little the military could do" (p. 348).

In addition to the AKP’s new conciliatory rhetoric, the ongoing EU integration reforms empowered the government to stand firmer against the military repression (Tombuş, 2013). In the early years of the government, “both sides remained cautious, anxious not to jeopardise Turkey’s chances of receiving a date for the opening of accession negotiations at the EU summit in Brussels on 16–17 December 2004” (Jenkins, 2007, pp. 350–351). Shortly after the European Council decided to open accession negotiations for full membership in 2004, the positive course of the EU relations began to fade (Öniş, 2008,
Although many arguments have been made regarding the estrangement from the EU ideal, there is a consensus on the fact that the AKP consolidated power thanks to the EU reforms (Usul, 2008).

In fact, the AKP sped up the pace of the EU integration reforms to restrict the influence of the military shortly after it came to power (Hale, 2003; Jenkins, 2007; Usul, 2008). Significant amendments were made in respect of the NSC and the Secretariat-General of the NSC. The frequency of the NSC meetings was reduced from monthly to bimonthly, which reduced the frequency of military's contact with the cabinet members. In July 2003, the rule to appoint a serving military personnel as the Secretary General of the NSC was repealed, and civilians had a chance to serve in this post. Furthermore, "the secretary general's unlimited access to any civilian agency and the authority to monitor the implementation of NSC recommendations" was abolished (Jenkins, 2007, p. 344). In addition, the Secretary General's staff appointment regulations were changed to increase the ratio of civilian staff.

These significant changes were met with caution, because the military had previously suppressed religious nationalist political parties considered to be predecessors of the AKP (Shambayati & Sütçü, 2012). Therefore, the AKP’s attempts to restrict the military’s influence were perceived as “attempts to weaken the secular, Kemalist aspects of the Turkish state and therefore as having a hidden Islamist agenda” (Müftüler Baç, 2005, p. 125). As an implication of this mistrust, bureaucrats, who sided with secular nationalist forces, acted reluctantly to implement the amendments issued by the government. In other words, “bureaucratic establishment resorted to its own rules and procedures in order to delay the implementation of the amendments passed by the parliament.” (Kadioğlu, 2007, pp. 292–293).

Even though the AKP deliberately avoided confrontation with the military, the headscarf issue marked a revealing instance of the covert clashes between the government and the military (Jenkins, 2007). Wearing a headscarf was traditionally considered at odds with the secular nationalist citizenship regime of Turkey (Baban, 2014; Gökariksel & Mitchell, 2005; Göle, 2013). To the military, the presence of a woman wearing a headscarf at a state ceremony was in contradiction with laicism. The military insisted on this interpretation of laicism even though the wives of the majority of the AKP politicians wore headscarves. As
a result, official ceremonies became occasions revealing the tension between the government and the military in respect of laicism.

The AKP's consolidation of power was not realised in an easy manner. In 2007, a coalition of secularist forces launched public demonstrations called the Republic Protest (İnce, 2012a). One of the goals of the protesters was to prevent the then-Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, from being elected as President in the upcoming election. The presidency was perceived to be one of the key institutions for the continuation of the secular nationalist order. While the Republic Protests were underway, the military announced a memorandum to state its concerns about the constitutional premise of laicism. The government took a stance against the memorandum by construing it as a military intervention in the upcoming presidential election. Even though the pressure of the secularist circles including the military was able to put a halt on the nomination of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the presidential candidate, it was unable to prevent, Abdullah Gül, one of the founding figures of the AKP whose wife wore a headscarf too, from being elected as the president in 2007.

5.2  Stages of Curriculum Reform before AKP

The constitutional amendments issued in the years from 1999 to 2008 limited the military’s role in politics, but did not end its influence over curriculum policies because the three interface mechanisms that ensured education promoted secular nationalism continued to operate without any considerable change. Namely, the National Education Basic Law remained in effect with no significant change. Nor was any change made to democratise curriculum development processes. The only remarkable change was related to the third of the interface mechanisms, the NSC. As mentioned above, the NSC and its Secretariat-General were re-structured with the EU accession reforms in order to consolidate civilian democracy. The weakening of the military influence was a positive change for the democratisation of citizenship education.

The 1999 Helsinki Summit marked a watershed moment in the official approach to reforming the militarised content of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course. The archival documents show that the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) gave a diplomatic response to the CoE’s invitation to participate in the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE) initiative in the pre-Helsinki Summit period (BoE, January 14, 1997). In 1997, the BoE’s letter held that the status of democratic citizenship education was outstanding in Turkey, and Turkey could help other
member states to improve their citizenship education (BoE, January 14, 1997). Unlike the condescending tone of the 1997 response, the MoNE took an interest in the EDC/HRE initiative after the military suppressed the political Islamist movement (BoE, January 11, 1999). A report written by the director of the Directorate of Foreign Affairs, a branch of the MoNE responsible for correspondence with foreign countries, reflects this changing approach (See Section 4.2). The report is written after the director joined a meeting of the Council for Cultural Co-operation (CDCC) as the representative of the MoNE:

Excerpt 1:

There is a unit called "Bureau", which effectively runs as the executive body of the CDCC. One member from one of the seven geographical clusters, who is not decided beforehand, is elected for this bureau once in two years. Although there is not an explicit article in the Statute, countries in the geographical clusters as an established practice follow a sort of rotation system in fielding candidates. It seems this established practice is not exercised only in Cluster E which Turkey is in. (…) Fielding a candidate for these elections through collaborative efforts among ministries and having our candidate elected is very important for our country's representation in Europe and our participation in future activities of the CDCC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Directorate of Cultural Affairs, February 2, 1999).

The director describes the CDCC as a platform of the CoE with four steering committees on education, culture, higher education, sport and youth. The CDCC brings together state representatives, high-profile bureaucrats and NGOs’ representatives to collaborate for the promotion of the CoE’s core principles (democracy, human rights, the rule of law) through education, culture and sports. The director presents introductory information about the administrative structure of the CDCC in order to show the ways in which Turkey would participate in the works of CDCC more efficiently.

The introductory tone of the report hints at the level of previous involvement, while revealing the willingness of the MoNE to leap forward in its cooperation with the CDCC initiatives. However, the report gives an impression that the underlying reason behind the willingness to contribute to the CDCC’s work is not to use that platform to develop policies for the development of democratic citizenship education in Turkey. Rather, the main concern seems to use the CDCC as a means to boost Turkey’s representation in Europe. The phrase, “for our country's representation”, explicitly manifests this intention. In this regard, even though the report shows a change, in comparison with the pre-coup period, in the official attitude to the collaboration with the Europe-based intergovernmental organisations, this change does not indicate that Turkey is now willing to undertake a citizenship education reform. The main concern is still to increase Turkey’s visibility in the
international arena. In other words, Turkey approaches the CoE to make a positive representation of itself, not to collaborate on educational reforms.

In the post-Helsinki period, the positive attitude to collaboration with the CoE and the willingness to be represented more in Europe-based intergovernmental organisations are reflected in the BoE’s participation in the EDC/HRE initiative activities. In 1999, in its correspondence with the CoE, the BoE seemed to be very interested in joining the EDC/HRE activities (BoE, January 11, 1999). The BoE’s correspondence to the CoE sums up the state of citizenship education and highlights the compatible characteristics of citizenship education in Turkey with the CoE standards. As the main characteristics of citizenship education in Turkey, the letter lists teaching students respect human rights, encouraging them to practise democracy at schools, develop a democratic identity, respect different ideas, accept criticism and uphold human rights.

Furthermore, in 2000, as far as the BoE documents are concerned, a board member for the first time joins in the final conference of the first phase of the EDC/HRE initiative (BoE, September 19, 2000). This high-profile representation of Turkey in the meeting signals the growing official interest. After the conference, the board member reports back that pupils should be given opportunities to practise democratic means while teachers should be offered in-service training on democratic citizenship education. The report also emphasises the importance of school-society cooperation in terms of providing a quality democratic citizenship education. In addition, the increasing numbers of correspondence in respect of the EDC/HRE initiative shows the growing engagement with the EDC/HRE programme.

In 2001, the MoNE appointed a coordinator in response to the CoE’s decision to appoint national coordinators for the second phase of the EDC/HRE initiative (BoE, March 3, 2001). The appointed national coordinator participated in the EDC/HRE activities, maintained correspondence with the CoE and organised several preparatory efforts for citizenship education reform. The preparatory efforts included the formation of an EDC/HRE project group and an EDC/HRE advisory committee, the adoption of an EDC/HRE national plan and pilot implementations. These efforts aimed at setting the groundwork for citizenship education reform. They reflected a number of characteristics that challenge the established way of curriculum development in Turkey (BoE, August 2, 2001). Firstly, the way in which the advisory committee was formed reflected a more participatory approach when compared with the established practices. It was composed of
eleven members in total, six of whom were from non-governmental organisations, two from universities, one from the Higher Education Council and two from the UN Decade for Human Rights Education National Committee.

The way in which the EDC/HRE project group held meetings manifests a concern to make the process participatory in line with the CoE recommendations. Participants from NGOs, universities, departments of the MoNE and other institutions were present in those meetings. In the activity report sent to the CoE, the national coordinator highlighted the following point:

**Excerpt 2:**

Contractions made by non-governmental organisations are seriously important on building citizenship sites, developing and improving politics in education and dissemination of the project all over Turkey (BoE, November 12, 2001).

Unlike the BoE’s traditional top-down approach, the development of the EDC/HRE national plan reflects a bottom-up approach. In line with the CoE recommendations, the EDC/HRE national action plan was developed with the contributions of 42 participants. Furthermore, two primary and two high schools were designated as pilot schools to implement the components of the national action plan before its nationwide implementation (BoE, March 8, 2002). Interviewee 14 who took part in the preparatory efforts of this period acknowledged the positive approach to the citizenship education reform:

**Excerpt 3:**

I guess it was 2001 or so, efforts on democratic citizenship education began in the Board of Education and sub-committees were formed. In that period, I was invited as an expert from my university to share my opinion in sub-committees, before that, I was invited to share my opinions in a large committee, and I was informed that sub-groups would be formed later. In that period, there were board members at the Board of Education who were dedicated to this business [the citizenship education reform]. There were board members who were diligently working with full effort. I cannot describe this period as bad… (Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015).

The archival documents and the interviewee’s account show that there were preparatory efforts undertaken as part of the EDC/HRE initiative. Even though the underlying concern was to boost Turkey’s visibility in Europe-based intergovernmental organisations, this gave rise to some preparatory efforts for the democratisation of the citizenship education curriculum. Interviewee 15, who was a high-profile educational bureaucrat in this period, described the efforts of this period as “in-depth”, “having philosophical depth” and “well-established” (August 4, 2015). Indeed, the preparatory efforts showed a considerable potential to change the militarised citizenship education. The intention to incorporate
different sectors’ voices and to develop policies from a bottom-up perspective shows this potential. Nonetheless, there is not substantial evidence to suggest that the BoE intended to dispense with the established curriculum development practices. In fact, despite the preparatory efforts, no change was made in the citizenship education taught at the time. The citizenship education curriculum remained untouched. The EDC/HRE committee’s plans and pilot implementations did not lead to any tangible change in the citizenship education curriculum taught nationwide.

5.2.1 Citizenship Education Reform Project

Following the Helsinki Summit, the EU Secretariat-General was created in 2000 to monitor the relations with the EU authorities. The EU Secretariat-General used one of the expansion instruments of the EU, the “Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance” (IPA) framework, to implement projects towards EU integration. The IPA framework is intended for candidate countries to apply for financial assistance in realising integration reforms (European Union Ministry of Turkey, 2015). The EU Secretariat-General encouraged the individual ministries to develop projects based on the IPA framework to speed up the integration process. In response to the call of the EU Secretariat-General, the EDC/HRE project group at the BoE drafted an IPA project on citizenship education in order to apply for EU financial aid in 2001 (BoE, September 27, 2002).

The IPA project developed by the EDC/HRE project group, which did not have a chance to be implemented, included a suggestion to invite three foreign experts in the area of citizenship education to Turkey (BoE, September 27, 2002). In their one year visit, experts were expected to make policy recommendations regarding citizenship education. The project proposal also included a suggestion to send three BoE experts to three EU countries to work with foreign curriculum experts. In addition, the proposal suggested forming a curriculum development committee where foreign and national experts would design a new curriculum. Other suggestions in the proposal included translating citizenship education curriculum of some EU countries into Turkish, disseminating good policies and practices through the media and the internet, organising awareness-raising activities, making decision-making processes more participatory, producing teaching materials and organising in-service training for teachers.

In order to put these suggestions into practice, the proposal aimed to provide financial assistance from the EU and expertise from the CoE. In this way, the IPA project proposal
brought together the EU and the CoE parties in the democratisation of citizenship education. Although the EU acquis does not include an explicit article concerning citizenship education curriculum, education was perceived as an instrument to meet the Copenhagen criteria in the Turkish case (Alexiadou, 2014; Keating, 2014). One of the interviewees, who worked in Turkey’s EU delegation team and was influential in the development of the IPA project proposal on citizenship education, mentioned that they considered citizenship education reform as a way of contributing to the improvement of human rights and democracy in Turkey (Interviewee 13, July 6, 2015). In fact, the EU progress reports frequently cited human rights violations, issues with democracy, freedom of thought, children rights, gender equality and discrimination as major obstacles hindering Turkey’s EU membership (e.g. European Commission, 2009; 2010; 2012). The IPA project proposal made the citizenship education curriculum reform a matter of EU-Turkey relations. The official approach to the IPA project proposal served as a barometer showing the level of interest in the citizenship education reform.

5.3 Stages of Curriculum Reform under the AKP

The preparatory efforts and the development of the IPA project proposal had taken place before the AKP came to power in 2002. The AKP’s rise to power was significant for the citizenship education reform since it subscribed to the other dominant ideology, religious nationalism. Under AKP rule, the first head was appointed to the BoE in March 2003. After the new head came to the BoE, the last EDC/HRE activity report, which had been sent to the CoE in February 2003, was revised and re-sent in April 2003 (BoE, February 20, 2003; April 30, 2003). The differences between the old and revised versions of the report, both were originally written in English, are worth exploring, since they show how the official interest in the curriculum reform changed under a new government. Excerpt 4 below is from the old version of the report:

**Excerpt 4:**

Serious reform attempts in accordance with European standards and norms have been continuing in Turkey. New government gives great importance on democratic participation [sic]. Crucial and prior objective of Government is to realize structural transformation [sic]. Its political willingness and convincing attempt are put with [are incorporated in] Government programme published to public [sic]. That means all problems in Turkey will be solved by participation and contribution of all related partners through negotiation processes.

(…)

As a paradigmatic shift, the New Minister of Education stated that those huge buildings and staff are here not for themselves just for students. They are for our students” (BoE, February 20, 2003).
Excerpt 4 conveys a message that democratisation efforts in education speeded up with the new government. From this perspective, an unrealistically optimistic expectation is expressed by the phrase: “…all problems in Turkey will be solved…” in this new period. The EDC/HRE national coordinator seems to exaggerate the impact of the new government on the educational reforms. By quoting the Minister saying everything in the Ministry of Education is for “our students”, the national coordinator highlights that a new atmosphere is prevailing in the MoNE with the arrival of a new minister. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the positive changes is not supported by sufficient evidence. The report’s unrealistically optimistic tone is arguably an effect of the fact that the national’s coordinator was under the influence of political context created by the AKP’s rise to power. After the new head was appointed to the BoE in 2003, the report was revised in the following way:

Excerpt 5:

Main policy of Ministry of National Education [sic] is stated in a Circular (No. 2001/69) in 2001-2005 Working Programme dated 29.08.2001… (...) In line with this main policy of Ministry of National Education, serious reform attempts in accordance with European standards and norms have been continuing in Turkey [sic]. Democratic participation is gaining more importance in the process. Crucial and prior objective is to realize structural transformation. The reform programme aims the participation and contribution of all related partners [sic] (BoE, April 30, 2003).

The new version of the report starts with a different statement than that of the previous one. By citing the MoNE's "working programme", the new report uses a more formal and diplomatic language in informing the CoE about the recent educational reforms. The new version does not include anything about the government's democratisation agenda. What was mentioned in the old report about the government's enthusiasm for democratisation completely disappears. The new report presents democratisation efforts in education as part of the implementation of the 2001-2005 Working Programme. It de-emphasises the role of political context and aims to present recent democratisation efforts as manifestations of a visionary and pre-planned reform agenda. The new report also presents the EDC/HRE activities in a much more detailed manner when compared to the previous one. The EDC/HRE activities presented in two pages in the old version are expanded to seven pages in the new report. One important difference is that the IPA project proposal is mentioned among the EDC/HRE activities in the new report. This change signals that the new administration intends to maintain the relationship with the CoE in a more formal and diplomatic manner.
The BoE archival documentation shows that the new administration showed a different approach to the collaboration with the CoE in respect of the EDC/HRE activities. After the second half of 2003, no EDC/HRE activity report was sent to the CoE. The BoE’s response to the draft of a CoE-sponsored study, *All-European Study on Education for Democratic Citizenship Policies*, shows an early symptom of this emerging negative approach (BoE, June 27, 2003). One of the CoE experts who is commissioned to review EDC/HRE policies of a group of countries including Turkey sends his draft to the BoE with a view to receiving the BoE’s comments. In its response, the BoE criticises the CoE for condoning the promotion of international hostility through citizenship education in its member states. The reason for the criticism is that citizenship education in Cyprus includes a topic entitled “The 1974 Coup and the Ensuing Turkish Invasion.” The BoE reacts to this by recalling the objective of the EDC/HRE initiative and criticising the CoE for allowing such a topic to be taught in a member state.

The BoE's discontent about the collaboration with the CoE surfaces on other occasions. In August 2003, the BoE sends a negative reply to the CoE's invitation of a representative from the BoE to participate in an upcoming EDC/HRE initiative meeting (BoE, August 19, 2003). It seems the BoE no longer wants to engage in the EDC/HRE initiative. In 2004, the BoE decides to appoint an academic as the new EDC/HRE national coordinator (BoE, May 10, 2004). Unlike the previous national coordinator, the new coordinator does not have previous work experience in the BoE. The appointment of an academic as a national coordinator is a sign of the negative approach to the EDC/HRE initiative. The new coordinator, whom I interviewed, stated that:

**Excerpt 6:**
The interviewee’s statements testify to the BoE’s indifference to the EDC/HRE initiative and the citizenship education reform. First of all, the commissioning of an academic from outside the MoNE shows the degree to which the MoNE values the EDC/HRE activities in this new period. Secondly, the expressions which the interviewee uses to underline the low level of interest in the EDC/HRE initiative, such as “I was not going there for decorative purposes [yani ben oraya süs olsun diye gimiyorum]” and “this project is like a stillborn child [ölü doğmuş bir çocuk]”, shows the level of the disappointment that the national coordinator had. He was surprised at the indifference to his job even though he was appointed with the minister’s approval, which is a mark of high-profile positions in the MoNE. The likening of the EDC/HRE activities to “a stillborn child [ölü doğmuş bir çocuk]” by a BoE official reveals the BoE’s reluctance in a striking way.

While the interviewee’s account gives a clear picture of the declining official interest, his reflections on his own motivation show that he was not intrinsically interested in the democratisation of citizenship education, but he saw it as an instrument to enhance Turkey’s image in the international arenas. He states he was dedicated to fulfilling his job outstandingly, for “some things are done on behalf of our country, the name of our country...
is heard, something is being done in Turkey and some things are really done in Turkey.” In this short statement, he refers to Turkey four times, which reveals that his main concern was not the democratisation of citizenship education, but it was instrumental to an ultimate nationalist goal.

The archival documentation confirms the declining interest in the EDC/HRE initiative which is underlined by the interviewees. For example, the documents show that, in 2005, the Central Finance and Contracts Unit, the authority responsible for IPA contract negotiations, cancelled all components of the IPA project negotiations (Central Finance and Unit, October 31, 2005). The BoE indicated the international experts’ lack of knowledge about Turkey as one of the reasons for the cancellation of the IPA project negotiations on citizenship education (Project Coordination Centre of Ministry of National Education, 2008). After the cancellation, the official interest completely disappeared. The key informants stated that the BoE head made it explicit that he wanted to repeal the citizenship education courses:

Excerpt 7:

| He said this in the meeting which I told you about. ‘In which country of Europe did you see such a course? (…) I am against this course’ (Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015). |

Interviewee 14’s statement shows that the BoE head considers citizenship education courses as a non-established subject. In 2005, the BoE acted in line with this approach and ended the discrete status of citizenship education courses. As for 2005, citizenship education became a cross-curricular subject (MoNE, 2005). Although the main textbook of the course was revised in 2004 and a considerable number of the military perspectives were removed, the citizenship education curriculum still reflected a profound impact of the military’s ideological perspectives (See Section 5.4). The militarised content of the subject was arguably one reason for the repeal of the course considering that the ideology of religious nationalism was in power. After the citizenship education courses were abolished, the BoE head turned down the EU's offer to start the implementation of the IPA project in 2005. I am told that the IPA project could not be launched in 2005 because the BoE head refused to re-introduce citizenship education courses.

Excerpt 8:
Excerpt 8 reveals that the BoE head construed citizenship education courses as an imposition from Europe. This is a new approach, which did not come to the surface until now throughout the period. At first sight, one can interpret Excerpt 8 that Europe-based intergovernmental organisations’ involvement in the citizenship education reform led the BoE head to object to citizenship education since he considered their involvements as “inculcation from outside” and “imposition”.

However, the introduction or removal of a course in Turkey does not depend on the personal decision of the BoE head. It is essentially a political decision that is indirectly made by the government. Even though such decisions are made in the Board by the majority of votes, the Board is not in a position to make a decision without governmental support. This is because the BoE is a sub-unit of the MoNE, and the education minister is a politician from the government party. In addition, the head of the board and board members are appointed by tripartite decree of the prime minister, education minister and president (MoNE, 2012b).

In light of this information, the removal of the citizenship education courses and the dismissal of the EU’s offer for the IPA project implementations cannot be seen as the independent decisions of the BoE which were made with the insistence of the BoE head. However, they were political decisions taken by the key figures in the policy cycle. Then, the question to be asked is why the government did not support citizenship education and collaboration with the CoE in respect of citizenship education reform. The simple answer would be the fact that citizenship education courses had been an effective instrument for the dissemination of the military’s version of secular nationalism and the exclusion of religious nationalists (See Chapter 4). Since the government is subscribed to religious nationalism, it wanted to end the dissemination of secular nationalist and militarist discourses through the citizenship education courses. This might be a reason for the removal of the citizenship education courses, but it is not a satisfactory explanation for the reluctance to collaborate with the Europe-based organisations on reforming or developing a new citizenship education curriculum.
The reluctance to undertake a citizenship education reform arguably results from a combination of three factors. Firstly, religious nationalist circles take a cautious approach about Europeanisation. By making a distinction between the scientific and moral values of Europe, they only tolerate the acquisition of scientific and technological advances of Europe by carefully abstaining from the adoption of moral values. This religious belief echoes in the AKP programme (AKP Program, 2002). Unlike the AKP's embrace of liberal policies in the economy, social policies regarding family and education reflect the ideology of religious nationalism. For example, the AKP programme does not include an education policy objective favouring the introduction of EDC/HRE. On the contrary, the programme explicitly spells out that the AKP would be committed to maintaining compulsory religious education. It places a priority on the promotion of religious values through education. The emerging negative approach to the collaboration with the European intergovernmental institutions can be explained by the dominant ideology in power, which considers citizenship education as a way of the adoption of European values.

Secondly, the BoE’s unforthcoming approach to citizenship education is linked to the worsening course of Turkey-EU relations. Turkey’s abandonment of the EU membership bid started following the 2004 Brussels Summit where a date was set for opening accession negotiations. The policy documents and the interviews reveal that the negative approach became prominent in 2005. The worsening course of the EU relations encouraged the BoE administration to express its views in more explicit terms. Thirdly, the negative official approach is linked to the ongoing military influence. The introduction of democratic citizenship education stands at odds with the official ideology of secular nationalism, so the concern that the military circles would disapprove of such a curriculum reform effort could be a factor that discouraged the government from providing a political endorsement.

In fact, the military circles reacted to the AKP's demilitarisation agenda in education in 2007. The mainstream media featured news in 2007 that the BoE decided to revise certain programmes of study after allegations that themes on secular nationalism were removed from the curriculum (Haberturk, 2007). For the revision of certain programmes of study, the BoE invited three army officers to work in revision committees. Because of controversies around the invitation of military officers, the MoNE released a press statement admitting that the army officers were invited to revise themes about secular nationalism in the curriculum (Milliyet, 2007). The press statement further highlighted that
this sort of collaboration between the military and the MoNE had been ongoing for a long time as an established practice.

One of the interviewees claimed that the military's influence in education was still intense in the BoE by 2007 (Interviewee 15, August 4, 2015). He mentioned a board member by name as someone who had close relationships with the military circles. According to the interviewee, the board member regularly provided updates about curriculum policies to the military circles. Furthermore, the prosecutor of the 2008 constitutional court to disband the AKP presented evidence derived from textbooks to show that the themes of secular nationalism were deliberately removed from textbooks during AKP rule (AKP Closure Case, 2008). This ongoing continuance of the military influence can be shown as the other possible reason for the reluctance to undertake the curriculum reform.

5.4 Textbook Analysis

After the AKP came to power, the first tangible change in the citizenship education curriculum was the revision of the main textbook in 2004. The Grade 8 citizenship and human rights education textbook, which I analysed in the previous chapter, was published five times, once in each year from 1999 to 2003 (Çiftçi et al., 2001). The five editions of the textbook were identical. However, the second series of the same textbook, which began to be issued in 2004, included considerable differences from the first series (Çiftçi et al., 2004)\(^1\). When I compared the version published in 2004 with the previous ones, I identified revised, removed, replaced and newly added sections. The changes struck a chord with the changing parameters of the political context. The ideological discourses identified with the military were modified, revised and removed. Exclusionary views on the Kurdish and religious nationalists and positive representation of the army and Atatürk were markedly changed. The changing configuration of the balance of power between the forces of secular and religious nationalism left its discursive traces in the main citizenship education textbook.

5.4.1 Changing Representation of the Kurdish People

The ideological discourses denigrating the Kurdish people as an internal enemy who colludes with foreign enemies were toned down in the new version:

Excerpt 9:

\(^{1}\) This citation refers to the main citizenship education textbook analysed in this chapter, which is the revised version of the previous textbook. To avoid repetition, the excerpts from the textbooks are cited with only a page number in the remainder of the chapter.
The old version is based on a discourse promoted by the military that the people of the region where the PKK is effective are abetting and aiding terrorists. The analysis of the statement in the old version is presented in Section 4.3.1. This statement was replaced with a more neutral one in the 2004 edition of the textbook. The new sentence is not based on the same discourse denigrating the Kurdish people, but makes a general warning regarding terrorist organisations. The phrase of “citizens” becomes “our citizens”, the use of pronoun “our” make it sounds compassionate, and the phrase of “terrorist/s” becomes “terror organisations”, which make the new version sound more general, not implying a particular terrorist organisation. Thus, the accusatory expressions disappear in the new one. The new version sounds like a piece of advice that has a positive grammatical structure in contrast to the old version’s accusatory tone with a negative grammatical structure (the difference in the use of “not”). The following comparison is a different illustration of the discursive change on the Kurdish issue:

**Excerpt 10:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because of these characteristics, our country is a country which is under a constant risk. Foreign countries that wished to take hold of Turkey do not want Turkey to develop and be a strong country in its region. In our country, those who wish to create an atmosphere of terror and chaos, from time to time, desire to divide our society into enemy camps by pitting one brother against the other. The task that falls upon us is not to fall into the traps of this sort. (...) The GAP project [a dam construction project], which will change the fate of Southeast Region made many countries jealous, so a terror atmosphere was immediately created in the region. Turkish youth to whom Atatürk entrusted the Republic of Turkey set a goal for himself to work for the peace of the country with the love of the homeland and nation without falling into these traps (p. 81)</td>
<td>Being interested in Turkey’s internal and external problems and adopting positive approaches will ensure that our country will become a powerful state all the time (p. 72).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
external enemies who have malign intentions towards Turkey. This discourse emanates from the xenophobic national security doctrine promoted by the military. In the old version of Excerpt 10, the dam construction project signifies Turkey’s development, while PKK is presented as a puppet-organisation supported by foreign enemies who want to obstruct Turkey's progress. Linking PKK terrorism to a dam construction project is a typical military discourse that reduces the issue to a matter of the manipulation of the uneducated people of the region by foreign countries. This discourse considers PKK terrorism as solely a security issue by insulating it from its socio-political and ethnic dimensions.

However, in the new version of the excerpt, this discourse to a great extent disappears in a way that it does not include an accusation directed at foreign countries; it does not draw a link between PKK terror and the dam construction project; it does not include the specific ideological idiom, “pitting one brother against the other [kardeşi kardeşe dişürecek]”; it does not make a personification of foreign enemies to emphasise their malign intentions; and finally, it does not address “Turkish youth” when advising them to set particular goals for themselves (See Section 4.3.1). In contrast to the old version, the new one uses positive language in advising students (no specific group is addressed like “Turkish youth” as in the old one) to develop “positive approaches” and “be interested in Turkey’s internal and external problems”.

The new series of the textbook does not include ethnic-nationalist discourses as explicit as in the old version. The following comparison illustrates this discursive shift:

**Excerpt 11:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We are Turkish. (…) Our historical past and our culture are our characteristics which distinguish us from the other nations. We are proud of being a part of the Turkish nation. Ataturk, by saying “How happy who says I am Turkish”, expressed the pride and honour of becoming a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Everyone who regards himself as Turkish is Turkish. <em>This understanding shows unity in plurality [understanding] in our culture. Atatürk summed up his love of Turkishness for a society that was in the process of becoming a nation in the following way: “if there is something superb in my nature, it is my being born as Turkish.”</em> We should all be proud of our country and society. As Our Great Father advised, we should all work, be proud and trust (p. 76).</td>
<td>We are Turkish. (…) Our historical past and our culture are our characteristics which distinguish us from the other nations. We are proud of being a part of the Turkish nation. Ataturk, by saying “How happy who says I am Turkish”, expressed the pride and honour of becoming a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. <em>Everyone who regards himself as Turkish is Turkish</em> (p. 68).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The analysis of a part of the old version is made in Section 4.3.1. The old version is based on a nationalist discourse which represents a peculiar blend of territorial-universal and ethno-nationalist citizenship. In the old version, the first quote from Atatürk presents Turkishness as a state of something that can be adopted by everyone who says I am Turkish. In contrast to this aphorism, the second quote from Atatürk implies that Turkishness is acquired by birth. The new version of Excerpt 11 subverts this contradictory notion of citizenship by discarding the italic part of the old version and highlighting the last sentence: “Everyone who regards himself as Turkish is Turkish”. In this way, the new excerpt dispels all signs associated with ethnic citizenship, and foregrounds signs that are associated with territorial citizenship.

