Assembling the Apparatus, Governing the Subjects

- the Emergence and Deployment of Higher Education in Modern China

Hua Guo

Thesis submitted to

Institute of Education

University of London

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2011

Table of Contents

LIST OF TABLES 7

LIST OF FIGURES 7

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 8

ABSTRACT 10

DECLARATION 11

Part I ***12***

Chapter 1 Introduction 13

The Past and the Present 13

Three Themes of Inquiry 15

Research Questions 17

The Structure of the Thesis 18

Introduction 22

The Imperial Examination 24

Late Qing 25

Republican China 26

China under State Socialism 28

The Reform Era 30

The Growth of HE System 32

Conclusion 34

Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework 37

Introduction 37

History and Genealogy 38

Power and Discourse 40

Apparatus 41

Subject and Subjectivity 43

Government and Governmentality 45

Conclusion 47

Chapter 3 Methodology **48**

Genealogy as a Nontraditional Research Tool 48

Genealogy as Open Methodological Projects 49

A Map of Data 50

Early Fieldwork and Shifts in Research Design 53

Interview Data 55

Limitations and Contributions of the Research 59

Part II ***61***

Framework for Part II **62**

Chapter 4 The Articulation of Principles **65**

Articulation 65

Principle 67

Articulatory Struggles 71

Conclusion 83

Chapter 5 The Construction of Systems **84**

Introduction 84

Systems 84

The Emergence and Development of HE System 85

The Emergence of Public Schools 88

The Privilege of HE 90

The Shaping of a Structural Hierarchy 92

The Hierarchy within the HE System 96

Conclusion 101

Chapter 6 Curriculum, Pedagogy and Campus **103**

Introduction 103

The Formulation of Curriculum **105**

Knowledge, Curriculum and Sociology 105

Techniques of Curriculum 106

Integration 106

Categorisation 108
Production 110
Regulation 111
Summary 113
The Use of Pedagogy 114
Early Criticisms 114
The Chinese Learner Debate 115
Exemplary Pedagogy 116
Socialist Exemplarity 118
Summary 120
The Arrangement of Campus 121
Space 121
Exemplary Campus 121
Enclosed Space, Governable Space 124
Configuring Campuses 127
Space, Time and Pedagogy 128
Summary 129
Conclusion 130
Summary of Part II - The Will to HE 131
Part III ***132***
Framework for Part III 133
Chapter 7 Rationalities and Authorities 135
Introduction 135
Rationalities 135
Governmentality and China 136
HE as a Solution 139
HE as Social Selection 142
HE as Self-governance 146
Authorities 149

Hegemonic Authorities 149
Alternative Authorities 149
Derivative Authorities 150
Conclusion 154
Chapter 8 Technologies 155
Introduction 155
Technologies of the Population 158
Technologies of the Body 163
Technologies of the Social 169
Technologies of the Self 174
Conclusion 183
Chapter 9 Desires and Choices 184
Desires and Rewards 184
Desires 185
Choices 196
Hot Specialities, Cold Specialities 197
Seeking the Secret Bargains 199
Choosing Professions, Professionally Choosing 200
Conclusion 204
Part IV ***205***
Framework for Part IV 206
Chapter 10 Truth 207
Introduction 207
The Criterial Notion of Truth 208
The Constructive Notion of Truth 209
The Perspectivist Notion of Truth 213
The Experiential Notion of Truth 218
Conclusion 222
Chapter 11 Subjects 223

Introduction 223

Desiring Subjects 226

Meritocratic Subjects 226

Infused Subjects 227

Administrated Subjects 229

Governed Subjects 230

Displaced Subjects 231

Troubled Subjects 232

Conclusion 234

Chapter 12 Ethics 235

Introduction 235

Ethics as a practice of Self-care 236

The Ethical Substance 237

The Mode of Subjection 243

Self-forming Activity 245

Telos 248

Conclusion 255

Chapter 13 Concluding Thoughts 256

Apparatus, Government and the Present 256

Foucault's Contribution and Limitation 256

Alternative Accounts, Principled Accounts 262

Seeking Alternative HE Assemblages 267

Reference 271

APPENDIX 1 285

APPENDIX 2 286

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1, Data Categories 51

2, Variables in Interview Data 56

3, Components of HE Apparatus....63

4, Prevailing HE Principles in Different Historical Periods 82

5, Distribution of Government Investment in HE and Regular Education 89

6, Yearly Expense on Students 91

7, Dimensions of Government through HE 134

8. Different Biopolitical Technologies 156

9, Documents in Examinees' dossiers 167

10, Foucauldian Notions of Truth 208

11, Subject Forms 226

12, Four Aspects of Foucauldian Ethics....236

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1, Education System in Contemporary China....23

2, Growth of HE, 1952 -1994....35

3, Growth of HE, 1994 onwards....36

4, Cover pages of *Sandian Yice* 122

5, 'Learning is a belief' advertisement 239

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My thanks to my supervisors, Dr. Ed Vickers (2007-2010), Professor Sir David Watson (2008-2010), Professor Deborah Youdell (2010-2011), and Professor Carol Vincent (2011-2012), for their guidance and support that make this thesis possible. In particular, to Deborah, who generally took me as her supervisee at my moment of desperation, helped me seek feasible approaches for this thesis and established high expectations of my PhD. And to Carol, who helped me fight through the very end of this long journey with timely guidance and generous support, and organised everything else in a highly professional manner, without which my completion would be hard to imagine. To my internal reader, Professor Paul Standish, for his helpful comments. To other academics who helped me with new ideas for the thesis, in particular Professor Paul Morris (IOE) and Professor Pan Maoyuan (Xiamen University, China). And to Professor Richard Pring (Oxford), whose generosity, integrity and wisdom constantly inspire me.

To my friends, who have been most supportive towards my studies and life, in particular Ms Ye Liu, who has been a loyal friend and an inspiration for my London times. To Ms Wu Bingwu and Ms Chen Yin, my most loyal and generous friends whom I am most fortunate to know from my visit to Xiamen University and to have as my true friends for this life. Mr Dai Junze, who generously accommodated me at the time of my financial difficulty and supported me without hesitation. And many others such as Ms Xia Yin, whose social network and people skills made my fieldwork much smooth, Mr Lloyd Robertson, Ms Liu Shuiyun, Mr Cao Yi, Mr. Bai Yan, Mr Wang Weicong, and Mr Man Jiawei.

To my mentor, Dr Jiang Haichuan, who knows me better than myself and helps me without hesitation. The final year has not been easy, and I could not imagine it without the constant encouragement, understanding, and support from Dr Jiang. He is always the reason why I can see a different world today.

To my best friend, Matthew Daniel Gower, who helps me from the very beginning of my overseas education till the final page of this thesis. I am more than honoured to know him for my life. Without him, I would not be able to fight for so long on my own. Matthew first brought to my attention the issue of HE expansion and student expectations, which became the initial focus of my thesis. In the following years, we have been discussing various ways to explore the issue deeper and elaborate my findings better. This thesis bears much of his efforts, his intelligence, and his persistence. For this, I can never thank him enough.

To Foucault, whose genius enlightens my inquiry in this thesis, and into this world of complexity.

To London, a magnificent city that kindly offers me what life has to offer. I could not imagine a better place anywhere else in the world for this 4 years of growth, bewilderment and hardship and rejoice.

To my parents. To them, I could not express my gratitude in any written words. They are every reason why I am able to live in the way I do, and to imagine bigger, and to achieve more. For this, I am always grateful.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a genealogy of the emergence and deployment of Higher Education (HE) in modern China, in particular its role in the production and shaping of a variety of subject forms. By engaging both historical and contemporary materials connected to HE, I intend to display, in Foucault's words, an 'effective' history of the emergence and deployment of HE in modern China, the ways in which HE becomes a particular apparatus of social selection and personnel production, and also an important form of government, also the ways in which HE influences its subjects in understanding their own subject positions in relation to HE, to others and to themselves.

In this thesis, HE is first understood as a complex apparatus made of a variety of components; each of these components – principle, system, curriculum, pedagogy, and campus, involves multiple power relations and cannot be reduced to a single power will. HE can be understood as a particular form of government over its targeted subjects. HE as such works through an assemblage of rationalities, authorities, technologies, choices and desires, all contributing to the production and shaping of particular forms truth, subject and ethics. Within this assemblage of HE government, all elements are not unified but rather open to struggles, changes and transformations.

DECLARATION

I confirm that the word length of

1, the thesis, including footnotes, is **99,204**

2, the reference is **7,180**

and

3, the appendices is **2,003**

Part I

Setting the Theme

Chapter 1 Introduction

The Past and the Present

Zeng Pu[1], a student at the School of Combined Learning (Tongwen Guan) in 1895, the earliest modern Higher Education (HE hereafter) institution in China, offered us a glance at the teaching and learning activities of early HE with a description of his experience at the institution.

> 'When I started to learn French... Zhang Qiaoye who was then in Office in charge of Affairs of All Nations (Zhongli Yamen) suggested setting up special classes in Tongwen Guan to recruit students from administrative staff in government offices who had good training in Chinese classics to study foreign language. Hence, four classes were set up for English, French, German and Japanese respectively. This was actually a good idea, although its aim was only to train a few senor officials in translation. But against this good idea, the students recruited were either high-ranking officials or celebrity intellectuals who were mostly busy with other work and thinking highly of themselves, and they would not concern themselves with serious academic studies. Their attendance at school was very much like their attendance to government offices – they would sit down for a while, have a cup of tea and some casual conversation with one another, as a gesture of showing gratitude to their superiors' efforts to provide education for the talented. It was mostly awkward for the foreign teachers, who had no choice but to come to perform a monologue in lectures every day and then leave the classroom. After a while, the teachers became bored of such monologues and hardly showed up again. The special classes were then ended silently, having lasted for eight months or so. For my fellow classmates, I could say for sure that eight months was completely wasted, but for me it built the foundation of my French language skills(qouted in Wei, 1982, pp. 192-193, my translation). '

Criticism of the bureaucratic nonsense and the lack of serious scholarship in early HE institutions in late Qing[2] are also applied to Peking Imperial University, the first modern university in Chinese history. According to Chen, after the abolishment of the Imperial Examination for government posts (*Keju*) as the route of socio-educational selection for bureaucracy in imperial China, the Imperial University became a site where government officials who had career setbacks and intellectuals from the previous examination system sought career opportunities. They largely wished to move up in the bureaucratic leadership after spending some time in this modern university. Since most of the students in Imperial University were from bureaucratic or other socially advantaged backgrounds, they would bring their personal aides to class.

> 'When the lectures were to begin, the personal aides would call out "master, please attend the class", and then bring in the stationery, tea sets and smoking pipes for their masters to their desks. When the lectures were over, these personal aids would call out "master, please go back to your residence", and then came into the classroom to clean up the desks.'

---

[1] Zeng Pu later became a renowned critical intellectual, a novelist in Late Qing and the Republic. His novel *Ni Hai Hua* was among the best novels that criticised the bureaucracy in Late Qing China.

[2] The Qing Dynasty was the last dynasty of China, ruling from 1644 to 1912. It was followed by the Republic of China.

This was perhaps a rather accurate portrait of modern HE and its students in the early years. These HE institutions were invariably small in size, and intended to provide an elite form of education for talented minds. It is these early practices of HE where I start my investigation into the history of HE in contemporary China.

The present is now haunted with a radically different portrait. In 2009, a book named *Ant Tribe* (Lian, 2009), brought the attention of the media and the public to the unemployed or semi-employed and low-income college graduates who live in China's rural-urban fringe. In the book, the term Ant Tribe refers to this particular group of college graduates who are likely between 22 and 29 years of age, working in jobs with low income and stability such as insurance promotion, electronic-appliance sales, advertising and the restaurant business, most of the time without contracts or social security benefits.

The authors use this term Ant Tribe as they find much similarity between this group and the ant – first, ants are known to be among the most intelligent of insects, and members of this group are likely to hold a university degree or diploma which presumably proves their intellect; second, ants are collective insects, and members of this group are also likely to live collectively, though as a result of socio-economic difficulties rather than biological natures; third, ants are traditionally associated with certain good characteristics—such as industriousness, humility, and optimistism—the members of this group tend to display; and fourth, ants are likely to cause damage to the property/habitats of larger organisms if their colonies increase exponentially in size and number. The authors of this book highlight this final point and therefore call for attention to the Ant Tribe. This is perhaps more evident in the title of the research that the book is based on, Potent crisis: a study of regionally inhabited university graduates and the issues of social stability. Although the book adopts a humanistic perspective and is sentimental at times, the second section, analysing survey data, suggests that the research is determined by government control. It is perhaps better understood as sociological gaze into a group deemed a potential threat to social stability. It is a study of, from the Foucauldian perspective, the abnormal: against our normative perceptions of university graduates, these young people are not doing jobs that require high intellectual capacities, neither are they given desirable economic rewards, despite their possession of higher education degrees or diplomas. The Ant Tribe is now, according to the authors of this book, a particularly vulnerable social group, in addition to the other three socially disadvantaged groups – peasants, migrant workers, and laid-off workers.

It would appear, then, that the portrait of university students in contemporary China is no longer centred upon bureaucratic nonsense and a lack of scholarship, but on a sense of bewilderment and

disappointment when facing the gap between dreams and reality, as one can see from this report (Caploe, 2011):

> 'Liu Yang, a coal miner's daughter, arrived in Beijing this past summer with a freshly printed diploma from Datong University, $140 in her wallet and an air of invincibility.
>
> Her first taste of reality came later the same day, as she lugged her bags through a ramshackle neighborhood, not far from the Olympic Village, where tens of thousands of other young strivers cram four to a room. Unable to find a bed and unimpressed by the rabbit warren of slapdash buildings, Ms. Liu scowled as the smell of trash wafted up around her.
>
> "Beijing isn't like this in the movies," she said.'

Often the first from their families to finish even high school, ambitious graduates like Ms. Liu are part of an unprecedented wave of young people all around China who were supposed to move the country's labor-dependent economy toward a white-collar future'. The significant contrast between the two types of subjects displayed above, I argue, should not be regarded as the necessary outcome of the socio-historical development of modern China from its prior feudal heritage and class privilege. But rather, I think it is a process that involves multiple power struggles, radical shifts and transformations—among those from lower classes ascendant during the process. It is a process that demands deeper investigation, which is what I propose to do in this thesis.

Three Themes of Inquiry

Over a century, university studentship has gone through tremendous changes, and so has HE itself in modern China. The HE system has grown from a cluster of language, military and technical schools in late Qing to an enormous collection of institutions, amounting to 2263 in 2008[3]. The total enrolment number in regular HE institutions (HEIs) in 2008 reached 20.2 million, and that of graduates reached 5.1 million in 2008[4].

Though such statistics may be suggestive, it is my contention that they do not warrant simply, following the tradition of HE studies, the contrast between the elitist bureaucratic 'masters' and the lost generation of 'ant tribes' is a result of the transition of HE development from an elite phase to a mass stage, though this perspective could be rather convenient in explaining what is happening around HE

---

[3] Ministry of Education, http://202.205.177.9/edoas/website18/96/info1261474691589796.htm last accessed 11th September 2011.

[4] Ministry of Education, http://202.205.177.9/edoas/website18/89/info1261469797229789.htm last accessed 11th September 2011.

and university studentship. My concern is not to what extent the changes in university studentship can be explained by the growth and evolution of the HE system. Instead, in presenting these two examples, I want to pursue research along two lines of inquiry. The first revolves around HE itself, and I want to move beyond the mere transformation of HE from language and technical schools to an enormous system and look into the ways in which HE, as an important social sector in the history of modern China, is assembled, shaped, and developed into what it is presented in contemporary discourses.

In the tradition of HE studies, HE is most likely to be viewed as a system of institutions that vary in history, reputation, size, and function, or a learning stage different from early schooling in manifold ways, most noticeably in pedagogy and curriculum. These approaches are without doubt useful and productive, as they have rather successfully opened up spaces for scholarly investigation and built up associations with other disciplines – sociology, psychology, philosophy, economics, history, and in recent decades, management. However, I intend to eschew the pursuit of many of these approaches, though I will occasionally engage with them in the discussion to follow. For me, HE is not merely a system that accommodates a substantial amount of young students and acts as a ground for the emergence of this sub-social group known as the ant tribe; it is, more importantly, a form of social governance, an assemblage of technologies and techniques aimed to shape and direct the production of intellects at an advanced level for certain objectives which may vary in different historical circumstance. Therefore, in my engagement with the rise of HE in modern China, I will focus on the emergence and development of all sorts of technologies and techniques of HE apparatus in shaping the functions and outlooks of HE.

