UCL Discovery
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

Social norms don't always work: An experiment to encourage more efficient fees collection for students

Silva, A; John, P; (2017) Social norms don't always work: An experiment to encourage more efficient fees collection for students. PLOS One , 12 (5) , Article e0177354. 10.1371/journal.pone.0177354. Green open access

[thumbnail of journal.pone.0177354.pdf]
Preview
Text
journal.pone.0177354.pdf - Published Version

Download (936kB) | Preview

Abstract

The use of social norms has become the tool of choice for behaviourally informed interventions. However, it is still not clear for what type of contexts and populations is this intervention effective. This randomised controlled trial with 4298 students tests the applicability of social norms to improve the late payment of university tuition fees. We find that providing information to late payers does not increase their likelihood of paying. This finding highlights how the use of social norms may not always be an effective tool in influencing behaviour.

Type: Article
Title: Social norms don't always work: An experiment to encourage more efficient fees collection for students
Location: United States
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0177354
Publisher version: http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0177354
Language: English
Additional information: © 2017 Silva, John. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Keywords: Adult, Age Factors, Electronic Mail, Female, Humans, Male, Multivariate Analysis, Social Norms, Students, Universities
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Political Science
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10025043
Downloads since deposit
54Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item