5.4.2 Changing Representation of Religious Nationalists

Religious nationalists who were implicitly denigrated in the old version of the textbook were those who founded the AKP and came to power in 2002. In other words, the changing political circumstances enabled religious nationalists who were referred to by derogatory expressions in the previous version of the textbook to hold political power after 2002. As a result of the transition of power from one dominant ideology and the other, citizenship education underwent a massive transformation. The revision of the main textbook can be seen as the first episode of this transformation. The ideological discourses on religious nationalism were almost completely removed in the new version of the textbook. For instance, the pejorative expressions used to denigrate religious nationalists wholly disappeared:

Excerpt 12:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Turkey, there is not a chance for an idea that does not compromise with</td>
<td>In Turkey, there is not a chance for an idea that does not compromise with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the historical past; does not agree with national culture and civilisation;</td>
<td>the historical past; does not agree with national culture and civilisation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>does not comply with our moral values; and does not become integrated with</td>
<td>does not comply with our moral values; and does not become integrated with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>our national ideals to succeed. The Turkish nation looks to the future with</td>
<td>our national ideals to succeed. The Turkish nation looks to the future with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hope and is respectful of the past. It is open to innovations. It is loyal</td>
<td>hope and is respectful of the past. It is open to innovations. It is loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to its traditions. The Turkish nation is respectful to its faiths, rejects</td>
<td>to its traditions. The Turkish nation is respectful to its faiths, rejects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fundamentalism, and does not like bigotry. It is neither backwards-looking</td>
<td>fundamentalism, and does not like bigotry. It is neither backwards-looking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nor pious. It regards everyone who lives in our homeland as precious. It</td>
<td>nor pious. It regards everyone who lives in our homeland as precious. It</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>does not consider anyone as a second class.</td>
<td>does not consider anyone as a second class.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A detailed analysis of the old version is made in Section 4.3.2. The old version attaches the attributes of secular nationalist groups to the whole of the Turkish nation. Some of the descriptors and concepts used in the old version like “fundamentalism [köktençilik], bigotry [taassup], backwards-looking [gerici], and pious [yobaz]” were the pejoratives that were used to denigrate political Islamists. In the new version, these pejoratives dissipate and the characterisation of the Turkish nation is made in a more inclusive way. The same discursive change in favour of religious nationalism takes place in the following excerpts:

**Excerpt 13:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modernity is the opposite concept to primitiveness and bigotry. This means</td>
<td>Modernity means living in the same century and complying with the understanding and conditions of the century. A modern person keeps up with the attitude, understanding and necessities of the century he lives in (p. 71).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>things that are modern, alive in today’s world, new and precious, stripped</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of primitive and rude measures are the understanding embraced by the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overwhelming majority of society. There are many things that are described</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as modern in today’s world. However, to be able to taste the intricacy and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beauty of modernity, it is necessary to install modernity in human’s mind.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bigoted and primitive thoughts stand against modernity and every type of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>innovation (p. 79).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The old version of Excerpt 13 defines modernity from a secular nationalist standpoint by associating pejorative descriptors to the opposite of modernity. The pejorative words that are shown to be the attributes of the opposite of modernity are the ones secular nationalists used to denigrate religious nationalists, such as “primitiveness [ilkelliğin] and bigotry [bağnazlık]”. By making attribution to religious nationalists by these descriptors, the excerpt defines modernity as the opposite of religious nationalism. This discourse of modernity which denigrates religious nationalists as those who are primitive, bigoted, not stripped of primitive and rude characteristics is subverted in the new version of Excerpt 13 by the removal of all pejoratives. Also, the new version is based on a different discourse on modernity which argues that the only measure of being modern is to live in the same era. In this way, the new excerpt aligns with the religious nationalists’ counter-argument against the secularists’ accusation.

The old version of the textbook included some parts to justify the anti-democratic measures of the 1997 coup, such as the headscarf ban and the shut-down of political parties. The new
version reflects a discursive shift in this regard. The following two excerpts represent this difference:

**Excerpt 14-15:**

<table>
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<th>Old Version</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What would be the dangers of people’s interpretation and practice of the freedom of conscience and religion in their own way? (p. 74).</td>
<td>Is the right to education a fundamental right for the enjoyment, improvement and protection of other rights? (p. 84).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In most of the civilised societies, some rights regulated and protected by the state are granted to individuals. All of these rights are called “public liberties”. In other words, the right to know your rights comes into existence with the importance given to human rights education by states (p. 84).

The old version of Excerpt 14 aims to frame the discussion on the headscarf ban through a manipulative question in order to make students approve the military impositions of the 1997 coup (See Section 4.3.3). This manipulative question is replaced with a different question. The new question is a yes/no question, not a wh-question, so it does not force students to take a certain position. The new question conveys a message that education is a fundamental right and no one should be deprived of the right to education under any circumstances. The message implicit to this question has the potential to debunk the underlying discourse of the old question in a way that the headscarf ban deprived millions of students of their rights to education. In this respect, the two questions are based on contesting discourses on the same issue.

Excerpt 15 is a new section which does not exist in the old version of the textbook. This section revitalises the secular nationalist interpretation of the headscarf ban by the inclusion of a concept: "public liberties". This concept gained widespread currency in the debates on the headscarf ban, which is used to advocate the use of the headscarf in public spaces. The inclusion of this concept not only indicates the decline of the militaristic discourses, but also signals the inclusion of the ideological discourses associated with religious nationalism. Discourses of religious nationalism are also manifest in other parts of the new textbook. For instance, the definition of culture was made with no reference to moral values in the previous textbook. This definition was replaced with a new one emphasising moral values as an indispensable part of culture (p. 80). Also, the new version of the textbook included a picture of Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi, who is the pioneer of the Sufi interpretation of Islam, and whirling dervishes characterise his spiritual path (p. 81).
5.4.3 Changing Representation of the Army and Atatürk

The previous version of the textbook depicted the army as the most vital institution, whereas many parts casting the army as the most central institution are modified in the new version. The old version of the textbook presented the weapon as a basic need (See Section 4.3.3), which is modified in the new version in the following way:

**Excerpt 16:**

<table>
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<th>Old Version</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mankind needed weapons as much as food and drink since the first day of his existence (p. 68).</td>
<td>Mankind has needed weapons in order to hunt animals in nature or benefit from them since the first day of his existence (p. 62).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The new version subverts the discourse of the old version firstly by specifying a reason for why mankind needed weapons, and secondly by getting rid of the part which compared the need for weapons with the need for food and drink. The new version explains the need for weapons by highlighting a reason for it (protection and nutrition). In this way, the militarist discourse is dispelled in the new version.

The old version of the textbook presented a glorified image of the army. It included statements that can be construed as legitimising the military’s interferences with the parliamentary democracy of Turkey. Many of such statements were dissipated in the new version of the textbook:

**Excerpt 17:**

The protection of the homeland against internal enemies is among the duties of the Turkish Armed Forces. The Republic of Turkey is an indivisible with its state, country and nation. There might be some groups who wish to jeopardise this integrity and destroy the free, democratic parliamentarian order, fundamental rights and freedoms. Against internal threats posed by these groups, within limits set by the constitution and laws, the Turkish Armed Forces can intervene in a situation. It fulfils the duty given by the constitution and the Grand National Parliament (p. 63).

In the past, the military toppled governments under the pretext of protecting “the free democratic parliamentarian order and fundamental rights and freedoms”. Referring to the presence of “internal enemies” within the country, Excerpt 17 presents a justificatory discourse on the military interventions. It legitimises the military interventions by firstly linking them to a good cause, meaning the military intervenes to ensure the peace and happiness of the nation, and secondly by claiming the military’s interventions are in line with the laws. The removal of this part is linked to the new dominant ideology represented...
in power, which was committed to restraining the political autonomy of the military at that time.

The old version of the textbook made a virulent propaganda of secular nationalism through adulation and veneration of Atatürk as an incontestable national hero. The following expressions exalting Atatürk were included in the previous version: “the republic which Atatürk founded” (p. 80), “Atatürk gave the Turkish citizens the Republic of Turkey as a present” (p. 75) and “this duty [of protecting the Republic] assigned by Atatürk” (p. 75). These phrases all disappeared in the new version. The following comparison illustrates the discursive shift in respect of Atatürk:

**Excerpt 18:**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Old Version</th>
<th>New Version</th>
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<tr>
<td>The recognition of women’s rights [in Turkey] is not a consequence of a movement of thought and social evolution as in some European countries. The rights granted to women in our country are a consequence of Atatürk reforms that took place in the state formation era. Reforms undertaken under the leadership of Atatürk opened up new horizons for Turkish woman (pp. 25-26).</td>
<td>The heroic acts women showed during the Independence War played a significant role in their entitlement to their rights. Women’s rights were expanded by the Atatürk reforms that took place in the Republican era. New horizons were opened up for Turkish women (p. 25).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The old version portrays the progressive reforms regarding women's rights as Atatürk's personal success. It overlooks women’s struggle in gaining their rights, but it simply claims that Atatürk himself gave all rights to women. The old version overlooks women’s agency to glorify Atatürk’s contribution. By contrast, the new version recognises women's own struggle in gaining their rights and, therefore, de-emphasizes the personal role of Atatürk. It links the progress in women’s rights to women’s “heroic acts” in the War of National Independence. The last statement of the old version is expressed in an active form to highlight the role of Atatürk, whereas the same statement is put in a passive form in the new version, which breaks the tie of dependency of “opening up new horizons for Turkish woman” on Atatürk leadership. The backgrounding of Atatürk’s role and removal of discourses exalting Atatürk are the discursive manifestations of the changing balance of power between secular and religious nationalism within the EU integration context.

### 5.5 Conclusion

On the basis of the military’s status within the system, I considered the 1999 Helsinki Summit as the dividing line in the evolution of Turkish democracy. Before 1999, the
secularist military had been the main authority regulating civilian politics and acted as the main force in the shaping of the citizenship education curriculum. After the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the EU reforms empowered the religious nationalists to limit the military's dominating role, which led to a decline in the promotion of the secularists’ discourses in citizenship education, while it paved the way for the inclusion of the discourses of religious nationalists in the curriculum. In other words, the EU reforms weakened the military’s power in the system and opened the citizenship education curriculum to the influence of religious nationalism.

The pre-AKP period saw a series of preparatory efforts undertaken in collaboration with the CoE, but with no tangible change in the curriculum, although the preparatory efforts had the potential to generate important outcomes regarding democratisation of citizenship education. After the AKP came to power in 2002, official interest in reform gradually faded away. Under AKP rule, even though the BoE was interested in removing the military's ideological discourses from the citizenship education curriculum, it showed a reluctance to introduce democratic citizenship education. The pace of EDC/HRE preparatory efforts slowed down, but significant change regarding the citizenship education courses took place. In 2004, the main textbook was revised to remove the ideological perspectives of the military. After 2005, the reform agenda was side-lined and citizenship education was made a cross-curricular theme. The evolution of citizenship education from 1999 to 2008 went in parallel with the changing balance of power. In 2008, the attempt of the constitutional court to disband the ruling AKP led to a revision in the AKP's approach to democratisation reforms. The government party adopted a forthcoming attitude to democratisation, which was echoed in the changing interest in the curriculum reform, which will be explored in the next chapter.
Chapter 6  Demilitarisation of Citizenship Education (2008-2012)

In 2010, the Board of Education (BoE) introduced the Citizenship and Democracy Education course as an outcome of collaborations with the Council of Europe’s (CoE) Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE) initiative (MoNE, 2010). Even though the BoE repealed the course two years later, this experiment symbolised an iconic attempt to develop a citizenship education curriculum within the structural constraints of the centralised curriculum authority (MoNE, 2012). It exposed the obstacles hindering participatory and inclusive curriculum development in Turkey. The present chapter is an attempt to offer a comprehensive account of the curriculum reform by taking a close look into the curriculum decision-making and development processes. It aims to reveal changes and continuities in the curriculum and the established ways of curriculum development.

Regarding the course, one study has appeared in the English peer-reviewed journals, which underlined that the course’s curriculum was cleaned from topics associated with militarism, national security, external and internal enemies and included some progressive features, such as learning themes on the issue of discrimination and gender equality (Çayır, 2011). Despite these new features, this study highlighted that the course was “still based on Turkishness with a single language and a single culture” (p. 27). This study is a critical analysis of the course, but it provides an incomplete picture because it solely relies on public sources, largely the course’s main textbook and programme of study. Secondly, it does not take into account the impact of the changing balance of power between the dominant ideologies within the EU accession process, which hampered its ability to offer an in-depth analysis.

In this chapter, I present the last episode of the evolution of the citizenship education courses in Turkey by starting from the appearance of an official interest in the curriculum reform in 2008. After delineating the political context between 2008 and 2012, I present the stages of the development of the new citizenship education curriculum. I respectively expand on the formation of the curriculum development committee, the preparation of a new curriculum, the introduction of the course in 2010 and its repeal in 2012. In this section, I shed light on the background of the curriculum reform and the introduction and repeal of the course through a critical discourse analysis of interviews, public and archival documents. Regarding this period, I draw on interviews more than the other sources
because interview data were more relevant to answer the research questions. Subsequently, I present an ideological analysis of the main citizenship education textbook. I term the evolution of citizenship education in this period as demilitarisation instead of democratisation of citizenship education because the changing aspects of the citizenship education curriculum reveal that the military's ideological discourses were removed, but, not human rights and democracy principles, so religious nationalism in power had an explicit impact in the citizenship education curriculum. Therefore, I term it demilitarisation rather than democratisation, even though it might be named as the Islamisation or politicisation of citizenship education.

6.1 Context and Background

In March 2008, the constitutional court attempted to disband the ruling Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi -AKP] on the grounds that it had violated the constitutional principle of laicism (AKP Closure Case, 2008). Only one vote rescued the government party from a possible shut-down. After surviving the constitutional court case, the government re-attempted to take the secular nationalist establishment under control (Shambayati & Sütçü, 2012). This notorious trial signified a breaking point in the power struggle between religious and secular nationalism. Once the AKP had averted this threat, it began confronting the secular establishment with more decisive measures (Çınar, 2010). The first manifestation of the government’s determination to end the hegemony of the secular nationalist establishment was a series of lawsuits brought against the influential army colonels on the grounds that they plotted coups to topple the ruling government (Polat, 2011). In the anti-coup lawsuits, many prominent military figures were imprisoned including the former head of the general staff. After consolidating power, the government attempted to solve the perennial democratisation issues of Turkey, such as the Kurdish issue. A process of peace negotiation was launched with the outlawed Kurdistan Worker’s Party [Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK]]. The government began to take measures to overhaul the assimilationist citizenship policies against the Kurds, such as establishing a state-owned television airing in Kurdish in 2009 (Aktürk, 2012). In the meantime, some PKK members laid down arms as a token of goodwill, which generated hope that the armed conflict would end permanently. In addition, the government representatives began to talk to the representatives of Alevis with a view to healing the state's battered relationship with them.
In 2010, a referendum was held to democratise the military-drafted 1982 constitution. The goal of the referendum was "to reshape the structure of higher administrative courts and reduce the role of the military in Turkish politics" (Cizre, 2011, p. 57). After the military's ability to intervene in politics was limited with the EU integration reforms, the judiciary took on "the role of ‘system guardianship’ and has started to make overtly political decisions by interpreting the law through time-tested statist and secular lenses" (p. 58). The constitutional court's attempt to disband the government party in 2008 appeared in this context of the judiciary's takeover of the secularist military's role. To limit the ability of key judicial institutions, the referendum included amendments to strengthen the government’s grip on the judiciary. Passed by a large margin, the referendum further weakened one of the strongholds of secular nationalism.

In 2011, the AKP won its third consecutive election victory, increasing its vote rate to nearly 50 per cent from 46 per cent. In the wake of the 2011 election, the government made more serious attempts to end the impositions of the 1997 coups. It lifted the restrictions placed on graduates of religious conservative schools and the ban on wearing a headscarf in public spaces. Reactions from the secular nationalist circles only changed the timing of the reforms intended by the government. When faced with a strong reaction, the government stepped back and waited for the right time to re-try. For example, the adoption of a bill aiming to end the ban of conservative high school graduates from entering into secular college programmes reflects this pattern. It was withdrawn in the face of a strong reaction from the secular-nationalist forces in 2004. On this occasion, the Prime Minister remarked: “As a government we are not ready to pay the price” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 350). This implied that the bill was temporarily suspended and would be re-attempted in future. In fact, the bill was passed after the 2011 elections.

Similarly, changing official policy on wearing a headscarf in public spaces reflects the same pattern. Following the 1997 coup, wearing a headscarf was banned in public spaces. The most controversial instances of the headscarf ban were seen at schools and universities. Interpreting schools and universities as public spaces, the secular-nationalist elites strictly enforced the ban. In 1999, the Prime Minister dismissed the only veiled MP from the parliament in the midst of noisy supportive chants from the benches of the ruling party (Cengiz, 2013). The gradual lifting of the headscarf ban marks a milestone in the AKP’s consolidation of power. Secular-nationalist circles opposed the presence of a veiled
member of parliament in the early years of the government. Nonetheless, the presence of members of parliament who wore headscarves marked a definite end to the ban in 2013.

The gradual takeover of the secular-nationalist establishment by the religious nationalist government led to a series of contestations and compromises. The AKP’s stay in power for more than a decade represents a break with Turkey’s past. Especially after the 2011 general elections, the government has re-configured the entrenched state ideology in many areas, including citizenship education, in line with the version of religious nationalism to which it has subscribed.

6.2 Stages of Curriculum Reform

Although the weakening of the military’s influence over education paved the way for the introduction of democratic citizenship education, the BoE continued to be reluctant to undertake the citizenship education reform (See Section 5.3). This reluctance disappeared as of 2008 following the constitutional court’s attempt to disband the government party. After the ruling AKP averted the threat, it began to give an impetus to democratisation efforts, which sparked the interest in curriculum reform. In addition, a new minister of education and a new BoE head were serving after 2008 (Appendix 1). In the following years, two approaches to democratic citizenship education competed in the policy cycle. A group of bureaucrats, whom I call proponent bureaucrats, were supportive of democratic citizenship education, whereas, another group, whom I call opponent bureaucrats, were against it due to their concerns that democratic citizenship education was an imposition from Europe and would harm national and moral values. The concerns of the opponent bureaucrats were not new, but had been prominent after the AKP came to power (See Section 5.3).

However, the pro-democratisation context of the period favoured the proponent bureaucrats, even though they were not the majority at the MoNE. When the MoNE, the CoE and the EU’s concerned units were in the process of signing an Instrument for Pre-Accession 1 (IPA) project contract in respect of citizenship education reform, a new citizenship education course was introduced in 2010. Before the IPA project was signed, the proponents started to implement some of the requirements of the project in the

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1 Instrument for Pre-accession is one of the expansion instruments of the EU, which facilitates candidate countries’ integration by offering them financial assistance for integration reforms before membership (See Section 5.2.1)
expectation that the implementation of the project would begin soon (European Commission, 2015). This expectation played an important role in the introduction of the course. The proponents introduced the course before the official implementation of the IPA project in order to obviate criticism of opponents that the reform was an imposition from outside. The course’s curriculum was prepared before the IPA project was put into practice, which enabled the proponents to present the reform as an independent initiative. I present below the phases of the reform in a chronological order.

6.2.1 Formation of the Curriculum Development Committee

When the BoE gave a green light to a new citizenship education course, a curriculum development committee was formed in March 2010 under the supervision of a board member. The programme of study was completed in approximately six months and made public in September 2010 (BoE, March 30, 2010; September 14, 2010). The committee was composed of seven permanent, including the supervising board member, and four contributing members. Of the eleven members, four were female and seven were male. I interviewed all the committee members and the supervising board members except for two contributing members. Of the nine members whom I interviewed, three of them held Bachelor degrees in philosophy, two in history, one in theology, one in classroom teaching, one in sociology and one in educational sciences. More than half of them held a Master’s degree and had experience of working as a teacher at state schools. Although social studies teachers teach citizenship education courses, none of the committee members had a degree in social studies teaching.

The supervising board member had a distinct influence on many aspects of the curriculum development process. First, he selected the members of the committee:

Excerpt 1:
The statements of the interviewee show that he believes that a democratic citizenship curriculum should be developed by a committee that has a diverse membership. His statements show that he has a concern to present the effort as democratic and himself as a decision-maker who follows democratic procedures. However, the interviewee’s effort to have ethnic, religious and ideological identities represented in the committee is not supported by the regulatory framework of the BoE. His effort might be even found contrary to the regulation concerning the formation of committees. The regulation concerned, the Special Expertise Committee Formation Circular (still in force), does not provide any basis to take into account ideological, religious and ethnic identities of committee members (MoNE, 1993). The official ideology of secular nationalism permeates it in a way that ethnicity and religion should be completely disregarded in the curriculum development processes. It does not even allow non-governmental organisations to join in curriculum development committees. Many of the interviewees highlighted that the BoE sets up committees in a non-participatory way, from those who work for the BoE (Interviewee 4, August 26, 2014; Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014; Interviewee 9, September 1, 2014; Interviewee 10, September 1, 2014).

The BoE’s curriculum development practice represents a closed process whereby a group of selected officials draft programmes of study under the supervision of board members. In the case of the citizenship education curriculum, the supervising board member’s consideration of ethnic, religious and ideological identities is a novelty in terms the pluralisation of the curriculum development process although it lacks a structural basis. He reflected on the constraints in the way of democratic curriculum development:

Excerpt 2:
The board member was well aware of the structural constraints and the provoking aspects of his effort. His effort was considered by his colleagues as “teaching new tricks to an old dog [eski köye yeni adet getirmek]” and met with “discontent” from those who follow the established practices. A close translation of the saying the interviewee uses would be “bringing a new custom to an old village”, which means trying to change the institutional conventions of the BoE. Therefore, his efforts were not supported by the majority of board members. The phrase “red line [kırmızı çizgiler]” metaphorically denotes the degree of challenge that a bureaucrat would face when attempting to introduce a novelty that had the potential to undermine the official ideology. It points to the possible dangerous outcomes of his efforts. Despite these obstacles, the interviewee garnered motivation from the political context in which the government was taking decisive measures to end the hegemony of secular nationalist establishment. In addition, the relationships with the CoE encouraged him to look for ways to make the curriculum development process more participatory. The ongoing IPA project negotiations was a source of encouragement for him to form and run the committee on the expectation that the effort would soon become a part of the project implementation. In comparison with their previous experiences, all interviewees acknowledged the progressive characteristics of the committee. They stressed the membership was unprecedentedly diverse:

Excerpt 3-4:

There were those in the committee who had some troubles because of their ethnic, political or religious identities. I mean those who think that they experience these sorts of issues in the past gathered there. In a classical sense, those who cannot be classified as white Turk, but Sunni, Anatolian type persons. I mean there were really members from all groups (Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014).

In that regard, x was a representative of a union, he valued these sort of things, we used to call him an active citizen, he was really active and as a unionist joining public demonstration, for example, I think he contributed a lot to these sort of things; if he had not been there, these would not have been like that (Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014).
Interviewee 7 underlines that those who had troubles due to their identities, meaning those who had been subject to the assimilationist citizenship regime, were present in the committee. The phrase "white Turk" needs some clarification. The dichotomy of white Turks versus black Turks became popular after the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, argued that observant Muslims were Turkey's Black Turks in 2003 (Demiralp, 2012). This figurative expression quickly gained popularity. The difference between white Turks and black Turks does not involve a racial, ethnic or religious category, but is more concerned with the favouring of the secular state establishment of a social group. The white Turks are those who are considered as full-citizens who occupy the key state positions in the military, judiciary and presidency and embrace the values of the secular nationalist regime.

What distinguishes them from the rest of society is their lifestyle, urbane accent and mannerisms, cultural preferences and their social and cultural capitals in Bourdieu’s terms (Bourdieu, 2004). The white Turks are the benefactors of the secular nationalist order. The black Turks are considered as second-class citizens because of their ethnic, religious or ideological identities. They are the subalterns of Turkey, who were left out in the margins of the socio-political, cultural and economic system. They mostly live in Anatolian provinces or the slums of big cities and retain their religious-traditional norms and values, provincial accent and mannerisms. The discontent of black Turks coalesced into a movement on the back of which the religious nationalist parties have risen to power since the 1990s. After the AKP came to power in 2002, the gap between white and black Turks had been bridged, the white Turks lost their hegemony, and their ideological perspectives shrunk in the official discourses, whereas the black Turks have prevailed and become the dominant social group of Turkey.

The interviewee’s use of the term involves this socio-political context. However, the way he used the term is slightly different to the common usage of the term. Even though he refers to two distinct categories with Anatolian Sunni-Muslims and white Turks, the local context of his sentence implies a symbiosis between the two groups. This is because the category of white Turks is identified with the secularised Sunni-Muslims more than the secularised parts of other ethno-religious groups. In the interviewee's account, "Sunni-Anatolian types" differs from "white Turks" due to their ideological orientation. The interviewee apparently refers to the black Turks as “Sunni-Anatolian types" because the term, black Turks, is not as common as white Turks in Turkish. This shows that those who can be described as white Turks were, to a great extent, absent from the curriculum.
development committee. This aspect of the committee stands in contrast to the committees of the past in which “white Turks” were dominant.

Excerpt 4 shows another novel characteristic of the curriculum development committee is that there was a member who was known to be a member of a leftist teachers union (Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014). To emphasise the diverse composition of the committee, the interviewee stressed that the left-leaning committee member was present without hiding his political opinions. Other committee members whom I interviewed also found the presence of this curriculum designer as a progressive step and confirmed that the committee was run in a democratic way.

Despite these progressive characteristics, the influence of the dominant ideology was discernible in the composition of the committee. Of the nine members of the committee, whom I interviewed, seven described themselves as conservative, whereas only two described themselves as left-leaning. Although the supervising board member stated that he paid attention to ethnic, religious and ideological differences when forming the committee, none of the committee members accepted that they were asked to represent their diverse identities in the committee. They did not even know that they were selected because of their differences. One of them, who was considered to represent a religious minority, refused to accept such a role. Similarly, a different interviewee stated that he received some criticism from his friends because they thought he was deliberately hired to make the committee look inclusive (Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014).

6.2.2 Introduction of the Course

When the curriculum development committee began to work, the BoE had not yet decided to introduce a citizenship education course. The course was introduced when the committee was preparing the programme of study (MoNE, 2010). The course introduction was a contested decision. The opponents objected to a new citizenship education course considering it as an imposition from outside. They argued that such a course would speed up the pace of individualisation, secularisation and social disintegration and would lead to the degeneration of national and moral values. In order to win the support of the majority, the proponents used the IPA project negotiation that the project would require a new
citizenship education course. In fact, the project fiche\(^2\) stipulates “preparing the curriculum and a course book for a compulsory course on EDC/HRE at primary school level\(^3\)” (European Commission, 2015). The proponents argued that their effort would be pointless if there were not a citizenship education course (BoE, March 30, 2010; November 25, 2010). Also, the proponents occupied influential posts within the BoE at the time of the reform, which enabled them to present the introduction of the course to the opponents as a politically supported initiative.

In this regard, one of the interviewees recounted an interesting detail that helped to guarantee the education minister’s support for the course (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014). When the citizenship and human rights education course was repealed in 2005, one hour surplus from the repealed course was added to another course taught at the same grade level, which was entitled Atatürk’s Principles and History of Reforms \([\text{Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi}]\) (MoNE, 1997, 2005). This course promotes secular nationalism “by disparaging Islamism” (Demiralp, 2012, p. 518). It presents the norms, values and identities associated with religious parts of the society as backwards while portraying the value and norms of secular nationalists as modern and progressive. The interviewee recounted that the minister became angry when he was told that the weekly hours of that course had been increased to three hours from two during his term. Upon learning this, the minister ordered the restoring of the course’s weekly hours from three to two. As a result, one hour space was used for the citizenship education course.

The name of this course was a compromise between the opponents and the proponents. Even though the proponents suggested naming the new course as Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education in compliance with the title of the IPA project, their suggestion was met with disapproval since the concept of democratic citizenship was made popular by the Kurdish political parties (Interviewee 4, August 26, 2014; Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014). Thus, the suggestion was dismissed, and the course was named Citizenship and Democracy Education.

\(^2\) The 2010 version of the project fiche included the article quoted above; one of the interviewees mentioned that the project fiche was remarkably changed before the official start of its implementation in 2011 (Interviewee 17, October 2, 2015).

\(^3\) At the time when the project fiche was prepared, “primary school level” referred to the first eight years of the compulsory education, which was a combination of elementary and middle school education (See Section 6.4).
### 6.2.3 Aim of the Committee

The committee members stated they aimed to prepare an inclusive citizenship education curriculum. For this, they attempted not to reflect the characteristics of the old citizenship education curriculum. The supervising board member reflected on the committee’s aim in the following way:

**Excerpt 5:**

What I had in my mind was not just this particular course, but that education should be democratised. This course is like a drop in the ocean, and the soul of education is militarist, nationalist or even racist and so on in our country. Therefore, education itself should be democratised so that it would become favourable to raising democratic citizens. However, our classroom relationships, our school organisations, our school culture, our curriculum, our textbooks, all components of our educational system are very far from the culture of democracy. The system should be wholly democratised. These issues are all supposed to be tackled from a holistic perspective. In this respect, I value the democratic citizenship education project so much, the human rights education project (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014).