My second theme focuses upon HE government. HE in my discussion is not merely a cluster of institutions or a period of learning experience, but a regime of truth about the educational characteristics of modern/contemporary human beings, a field of discourses and institutional practices that help to manifest, produce and promote such characteristics, an assemblage of technologies and techniques that are essential to understanding the ways in which one understands him/herself as a certain educational creature. To this end, I look into the invention and deployment of multiple rationalities, authorities, technologies and techniques, desires and choices aiming at the shaping and production of certain subjects and subjectivity connected to HE.

My third theme focuses on the power-produced truth, subject and ethics of HE in modern China. In the discussion to follow, I intend to reveal first, the forms of truth that is produced, modified, and appropriated, the ways in which different forms of subject and subjectivities, such as the bureaucrats in *Tongwen Guan* and the *Ant Tribe* came into being, and aspects of ethics of HE as a form of relation one

has to oneself. It is important for one to bear in mind that the truth, subject and ethics from radically different historical periods may have more in common than they appear. This possible consistency in the truth, subject and ethics of HE might be due to the influence of cultural norms, or mere coincidences.

In terms of the perspectives to be used in this thesis, I engage with the history of HE in modern China, but only to the extent that it bears on the question of the emergence of HE as assemblage of principles, systems, institutions, etc. and that of subjects that may, or may not, be historically varied and contextually different; I look at politics and policies of HE in the same fashion, aiming to explore the invention and deployment of certain technologies and techniques in relation to HE which make human subjects intelligible, practical and governable; I investigate subjects and ethics in discourses and fieldwork, to explore the invention and fabrication of such subjects and ethics via the deployment of HE, the ways in which subjects understand and formulate their relations with HE, with others and with themselves.

By proposing my inquiry in this fashion, I am not suggesting that the history of HE can be reduced to its capacities to make human subjects governable. In following Rose (1996) in his discussion of psychology, I also argue that heterogeneous processes of organisational formation and expansion of institutions and systems do not necessarily have regulatory aspirations as their conscious aim or latent determinants. But, rather, this history is more intelligible with the relations between the problems of governability and the emergence and institutionalisation of HE taken into account. In this process, new forms of institutions are invented, along with new practices to be hosted in these institutions; new authorities are formulated, along with their relations with their respective subjects; new subjects and subjectivities emerge, along with their relations with institutions, authorities, and themselves.

Research Questions

As I state above, my discussion in this thesis is of two themes – the first on the ways in which HE as a particular social sector is assembled, and the second, how HE is deployed in the manufacturing and shaping of different subjects and subjectivities. I put forward following research questions accordingly.

1. In what ways is HE as a social sector assembled from its apparatus components? What are the technologies and techniques that are invented, developed and modified in this process?

2. In what ways is HE invented and deployed as form government in the production, shaping and governing of its subjects?

3. What is produced as the 'truth' of HE? And what are the forms of subject, and ethics produced in such a process?

In my three analysis sections, I will address these questions accordingly. Part II focuses on the assemblage of HE apparatus components, Part III on HE as a form of government, and Part IV on the truth regime of modern HE, the formation process of HE subjects, and the ethics of contemporary HE in China.

The Structure of the Thesis

Though the primary focus of this thesis is subjects – subjects of HE, subjects of population management, of social engineering, of ethical formation – I think it is indispensable and beneficial to explore the objects of HE – principles, systems, institutions, curriculum pedagogy and space, and the ways in which these apparatus assemblage have been integrated into the assemblage of HE and during the process, turned into sites of various human technologies and techniques that aim to direct subjects of HE towards certain objectives. It is through the discussion of the apparatus components that my exploration of subjects and subjectivities could become salient and practical, that one can have access to the ways in which subjects of contemporary China find themselves inescapably included in the discourses of HE, and encounter the mundane practices of educational institutions – university campus, library, study room, high school classrooms – on a daily basis, without being necessarily aware of the technologies and techniques exercised upon them. Only by first examining the intended objects of HE can one become perceptive as to the ways in which subjects express their educational desires and ambitions with immediate reference to the requirements of a modern society, as if these desires and ambitions are a natural element of a grand social narrative of the educational nature of modern/contemporary beings; the ways in which subjects choose to become involved in various means of social engineering and selections such as the College Entrance Examination (CEE hereafter).

Accordingly, the discussion in this thesis is made up of two projects – the apparatus components of HE and the subjects of HE. As I have roughly adumbrated, I choose to begin my investigation with the apparatus components of HE, not only in an attempt to set up the general background for the convenience of further discussion on subjects, but also with the intention to reveal the invention and deployment of HE as a process of institutional emergence and discursive formation, as a site where a

myriad of technologies and techniques have been invented, exercised, adjusted, abolished or sustained. In order to do this, my discussion of the objects of HE will include the following five perspectives – the articulation of principles, the manufacturing of systems, the formulation of curriculum, the use of pedagogy, and the arrangement of space.

But before I embark upon the investigation, I provide a brief history of HE in the Chapter 1, in which I will provide a brief socio-historical account how policies and practices may have varied from one historical phase to another, and how a modern HE system in China began to take shape across these phases. However, I do not intend to provide a comprehensive account of the history of modern HE in China, but rather to organize the historical materials in a way that would serve as a background of my further investigation in later chapters.

In Chapter 2, I will put forward my theoretical framework, in which I will discuss my use of Foucauldian approaches, and their relevance to the Chinese context. I will discuss my use of concepts including genealogy, technology and technique, discourse, subjectivity, etc. In this chapter, I do not intend to propose a formal theory for my inquiries, but rather I prefer to put forward a theoretical 'toolbox' (Ball, 1993), an assembly of a number of dimensions along which my discussions are to be conducted. In Chapter 3, I discuss my methodology for the thesis. The main approach of my investigation is genealogy, and I introduce various sources of data I use in this thesis. I will also discuss the paradigm shifts in my previous stage of studies, including data collection in my fieldwork. I then explain why and how I decide to abandon my prior theoretical framework and take up genealogy as the main analysis approach.

My analysis begins in Chapter 4, in which I will look into the principles of HE and the manufacturing of its systems. My discussion of the principles inspired by Ian Hunter's (1994) work Rethinking the School, in which he argued that the emergence of popular schools was based upon principles other than the moral ideals of full intellectual development or eventual liberation of human being. Instead, its emergence was closely related to transformation of pastoral care to pedagogy of modern popular schools. To follow the lead of Hunter, I also begin my investigation with the principles established, articulated, adjusted and developed out of the emergence of HE, the principles that defines the nature and scope of HE, shape the outlook and structure of its system, regulate its practices, organize its knowledge provision, and select its subjects and direct them towards certain objectives deemed as desirable.

In Chapter 5, I engage with the manufacturing of a HE system which now appears hierarchical in many ways. Externally, with relations to other sectors of schooling, the HE system is at the top of an educational pyramid; and internally, various institutions are ranked by their reputation, academic achievement, and specialties, and are in turn given different amounts of funding. It is perhaps facile to explain the formation and presence of such a hierarchy with reference to a philosophy of market competition and social evolution, which would suggest this hierarchy is a product of a meritocracy. I challenge this explanation of the presence of a hierarchy by showing that it is not generated by natural and rational social selection but policies and practices born out of certain historical contingencies and objectives of social engineering that shape the structure and appearance of such a hierarchy.

In Chapter 6, I bring together the discussions of three other dimensions of HE apparatus – curriculum, pedagogy and campus. In my investigation of HE curriculum, rather than following the perspectives taken by either the sociology of education or New Sociology of Education, I look into the formulation of an appropriate curriculum for HE, the ways in which different components of knowledge are put together via various intellectual techniques in order to create space of government of HE and its subjects. In terms of pedagogy, I look into the deployment of pedagogy as intellectual techniques in the shaping and governance of teaching and learning practices in HE. Instead of seeking ways to modify and improve the pedagogy at work in contemporary China, or to devise an alternative, my focus is to analyse what has emerged as an 'appropriate' pedagogy for HE in modern China, the ways in which certain forms of educational practices and relations have been invented and assembled as the norm, the standard and the order of pedagogy. I engage with the 'Chinese learner' debate and the notion of 'exemplarity', and look into the ways in which certain teaching and learning practices are introduced and established as legitimate and intelligible. In term of space, I explore the arrangement of modern HE campus. To this end, I engage with the underlying assumptions and logics of space configuration for HE, the ways in which certain spaces are assigned with specific functions and the ways in which these functional spaces are assembled together to be presented as an appropriate campus space.

Chapter 4, 5 and 6 constitute an analysis of the apparatus components of HE, and in chapter 7, 8, and 9, I will proceed with the second project of this thesis – HE as a means of government. Allow me to stress again that my separation of the discussion of the apparatus components from that of HE government, and that of subject and ethics is not to suggest that they belong to different domains of investigation, or should be carried out in different fashions. On the contrary, these three projects are inextricably entwined. The first project, my discussion often broaches subject formation, and in the second project, I make reference back to the discussion of the apparatus components. My discussion of

the government of HE is conducted in a similar way to that of the first project, and in the third part of this thesis I augment my inquiry practically by drawing on more data from my fieldwork in addition to historical resources and theoretically by acknowledging later developments in Foucault's thinking on governmentality and subject. My decision to separate these three projects is not merely for the sake of convenience, but in the belief that a fuller account of the subjects is made more intelligible in the light of the discussion of apparatus and government, that the subjects can be more visibly located in the power relations that is made of and, at the same time, making use of the numerous technologies, techniques, practices and discourses of HE.

In Chapter 7, I will look into the notions of government and governmentality and how these notions can be useful to the inquiries in this part, and also how rationalities and authorities of HE government are invented, sustained or changed. In Chapter 8, I will focus upon the four categories of technologies of HE government, referring to the technologies of the population, the body, the social and the self. I will engage with the ways in which these technologies are invented and enforced, and also their roles in the formation processes of HE subjects. In Chapter 9, I look into the ways in which desires, rewards, and choices are used to govern HE subjects and to encourage self-governance.

In Part IV *Governing the Present*, I look more closely into the contemporary HE system. In this final Part, I first bring together three theoretical tools - truth, subject and ethics. I use these tools to explore mainly my interview data and some other discursive materials. In Chapter 10 I investigate the power-produced truth of HE - what forms of truth have been produced, how they are maintained or modified in discourses and practices, and how they are appropriated by HE participants. In Chapter 11, I summarise the various forms of HE subjects that are formulated in the history of modern China, either as products of historical consistency or historical contingency. In Chapter 12, I further investigate the formation process of contemporary HE subjects from the perspective of ethics, and reveal the ethical substance, the mode of subjection, the self-forming activity and the telos of contemporary HE.

In Chapter 13, the concluding chapter, I first examine the contribution and limitation of a Foucauldian frame to my inquiry in this thesis. I then discuss some criticisms of the current HE system in China as a form of resistance to the hegemonic accounts of HE. But these criticisms alone, I argue, are not sufficient if we want to bring changes to the current Chinese HE. HE in China is not a mere collection of institutions, but a concrete and complicated apparatus, a powerful form of government, and a hegemonic yet persuasive regime of truth. By looking at some new forms of HE practices, such as class videos from foreign universities on internet, and domestic experiments of summer school programmes, I explore the possibilities of alternative HE assemblage.

Higher Education in Modern China

Introduction

In this chapter, I will provide a brief review of the history of HE in modern China, with reference to the general socio-political context of different historical phases, the rise and development of modern HE institutions, the influences of certain political and intellectual figures, the introduction and prevalence of certain policies and practices, etc. But I will organise my review in a thematic, rather than strictly chronological, manner. I will divide this review into a number of small sections and present them in a way that would serve as background information for my analysis by chapter.

Allow me to first elaborate on my use of the term 'Higher Education'. This term may refer to various forms of educational activities conducted at many types of educational institutions in different countries and across different historical period (see Windolf, 1997 for instance). It is not my intension to make either a historical or international comparison of HE, but only to focus on its meaning in the Chinese context. The earliest definitions of HE were borrowed from the Japanese model. For instance, the one that appears in the 1903 Kuimao Decreed of Education System refers to all educational activities conducted in advanced colleges (*Gaodeng Xuetang*), universities and postgraduate schools (*Tongru Yuan*) (see Chen, 2005). Some of the leading scholars working in HEIs in the Republican era also gave their respective interpretations, but the term HE was frequently used interchangeably with university education. Cai Yuanpei writes that 'university education is a further advanced form of education after secondary education; Fu Sinian understands HE as 'mainly academic education conducted in universities and other institutions of equal status, and it should also include some non-academic activities such as student character building, all of which contribute to HE's basic function – the acquisition, development and utilisation of what scholarship has to offer'; Zhuang Zexuan argues that HE is a form of education that 'aims to produce leaders of one country... and its participants should be intellectually superior to benefit from this form of education' (Cai, Fu and Zhuang, all quoted in Li, 2004, pp.100-101, my translation). Arguably, the variety of definitions in the Republican era is a result of the co-existence of multiple HE models and theories.

However, the definitions of HE in the following eras tend to be predominantly shaped by the Soviet Model and the socialist mentality, which places an emphasis on personnel production and specialty training. For instance, Pan Maoyuan, a leading scholar in HE studies in China and the founder of the first research institute of HE in China, gives a definition of HE in his



Figure 1, Education System in Contemporary China, based on Zhou (2006, p. 12)

widely quoted *Higher Education Studies* - 'Higher Education is a form of professional education based on regular education[5], and aims to produce personnel of various specialities' (1984, p. 84, my translation). A more recent definition is given in Zhou Ji (2006, pp. 11-12)'s book, Higher Education in China. He writes,

> 'China's higher education consist mainly of special course (or junior college) education, regular course (or undergraduate) education and graduate education, and includes education for academic qualifications and education for non-academic qualifications. Taking the form of full-time or part-time programs, it can also be delivered through radio, television, and correspondence, and by other long-distance means. Higher education for academic qualifications is conducted mainly by schools of higher education while the other institutions of higher education may undertake non-academic programs'.

The HE system and the entire education system in contemporary China are illustrated in Figure 1. Although the term HE covers all educational activities above the level of secondary education, the focus of my inquiry falls primarily on undergraduate education conducted in universities and colleges. This is because the undergraduate sector plays the most significant role in the discourses and practices of HE in China. The most common expression related to HE in the public discourses is 'going to university' (*shang daxue*), meaning to study for an undergraduate degree. Also, in my discussion of HE system in Chapter 5, I will explore the system's hierarchical structure further.

The span of a century or so since the late 19th century witnessed the fall of imperial China and the advent of its modern times. Historians (Ichiko, 1980; Pepper, 1987a; 1987b; 1991; Sun, 1986) tend to divide this span into several phases in accordance with the political regimes in power, including the late Qing Dynasty, the Republican China, and Socialist China, and post-socialist China. I outline below the development of HE in different historical phases, and also a process of HE development in China with reference to statistics. But now, I begin my discussion with the Imperial Examination, the influence of which upon HE in modern China is difficult to overstate.

The Imperial Examination

Researchers in China tend to trace the origin of universities in China back either to *Taixue* in the Han Dynasty or *Shuyuan* which largely came into existence in Song Dynasty. Neither assignation of origin is entirely justifiable. *Taixue* had more to do with education of high status social elites rather than providing education of a demonstrably higher level (Chen, 2002). *Shuyuan* lacked independence from

[5] The term 'regular education' in the Chinese context refers to primary and secondary education.

the government compared to its medieval counterparts of European universities such as Bologna, Paris and Oxford.

Introduced in the Sui Dynasty (581-618 AD), the Imperial Examination, also known as *Keju*, were a centralised civil service examination which developed and matured during the Tang Dynasty, continuing until their 1905 abolition under the Qing Dynasty, a history (with brief interruptions, e.g. at the beginning of the Yuan dynasty) of 1,300 years (Chaffee, 1985; Lee, 1985; Li, 2005; Liu, 2002). During this extensive period, there were hardly any incentives from central or local governments during any dynasty to implement comprehensive schooling for populations. The governments found it sufficient to recruit talents from this examination system alone, and to promote teaching and learning in private channels such as *Shuyuan* and *Sishu* (family schools) via the Imperial Examination. Ideas of state schooling system did not gain popularity until the late 19th Century when popular schools were argued to be a major advantage of western societies over Chinese society and an essential reason of the triumph of the West in wars against China.

The Imperial Examination was intended to be an open social selection system through which any male adult in China, regardless of his social background, could become a high-ranking government official. However, since the process of studying for the examination tended to be time-consuming and costly (if tutors were hired), most of the candidates came from the numerically small but relatively wealthy land-owning gentry (Chang, 1955). Nonetheless, for most part of the imperial history, the Imperial Examination did contribute to greater social mobility in the society – from Song to Qing Dynasty, around 30% -45% of the final successors came from families with no prior history of civil service (Shen, 2002). The examination system also served to maintain cultural unity and consensus on basic values. The uniformity of the content of the examinations meant that the local elites and ambitious would-be members of those elites across the whole of China were taught with the same values and were likely to follow the ideological orthodoxy of the government – the Confucian Canon (Chaffee, 1985; Lee, 1985; Li, 2005; Liu, 2002), which had been modified and manipulated by successive governments since Han Dynasty (206 BC -220 AD) (Huang, 1988).