The interviewee highlights that his aim was the democratisation of the whole education as he thinks “the soul of education is militarist, nationalist or even racist and so on in our country”. From this perspective, he regards the citizenship education course just “a drop in the ocean [devede bir kulak]”. The interviewee’s consideration of the educational system is not typical of an educational decision-maker at the BoE. The key informants and policy documents of the past curriculum reforms consistently revealed that the citizenship education reform was seen as a means to making Turkey look more democratic and modern. The underlying concern was to enhance Turkey’s image in the international arena. In a remarkably distinctive way, the interviewee’s motivation relies on a conviction that “our classroom relationships, our school organisations, our school culture, our curriculum, our textbooks, all components of our educational system are very far from the culture of democracy”. His statements do not show any sign that his concern is to make Turkey look a modern and democratic member of Western liberal countries. On the contrary, he recognises the intrinsic value of democratic citizenship education. The presence of such a board member is a novelty, which might be explained by the weakening military influence, given that the BoE is a key institution in terms of the dissemination of nation-state ideology.

According to Interviewee 11, the educational reform was not in sync with the government's democratisation agenda when compared with other policy spheres because of the existing bureaucracy's unsupportive attitude (August 24, 2014). This criticism of the existing bureaucracy chimes with Kadoğlu's (2007) observation that the bureaucracy deliberately...
delayed "the implementation of the amendments passed by the parliament" (p. 293). The BoE represents a perfect foil to observe bureaucracy's reluctance in implementing the government's reforms. As an educational bureaucrat who thought that the existing bureaucrats were slowing down the democratisation intended by the government, he took the lead in expediting the pace of educational reform by pushing for the introduction of the citizenship education course. Other interviewees considered the introduction of the course as a part of the government’s democratisation agenda, too. They thought that there was a political will to break with the authoritarian policies of the past, and they were contributing to that process:

**Excerpt 6:**

The assumption that accompanied criticism or suggestions in my head was this: The state has asserted itself so much over its citizens so far. My father still enters into the district governorship and an official state institution by buttoning up his jacket. This situation engendered a discontent in a serious way. It was like revolting against an authority, an extremist authority. This effort aimed to weaken the power of state that has an unjust and unfair authority over its citizens. My thought was, this state, this excessively bullying state, sacrificing its citizens for its own interest without batting an eyelid. This state is not forgiving the criminals of conscience, but forgives when people kill each other, it does not forgive any crimes committed against itself, this state is a bit cruel, this needs to be chipped, corrected, the space of a citizen in citizen-state relations should be expanded, and this was the thought in my head. I mean we should let a citizen know who and what he is, I mean you are a human, you have rights in relation to the state, and what we call a state is made up of you  (Interviewee 10, September 1, 2014).

The underlying discourse that the interviewee has manifests itself in his portrayal of the state. The interviewee thinks his father buttons up his jacket when he goes to state institutions because the state is an “excessively bullying state, sacrificing its citizens for its own interest without batting an eyelid”. Through personifying the state, the interviewee paints a despotic image of the state that has not been held accountable for its wrongdoings. According to the interviewee, the state has never been compassionate, but merciless to its citizens, so the purpose of the committee was to develop a citizenship education curriculum to raise a democratic citizenry who transform the state structure into more democratic forms.

The interviewee’s portrayal of the state and his reflections on their effort show that he conceives citizenship as an institution that governs the relations between people and political authority. Therefore, he thinks the new citizenship education course must present a democratic image of the state with which citizens are welcomed to have a compassionate relationship. This concern reduces the concept of citizenship to only citizen-state
relationships. In fact, the committee members were not much concerned about changing the image of society from a homogenous nation to a multicultural society. The main concern was to correct the image of the state and improve state-citizen relations through citizenship education. This concern to use citizenship education in an effort to change the image of the state is in line with the political discourses of the government party, whose key figures have publicly criticised the oppressive characteristics of the state in the past and underlined that they aimed to make the state servant to the needs of citizens. Because of this concern, the committee encouraged students to get in touch with public authorities in their immediate environment whenever they feel a need. This is expected to repair the broken citizen-state relations of the past:

Excerpt 7:

There are things that can be done as a student and there are other things that can be done as a citizen. For example, paying tax does not concern him much at this moment, he should know it. However, rather than paying taxes, he should better know writing a request to school administration regarding his problems (Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014).

Writing a request to public authorities is one of the common citizenship acts in Turkey. In the past, writing a request to public authorities was considered as a futile effort because of an ingrained belief that the request would not be delivered by the authorities. In some cases, writing a complaint took courage because the state authorities were regarded too oppressive to hold to account. The committee aimed to reform state-citizen relations in a democratic way. In order to accomplish this, they wanted to make students willing to get in touch with authorities. The same interviewee expanded on this through an example. In a pilot school where the curriculum was implemented, a student who had taken the course came up with an idea that he could file a complaint to local authorities about unattended cows dirtying the environment. Since school administration marked the most convenient authority to practise this skill in the students’ immediate environment, the interviewee highlighted that the outcome the course engendered in the student represented exactly what the committee wanted to achieve.

The emphasis on writing a request arguably diverted the committee’s attention from other objectives of citizenship education, such as developing critical thinking and deliberative decision-making skills. The following conversation between me and one of the committee members reveals the inadequate attention the committee paid to the political dimensions of citizenship education. In response to my follow-up question to clarify whether "taking action" includes the right to protest, the interviewee replied:
The interviewee considers students as incapable of taking political actions as full citizens. Although the consideration of students as citizens-in-waiting is incompatible with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, it seems the interviewee thinks the political objectives of citizenship education are not relevant to middle school students (United Nations, 1989). The interviewee’s discourse is based on the notion of official citizenship that permeates national citizenship education. The official notion of citizenship deprives children of their rights until they become 18 year old in many Western countries. The exclusion of children from full citizenship until they are 18 year old is a process in which children are tamed and socialised into the conventionalised norms of citizenship. Young people are not allowed to practise their rights until the dominant forces of society think they adequately internalised the conventionalised acts of citizenship. The interviewee’s statements support this since he considers middle school students not mature enough to take part in political actions despite many instances of political actions where middle school students are actively involved.

6.2.4 Debates in Committee

The majority of the interviewees acknowledged that the committee had a democratic climate when compared with their experience in other committees:

Excerpt 9:

Debates in the committee generally took place in a way that the chair board member exactly wished for. Especially about the topic of cultural diversity, expectations of x who is a member to a left union, and an active unionist, was not welcomed by z’s [an Islamist]. From time to time, there had been tensions between these friends over these sorts of issues. The chair had been the key mediator in our debates. (…) Frankly speaking, it was not a committee which had a positive atmosphere and we worked peacefully (Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014).

The interviewee’s statements confirm the relatively democratic climate of the committee. The interviewee found the committee as “not an easy committee with a positive atmosphere to work” because he was not used to committees that encouraged democratic discussions. The emphasis on the role of the supervising board member indicates the asymmetrical power relations in a way that he dominated the committee work.
The selection of knowledge incited heated debates in the committee. The first issue the committee members found difficult to settle was whether the programme of study should be underpinned by a republican/duty-based or liberal/rights-based notion of citizenship. Although the majority were in favour of a rights-based approach, some insisted on foregrounding duties and responsibilities in the curriculum. Members in favour of responsibilities highlighted the importance of national unity and togetherness (Interviewee 3, August 29, 2014; Interviewee 9, September 1, 2014). One of the interviewees told how they reached a compromise:

**Excerpt 10:**

The interviewee’s phrases “our statist understanding”, “our old curriculum and teaching technique” and “this tradition” underline the degree to which duty-based citizenship conception had been deep-rooted in the Turkish educational system. This aspect of the educational system is in line with the authoritarian image of the state ingrained in the social memory of the citizenry. According to the interviewee, they aimed to change the negative discourses on the state and citizen-state relationship by promoting a rights-based conception of citizenship.

The second debate revolved around nationalism versus universalism. Non-governmental organisations, academics and some board members who were asked to comment on the draft curriculum underlined that the curriculum was weak on promoting national integrity (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014). One of the interviewees explained this tension as follows:

**Excerpt 11:**
The interviewee who described himself as religious refers to religious groups by “us”. His statements reveal that religious circles wished to promote the national culture and values against the harmful impacts of globalisation. They held a negative view of “global citizenship”. The interviewee states that the committee took a moderate approach to this issue in order to please “some people”. The possible reaction of religious nationalist circles seems to be given consideration given the fact that their ideology was represented in power. Interviewee 4 reflected on the inclusion of some nationalist elements in the curriculum in the following way:

**Excerpt 12:**

Me: What would you say about the aspects of the new programme which reminds of the past?

Interviewee 4: They were included to please some people…

Me: A bit pre-empting, silencing, preventing criticism

Interviewee 4: Yes, yes, that is exactly what we tried to do.

Me: Some members in the committee might have wanted them as well.

Interviewee 4: It was for preventing the reaction: why it is absent, why it is not there, yes, my brother, there is that much inclusion of discrimination, that much diversity, that much emphasis, you fragment, which is good, but a question will arise: how are we going to keep the society together? Our answer to this question will exactly be this (August 26, 2014).

The interviewee’s statements show that the committee members cared much about how the programme of study would be found by “some people” and what kind of reactions they would receive. The concern to gain an external approval of “some people” and the structural constraints set by the BoE’s organisational culture arguably made the committee pay inadequate attention to the needs of students and the basic objectives of democratic citizenship education. Interviewee 4 justifies the inclusion of some nationalist elements in the curriculum by their concerns to gain an external validation from “some people”. He
further elaborates that they included the nationalist discourses to pre-empt criticisms, such as “why is it absent, why is it not there, yes, my brother, there is that much inclusion of discrimination, that much diversity, that much emphasis, you fragment, which is good”. Even though no one told them these criticisms the interviewee seems to be sure that they would receive them if they had not included nationalist discourses.

The phrase “you fragment, which is good [ayrıştırılmışınız gayet güzel de]” is important since it reveals a dominant discourse that the inclusion of multiculturalism would lead to fragmentation unless nationalism is adequately emphasised. Advocates of multiculturalism are usually reacted to with phrases like “your ideas are good, but not realistic because their implementation would fragment the national unity”. The interviewee admits that they included nationalist discourses to avoid criticism. Even though the interviewee left unspecified whom he meant by “some people”, the phrase “some people” arguably points to influential military persons or politicians who wish to see nationalism promoted in the curriculum.

The third issue involved historical religious references. Since the members who described themselves as conservative were the majority, the committee came up with an idea to prepare an “authentic” citizenship education curriculum based on not only “western sources”, but also “our” sources (Interviewee 1, September 8, 2014; Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014; Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014; Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014). To this end, they wished to include some historical religious references from “our” past that support democracy, citizenship and human rights. Some members insisted on inserting the Farewell Sermon (a speech given by the Prophet Muhammed in 630) amongst the human rights documents:

**Excerpt 13:**
The interviewee who described himself as a religious person refers to his likeminded friends by “us”, which reveals that religious circles wished to promote the national and moral values against the harmful impacts of globalisation. The interviewee describes those who opposed their suggestion as “another group” by highlighting that they “resisted” [direndi] to their wish to include the Farewell Sermon. The interviewee’s depiction of those who wished the Farewell Sermon to be included as “friends” and those who opposed it as “another group” hints that there was an ideological polarisation in the committee. In addition, the lexical choice of the interviewee, “resisted” [direndi], is significant since this phrase is often associated with left-leaning groups with a negative connotation that they tend to resist everything.

The interviewee admits that the Farewell Sermon was included in the curriculum without having persuaded those who objected to it. The conversation between me and the interviewee shows that the interviewee does not want to give an impression that “his group” dominated the committee. The interviewee made an effort to prevent me from having an impression that, because the political context was favourable to them, they had a better
chance to emphasise their ideological discourses in the curriculum without needing much to persuade the members who were opposed to them. To this end, he only shared with me that some of his friends and him wanted to include the Farewell Sermon in the curriculum and some members of the committee were opposed to their suggestion. He only said it was “the most intense debate”, but seemed unwilling to tell me how they settled this debate. My response, “but it was included”, demanded further elaboration, put the interviewee on the defensive and made him highlight that they gave up on some other references. By this, he implied that they did not dominate the committee on every issue, but showed a compromising approach on other occasions. When I asked him to give an example of such compromise, he could not clearly remember an example by saying “I am not prepared well for this [the interview]”.

A different interviewee gave an example of such a compromise which involves the inclusion of a proverb that goes “treat people nicely to make the state prosperous” [İnsan yaşat ki devlet yaşasın]. This proverb was believed to be said by a Turkish-Islamic saint who lived in Anatolia in 13th century. One of the interviewees stated that they objected to including this proverb since it emphasises the significance of state rather than that of people (Interviewee 10, September 1, 2014). Highlighting that they decided to promote a liberal rights-based conception of citizenship and change the negative image of the state, the interviewee said he hardly managed to persuade the others that the proverb did not support the main purpose of the programme of study.

6.2.5 Approval of Programme of Study

The BoE selects, controls and constrains what is taught in formal and informal educational institutions (below higher education). Because of its centrality to the selection of school knowledge, it has become a battlefield in the power struggle between secular and religious nationalism. The ideologically-strategic status of the BoE inhibits its ability to make autonomous decisions. The BoE bureaucrats are placed in a position to implement the wishes of key state actors representing either side of the rival sources of power, namely elected-governments and the unelected state institutions (the military, judiciary and the presidency). In periods when the ideological gap between these rival sources becomes less prominent, the BoE still has to sustain its ideological role. This dependency on key state actors' directives creates a submissive culture in which arbitrary hiring and sacking decisions and self-censorship are seen as institutional norms.
One of the interviewees, who wanted to remain anonymous, used the metaphor of the pit of hell [gayya kuyusu] in describing the arbitrariness of sacking decisions in the BoE. He underlined that there is no job security, which forces the BoE officials to resort to self-censorship as a survival strategy. During my fieldwork, when my research application was turned down, I talked to a board member to find out why I was not granted permission. The board member teased me: “What are you going to ask curriculum designers? They do not have any answer to your questions; they do what is told by us.” The board member's statements show the asymmetrical power relations at the BoE where curriculum designers are seen as powerless by their superiors.

The seating arrangement of the room where the board meetings take place well demonstrates the hierarchical structure of the BoE. On the condition of anonymity, an interviewee described the seating arrangement of the room. The interviewee used the word “serfs” [marabalar] to describe committee members in relation to board members within the hierarchy of the seating arrangement. In Turkish, maraba refers to peasants who work in the fields of landlords in a medieval-like territorial system. The interviewee underlined that when committee members sit in the chairs in the middle ground, they cannot look in the face of board members. This is because seats at the top circle are allocated for board members, whereas chairs and tables in the middle ground are set up for committee members. Committee members must look up and turn their head back to be able to see board members. In a moderate tone, another interviewee depicted the relationship between curriculum designers and board members in the following way:

**Excerpt 14:**

As a committee, you might have brought together diverse ideas, but decision-makers think more monolithically. This was true for this programme of study as well. The issue, to what extent you can persuade the other side there, this issue depends on the persuasion part, not on the point of view. This is a problem in the formation of policies, did I make myself clear? No matter how rational solutions or rationales I present to you, of course this is normal in a communication and it is normal on the basis of the possibility of reaching a compromise, but there is your boss in front of you who is in a quite higher position than you, and you do not have a thing, I mean you can only say this, you can say it if he allows you to say it, if he wants, he even would not allow (Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014).

As an implication of the hierarchical institutional culture, the committee members admitted that they did not feel free and safe to state and defend their ideas (Interviewee 4, August 26, 2014; Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014; Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014; Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014). They resorted to self-censorship as a common practice when there
was a discussion on contentious issues. The interviewee explained why he self-censored his thoughts:

**Excerpt 15:**

**Interviewee 7:** I think it is self-censorship. There was no need for anyone to tell a thing, you somehow know it. Because we undergo different processes and do textbook examination at the Board of Education, it was a committee which specifically comprised philosophy group teachers, we have already experienced many things before within the institution. From a picture and a sentence there, what kind of questions would come, you would write an answer to them, I mean we were individuals who know Turkey’s issues in that regard, you know the concerns and you are aware that you are going to make the whole of Turkey accept a thing, by paying attention to these, you have to present a product that will please everyone.

**Me:** It seems the national identity is at the centre.

**Interviewee 7:** I must say this, yes, the state was significant and it was reflected there; duties and responsibilities to the state and other benchmark of this sort were included, for example, we discussed if they should be wholly left out, but it was concluded that they must be included, it was not a unanimous decision (Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014).

The interviewee's statements show how the BoE officials unconsciously internalise the institutional culture of the BoE relegating them to a powerless status. The concern not to bother anyone signifies the lodestar of the moral compass of the BoE officials. The asymmetrical power relations make the curriculum designers consider the comments of board members as commands to be followed through. For example, Interviewee 8 admitted that they added some sections to the programme of study on the wishes of board members (September 2, 2014).

Regarding the approval of the citizenship education programme of study, one of the interviewees recounted that nothing remarkable took place. It was an ordinary meeting (Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014). He maintained that there is an implicit rule that if an influential board member supervises committee work, this means the programme prepared would receive board approval easily. The “implicit rule” indicates the importance of the monitoring of the making of the programme of study along the way. If the making of a programme of study is properly monitored, there is no need to hold it up to tight scrutiny in the board meeting.

Even though the curriculum development process of the citizenship education course was supervised by a board member, two interviewees recalled some objections raised at the
approval meeting. One of them noted that a board member objected to a learning objective involving the issue of discrimination (Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014). The board member argued that discrimination would not be possible in contexts where all people are regarded as equal members of the same nation, so the learning activity is irrelevant, since all citizens are accepted to be equal. Although the objection of the board member lacked a rational basis, the interviewee said that they had to discard the learning objective in order to gain the Board's approval. This intervention exemplifies the BoE's nationalising role as the key ideological apparatus of the educational system. In relation to this function of the BoE, Interviewee 4 gave a specific example that illustrates how it controls educational discourses:

**Excerpt 16:**

**Interviewee 4:** I shall give a specific example, here I want the concept of autonomy to be included in the eighth grade programme. I think it is so significant. I have read Kant a lot, in the 1700s Kant said that if you cannot raise autonomous individuals, democracy’s destiny would be tyranny, I say this as much as I remember. Okay, what is autonomy? Engin Gençtan defines it beautifully. For example, we included it in the high school programme following very heated debates: Oh God, it would be linked to the demand for the autonomy of the South-eastern Region? Autonomy? What? Did you shift to politics? Are you making a reference to there? No, not at all, humans can be autonomous too, we are going to define it. At last, we included it by defining it: Humans under all pressures…

**Me:** Ability to make your own decisions.

**Interviewee 4:** In line with your inner voice…

**Me:** It was included as a result of your demands, right?

**Interviewee 4:** Yes, yes. (...) We are discussing the citizenship education programme in the final board meeting, I defended this there as well, I told that I do not understand, we include its definition, look we say how it is supposed to be perceived… It was the time I guess, Engin Gençtan defined that, the concept of autonomy, I eventually took the book to the meeting, they said, no no, they rejected it in the board, and they did not accept it (August 26, 2014).

In Turkey, the concept of autonomy connotes the claim of the Kurdish separatist movement. Even though the concept proposed by the committee member had nothing to do with political autonomy, it seems board members categorically refused it. The removal of the concept exemplifies the board’s uncompromising approach to national issues. A democratic citizenship education curriculum is unlikely to be developed in this institution where dominant ideologies have an unstrained influence. The following excerpt is the most
explicit one in describing the hierarchical institutional culture of the BoE and its impact on
the curriculum designers:

Excerpt 17:

**Interviewee 4:** In our country, debates on controversial issues at the political and
academic levels are not adequate. We are going to reflect this in the programme and
textbooks! Here, the status of compulsory religious education course is obvious, the
processes it has undergone, despite many court verdicts, despite the rulings of the state
council [a high court], what we experience is obvious. Therefore, the sacred state, the
lofty interests of the state, the fear of fragmentation are always in the sub-conscious [in
the back of head]. What would happen to us if we touch upon these issues? What trouble
would we face? This has an impact, as I said.

**Me:** There is a cautious climate…

**Interviewee 4:** Of course, of course, absolutely. Therefore, I would never say we
included controversial topics. And when we were preparing learning activities, we
could not talk about what we had experienced, the problems of our own society (…) We
could not touch on controversial issues maybe because of this, there is always a
village in the distance, and discrimination does not exist in our country, of course. When
the programme of study was being prepared, there was constant control. It was put onto
the agenda of the Board, it was approved, and it was sent back. It was not supposed to
be sent back with some changes. It came back with a note saying that it was okay on
the condition that those changes were to be made. Upon this, the committee had to make
those changes, it had to reflect them in the programme (August 26, 2014).

The interviewee admits that no matter how hard they tried to dismantle the established
culture of citizen-state relations, “the sacred state, the lofty interests of the state, the fear of
fragmentation are always in the sub-conscious [in the back of head]”, which insinuates into
the curriculum they develop. There are two significant points in the interviewee’s
statements. The first is his admittance that “when we were preparing learning activities, we
could not talk about what we had experienced, the problems of our own society”. The
institutional atmosphere and deep-seated beliefs make curriculum designers develop de-
contextualised programmes that are detached from the realities of Turkey. Democratic
citizenship education that does not address the citizenship, democracy, and human rights
issues of the context where it is taught is not likely to promote democracy. It might be
called a de-contextualised version of democratic citizenship education. The second
significant point is that the interviewee admits that “there was constant control” during the
preparation of the curriculum. When the second point is coupled with the first one, it can
be concluded that curriculum designers who do not feel free and safe to state and defend
their ideas and who are constantly controlled and constrained by their superiors are not
likely to promote democracy through education. They are forced to keep up with the official
view of citizenship which is based on the norms and values of the dominant social groups (secular and religious) and promote the discourses of dominant social groups.

6.3  Textbook Analysis

The textbooks analysis in the previous chapters documented the ways in which the dominant ideologies were infused in the curriculum. The first textbook, published during the military-dominated political context of 1999, included many statements reflecting the official ideology of secular nationalism (Çiftçi et al., 2004). The revised version of this textbook, published in 2004, exemplified the declining influence of secular nationalism and the infusion of the ideological discourses associated with the government party (Çiftçi et al., 2004). The textbook analysed here is a new textbook written on the basis of the programme of study of 2010. In the new citizenship education curriculum, the secular nationalist discourses were, to a great extent, replaced with the ideological discourses of the government reflecting religious nationalism. The textbook, which was published in 2010, is composed of four themes: Every human being is precious; Culture of democracy; Our rights and freedoms; Our duties and responsibilities (Özpolat, 2012). The new dominant ideology, religious nationalism, permeates the whole textbook, while the influence of secular nationalism remains visible. I first present the novel ideological discourses, then the remaining influence of secular nationalism.

6.3.1 Religious Nationalism in the Curriculum

Religious nationalism foregrounds Turkey’s contribution to the religion of Islam by depicting Islam and Turkishness as the two halves of an integral whole. It “envisages Turkey as the potential leader of the Islamic world and union. Within this context, the nostalgia for the Ottoman past can become a modern and nationalistic imperial (or irredentist) fantasy” (Bora, 2003, p. 449). With the AKP coming to power in 2002, the ideology of religious nationalism began to make its way into the citizenship education curriculum. In the latest citizenship education textbook, there is an explicit shift to religious nationalism. The textbook includes quotations from historical religious sources, such as the Farewell Sermon by the Prophet Muhammed, Masnevi by Mevlana Celaeddin-i Rumi and Malakat by Haji Bektash Veli. These religious references are described as “sources feeding our culture” (p. 12). The expression “our culture” assumes everyone as a member of the

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4 This citation refers to the main citizenship education textbook analysed in this chapter. To avoid repetition, the excerpts from it are cited with a page number in the remainder of the chapter.
same homogeneous religious culture. The textbook includes the following quotes from the references in question:

**Excerpt 18:**

| The prophet Mohammed, Rumi, Haji Bektash Veli, who are among the sources that maintain our culture, emphasise the value of man in the following ways: |
| Just as there is no superiority of an Arab over a non-Arab or a non-Arab over an Arab, someone with red skin does not have any superiority over someone whose skin is black; black is not superior to red-skinned people (Farewell Sermon) |
| Mankind is even more precious than the ninth heaven (Masnavi) |
| Do not forget that your enemy is a human being (Malakat) (p. 12). |

The common feature of the sources cited in the excerpt is that they are all historical religious references. Next to the quotes, the representative pictures of Mevlana and Haji Bektash Veli are featured with the calligraphy of a whirling dervish. The pictures and excerpts are intended to teach students the human rights principle of the inherent dignity of the human being. According to the committee’s understanding, human rights principles are grounded in “our” rather than “western” references through the citation of these historical religious sources. In other words, the inclusion of the historical religious sources was an outcome of the decision of the curriculum development committee to conceptualise human rights and democratic norms in reference to “our” sources. The quotes and visuals manifest the committee’s attempt to accomplish this goal.

Nevertheless, this attempt does not represent a sound one firstly because the cited sources include statements that can be found as contrary to human rights principles. For example, some versions of the Farewell Sermon have controversial statements about women’s rights. A section in one of its versions encourages men to beat women under certain circumstance (Chaudhry, 2013). Considering the presence of that statement in it, its inclusion in a democratic citizenship education curriculum can be found problematic. Furthermore, the Farewell Sermon includes statements in regards to slavery which runs the risk of presenting it as a legitimate institution, which is completely at odds with human rights principles. Secondly, the central message of the excerpts is vague because they were written or spoken at least 800 years ago. The phrases “red-skinned people” and “the ninth heaven” do not convey an explicit meaning, while the comparison of a non-Arab with an Arab might be found as irrelevant considering that the textbook is intended for the use of students in Turkey.
The textbook also includes a statement saying what makes a society a nation is “knowledge, art, history, language, religion, ethics, manners and customs” (p. 133). The inclusion of religion among the constitutive components of a nation signifies the transition to religious nationalism. This is because the previous textbooks did not have any mention of religion (Çiftçi et al., 2001, 2004). In the textbook, the freedom of conscience and religion are depicted as though it only applies to people who believe in one of the Abrahamic religions. The freedom of religion and conscience is used nearly ten times in the contexts where people who believed in Abrahamic religions are addressed. There is no attribution that atheists, agnostics or those from non-Abrahamic religions have the right to freedom of conscience and religion. In addition, the textbook features pictures of religious-looking old men and women (pp. 19, 23, 141, 142). These pictures represent a novelty when compared with the old textbooks, which made a good presentation of modern secular-looking people. For example, a picture featuring a young man kissing the hand of an old man who has a white beard and another one showing a little girl holding one of the hands of an old woman who wears a headscarf are included in the textbook.

In addition to the signs of transition to religious nationalism, there is evidence of politicization, suggesting that the textbook intends to convey a good representation of the government party. The textbook includes pictures of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the then-Prime Minister and now the President of Turkey. A framed picture of Erdoğan is hung on the wall of a newly-established state unit for public complaints. In the picture, Erdoğan approaches an old woman wearing a headscarf with a smile on his face (p. 99). Next to the picture are written the words “the prime minister is listening to you.” The second occasion where Erdoğan’s picture is seen is a learning context in which the significance of solidarity is emphasised through a fund-raising campaign for needy people of Somalia (p. 65). In the picture, children hold a placard on which “thank you on behalf of our brothers and sisters” is written. In the back row of the children, Erdoğan stands with other politicians, including some ministers and the head of the Presidency of Religious Affairs.

The textbook includes evidence that can be considered as political propaganda. A learning activity, designed as a newspaper template, prompts students to fill empty spaces according to specific news topics:

**Excerpt 19:**
These news topics, which are given to students as prompts, make an implicit political propaganda since all three praise government policies. In a different learning context, a student-written poem, titled “They are not crying anymore”, is included (p. 131). The poem reports the progress of Turkey to the founding leader, Atatürk, by presenting high-speed trains as symbols of the development. A picture of high-speed trains is featured under the poem. The AKP politicians regard high-speed trains as evidence of the government success and frequently mention them in their political talks. In the poem, the student poet highlights Turkey's progress and teases secular nationalists by using a political discourse associated with the government party. By satirising those who used to cry on the death anniversary of Atatürk, the student poet communicates a message that they are not crying anymore because Turkey is achieving the goals Atatürk set. With this message, the poem reiterates a political discourse identified with the religious nationalist parties that the loyal followers of Atatürk are those who are working for the development of Turkey, not those who idolise Atatürk-related symbols.

The positive representation of the government is also made in indirect ways. No historical or contemporary human rights issues from Turkey are mentioned in the textbook. Socio-political issues are overlooked in learning contexts on human rights. A misleading message is conveyed that the struggle for human rights is a finished business:

**Excerpt 20:**

The most basic human right, the right to live, is frequently violated throughout history. In today’s world, democratic states are taking measures for the preservation of the right to live. Human life and dignity is under constitutional protection in countries where democracy prevails. All sorts of measures are taken against possible risks that can jeopardise human life and dignity (p. 25).

Excerpt 20 reinforces a misjudgement that there are no human rights issues in democratic countries and no need to struggle for human rights. Human rights issues are implied as something that can be only seen outside Turkey since Turkey is a country with a constitution and a regime of democracy. From this angle, the human rights issues from other parts of the world, not from Turkey were included in the textbook. In a learning context on child labour, no issue regarding child labour in Turkey is brought to the attention
of students. The issue is glossed over with general statements without specifying any context:

**Excerpt 21:**

One of the important problems of the world is child labour. It is known that child labour in some places of the world is very common. In some research, it is found out that more than 44 million child labourers were made to work in just one country (p. 86).

Next to the above statement are two pictures of an Indian-looking child labourer carrying bricks. The images of the Indian-looking child reinforce the misjudgement that there are no child labourers in Turkey. On the other occasion, from the same perspective, racism is presented as an issue in the USA through examples from the American Civil Rights Movement (p. 50). No incidence of discrimination in Turkey is mentioned in the textbook. Also, the textbook overlooks root-causes of socio-political issues and implies that those issues result from a lack of love:

**Excerpt 22:**

Harmony spoils in a society or a world where there is no love, respect and tolerance. We may come across instances of violence among people, fights and disputes on TV channels and in newspapers. Have you ever thought of the reason that underlies this? If love is inadequate, people hurt each other (p. 22).

Excerpt 22 presents the underlying cause of violence as lack of love. It sends a message that, when we treat everyone as our brothers, social problems will be automatically solved. This message sounds like the words of a religious preacher to a group of believers of a religion. A democratic citizenship education textbook is expected to highlight the underlying causes of violence instead of explaining it with a lack of love. Nevertheless, the textbook authors avoid any mention of social, economic and political issues of Turkey in order to reinforce a good representation of the government.

**6.3.2 Refashioned Secular Nationalism**

In the previous textbooks analysed in Chapter 4 and 5, I used the depiction of the army and Atatürk as a foil to show the influence of secular nationalism. Here, in the analysis of the latest textbook, I will use the modified depiction of the army and Atatürk as evidence to show the declining, but remaining, influence of secular nationalism. There is a clear move from the secular nationalist depiction to the religious nationalist portrayal of the army and Atatürk. This is because, even though the military’s grip on power declined with the EU accession reforms, still-in-force military-influenced educational legislation requires the promotion of secular nationalism. For example, the textbook does not have any mention of the ethnic and religious minorities of Turkey. Rather, a nationalist discourse is still
prominent. For example, the textbook brings a MoNE-initiated project to the attention of students. The project aims to teach “Turkishness and Turkish culture” to Turkish students abroad (p. 133). This topic might have an adverse effect on students from minority backgrounds, since the MoNE is concerned about the alienation of Turkish students abroad while being indifferent to the absence of diversity in the curriculum in Turkey. The expressions of this nationalist discourse is not arguably a choice of the curriculum development committee, but emanates from the educational legislation.

The most important indicator of the declining influence of secular nationalism is that the exclusionary expressions about the Kurdish people and religious nationalists wholly vanished. The textbook has no mention of the army, weapons, internal threats or external enemies. The only term which can be construed as militarist used in the textbook is “doing military service”, on one single occasion (p. 128). Except for this, there is no sign of militarist discourses. Despite this novelty, the textbook includes some nationalist elements, which can be linked to the remaining influence of secular nationalism. For example, a section titled “Our Duty and Responsibilities” recalls the language of the previous textbooks in which a duty-based and authoritarian notion of citizenship was promoted. The section starts with a definition of citizen and subsequently lists the characteristics of a good citizen:

**Excerpt 23:**

| Individuals who have legal rights and duties under a sovereign state, live in the same territories and are loyal to the same state are called citizens. A good citizen embraces the loyalty to his nation, state and laws as a fundamental value and acts in line with those values. These values are preconditions for living together, and having peace and happiness. Loyalty to state encompasses respect to and faith in nation, law, order and stability (p. 127). |

The definition represents an official notion of citizenship because it views living “in the same territories” as a defining characteristic of citizenship. People may stand in solidarity with people in other parts of the world, and they do not have to live in the same territory and under a sovereign state to be called as citizens. From the perspective of performative citizenship, the whole globe can be seen as the same territory for citizenship. Excerpt 22 emphasizes “Loyalty to state” and “respect to and faith in nation, law, order and stability” as the characteristics of a good citizen. These characteristics might be construed that the textbook promotes docility and obedience, which is better seen in the following excerpt:

**Excerpt 24:**
We can list the fundamental values which an individual who is loyal to his homeland is supposed to have:

- Loyalty to the nation
- Acting with tolerance
- Self-respect
- Loyalty to the homeland
- Responsibility
- Respect for fellow man
- Loyalty to the state
- Responsibility to society
- Respect for the nation
- Responsibility to the state
- Respect for the state
- Loyalty to spiritual values
- Respect for the laws (p. 127).

This section promotes the national and collective values, duties and responsibilities of citizens. The terms “loyalty/respect/responsibility” which connote a meaning of reverence, obedience and docility are employed in all articles but one. The list reveals that a good citizen must be loyal, respectful and responsible, which are the attributes associated with a duty-based notion of citizenship. For example, the list does not include “having the knowledge of rights”, “holding the public authorities to account”, “critical approach to news” and “deliberative decision-making” as the characteristics of a good citizen. Even though this part is based on a notion of citizenship similar to the one promoted in the past, it has one remarkable difference, which is the inclusion of “the loyalty to spiritual values [manevi değerler]”. The term “manevi değerler” is a concept that refers to religious beliefs, which reflects the influence of religious nationalism. After listing the characteristics of an exemplary citizen, the section continues with the following passage:

**Excerpt 25:**

A good citizen is patriotic. Patriotism requires embracing and loving the values, homeland, nation, laws of the nation to which one is a part. As an individual of the country we live in, we should feel a sincere loyalty to the nation we belong to, principles the nation is based on and mutual interests. Our country (homeland) where we were born, fed, live and maintain our material and spiritual existence is a very sacred value to which we are supposed to be loyal (p. 127).

The passage sounds like a section from the previous citizenship education textbooks in which the military’s ideological discourses were promoted (Çifçi et al., 2001, 2004). A statist and nationalist understanding promoting obedience and docility as citizenship virtues permeates the whole passage. Again, the only novelty is some religious elements like the words “spiritual existence” and “sacred”. As a sign of continuity with the past, the textbook
repeats the duties of citizens, which Üstel (2004) described as the “classical trilogy of citizenship” (p. 264), which are paying taxes, voting and doing military service. The textbook does not break this tradition and lists “respecting laws and obeying them, paying tax, doing military service, participating activities of electing and getting elected” as the basic duties of citizens (p. 128).

The last element that is linked to the declining but continuing influence of secular nationalism is the inclusion of aphorisms from Atatürk and his pictures. However, the image of Atatürk has remarkable differences to the ones presented in the past. In contrast to his nationalist and militarist representation, the present textbook foregrounds his liberal, pro-human rights, pro-democracy and pro-peace characteristics. The changing discourse on Atatürk is best captured in a section titled “Human Rights for All”, in which Atatürk’s modern-looking pictures and statements promoting international peace are presented (p. 26). The section informs students that UNESCO declared 1981 as “Atatürk Year” to honour the centenary of his birth. The section continues that UNESCO’s decision highlighted Atatürk’s exemplary efforts to promote international peace.

On a different occasion, an image of Atatürk featuring him carefully listening to a citizen is included (p. 38). Although the previous textbook quoted Atatürk saying “the most important duty of a woman is motherhood” (Çiftçi et al., 2001, p. 26), the aphorisms in the present textbook highlight equality between men and women and the importance of democracy. In one picture, he is shown standing among modern-looking female students, in another he stands in a crowd of modern looking men and women (p. 53). In a different picture, Atatürk is shown holding the hand of a little child (p. 107), helping a little child to walk (p. 113) and reading a book on a table (p. 115). The portrayal of Atatürk in the new textbook stands in contrast to his previous portrayals in military uniforms. While the continuity of Atatürk's pictures and aphorisms indicates the remaining influence of secular nationalism, his changing representation mirrors the ideological transformation of Turkey.

### 6.4 The End of Curriculum Reform

The attempt of the constitutional court to disband the ruling party marked a turning point in the AKP's struggle with the secular state establishment. After averting this threat, the government began to limit the power of the secular establishment with more decisive measures. After regaining its self-confidence by winning nearly 50 per cent of the votes in the 2011 election, the government intensified the ideological clash and began to wholly end
the impositions of the 1997 coup, such as the headscarf ban, the closure of conservative religious middle schools and the exclusion of conservative religious high school graduates from secular college programmes. The limitation of the military's political role made it easy for the government to pursue its own ideological agenda. In this period, educational reform took on a direction of Islamisation rather than democratisation.

The parliament passed a law, known as the 4+4+4 educational reform, in 2012, which restructured the entire curriculum (Grand National Assembly, 2012). Each four-year represents one of the three stages of K-12 education, elementary, middle and high school. With this law, conservative religious middle schools which had been shut down with the 1997 coup were reopened and the college entrance restrictions for conservative religious high schools were lifted. In order to implement the reform, the BoE announced new timetables for each stage of K-12 education (MoNE, 2012a). The citizenship education course disappeared in the new timetables. The BoE decided to repeal the Democracy and Citizenship Education course, which had been introduced nearly two years ago. I sought an explanation for the repeal of citizenship education and asked all interviewees why the BoE decided to repeal the course, but none of them provided a clear answer. Only one interviewee gave information about the decision:

**Excerpt 26:**

As a first-hand experience, I shall tell you how the decision was taken. I am not an authorised person from the Ministry. Before this decision had been announced, this issue came up in our previous chats and personal conversations with the most authorised person on this issue, the head of the Board of Education. This is because the institution with which we were working was in collaboration with the Board of Education. The repeal decision had been conveyed to the Prime Minister of the period before it was taken at the Board of Education and was announced to the public with the political will (Interviewee 17, October 2, 2015).

The interviewee clearly expressed that the repeal decision was taken with the permission or endorsement of the prime minister of the period. This information needs no clarification, as it makes explicit that the repeal was a political decision. With the removal of the course, the curriculum reform agenda was completely abandoned. There was no interest in the BoE to re-introduce citizenship education in middle schools when I carried out my fieldwork in 2014.

The new middle school timetable in which citizenship education vanished included an unprecedented number of religious education courses. The 2010 timetable made compulsory 30 hour courses per week for eighth graders, of which only one hour was allocated for the Citizenship and Democracy Education course (MoNE, 2010). The 2012
timetable increased the weekly course hours to 36, but did not include a citizenship course, preserved the compulsory religious education course (two hours per week) besides introducing three new Islamic education courses (each one two hours per week) (MoNE, 2012a). These three new courses are named Qur’an, Prophet Mohammed’s Life, and Basic Religious Studies. According to the new timetable, an eighth-grade student can take eight-hours Islamic education courses per week out of 36 total weekly hours. That number of Islamic education courses at secular-track middle schools had never been seen until the announcement of the new timetable in 2012. The unprecedented number of Islamic education courses clearly suggested that the government sacrificed citizenship education to make more room for Islamic education courses. The repeal of citizenship education courses was also arguably a reflection of the fact that the new education ideology favouring Islamic education was not supportive of democratic citizenship education at all.

6.5 Conclusion

In 2008, the MoNE re-launched the negotiations with the EU and the CoE regarding the curriculum reform, which led to the introduction of a new citizenship education course. This course was introduced in a political context wherein the government was making attempts to solve the perennial citizenship problems. It appeared at a time when the government was willing to revisit the assimilationist citizenship policies towards the Kurdish and Alevi people. More importantly, the armed conflicts with the PKK had ceased at the time the curriculum reform was undertaken. Nonetheless, the course proved a short-lived experiment, as the MoNE repealed it two years after its introduction. With the consolidation of power, the government took an ideological path and re-structured the whole educational system in 2012. The new middle school curriculum did not include citizenship education courses, but an unprecedented number of religious education courses (MoNE, 2012a). The repeal of the course indicated that the new dominant ideology was not supportive of citizenship education. Since the curriculum reform of 2010 succeeded the demilitarisation of citizenship education, I termed the evolution of the subject in this period as the demilitarisation, instead of the democratisation, of citizenship education because the dominant ideology in power continued to permeate the curriculum.
Chapter 7  Role of the Council of Europe

The original role of citizenship education in Turkey was to serve the secular-nation building project. The military, the guardian of secular nationalist order, maintained this role across the years. In the event citizenship education deviated from this role, the military was involved in re-defining it on the basis of a secular nationalist interpretation of the contemporary issues of the day. This pattern was repeated following the overthrow of the first Islamist government by a postmodern coup\(^1\) in 1997. Produced after the coup, the citizenship education curriculum of 1998 reflected a profound influence of the military's ideological discourses. The 1999 Helsinki Summit, where Turkey's application to the European Union (EU) membership was recognised, created a sea change in the political context wherein the influence of the military declined to the advantage of civilian politics.

Following the Helsinki Summit, the Board of Education (BoE) showed an interest in one of the Council of Europe’s (CoE) educational initiatives, called the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE). The engagement with the EDC/HRE initiative became the main driver of the citizenship education curriculum reform in the following years. Between 1998 and 2002, the BoE made several preparatory efforts to advance a citizenship education curriculum reform in collaboration with the CoE. However, the preparatory efforts did not yield any tangible outcome (See Section 5.2). The militarised citizenship education continued to be taught with no remarkable change until 2005 (See Chapter 4).

In 2002, the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi -AKP], as a successor of the suppressed religious nationalist parties, came to power. As a representative of religious nationalism, the new government was dedicated to downgrading the military's ideological discourses in the curriculum. Under AKP rule, the BoE made attempts to remove the military's discourses from the citizenship education curriculum, but took a half-hearted approach to the introduction of a democratic citizenship education course. It was keen to demilitarise the curriculum, but reluctant to preserve citizenship education as a discrete subject in the timetable of middle schools.

\(^1\) This military intervention is known as a postmodern coup because a direct takeover of the government by the military did not take place. The military gradually toppled the government by dictating certain impositions on it.
Under AKP rule, two approaches to the EDC/HRE curriculum reform emerged in the policy cycle (See Section 6.2). The first is represented by opponents who called citizenship education a troubled subject being used for the dissemination of secular nationalism to expunge religious moral values. The opponents considered the EDC/HRE curriculum reform to be undertaken in collaboration with the CoE as an imposition from Europe and wished to repeal citizenship education courses. The second approach was represented by the proponents who wished to make use of citizenship education to improve the poor human rights record of Turkey on the way to EU membership. The proponents sought political support to advance a citizenship education curriculum reform, but were not successful at persuading the opponents who were in the influential posts in the education policy cycle.

The collaboration with the CoE weakened when the opponents were occupying effective administrative posts at the BoE by 2005. In this period, the BoE decided to repeal the citizenship education courses (MoNE, 2005). However, the political atmosphere changed considerably after the constitutional court attempted to disband the ruling government in March 2008. This lawsuit signified a breaking point in the power struggle between the forces of religious and secular nationalism. Once the AKP averted this threat, it gave impetus to democratisation reforms and began confronting the secular establishment with more substantive measures (See Section 6.1). In this political context, the proponents managed to set a curriculum reform agenda. After the proponents came to hold effective posts, they managed to resume the Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA\(^2\)) project negotiations with the CoE and the EU and re-attempted to introduce a new citizenship education course. Despite the weak political support, the proponents succeeded in introducing a new course in 2010. The cooperation with the CoE played a recognisable, albeit mixed, role in achieving curriculum reform.

In this chapter, drawing on a dataset collated from the archival and public documents and interviews with key informants, I focus my attention on the advantages and limitations of the CoE’s impact on the EDC/HRE curriculum reforms. The chapter is organised into two main sections. The first part gives a background about the CoE, Turkey’s relations with the CoE and its involvement with democratic citizenship education. The second section discusses evidence of the CoE influence and its limitations.

\(^{2}\) Instrument for Pre-accession is one of the expansion instruments of the EU, which facilitates candidate countries’ integration by offering them financial assistance for integration reforms before membership (See Section 5.2.1)
7.1 Council of Europe and Turkey

The founding treaty of the CoE was signed at St James’s Palace in London on 5 May, 1949 (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2010). Representatives from Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden were present in this meeting. On 3 August, 1949, the CoE’s headquarters were opened in Strasbourg, France. The CoE is the first intergovernmental organisation committed to the goal of a harmonious, if not united, Europe. It promotes three core principles: human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It has two legislative bodies (the parliamentary assembly and the committee of ministers) and one executive body (the European Court of Human Rights). Its work is involved in a wide range of socio-political issues, such as human rights, child custody, prevention of torture, minority rights, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, environmental issues and so on (Macmullen, 2004). Only national defence remains outside the interest of the CoE.

Except for the court, the legislative branches of the CoE operate like a “standard setting” body (Macmullen, 2004, p. 407) and “a negotiating forum” (p. 408) to reinforce the application of its core principles. Jackson (2014) describes CoE’s policy instruments as “adaptable reference text and not as an inflexible framework”, which are produced in consultation with the member states (p.138). Even though the CoE’s policy instruments are legally non-binding, the CoE utilises several enforcement strategies to reinforce a compliance with its core values, such as capacity building, transparency, rule interpretation and shaming and naming. These enforcement strategies enable the CoE to make significant contributions to the democratisation processes in its member states.

Turkey has been a member of the CoE since 1949 (Starkey, 2003). The Grand National Parliament of Turkey approved Turkey’s membership to the CoE after the French ambassador conveyed the CoE’s invitation in 1949. During the Cold War period, Turkey collaborated with the other member states in upholding the core principles of the CoE (Öncü & Cevizüleri, 2013). Turkey’s membership was temporarily suspended after the 1980 coup due to human rights violations (Kabasakal Arat & Smith, 2014; Macmullen, 2004). The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015) takes pride in collaborating with the CoE and states that Turkey has assumed the chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers seven times and played an important role in the integration of eastern and central European countries to the CoE (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). It also acknowledges that Turkey
has been in close collaboration with the CoE in advancing a number of constitutional amendments, such as the amelioration of civil law and the penal code.

In fact, the CoE played a significant role in curbing the military’s role in politics by providing legal expertise to the Turkish authorities. Turkey’s EU membership bid has also positively affected the collaboration with the CoE. It is widely acknowledged that the CoE’s impact becomes far-reaching in countries that are in the process of meeting the EU accession requirements, since the CoE and the EU have many standards in common (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2010). Although they stand as two separate institutions, their mutual standards lead to call the CoE as a “waiting room” before EU membership (p. 13). In fact, Turkey’s collaboration with the CoE improved considerably during the EU accession process after the 1999 Helsinki Summit.

7.2 Council of Europe and Citizenship Education

The CoE has been interested in education as a force to promote its core principles and create harmony and unity between its member states (Birzéa, 2005). The European Cultural Convention, in force since 1955, provides a legal basis to encourage the member states to cooperate in cultural issues, including education. The CoE had an administrative body for the application of the convention, named the Council for Cultural Co-operation (CDCC), from 1961 to 2001. The CDCC operated as a platform to set the agenda for the CoE’s work in the fields of education, culture, media, sport and youth (Compendium, 2015). In 2001, the CDCC’s duties were taken over by four separate steering committees. In 2012, a supervisory committee, the Steering Committee for Culture, Heritage and Landscape, was created to provide a platform for member states' representatives and CoE's permanent experts to collaborate on educational issues. Since the CoE’s educational policy instruments are non-binding, their applications vary considerably among member states. Keating (2014) notes that CoE’s policies are often “mediated, resisted, and/or co-opted by member states, depending on member states’ institutions, histories and current political needs” (pp. 18–19). For example, countries that have relatively less stable democratic institutions can be more willing to implement the CoE's policies on democratic citizenship education.

7.2.1 Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education initiative

Promoting human rights and democratic citizenship through education has been a parcel of the CoE’s commitment to enforce a compliance with its core principles (Birzea, 2000).
During the post-Cold War period, the pressing international issues of democracy, citizenships and human rights made the CoE focus its attention more on education as a tool to disseminate its own core principles. An interest in education for democratic citizenship was recorded in the education minister’s meetings in Madrid in 1994 and in Kristiansand in 1997 (Kerr et al., 2010). The final declaration of the second summit of heads of state and government called on initiating a programme on education for democratic citizenship. In 1997, the CoE and the EU representatives decided to launch a three-year programme, which was later named the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE) (Naval, Print, & Veldhuis, 2002). The EDC/HRE initiative epitomised the CoE’s commitment to foster a culture of democracy and human rights as well as to fight racism, violent extremism, xenophobia and discrimination.

The EDC/HRE programme was completed in three phases, each one of which lasted nearly three years. The first phase was completed between 1997 and 2000, the second phase, from 2001 to 2004 and the third phase, 2006 to 2009 (Kerr et al., 2010). In the first phase, the various divisions of the CoE collaborated to form a conceptual and definitional basis for EDC/HRE, to develop methods and materials and encourage grassroots organisations to contribute to the initiative. One of the outcomes of the first phase was the adoption of a declaration and programme of action on education for democratic citizenship in Budapest in 1999. In the second phase, the education committee bureau identified “policy development” as “the first priority of the EDC activities” (O’Shea, 2002, p. 5). One of the education policy instruments, Recommendation Rec (2002) 12, was adopted on 16 October, 2002 at the 812th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. This document recommended to the member states the promotion of education for democratic citizenship in all stages of educational system. In the second phase, the member states were asked to appoint national coordinators for the EDC/HRE initiative with a view to enhancing networks and disseminating good policy and practices.

In the third phase, the focus was shifted from the development of policy instruments to designing manuals for policy-makers and practitioners to facilitate the implementation of EDC/HRE policies. In an effort to help the member states better implement EDC/HRE policies in their national contexts, the committee of ministers adopted the Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (the EDC/HRE Charter) in 2010. Osler (2013) underlines that the EDC/HRE Charter signifies “a turning point in the Council of Europe’s work in promoting citizenship and human rights
education” (p. 31). The EDC/HRE Charter presents a succinct summary of the fundamental objectives of the field of EDC/HRE. It includes clear definitions of education for democratic citizenship and human rights education.

The model of citizenship education proposed in the EDC/HRE Charter is premised on human rights, promotes active participation, respect for diversity and the rule of law. As the overarching objective, the EDC/HRE Charter underlines enabling learners to contribute to “the building and defence of a universal culture of human rights” (CoE, 2010, p. 7). In addition, it includes significant recommendations to make curriculum development processes inclusive and participatory. The EDC/HRE Charter sets standards by which to judge the quality of citizenship education as to whether it is a national citizenship education curriculum underpinned by the notion of official citizenship or democratic citizenship education underpinned by the notion of performative citizenship (See Section 1.3).

7.3 Evidence of CoE Influence
The CoE played a positive role in Turkey’s citizenship education reform. Especially after the Helsinki Summit, it became a source of stimulation for the proponents to seek opportunities to undertake a citizenship education curriculum reform. Even though the progressive characteristics of the new curriculum cannot be only explained by the CoE’s influence, I argue that the cooperation with the CoE played a significant role in the demilitarisation of the citizenship education curriculum. I identify the CoE’s positive impact in three elements. Firstly, the CoE helped set a citizenship education curriculum reform agenda. Secondly, the CoE’s support encouraged the proponents to keep seeking ways to advance the curriculum reform. Thirdly, the collaboration with CoE had a recognisable impact on the ways of curriculum development process and the citizenship education curriculum of 2010.

7.3.1 Setting a Reform Agenda
The curriculum reform of 2010 would not have been possible without the CoE’s support. After the start of the EDC/HRE initiative in 1997, the CoE began to act as a source of constant stimulation for the BoE to advance a citizenship education curriculum reform. However, the official interest in the curriculum reform fluctuated with the changing political parameters. During the military-dominated period in the run-up to the 1997 coup, the BoE approached the collaboration with the CoE in a formal and diplomatic way, which
is captured in the BoE’s response to the invitation by the CoE to join the EDC/HRE initiative:

**Excerpt 1:**

There are many things concerning democratic citizenship that Europe would learn from Turkey. Because the concept of “Citizen” was formed as an approach superseding the concept of “subject hood” in a period of 150 years, and the modern identity of “Democratic Citizen” has developed [in Turkey] (BoE, January 14, 1997).

The BoE presented Turkey as a country with an outstanding history in terms of the evolution of democratic citizenship, which can provide assistance to other European countries for EDC/HRE reforms. The discourse that permeates Excerpt 1 is analysed in detail in Section 4.2, where I interpreted the emphasis on the state formation era as a sign of the growing influence of the secular nationalist forces in the pre-coup period. The BoE further suggested disseminating a translation of the citizenship education textbook of the 1930s to the other member states as a source book for democratic citizenship education. The textbook in question was under the heavy influence of the ultra-nationalist ideologies of the 1930s (Üstel, 2004). These features of the letter hint that the military’s attempt to suppress religious nationalism resonated in the BoE’s letter. While the dominant ideology in power was prevailing over the BoE, the BoE developed a negative approach to the EDC/HRE initiative, as evidenced by the fact it equated secular nationalist citizenship education with democratic citizenship education in the letter.

However, this negative approach changed after 1999. A report written by the head of the Directorate of Foreign Affairs of the MoNE signalled the changing approach (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Directorate of Cultural Affairs, February 18, 1999). After participating in the Council for Cultural Co-operation (CDCC) meeting, the director reported back detailed information regarding the administrative structure of the CDCC in order to show the ways in which Turkey would participate in the works of CDCC more effectively (See Section 5.2). In the second phase of the EDC/HRE initiative, the BoE appointed a national coordinator and more enthusiastically engaged in the EDC/HRE activities (BoE, March 3, 2001). The official reports of this period indicate that the national coordinator organised several preparatory meetings to set the groundwork for a citizenship education curriculum reform. For example, an EDC/HRE committee, formed within the BoE, developed a national EDC/HRE action plan and launched pilot implementations at some schools (See Chapter 5). More importantly, the BoE began to develop an IPA project proposal for the citizenship education reform. The changing approach of the BoE in parallel with the
changing political dynamics shows that the level of cooperation with the CoE was closely tied to the political factors.

The established ways of top-down curriculum development in Turkey were stretched by the influence of the EDC/HRE initiative (BoE, November 12, 2001). The EDC/HRE committee developed the national EDC/HRE plan with the participation of an unprecedented number of stakeholders (See Section 5.2). The national plan was also underpinned by a rights-based notion of citizenship. Considering that the preparatory efforts were undertaken as part of the EDC/HRE initiative, the more democratic development of the national plan and its progressive characteristics can be easily associated with the influence of the CoE. However, the preparatory efforts did not yield any tangible outcome because the governmental change in 2002 resulted in a gradual weakening of the BoE’s engagement in the EDC/HRE initiative (See Section 5.3). Official interest in the curriculum reform was dissipated after a new head was appointed to the BoE in 2003. The BoE archival documents show the active participation of the EDC/HRE national coordinator in the EDC/HRE initiative activities from 1999 to 2003, but after 2003, there was not much involvement. This is because the new administration put a halt to the preparatory efforts, scrapped committees and discharged the EDC/HRE national coordinator, so the collaboration with the CoE turned into a tokenistic formal engagement.

The only element sustained by the new administration was the IPA project negotiation. The BoE remained in contact with the CoE and the EU regarding the IPA project negotiations, but began to show reluctance when the joint parties (the EU and the CoE) were ready to sponsor the project in 2005 (Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014; Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015). In this period, the BoE developed a negative approach to the curriculum reform by considering the subject as an imposition from Europe. The underlying belief behind this negative approach was that Europe was imposing its own values on Turkey under the cloak of democratic citizenship education, so the EDC/HRE curriculum reform was detrimental to moral and religious values. According to the opponents, democracy is not something that can be taught through individual subjects in the curriculum. Therefore, implementing the EDC/HRE curriculum reform would lead to the degeneration of national values. With this belief, the BoE refused to implement the IPA project, and repealed citizenship education courses in 2005.
This new approach to the EDC/HRE curriculum reform was an effect of the dominant political ideology in power. Although the official interest in citizenship education vanished after 2003, a struggle for influence to introduce a democratic citizenship education course continued within the BoE. Against the opponents, the proponents developed an alternative view that the EDC/HRE curriculum reform could make a contribution to the improvement of human rights and democracy in Turkey. When the political context was favourable to democratisation reforms by 2008, the proponents resumed relationships with the CoE (See Section 6.2). The support of the CoE helped the proponents to set a curriculum reform agenda, which led to the introduction of the citizenship education course in 2010. During the period from 1999 to 2010, the CoE's support enabled the proponents to sustain the curriculum reform agenda and introduce the course.

7.3.2 Strengthening Proponents within the MoNE

The proponents argued that citizenship education could be used as an effective means to improve the culture of human rights and democracy and strengthen the EU membership bid of Turkey. They highlighted that democracy and human rights are not in the monopoly of the Europe, but universal and have resonance in “our” own culture (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014). They wished to design a citizenship education curriculum underpinned by a harmonious combination of universal and cultural sources. Cultural sources included the historical religious references mentioned in Section 6.3.1. The proponents developed a synthesis approach for the cultural contextualization of the EDC/HRE objectives. This synthesis approach moderated the objection of those who categorically rejected the subject and helped to garner more support for curriculum reform.

When some of the proponents were promoted to higher posts in 2009, they had a chance to deepen the cooperation with the CoE. After gaining the education minister’s approval, they resumed the IPA project negotiations, which had fallen by the wayside in 2005 (See Section 5.3). In 2009, the MoNE’s high-profile bureaucrats met the CoE decision-makers to discuss the details of the IPA project (Interviewee 16, September 16, 2015). A series of technical issues needed to be settled prior to the implementation of the IPA project (Interviewee 13, July 6, 2015) and settling these details prolonged the application of the project. Even though the partners for an IPA project are normally selected through a tender process, the MoNE insisted on working with the CoE as the main partner. According to Interviewee 16 from the CoE, the MoNE bureaucrats stressed that “the Council of Europe has really a comparative advantage and key in this area” and wanted to implement the project in
cooperation with the CoE (September 16, 2015). Although it is not usual for the European Commission to make an exception to the IPA regulations, it approved the CoE as the main partner for the project implementation without a tender process.

After the CoE was designated as a partner in the IPA project implementation, it funded a conference in Ankara in November 2009 (Interviewee 11, August 11, 2014; Interviewee 16, September 16, 2015). Although there appears to be no official record of the conference, either from CoE or BoE, some documents give details about it. This conference provided a platform for academics from universities, NGO representatives, MoNE bureaucrats, curriculum designers and CoE representatives to discuss the details of the citizenship education reform (Project Coordination Centre of Ministry of National Education, October 26, 2010). Interviewee 16 claimed that there was still an opposition to collaborating with the CoE and maintained that the main purpose of the conference was to set “the groundwork in a way for the political acceptance to work with” the CoE as the main partner (September 16, 2015). This opposition was coming from those who had been against the involvement of a Europe-based institution in the curriculum work of Turkey. Given the presence of the Minister of Education at the conference, the conference provided proponents with an opportunity to ensure political support.

Interviewee 16 recounted that, in the conference, the proponents emphasised the fact that working with an international partner is a requirement of the IPA project implementation, not a choice (September 16, 2015). From this angle, they underlined the advantages of working with the CoE and emphasised that Turkey is a member of the CoE and signed up to the EDC/HRE Charter. They also highlighted the CoE’s outstanding record of providing assistance for democratisation reforms in Turkey. One of the CoE’s characteristics, being non-interventionist, played a positive role in persuading the opponents and garnering political support:

**Excerpt 2:**

It is much more productive if you work more as partners and suggest, give ideas and be serious, but also modest. I think that approach might work better than coming in and imposing things. I lived three years in Bosnia and Sarajevo. In the beginning, the international community would impose everything, it is easy to do, but it does not work. I see there is legislation that was just imposed and nobody is implementing because they did not feel part of the project (Interviewee 16, September 16, 2015).