Late Qing

The Qing Dynasty, ruling from 1644 to 1912, is the last dynasty of imperial China. 19th-century China was an era in which Qing control weakened and prosperity diminished, as a result of multiple factors such as massive social strife, economic stagnation and the conflicts between the Qing government and other nations in international trade, most noticeably the two Opium Wars with the Great Britain. The

Qing government took initiatives to bring changes to its socio-political system in order to cope with the foreign invasion and mass civil disorder. Education was given particular emphasis in such reforms. A number of modern HE institutions in technology and military training began to emerge, and the Imperial Examination was abolished in 1905 to enforce the implementation of a new state schooling system. This was after the first initiatives of a modern HE system made by the Qing governors before the very end of the empire. However, the efforts of late Qing governors were soon interrupted when the regime came to its end in 1911.

Republican China

The Republican Era, from 1912 to 1948, was far from being a unified phase. Between 1912 and 1916, the Nanjing government fought against Yuan Shikai, who had effective control of the Beiyang Army, the most powerful military force in China at the time. After Yuan Shikai's death in 1916, shifting alliances of regional warlords fought for control of the Beijing government until 1928 when the republic was nominally unified under the Chinese Nationalist Party in Nanjing, and was in the early stages of industrialisation and modernisation. The "Nanjing Decade" of 1928-37 was one of consolidation and accomplishment under the leadership of the Nationalists. But most nation-building efforts were stopped during the full-scale War of Resistance against Japan from 1937 to 1945, and later the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalist and the Chinese Communist Party between 1945 and 1949.

As Wang (1966, p. 362) usefully pointed out in his intense discussion of the Chinese intellectual and western influence in the pre 1949 era, one major feature of Chinese education during that period is 'its frequent revision more or less in accordance with the background of the educators'. The first major influence is from Japan. The Imperial University, for instance, was founded in 1898 after the pattern of the University of Tokyo.

The second major influence came from Europe. The most noticeable figure that introduced European model to China was Cai Yuanpei, perhaps among the most frequently cited figures of a liberal tradition of HE in China. Cai was trained in Germany and France, and took up the chancellorship of Peking University in 1917. Cai's idea of university education and the practical reforms that he carried out were regarded as widely influential for his promotion of university autonomy and academic freedom, both which are the essence of modern universities. Through his leadership as Chancellor of Beijing University, Cai carried out many practical reforms that had a profound impact on the development of

higher education in China. He is well remembered for his accomplishments in the stimulation of creative scholarship and pure research, and in the reorganisation of university administration based on the principle of democracy.

After the establishment of a new Nationalist government in Nanjing (Nanking) in 1927, Cai Yuanpei attempted to apply his experimentation of university autonomy in Peking University to the whole higher education system. He proposed to set up a university council to manage the educational work but at the same time stay independent of the nationalist government. The proposal was initially accepted but soon abolished (Hayhoe, 1996). The Ministry of Education was founded in 1928 instead and regulated by the central government. Instead of supporting academic freedom, the new regime was eager to direct university towards its own political agenda – university education aiming at practical objectives of nation building, which was in a similar way that their counterparts in the late Qing Dynasty experimented. This was reflected in a tighter control of school administration and curriculum, for instance, the introduction of compulsory military training and 'Party Doctrine' course, the standardisation of curricula, etc. However, this plan was met with vigorous resistance from university staff and students alike.

After the outburst of war caused by the Japanese invasion in 1937, a large number of universities were forced to move to the hinterland and Hong Kong. This is probably the first and only time in which educational resources in the hinterlands surpassed those in coastal areas. The Nationalist government initiated a number of policies to support academic work during the wartime, but also intended to exert total control over the university education. This was still strongly opposed by university staff and students, as for now the idea of academic freedom and university autonomy had become an indispensable part of institutional practices and discourses in HE. One example is the famous Southwest Associated University, a combination of Qinghua University, Peking University and Nankai University. Comparatively little interference from the central government enabled the university to operate with considerable autonomy. Throughout the wartime, the university produced a high quality of scholarship in various disciplines and educated a group of intellectual leaders (Hayhoe, 1996).

An important alternative to the university education under the Nationalist regime is the Communist form of higher education – *Kangda*, or the Anti-Japanese Resistance University (Pepper, 1996). Founded in 1938, it offered short-term courses (six months or so) to young people in military and strategic affairs. The curricular focus was on Marxism and military strategy, but also included philosophy and history. Kangda was rather distinctive for its open access, combination of labour and academic studies, and political education at the core of its curriculum (Hayhoe, 1996).

China under State Socialism

The period between 1949 and 1966 witnessed a strong influence of state socialism in the model of Soviet Union. In 1966, Mao and his allies launched the Cultural Revolution, which would led to a major upheaval in Chinese society. After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping quickly came into power and initiated China's transition from a planned economy to a mixed economy with an increasingly open market, or in the official term by the Communist Party of China 'Socialism with Chinese characteristics'.

Zhou (2004), in his book The State and Life Chances in Urban China: Redistribution and Stratification, 1949- 1994, suggests dividing this period into three stages. The 1949–1965 period was marked by nation building, centralisation and economic development, often characterised by 'rushed growth'. But this was also a period with notable political fluctuations and campaigns. The 1966-1979 period covers the most controversial movement in the history of modern China – the Cultural Revolution, and its immediate aftermath, during which Mao's idea of socialism was executed to an extreme by radical policies and political campaigns. This is a period that now bears the blame for its destructive effects to the 'order' and 'healthy development' of educational system (Liu, 2005) despite its possible achievements, in particular at the elementary level (Pepper, 1996). The 1980-1994 period was the post-Mao era when the radicalism in the previous stages was abandoned, also best known for the 'Open Door' policy and the economic reform introduced by Deng Xiaoping. It marks a thorough rupture from the state socialist redistributive system in the previous stages and the emergence of market economies and market mechanisms that led to new rules of resource allocation and opportunity distribution.

China as a socialist state (though its current status becomes rather controversial) was greatly based on the political logic that '(a)llocative as well as redistributive priorities are decided through political processes structured by the monopolistic party-state (Zhou, 2004, p. 7)'. It favours heavy industry over consumer goods in the economic arena, and its reward system cares more about political status and loyalty than human capital (employable skills or educational qualifications).

These three significant features were rather evident in shaping the modern outlook of the Chinese higher education system. One of the most important changes during this span was the introduction of the Soviet Union model as authoritative reference, in place of the American and European models. Also, there were also strong influences from the early Communist form of higher education – Kangda,

the Anti-Japanese Resistance University. But later on these influences became intertwined and it was rather difficult to distinguish one from the other. Even after the Soviet Model was dropped officially by the end of the 1950s, it somehow remained an internal reference to policies initiated by the Communist Party though without being given credit (Pepper, 1996).

The Soviet model was characterised by a 'classless' education system, featuring 'a disciplined classroom-oriented academic format designed to produce loyal citizens capable of maintaining the bureaucratic institutions and heavy industries upon which the Soviet Union's centralised planned economy was built (Pepper, 1996, p. 163)'. The Kangda model was similar in its aim to train bureaucratic personnel but was more rural oriented and favourable towards the working class, and also recognised for its willingness to sacrifice quality for quantity, which well suited the government agenda from 1958 onwards when the Great Leap Forward started. The Soviet model and the Kangda model overlapped in the mentality of higher education in their aims to produce loyal intellectuals, which greatly explains their immediate acceptance and popularity in the new regime. Moreover, private universities nationalised in 1952-1953, were put under the control of Education Ministry.

These early reforms were designed and carried out under the socialist ideology to reduce the disparities between rural and urban areas, and between manual and mental work. The socialist state, in order to achieve that goal, was to open educational opportunities to the working class, and reduce the wage difference between manual and mental work via a unified wage standard. Armed with the rigid control and robust intervention, the Communist Party was able to greatly accomplish these two missions, in particular the latter half of the period starting with the Great Leap Forward. Political criteria were forced on the admission process of university education to enlarge the proportion of students of worker-peasant origin and to suppress the advantage of the intellectuals, and also manual work was introduced into university curriculum to raise the proletarian consciousness among university students. These principles were further strengthened during the Cultural Revolution era. As a result, the worker-peasant class was offered better educational opportunities, at the expense of those of the intellectual class.

Between 1966 and 1976, the period was marked by widespread social and political upheaval, the nation-wide chaos and economic disarray engulfed much of Chinese society. The ten-year span is best known as the Cultural Revolution, launched by Mao Zedong on May 16, 1966, who alleged that liberal bourgeoisie elements were dominating the party and insisted that they needed to be removed through post-revolutionary class struggle by mobilising the thoughts and actions of China's youth, who formed Red Guards groups around the country. Although Mao himself officially declared the Cultural

Revolution to have ended in 1969, the term is today widely used to also include the power struggles and political instability between 1969 and the arrest of the Gang of Four as well as the death of Mao in 1976.

There is a rich literature on political, economic and educational dimensions of the Cultural Revolution (Bettelheim and Ehrenfeld, 1974; MacFarquhar et al, 1997; Robinson, 1968; Zuo, 1991). The most distinctive feature in education during this period was the abolition of formal education, in particular the key institutions marked by elitism and selectivity, in favour of open access to education for the broad mass of peasants and workers. Admission to higher education was based on political and social class rather than academic merit. And also to reduce the rural and urban disparities in educational resources and economic development, an enormous group of educated youth were sent down to rural areas to 'receive education from the proletarian class' and provide aids for rural modernisation.

The Cultural Revolution is now regarded as destructive towards higher education (Liu, 2004; Wu, 2004) – a considerable proportion of institutions were shut down and the rest were taken over by the Worker-Maoist propaganda teams; the majority of the faculty were sent down to rural areas for 're-education' and there were hardly any regular educational activities, etc. This radical backlash was arguably due to the extreme conflicts between the political elite and the educated elite, which extended itself from the early thought reform to the Anti-rightist campaign and to the Culture Revolution (Liu, 2004).

The Reform Era

1979-1994 was a period of firm departure from the Maoist socialisation towards first commodity economy up to 1992 and then market economy from 1992 onwards, marked by a swift removal of the policies and exercises in the Cultural Revolution era that were now labelled as 'extreme leftist' and regarded as 'destructive toward the regular social order and economic development' (Ministry of Education, 1984). The economic reforms in the post 1992 era further introduced the market mechanism to both the public and private sector of Chinese organisations. By the mid-1990s, a considerable proportion of the public enterprises had been transformed into relatively independent corporate entities, and their obligation to the state was via taxation. These changes also introduced new mechanisms of reward and sanctioning practice. As Wu and Xie (2003, p. 425) argue,

> 'One of the principal structural changes following the post-socialist transformation has been the gradual replacement of the state by the market as the principal agent of social stratification. This dramatic change

has led some theorists to predict an increasing in the importance of market credentials (such as education) and a decrease in the importance of political attributes as determinants of earnings in transition economies'.

Though credentials are increasingly valued, it is not to say that political attributes have lost their attractions. On the contrary, the biggest winners tend to be those who are in possession of both. It is particularly interesting to look at the case of a large group of government cadres who resigned from their posts and entered the market in the mid-1990s, known as those who 'jumped into the sea'. Unlike the early entrants in the 1980s who were mainly in the low tiers of the social hierarchy, those who jumped into the market had absolute advantages in both human capital (such as education) and political capital (such as party membership) both of which received positive returns in the reform era (Bian and Logan, 1996; Ma and Abbott, 2006; Nee, 1996; Walder, 2003), and have been strengthened over time (2000). In other words, it is now possible for the transformation to happen from human capital and political capital into more measurable economic rewards, and those who jumped into the sea were the first group to enjoy the benefits of the rise of meritocracy in China. Furthermore, a model of social hierarchy suggested by a group of sociologists at Chinese Academy of Social Science (Lu, 2002; 2004)still regard the possession of political resources as the major determinant of one's social status.

In the post-socialist period, mechanisms of distribution in state socialism were gradually eroded and economic returns to higher education began to rise and vary significantly among different social groups. There now exist a number of theories explaining the connection between economic transformation and social transformation, but one message is clear – socio-economic transformation has led to, primarily, an increasingly unequal distribution of educational opportunities. The World Bank report on poverty reduction in China (Datt and Chaudhuri, 2009) points out that in the year 2000 participation in higher education per 100,000 was 18 times higher in urban sector than in rural sector, 4 times in secondary level.

With regard to educational reforms, the most noticeable are the resumption of the hierarchy of urban-based key schools, and the nationally unified college entrance examination featured as selection based on academic merits, and a gradual withdrawal of government support in rural education. Urban school system (both primary and secondary level) enjoyed reliable government support and rural school systems were left to rely on their own resources in townships and counties, without any higher-level public assistance. Even within the city school systems, students were distributed into the regular schools and key institutions under an intertwined influence of families' cultural capital, social capital

and economic capital (Li, 2008). The 1985 reforms, best known for the introduction of 'Nine Year Compulsory Education', were also marked by some important changes or trials in higher education, including giving more decision-making power to institutions, the enrolment of self-supporting students, the expansion of university disciplines, and reform of course content and teaching methods, etc. The 1994 reforms were marked by with the introduction of partial tuition fee and the cancellation of graduate placement scheme, suggesting an end to the state socialist higher education system and the advent of market competition era.

The Growth of HE System

As briefly mentioned above, the late Qing government made some early experiments and effort in establishing modern HE institutions. In coping with the diplomatic crisis starting from 1860, the Interpreter's College was set up in 1862 to provide language training for future diplomats. Similar language institutes were set up in Shanghai, Guangzhou (*Guangfang Xuetang*, 1863 and 1864) and Hubei (*Ziqiang Xuetang*, 1893). Two other forms of institutions were also set up in a similar manner – one is colleges for ship manufacture and conducting, such as *Chuanzheng Xuetang* in Fujian (1866) and *Shuishi Xuetang* in Tianjin (1880); the other was Army Colleges, such as *Wubei Xuetang* in Tianjin (1885), and in Hubei (1895), *Lujun Xuetang* in Guangdong (1887) and in Nanjing (1895). After the traumatic defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the language institutes and special colleges were deemed as insufficient for personnel production (He, 1931).

Nonetheless, the early institutions were invariably small in scale, and there was hardly a system in place. The growth of modern HE institutions and the emergence of a system were made possible in the Republican era. According to the Leagues of Nations' Report (Becker *et al*, 1932), a review of education in China commissioned by the Nationalist Government, by the 1930s, there were mainly three kinds of institutions recognised by the government as universities – National universities, Provincial Universities, and Registered Private Universities. The first kind was supported by the National Government, the second by Provincial Government, both of which were under public control. Over 90% of the total expenditure of these institutions was supplied by the government, and their Presidents were appointed by a public authority. In comparison, only three private universities received public funding in the year 1930-1931 and over 50% of their income was derived from tuition fees.

Data of the ratio of three kinds of institutions throughout the pre 1949 era were not available, but a snapshot of the 1931 can be useful. The report (pp. 141- 142) calculated 59 universities and a total of

33,847 students – among them 15 were National with 11,572 student, and 17 Provincial with 5,910 students, and 27 Private with 16,365 students. Students were rather equally divided in the public and private sector, 34% in the National Universities, 17% in the Provincial and 48% in the Private (Becker *et al*, 1932; Orleans, 1960; Wang, 1966). Private institutions, therefore, made a significant sector of the system given their capacity and diversity, but all of them were nationalised by the Communist government in 1952-1953, and largely disappeared from the later system until the late 1990s when private institutions (*Minban Daxue*) were again allowed (Pepper, 1996; Wu, 2004).

There were also a large number of colleges not included in the report as they were not officially recognised, but were believed to have accommodated a substantial proportion of students - the report calculated 59 universities with total 33,847 students in 1931, and Wang (1966) reported 108 institutions and 43,528 students in 1932. The different was still considerable with the possible expansion taken into account.

After the Communist party came into power in 1949, HE institutions had a rapid expansion. Figures 1 and 2 display the growth in number of higher education institutions (HEIs), enrolment and graduates between 1952 and 1994 (data from 1949 to 1952 are not available). The trends in the figures were fairly consistent. Between the late 1950s and 1962, there were rapid rises in all three as this was during period of Great Leap Forward, accompanied by a radical expansion of higher education in both institutions and student population. But these rises were followed by drastic falls in the early 1960s, as a result of economic backwardness and a criticism of Mao's radicalism in the Great Leap Forward, and then a further drop in enrolment till 1970s for the Culture Revolution shut down a large number of institutions and total enrolment for three years. The numbers of institutions and graduates remained low during the 1970s when only a small number of worker-peasant-soldier students were enrolled. Numbers of students and institutions had a rapid increase in 1997-1998 when formal education was resumed, and reached a plateau in 1985 when graduate employment became less favourable. But the number of graduates kept rising because of the time lag between enrolment and graduation.