Interviewee 16 emphasises that the CoE exerts an influence as a soft-government mechanism, rather than “coming in and imposing things”. It seems the CoE make deliberate
efforts to work on an equal footing with member states' authorities. Mentioning his experiences in Bosnia and Sarajevo, the interviewee stressed that being “serious, but also modest” is a more effective approach to bring about a positive change. The proponents also underlined this characteristic of working with the CoE as a positive aspect. They emphasised that the CoE only provided technical assistance on their request (Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014; Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014). Interviewee 11, internal to the BoE, reflected on this:

I was maintaining the negotiations of the citizenship and human rights education project. I was maintaining the negotiations with the Council and the Ministry. I was receiving many criticisms like we were having the Council make programmes. Fortunately, the programme [citizenship and democracy education programme of study] was finished before starting to work with the Council. We said thank God! Of course, an educational system is normally envisaged according to each society’s needs and priorities. Both in the negotiation stage and other stages in our relationship with the CoE, we have never had an imposition, dictation, content imposition or an approach of this sort. Nothing like it became a case. As I mentioned, they were only sensitive about the proper use of funding they provided (August 24, 2014).

According to Interviewee 11, the CoE's working principle is a strength that makes it a popular partner to work with. Interviewee 16 also stressed that the CoE does not have any special agenda about Turkey, it does the same in Turkey as it does in all other member states; nothing special is imposed on Turkey (September 16, 2015). The emphasis on this characteristic played a decisive role in the persuasion of the opponents.

The conference made the IPA project implementation a more feasible option. Interviewee 16 stated that the CoE officials had an impression that the conference was “almost a launching event” of the IPA project implementation (September 16, 2015). Interviewee 11 from the BoE confirmed that the conference reinforced an expectation that the IPA project was to be launched very soon (August 24, 2014). He stated that “the CoE informed us that the IPA project would be carried out in 2009.” Although the project did not start as expected, the proponents launched the curriculum reform at the beginning of 2010 with an expectation that the project would be implemented soon, and their initiative would merge into the project implementation. However, the project was delayed until November 2011 and the proponents' initiative turned into an independent effort supported by the CoE. Despite this unexpected delay, the CoE’s involvement strengthened proponents within the MoNE and contributed to the realisation of the curriculum reform in 2010.
7.3.3 Impact on the Process and Product

The proponents launched the curriculum reform by forming a curriculum development committee to prepare a new curriculum in 2010. While the curriculum development committee was drafting the curriculum, the BoE introduced a new course, titled Citizenship and Democracy Education (MoNE, 2010). Since the curriculum reform was launched with an expectation that it would soon become a part of the IPA project, the proponents had a concern to comply with the CoE policy objectives. The committee members familiarised themselves with the CoE’s education policy objectives. For example, the board member, who was designated to supervise the curriculum development process, was the same person who had restored and maintained relations with the CoE in respect of the IPA project. Furthermore, two of the committee members stated they had been to the CoE’s Headquarters to discuss the details of the IPA project (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2015; Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014). In addition, some of the committee members had experience of working in other CoE-involved projects.

Some aspects of the curriculum development process and the final product manifested the impact of the CoE policy objectives expressed in the EDC/HRE Charter (CoE, 2010). For example, the proponents strove to stretch the established curriculum development practices to more participatory and inclusive forms. To achieve this, the committee made attempts to provide inputs from academics and NGOs through interviews and their written comments on the draft of the curriculum. As a result of the consultation effort, eleven NGOs, which are interested in citizenship education, sent a letter summing up their consensual expectations to the committee (Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014). Although the committee asked teachers unions to send their feedback and comment on the draft programme of study, none of them gave a response to the committee’s request (Interviewee 4, August 26, 2014). The teacher unions' indifference might have stemmed from a firm belief that the committee was asking for their contribution to make the process “be seen” as democratic. Despite the shortcomings of the consultation process, the committee’s effort to make the process more democratic represents a novelty and is linked to the committee’s concern to conform to the CoE standards.

In addition to consultation efforts, the committee implemented the curriculum in pilot schools in different regions of Turkey. The committee members visited the pilot schools, made observations and had interviews with students, teachers and school administrators. The pilot schools were asked to send evaluation reports regularly to the committee. The
committee members highlighted that they took into account the pilot schools’ responses when producing the programme of study and textbook. However, the committee’s effort to make the process as participatory as possible was hampered by the regulation specifying the formation and running of curriculum development committees, the Special Expertise Committee Formation Circular, which does not allow hiring anyone except for BoE officials (MoNE, 1993). For example, there is no regulatory basis to commission academics from universities and non-governmental organisation representatives to work in curriculum development committees. Because of this, the committee received input from outsiders through indirect consultations.

The committee aimed to design curricular materials based on learning activities rather than topics (Interviewee 12, September 9, 2014). According to Interviewee 12, the curriculum designers learnt an activity-based curriculum development approach through their interaction with the CoE. In addition, the citizenship education curriculum included novel features regarding democratic citizenship, active participation, diversity and human rights. The absence of the military's ideological discourses, promotion of a rights-based conception of citizenship and the inclusion of themes on discrimination are some of the progressive characteristics of the new curriculum that can be easily associated with the CoE’s influence. Even though there was no written acknowledgement concerning the CoE's contribution in the final documents, one of the interviewees stated that they did not acknowledge the CoE's contribution because the IPA project implementation had not yet been launched when they finalised the curriculum (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014). The interviewee underlined that it would not have been proper to make reference to the CoE, since their effort did not have a formal link to the CoE. However, the interviewee accepted that they remained in contact with the CoE during all phases of the preparation of the new curriculum and had a concern to conform to the CoE’s recommendations.

7.4 Limitations of CoE Influence

As an intergovernmental organisation with an international recognition of promoting universal principles of democracy and human rights, the cooperation with the CoE had a positive impact on the realisation of the citizenship education curriculum reform in Turkey. However, it also had some limitations. On the basis of the curriculum reform of 2010, I identify three limitations. The first one is that being a European organisation reinforced the objection of religious nationalist circles to the curriculum reform. The second resulted from one of the working principles of the CoE, having influence rather than power, which opens
the CoE’s involvement to the abuse of political actors who wish to make themselves seen as pro-democracy while pursuing anti-democratic policies. The third limitation is concerned with the expertise of CoE staff who are sent to provide expertise to the curriculum authorities in undertaking curriculum reforms. In fact, the CoE experts' knowledge on socio-political context and their relationship with decision makers of member states are vital for the success of curriculum reforms.

### 7.4.1 Being an External Actor

Interviewee 16, internal to the CoE, shared his impression that the proponents of the curriculum reform in Turkey were under the pressure of “religious groups” because they were collaborating with the CoE (September 16, 2015). Interviewee 11 from the BoE confirmed that they were severely criticised for letting the CoE intervene in the curriculum work (August 24, 2014). Interviewee 11 admitted that he felt relieved when they finalised the curriculum before the start of the IPA project implementation. The completion of the curriculum before the commencement of the IPA project enabled him to reject the accusation that they allowed the CoE to intervene in the curriculum work of Turkey. Since citizenship education is closely associated with norms and values to be transmitted to future generations, external interference incited a reaction from the religious nationalist circles. This was because the religious nationalist circles hold a firm belief that curriculum must be kept outside of all foreign interventions. The religious nationalist circles are also extremely critical of Europe-based international organisations. In this regard, Interviewee 16 stated the following:

**Excerpt 3:**

> We definitely work hand in hand with the EU, I mean not only in Turkey, but many other countries. We have a secretary general who meets the commissioners; we have daily contacts in Brussels… At the same time, we also have a responsibility to support our member states, not only the EU accession member states to implement activities because that is the other thing… we always mentioned to the Turkish authorities that Turkey is not the only one that is undergoing the reform process of EDC/HRE, it is the same in France the same in other countries… (Interviewee 16, September 16, 2015).

The interviewee emphasises that they assured the Turkish authorities that the collaboration with the CoE is a normal and transparent procedure that had been experimented in other contexts. The CoE officials needed to highlight that nothing special was imposed on Turkey. Nevertheless, the CoE’s involvement with the curriculum reform was met with suspicion and delayed the realisation of the reform. The repeal of the course might also be linked to the involvement of the CoE, since it appeared in a context wherein the government began to follow an ideological agenda more openly in 2012.
7.4.2 Influence Rather than Power

As a soft-governance mechanism, the CoE does not oblige curriculum authorities to conform to certain requirements in respect of curriculum development since the CoE’s education policy instruments are non-binding. Given that the cooperation with the CoE has a political value, this characteristic of the CoE cooperation runs the risk of equipping authoritarian political regimes with a tool to present themselves as pro-democracy without advancing any remarkable democratisation reform. It allows abusing the cooperation with the CoE for political purposes. Even though it is a reality that the CoE lacks the power to make binding agreements with its partners, it can choose to cooperate with curriculum authorities willing to advance the EDC/HRE curriculum reforms.

In the Turkish case, the relations between the BoE and the CoE were positive in 2011 to the extent that the CoE requested the BoE to host the 18th annual meeting of EDC/HRE national coordinators in Turkey. The BoE readily accepted this request and organised the meeting in Antalya in 2011. Interviewee 16 shared his reflections on the meeting in the following words:

**Excerpt 4:**

> I think it was in Antalya, all the representatives of the member states met in Turkey to have our annual meeting on education for democratic citizenship that was hosted by Turkey and I remember the head of the Board of Education was there…. it was interesting on both sides, I think, to see Turkey showed its interest in the subject by hosting such a meeting and showed the rest of Europe that it was interested kind of really deeper in this project. It was also interesting for other people in Europe to see that Turkey was starting to be interested more (Interviewee 16, September 16, 2015).

The interviewee’s account highlights the political value of cooperating with the CoE. The organisation of the meeting in Turkey created a positive impression that the government would give an impetus to democratisation reforms in education. However, this level of cooperation between the CoE and the BoE was not reflected in the curriculum reform. On the contrary, at the peak of the cooperation, the citizenship education course vanished from the timetables of middle schools (MoNE, 2012a). Furthermore, the new middle school timetables included an unprecedented number of religious education courses. Ironically, these curriculum reforms were advanced when the CoE’s cooperation with the BoE was at its peak in 2012 (BoE, September 14, 2011). The CoE’s partnership helped the government project itself as pro-democracy while transforming the educational system into a more religious outlook.
7.4.3 Expert Issues

The third limitation of the CoE influence is concerned with the international experts of the CoE. Turkey’s case of curriculum reform suggests that having expertise in the field of EDC/HRE is not sufficient for the CoE’s experts to become successful at helping curriculum authorities of member states. This is because the EDC/HRE curriculum development requires embedding the EDC/HRE objectives into specific topics or learning activities derived from the curricular repertoire of the target context. Given that every sentence, word and visual in curricular materials conveys a message to learners, the cultural contextualization of the EDC/HRE objectives is a delicate business, which requires having in-depth knowledge of the target context in addition to expertise in the field of the EDC/HRE. Without suitable experts, the EDC/HRE curriculum reform can result in the production of curricular materials that promote dominant ideological discourses. CoE experts with inadequate knowledge may not notice subtle ideological messages permeating curricular materials.

Having a competency in intercultural communication is also significant for the CoE expert to make a positive impact on curriculum reforms. For example, some key decision-makers from the BoE told me in personal conversations that the condescending behaviours of a CoE expert 3 discouraged them from deepening the collaboration with the CoE. They stated that the expert had little understanding of the Turkish context and had little experience of the expectations of Turkish bureaucracy. This expert problem might have resulted from the fact that the CoE is not a well-funded organisation and has to work with 47 member states, so CoE’s capacity to find appropriate experts was limited by financial constraints.

7.5 Conclusion

The CoE’s role is conspicuous in the process of the revival of the citizenship education curriculum reform agenda. Although some influential actors refused to cooperate with the CoE, there were always bureaucrats within the MoNE who were keen on advancing the curriculum reform by working in close collaboration with the CoE. The CoE's influence became more visible when the proponents were in effective posts after 2008. In the following years, the CoE's impact was more acutely captured in setting an agenda for curriculum reform, strengthening the proponents, making a difference in the process of

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3 The CoE sent this expert to Turkey after the official approval of the IPA project in 2011, who did not take part in any effort for the preparation of the eighth-grade citizenship education curriculum.
advancing the reform and the progressive features of the new curriculum. Focusing only on the positive aspects of the CoE influence leads to a conclusion that the CoE is an effective player in the curriculum reforms of non-Western contexts like Turkey. However, this conclusion only shows the bright side of the picture, since the Turkish case also revealed some significant limitations of the CoE's influence.

The limitations of the CoE’s influence are mainly concerned with being an external organisation based in Europe, having an influence, but not power, and expert-related problems. Although the first limitation arising from being an external actor is hard to eliminate, the second and the third limitations can be eliminated. For example, the CoE can broker a binding agreement with curriculum authorities before starting to work with them as a partner. Alternatively, the CoE can decide not to collaborate with member countries where there is a possibility that authoritarian political powers can manipulate its involvement. To minimise the limitation stemming from experts, the CoE could commission those who have in-depth knowledge of target contexts and are competent in intercultural communication. Similarly, the CoE can follow up the performance of its experts by asking for feedback from curriculum authorities where they are sent to work. These measures can increase the effectiveness of the CoE's influence in EDC/HRE curriculum reforms and help to better uphold its core principles in the member states.
Chapter 8  Conclusion and Discussion

The preceding four chapters provided detailed answers to the research questions, but did not squarely address each one of the questions. They responded to the research questions partially through a chronological account of the reform process. In this chapter, I answer each of the research questions one by one, outline the general findings and discuss the main conclusions in relation to the relevant literature. At the end, I make recommendations for the consideration of decision-makers and point directions for future researchers.

8.1  First Question

| How did the following considerations influence the Turkish Ministry of National Education’s citizenship education curriculum reform between 1995 and 2012? |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| a. Internal political considerations |
| b. European Union (EU) accession process |
| c. The United Nations (UN) and Council of Europe (CoE) |

This question aimed to identify the drivers of the citizenship education reform, namely external and internal influences on the curriculum reform. Even though the external and internal influences are too intertwined to disentangle, for the purpose of providing an accurate answer to this question, I attempt to separate them out under the following subheadings:

8.1.1  Internal Political Considerations

My examination of the dataset led me to develop the following premise: the military, which played a custodianship role in maintaining the secular nationalist state order, formed a platform on which education in general and citizenship education in particular served the nation-building project. By disseminating an official ideology, the national education aimed to raise citizen-soldiers who were identified with the imagined modern, secular and homogeneous Turkish nation. I considered the dissemination of an education ideology of nationalism as the main obstacle hindering the democratisation of the citizenship education curriculum. The official education ideology was rooted in the norms and values of secular nationalist groups and perpetuated by three key state apparatuses: the judiciary, the presidency and the military.
The military used three interface mechanisms to insert this ideology into the curriculum (See Chapter 4). First, the national curriculum authority, the Board of Education (BoE), enabled the military to keep the citizenship education curriculum within certain ideological boundaries. Second, the military controlled the subject through educational legislation enacted in the aftermath of military coups. The military influence on the constitutional texts had a direct impact on the subject, since the content of the subject was prepared in compliance with the legislative framework, and, more importantly, the subject's content was derived from the constitution. In fact, the analysis of the textbooks showed that citizenship education was firmly grounded in the Constitution. The last mechanism, which allowed the military to control citizenship education, was the National Security Council (NSC), which gave the top army colonels a chance to influence the cabinet members. By this platform, the military had an opportunity to talk to the leaders of the executive, including the Prime Minister, regarding curriculum policies and, thereby, exercise an ideological control over the subject. As a result, the discourses of secular nationalism underpinned the conception of national identity, democracy and human rights promoted in the curriculum.

The ideological features of citizenship education began to undergo a process of change when the military's hegemony over the Turkish democracy came into question at the beginning of the 1990s. As the end of the Cold War brought human rights and democracy to the frontline in international politics, the Turkish governments sought ways to keep up with the international developments and speed up the process of the EU membership accession (F. Türkmen, 2007). In parallel to the growing questioning of the military's dominant status in politics, an interest arose in the MoNE to less emphasise the military's ideological discourses in the citizenship education curriculum. As early as 1992, the Minister of National Education openly remarked that the militarist perspectives (e.g. statements blaming political parties for chaos rampant in society before the 1980 coup) would be removed from citizenship education textbooks (Milliyet, 1992). The same year, the MoNE decided to discard some topics promoting the military's ideological discourses from the curriculum of the citizenship education courses, such as terror and anarchy, external and internal threats, national defence, the NSC, military service and so on (MoNE, 1992). However, the weakening of the military’s dominant role in the system did not progress in a linear way, neither did the democratisation of the curriculum of the citizenship education courses.
While the post-Cold war era created a favourable political atmosphere to democratisation, it opened a space for the expression of Kurdish separatism and religious nationalism. This made the forces of the secular nationalist establishment alert to democratisation reforms intended by the governments. Emerging national security threats made the military reluctant to concede its dominating role in politics. The military wished Turkey to side with the western liberal bloc without substantive changes in the citizenship regime. By contrast, governments were keen on democratisation reforms, since they relied on the vote of an electorate whose majority had ethnic, religious or ideological identities suppressed by the secular state establishment. They strove to capitalise on Turkey’s links to international organisations, such as the EU, CoE and UN, to persuade the military circles for democratisation reforms.

The tension between the military and governments gave rise to tokenistic democratisation reforms, which were undertaken to enhance the image of Turkey as a respectable democratic state rather than to eradicate the root-causes of democracy and human rights problems. The purpose was to make Turkey “be seen”, rather than “make”, a democratic country siding with western liberal democracies. The citizenship education curriculum reform was stuck in this tension between the military and civilian governments. In 1995, the MoNE attempted to reform secular nationalist citizenship education through the integration of human rights education after joining the United Nations (UN) Decade for Human Rights Education (HRE) initiative. However, the tension between the military and government escalated after an Islamist political party formed a coalition government in 1996 and cast a long shadow over the prospect of the curriculum reform. The new citizenship education curriculum was developed after the military overthrow of the Islamist government in 1997, when the military was committed to rooting out two dissident movements: Kurdish separatism and religious nationalism.

The military's attempts to suppress religious nationalism and Kurdish separatism were echoed in the citizenship education curriculum of 1998. The reform efforts that culminated in the participation in the UN programme in 1995 ended with the announcement of the 1998 curriculum, which placed the military's ideological perspectives at the centre of the course’s curriculum. The reform efforts undertaken from 1995 to 1999 brought some cosmetic changes without a considerable shift in the course’s curriculum. The power struggle in the broader political context caused the citizenship education reform to be used as an ideological tool to consolidate the hegemony of secular nationalism. The curriculum
reform in this period demonstrated what was necessary for the democratisation of citizenship education and signified both a retreat and a restarting point for the curriculum reform in the following years.

The ideological tension between the governments and the secular state establishment was exacerbated by the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP] coming to power in 2002. The transition of power from secular to religious nationalism under AKP rule created opportunities for the realisation of citizenship education curriculum reform. Since the AKP government wished to dispense with the military’s ideological discourses in education, it reinforced a reform rhetoric that the EU membership accession required the re-structuring of the whole curriculum. I construed this reform rhetoric as a strategy to moderate the secular nationalists’ reaction to a possible change in the education ideology towards religious nationalism. This reform rhetoric led to the repeal of the citizenship education courses and abandonment of the curriculum reform agenda in 2005. The reason for the repeal was that the educational bureaucrats who represented the new dominant ideology saw the citizenship education as an ideological subject promoting the discourses of secular nationalism and European norms and values. In parallel to the shift from secular to religious nationalism in education, the importance attached to the citizenship education courses faded away.

In 2008, the attempt of the constitutional court to disband the government party created a sea change in the political context and re-motivated the government to make a stride in the EU membership bid. This change had a positive influence on the revival of the citizenship education reform agenda. The MoNE re-launched the negotiations with the EU and the CoE regarding curriculum reform, which led to the introduction of a new citizenship education course: Citizenship and Democracy Education. This course was introduced in a political context wherein the government was making attempts to solve the perennial citizenship problems. It appeared at a time when the government seemed willing to revisit the assimilationist citizenship policies towards the Kurdish and Alevi people. More importantly, the armed conflicts with the PKK had ceased at the time the curriculum reform was undertaken. In this respect, the course symbolised the most tangible outcome of the two-decade long reform efforts that hung in the balance because of the ideological clash between secular and religious forces.
Nonetheless, the Citizenship and Democracy Education course proved a short-lived experiment, as the MoNE decided to repeal it two years after its introduction (MoNE, 2012a). The repeal decision was linked to the government’s new agenda which came to the surface after the 2011 general elections. With the consolidation of power, the government began following an ideological path more openly and re-structured the whole educational system in 2012. In this period, the government put its own ideological agenda into practice without needing much to compromise with other political actors.

Following the parliament passing a law to re-structure the whole K-12 education, the MoNE announced new weekly course timetables for each stage of the educational system. The new middle school timetable did not include the citizenship education course, but an unprecedented number of religious education courses (MoNE, 2012a). The new timetable gave an impression that the MoNE sacrificed the citizenship education course to make more room for religious education courses. The repeal of the Citizenship and Democracy Education course and introduction of religious education courses proved that the new dominant ideology was not supportive of democratic citizenship education (See Chapter 6). The subject was not made a cross-curricular theme, as had been experimented previously, but completely removed. The repeal of citizenship education symbolised a significant moment in the ideological transformation of the country that took place gradually from 2002 to 2012. The demilitarisation efforts that culminated in the 2005 curriculum reform did not lead to the institutionalisation of democratic citizenship education, but turned towards the Islamisation of school knowledge.

8.1.2 European Union Accession Process

The influence of the EU membership bid on the curriculum reform grew markedly distinct following the recognition of Turkey as a candidate for membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit. In 2001, the Turkish government began to pass the EU accession laws with a goal of securing a date for the opening of accession negotiations at the 2004 Brussels Summit (Müftüler Baç, 2005; Öniş, 2008). In the democratising atmosphere of the EU membership process, a group of politicians from the disbanded religious nationalist Welfare Party [Refah Partisi, RP] founded a new political party, the AKP. Coming to power in 2002, the AKP embraced more moderate religious nationalist discourses when compared with its predecessor. The EU membership reforms enabled the AKP to strengthen its grips on power and minimise the military’s ideological impact on education. In parallel to the consolidation
of power by the ruling party, the military’s ideological discourses were less emphasised in the citizenship education curriculum.

My analysis of the interview transcripts and policy documents suggested that the AKP government instrumentalised the EU membership agenda as a rhetorical device to advance a curriculum reform to break the hegemony of secular nationalism in education (See Chapter 5). The MoNE used the EU membership bid to make a case for a curriculum reform, despite the fact that the EU membership criteria did not, in reality, include an explicit requirement in respect of a citizenship education curriculum reform (Keating, 2014). The MoNE's rhetoric was a deliberate strategy to mitigate the reaction of the military circles to possible changes in the education ideology. This is because the curricular changes intended by the religious nationalist ruling party would prompt less severe reactions from the secular nationalist circles when framed as requirements of EU membership.

In 2004, the MoNE launched a comprehensive curriculum reform with the rhetoric that EU membership made it necessary to revisit the whole curriculum. The government derived justification from the EU integration process to excise the military's ideological discourses from the curriculum. Since the citizenship education curriculum of 1998 was filled with the military's ideological discourses, the MoNE decided to repeal the citizenship education courses as part of the curriculum reform (MoNE, 2005). The military perspectives vanished from the cross-curricular citizenship education themes infused into the content of other subjects after 2005 (İnce, 2012b). While the forces of religious nationalism were triumphing over the forces of secular nationalism, the ideological discourses associated with secular nationalism were being replaced with religious nationalist discourses. However, the demilitarisation efforts did not culminate in the introduction of democratic citizenship education. In other words, the government made remarkable efforts to end the military's dominance in education, but not to introduce democratic citizenship education.

Even though the revival of the curriculum reform agenda in 2008 was linked to the internal political developments, the EU membership bid considerably contributed to the introduction of the citizenship education course in 2010. Since the MoNE planned to undertake the citizenship education curriculum reform with the financial aid of the EU and expertise assistance of the CoE, it resumed IPA project negotiations (See Section 5.2.1). A new citizenship education course, named Citizenship and Democracy Education, was introduced in 2010 on the expectation that the IPA project, which required the introduction
of the course, would be implemented soon. Even though the approval of the project and the start of its implementation was delayed until 2011, the citizenship education course began to be taught nationwide starting from 2011-2012 academic year. The introduction of the course as an outcome of the IPA project indicates that the EU membership bid had an explicit impact on the realisation of the citizenship education curriculum reform of 2010.

8.1.3 The United Nations and the Council of Europe

In 1995, the MoNE agreed to reform the eighth-grade citizenship education courses in response to the UN Decade for HRE initiative. The MoNE changed the title of a course from the ‘Citizenship Studies’ to the ‘Citizenship and Human Rights Education’ and revised the course’s curriculum through the integration of some human rights themes (MoNE, 1995). However, this reform was overtaken by political events including the rise to power of the religious nationalist and the subsequent military coup of 1997 that toppled the Islamist-party-led coalition government. Following the military overthrow of the Islamist government, the MoNE launched the first curriculum of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course in 1998 (MoNE, 1998). This curriculum was filled with exclusionary discourses directed at the Kurdish people and religious nationalists, while making a hagiographic representation of the military and Atatürk. The evolution of the subject in the pre-Helsinki era (1995-1999) showed that the UN influence proved sufficient to make the MoNE act for the democratisation of citizenship education, but insufficient to bring about changes in the ideological discourses promoted in the curriculum. Furthermore, the militarist ideological discourses were intensified in the curriculum of the course introduced with the UN influence (See Chapter 4).

In the post-Helsinki era (1999-2012), the citizenship education reform was closely associated with the MoNE’s involvement with one of the CoE’s programmes, called the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE) (See Chapter 7). In the years from 1999 to 2004, several preparatory efforts were undertaken as part of the MoNE’s participation in the EDC/HRE programme, but those preparatory efforts gradually disappeared following the appointment of an AKP-nominated head to the BoE in 2003. The new head showed reluctance to accept assistance from the Europe-based intergovernmental organisations because he construed the involvement of the international organisations with the curriculum reform of Turkey as a sort of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey.
My analysis of the interview data and policy documents suggested that two competing discourses on the citizenship education courses emerged within the MoNE during the AKP years (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014; Interviewee 16, September 16, 2015). A group of decision-makers at the BoE supported the introduction of democratic citizenship and the collaboration with Europe-based organisations. Another group, however, was suspicious of Europe-based organisations’ involvement with the curriculum reform and the citizenship education courses since they considered the subject as a way of adoption of Western norms and values and having the potential to harm the national and moral values of the Turkish nation. Since those who opposed the citizenship education courses were dominant at the BoE, the prevailing discourse was that Turkey was not in need of assistance of European institutions to advance the curriculum reform. As a result, the relationships between the MoNE and the CoE in respect of the curriculum reform deteriorated in 2005, and the citizenship education courses were removed from the middle school curriculum.

In 2008, in a different political context, the bureaucrats who wished to introduce a citizenship education course were appointed in influential administrative posts in the BoE and resumed the curriculum reform agenda in collaboration with the CoE. They managed to make the CoE a party to the IPA project negotiations. The CoE’s agreement to become a party in the IPA project paved the way for the introduction of the course in 2010. When the parties were in the process of brokering the IPA agreement, the BoE decided to introduce the course, which represented the first citizenship education course underpinned by a rights-based citizenship in Turkey (MoNE, 2010).

I identified three sources of evidence of the CoE’s influence on the curriculum reform of Turkey (See Chapter 7). The first is that the EDC/HRE programme had a significant impact on setting a citizenship education reform agenda in Turkey. The second is that the CoE helped the proponents resume the IPA project negotiations and realise the curriculum reform in 2010. The third is that the CoE’s policy instruments guided the curriculum designers to design a more progressive curriculum. Besides these advantages, the CoE’s experts’ lack of understanding of the Turkish context, the non-binding characteristic of the CoE’s education policy instruments and being a Europe-based organisation hardened the opponents’ objection to the curriculum reform.
8.2 Second Question

What changes and continuities can be identified in the content of the citizenship education curriculum in the given period?

The second question aimed to explore changes and continuities in the content of the citizenship education courses in relation to the changing balance of power between the dominant ideologies within the given period. This question intended to reveal the ways in which the transition of power from secular nationalism to religious nationalism was discursively manifested in the curriculum of the citizenship education courses. Below is an attempt to disentangle the continuities and changes in the curriculum within the given period:

8.2.1 Continuities

After examining the citizenship education curricular texts of the period, I concluded that the most important continuity in the citizenship education curriculum was that the discourses of dominant ideology in power permeated the content of the subject throughout the period. The subject relied on the ideological discourses of dominant social groups holding political power instead of “the repertory of ‘common knowledge’ of” the whole community of Turkey (van Dijk, 1998, p. 37). The citizenship education curriculum of 1998 was under a profound influence of the military’s ideological discourses (See Chapter 4). The citizenship education curriculum of 2010 reflected a profound influence of the ideology of religious nationalism.

The second continuity was that there was no sign of diversity in the citizenship education curriculum throughout the period. No ethnic and religious minority of Turkey was even mentioned by name in the textbooks. However, when I compared the curriculum of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course (taught from 1999 to 2005) with the curriculum of the Citizenship and Democracy Education course (taught from 2011 to 2015), I identified a change of attitude towards diversity. I found out that the latter curriculum showed fewer signs of the assimilationist approach to the ethnically and religiously diverse components of society (See Chapter 5). Furthermore, the latest textbook implicitly presented diversity as an asset rather than a problem.
The third continuity is that the citizenship education curriculum in the given period did not promote criticality to the political authorities as a democratic citizenship skill. Students are not encouraged to hold the public authorities to account and contribute to the transparency of the democratic system in Turkey. The last continuity in citizenship education curriculum in the given period is that it did not address democracy and human rights issues from Turkey. Even though the latest curriculum included more contemporary issues regarding human rights, it did not include an example from Turkey. Rather, the curriculum showed a deliberate attempt to bring human rights issues of other contexts to students’ attention and not to touch upon any citizenship and human rights issue of Turkey.

8.2.2 Changes

The decisive shift in the balance of power left its discursive traces on the citizenship education curriculum. In parallel with the AKP’s consolidation of power, religious nationalist discourses were emphasised more at the expense of secular nationalist discourses. The 1998 and 2010 curricula promoted starkly different ideological discourses. The citizenship education curriculum of 1998 was duty-based, nationalist, militarist, statist, authoritarian, exclusionary and inculcating collective values and obedience. During the period from 1999 to 2012, the citizenship education curriculum moved towards a direction that can be described as less nationalist, less focused on collective values, more inclusive, rights-based, more focused on individual differences and more supportive of participatory and active citizenship.

During the first years of the AKP government, the main textbook was revised in order to de-emphasise the military’s ideological discourses. Exclusionary views on the Kurdish minority and religious nationalists and hagiographic representation of the army and Atatürk were modified (See Chapter 5). In 2005, the MoNE made the subject a cross-curricular theme, which took the demilitarisation of the subject one step further. The citizenship education curriculum of 2010 can be regarded as the first civilian citizenship education curriculum in the sense that it did not include the militarist discourses. Another significant change is that the latest citizenship education curriculum was unprecedentedly filled with religious nationalist discourses. Also, it included strong evidence of politicisation, such as the pictures of the Prime Minister and other political figures from the ruling party. The Islamisation and politicisation of the citizenship education curriculum represented the major changes I was able to identify through the analysis of the corpus of this research. Finally, the repeal of the citizenship education courses in 2012 was an unprecedented
development in the history of citizenship education in Turkey since the subject had never been removed completely in the past. The citizenship education courses were made a cross-curricular subject twice throughout the history of modern Turkey, but never wholly repealed until the MoNE decided to remove them from the middle school course list in 2012.

8.3 Third Question

What were the processes of developing the citizenship education curriculum in the given period?

The third question aimed to describe the processes of developing a citizenship education curriculum in order to draw links between the ways of curriculum development and the characteristics of curriculum. The underlying assumption was that a democratic citizenship education curriculum is developed through democratic curriculum development processes. In Turkey, the process of curriculum development starts with the BoE's decision to introduce a new course or revise the content of an existing one. Even though the BoE signifies the national curriculum authority to launch a curriculum reform, it cannot make such a decision without a governmental endorsement. For example, the BoE announced the 1998 programme of study only after it was given an informal mandate by the military after the 1997 coup. Similarly, the 2010 programme of study appeared after the government greenlighted the proponent bureaucrats to undertake the reform.

When the BoE decides to prepare a new programme of study, it designates a board member to carry out the decision. The board member forms a curriculum development committee, often from those who are already working in textbook examination panels under the auspices of the BoE. The board member supervises the committee's work, in which the committee's work is examined and given feedback by other board members until it is approved by the Board. During this process, committee members stay in contact with board members and become present in board meetings for the approval of the programme. Once the programme is approved, authors translate it into a textbook form. The approval of textbooks undergoes a similar procedure.

My analysis of the dataset revealed that the ways in which the 1998 programme of study was prepared had considerable differences to that of the 2010 programme of study. The making of the 2010 programme appears relatively more transparent and participatory when
compared with the previous programme of study. One of the interviewees, who was a member of both of the curriculum development committees which prepared both of the programme of studies, stated that a committee consisting of four or five members prepared the 1998 programme of study, which was modified in the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council before the approval of the Board (Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014). However, the making of the 2010 programme of study was more inclusive and more participatory in the sense that a committee comprising eight members prepared it and the committee made attempts to make the process democratic as far as the curriculum development regulatory framework allowed it. For example, the draft programme of study of 2010 was sent to NGOs, academics and teacher unions to receive feedback, which had not been the case for the programme of study of 1998. Also, the curriculum development process of the latest course saw pilot implementation of the programme of study, whereas the programme of study of 1998 was not piloted before its nationwide implementation.

The comparison of the curriculum development processes of the two courses suggests the ways in which the citizenship education curriculum development processes became more participatory in the given period. Given that the curriculum of the latest course was more democratic and aligned with the characteristics of democratic citizenship education (See Table 1.1), one can conclude that participatory curriculum development is more favourable to the development of a democratic citizenship education curriculum, which substantiates the supposition built into the third research question.

8.4 Discussion

This study showed that there was an established relationship between the military and education in Turkey. The military played a discernible role in the making of the citizenship education curriculum of 1998 (See Chapter 4). It instrumentalised the citizenship education courses to spread its own conception of national identity, citizenship and human rights, suppress the dissident movements and fortify the hegemony of the official ideology. Nevertheless, studies investigating the political and ideological aspects of education in Turkey generally overlooked the role of the military in curriculum development processes and the role of the 1997 military intervention in the curriculum of Citizenship and Human Rights Education course (Aschenberger, 2015; Çayır, 2007; Çayır, 2011; 2014; Çayır & Bağlı, 2011; Caymaz, 2008; Gök, 2004; Gülmez, 2001; İnce, 2012b).
Regarding the relationship between the military and education, Kaplan (2006) stated that there was a silence “about the central role the military has played in shaping educational policies” (p. 175). Despite the scarcity of studies looking into this relationship, one can find arguments that describe “‘national education’ and ‘national defence’ as the two fronts of nation building” (Altınay 2004, p. 120). Altınay (2004) illustrated how the content of the National Security Knowledge course was brought in line with the military's ideological perspectives after the 1997 military intervention. Expanding on the military's ideological thrust on school knowledge, Altınay (2004) reported from three military officers who taught the course that they were “given classified directives […] to pay special attention to Atatürk's principles” (pp. 133-134). However, Altınay (2004) did not recognise the fact that the infusion of the militaristic discourses into the course content was linked to the official efforts to stamp out religious nationalism and solidify the hegemony of secular nationalism. She did not mention the 1997 military coup in interpreting the changes in the course content. Üstel (2004) is the only scholar who underlined the role of the coup with an observation that the textbooks published after the coup counted religious nationalists as an internal threat. Furthering this argument, the present research showed that there was a hierarchical relationship between the military and education, which enabled the military to infuse its ideological discourses in the textbooks in the given period.

The present study disputed the main proposition of studies of the world society thesis that proposed there was a cross-national transition from nationalist to post-nationalist forms of citizenship education (e.g. Bromley, 2009; Meyer, Bromley, & Ramirez, 2010; Moon, 2013; Ramirez, Bromley, & Russell, 2009; Ramirez, Suarez, & Meyer, 2007; Rauner, 1999; Soysal & Schissler, 2004). In contrast to these studies, the present study found that Turkish citizenship education curriculum did not move in the direction of becoming more inclusive of transnational identities and ethnic and religious diversity of Turkey’s society. It revealed a trend of militarisation, Islamisation and politicisations in the curriculum in the given period. This period was classified by studies of the world society thesis as the culmination of the cross-national transition to democratic citizenship education (e.g. Moon, 2009; Moon & Koo, 2011; Rauner, 1998, 1999). However, the present research did not support that observation since the presentation of human rights, diversity and global issues were tokenistic, and no mention of any democracy, citizenship and human rights issues of Turkey was seen in the textbooks throughout the given period.
This study supports the studies in the third sub-group of qualitative investigations of international convergence, which argue that a combination of internal and external influences had the most reliable explanatory power for the phenomenon of curriculum change in citizenship education (See Section 1.6.2) (e.g. Cardenas, 2005; Keating, 2009a; Levinson, 2004, 2005; Morris et al., 1997; Ortloff, 2005). In line with these studies, the present study concluded that curriculum change in citizenship education can be partially explained without paying attention to local and national influences. Although a cursory examination might find supportive evidence for the studies of the world society thesis, an in-depth analysis would dispute it because the nationalist discourses remained powerful in the curricula (Lerch, Russell, & Ramirez, 2017). For instance, in Turkey, the ways in which human rights were instrumentalised in the power struggle showed that the gatekeepers of the curriculum change were still nationalist actors in the given period. Even though these gatekeepers had been exposed to transnational educational discourses, this did not prevent them from redressing the global discourses to serve their group interest in the ongoing power struggle.

On the surface, one can argue that the findings of the present study agree with the studies of the world society thesis in that the evolution of citizenship education in Turkey showed a trend of democratisation, the militarist themes dissipated, the emphasis on human rights, international human rights conventions, individual differences, global issues and many other signifiers of progressive curriculum change was increased throughout the given period. However, this would be an uncritical conclusion because the present study clearly showed that dominant ideological discourses were consolidated under the title of democratic citizenship or human rights education in Turkey.

In fact, the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course textbooks contained militarist and exclusionary discourses targeting the Kurdish people and religious nationalists in addition to statements presenting using a weapon as natural as the need to drink water and eat food (See Chapter 4). What was called human rights education in Turkey had little in common with international standards. The Citizenship and Democracy Education course transmitted religious nationalist discourses as evidenced by many elements designed to support the ideology of the ruling party and Islamic values (See Chapter 6). In this sense, this study concluded that the international agencies had a limited impact that was evident at a symbolic level, while the underlying discourses kept favouring those in power. This
finding diminishes the face-value attached to the inclusion of human rights, democracy and globalisation.

The present study calls for caution that the signs of democratisation might be superficial and the dominant ideologies might permeate the subject in subtler ways under the veneer of cosmetic changes. In fact, even though the Citizenship and Human Rights textbooks, which I analysed in this study, had been examined by previous studies (Çayır, 2007; Çayır & Bağlı, 2011; Gök, 2004; İnce, 2012; Üstel, 2004), scholars did not relate to the changing content of the same textbook to the changing balance of powers (See Chapter 5). My line-by-line comparison revealed a discursive shift in the content of the course that illustrated the alignment of the curriculum with the dominant ideology of religious nationalism. In an effort to judge the quality of a curriculum reform, researchers must pay attention to substantive values promoted in curricula and the ways in which curricula are developed.

The present research concluded that the attributions to human rights and diversity alone cannot be indicative of the democratisation of citizenship education. They do not have a positive value as long as militarist, exclusionary and ideological discourses dominate the curricula. This conclusion challenges the studies of the world society thesis which implied that the inclusion of human rights, diversity, social history instead of military, globalisation and global citizenship had a positive value for the democratisation of citizenship education (e.g. Bromley, 2009; Meyer, Bromley, & Ramirez, 2010; Moon, 2013; Ramirez, Bromley, & Russell, 2009; Ramirez, Suarez, & Meyer, 2007; Rauner, 1999; Soysal & Schissler, 2004). They sent a message that all worldwide rise of human rights, cosmopolitanism, diversity, individualism, environmentalism had a contributory effect on the transition from nationalist to democratic citizenship education. Against this argument, the present study showed that these themes do not have a face positive value, but the ways in which they are contextualised in curricula is significant for the institutionalisation of democratic citizenship education.

The present study concluded that the militarist themes, references to military figures and emphasis on the national military declined in the citizenship education textbooks in the given period. This specific finding fully agrees with the studies of the world society thesis which considered the declining emphasis on the military as a global trend (Bromley, 2009; Lerch, Russell, & Ramirez, 2017; Soysal & Wong, 2007). Although these studies argued that demilitarisation in curricula was driven by global, not local or national, factors, the
present research gave more credit to internal influences. It is true that the de-militarisation of the curriculum in Turkey was supported by the international agencies, but more importantly, the rise to power of an ideology, which had fiercely clashed with the military, played a pivotal role in the decline of military themes. If secular nationalism had continued to prevail with the backing of the military, the international influences would still be powerless to remove militarist themes from the curriculum. For example, the participation of the MoNE in the UN Decade for HRE initiative in 1995 did not result in the demilitarisation of the curriculum, but an intense incorporation of militarist themes into the curriculum. This suggests that the international agencies cannot be given credit for the declining military emphasis without recognising the role of local and national influences.

The present research showed that the CoE had more impact than the UN in the evolution of the citizenship education curriculum in Turkey in the given period. This is because the first course, introduced in response to the UN Decade for HRE initiative, contained ideological, militarist and exclusionary discourses, which manifested the limited influence of the UN project. However, the second course, introduced in coordination with the CoE, included fewer signs of exclusionary discourses. Although there are a temporal gap and significant contextual differences between the two periods in which these courses were introduced, the qualitative differences between them suggest that the CoE’s impact became more discernible as compared to the UN. This difference is associated with the fact that the EU and the CoE support each other in countries in the process of EU membership (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2010). The CoE made a more discernible impact because Turkey was willing to undertake efforts that would support the EU membership bid. In fact, the national curriculum authority of Turkey responded to the CoE’s educational projects more positively during times when Turkey’s EU membership prospect was promising.

This research showed that the EU can have negative implications for democratic citizenship education when it empowers internal forces of a society that do not embrace the CoE’s core values. Previous studies highlighted post-nationalising and democratising aspects of the EU and acknowledged that the EU’s impact did not become far-reaching because it did not have binding authority over the curriculum authorities of member states (Keating, 2009, 2014; Ortloff, 2005; Piattoeva, 2010). However, these studies did not say anything about the negative impact that the EU could produce for citizenship education in the member or candidate states. The present research showed that the EU reforms in Turkey enabled the religious nationalists to dismantle the secularist military’s hegemony and align the
curriculum with their own ideologies. This suggests that the EU reforms do not necessarily support the democratisation of citizenship education, but might result in the Islamisation of the curriculum as exemplified by the Turkish case.

The MoNE under AKP rule effectively used a policy rhetoric that the EU membership required certain changes in curricula. Previous studies did not take a critical look at the MoNE’s rhetoric as to whether the EU membership really required a curriculum reform (e.g. Altinyelken, 2015; Çayır, 2009; Kanci, 2009). However, I did not take that rhetoric at face value and found that the EU membership did not have requirements involving citizenship education curriculum (Alexiadou, 2014; Keating, 2014). Thus, I could argue that the MoNE’s justification that the EU membership required certain changes in curricula was a rhetorical device designed to moderate the secular establishments’ resistance. In other words, it was a strategy to terminate the ideological hegemony of secular nationalism in education.

The present research showed that the centralised curriculum development system enabled the dominant ideologies in power to shape the citizenship education curriculum in the given period. There are a few studies which draw parallels between the characteristics of the curriculum and the ideology of ruling party (e.g. B. Türkmen, 2009). Rather, the major tendency in the literature is to look into the ways in which the general characteristics of political context affected the curriculum or how the official ideology, backed by the secular state establishment, permeated the curriculum (Altınay, 2004; İ. Kaplan, 1999; S. Kaplan, 2006). The previous researchers did not need to look in detail at the influence of the ruling party’s ideology because the ideological hegemony of the secular nationalist establishment left little space in the past for the ruling parties to exert an influence over the curriculum (Çayır, 2011, 2014; Çayır & Gürkaynak, 2008; Caymaz, 2008; İnce, 2012a; Üstel, 2004). In the past, secular nationalism enjoyed the support of not only the education community, but the whole apparatuses of the state including the military and the judiciary, and the political parties that ruled without a coalition did not deviate considerably from the ideological premises of the secular establishment. This kept the citizenship education curriculum within the ideological boundaries of secular nationalism. However, the election of the AKP which opposed substantial elements of the secular nationalist establishment and its stay in power for more than 15 years led to significant changes in the curriculum. The ideological shift in the content of the subject was eased by the EU integration reforms that
weakened the ideological hegemony of the military, which allowed the government to align the curriculum with its ideology. This had never been the case before.

Since a government with a considerably different ideology had a chance to dominate for the first time, the citizenship education curriculum demonstrated a considerable departure from the official ideology of secular nationalism. This novelty might be explained by the fact that the ruling parties in the past did not pursue an overtly divergent ideology from the official ideology, so their impact largely went unnoticed. Because the AKP government subscribed to an ideology which was overtly in conflict with the ideology of secular establishment, it left discernible discursive traces in the curriculum. This novelty might also be a result of the AKP’s uninterrupted stay in power for more than one decade, as it now represents the party which has stayed in power for the longest time in the history of Turkish democracy.

Government’s influence in citizenship education has been found in other contexts. Parker (2004) noted a close association between dominant ideologies and citizenship education in Palestine, Brazil, Israel, the United States and South Africa. In England, after the Labour government made citizenship education a compulsory subject in 2002, some elements associated with the ideology of the Labour Party, such as communitarianism and diversity, was echoed in citizenship education (Jerome, 2013; Kisby, 2012; Kiwan, 2008). Davies & Chong (2016) found that the formation of a Conservative-led government led to less emphasis on human rights and the positive representation of the monarchy in citizenship education in England. Soysal & Wong (2007) found that after the socialists came to power in France, “ample space is devoted to substantiate and prescribe plurality and tolerance as corrective measures to racism and discrimination” (p. 83). In South Korea, after the transition to a democratic system, citizenship education textbooks began to mention women, workers, immigrants/refugees, indigenous peoples and sexual minorities (Moon, 2013a). These examples show that the nation-state is still the most effective arbiter of citizenship education curriculum. These examples showing the influence of a government change in citizenship education challenge the contention that the internal influences are in effective in curriculum change in citizenship education. They cast doubt on the Ramirez, Suarez, & Meyer's (2007) contention “that national developments in the human rights education area reflect ties to world educational and human rights organizations and discourse, more than the effects of national developments and human rights experiences” (p. 36).
The present study concluded that participatory curriculum development processes support democratic citizenship education, whereas the centralised curriculum development impedes the production of democratic citizenship education programmes. Han et al.’s (2013) cross-national examination about the association between the nature of values promoted in the curricula and ways of curriculum development found that citizenship education tends to promote collective norms and values in countries with centralised curriculum development practice, whereas the subject is more aligned with democratic values and encouraged individual autonomy in countries with a decentralised curriculum development practice. In fact, political actors with an agenda to disseminate a particular ideology favour more centralised curriculum development systems because they effectively enable political powers to control educational discourses. The present study concluded that if the dominant power is willing to promote substantive democratic values, it is very likely that it will allow democratic curriculum development practices.

This study concluded that democratic citizenship education needs the support of internal forces of a society if it is going to create long-lasting improvements in the culture of democracy and human rights. Investigating citizenship education reforms in Australia, Canada, England and the USA, Hughes et al. (2010) drew a similar conclusion that successful citizenship education reforms require six preconditions to be fulfilled, the first of which is a public interest in citizenship education. As highlighted by Hughes et al. (2010) a national debate on citizenship education is of paramount importance in Turkey. When the BoE decided to introduce or repeal the citizenship education courses, no remarkable objection or support was recorded against or in favour of these decisions. This indifference is a serious obstacle to the democratisation of not only citizenship education but the whole curriculum in Turkey.

In this respect, the case of Spain contrasts sharply with that of Turkey. When the Spanish government introduced a citizenship education course, “Education for Citizenship and Human Rights”, in 2006, the Catholic Church mobilised the conservative segments of society against the subject on the grounds that the course was harmful to Christian values. Munoz Ramirez (2015) reported that the Catholic Church effectively used media, influential civil society organisations and organised seminars, conferences, websites, public demonstrations, press conferences and interviews with public figures to mobilise the society against the course. Those who were against the course invoked the right to
conscientious objection to prevent their children from attending the course. In response, the advocates sought ways to strengthen the status of the course and took the invocation of the right to conscientious objection to the Supreme Court in 2009. The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that the right to conscientious objection could not be invoked in regards to the citizenship education course because the course was not based on the moral and religious norms and values of a particular social group, but the constitutional values to which all citizens were supposed to adhere (Munoz Ramirez, 2015). Despite this verdict, the opponents continued their objection and eventually succeeded in repealing the course after a conservative government, the Popular Party, came to power in 2011 (Fundacion Cives, 2013). In reaction to the government decision, the advocates mobilized dozens of organisations and sent a memorandum to the CoE to report the government’s violation of the Spain’s commitments to international law regarding citizenship and human rights education.

The Spain case shows that the majority of the internal forces mobilised by the Catholic Church was against the subject, while those who wished to keep the subject had to seek external support. Even though the Spanish case is not an example where citizenship education is institutionalised in the curriculum, it still supports my conclusion that democratic citizenship education is unlikely to bring about long-lasting improvements if the internal forces of a polity do not support it. Although the public interest in curriculum work in Spain sharply contrasts with the indifference to citizenship education in Turkey, democratic citizenship education was not institutionalised in both countries, because the major socio-political forces were not supportive of it.

The South Korea’s citizenship education reform stands in contrast to the cases of Turkey and Spain where dominant forces were not supportive of democratic citizenship education. In South Korea, grassroots organisations made efforts to institutionalise democratic citizenship education by effectively challenging the conservative ruling elites (Moon, 2009, 2013b). Moon (2009) surely stated that “much of the success of HRE in South Korea came as a result of the efforts of local citizens and civil society groups with most of the resistance coming largely from conservative political elite circles.” (p. 122). The close collaboration of domestic NGOs with transnational networks of human rights organisations resulted in the consolidation of democratic citizenship education in South Korea. In fact, human rights norms are best socialised into domestic practices when there is a continuing pressure from both above and below on governments (Risse & Ropp, 1999; Risse & Sikkink, 1999). In
South Korea, pressure from above came from a network of transnational human rights organisations, while pressure from below was mounted by grassroots human rights organisations. As a result, a quality democratic citizenship and human rights education was developed in South Korea as evidenced by the fact that students were encouraged to discuss “poor prison facilities [in South Korea] as human rights violations” in comparison to the conditions of prison facilities in other countries (Moon, 2009, p. 103). This constitutes a contrast to Turkey where no internal human rights issue was mentioned in the textbooks.

As mentioned above, the present research agrees with the main argument of studies in the third subgroup of qualitative investigations of international convergence (See Section 1.6.2). These studies revealed that international agencies and global trends have a limited impact since they do not have any binding power over national curriculum authorities (Engel, 2014; Hahn, 2008, 2015; Janmaat & Piattoeva, 2007; Keating, 2009a; Levinson, 2004, 2005; Piattoeva, 2009). In line with these studies, my study concluded that the international agencies did not provide a sufficient support for the institutionalisation of citizenship education in Turkey. The national forces became effective and infused their ideologies into the curricula. In addition, the present research showed that citizenship education can include exclusionary, even racist and sexist, and militarist discourses, besides nationalist and superficial global discourses. The studies cited above did not find militarist and exclusionary discourses in citizenship education curricula that were comparable to what was revealed in this research.

Finally, this study found that the citizenship education courses in Turkey did not have a stable presence in the curriculum. The changing status and content of the citizenship education courses in Turkey reflected the pattern identified by the IEA study that citizenship education courses across the participant countries had a great degree of variations in the status, content and ways of provision of citizenship education (Ainley, Schulz, & Friedman, 2013; Schulz, 2010). Future IEA studies might benefit from the present research that the presence of citizenship, human rights, democracy or social studies courses do not necessarily mean that young people are provided with a genuine political education. Great variations in the contents and ways of offering citizenship education make it difficult to understand students’ outcomes. An initial evaluation of the intended curriculum of participant countries can help better interpret students’ civic knowledge, engagement, perception, and attitudes. Such an evaluation might even lead to discarding
certain countries from the study if they are propagating the ideologies of those in power under the title of citizenship, democracy, social studies or human rights education.

8.5 Recommendations for Future Reforms in Turkey

Since 2002, the AKP government has broken the monopoly of secular nationalist forces over curriculum policy, and the transition of power from one dominant ideology to another has opened a possible space where citizenship education reform could be realised. This space was used in a limited way in the citizenship education reform of 2010. Even though there is no promising sign that the government is going to launch a citizenship education reform soon, developments in the EU membership bid or the elimination of domestic and regional security issues may give an impetus to democratisation efforts. A ceasefire with the PKK can play a significant role in the revival of the democratisation agenda. If the current situation changes for the better and the government wishes to introduce democratic citizenship education, I make the following recommendations relying on the findings of the present study:

1- Even though the BoE is an appointed, not elected board, it has not been subject to a remarkable public nor scholarly critique. In my fieldwork, I was told that I was the only researcher who had come to conduct research there (See Section 3.3). This lack of interest is arguably caused by an entrenched conviction that curriculum is a specialised business fulfilled by experts in the state departments. The findings of this research suggest that this entrenched conception of curriculum should be changed towards a notion that curriculum should be developed through participatory and inclusive processes. This change is necessary in order to make relevant stakeholders engaged in curriculum work. A democratic conversation on curriculum in academia and the community of practitioners can facilitate this conceptual change.

2- One significant conclusion of this study is that the existing curriculum development system is non-participatory and non-inclusive in Turkey (See Section 6.2). This system was originally devised for the goal of unifying the diverse people of Turkey into a homogeneous, modern and secular nation in the state formation era (1923-1938). Since it was originally intended to turn inhabitants of the country into a secular nation, it favours the most powerful groups to shape curriculum and forces alternative visions to disappear. The nation-state ideology disseminated by it changed from secular to religious nationalism, but the mechanism conveying a monolithic official ideology has persisted up to the present
with no significant change. The latest government has not made any structural change in this curriculum development system. In order to institutionalise democratic citizenship education, the existing curriculum development system should be made participatory and inclusive to allow multiple actors to contribute to curriculum development.

Curriculum development systems that are intended for nation-building purposes suppress alternative visions, inhibit critical thinking, and propagate certain perspectives without allowing for reasoning and free discussion, which in turn ruins the liberating and transforming power of education. Despite these negativities, the non-inclusive and non-participatory curriculum development system of Turkey has not been democratised because national security concerns have hindered this possibility. As a secular nation-state in the Middle East, a frontline member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and a country having suffered from ethnic separatism for decades, dominant socio-political forces have never fully overcome the fear of disintegration. During the state formation era, the goal of nation-building, during the Cold War era, the danger of communism and, since the post-Cold War era, the clash of the secular nationalist establishment with the dissident ethnic and religious movements have made it hard to dispense with the centralised curriculum development practice. The presence of irreconcilable differences amongst social groups further justified the continuance of this system. In fact, the “cultural common ground of generally shared beliefs” is not very solid in Turkey (van Dijk, 1998, p. 51). Social groups find it hard to reach a compromise on what to teach in schools as there is not a sound common ground or a common set of norms and values shared by major social groups.

Nevertheless, as the findings of the present study revealed, the existing curriculum development is an obstacle hindering the institutionalisation of democratic citizenship education in Turkey (See Section 6.2). A more inclusive and participatory curriculum development system is necessary to bring citizenship education in line with the expectations expressed in the EDC/HRE Charter (CoE, 2010). A legislative framework for democratic curriculum development is still not available. For example, the current regulatory framework does not allow non-governmental organisations to join curriculum development committees (MoNE, 1993). I support the view of my informants in the BoE that the legislative framework should be amended to make the existing system participatory and inclusive (See Section 6.2.1).
The present research also found that most of the NGOs showed indifference to the request of the curriculum development committee for feedback on the draft curriculum in 2010. I construed the indifference of NGOs as a manifestation of an underlying disbelief that their contributions would not be taken into consideration, but they were asked for feedback to make the process “be seen” as democratic. In order to dispel this apathy, I would recommend that the official authorities should persuade stakeholders that their participation is valuable, not tokenistic. They should be assured that their contributions are reflected in final outputs. To this end, partnerships between NGOs and BoE can be forged, as in other European countries, and NGOs can be asked to produce educational materials to enhance the citizenship education experience of students.

3- From an alternative standpoint, the non-inclusive and non-participatory curriculum development can be seen as not the real cause of the problem, but a symptom of the problem. The underlying cause is that the dominant social groups in Turkey do not recognise the significance of universal human rights principles and democratic norms. Therefore, in addition to the re-structuring of the curriculum development system, the influential socio-political actors should be convinced of the significance of democratic citizenship education. For this purpose, a high-profile committee, representative of the Turkish society, can be formed to determine Turkey-specific objectives of democratic education. The high-profile committee can spark a national debate “into the condition of citizenship education” and develop “clear, consistent and widely accepted goals or outcomes for establishing directions and formulating standards” for citizenship education (Hughes et al., 2010, p. 296). For example, in England, citizenship education became a compulsory subject following a high-profile committee, chaired by political science Professor Sir Bernard Crick, which set the objectives of citizenship education (Qualification and Curriculum Authority, 1998). England’s experiment can serve as a model to deliberate the objectives of citizenship education in Turkey.

4- The citizenship education curriculum reform within the given period was undertaken with the involvement of the international organisations, namely the UN and CoE. Even though the curriculum reform of 1998 was realised in conjunction with the UN Decade for Human Rights Education programme, the final outputs were under a profound impact of the military's ideological perspectives. The citizenship education curriculum of 1998 was instrumentalised in the service of the suppression of Kurdish separatism and religious nationalism. Similarly, the introduction of democratic citizenship education in 2010 was
advanced when the forces of religious nationalism were consolidating power. The 2010 curriculum was significantly affected by the ideology of religious nationalism, even though the curriculum reform was undertaken in collaboration with the CoE.

In this respect, the Turkish case demonstrated that curriculum reforms sponsored by international organisations might result in the promotion of the ideological perspectives of powerful social groups under the name of democratic citizenship education. This happens mainly because those who belong to the dominant social groups occupy the critical posts in the centralised curriculum authority of Turkey. In the first reform, the secular nationalists were in charge, so their views permeated the curriculum, and in the second reform, the religious nationalists were in charge, so their views filled the curriculum. In both cases, the subject partly ended up being an instrument for the dissemination of the dominant ideological discourses.

In order to eliminate this negative consequence, I would recommend that international agencies should ensure that the marginalised groups are included in curriculum development processes. Since general frameworks are easy to manipulate, international agencies should have a clear set of standards developed for specific target countries. They should only sponsor efforts that have the potential to bring about a considerable shift. Curriculum reforms launched with no explicit recognition of domestic human rights issues can hardly yield positive outcomes. The potential of a curriculum reform can be tested by looking at whether the influential politicians in target countries recognise the major human rights issues of their countries and are willing to strengthen the culture of human rights and democracy by tackling those issues through education.

The recognition of human rights issues is an indispensable precondition for the contextualization of EDC/HRE principles in the curriculum of the target context. Rather than presenting them as mere information, they should be taught through examples derived from democracy and the human rights struggle of the target context. The contextualization of EDC/HRE principles is the locus where dominant ideologies' distortion comes into play. International organisations can minimise this by hiring experts with an adequate level of knowledge on the dynamics of power relations in target countries. International agencies’ experts should have in-depth knowledge of the target context to the extent that they can discern which norms, values and perspectives are associated with which groups in the country where they are sent to provide expertise on the development of a democratic
citizenship education curriculum. In this way, they can help prevent citizenship education from being used as an instrument for the interest of powerful social groups.