In 1998 China was to some extent affected by the Asian economic recession. Approximately at the same time, the higher education system started expanding at an unprecedented rate, both in the number of entrants and also of institutions. Since the government's decision to initiate the expansion in 1998, the gross enrolment rate in HE has increased to from 10.5% in 1999 to 23% in 2007, with the student population rising from 4.15 million to over 27 million (Ministry of Education, 2008; MoE, 1999). The official account regarding the sudden implementation of the expansion was to first delay the entry into the depressed labour market and increase the employability via formal education of university age

cohorts, and second to boost the economy by encouraging educational investment and school construction (Ministry of Education, 1998).

The rapidity of the expansion is clear in the number of new entrants and also in the number of institutions. From 1994 to 1998, the number of entrants had a marginal increase from 900 thousand to 1084 thousand, but the number multiplied almost four times from 1 million 597 thousand in 1999 to 5 million 659 thousand in 2007. A similar trend can be applied to the growth of institutions, the number of which doubled from 1041 in the year 2000 to 1908 in 2007 (China Statistic Bureau, 2008). The gross enrolments ratio in higher education, hence, rose from 4.3% in 1994 to 23% in 2007.

Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter, I explain the inquiry of this thesis. I put forward three questions and propose to address them in three analysis section, Part II on HE apparatus, Part III on HE government, and Part IV on the truth, subject and ethics of HE in modern China.

In the second part, I make a brief introduction of HE in modern China. I first elaborate on my use of the term 'Higher Education' in the Chinese context. Then I trace out the development and growth of HE system in modern across different historical phases. The past century or so witnesses a most radical socio-political changes in various perspective, during which modern HEIs emerged and gradually developed into a huge system of institutional diversity and student intakes. But the rise of modern HE in China is not a unified process, but rather within different phases various policies and practices were introduced to shape and direct the process. Nonetheless, the growth of HE system in modern China has been most noticeable, in particular after the recent rapid expansion from 1998 onwards.



Source: based on Chinese Statistic Bureau. 1996



Source: based on Chinese Statistic Bureau. 1996



Figure 2, Growth of HE, 1952 -1994, based on Chinese statistic Bureau, 1996







Figure 3, Growth of HE, 1994 onwards, based on Chinese statistic Bureau, 2008

Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework

Introduction

This thesis makes use of a number of conceptual tools introduced by Foucault and other scholars such as Nikolas Rose and Mitchell Dean. I engage with these concepts and tools in this chapter, including power, discourse, technology, genealogy, apparatus, subject and subjectivity, government and governmentality. My discussion of these tools is not to suggest a new theory of subject or subjectivity, but to explore the usefulness of these tools to my investigations of the assemblage of HE and the role of HE in the making of subjects and subjectivities in modern China, in both the history and the present.

Through his political and conceptual work, Foucault concerns himself essentially with 'the nature of the present' (Foucault, 1998; Rabinow and Rose, 2003; Youdell, 2011). In seeking the constitution of the present, he makes

> 'the attempt to try to trace, in very concrete and material forms, the actual history of those forms of rationality that comprise our present, the ways of thinking and acting with which they have been caught up, the practices and assemblages which they have animated, and the consequences for our understanding of our present, and of ourselves in that present'(Rose, 1999, p. X).

Foucault not only helps to visualise how the detailed workings of the forms of thoughts and practice came to formulate and shape our contemporary existence and experience, but also bring our attention to the questioning about the certainties of our present, with regard to our knowledges, our identities and our conducts (Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991; Gutting, 2003; Rabinow and Rose, 2003). In his writing, new meanings are given to words that were once familiar to us- such as truth, knowledge, power, technology, discourse, practice (Dreyfus, Rabinow and Foucault, 1982). And these very words are made into new conceptual tools that have since been widely used in social sciences and humanities. In the past few decades numerous studies have tried to apply Foucault's thoughts to the domain of educational studies. Ball (1990, 1993, 2002) is among the first to introduce Foucault to sociology of education through his studies of educational policies, social class and school choices. Youdell (2005, 2006, 2011) brings together Foucault and Butler in her ethnological studies of inequality and subject formation in contemporary schools. Perryman (2007, 2009) brings together Lyotard's 'performativity' and Foucault's 'normalization' in her study of school inspection. Vincent (1997,1998) applies Foucault's thought in her studies of social relationships in school and family settings. Olssen uses Foucault's idea of governmentality in his study of knowledge capitalism (2004b, 2006), and also establishes a dialogue between Foucault and those from other schools of thoughts such as Marx, Hayek, and Popper (2003a, 2003b, 2004a).

In this thesis, I will make use some of these tools - such as genealogy, apparatus, government, subject and ethics. I will explore them in turn.

History and Genealogy

How should one write a history of HE? Should one write down in chronological order the founding of institutions that are regarded as significant and influential? Should one focus on the sequence of events that shape the structure and the outlook of the HE system? Should one pay attention to the policy shifts across different historical periods? Should one be concerned with the political and intellectual figures that establish the doctrines and norms of HE? Should one engage with the culture, the tradition, and the social memory of HE?

There is no easy answer to questions like these; and, I believe, neither is there a correct one. In fact, researchers can, as many have so done with their studies, approach the history of HE by employing more than just one of the perspectives mentioned above, with their own respective emphasises. Some are interested in 'what actually happened', while some may be more curious about 'why things happened in the way they did'. To follow the tradition of sociology, my concern, apart from these two perspectives, is to look at 'what has emerged out of what happened' – the invention or introduction of new ways of thinking and acting upon ourselves and others, may it be a human technology, a discourse, a pattern of being, a new form of subjectivity, etc. To this end, I now discuss the approach of genealogy in the Foucauldian frame.

Foucault's work offers us a new perspective in understanding history. In his understanding, history is not the march of progress towards certain goals or purposes, but marked by improvisational inventions and borrowings in the face of pressing demands. Genealogy refuses the uniformity and regularity of history, but rather it is intended to show traces of the influence of power on truth by exploring a plural and sometimes contradictory past. Following the lead of Nietzsche, Foucault employed the approach of genealogy to explore the effect of history on the present, most distinctly in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1977a) and *The History of Sexuality*, volume one (Foucault, 1998). In the former, he discusses the role of modern prison system in disseminations of modern disciplinary practices. In the later, he focuses on the emergence of a science of sexuality, and the emergence of bio-power in the West. Such a genealogical approach tend to understand historical phenomena 'not as realisations of underlying principles or developmental laws, but as contingent assemblages put together under "blind" historical circumstances (Hunter, 1996, p. 147)'.

In Nietzsche, Genealogy, History (Foucault, 1977b), Foucault elaborates upon the principles of genealogy. Hence, instead of search for Ursprung (the German equivalent of "origin"), Foucault argues that other two phrases used by Nietzsche, *Herkunft* (descent) and *Enstehung* (emergence) are most accurate in presenting the true objective of genealogy, as

> '(g)enealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things; its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the presents, that it continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a predetermined form to all its vicissitudes. Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people. On the contrary, to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority from the moment it stops being pious (Foucault, 1977b, p. 146).'

This said, the search for descent should therefore be not in an uninterrupted continuity, but rather in Entstehung (emergence). Emergence should be understood as a product of 'a particular stage of force', or 'the entry of forces … their eruption, the leap from the wings to centre stage' (p148-150), to become the new focuses of interest and control. Another important dimension of genealogy that is connected to emergence is that, once certain forms and practices of power is established as a response to some historical contingencies, they may also spread into other domains of a society, and are later established as a norm. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1977a) traces the spread of discipline as a novel form of government from modern prisons to other social domains such as schools, army and hospitals.

Some studies have used this tool into educational settings. In *Foucault and Education- Discipline and Knowledge* (Ball, 1990c), a collection of a number of educational studies using Foucauldian tools, Dave Jones (Jones, 1990a) uses genealogy to explore the emergence of urban schoolteacher and Richard Jones (1990b) looks into the emergence of physiology in post-Revolutionary France. A major work of genealogical investigation in education is done by Ian Hunter(1994) in his *Rethinking the School*. In this book, Hunter argues that the principles underlying the assemblage of modern popular schools follow neither the Marxist argument of social equality nor the Liberal stance of full intellectual development, but should be understood as historical imperatives to cover contingences such as uneducated urban populations.

The perspectives of genealogy can be very useful to my inquiries in this thesis. As I will show in the chapters to follow, the assemblage of HE apparatus in China, for instance, has witnessed a number of cases that can be best explained in the genealogical frame. With regard to its idea of emergence, the

most noticeable case would be the fact that the introduction of HE to China from foreign examples was a response to a historical contingency of a pressing demand of the time - defeats in warfare and foreign invasions. This genealogical approach underlies my inquiries throughout most parts of this thesis. However, it should be noted that my hybrid approach will inevitably include some more straightforward or conventional history. This is especially needed in my introduction of HE in China and the context and history of its development.

Power and Discourse

Perhaps the most important contribution of Foucault's work to social sciences and humanities is his notion of power (Dreyfus, Rabinow and Foucault, 1982). In exploring the constitution of the present, Foucault suggests a different perspective to look at the relations between power and subject. He writes (p. 90),

> 'By power... I do not mean "Power" as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the forms of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes.'

Therefore, Foucault argues (p. 93),

> 'power is not an institution, not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.'

In Foucault's understanding, power is not a mere hierarchy of domination and subordination, but a web of relations. In this web,

> 'Power is everywhere: not that it embraces everything, but that it comes from everywhere ... Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations (Foucault, 1998, pp. 93-94)'.

Foucault suggests a third form of power, disciplinary power, in addition to two other forms of power in our conventional understanding, judicial power, power that is embedded in law, and sovereign power, power of the state or monarch that is used to impose their will over the ruled (Foucault, 1977a). This disciplinary power works through our mundane daily practices, among persons and institutions, through, not necessarily repression and coercion, but also through discourses.

In Foucault's understanding, discourses are 'systems of thought composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of actions, beliefs, and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the world which they speak' (Lessa, 2006, p. 285). Discourses as such can 'produce and regulate the world in their own terms, rendering some things common sense and other thing nonsensical' (Youdell, 2006, pp. 34-35).

Discourse is not a single set of unified codes, but ranges from 'a regime of truth' – what appears self-evident and is taken for granted, to 'disavowed' or 'subjugated' knowledges – which are not speakable or intelligible(Foucault, 1998; Youdell, 2011). Neither is discourse stable or unchanged. Certain discourses may prevail as truth at certain geographic settings, within certain historical periods, but they are subject to challenge, modification, refutation, and abolishment. Therefore, discourse shapes but not determines subjects – it is always liable to resistance and change, and alternative discourses can in turn prevail. Foucault writes,

> 'We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.(Foucault, 1998, p. 101)'

There have been a large number of studies that make use of the notion of discourse and the approach of discourse analysis in both education studies and China studies. With regard to the former, Ball (1990a; 2006) develops this tool into his 'policy sociology'; Popkewitz and Brennan (1998) put together a number of essays that apply the notions of power and discourses and others to issues in educational settings. Baldwin (1994) discusses the keyword 'quality' and its role in shaping the discourse of higher education, noting how students are understood as customers in such a discourse. With regard to the latter, Dikötter (1992) explores the discourse of race in modern China and argues that ideas about race are indigenous in China; Murphy looks into the discourse of suzhi in rural China that aims to accelerate demographic transition, restructure the education system and professionalize labour markets, etc.; Kipnis (2006) also looks into the formation of the suzhi discourse from three perspectives – a linguistic history, a genealogy of related discourses and an analysis of contemporary text. I will particularly look into the discourse of suzhi in later chapters.

Apparatus

The notion of apparatus or *dispositif* is one the most powerful conceptual tools introduced by Foucault. Social theory tends to separate the work on institutions, classes and cultures from that of ideas, ideologies, beliefs and prejudices, but with the idea of apparatus, Foucault is able to cut across all these categories, to look for different elements, associations and relations. In his studies of prisons, clinics, schools, Foucault practices a new form of research that aims to analyse the articulations of these grand complexes in the mundane practices of such apparatuses (Rabinow and Rose, 2003). He summarises the meaning of the concept 'apparatus' as follows:

> 'What I am trying to pick out with this term is, … a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements (Foucault, 1980, p. 194).'

The elements that comprise of a given apparatus can be very much anything – in the light of my discussion of other conceptual tools, one can understand the formation of such apparatuses as an assemblage of relations of forces, multiple discourses and performatives, various technologies, and heterogeneous subjects and subjectivities. In Foucault's understanding, these elements are 'joined or disjoined by a strategic logic and a tactical economy of domination operating against a background of discursive formation (Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. 11)'. Foucault also calls for attention to, not only the emergence but also the further development and deployment of apparatuses - such apparatuses are initially formed and put to work in response to a 'strategic imperative' in a given historical situation – 'crises, problems or perceived challenges to those who govern'(Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. 11), for instance, the apparatus of the prison was invented to tackle the problems of criminality (Foucault, 1977a), the apparatus of sexuality to address the issues of reproduction and physical desire (Foucault, 1998), and the apparatus of mass schooling to cope with the crisis of large uneducated populations in industrial cities (Hunter, 1994). But what is important is that, such apparatuses, once formed, can be applied to other situations using the same general rationality, and become, that is, a technology of power. As Rabinow and Rose further elaborate,

> 'What may have begun, for example, as a rather ad hoc assemblage of ways of thinking and acting, making use of elements that were to hand, linking them in new ways and turning them to new ends, in order to attempt to deal with a problem such as that of urban crime may turn into a way of thinking and acting applicable to other problems and populations, at other times and in other places. The apparatus can be rationalised and the techniques turned into a generalizable technology. Further, despite the initial intention that an apparatus will respond in a targeted way to a particular problem to achieve a specific strategic objective, diverse and unplanned effects can and do result. These too can play a role in extending the network of the apparatus (Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. 11).'

Therefore, in my genealogical study of HE in modern China as an apparatus, I will go beyond the mere rise and fall of particular institutions and changes and shifts in the educational policies in the emergence of HE system in China in the past century or so, and I will not look for a developmental law hidden behind a historical (dis)continuity that, once discovered, can shed some lights on the future development of HE in contemporary China. I intend to interrogate the extent to which HE is first of all a historical response to a national crisis in scientific and technological disadvantage and the absence of knowledge production and provision for modern societies, then a challenge to the construction of a modern civil society, and then a plan to mobilize massive populations for economic production in a market economy. Also, I am concerned with the general rationalities that have been extracted from such an apparatus and turn HE into an assembly of human technologies, technologies that establish HE as a major owner, regulator, producer and distributor of educational knowledge at an advanced level, and technologies that greatly determine not only how teaching and learning are conducted within HE institutions, but also in other sections of popular education, and technologies that to a great extent rule over one's intellectual competence, moral and physical fitness, and hence life chances in contemporary China.

Subject and Subjectivity

With regard to the notion of the subject, there have been a number of positions in the tradition of philosophy and social sciences. Descartes, for instance, argues that humans are endorsed with minds or rational soul (Zonabend, 1984), and some later perspectives taking this stance, such as phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Schutz, Walsh and Lehnert, 1972), empiricism (Davies, 2003) or rational choice theory (Boudon, 1974; Goldthorpe, 1996), suggest that the subject is an originator of its own ideas and values , or endowed with essential properties such as rationality. In comparison, those who follow the tradition of structuralism reject these general presumptions of the subject as a free and autonomous individual, but instead understand the subject as a construct. Althusser (1977), for instance, insists that subjects are constituted by ideological practices, meaning that the acquisition of one's identity is largely determined by a whole series of unconscious practices, rituals, customs and beliefs produced by institutions like schools, families and churches, or in his terms 'ideological state apparatus'.

Foucault rejects two conventional ways in which we understand power and subjectivity – first, power has been understood as constraints that dominate, deny, and repress subjectivity; second, political power is largely understood in terms of oppositions between 'the state' and 'private life', with

subjectivity located within the latter. Within regard to the first interpretation of power, Foucault suggests that instead we can analyse the role of power in the construction, modification, and utilisation of human beings as subjects; and with regard to the second stance, Foucault suggest that power traverses all practices, and via these practices that range from general social policies to nuanced bodily movements, subjects may become ruled and directed by others but also have come to direct or regulate their own conduct (Rabinow and Rose, 2003).

In summary, within this Foucauldian frame, one is offered a new perspective upon the relations between power and subject – first, power works through, and not against, subjectivity, and subjectivity does not lie outside power but is formulated by power; second, political power, does not necessarily suppresses individual autonomy, but can also have subjectivity as a resource for certain strategies and tactics (Rabinow and Rose, 2003), and subjects can be turned into regulators of their own conducts without repression and coercion; third, power is not exclusively exercised by the dominant but instead should be understood as a web of relations.