8.6 Future Research Agenda

First and foremost, future research can investigate the same issue in more depth by drawing on more interviews and policy documents since the present study could not exhaust all data sources. More documents can be provided from the archives of the BoE and different units of the MoNE and the CoE. Data quality can be enhanced by including perspectives from key politicians. Secondly, using the theoretical framework of the current study, the capacity of education to develop a culture of democracy and human rights can be explored through the analysis of curricular texts and interviews with practitioners and decision-makers. Thirdly, textbooks, currently in use, can be examined to document the extent to which they are in line with the universal human values. One might find this topic quite significant considering the international context in which joint efforts have been undertaken to eradicate religious extremism. Such research can provide financial support from organisations such as, Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research and Spencer Foundation.

In Section 2.2, I argued that the genuine citizenship education started in Turkey in 1948 on the grounds that the concept of citizenship appeared in the title of citizenship education courses for the first time in 1948. Furthering this argument, curricular documents that belong to the citizenship education courses taught after 1948 can be examined to reveal how the conceptions of democracy, citizenship and national identity have evolved during the multi-party democracy era. I intend to take the present research further by exploring the implementation of citizenship education curriculum at schools, which is an area that has not been explored extensively. Research about the implementation of citizenship education might include the exploration of students’ conceptualisation of national identity, democratic citizenship and human rights. It might involve looking at ways in which official intentions coded in citizenship education curriculum are taught by teachers and learned by students. Finally, I am interested in researching about the influence of neo-liberalisation in citizenship education. I am particularly curious about the relationship between the Islamisation of the curriculum and neo-liberalisation in education and how these two trends affect each other and what results they bring about in terms of democratic citizenship education.
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Archival Documents


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Appendices

1. Influential Actors in Citizenship Education Reform

Note: Information presented in the table derived from the official websites of the Ministry of National Education (MoNE), the Directorate of Foreign Affairs of the MoNE, the Board of Education and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey
2. Research Application to the Board of Education
(Original Copy)

TALİM TERBİYE KURULU BAŞKANLIĞINA
ANKARA

Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı reisi-ber bir öğrencisi olarak, 1416 sayılı kanun ile
İngiltere'nin Londra şehrinde, Institute of Education-University of London'da
vandalslık eğitimi alanında doktora eğitimi almaktayım. Tez çalışması ile ilgili
olarak kurumunuzdaki zotophanedeki ve varsa diğer birimlerdeki ilgili dokümanlara
uluşmam gerekmektedir. Ayrıca çalışmakta olduğu küm kapsamdında kurumunuz
bünyesinde görev yapmış/yapınca olan çeşitli görevlilerle ilekontakte yapmayı
planlamaktayım. Kendim ve çalışmanın ile ilgili gerekli detaylar bu dilekçe edinme
mevcuttur.

Gereğini makamınızdan arz ederim.
To the Board of Education

Ankara

As a Ministry of National Education scholarship holder, with the No.1416 law, I study a doctorate degree at the University of London Institute of Education, in London, the UK. Regarding my PhD research project, I need documentation in your institution’s library and other units if there is any document stored there. In addition, for my research project, I am planning to interview some officials who worked in the past or are currently working in your institution. Necessary documents concerning myself and my research are in the attachment of this request.

Kindly submitted for necessary action.

Address

11.08.2014
Signature
3. Response from the Board of Education to My Application
(Original Copy)

T.C.
MİLLİ EĞİTİM BAKANLIĞI
Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu Başkanlığı

Sayı : 67951427/605.01/3474854
Kona: Dileğinize

İlgi: 21/08/2014 tarihli dilekçeniz

İlgili dilekçeniz incelediğim olup vousdupluk eğitimi almanızda yapmakta olduğunuz doktora tez çalışması ile ilgili olarak kurumumuz kütüphanesinden yararlanmanız uygun bulunmuştur. Ayrıca tez çalışmanızı kaynak teşkil edecek dokümanları kurumumuz web sayfasından ulaşabilirsiniz.

Bilgilerinizi rica ederim.

Bu bildir, 5070 sayılı Elektronik İança Kanununun 5inci maddesi gereğince genellet elektronik izne ile imzalanmıştır.

Evrak teşidi: http://evrakseorxp.meh.gov.tr adresindendir fec2-1df0-3e38-8e86e-b857 kodu ile yapılabilir.

Araştırmacı Bv: 06648 Ankara/ANKARA
Elektronik Ağ: www.meb.gov.tr
c-posta: ad soyad@meh.gov.tr

Ayarlı bilgi içeri: Ad SOYAD/downloads
Tel: (0 312) XXX XX
Faks: (0 312) XXX XX
The Republic of Turkey
Ministry of National Education
Board of Education

No: 67951427/605.01/3474854
Subject: Your request

21.08.2014

Concerning: Request dated as 11.08.2014

Your request concerned has been examined, and you have been granted permission to use the library of our institution about your doctorate research project in the field of citizenship education. In addition, you can access to documentation that might be used as source in your research through the website of our institution.
4. Protocol for Obtaining Archival Documentation
(Original Copy)

TUTANAKTIR

London'da Institute of Education'da doktora eğitimi almaktan olan 20872982334 TC kimlik No'lu Abdükerim ŞEN kurumnumu 11.08.2014 tarihinde yazıtı özür süreci başına getirilmiş seçilmiştir. Çeştileri rapor ve belgelerden toplam 912 sayfa görüntüsünü fotoğraflamak yoluyla doktora araştırmalarında kullanmak üzere almıştır. Fotosanlanmış belgelerin bir süreći CD ve kaydedilen her kişinin başvurusu ile ilgili dilcelere dosyasına eklenmiştir.


İşbu tutanakla yapılan işlemler taraflarca kayıt altına alınmıştır.

Kurum Yoğunluğu

Doktora Öğrencisi - Araştırmacı
(English Translation)

The Protocol

On August 11, 2014, Abdulkerim Sen, a PhD student at the Institute of Education in London, whose the Republic of Turkey identity card number is 20872982334, applied to our institution to carry out his fieldwork in our institution. As a result of his work in our institution, he obtained 912 images, which are composed of several reports and documents, via taking a picture in order to use them in his doctoral research. One copy of the images that have been pictured by Abdulkerim Sen has been saved on a CD and attached to the request folder where his research application is kept.

Regarding the use of data, the person in question is responsible for complying with the basis and procedures regarding the implementation of the right to information act. Information and documents that are obtained within the frame of this regulation cannot be reproduced for commercial purposes, cannot be used and cannot be published without the consent of institution or organization where they are taken. Those who reproduce information and documents that are obtained contrary to the principles in the regulation, those who use and publish them are subject to the articles of law that specifies punitive and judicial responsibilities. Regarding the use of documents, the person is responsible for punitive obligations that might arise in the event of uncovering names mentioned in the documents without a consent on the basis of the right to privacy. The same punitive obligations is true for anything that is declared without the consent of person mentioned in the documents, such as health information, or something that might pose a risk to person’s private and family lives, honour and dignity, professional and economic values.

With this protocol, the transactions are recorded by the both parties.

Authorised person on behalf of the institution

Doctorate Student-Researcher
5. Interview Information Sheet (English)

Institute of Education

Information sheet for a PhD Research Project
Citizenship Education Reform in Turkey between 1995 and 2012

My name is Abdulkerim Sen and I am inviting you to take part in my research project, titled as Citizenship Education Reform in Turkey between 1995 and 2012. This research explores the curriculum change in citizenship education in Turkey between 1995 and 2012 with a focus on the role of political factors in the context of Turkey-European Union relations. In exploring the research topic, I focus on grade 8 citizenship education curriculum because the subject had been taught at this grade level for the longest time in the given period. Two programmes of citizenship education have been announced for grade 8 pupils within the last couple of decades. The first was announced in 1998, and the second, in 2010. From the start of the reform in 1995 to its end in 2012 this research aims to reveal the role of political factors in the curriculum change in citizenship education. It also aims to explore the extent of the influence that the Council of Europe exerted in this curriculum change in Turkey in the given period.

For this exploratory case study on curriculum change, I collect data through semi-structured interviews with key actors who played an active role in the reform process. I also analyse programme of studies, textbooks, public and archival documents as other primary sources in exploring the research topic. Two research questions which I aim to answer are:

1. How did political factors make an impact in the curriculum change in citizenship education in the given period?
2. What were the limitations and advantages of the Council of Europe influence in the curriculum change in citizenship education in the given period?

I very much hope that you would like to take part in this research.

Thank you very much for taking the time to read this information sheet.
If you would like to be involved, please complete the following consent form and return to a.sen.14@ucl.ac.uk.

This project has been reviewed and approved by the UCL IOE Research Ethics Committee.
6. Interview Information Sheet (Turkish)

Bilgilendirme Kağıdı

Araştırmacı: Abdulkemer Şen

Doktora Öğrencisi, University of London-Institute of Education


1. 1995-2012 yılları arasında vatandaşlık eğitiminin dönüşümünde etkili olan dinamik ve parametreler nelerdir?

2. 1995-2012 yılları arasında Türkiye’de vatandaşlık eğitimi öğretim programları nasıl hazırlanmıştır?

İlk soruya bu değişimın arkasındaki dinamikler ve parametreler incelenmek istenmektedir. Başka bir ifadeyle, birinci soru ile Türkiye’yi vatandaşlık eğitimin politikaları alanında Avrupa’nın bir parçası olarak görebile, iç ve dış dinamiklerin bu dönüşümde ne kadar etkili olduğunu saptanmaya çalışılmaktadır. İkinci soruyu ise vatandaşlık eğitimi politikalarının nasıl ve ne gibi süreçlerden geçerek hazırlanlığına yoğunlaşmaktadır. Konuyla ilgili merak ettiği sorularınızı müllakat öncesinde cevaplamaktan memnuniyet duyarım.
7. Interview Consent Form (English)

Institute of Education

Citizenship Education Reform in Turkey between 1998 and 2010

Yes/No

I have read and understood the information sheet about the research  

I agree to be interviewed  

I am happy for my interview to be audio recorded  

I understand that if any of my words are used in reports or presentations they will not be attributed to me  

I understand that I can withdraw from the project at any time, and that if I choose to do this, any data I have contributed will not be used  

I understand that I can contact Abdulkerim Sen at any time  

Name:

Signed ___________________________  Date:__________________________

Researcher's name: Abdulkerim Sen  Signed:
8. Interview Consent Form (Turkish)

Katılımcı İzin Formu

Araştırmacı: Abdulkerim Şen


Lütfen aşağıdaki formu doldurunuz.

Katılımcı:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>İşaretlenen Alan</th>
<th>Evet</th>
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<td>Çalışmanın amacı ve içeriğinin taraflı yeterince açıklanıp bıyan ederim.</td>
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<td>Bu araştırmaya gönüllü olarak katıldığıımı beyan ederim.</td>
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<td>Araştırmaçı, mülakattan sonraki bir hafta içerisinde, benimle yapılan mülakata ilgili verilerin kullanılmasını, silinmesini benim talebim doğrultusunda yerine getimekle sorumludur.</td>
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<td>Sadece araştırmanın kullanılması şartıyla bu mülakatın ses kayıt cihazı ile kaydedilmesini onaylarım.</td>
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İmza: .................................................. Tarih: ....../...../2014
Excerpt 1:

INTRODUCTION

Human Rights Age starts with the foundation of the United Nations (1945). Turkey, one of the founding members of the United Nations, is one of the first member states which signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Afterwards, it displayed its positive approach to human rights by ratifying a series of universal and regional human rights conventions.

Now, the fact our century gained recognition as the human rights age is known. While entering into a new century, new developments emerging in the world shows that, as of today, the measure of developmental level of countries will be the importance that countries attach to human rights and the degree to which countries protect them.

(…)

REGULATIONS THAT STIPULATE HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION

c. At the international level

d. At the national level

DECISIONS THAT WERE TAKEN CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION

4. “Citizenship Studies” course, which is still taught in the second stage of primary education institutions, shall be re-structured under the name of “Citizenship and Human Rights Education”.

5. (…)

6. In order to avoid personal and political inculcations, as a principle, international human rights documents shall be taken as the basis for human rights education.

[Signatures]

State Minister Responsible for Human Rights  Minister of National Education

(BoE, March 6, 1995)
GİRİŞ


Çağımızın bir insan hakları çağı olma niteliği kazandığı artık biliniyor. Yeni bir yüzyıla girerken, dünyada beliren yeni oluşumlar gösteriyor ki, bundan böyle ülkelerin gelişmişliğinin ölçütü, devletlerin insan haklarına verdikleri önem ve onu koruma derecesi olacaktır.

(...)

İNSAN HAKLARI EĞİTİMİNİ GEREKLI KİLAN DÜZENLEMELER

- a. Uluslararası Düzyeye
- b. Ulusal Düzyeye

İNSAN HAKLARI EĞİTİMİ KONUSUNDA ALINAN KARARLAR

1. İlköğretim kurumlarının ikinci kademesinde halen okutulmakta olan ‘Vatandaşlık Bilgileri’ dersinin, ‘Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları Eğitimi’ adı altında yeniden düzenlenmesi yapılacaktır.
2. (...)

[İmzalar]

İnsan Haklarından Sorumlu Devlet Bakanı                      Milli Eğitim Bakanı

Excerpt 2:

Existing Situation

3. There are many things concerning democratic citizenship that Europe would learn from Turkey. Because the concept of “Citizens” was formed as an approach superseding the concept of “subject hood” in a period of 150 years, and the modern identity of “Democratic Citizens” has developed [in Turkey]

4. This process started with the 1839 Sultan’s Decree for Reorganisation [Tanzimat]; the classifications of umma-congregation-religious community reached to the stage of neighbourhood-hometown; after the promulgation of the National Republic under the leadership of Atatürk, the individuals of modern Turkish society that were expected to come into being are called “Citizens”.

In this last stage, the one who acted as both leader and teacher is Atatürk. He urged prominent scientists and politicians of the time to work on the identity of democratic citizenship on the condition that he himself would extensively make contributions. The book, Civic Information for Citizens [Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler], which is an outcome of these efforts, is the most important matter that should be brought onto agenda, as a comprehensive source of democratic citizenship education in our country, in the Conference of Ministers of Education of Europe and Education Committee meetings (BoE, January 14, 1997).
Mevcut Durum


2. Bu süreçte 1839 Tanzimat yeniliği ile birlikte başlanmış olup, ümmet-cemaat-millet sınıflamaları; XX. yüzyıl başında ahali-memleket așamasına ulaşmış; Atatürk’in önderliğindeki Milli Cumhuriyet’in ilanından sonra da oluşmuş öngörülen çağdaş Türk toplumunun bireylerine ‘Vatan’dan denilmiştir.


Excerpt 3:

Interviewee 11: The old curriculum was prepared in the end of the 1990s. Yes, it was because the United Nations. What was it? The Decade for Human Rights Education. However, in those years in Turkey, the 28 February Process was under way and there was a conspicuous domination of the tutelage regime over the educational system; therefore, I do not think academic circles, curriculum experts and those who prepared the curriculum, those who wrote textbooks and decision-makers of the time managed to cross the red lines drawn by the military people of the period and prepare a programme of study and textbook that is in line with human rights and democracy principles. I mean it is because it was a dark period of Turkey.

Me: Who prepared the programme of study? Of course, who approved it is identifiable because there is a board decision about it, but who really prepared it?

Interviewee 11: We were not able to identify those who really prepared it. What I can only tell you about the programme is that it was a programme of study promoting pure citizenship; appealing to a rigid understanding of citizenship encouraging obedience, submission, paying tax, joining the army, picking up litters; not grounded in an understanding of equality and a sense of mutual duty and responsibility in state-citizen relationships (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014).

Excerpt 4:

The boundaries of becoming a citizen are drawn in our constitution. According to it, “All people who are bound to the Turkish state through citizenship ties are Turkish. Those who are a child of a Turkish father and Turkish mother are Turkish. None of the Turkish people can be denaturalised unless they act contrary to the loyalty to the homeland” (p. 16).

Excerpt 5:

Atatürk summed up his love of Turkishness for a society that was in the process of becoming a nation in the following way: ‘if there is something superb in my nature, it is my being born as Turkish.’ We should all be proud of our country and society (p. 76).

Excerpt 6:

In some places, citizens’ not reporting terrorists, unconsciously hiding them as a guest, abetting them, providing their needs for food and dress led terror to thrive. Leaving the fight against terrorism to officials shows people’s public unconsciousness. At the end of the day, we all suffer from the political, economic and social issues [created by the terror]. In such situations, people who feel responsible to their homeland both fulfil their citizenship duties, and by warning security forces, they prevent damages to be caused (p. 69).

Excerpt 7:

Because of these characteristics, our country is a country which is under a constant risk. Foreign countries that wished to take hold of Turkey do not want Tukey to develop and be a strong country in its region. In our country, those who wish to create an atmosphere of terror and chaos, from time to time, desire to divide our society into enemy camps by pitting one brother against the other. The task that falls upon us is not to fall into the traps of this sort.

The GAP project [a dam construction project], which will change the fate of Southeast Region made many countries jealous, so a terror atmosphere was immediately created in the region. Turkish youth to whom Atatürk entrusted the Republic of Turkey set a goal for himself to work for the peace of the country with the love of the homeland and nation without falling into these traps (p. 81).

Excerpt 8:
The unifying idea for terror and anarchy that aim at the disintegration and fragmentation of the Turkish nation and the Turkish state is Atatürk’s opinions and ideas. One of the sacred duties of every Turkish child is to be united around the Atatürkist ideas (p. 66).

| Excerpt 9: |
| Duties that fall onto individuals in the fight against terror: |
| • Being faithfully loyal to the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish society, and the Turkish national values and culture |
| • Being faithfully loyal to the regime of the republic |
| • Being proud of becoming Turkish (pp. 70–71). |

Terörle mücadeledeki ilerleme şu görevler düşmaktadır; 
• Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ne, Türk toplumuna, Türk milli değer ve kültüre bağlı olmak, 
• Cumhuriyet yönetimine inanca bağlı olmak, 
• Türk olmakla gurur duymak.

| Excerpt 10: |
| Nation is a group of people who mostly live on the same territory and share the same language, sentiment, ideal, history, culture and interest. The reality of nation relies on the premise of the existence, unity and continuity of the nation. The basic element of this is possible through the unification of Turkish citizens around the love of nation in every matter. (p. 35). |

Millet; çoğunlukla aynı topraklar üzerinde yaşayan, aralarında dil, duygusal, ülkücü, tarih, kültür ve çıkar birliliği olan insan topluluğudur. Millet genelinde, milletin varlığı, birliliği ve devamı esası dayanır. Bunun temel faktörü her komuda Türk vatandaşlarının millet sevgisi etrafında bütünleşmesi ile mümkündür.

| Excerpt 11: |
| In Turkey, there is not a chance for an idea that does not compromise with the historical past; does not agree with national culture and civilisation; does not comply with our moral values; and does not become integrated with our national ideals to succeed. The Turkish nation looks to the future with hope and is respectful of the past. It is open to innovations. It is loyal to its traditions. The Turkish nation is respectful to its faiths, rejects fundamentalism, and does not like bigotry. It is neither backwards-looking nor pious. It regards everyone who lives in our homeland as precious. It does not consider anyone as second class citizen. It is loyal to the ideals of Atatürk from the heart (p. 73). |


| Excerpt 12: |
| Divisive, destructive and reactionary groups have a goal of destroying Atatürk’s reforms and the regime of the Republic, which are the basic source of the existence of the Republic of Turkey (p. 77). |
Excerpt 13:

Modernity is the opposite concept to primitiveness and bigotry. This means things that are modern, alive in today’s world, new and precious, stripped of primitive and rude measures are the understanding embraced by the overwhelming majority of society. There are many things that are described as modern in today’s world. However, to be able to taste the intricacy and beauty of modernity, it is necessary to install modernity in human’s mind. Bigoted and primitive thoughts stand against modernity and every type of innovation. (p. 79)


Excerpt 14:

What would be the dangers of people’s interpretation and practice of the freedom of conscience and religion in their own way? (p. 74).

İnsanların, din ve vicdan hürriyetini kendilerine göre yorumlayarak hayata aktarmalarının sıkıncaları neler olabilir?

Excerpt 15:

…because political parties that commit racism, sectarian discrimination and divisiveness might attempt at violations towards the state’s order, citizens, when they are joining political organisations, have to be conscious of these sorts of political parties. This sort of organisations that have a danger of dividing people into camps as “from us – not from us” must be precluded.

When political organisations that have the potential to divide people into various camps come to power, by appointing people whom they describe “from us” to state positions, they might attempt to create cliques within the state structure (p. 94).

…ırkçılık, mezhep ayrımcılığı ve böülücülük yapan siyasi partiler, devletin düzenine yönelik ilhalleri girişebileceğinden vatandaşlar, siyasal örgütlenmeler içerisinde yer alırken, böyle partilere karşı duyarlı olmalıdır. İnsanları ‘bizden – bizden de değil’ şeklinde kamplara ayırma tehlikesini barındıran bu tür örgütlenmelerin önüne geçilmelidir.

(…)

İnsanları değişik kamplara bölme tehlikesi taşıyan siyasi örgütlenmeler, iktidara geldiklerinde ‘bizden’ dedikleri insanları devlet kadrolarına alarak, devlet yapısında da örgütlenme içine giribilirler.

Excerpt 16:

Mankind needed weapons as much as food and drink since the first day of his existence (p. 68).

İnsanoğlu var olduğundan beri, yemek içme kadar, silaha da ihtiyaç duymuştur.

Excerpt 17:
At present, the Republic of Turkey sustains its territorial integrity despite various dangers. If Turkey has not gone to a general war since the foundation of the Republic, it is thanks to the power and deterring influence of the armed forces. The Turkish Army is one of the most powerful armies in the world. With this power, it deters its enemies. It ensures the happiness and safety of the nation (p. 63).


Excerpt 18:

The Turkish people founded many states throughout history thanks to the importance they attach to military power. This situation in the Turkish states indicates that military power comes before everything else and it reaches the level of sovereign power in the society. Our army is the source of peace, safety and pride for our nation. Our army is also the guardian of our republic that is a democratic regime (p. 62).

Türkler tarihi boyunca, askeri gücü verdikleri önemle birçok devlet kurmuşlardır. Türk devletlerinde bu durum askeri gücün hemen her şeyden önce geldiği ve toplumda egemen güç düzeyine eriştiği görülmüşdür. Ordumuz, ulusumuzun, huzur, güven ve gurur kaynağıdır. Ordumuz, demokratik bir yönetim biçimi olan cumhuriyetimizin de beşçisidir.

Excerpt 19:

The duty of military service is a sacred duty for us, the Turkish people. When the time comes, every Turk fulfils this duty with love and pride of being a soldier. In military posts, our youth prepare for the life by being provided with some life trainings in addition to teaching on the art of being a soldier. Therefore, everyone receives a military service call and joins the army for the defence of the homeland with love.

Military service is the service to the homeland; this duty is not fulfilled only in military posts. When the defence of our country is in question, every Turkish child fulfils the duty and contributes to the defence of the country (p. 34).


Excerpt 20:

Turkey has a very significant geopolitical location in terms of the world and regional balances. For this reason, many countries have aspirations on our country. Therefore, we are a country, which is under a constant risk. Places where terrorist organisations that aim to destroy our country sheltered mostly are neighbouring countries outside Turkey that we think as an ally. A possible attack to our country, which has a very vital location in terms of the balance of world power, will jeopardise the world peace (p. 80).

The recognition of women’s rights [in Turkey] is not a consequence of a movement of thought and social evolution as in some European countries. The rights granted to women in our country are a consequence of Atatürk reforms that took place in the state formation era. Reforms undertaken under the leadership of Atatürk opened up new horizons for Turkish women (pp. 25-26).

Kadın haklarının tanınması, bazı Avrupa ülkelerinde olduğu gibi, düşüncede akımlarının ve toplumsal evrimin bir sonucu değildir. Ülkemizde kadınlara tanınan haklar, Cumhuriyet dönemde gerçekleşen Atatürk inkılaplarının bir eseridir. Atatürk’ün önderliğinde yapılan inkılaplar, Türk kadınına yeni ufuklar açmıştır.

Excerpt 22:

…new laws [about women’s rights] did not go against the Turkish women’s actual conditions because the great leader Atatürk knew in great detail the cultural characteristics of Turkish society (p. 26).

Ulu önder Atatürk, Türk halkının kültürel yapısını çok ayrıntılı görebildiği için çıkardığı yasalar, Türk kadınının hayatına ters düşmedi.

Chapter 5

Excerpt 1:

There is a unit called "Bureau", which effectively runs as the executive body of the CDCC. One member from one of the seven geographical clusters, who is not decided beforehand, is elected for this bureau once in two years. Although there is not an explicit article in the Statute, countries in the geographical clusters as an established practice follow a sort of rotation system in fielding candidates. It seems this established practice is not exercised only in Cluster E which Turkey is in. (…) Fielding a candidate for these elections through collaborative efforts among ministries and having our candidate elected is very important for our country's representation in Europe and our participation in future activities of the CDCC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Directorate of Cultural Affairs, February 2, 1999).


Excerpt 2:

*English in its original*

Contributions made by non-governmental organisations are seriously important on building citizenship sites, developing and improving politics in education and dissemination of the project all over Turkey (BoE, November 12, 2001).

Excerpt 3:

I guess it was 2001 or so, efforts on democratic citizenship education began in the Board of Education and sub-committees were formed. In that period, I was invited as an expert from my university to share my opinion in sub-committees, before that, I was invited to share my opinions in a large committee, and I was informed that sub-groups would be formed later. In that period, there were board members at the Board of Education who were dedicated to this business [citizenship education reform]. There were board members who were diligently working with full effort. I cannot describe this period as bad… (Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015).
Serious reform attempts in accordance with European standards and norms have been continuing in Turkey [sic]. New government gives great importance on democratic participation [sic]. Crucial and prior objective of Government is to realize structural transformation [sic]. Its political willingness and convincing attempt are put with [are incorporated in] Government programme published to public [sic]. That means all problems in Turkey will be solved by participation and contribution of all related partners through negotiation processes (BoE, February 20, 2003).

In line with this main policy [set out by the circular dated 2001] of Ministry of National Education, serious reform attempts in accordance with European standards and norms have been continuing in Turkey [sic]. Democratic participation is gaining more importance in the process. Crucial and prior objective is to realize structural transformation. The reform programme aims the participation and contribution of all related partners [sic] (BoE, April 30, 2003).

It is a job which you are supposed to do completely voluntarily, I mean you are commissioned by the Minister’s approval and confirmation, the rectorate permits this commissioning, but what is being told me is that this job will be done voluntarily; what I mean by this is that there is no financial profit from this job for me. Could I make it clear? I mean, no way! I did this job voluntarily. I had not known this and had not asked about it before I accepted the offer. As far as I was concerned, some payments are made to experts for this sort of projects, this is what I was told. Yes, the Ministry of National Education covers expenses when you join meetings abroad, but I was not paid for hours I worked for the project. I did the job voluntarily.

(…)

It was an effort to show that some things are done on behalf of our country, the name of our country is heard, something is being done in Turkey and some things are really done in Turkey. However, I am aware of the fact that I am only an academic, the secretariat is there [Board of Education-BoE], the traffic always gets jam, and there is always an issue in somewhere. I want to underline that when I was appointed to the project, I could not reach any document, there was no information. I mean I was not going there for decorative purposes [yani ben oraya süs olsun diye gitmiyorum]. Someone from there told me, dear, this project is like a stillborn child [ölü doğmuş bir çocuk], do not tire yourself up too much, this is what they told me! I replied, wait a second, I came here with the approval of the minister, I am asked to work, my university granted permission for this. I am not accepting this! I am going to work! I do not know if I would do this with my current motivation, I guess it was something that my young age gave me, I was more excited and I was more enthusiastic (Interviewee 14, J uly 28, 2015).
Excerpt 7:

He said this in the meeting which I told you about. ‘In which country of Europe did you see such a course? (…) I am against this course’ (Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015).

Excerpt 8:

The head of the Board of Education rejected it by saying “We do not need a course which will be taught as a result of an imposition from outside, we are successfully teaching it as a cross-disciplinary subject, we do not do business by inculcation from outside.” With this idea, he rejected the project and whatever that would come with the project (Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014)

Excerpt 9:

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<td>In some places, citizens’ not reporting terrorists, unconsciously hiding them as a guest, abetting them, providing their needs for food and dress led terror to thrive (p. 69).</td>
<td>Our citizens should individually be sensitive to activities of terrorist organisations (p. 63).</td>
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<th>Yeni Versiyon</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bazı yerlerde, vatandaşların teröristi ihbar etmemesi, bilmeden misafir gibi saklaması, yataklı yapması, giyecek ve yiyecik gibi Vatandaşlarımız terör örgütlerinin faaliyetlerine karşı bileysel olarak dayanması olmalıdır.</td>
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<td>Being interested in Turkey's internal and external problems and adopting positive approaches will ensure that our country will become a powerful state all the time (p. 72).</td>
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Excerpt 12:

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<td>Countries in the world are known with different names. We are Turkish. (...) Our culture are our characteristics which distinguish us</td>
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historical past and our culture are our characteristics which distinguish us from the other nations. We are proud of being a part of the Turkish nation. Atatürk, by saying “How happy who says I am Turkish”, expressed the pride and honour of becoming a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Everyone who regards himself as Turkish is Turkish. This understanding shows unity in plurality [understanding] in our culture. Atatürk summed up his love of Turkishness for a society that was in the process of becoming a nation in the following way: “if there is something superb in my nature, it is my being born as Turkish.” We should all be proud of our country and society. As Our Great Father advised, we should all work, be proud and trust (p. 76).

Excerpt 13:

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<td>Modernity means living in the same century and complying with the understanding and conditions of the century. A modern person keeps up with the attitude, understanding and necessities of the century he lives in (p. 71).</td>
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<td>What would be the dangers of people’s interpretation and practice of the freedom of conscience and religion in their own way? (p. 74).</td>
<td>Is the right to education a fundamental right for the enjoyment, improvement and protection of other rights? (p. 84).</td>
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<td>İnsanların, din ve viedan hüriyetini kendilerine göre yorumlayarak hayata aktarmalarının sakınçaları neler olabilir?</td>
<td>Eğitim hakkı, diğer hakların da kullanılmamasında, geliştirmesinde ve korunmasında temel hak mıdır?</td>
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Excerpt 16:

In most of the civilised societies, some rights regulated and protected by the state are granted to individuals. All of these rights are called “public liberties”. In other words, the right to know your rights comes into existence with the importance given to human rights education by states (p. 84).