The idea of subjectivity, according to Youdell (2011, p. 42), can be understood as 'a subject's sense of their own subject-hood, their recognisability to themselves as well as their constitution and recognition as a subject in and to the social world'. As Rose (Rose, 1999, p. XII) suggests, one can approach the notion of subjectivity from four perspectives – first, ontological, in terms of spirit, soul, habits, emotions, will as individualised and collectivised in various ways; second, epistemological, as knowable through, for instance, observation, testing or confession; third, ethical, as the desirable characteristics that one should seek to formulate, indigenous, moderate, independent, fulfilled, civilised; and fourth, technical, in terms of what one should act upon oneself towards certain objectives such as self-evaluation, self-improvement, or self-reform.

A genealogy of subjectivity should not attempt to trace a unified or linear march, as it is not a matter of a succession of epochs (for instance, in the case of modern China, from Imperial, to republican, to Communist/socialist, and to post-socialist), but a process of 'assembling subjects' that is 'complex, variable, material, technical, the confluence of a whole variety of different shifts and practices with no single point of origin, or principle of unification' (Rose, 1999, p. XX). It is a process that is a matter of language, truths, norms and techniques of the self. In such a process, human subjects are located among various apparatuses, and are accorded with various capacities that are not confined by or unified within individual bodies and minds. Rose writes

> 'a human being is constituted through devices, gazes, techniques, which extend beyond the limits of the flesh. These are not capacities of an isolated and self-contained individual but are localised in particular spaces such as offices,

bedrooms, classrooms, libraries, churches. They are assembled together in apparatuses such those of ... schooling within its classrooms, desks, partitioning of days and hours, regimes of assessment and examination, space for work and sport... Within these apparatuses, the contemporary subject is accorded all kinds of new technical possibilities, of perception, sensation, motivation, emotion, pleasure and dissatisfaction, and self-reflection (Rose, 1999, p. XX).'

Government and Governmentality

The notion of government in a Foucauldian tradition is different from what our contemporary polity suggests. It does not refer to various political regimes in power, or the group of representatives within political positions. Nor does it mean governing through law-making, the police, or decisions in governmental organisations and so forth. To Foucault, these are perhaps the 'empirical activities' of government, or what government may surface as (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991, p. 6). In a Foucauldian frame, the concerns of government lie in the shaping of human conduct at both a collective and an individual level. By making reference to a notion of government of Europe in the 16th century, Foucault (1982, p. 221) explains, government

'designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, or the sick. It did not only cover the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection, but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of actions of others.'

Foucault's idea of government enables one to include the domain of the mundane, of the everyday lives of the ordinary in analysis. The analysis of government is not only confined to the discussion of policies and other political practices, but also how human conducts are shaped by the exercise of government, and how different kinds of subjects are formulated in such a process. From this perspective, what underpins the different forms of government is the belief that human conduct can be 'regulated, controlled, shaped and turned to specific ends' (Dean, 1999, p. 11). Hence, government can be understood as 'the conduct of conduct'(Barry, Osborne and Rose, 1996), the ways in which the conduct of individuals and groups can be directed, though not necessarily determined (Anozie, 1982; Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991; Ball, 2003; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1996). Dean further articulates this notion of government. He writes (1999, p. 11),

'Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seek to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests, and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes'.

Dean's definition is most useful in that it maps out the dimensions of government. As he explains, there is first of all a dimension of rationality, or logic in government, which may be manifested in the management of population or economics; second, the exercises of government should not be understood as carried out solely by central government, but instead it involves multiple authorities and agencies, may they be local governments, discursive agencies or subjects themselves; third, the analysis of government can be made possible by focusing on a variety of technologies and techniques that aim to shape human conducts, which may surface as health campaigns and education campaigns, TV programmes that teach one how to dress properly for social occasions, and books that teach one how to manage one's own finance situation, etc; fourth, to analyse the effects of government, one can examine how new choices of human activities are introduced and promoted, new desires and aspirations fostered, new beliefs introduced, may they be desires for higher education or life-long learning, aspirations to keep oneself updated about everyday news events, fears of terrorist attracts and alerts of suspicious behaviours in any public spaces, or beliefs in social mobility via quality education and hard work.

Also, in his discussion of modern forms of government, Foucault further introduces his idea of governmentality, by which he refers a particular way in which modern forms of political thought and action address the problems that can and should be addressed by various authorities. The concept of governmentality refers to

> 'the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population'(Foucault, 1979, p. 20).

According to Foucault, governmentality has since the end of absolutist monarchies in the 18th century underpinned all modern political rationalities, 'insofar as they similarly construct the tasks of authorities in terms of the calculated supervision, administration and optimisation, of the forces of society, rather than in terms of the maintenance of power per se (Jeffreys and Sigley, 2009, p. 3)'. The ultimate aim of 'government', as these political rationalities designate, is to manage the condition of a population, which can be achieved via the effective management and regulations of its wealth, health, education, its capacity to labour and to reproduce, etc. The notion of governmentality draws attention away from the state as an apparatus of control to a variety of forces and knowledges that are intended to regulate the lives of individuals and populations within particular national territories.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I discuss some major theoretical concepts that are helpful in my investigation. I first discuss the idea of genealogy, which underlies this thesis. I then discuss the core of Foucault's theoretical tools, power and discourse, and how these two concepts can attribute to my research. The other three theoretical tools help to organize my thesis –Part II of thesis resolves around the apparatus components of HE, and Part III around HE as a form of government and governmentality, and both two parts, and also Part IV of the thesis are closely related to my investigation of HE subjects and subjectivities. In the beginning of Part II and Part III, I further discuss their respective frameworks.

Chapter 3 Methodology

In this section, I explain the methodology of this thesis. This thesis deploys a genealogical approach and I gathered my data from a wide range of resources and documents.

Genealogy as a Nontraditional Research Tool

Genealogy is a nontraditional research tool – it does not have a clear blueprint for one to follow (Meadmore, Hatcher and McWilliam, 2000). Genealogy bears the label of 'anti-history' (O'Farrell, 1989), as it is the present rather than the past that becomes the object of inquiry; it does not intend to uncover what may be behind the themes, or to search for a general causality, but rather to identify clues (Donzelot, 1979) of the present problems in 'the surfaces of events, small details, minor shifts and subtle contours' (Dreyfus, Rabinow and Foucault, 1982, p. 78). Genealogy is present oriented – it ask questions such as 'What is happening now? What is this present of ours? How have we become what we are and what are the possibilities of becoming 'other'?' Tamboukou (1999, p. 215). These questions create unexplored areas of investigation. The use of historical data in genealogy is aimed to destabilize the conceptual foundation of the present understandings (McCallum, 1990). As such, genealogy starts with 'questions posed in the present, investigating the terms in which those problems are currently understood, and tracing the line of descent that led to problems being posed in these ways' (Meredyth and Tyler, 1993, p. 4). Genealogy imposes 'specific and definite questions in the present tense', and investigates past practices to reveal their 'foreignness', and therefore unsettle the legitimacy of the present and open it up for reexamination and further enquiry (Meadmore, Hatcher and McWilliam, 2000, p. 464). In order

> 'to achieve this present orientation, it is necessary for historians of the present to reproblematize the very starting points of their intellectual endeavour by dismantling the key conceptualisations that seem most fundamental and natural to particular truths about the world, themselves, and the subject. In so doing, a genealogy is also a politics. Through genealogical investigation, present problems can be examined through a new lens, outside traditional modes of inquiry in the social sciences'(Meadmore, Hatcher and McWilliam, 2000, pp. 464-465).

From this perspective, genealogy can be most useful to my analysis, as I am primarily concerned with the present problems of HE in contemporary China in terms of the ways in which HE is understood as the ultimate goal of one's intellectual pursuit, as primary ruler of one's intellectual competence, as the shaping force of one's overall life chances, etc. I intend to unsettle the assumed significance of HE,

and explore the process through which the subjects of HE are 'gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts' (Gordon, 1980, p.97).

*Genealogy as **Open Methodological Projects***

As Tamboukou and Ball (2003) point out, although Foucault suggests genealogy as a research project, he refuses to frame it in any closed theoretical or methodological systems, and his own (genealogical) work also goes beyond the existing system of research theories and methods. Not surprisingly, Foucault's work has been subject to criticism from practitioners of mainstream social and political theory for this 'absence' of recognizable methodologies. But those who use a Foucauldian frame of research tend to argue that this absence of clear methodologies instead opens a wider space in which one can collect and engage data outside an existing system and therefore explore questions that have not been tackled before. Tamboukou (1999, p. 215) concludes in her excellent review of Foucault's genealogies ,

> 'Foucault's originality lies in his strategic use of different discourses and approaches in the writing of his genealogies. Each reading of these genealogies reveals hidden layers of attentive and detailed research of an immense variety of data. Rather than following methodological principles, Foucault's genealogies create a methodological rhythm of their own, weaving around a set of crucial questions... (and they) do not offer methodological 'certainties'. They persistently evade classification, but they do inspire the writing of new genealogies to interrogate the truths of our world.'

This methodological rhythm, identified by Tamboukou, sheds some interesting light on the question of 'how to do a genealogy'. First of all, genealogy, as Foucault notes, 'requires patience and a knowledge of details, and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material' (Foucault, 1977, p. 139). In his genealogical work, Foucault engages with a 'polymorphous and diverse map of documents and sources' (Tamboukou and Ball, 2003, p. 14), and he is

> 'careful with minor textual details, scrupulously citing his examples, commenting on their structure, following the "order of their discourse", comparing and juxtaposing them, tracing their repetition, recurrence or even disappearance in relation to the era, the philosophical school or even the historical personalities they were adopted by (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 214)'.

Genealogical texts in Foucault's work are usually 'short and dense', and although he himself is persistently against categorisations, Foucault

> 'turns out to be exceptionally effective in forming structures, groups and categories and placing them in an order. His genealogical texts are full of meticulous diagrams, sketches and outlines that systematise the route of his thought and his findings. (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 214).'

A Map of Data

As Tamboukou (1999) points out, the objects of rigorous genealogical analyses are largely socio-historical phenomena, and in the case of this thesis, the emergence and deployment of HE. To this end, I follow the lead of Foucault, and engage a 'map' of documents and resources in my genealogy of HE in modern China. This map of data is intended to transverse a gap between the past and the present, between 'macro-level analysis of education systems and education policies and micro level investigation, especially that which takes account of people's perception and experience' (Brownlie, Feniak and Schnellert, 2006, p. 359). My historical perspectives leads me to a variety of policy documents from relevant periods over the time scale under scrutiny, and my concerns with the present directs on my attentions to contemporary discursive materials of various kinds, such as university life guides and student dossiers.

Therefore, I choose from a wide range of data, including existing literatures, policy documents, news reports, TV programmes, research projects, publications and readings on contemporary HE, and personal dossiers, etc. My selection of these documents is in the belief that by integrating their contents I can trace and lay out the power relations, competing discourses, institutional emergence, discursive formation, and subject positions of HE in modern China. I put them into the following categories for the sake of convenience.

Categories	Types	Examples
Existing Literature	General History of Education in modern China	Hayhoe (1996) China' Universities 1895-1995 Pepper (1996) Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China Yang (2003) The Struggled Sunrise
	Period History of Education in modern China	Education sections from Cambridge History of China, late Qing (Ichiko, 1980) the Republican Era (Sun, 1986), Communist China (Pepper, 1987; Pepper, 1991), and Contemporary China (Zhou, 2006) He (1931), University Education in the past 35 years, late Qing to mid Republican;
	Others	Prybyla (1975), HE during the Cultural Revolution period Huang (1988) and Liu and Li (2006), Imperial China
Original Texts	Policy Documents	He and Wu (1998) Important educational documents of People's Republic of China 1949-1997
	Political Speeches	Cai (1993) Inauguration Speech of Chancellorship of Peking University
	Reports	Becker et al (1932), the League of Nations Report Zhou (1959) First Report on the Work of Government
	Regulations	University Regulations of Morning Exercise, Dormitory and Self Study; National Regulations of HE enrolment and Campus Design
News Reports	Hegemonic	Articles from People's Daily and Guangming Daily on HE
	Alternative	Articles from Southern Weekend and Frozen Point on HE
Personal Dossiers	Documents in Student Dossiers	Annual Review Form, Self Assessment Form, and Bodily Qualification Form
Websites	Sections on HE in portal websites	HE section at Sina, www.sina.com.cn and Sohu, www.sohu.com
Popular publications connected to HE	University Life Guides	Ren and Zhang, (1996) Essential Lessons for Perfect University
	Cramming Materials	Sandian Yice series
Interview Data	Group interviews	Discussions of reasons of participation in HE
Others	Research Projects	Students' Affairs Research Branch of China Higher Education Association, Key studies of students' affairs of 2011'
	Online materials	Campus pictures from university official websites

Table 1, Data Categories

The table above does not serve as an exhaustive list of all my data, but it does show the most important categories used in this thesis. My interrogation of these data is intended to explore HE in modern China as a 'regime of truth', to establish an 'effective' history of HE apparatus, and to reveal the role of HE as a form of government in the manufacturing of different subjects and subjectivities. For now, allow me to further elaborate my use of these data.

1. I engage with a large number of existing literatures to present both historical continuities and ruptures in the development of HE, especially the work of general history and period history of HE, in particular that of Pepper (1996) and Yang (2003), both of whom have put together valuable collections of documents and provide insightful comments on the development of HE from historical and political perspectives. For me, these literatures are not merely references to support my argument, but also 'traces' through which I further explore the emergence and deployment of HE.

2. I also go back to some *original texts* of policy documents, regulations, and reports, in order to gather a wider range of data beyond the conventional types of evidence for historical and political studies. For instance, I reveal the uses of technologies of the population and the body in certain university regulations and national regulations.

3. In order to display competing discourses of HE, I resort to two types of *news reports*, which I term 'hegemonic' and 'alternative' for the time being – the former refers to newspapers under direct supervision of the central Government such as *People's Daily*, and therefore can be regarded as a reflection of hegemonic voices of HE; the latter refers to newspapers that are less rigidly controlled by the central Government and are more likely to post criticisms and critical reflections on social and political issues in China. Thus, I call them 'alternative' voices.

4. To closely examining the production of individual subjects of HE, I look into a particular form of government, *personal dossier* system, and I analyse certain files in student dossiers which I gained access to; my discussion of the technologies of the social and the self in Chapter 8 is largely based on these files.

5. To bring out a fuller account of student subjects and subjectivities, I analyse the *interview data* from my fieldwork.

6. To further engage the prevailing discourses of HE in post-socialist China, I look into *website* sections on HE, *popular publications* such as university life guides, and also cramming materials for the CEE.

7. To reveal the ways in which university students are turned into subjects of a new knowledge of HE, I look into some *research projects* on university students in this regard.

8. To engage the ways in which HE campus is arranged, I examine the images of campus spaces on university websites and some images from the book covers of cramming materials.

Early Fieldwork and Shifts in Research Design

The focus of my PhD research has undergone some radical changes over the years. In 2008 I conducted my pilot study, and the research design back then was to detect possible mismatches between student expectations of HE and their actual experiences. I have chosen four universities in Beijing to conduct the pilot. But after a number of group interviews, I realised that the concept of student expectations was more complicated than I expected, and my previous theoretical framework based on economic rationality could not properly explained the data I collected from the interviews; for instance, students from various backgrounds almost invariably show little concern over the economic returns to their investment in HE.

During the academic year of 2009, I took a completely different approach to the concept of student expectation. First, the modified research focused only on student expectations, and excludes student experience from the inquiry. Secondly, the research adopted mainly a socio-historical perspective, rather than an economic perspective. I wrote an extensive review of HE development in modern China, with a particular focus on the changes in university studentship in different historical periods. I made use of the theory 'social memory' and further developed a framework called 3-E, namely Entrance (enrolment in universities and subjects), Experience (teaching, learning and socialization) and Exit (employment and social mobility), in order to categorize the changes among university students. In the empirical part, students' social backgrounds are to be employed as a major variable in both

questionnaire survey and interviews. Thirdly, I determined that higher education expansion would not be discussed as a mere context but as a particular event that reshapes the structure of the higher education system. The focuses were upon two issues, first, the nature of student expectations of HE with regard to the choices, operation and benefits of HE, and the extent to which and why these expectations vary across different social cohorts. (family residence and parental occupation, etc.) in contemporary China.