Excerpt 17:

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Excerpt 18:

The recognition of women’s rights in Turkey is not a consequence of a movement of thought and social evolution as in some European countries. The rights granted to women in our country are a consequence of Atatürk reforms that took place in the state formation era. Reforms undertaken under the leadership of Atatürk opened up new horizons for Turkish women (pp. 25-26).

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<td>The heroic behaviours women showed during the Independence War played a significant role in their entitlement to their rights. Women’s rights were expanded by the Atatürk reforms that took place in the Republican era. New horizons were opened up for Turkish women (p. 25).</td>
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Chapter 6

Excerpt 1:
I identified those who had an awareness of academic competence and special interest in democracy, citizenship and human rights issues among those who were working for the BoE at the time. When I was identifying them, I kept in line with democratic norms as much as I could. Not only multi-voiced but very diverse, if it is necessary to say more openly, I wanted right-leaning, left-leaning, Alawites, Sunnites, Kurdish and Turkish to be represented in the committee as far as those who were available within the BoE reflected the social, intellectual and cultural diversity of Turkey. In my own way, I formed a committee reflecting all colours. In the first meeting I had with the committee, I made it clear that the reason I chose each of you is not only your interest and competence in the area but also your being different from each other. I encourage you to preserve all of your differences until the job is done because if you look like each other, a product conforming to the nature of democracy will not come into being (…) this diversity in the committee had continued until I left (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014).

Excerpt 2

Of course, I was a bit pushing the boundaries of the BoE. Frankly speaking, when I was doing this, we were receiving some implicit and explicit things from those embracing the established structures, both those who are in an equivalent position and hierarchically higher positions, I was feeling it I mean discontent; ‘teaching new tricks to an old dog’ style discontents. However, because I believed what I was doing was right and whole-heartedly believed the existing system should change, I was working with enthusiasm by disregarding them. When you do not care about them, you do it… I was doing this, we were receiving some implicit and explicit things from those embracing established structures. Both who are in an equivalent position and hierarchically higher positions, I was feeling it I mean discontent; ‘teaching new tricks to an old dog’ style discontents. However, because I believed what I was doing was right and whole-heartedly believed the existing system should change, I was working with enthusiasm by disregarding them. When you do not care about them, you do it… (…) this diversity in the committee continued until I left (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014).

Excerpt 3:

There were those in the committee who had some troubles because of their ethnic, political or religious identities. I mean those who think that they experience these sorts of issues in the past gathered there. In a classical sense, those who cannot be classified as white Turk, but Sunni, Anatolian type persons. I mean there were really members from all groups (Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014).

Excerpt 4:

Etnik kimliğinden dolayı sorun yaşamış, siyasi kimliğinden dolayı sorun yaşamış, belki de inancından dolayı sorun yaşamış kişiler vardı. Yanı background’larında bunları bir şekilde deneyimlediğini düşünden insanlar bir arada idi. Ya da simdi klasik anlamda çok beyaz Türk kısımı girmeyen ama hani Sünni şey olan orta Anadolu tıplemelerimiz de vardı yanı gerçектen her gruptan kişiler vardı.
In that regard, x was a representative of a union, he valued these sort of things, we used to call him an active citizen, he was really active and as a unionist joining public demonstration, for example, I think he contributed a lot to these sort of things, if he had not been there, these would not have been like that. (Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014).

…o anlamda x sendika temsilcisidir, o tur şeylerle önem verdi, biz zaten ona aktif vatandaş diyorduk, birebir cünkü aktifdir, sendikaci olarak eylemlere katılma olarak, mesela bu tur şeylerde onun çok katkısı olduğunu düşünüyoruz, o olmasaydı belki bunlar bu kadar şey olmayabildirdi.

Excerpt 5:

What I had in my mind was not just this particular course, but that education should be democratised. I mean this course, it is like a drop in the ocean, and the soul of education is militarist, nationalist or even racist and so on in our country. Therefore, education itself should be so democratised that it would become favourable to raising democratic citizens. However, our classroom relationships, our school organisations, our school culture, our curriculum, our textbooks, all components of our educational system are very far from the culture of democracy. The system should be wholly democratised. These issues are all supposed to be tackled from a holistic perspective. In this respect, I value the democratic citizenship education project so much, the human rights education project (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014).

Benim kafamda sadece bu ders değil, eğitimin demokratikleştirilmesi gerekıyor. Yani bu ders bu hani devede kulak gibi bir şey olur. Yani eğitimin ruhu bize biride militaritstir hatta milliyetçidir hatta vs vs. O yüzden eğitimin kendisinin demokratikleştirilmesi gerekir ki demokratik vatandaş yetiştirmeye elverişi olsun ama sınıf içi ilişkilerimiz okul örgütlerimiz okul kültürümüz müfredatımız kitaplarımız yanıt eğitimin sistemimizin aşağı yukarı bütün unsurları demokrasi kültürünün çok uzagağındı toypükün sistemin demokratikleştirilmesi gerekıyor. Yani evet bütün bunlar top yekün olarak ele alınması lazım ben bu demokratik vatandaşlık eğitimi projesini şey insan hakları projesini bu yönüyle çok önemsiyorum açıkçası ama.

Excerpt 6:

The assumption that accompanied criticism or suggestions in my head was this: The state has asserted itself so much over its citizens so far. My father still enters into the district governorship and an official state institution by buttoning up his jacket. This situation engendered a discontent in a serious way. It was like revolting against an authority, an extremist authority. This effort aimed to weaken the power of the state that has an unjust and unfair authority over its citizens. My thought was, this state, this excessively bullying state, sacrificing its citizens for its own interest without batting an eyelid. This state is not forgiving the criminals of conscience, but forgives when people kill each other, it does not forgive any crimes committed against itself, this state is a bit cruel, this needs to be chipped, corrected; the space of a citizen in citizen-state relations should be expanded, and this was the thought in my head. I mean we should let a citizen know who and what he is, I mean you are a human, you have rights in relation to the state, and what we call a state is made up of you (Interviewee 10, September 1, 2014).

Benim kafamda eleştirilere ya da yönelimlerle eşlik eden varsayımyı suydu: Devlet şimdiye kadar kendini aşırı bir şekilde vatandaşları üzerinde gösterdi, benim babam hala onunu ilikleyerek bir kaymakamlığa bir devletin resmi kurumuna girer. Bu ciddi anlamda rahatsız edici bir durumdu, ee bir otoriteye başkaldır gibi, bu otorite aşırı, vatandaşlar üzerinde haksız ve adil olmayan bir otoriteye sahip olan devletin gücüne zayiflatma görevini yani benim düşündü, bu devlet fuzulca tahakküm varı bu devlet, kendi çıkarları için vatandaşlarını gözünü kırpmadan feda edebiliyor. Bu devlet düşünceleri suçlularını affetmiyor, ama insanlar birbirlerini öldürduğu zaman bunları affediyor, kendisine karsi hiçbir suçu affetmiyor, bu devlet biraz gaddar, biraz bunun yönümseli biraz kendine çekici düz venirse ve vatandaş devlet ilişkisindeki o pastan pastadaki pay, vatandaşın alanının genişletilmesi şeklinde daraltılmasına lazım, benim kafamda düşünceleri bu yüzden yani bu vatandaşın kendisinin ne olduğunu bildirelim onun sız bir insansız devlete karşı hakkınız var devlet dediğimiz şey sizden olursun.
There are things that can be done as a student and there are other things that can be done as a citizen. For example, paying tax does not concern him much at this moment, he should know it. However, rather than paying taxes, he should better know writing a request to school administration regarding his problems or follow current news (Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014).

Excerpt 8:

If you are saying this with an understanding of non-governmental organisation, I do not think we had such an intention because these are students and what students can do and what they cannot do is limited (Interviewee 6, September 12, 2014).

Excerpt 9:

Debates in the committee generally took place in a way that the chair board member exactly wished for. Especially about the topic of cultural diversity, expectations of x who is a member to a left union, and an active unionist, was not welcomed by z’s [an Islamist]. From time to time, there had been tensions between these friends over these sorts of issues. The chair had been the key mediator in our debates. (…)

Frankly speaking, it was not a committee which had a positive atmosphere and we worked peacefully (Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014).

Excerpt 10:

The issue of rights and responsibilities, there are really serious debates here. We are, in our statist understanding, yes you have that right, but that responsibility in return, it is always… I do not know how to say, there is a limitation, I mean I am giving you a right, but there is a limitation to it. It [the system] always felt a need to remind that, both our old programmes, programmes of study and teaching processes, there is always a reminding of it, I mean it [the system] always felt the need to remind this, the system, we want to break this. Yes, there is a balance, but I am do not know to what extent we achieved this, but we aimed to place the concept of rights first because we first find not our responsibilities, but our rights, there are rights that we have from birth, but no responsibility, but there is rights at the first place (Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014).

…bu haklar ve sorumluluklar konusu hakikaten çok ciddi tartışmalar var burada ii bizde iste bu bizim devletçi anlayışta ii evet senin su hakkin var ama su sorumluluğunda var ha böyle hep bir… Nasıl söyleyeyim ii bir sinir var yani. Sana bir hak veriyorum ama onun bir sinir var. Hep bunu bir hatırlatma ihtiyaç Está bizim eski programlarmız gestãoim programlarmız olsun gestão süreçlerimiz de olsun hep bunun hatırlatması var yani bunu hatırlatma ihtiyaç Está hissetmiş hep sistem ama biz bunu ykmak istedik ii evet bir denge var ama ne kadar basarık bilmiyorum ama önce hak kavramını koymaya çalıştuk. Çünkü biz önce sorumluluklarımızı değil önce haklarmızı buluyoruz hani doğştan getirdiğimiz de haklarda var sorumluluk yok ama hak var önce hak var önce haklari.
Excerpt 11:

This is one of the issue about which we had the biggest and the most of our debates, the works in the committee or a series of discontents we received from outside. Universalism bothers us, I mean some circles. Why? Because universalism is equal to global citizenship, people perceive it like that, which means, people understand it like this: there is an understanding like the boundaries will disappear and national values like national culture will disappear. Here we faced resistance, yes, but what we tried to do is it should have a balance, I mean a person himself might be a part of a nation, a people, a country, but at the same time he is a part of the world, we try to give it in a balanced way. It was one of the issue we talked for long, yes we tried to please some people, and I must admit this (Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014).

Excerpt 12:

Me: What would you say about the aspects of the new programme which reminds of the past?

Interviewee 4: They were included to please some people...

Me: A bit pre-empting, silencing, preventing criticism

Interviewee 4: Yes, yes, that is exactly what we tried to do.

Me: Some members in the committee might have wanted them as well

Interviewee 4: It was for preventing the reaction: why it is absent, why it is not there, yes, my brother, there is that much inclusion of discrimination, that much diversity, that much emphasis, you fragment, which is good, but a question will arise: how are we going to keep the society together? Our answer to this question will exactly be this (August 26, 2014).

Excerpt 13:

Ben: Yeni programdaki laik-milliyetçilik bağlamında eskiyi hattırlatan unsurlar hakkında ne dersiniz?

Katılımcı 4: Bu bir yerlere selam yani...

Ben: Biraz teşkin etme susturma eleştiriyi önleme

Katılımcı 4: tabi tabi aynen şöyle

Ben: Yoksa komisyonda birileri mi istedi?

Katılımcı 4: bu yok denilmesin yani niye yok bu peki kardeşim bu kadar ayardınız bu kadar çeşitlilik bu kadar vurgu var ayırtırmışsınız gayet güzel de bunlar bir arada tutacak nasıl tutacağız diye bir soru gelişsecek buna cevabınız tam da bu olacaktır.
Interviewee 8: Regarding the historical documents, we wanted the Farewell Sermon to be included because I think the Farewell Sermon includes human rights themes, there were friends who agree with me, we wanted it, but another group resisted to it, umm an opinion like that came from one of the NGOs, we prepared a draft and presented it to them and received opinions of them, criticism about this came from a few NGOs like the Farewell Sermon is not a human rights document. The most intense debate happened on this issue, I am telling this as an example, there are this sort of things.

Me: But it was included?

Interviewee 8: Excuse me?

Me: It was included; it was in the programme.

Interviewee 8: Yes, it was included but besides this, some other subjects were discarded, for example, there were a number of historical element, we discarded them.

Me: Historical elements?

Interviewee 8: For example, here I am not making a distinction between the programme of study and textbook, if it does not exist in one of them, it exists in the other, I mean I am not prepared well for this, I mean I did not have a look, I could not clearly say it was about that topic, on that page, I mean for example there was a section on Gallipoli War in one of our textbooks, there was unity and togetherness message in that section, some debates took place about it, we discarded it. Also, we put something from Mehmed the Conqueror in one of our books, he had an edict which we thought was about human rights, some debates took place about it as well (Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014).

Katılımcı 8: Belgeler konusunda biz burada Veda Hutbesi’nin de olmasını istedik. çünkü ben Veda Hutbesi’nin de insanların konusunda temalar içerdiğini düşünüyorum. Böyle düşünmen benim gibi düşünmen arkadaşı var, biz istedik ama bir grub da buna direndi. Bu şey hatta bu STK nin birisininden de böyle bir görüş gelmişti biz bir taslak hazırlayıp onlara sunduk onlardan görüş aldık birkaç STK dan da bu konuda eleştiri gelmiş içte veda hutbesi bir insan hakları belgesi değil gibi mesela en yoğun tartışmalar burada tartışılıdı örnek olarak veriyorum. bu tür şeyler var,

Ben: Ama konuldu?

Katılımcı: 8: Efendim?

Ben: Ama konuldu yani programda yer aldık.

Katılımcı 8: evet konuldu ama bunun yanında hani başka konulardan çıkaranlar da oldu ,mesela tarihi öğeler vardı bir takım onları çıkarmak zorunda kaldıkt,

Ben: Tarihi öğeler derken ?

Katılımcı 8: Mesela hani burada mürfredat ya da kitap ayrıntı yapmıyorum ben, birinde yoksa birinde vardır yani simdi çok da hani bu konuda çok da hazırlık da yapmadım. Yani hani bir şöyle karsıtmadım, tam net su sayfada su konuda diyemeyeceğim. Yani mesela şey vardı bir kitabımızda Çanakkale savaşını ile ilgili bir bölüm vardı orda birlik ve beraberlik veya onuna ilgili o temada sanırım mesajla onu ilgili bir takım tartışmalar olduğu sonra bir kitabımızda Fatih Sultan Mehmet’in bir şeyini koymıştuk, bir fermanı vardı insan haklarıyla ilgili olduğunu düşünüpümüz onu ilgili tartışmalar oldu..

Excerpt 14:
As a committee, you might have brought together diverse ideas, but decision-makers think more monolithically. This was true for this programme of study as well. The issue, to what extent you can persuade the other side there, this issue depends on the persuasion part, not on the point of view. This is a problem in the formation of policies, did I make myself clear? No matter how rational solutions or rationales I present to you, of course this is normal in a communication and it is normal on the basis of the possibility of reaching a compromise, but there is your boss in front of you who is in a quite higher position than you, and you do not have a thing. I mean you can only say this, you can say it if he allows you to say it, if he wants, he even would not allow (Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014).

Excerpt 15:

**Interviewee 7**: I think it is self-censorship. There was no need for anyone to tell a thing, you somehow know it. Because we undergo different processes and do textbook examination at the Board of Education, it was a committee which specifically comprised philosophy group teachers, we have already experienced many things before within the institution. From a picture and a sentence there, what kind of questions would come, you would write an answer to them, I mean we were individuals who know Turkey’s issues in that regard, you know the concerns and you are aware that you are going to make the whole Turkey accept a thing, by paying attention to these, you have to present a product that will please everyone.

**Me**: It seems the national identity is at the centre.

**Interviewee 7**: I must say this, yes, the state was significant and it was reflected there, duties and responsibilities to the state and other benchmark of this sort were included, for example, we discussed if they should be wholly left out, but it was concluded that they must be included, it was not a unanimous decision (Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014).

Excerpt 16:

**Katılımcı 7**: bence internal censorship… Kimse bir şey desmesine gerek yoktu bir çekilde siz bunu biliyorsunuz. Şimdi TTKB’de kitap inceleme ve biz farklı süreçlerden geçtiğimiz için özellikle felsefe grubu öğretmenlerinden oluşan bir komisyonu. Biz zaten bu kurum içerisinde daha önce birçok şey deneyimledik, Oradaki bir resimden bir cümleden, zaten ne tur soru önergeleri gelir onlara cevaplar yazarsınız şey yaparsınız, yani Türkiye’nin o anlamda şeyleriniilen kişileri zaten. Hassasiyetleri biliyorsunuz ve şeyin de farklıdır hani tüm Türkiye’ye bir şeyi kabullendirecek seniz bunlara dikkat ederek ortaya karışık bir ürün koymak durumunuzdu.

**Ben**: milli kimlik merkezde gibi…

**Katılımcı 7**: yani sunu söyleyeyim, devlet önemiymiş ve orayaı yansıtıdı. Devlette karşı ödevler görevler o tur kazanımlar olduğu tamamen mesela kaldırılmaksızın konusu tartışırken ama olması gerektiği konusunda sonuca bağlandığın tamamen de böyle bir global analiz olmadi.
**Interviewee 4:** I shall give a specific example, here I want the concept of autonomy to be included in the eighth grade programme. I think it is so significant. I have read Kant a lot, in the 1700s Kant said that if you cannot raise autonomous individuals, democracy’s destiny would be tyranny, I say this as much as I remember. Okay, what is autonomy? Engin Gençtan defines it beautifully. For example, we included it in the high school programme following very heated debates: Oh God, it would be linked to the demand for the autonomy of the South-eastern Region? Autonomy? What? Did you shift to politics? Are you making a reference to there? No, not at all, humans can be autonomous too, we are going to define it. At last, we included it by defining it: Humans under all pressures…

**Me:** Ability to make your own decisions.

**Interviewee 4:** In line with your inner voice…

**Me:** It was included as a result of your demands, right?

**Interviewee 4:** Yes, yes. (...) We are discussing the citizenship education programme in the final board meeting, I defended this there as well, I told that I do not understand, we include its definition, look we say how it is supposed to be perceived… It was the time I guess, Engin Gençtan defined that, the concept of autonomy, I eventually took the book to the meeting, they said, no no, they said no no, they rejected in the board, and they did not accept it (August 26, 2014).


**Ben:** Kendi kararlarınızı verebilme gücü

**Katılımcı 4:** iç sesi doğrultusunda

**Ben:** Sizin talepleriniz doğrultusunda kondu yani

**Katılımcı 4:** Evet, (...) Vatandaşlık programının en son Kurulu'nda tartışıyor. Orda da savundum, dedim ki ya anlamıyorum yani tanımı koyuyoruz bukın nasıl algılanması gerektiğini söylüyoruz, zamanıydı galiba Engin Gençtan'ın o şeyi tanımladığı, özerkliği tanımladığı, o kitabi da götürdüm en son, hayır hayır dediler hayır hayır dediler kurulda reddettiler kabul etmediler. En son lise 'de kabul ettirdik, kurulun yapısı da değişmişti.

**Excerpt 17:**
Interviewee 4: In our country, debates on controversial issues at the political and academic levels are not adequate. We are going to reflect this in the programme and textbooks! Here, the status of compulsory religious education course is obvious, the processes it has undergone, despite that many court verdicts, despite the rulings of the state council [a high court], what we experience is obvious. Therefore, the sacred state, the lofty interests of the state, the fear of fragmentation are always in sub-conscious [in the back of head]. What would happen to us if we touch upon these issues? What trouble would we face? This has an impact, as I said.

Me: There is a cautious climate…

Interviewee 4: Of course, of course, absolutely. Therefore, I would never say we included controversial topics. And when we were preparing learning activities, we could not talk about what we had experienced, the problems of our own society (…) We could not touch on controversial issues maybe because of this, there is always a village in the distance, and discrimination does not exist in our country, of course. When the programme of study was being prepared, there was constant control. It was put onto the agenda of the Board, it was approved, and it was sent back. It was not supposed to be sent back with some changes. It came back with a note saying that it was okay on the condition that those changes were to be made. Upon this, the committee had to make those changes, it had to reflect them in the programme (August 26, 2014).

Katılımcı 4: Bizde henüz bu tartışmalı konularda, siyaset ve akademik düzeyde tartışma yeterli değil, bu bunu bir de ortaöğretim düzeyinde programa yansıtabilecek ders kitaplarına yansıtabilecek işte din kültürüne hali ortada yasadığı süreçler o kadar şeye rağmen mahkeme kararlarına rağmen Danıştay‘in kararlarına rağmen yaşamaklaştığımız ortada. Yani dolayışıyla kutsal devlet işte aman devletin ali çıkarları,ulsion parçalalama korkusu o her zaman bilinçaltında var: Acaba bunlara dokunursak ne olur, başımızı ne gelir, o yansıtıyor o, dediğim gibi.

Ben: Bir ihtiyatlı hava var yani

Katılımcı 4: Tabi tabi kesinlikle. Onun için yansıtılmamızı asla söyleyemeyiz. Ve kendi ee etkinlik hazırlarken, kendi yaşadıklarımızdan, kendi toplumumuzun sorunlarından bahsedemek ki.

(...) Tartışmalı konulara giremedik belki bunun yüzden hep işte uzakta bir köy var ayrımsız bizde yok canım. Program hazırlarken her an bir kontrol vardı. Oraya da girdi kurulun gündemine de girdiği zaman Kabul edildiği zaman orada da, geri geldi kimi değişiklikler gelmesi gerekmiyor şu değişiklikler yapılması yapmak kaydıyla uzundur diyor akabinde comisyon o değişiklikleri yapmak zorunda programa yansıtmak zorunda zaten

Excerpt 18:

The prophet Mohammed, Rumi, Haji Bektash Veli, who are among the sources that maintain our culture, emphasise the value of man in the following ways:

Just as there is no superiority of an Arab over a non-Arab or a non-Arab over an Arab, someone with red skin does not have any superiority over someone whose skin is black; black is not superior to red-skinned people. (Farewell Sermon)

Mankind is even more precious than the ninth heaven (Masnavi)

Do not forget that your enemy is a human being (Malakat) (p. 12).
Kültürümüzün beslendiği kaynaklardan olan Hz. Muhammed, Mevlana ve Hacı Bektaş Veli insanın değerini şöyle vurgulamıştır:

‘Arap’ın Arap olmayana, Arap’a olmayanın da Arap üzerinde üstünlüğü olmadığı gibi kırmızı tenlinin siyah üzerine, siyahın da kırmızı tenli üzerinde bir üstünlüğü yoktur…” (Veda Hutbesi)

‘İnsan değer bakımından arştan (göğün en yüksek katı) da üstündür.’ (Mesnevi)

‘Düşmanımızın dahi insan olduğunu unutmayınız’ (Malakat)

**Excerpt 19:**

The Prime Minister inaugurated the first school of Turkey, which has an elevator for disabled people.

Computers that students needed are distributed to schools.

The state accelerated efforts that aim to increase the prosperity of workers and civil servants and improve their living conditions (p. 125).

Başbakan; Türkiye'nin ilk engelli asansörüne sahip okulun açılışını yaptı.

Öğrencilerin ihtiyaçları olan bilgisayarlar okullara dağıtıldı.

Devlet; çalışanların refahını yükseltmeye ve yaşam standartlarının düzeltmesine yönelik çalışmalar hızlandırdı.

**Excerpt 20:**

The most basic human right, the right to live, is frequently violated throughout the history. In today’s world, democratic states are taking measures for the preservation of the right to live. Human life and dignity is under constitutional protection in countries where democracy prevails. All sorts of measures are taken against possible risks that can jeopardise human life and dignity (p. 25).

En temel insan hakkı olan yaşam hakkı tarih boyunca sık sık ihlal edilmiştir. Günümüz de demokratik devletler yaşam hakkının korunması için tedbir almaktadır. Demokrasinin hüküm sürdüğü ülkelerde insan yaşamını ve onuru anayasal güvence altındadır. İnsan yaşamını ve onurunu tehdikeyeye atabilecek her türlü tedbir alınmıştır.

**Excerpt 21:**

One of the important problems of the world is child labour. It is known that child labour in some places of the world is very common. In some research, it is found out that more than 44 million child labourers were made to work in just one country (p. 86).

Dünyanın önemli sorunlarından biri de çocuk işçiliğidir. Dünyanın bazı yerlerinde çocuk işçiliğinin çok yaygın olduğu biliniyor. Çeşti araştırmalarda sadece bir ülkede kırk dört milyondan fazla çocuk işçi çalıştırıldığı tespit edilmiştir.

**Excerpt 22:**

Harmony spoils in a society or a world where there is no love, respect and tolerance. We may come across instances of violence among people, fights and disputes on TV channels and in newspapers. Have you ever thought of reason that underlies this? If love is inadequate, people hurt each other. In a society where justice and equality lack, injustices prevail (p. 22).
Sevginin, saygının, hoşgörünün olmadığı bir toplumda/dünyada ahenk bozulur. Bireyler ve toplumlar arasında çatışmalar çıkar.

Televizyon kanallarında ve gazetelerde insanlar arasındaki şiddet olaylarına, kavgalara, anlaşmazlıklarla rastlanmışsınız. Bunun altında neden hiç düşündünüz mü?

Sevgi eksikse insanlar birbirine zarar verir. Adaletin ve eşitliğin eksik olduğu bir toplumda haksızlıklar alış bileşir.

**Excerpt 23:**

Individuals who have legal rights and duties under a sovereign state, live in the same territories and are loyal to the same state are called as citizen. A good citizen embraces the loyalty to his nation, state and laws as a fundamental value and act in line with those values. These values are preconditions for living together, and having peace and happiness. Loyalty to state encompasses respect to and faith in nation, law, order and stability (p. 127).

Vatandaş, devletin egemenliği çerçevesinde hukuki hak ve ödevleri olan, aynı topraklar üzerinde yaşayan, aynı devlete bağlı bireylere denir. İyi bir vatandaş ülkesine, milletine, devletine ve kanunlara bağlılığı temel değer olarak benimser ve bu değerleri uygun hareket eder. Bu değerler, bir arada yaşamamızın, huzur ve mutluluk içerisinde olmamızın ön koşuldur. Devlete bağlılık; millete, hukuka, düzen ve istikrara saygı ve inancı kapsar.

**Excerpt 24:**

We can list the fundamental values which an individual who is loyal to his homeland is supposed to have:

- Loyalty to the nation
- Acting with tolerance
- Self-respect
- Loyalty to the homeland
- Responsibility
- Respect for fellow man
- Loyalty to the state
- Responsibility to society
- Respect for the nation
- Responsibility to the state
- Respect for the state
- Loyalty to spiritual values
- Respect for the laws (p. 127)

Vatannına bağlı bir bireyin sahip olması gereken temel değerleri aşağıdaki şekilde sıralayabiliriz:

- Millete bağlılık
- Höşgörüülü davranmak
- Öz saygı
- Vatana bağlılık
- Sorumluluk
- İnsana saygı
- Devlete bağlılık
- Topluma karşı sorumluluk
- Millete saygı
- Kanunlara bağlılık
- Devlete karşı sorumluluk
- Devlete saygı
- Manevi değerlerine bağlılık
- Kanunlara saygı
Excerpt 25:
A good citizen is patriotic. Patriotism requires embracing and loving the values, homeland, nation, laws of the nation to which one is a part. As an individual of the country we live in, we should feel a sincere loyalty to the nation we belong to, principles the nation is based on and mutual interests. Our country (homeland) where we were born, fed, live and maintain our material and spiritual existence is a very sacred value to which we are supposed to be loyal (p. 127).

Excerpt 26:
As a first-hand experience, I shall tell you how the decision was taken. I am not an authorised person from the Ministry. Before this decision had been announced, this issue came up in our previous chats and personal conversations with the most authorised person on this issue, the head of the Board of Education. This is because the institution with which we were working was in collaboration with the Board of Education. The repeal decision had been conveyed to the Prime Minister of the period before it was taken at the Board of Education and was announced to the public with the political will (Interviewee 17, October 2, 2015).

Chapter 7

Excerpt 1:
There are many things concerning democratic citizenship that Europe would learn from Turkey. Because the concept of “Citizen” was formed as an approach superseding the concept of “subject hood” in a period of 150 years, and the modern identity of “Democratic Citizen” has developed [in Turkey] (BoE, January 14, 1997).

Excerpt 2:
*English in its original*

It is much more productive if you work more as partners and suggest, give ideas and be serious, but also modest. I think that approach might work better than coming in and imposing things. I lived three years in Bosnia and Sarajevo. In the beginning, the international community would impose everything, it is easy to do, but it does not work. I see there is legislation that was just imposed and nobody is implementing because they did not feel part of the project (Interviewee 16, September 16, 2015).

Excerpt 3:
I was maintaining the negotiations of the citizenship and human rights education project. I was maintaining the negotiations with the Council and the Ministry. I was receiving many criticism like we were having the Council make programmes. Fortunately, the programme [citizenship and democracy education programme of study] was finished before starting to work with the Council. We said thank God! Of course, an educational system is normally envisaged according to each society’s needs and priorities. Both in the negotiation stage and other stages in our relationship with the CoE, we have never had an imposition, dictation, content imposition or an approach of this sort. Nothing like it became a case. As I mentioned, they were only sensitive about the proper use of funding they provided (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014).

Excerpt 4:

English in its original

We definitely work hand in hand with the EU, I mean not only in Turkey, but many other countries. We have secretary general who meets the commissioners; we have daily contacts in Brussels… At the same time, we also have a responsibility to support our member states, not only the EU accession member states to implement activities because that is the other thing… we always mentioned to the Turkish authorities that Turkey is not the only one that is undergoing the reform process of EDC/HRE, it is the same in France the same in other countries… (September 16, 2015).

Excerpt 5:

English in its original

I think it was in Antalya, all the representatives of the member states met in Turkey to have our annual meeting on education for democratic citizenship that was hosted by Turkey and I remember the head of the Board of Education was there…. it was interesting on both sides, I think, to see Turkey showed its interest in subject by hosting such a meeting and showed the rest of Europe that it was interested kind of really deeper in this project. It was also interesting for other people in Europe to see that Turkey was starting to be interested more (September 16, 2015).