To this end, I conducted both quantitative survey and qualitative interviews to collect data in Beijing. The reasons were its advantage in higher education resources, particularly the diversity and quality of higher education institutions, and its equally diversified student group. Beijing hosts some of the top universities in China. In 2008, there were in total 82 universities in Beijing, with 36 supervised by the central government, 36 by the Beijing Municipal Government, and 10 private institutions. 8 Beijing universities out of a nationwide total of 39 were included in the 985 Project, and another 26 universities out of a nationwide total of 107 were part of the 211 Project (Beijing Municipal Education Commission, 2009). In 2002, Beijing enjoyed 12.88% of the total governmental expenditure in higher education in China, triple of its share of undergraduate enrollment at 4.33%. Moreover, the privilege of higher education resources in Beijing is also shown to local students - the transition rate between secondary education and higher education was as high as 75% in Beijing, and gross enrollment rate in higher education reached 52% in 2003, almost triple of the national figure at 17% (Wang and Zhu, 2003). Most importantly, HEIs in Beijing, in particular the best universities, tend to be more inclusive than those of other regions in term of recruitment of non-local students. Though there is evidence of local protectionism in recruitment policies toward local students (Zheng, 2001), key institutions in Beijing accommodate the highest proportion of non-local students. Between 2002 and 2006 Peking University only recruited 12% of its total entrants from Beijing, even fewer in Qinghua Univerity, China Renmin University and Beijing Normal University. Between 2000 and 2002, the average rate of local entrants in Ministries-affiliated institutions was 44.76% - the ratio in Beijing was only 18.98%, the lowest nation wide. In comparison, the ratio in Shanghai was 56.99% (Ye and Wu, 2006). In this regard, the student sample in Beijing will be less biased than that of other cities, and makes a fine representation of the national data.

Four universities are chosen for their different degree of academic selectivity, and data were collected from the first -year and the final- year students in October 2009. Students in two faculties were chosen for both group interviews and survey study– *Economics and Finance*, and *Humanity*. Two classes of students (approximate 60 in total) were randomly chosen in each faculty. One group interview is

conducted with 3 students in each class, chosen for their family residency (rural/other urban/Beijing). In total, there were 651 copies of valid questionnaires, and 16 focus group interviews. However, only the qualitative data are used in this thesis as the quantitative data are not compatible with the analysis in the analysis approach taken in this thesis..

As I went on this the analysis, I gave up on the previous socio-historical framework as it proved insufficient in explaining a high degree of consistency in student expectations of HE across different social cohorts. In order to understanding this research finding, I decided to go back to the notion of HE itself, and conducted further investigation into the meanings of HE in modern China. From June 2010 onwards, I started to restructure my thesis in a Foucauldian frame, and gathered data from a wider range of resources. Eventually, I decided to rewrite most of the chapters to include what I thought would be more interesting and useful to my project of understanding the role of HE in the history of modern China, also how HE influences the ways in which students understand their subject positions in contemporary society. To this end, I decided to take the approach of genealogy, and only make use of the interview data in this thesis. Also, because the interview data had been collected before this second shift of research design, I only use them as a form of 'discursive material' additional to other data. Although the interview data made the previous hypothesis obsolete, their validity remained. They are still valuable resources for my current research on student subjects and subjectivities. The questions of the interviews were closely related to my overall research question in the current thesis. Therefore, the interview data only required a different approach of interrogation. I framed them in my genealogy together with other forms of data.

From January 2011 onwards, I became interested in the personal dossier system, and how it can be understood as a particular form of government in both socialist China and post-socialist China. I contacted a senior administrator at one of the fieldwork universities, and managed to negotiate access to 10 copies of student personal dossiers with the permission of both the senior administrators and the chosen students. These students allowed me to use the contents of their dossiers with a condition of confidentiality. I also gained permission of all the interviewees to use the interview data for my research. All the participants in my fieldwork remain anonymous in this thesis.

Interview Data

Although the quantitative data from my fieldwork will not be used in this thesis, I will include, as I mention above, the qualitative data from my interviews. These data bear great relevance to my genealogical investigation in Part II and III. First of all, it was the themes that emerged out of these

interviews that inspired me in conducting a comprehensive investigation into the various components and perspectives of HE apparatus and government. Secondly, my engagement of interview data in Chapter 10 reflects upon my findings from the genealogical investigation, and also supplement these early findings with further contemporary evidence and relevance. More importantly, as the notion of HE subjects lie in the heart of this thesis, my discussion of interview data serves to portray the contemporary subjects in a vivid and persuasive manner.

Variables	Categories
University Tier	Tier1, Key, 985 Project
	Tier 2, Key, 211 Project
	Tier 3, Regular
Year	Year 1
	Year 4
Specialty	Economics related
	Foreign Language
Household	Beijing
	Other Urban
	Rural

Table 2, Variables in Interview Data

These four listed above, as I will show in the following chapters, are among the most significant variables of my research, and arguably, the HE system in contemporary China. My choices of them are underpinned by the followings assumptions:

1, University Tier

As my discussion in the following chapters, in particular Chapter 5, will show, the HE system in contemporary China is a hierarchical system made of institutions with (presumably) different academic competence and enrolment selectivity. Tier 1 institutions are known as members of the '985 Project', Tier 2 as members of the '211 Project', and Tier 3 as regular institutions. The Tier 1 institutions are also known to be the most selective and tend to choose among the highest achievers in the CEE, the national entrance examination for HE, tier 2 less so, and tier 3 being the least selective among all.

2, Year

By year here I mean the year of study in HEIs. A university degree usually takes 4 years to complete in contemporary China (except for a small number of particular specialties such as medical degrees,

which may take up to 5 years). Students in Year 1, by the time of my fieldwork, have just started their HE courses, and have fresher memories of their previous understandings of HE. Students from Year 4, in comparison, are likely to have better understandings of HE after their 3 years of experiences, and may also be more concerned with the job market for HE graduates.

3, Specialty

The meaning of 'specialty' is similar to 'subject' in British terms, or 'major' in American terms. As my discussion in Chapter 9 will show, the choice of one's specialty is given great attention in contemporary China. Some specialties are considered more likely to lead to better life chances (higher salaries, higher job security, higher welfare benefits, higher social status, etc.), and some are less so. Therefore, the former is called 'hot' specialties, and the latter 'cold' specialties in China.

4, Household

After the reform era, there is now a considerable disparity in educational resources among different regions, in terms of both HE and pre-HE. Beijing is perhaps among the most resourceful across the countries; other urban areas less so, but are still significantly more resourceful than the rural areas. The household policy, introduced in the high socialism era to control migration from rural to urban areas, is now still in effect in contemporary China. Hence, one's access to educational resources is very much decided by one's household registry, which is very difficult to change.

In total, there were in total 48 participants in my interview, and I conducted interviews with them in 16 groups. Three interviewees from each group were doing the similar specialties in the same faculty at the same institutions, but they are from different household backgrounds - one is from Beijing, one from other urban areas, and one from rural areas. There are a number of reasons behind this arrangement. First of all, I chose the form of group interviews rather than individual interviews because I had the impression that students in China were more comfortable in a group than as individual interviewees from my pilot study in 2008, in which I used both approaches; once a member of the group started to talk, others would follow naturally, and as they went on, the interactions among the group members could bring out more depth in conversation. Secondly, I chose interviewees in the same group from the same faculty is because that interviewees would feel more comfortable to be around with people they knew from their daily lives, those from the same faculty, in most of the cases, the same class (the smallest academic unit in HEIs). Thirdly, I use household registry as the basic variable since the data I collected from my pilot study, both interview and survey, indicated that this is

the most significant variable in students' understanding and expectations of HE. Putting interviewees from three different household backgrounds is together more likely to bring out differences in students' understanding of HE, or their HE subjectivities. This was proven effective in the fieldwork.

Interview Data Analysis

All the interviews were transcribed into Microsoft Word documents, and I imported these documents into NVivo for coding. All the texts were not translated into English in the analysis, except the sections that I quoted them in Part IV. I organised all transcripts by interview questions rather than any smaller units. When I analysed the texts, I organise responses from all interviewees by questions in NVivo, and coded the texts with a number of keywords.

Research Ethics

Two types of data used in this thesis required the participation of human respondents. The first type is documents from student dossiers. For these documents, I acquired written consents from the Head of Student Affairs at the chosen institution, and also the individual students whose the dossier materials were used. The students were given written confirmation from me stating that their names and any personal information would not appear in my thesis, and I would only analyse the materials included in the dossiers and quote certain sections. When I eventually decided to use materials from one particular participant, known as Mr Y in later chapter, I made another contact with him, and informed him about my use of his materials, and he agreed to be quoted in this thesis.

The second type is the interview data. I acquire written consents from all my interviewees that stated they were willing to participate in this research, and agreed to be quoted in my thesis. Their confidentiality was ensured by using numbers instead of their actual names in my quotes, and I also sent them my transcripts of their respective interview sessions to ask for their confirmation to be quoted as such. All interviews were conducted in Chinese, the native language of all interviewees and the interviewer. All interviews took place in relaxed, friendly settings, such as campus cafés, guest rooms of student halls, and small meeting rooms of the faculty. With the permissions of the interviewees, all the interviews were recorded in audio, and I also took notes on site.

Limitations and Contributions of the Research

In order to conduct genealogical research, one must deal with an extensive and diverse collection of historical materials. Although I struggled to collect as many original documents as possible, my designs could only be partially realised due to the lack of data on students' accounts of HE in previous era, among other relevant input either lost, buried or seriously degraded during the strife existent throughout China in the first half of the 20th Century. It is also important to note that few prior studies pertaining to student subjectivity in China exist for reference, which was perhaps a result of the absence of social sciences throughout the age of state socialism and their slow development until recent two decades in China.

Moreover, my fieldwork was carried out prior to the paradigm shift for the thesis, so the data could be not used to prove or disapprove any assumptions I had. I therefore used them as additional discursive materials to the other forms of data I collected in my three analysis chapters in Part IV. The interview data contribute the analysis with regard to the ways in which certain 'truth', subjects and ethics are produced through HE. In the future, I will continue with this research if possible, and try to conduct a fieldwork that draws upon my findings in this thesis, either in the fashion of stereotype interviews, or ethnology. I believe one can certainly benefit from an in-depth participant observation of HE students in contemporary China.

Furthermore, as a researcher, my perspectives of the study and selections of materials are inevitably influenced by my own experience of HE in China. The year of my enrollment in HE, 1999, was the year when a massive expansion of HE began. After the high pressure of the CEE preparation and turmoil in the enrollment process which almost cost me the chance of getting into a key university, comes the shock of the over-populated campus, heavy schedules, close monitoring, and bewilderment of what counted as HE, and what I was supposed to do for the next four years. My personal doubts of the HE system were reflected in my interview questions, and also in my general inquiry into the history of modern HE in China. While this may call into question my 'objectivity' as a researcher, I would also argue that as an 'insider' of the system, my experiences provide me with particular perspectives that are perhaps largely unknown to those from a different educational tradition—particularly the mundane but pervading governmental intrusion such as the regulation of morning exercises and evening studies, protocol for dormitory maintenance, etc. My research training in the UK provides me with different perspectives from my counterparts who receive their training in China and tend to conduct studies following certain conventions such as policy studies or comparative studies.

For instance, in a seminar at a research institution best known for its leading role in HE studies in China, a senior researcher (who was also a high-ranking administrator of the university) told me that if he were my supervisor, he would have discouraged me from doing this research of student subjectivity as it had little value.

However, I believe that the value of this thesis rests upon the fact that it looks into what people have taken for granted, in terms of how they understand HE, what it means to receive HE, and what one is entitled to expect from HE, among other touchstone concepts. In addition to a comprehensive review of the emergence and deployment of HE in modern China, I also explore the shaping of HE subjects and subjectivities, a domain that remains to be further explored in future studies. To acquire better understanding of and bring changes to a system that has for long been caught in a dilemma between control and cultivation, I suggest that we examine Chinese HE from perspectives that are perhaps most familiar to the insiders, and in ways that are most alien to them.

Part II

The Will to HE

Framework for Part II

The Will to HE

The title for Part II of the thesis is a reference to the subtitle of Foucault's (1998) first volume of *The History of Sexuality – the will to knowledge*. In this volume, Foucault looks into the deployment of sexuality as a technique of power, and also the invention of social science disciplines in our attempts to understand sexuality and to govern populace and individuals in the lights of such knowledges. Such a will to knowledge, therefore, can be understood as certain rationalities upon which the introduction, development and utilisation of certain disciplines are based and certain knowledge practices are rendered intelligible and productive. Such rationalities aim to render human subjects – their minds, emotions, and bodily practices – more comprehensible, and consequently more governable. This approach has been further explored by Rose, who looks into the emergence and deployment of psychology as a particular discipline that centres upon the contemporary self (Rose, 1985; 1996; 1999).

My borrowing of the phrase is not to suggest that I will study HE as a particular discipline, neither will the approach of sociology of scientific knowledge underpin my investigation in this part, though this approach will be used in my analysis of the formulation of HE curriculum. As I mention in the introduction chapter, I will explore HE as an apparatus – an assemblage of components, relations of forces, multiple discourses and various technologies. Nonetheless, the logic and stance underpinning the will to knowledge is very much applicable to my investigation of the emergence, development and deployment of HE as such an apparatus. By using the will to HE as the title, I concern myself primarily with a dual-process in which HE is assembled according to certain rationalities upon the governance of populations and individuals, and HE serves as both the support and instrument of these very rationalities, such as HE in the service of the needs of society over those of individuals, etc. However, I am not suggesting that these rationalities, mechanisms, mentalities are prior to the emergence of HE, and HE should be understood as their manifestation, or (partial) realisation. Rather, as I will show later in the chapters to follow, these rationalities are born out of the responses to certain historical contingencies in which limited technical means and resources were available – for instance, the building of state schooling system was aimed at providing eligible candidates for the Imperial University in late Qing as the university could not recruit enough students from the members of aristocracy and governmental offices, but later it was established as a consensus and rationality that the primary aim of the schooling system is to cultivate and select students for higher learning, a principle that is much visible in contemporary China.

In the chapters to follow, I aim to trace and display this will to HE in modern China, by exploring the establishment and deployment of the rationalities that underpin this will. My investigation covers five major apparatus components of HE, including principle, system, curriculum, pedagogy and space. I am not suggesting that these five components constitute the complete assemblage of HE, but rather they are what I believe the most significant dimensions in the complex and constantly changing existence of HE, significant not only as in that they represent the traditional interest of academic inquiries into HE, but that they are also the fields where the most tangible operations of technologies and techniques of power can be located and displayed.

HE apparatus	1, Principle
	2, System
	3, Curriculum
	4, Pedagogy
	5, Campus

Table 3, Components of HE Apparatus

By principle, I refer to the political articulation of the aims, objectives, priorities, approaches, and uses of HE across different historical periods, principles that are not prior to the establishment of HE as an social apparatus to cultivate, discipline, select, and distribute members of the populace but emerge out of an assemblage of the technical means available to the multiple forces – social, economic and political, and parties of interests – the state, the political parties, the public and the academia. By system, I primarily refer to the assembly of HE institutions that may vary greatly in tradition, size and mission, an assembly that is subject to political efforts in forms of legislation, construction, adjustment, and supervision; I will also look into the relations between the sector of pre-tertiary education and the sector of HE. By curriculum, I refer to collections of educational knowledge from various disciplines and specialities that are rendered appropriate for advanced learning in HE institutions. By pedagogy, I refer to the ways in which teaching and learning are conducted to achieve certain desirable objectives. And by campus, I refer to the ways in which university campus is assembled from a variety of spaces that are assigned with different functions. I organise my discussion in Part II of this thesis according to this framework in Table 4 above.

My sequence of discussions is not to suggest causal relations or lines of significance among the five components, that the principles determine the shape of the system, and the system determines the curriculum and pedagogy, etc. It is perhaps better understood in the descending sequence of abstraction

in notions, with principle being the most abstract component, and the descending sequence in the degree of locality of power operations, with pedagogy as the most local centre of power relations, the most immediate field where the apparatus of HE are joined with subjects of HE. However, I am not primarily concerned with the internal relations among the components of apparatus. But rather, by engaging with these components, I intend to provide a coherent account of the technologies and techniques of power at work, the rationalities and mechanism that formulate the discursive and material presence of HE, and the will to HE that underpin the projections and understandings of HE in modern China.

Chapter 4 The Articulation of Principles

In this chapter, I will explore the principles of HE that emerge out of the responses to certain historical contingents in modern China, most noticeably the national salvation in the late Qing, the building of modern state in the Republican era, and the production of manpower for industrial and technological construction under state socialism. To do so, I adopt a genealogical approach. As Hunter 3(1994, pp. xvi-xvii) suggests,

> '(n)egatively defined, this approach refuses to treat the historical and technical organisation of the school system as if it were the expression – partial or otherwise- of an underlying principle or tendency of development... It eschews, for example, such deep origins for the school system as the aspirations of democratic communities or the depredations of capitalist ruling classes. To construe the approach more positively, we can say that this genealogy concentrates instead on the contingent circumstances in which the school system came into being, and on the available cultural techniques, institutions and modes of reflection from which it was assembled. The picture that emerges is thus not one of the school's appearance as the partial manifestation of an underlying principle, but of its improvised assemblages as a device to meet the contingencies of a particular history.'

I suggest, if we are to understand the complex of demands and expectations upon HE in contemporary China, we need to first of all trace out and display the actual principles at work before we can confidently set out to seek the alternatives to these very principles. But seeking the alternatives is not what is intended in this chapter; I intend to save it for the final chapter of my thesis. Therefore, here I limit my discussion to the articulated principles in different historical phases alone. I begin my discussion with the two concepts central to this chapter, articulation and principles.

Articulation

My use of articulation follows the lead of Laclau and Mouffe (2001), who particularly in their Hegemony and Socialist Strategies, develop Gramsci's theory of articulation. For Grasmsi, articulation refers to the process by which particular classes appropriate cultural forms and practices for their own use. Instead of focusing on class struggles, Laclau and Mouffe, place the notion of articulation in relation to discourse, and understand articulation (and especially hegemonic articulation) as attempts to define meaning within a discursive field, as acts to both modify and fix identities. The practice of articulation is manifested most visibly in efforts made to create a partial fixity of meaning around what Laclau and Mouffe call 'nodal points' – a nodal point being a privileged element that gathers up a

range of differential elements, and binds them together into a discursive formation, such as democracy and its political elements - to 'suture' the open character of the social. They write,

> 'we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse. (2001, p. 105)'

Hence, I suggest that we can also treat HE as such a nodal point where a range of articulatory struggles take place. These nodal points may refer to for instance the focuses, means and ends of HE, all of which will be dealt with in the following section. Hence, once such nodal points are identified, one can seek to trace out the articulation of HE principles, the efforts that aim to create meanings around the belief and practices of HE, and attempts to direct and sustain the development and deployment of HE.

Furthermore, Laclau and Mouffe bring together Gramsci's notion of hegemony and Foucault's notion of discourse together to understand the process of political articulation – the process by which certain political ideas and forms become hegemonic. Hegemony here refers to these ideas and forms that prevails in socio-political fields and are accepted as common sense by those who are not likely to benefit from these ideas and forms. Hence, through the process of political articulation, particular ideas and forms become hegemonic. However, Laclau and Mouffe do not regard hegemony as merely ideological trick, as entirely negative. On the contrary, they argue that hegemony serves as 'a fundamental discursive condition for the socio-political' (Youdell, 2011, p. 26). Mouffe further argues (Mouffe in Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006, p. 967),

> '... hegemony is transformed by articulation. You cannot understand the idea of hegemony ... independently of our thesis about the discursive construction of reality and the social. Or to put it in a Gramscian sense: common sense is always something which is the result of political articulation. Reality is not given to us; meaning is always constructed. There is no meaning that is just essentially given to us; there is no essence of the social, it is always constructed. The social is always the result of a hegemonic articulation; every type of social order is the product of a hegemony as a specific political articulation'.

Therefore, hegemony as such, is not an oppressive and problematic social practice, and hence is not to be overcome. Rather, hegemony describes the multiple and heterogeneous meanings and discourses that formulate our contemporary understanding of society and ourselves. What one should aim at is a struggle for hegemony, a struggle over which principles, ideas, mechanisms should be established as hegemonic over others. Mouffe (Mouffe in Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006, p. 967) explains that

> 'hegemony is positive in the sense that, if we accept that there is no order, if we did not have any kind of hegemony, we would be living in complete schizophrenia. There would not be any form of meaning, any form of order. In other words, the question is not to get rid of power. Power is constitutive for the social; there is no social without power

> relations. Now, any form of order is a hegemonic order, but of course there are some forms of order that are more democratic than others. Power relations are constructed in different ways. A democratic society in which there is accountability is a form of order and it is a better form of order than an authoritarian regime'.

To understand the process of political articulation as inevitably hegemonic, and also hegemony as a condition of discursive struggle, Laclau and Mouffe not only open up the idea of hegemony and discourse, but also expand the scope of their application in social studies. The articulation of principles of HE, therefore, can be understood as ongoing struggles in the discourses of HE with regard to its focuses, means and ends, as a result of multiple propositions stating why and how their respective systems of belief and practices serve to underpin the establishment, development, and adjustment of HE in order to achieve certain objectives in social, political and economic domains. Such articulatory practices can be found in discursive materials including government propaganda and policies, university regulations, prevailing citation from political authorities and figures. At different historical stages in the history of modern HE in China, different propositions appear as hegemonic in terms of their influence in public discourse, policy decisions, and daily practices. Such struggles for hegemonic articulation are perhaps most visible at the time of regime changes or massive socio-political movements, as is the case of modern HE in China. A series of rapid and radical social changes in the past century or so have also brought with them a set of principles of HE that seemingly differ greatly from one another. These principles request loyalty to different regimes and ideologies, embracing different understanding of the role of HE in grand socio-political agenda, proposing different systems of HE institutions, endorsing different forms of HE pedagogy, and formulating different structures of HE curriculum. But perhaps these historical distinctions are overrated. With a closer look, one may find traces of some similarities among these principles, for instance their almost unanimous focus on the collective rather than the individual, and also an equally coherent emphasis on knowledges that are practical and immediately relevant to the socio-economic development of the nation. In the following sections, I will trace out the articulatory practices over the principles of HE, with regarding to the statements, changes and shifts and the under-recognised coherence in the hegemonic principles established.

Principle

What I mean by principles in this chapter are various propositions that serve as the foundation for systems of belief and practices in conducting HE towards certain desirable objectives. These propositions manifest through three correlating factors – first, the focuses of HE, by which I mean the

formation of subjects that are rendered as priorities of the time, the most desirable, the ideal forms of subjects for certain socio-political settings, may they be personnel for diplomacy and military needs, liberal individuals cultivated by modern universities, citizens of a modern state, or technocrats who are equipped with both political loyalty and professional expertise; second, the ends of HE, by which I refer to the objectives that HE is set to achieve, may they be the production of special personnel and national salvation, or the cultivation of leaders for various industries, or the promotion of egalitarianism in educational access, or the accumulation of human capital for global economic competition; the third, the means of HE, by which I mean the ideological, curricular, and pedagogical approaches and arrangements that are believed to best facilitate the realisation of the objectives identified, may they be a combination of Confucian doctrines with modern scientific and technologic disciplines, or the liberal or general forms of teaching and learning that encourage an appreciation of various fields of studies, or the penetration of party doctrines into curriculum, or the removal of all humanity and social science disciplines and the domination of science and technology. As the analysis in the following sections will show, in different historical periods, a number of principles cohere around their own sets of focuses, ends and means of HE, and their propositions surface as varying greatly from one another, mostly resulting from the radical shift in the political regimes and their corresponding strategies and practices in HE. But underneath these seemingly varied propositions, one might find much similarity hidden in the principles articulated across the history of modern HE in China.

First of all, with regard to the focuses of HE, one of the central issues is whether HE in modern China should primarily serve the development of individual or the development of the collective. Here, by the notion of the individual, I refer to its liberal interpretation – a human subject with his or her faculties to be cultivated and developed. The ideas of the collective, in comparison, tend to vary greatly in different historical periods. Essentially the collective is various forms of personnel, personnel that can be immediately deployed for national salvation in the late Qing to cope with to the all-around challenges at hand, social, economic, political, and military, for national building in the Republican era to play the role of the leaders in various industries and governing bodies, for national reconstruction under state socialism to transfer knowledge into socio-economic development, and for national strengthening in the post-socialist era for the development of a market economy.

Second, the articulation of the ends of HE has been closely associated with, though not necessarily determined by, the needs of various political regimes and their respective socio-political environment; the late Qing is a nation ruled by an imperial regime, and then in the first half of the Republican era, a

modern society that aims to transform its residents into citizens, and in its second half, a nation at war that requests HE to follow the order of the party-state, under state socialism, a new nation that is in great need of technocrats to facilitate its scientific and technological development, and also an egalitarian society that emphasises primarily promoting educational opportunities among the working class; in the post-socialism era, a country that bases its competence in a global economy upon the accumulation of human capital. It is within a small window period in the first half of the Republican era that one could find the hegemonic principles of HE in the primary service of the individual, promoted by a group of liberal reformists such as Cai Yuanpei.

A related dimension of the ends of HE is the articulatory struggles surrounding the practicality of HE, meaning to what extent HE should make immediate and direct contribution to the needs of the nation/ state, may these needs be defined as military, socio-political, and/or economic, and to what extent HE should be devoted to the production of practical knowledge and personnel that is immediate relevant to such needs. Corresponding to the focuses of HE, the modern history of HE in China is dominated by a utilitarian mechanism, that HE should be concerned primarily with the needs of the nation/state and should accordingly give more attention to disciplines that can most immediately make a direct contribution to fulfil such needs.

Third, with regard to the means of HE, two repeating themes emerge out of the articulations – one is the curricular preference among disciplines and the other is the pedagogical deployment of certain ideologies. For the former, one would also find that science and technology disciplines have been given overwhelming attention throughout the century or so. In the late Qing, science and technology were largely understood as the essence of the advantages of Western countries over China, most evidently in their powerful military equipment, and HE institutions mainly began with the teaching of such disciplines until the end of the imperial China when there was a widening consensus that the strength of western countries actually lay in their socio-political system. Hence, in the first two decades of the Republican era, social science disciplines such as politics and education were given much more attention, but when the central Nationalist government came into power, attempts were made to promote science and technology disciplines, which were believed to make more a concrete contribution to national building. Under state socialism, social science and humanity disciplines were largely removed from HE curriculum as they are of 'no use to the proletarian mass' (Pepper, 1996) and were gradually reintroduced after the Cultural Revolution. Nonetheless, science and technology disciplines still predominate HE institutions in contemporary China.

A second dimension with regard to the means of HE is a combination of a systematic imitation of foreign HE models and the pedagogical deployment of ideologies. From a genealogical perspective, a society only has a limited number of cultural techniques for the construction and management of its HE system and institutions. In the case of HE in modern China, there have been two sets of techniques constantly at play – one is to imitate the models of HE in foreign countries, and the other is to direct and regulate HE curriculum and pedagogy with certain ideological patterns (Chen, 2002; Orleans, 1960; Pepper, 1996; Wang, 1966).

For the former, educators and governors of HE in late Qing favoured the German and Japanese models as the two models were believed to emphasise discipline and obedience over individual needs, and the dominant ideology was Confucian canon, which was obviously the safest and the most immediately available and relevant choice to the maintenance of socio-political order in imperial China (Chen, 2002); in the first half of Republican China, it was the idea of liberalism and democracy introduced from western societies that prevailed in academia, and HE system was under the influence of European models first but was later dominated by the American model, which was due to the shifting influence and contribution of returned students from first European countries such as Cai Yuanpei and then U.S. such as Hu Shi (Wang, 1966); while in the second half, the systematic hybridity remained largely unchallenged but in terms of ideology, the Nationalist government intended to lead HE to comply with its own party doctrines. There attempts were largely resisted by academia which was then much in favour of liberalism and democracy (Yang, 2003). As soon as the Communist party became the ruling party of the nation, the HE system was first adjusted to the Soviet model, which led to the nationalisation of all HE institutions, abolishment of almost all social science and humanity departments and disciplines and emphasis on the production of technocrats. The system was again adjusted to the model of Anti-Japanese University, a kind of institution for the Communist party to train its own cadres with its own party doctrines, in order to prioritise the cultivation of political loyalty over that of other skills and expertise (Pepper, 1996); in the post-socialist period up to now, in terms of the model, the HE system may be understood as of greater institutional diversity and of much bigger scale, and the tight control of the central government seems to have loosened. In term of ideology the influence of party doctrine as the authoritarian ideology becomes less robust but remains significant and so far other alternatives are not encouraged among HE institutions. This pattern echoes what is known as the neo-liberalism with Chinese characteristics (Harvey, 2005), meaning an increase of institution autonomy in the finance and department structure, but under the ongoing supervision of the party-state and within the tolerance of the authoritarian ideology which remains largely unchanged

and unchallenged. The influence of neo-liberalism will be further discussed in the next Part of the thesis.

Articulatory Struggles

The past century or so witnessed a most radical and rapid change in political regimes in modern China, each with its own principles of higher education. At the first glance, these principles may differ greatly from one another, with regard to their respective focuses, means and ends. Nonetheless, a number of themes emerge out of the articulation of these principles, which rather cohere across the various historical stages.

I now begin my discussion of the various principles articulated across the history of modern China with the late Qing. The emergence of HE in modern China is not a result of an ongoing social evolution, but rather an unprecedented historical crisis in diplomacy. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, the late Qing was facing challenging from both exterior wars and massive civil disorders. The defeats in a series of wars and the subsequent diplomatic affairs forced the Qing government to reflect upon its own education system. As He Bingsong summarises (1931, p. 1, my translation),

> 'the so-called "national crisis and deep adversities" is very much related to the defeats in diplomacy. After China's defeat in the Opium War and the signing of the Nanjing Treaty in 1842, and the invasion of British and French troops into Beijing in 1860, the Qing government was entirely incompetent in coping with the exterior challenges. All the diplomatic affairs were handled by a group of interpreters. Without proper training and being materialistic, these interpreters more than often turned trivial matters into major negotiations. Therefore, there emerged some general understandings in China that first, interpreters were not to be trusted and there was an urgent need to produce personnel in interpretation; second, there was an urgent need to produce personnel for ship manufacturing and military and naval forces, to defend the nation from the overwhelming forces of the western troops. Therefore, the educational reforms of the late Qing started with these two perspectives.'

Hence, some educational experiments were carried out at small scales, including the establishment of several institutions for interpretation, military and naval training, and ship manufacturing since the 1860s onwards, the establishment of the first modern university, the Imperial University of Peking in 1898, and the abolishment of the Imperial Examination in 1905. The discourse of education at this time, as He argues, was 'to produce personnel to handle the critical moments' (He, 1931, p. 2), personnel that is capable of, for instance, handling immediate issues in international affairs, political conflicts, reforms in military forces, personnel that is capable of sustaining the life of the falling empire for the time being. According to the reformists such as Zhang Baixi, Rong Qin and Zhang

Zhidong (1903), the establishment of a new public schooling system and the abolishment of the Imperial Examination system were therefore understood as unavoidable, as it was only a new system, a new set of educational principles, a new collection of disciplines that could save this nation from its humiliations and sufferings. These experiments were not without criticisms and resistance, as there were concerns that the introduction of foreign models of education would lead to the degeneration of the traditional educational practices in China, and hence threaten the political foundation of the empire. But towards the near end of 19th century, even the most conservative members of the government and the gentry literates would agree that though the development of the military forces and the growth of economy were vital to the immediate survival of a falling empire, the establishment of schools and the production of talents were the only means available to national salvation(Liu and Li, 2006; Yang, 2003b).

In late Qing, the process of its hegemonic articulation was most visible through such discourses around the role of education in national salvation, struggling between the conservatives who defend the conventional schooling approach, and the reformists who advocated the establishment of HE institutions and a new public education system. The hegemony of the reformist understanding of education was achieved upon a recognition shared by the regime and the public of China's severe disadvantage in science and technology against its unexpected foreign intruders, and also a quick and perhaps inaccurate conclusion that the development of national strength lies in the advancement of science and technology and the latter can be achieved by an immediate transplantation of scientific and technological institutions after foreign models. Embedded in the establishment of the early HEIs was the late Qing's ambitious design to turn the cause of suffering, the technological forces of the intruders, into the cure for the damage, into the means of national salvation.

The Imperial University was patterned upon Japanese universities, and its regulation *the Charter of Imperial University for Royal Permission* (reprinted in Yu and Tang, 1991, p. 339, my translation), can be seen as an early attempt to articulate HE principles. It says,

> '(the charter proposes) to establish the Imperial University for recruit graduates from senior schools; and to establish a Tongru Yuan (graduate school, to be set in Imperial University) to recruit graduates from the Imperial University. It is the principle of the University to follow the imperial decrees, set right course of development and produce general talents. The University should take it as its objectives to produce abundant personnel with various specialties for employment, and the Tongru College has its aim to advance academia in China on a daily basis, to produce new knowledge for publication, to invent new pieces of technology for the use of the public.'

But, for the late Qing regime, the production of personnel was not merely about the instructions of skills and knowledge of a small number of disciplines, the formulation of aptitude – it is also about the

instructions of ideologies and socio-political norms, the formulation of attitude. In the case of Imperial University, HE should be aimed at promoting Confucian orthodoxy and loyalty towards the empire. *The Re-scheduled School Charter* (reprinted in Yu and Tang, 1991, p. 939, my translation) states, 'it is the basic principle for any forms of schools to foster loyalty and filial piety, to be based on Confucian Classics, to set the spirits of students pure and upright.'

Here, the objectives of HE in the late Qing may surface as the production of personnel and the production of knowledge, but they are vested with particular focuses – in the short term to produce personnel with certain specialties to cope with immediate threats on the empire, and in the long term, to catch up with the west in science and technology and to build a larger intellectual reservoir to perform efficient service to the Empire. The means to realise such objectives, can perhaps be best described a combination of, on the one hand, a resort to the superficial presentation of modern science and technology such as military weapons and HEIs, and on the other hand, the pedagogical techniques of Confucian orthodoxy that endorses loyalty to the falling empire. But as the later reformers realised, the essential disadvantages of China to its foreign intruders, did not lie in its scientific and technological backwardness, but in its socio-political structure. The imperial form of governance could no longer cope with the challenges of the time, and the Confucian orthodoxy that had been in the service of the imperial regime was also incompetent in producing personnel of the modern age.

The most important transition in education system was completed under the late Qing regime – the establishment of modern HE institutions, the formulation of the state schooling system, and the abolishment of imperial examination system, all of which lay the foundation for the future development of modern education in China (Chen, 2002). However, despite the endeavours of the late Qing reformists, the empire could not be simply saved by a small number of HE graduates. The challenges to the bureaucratic system of imperial China from both outside and inside led to revolutions across the country, and the Qing government was by the time extremely vulnerable after exterior wars and civil disorders. The Empire came to its end in 1911. At that time, the number of HE institutions was small, and the state schooling system was largely under developed, but the designs and efforts of the late Qing government and the public did initiate new discourses upon the significance of HE for national survival and development, in particular its practical uses in producing personnel to cope with immediate crisis, and this idea remained the central position in throughout the struggles over the hegemonic articulation of principles.

The articulatory struggles in the Republican era are mostly carried out between two streams of understandings over the uses of HE, the liberal, represented by then educationists and scholars such as

Cai Yuanpei, then Minister of Education and Vice Chancellor of Peking University, and the authoritarian, represented by the officials in the Nationalist Government founded in 1927. Between 1911 and 1927, the country was caught up most of time in civil wars among warlords, and HE institutions were able to develop without much government intervention. Liberal reformists were able to establish and manage their institutions in ways such that notions of academic autonomy, liberal education, the full development of human faculties were most appreciated and fostered. In other words, the liberal stance of HE was the hegemonic principles articulated and in circulation. But from 1927 onwards, the newly founded central government intended to strengthen its control over HE by promoting its Party doctrine among HE institutions. HE was requested to follow the design of the Nationalist Party, and be primarily in the service of the demands of the Nation state rather than the individuals. The authoritarian stance was forcefully resisted by the liberal intellectuals.

Cai was offered the post of the Minister of Education in 1912. Under his guidance, the Act I of the laws governing colleges and universities was announced in 1912, (reprinted in Su, 1985, p. 640, my translation), which states that 'the objectives of colleges and universities are to instruct (students) in advanced learning, to train knowledgeable experts, and to meet the needs of the nation.'

According to the Act, HE should ultimately be in the service of the nation. Even a liberal reformist as Cai could not afford to establish the full development of human subject, as the liberal understanding of HE would prefer, as the primary objective of HE, but rather, it is still the collective good to which HE should seek to contribute. Nonetheless, Cai did make great efforts to bring liberalism and democracy into university administration since he took the post of the Vice Chancellor of Peking University in 1917. This was achieved by giving authorities to academics - for instance, the Executive Committee was organised among the faculty deans as a legislative body and the Professors' Committee was set up as an academic body to supervise curriculum, and fostering academic freedom, which for Cai, is best reflected in the widest diversity of commitments and attitudes on campus. The most praised policy of 'freedom of thoughts' (Vol. 3, p. 271) – that a university should accommodate various schools of thoughts and theories - under his chancellorship is still quoted in contemporary discourse of HE management in China.

Cai (1984, p. 177, my translation) also believes that education should first of all focus on the development of individuals, and in turn these educated individuals can make contributions to the society, and education should not be dictated by any political forces. He claims that

> 'education is to help the taught obtain the abilities to develop the intelligence of mind, and perfect personal traits that contribute to the culture of humankind; but education is not to make the taught a special instrument used by others who have some other kind of purpose.'

Cai's emphasis upon nurturing individuality was widely echoed by other liberal educators, such as Jiang Menglin, Cai's successor as the principal of Peking University, who argues that HE should foster 'sound individuals' and contribute to 'the evolution of society'. This emphasis of individuality was also shared by Pan Guangdan, then director of Office of Academic Affairs at Qinghua Univerity, who argues that HE should foster character building among individuals via liberal education, rather than blindly following the needs of the society (see Yang, 2003, p. 67).

After the Nationalist government was established in 1927, however, the liberal form of HE was directly challenged by the newly founded party-state. One of the priorities in the political agenda of the Nationalist government was to establish itself as the authoritarian regime for the nation, and this would include a tighter control of HE system and the academia. The means immediately available was again, not surprisingly, party doctrines. In May 1927, Jiang Jieshi, then the president of the government, announced his idea of 'partyism education', and to govern the nation by the party and party doctrines. This was followed by Hu Hanmin's criticism of the prevailing liberalist understanding of education, who argues that

> 'education must not be without an underpinning ideology, a sole ideology... We are now guided by the Three People's Principles (Nationalism, Democracy and the People's Livelihood) in our endeavour to salvage, construct and govern the nation, and hence, education should not be left outside the realm of the nation. Education should therefore be subject to the sole guiding ideology, the Three People's Principles, and no others; otherwise, there would be no ideology at all'(Hui in Yang, 2003, p. 68, my translation).

Another historical contingency, the Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1945, was used to justify the governmental control of HE. Wu Junshen (1983, pp. 23-24), the then Director of HE Office, argued that,

> 'The state and the society has invested in higher education, so it is necessary to have certain regulation over the sector to ensure the objectives of the state and the society. The wartime is of course different – any given country would put some constraints over the freedom of any sectors of state affairs. The Chinese higher education system is no exception during the wartime. It is therefore sensible and necessary for the government to set up a certain degree of regulation over higher education during the wartime'.

Chen Lifu, then Minister of Education, also supported Wu's argument, and stated that education during the wartime should be education for 'the sole purpose of national salvation'(Yang, 2003). It was nonetheless difficult to assess to what extent the Nationalist Party was successful in their articulation

of HE principles against the liberal educators. But the link between HE and national salvation was strengthened during the times of Japanese invasion. For instance, in 1927, a song written to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Peking University is still themed upon the encouragement of assiduousness and elitism – 'treasure your studentship and do not age in vain; with natural authenticity, all are outstanding figures at their best ages; once cultivated, (one will be) youngster with knowledge and integrity', while in 1939, the school anthem for Western Union University (which was made of Peking University, Qinghua University and Nankai University) was written very much in patriotic tone – 'a lengthy humiliation (will end) and a reconstruction will begin at the most difficult time, asking for talents and heroes; … in the face of multiple misfortunes, one is worried with the future of the nation, and should be motivated yet patient, and inspired by the preceding sages'[6].

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became the ruling party of China in 1949, and has since been in possession of monopolistic control of the national affairs, with education being a significant part of its agenda. With regard to the articulation of HE principles, the CCP, in order to establish its hegemonic account of HE, needed to engage with different principles from both outside and inside the party. From the outside, the party launched a series of political movements targeting the intellectual community from the previous era, in order to establish itself as the sole authority over the directions of educational development and policymaking. From the inside, the articulation of HE principles is closely associated with the struggles for governing power between the two factions of the CCP, known as the radicals and the moderates who held fundamentally different views in the goals and approach to national development and in educational policies (Tsang, 2000). The five decades under the Communist regime bears witness to a series of tumultuous shifting currents in HE principles and practices, in forms of national experiments in HE at an unprecedented scale in human history.

From the outside, two main approaches can be identified in the Party attempts to replace the prevailing belief and practices in the inherited HE system with its own principles - central control over all HE institutions and political movements to suppress intellectuals who disagree with the party. In a 'learn from the Soviet Union' movement (between 1950 to roughly 1956), the CCP on the one hand reconstructed the HE system in accordance with then Soviet model, with emphasis on central control and heavy industry, and on the other hand launched concurrent campaign for 'thought reform' among the intellectuals. The thought reform intended to promote among the intellectuals a new orthodoxy based on the canons of Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong, and to refute and 'correct' the intellectual community's 'misperception' of itself as the modern successor of China's traditional ruling elite

[6] From http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/北京大学, accessed on 15th May, 2011, my translation

(Goldman, 1981). Deputy Education Minister Qian Junrui made an authoritative statement at the very start of the Thought Reform that

> 'If teachers at HE remain adhering to a reactionary ideology of the Anglo-American bourgeois, or stubbornly to his own individualism, objectivism or sectarian views, and not subject to concrete transformation, all efforts in HE reforms, such as the departmental adjustment, curriculum reform, improving pedagogy, etc., will be difficult to carry out and implement, and all decisions and regulations on HE reform will inevitably become mere paperwork ... (and) it will be extremely difficult, even impossible for the country to complete the grand mission to cultivate a large number of senior personnel in the service of national construction (Qian, 1951, my translation).'

In other words, in order to establish the CCP's HE principles hegemonic, to implement an overall reconstruction of the HE system in the Soviet model, and to enforce party doctrines on HE pedagogy and curriculum, it is important to eliminate resistance from the intellectuals who were possessing a hegemonic account of HE dominant in the previous era. Subsequently, the proposed HE reform was conducted immediately and swiftly, as discussed in the next chapter. At the end of the First Five Year Plan, Mao in 1956 initiated the Hundred Flowers Campaign to ask intellectuals for their opinions on the CCP and the national development under the party guidance. Mao was under the impression that intellectuals were essential and sympathetic to communist development, but he was astonished at the out-pouring of criticisms of the party and its policies by the intellectuals in 1957. With regard to the HE reform in particular, the assembled educators at a Beijing symposium of university leaders put forward two major complaints. First, without a careful screening of candidates, the drastic rise in student number and the enrollment of students with 'uneven attainment' inevitably harmed the quality of HE, and the authorities were advised to review whether such a large number of HE graduates were necessary to the ongoing national construction. Second, inadequate attention was paid to the socio-economic situation of the nation, and the legacy of Chinese HE before the recent reform, and to the individual character and preference of students (Tsang, 2000).

However, the Hundred Flowers Campaign was soon ended by Mao, and was followed the Anti-Rightists Campaign which led to the denouncement and persecution of a large number of intellectuals. Criticisms aired by the intellectuals were dismissed. The provisional regulations introduced in September 1956 to lessen controls over HE institutions were soon abandoned as they were 'obvious mistakes', as students were not enthusiastic about independent study in their free time, and political lessons were neglected. Furthermore, the speech given by Jiang Nanxiang, then the principal of Qinghua University, was put forward as an authoritative rebuttal from the party, in which he dismissed the old system for being costly and elitist, unable to produce a large number of personnel needed for

the national construction, and the needs of the state manpower should prioritize over the concerns of student individuality. He says

> 'objective needs (of the state) come first, individual wishes and special capabilities are born and developed on this objective foundation, and individual wishes are not immutable' (Jiang, 1956, my translation).

After the anti-rightist campaign, there appeared little room to hold resistance to the hegemonic principles set by the authoritarian party, and the Soviet-style centralisation and uniformity of curriculum and pedagogy became the main feature of HE system, even after the end of the Cultural revolution and a decade of countervailing influences from the West during the 1980s.

From the inside, the Party itself shifted between two sets of principles held by two factions within. The radical faction, led by Mao Zedong and others, prioritizes the achievement of political consciousness and ideological devotion to communism, and hence continuing class struggles and revolution to transform the social relation of production lie at the centre of national development and communist politics and ideology should be placed at the core of social life. For this faction, HE, like other sector of state schooling, plays a key role primarily in political and ideological development of the Chinese people and society, in fostering a love for communist ideals (the making of 'redness'). The radicals oppose stratification and elitism in education, and believe that education should be concerned with the promotion of social equality and socially oriented goals.

In comparison, the moderates, led by Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and others at various times, prioritize the material and moral improvement of people's lives, and hence economic and technical development, rather than political and ideological agenda, should be at the heart of national construction. In this regard, HE should be primarily concerned with transferring human input into production and supporting the development of science and technology, and HE institutions should be devoted to the transmission of skills and knowledge (the making of 'expertise') as well as the moral development of the learner. With regard to the concern of social equality, the moderates prefer stratification within HE in order to prepare a diversified workforce, and to do so, key schools and universities are to be established as model institutions and it was proposed that competitive examinations were to be set at every level of schooling to achieve educational selection and the preparation of the elite.

With regard to the articulation of HE principles, the 'two-line struggle' between the radical and moderate factions from 1949 onwards has been focusing upon three enduring issues – political/ ideological development versus education for economic development, education for social equality

versus education for efficiency, 'quantity versus quality' of the intellectual community, to be enlisted them in national construction versus their suppression as the enemy of the state.

Here I provide a brief historical review of the articulatory struggles between the two factions. In the first Five Year plan, the party policies seem to balance between the two factions. Lu Dingyi (1950, pp. 4, 7), the Minister of Propaganda, claimed that

> 'our work (of education and culture) focuses on two objectives: first, to move the ownership of education and culture industry from a few people to the massive working class; second to integrate education and culture industry into serving the objectives of national recovery and development in production and construction...The government of People's Republic of China decide to prioritize the development of education for workers and peasants, to produce new forms of intellectuals from worker-peasant origins'.

However, as later experiments showed, the two objectives later proved to be almost incompatible. In pursuance of the first aim, HE would have to expand itself to accommodate the large population of workers and peasants, and at the same time lower its admission requirements for worker and peasants on a massive scale, as their general lack of schooling would be an obstacle to learning at HE level. In pursuance of the second aim, HE would need to prioritise quality over quantity to achieve better performance if it remained an elite system for the time being and recruited those with better educational preparation, students who are likely to come from traditionally advantaged social backgrounds, such as urban middle class.

As this plan prioritises the first objective, the pursuit of the second objective was much less successful. In 1955 Li Fuchuan, then chair of the State Panning Commission pointed out in the 'Report of the 1st Five-Year Plan' that, firstly (reprinted and translated in Bowie and Fairbank, 1962, p. 511),

> 'the shortage of scientific and technological personnel is now apparently a huge obstacle to our advancement. One of the major political tasks we must accomplish in the first and second Five-Year Plan is to produce a large number of engineering technical staff, skilled workers and personnel with specialties in various domains who are loyal to the national and the socialist enterprise and equipped with modern scientific knowledge.

and therefore,

> '(we) should first focus on the improvement of quality and at the same give considerations to quantity in the education of cadres in higher education institutions and middle technical colleges. The tendency to go after numbers only and ignore quality is clearly not in the interest of the state plan of construction... Apparently, the quality of students can only be improved gradually. Proper conditions for improvement should be created enthusiastically, but not with rush or too high a standard, or a forced unity. There, however, must be a bottom limit, such as ... being intellectually able to keep up with the class. It is impossible or very difficult to turn students who do not meet these minimum requirements into useful construction personnel.'

However, this stress on quality was equally short-lived as the previous stress on quantity. After the Anti-rightist campaign in 1957, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council issued the "Directive on education work' (1958, p.1), which proposed a even more ambitious plan of quantitative expansion in education - 'we will spend 15 years also to promote universal higher education, and another 15 years to attend to the work of quality improvement'.

This plan was part of the Great Leap Forward campaign during 1958-1960 led by Mao Zedong. The campaign was intended to accelerate the move towards communism. During this brief period, the political and ideological function of education was prioritised over acquisition of expertise for economic production, and the promotion of social equality was set as a key goal for national development, with a substantial expansion of access to education for peasant and working-class children. But Mao's ambition was hit by a sharp economic decline and in 1960 he relinquished control of national affairs to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Liu and Deng abandoned the egalitarian approach to education, but instead reversed the expansionist policy in education and put forward a dual system, with regular schools (full time) for the elite and work-study schools (part time) for the mass.

Dissatisfied with Liu and Deng's policies, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and regained control of the party again. During the decade between 1966-1976, Mao returned to the earlier emphasis on collectivist production, ideological and political conformity, and egalitarianism, and at the same time purged his political opponents and further oppressed the intellectual community. With regard to educational policies, the pendulum swung back towards political loyalty and social equality. HE was largely at a halt during the period and majority of HE institutions were closed.

After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping gained paramount leadership in the CCP two years later and immediately started to reverse Mao's policies, and introduced his twin policies of reform and opening up to the outside world, which led to a rapid and sustained economic growth and a clear improvement in the living standard in the 1980s. Also, the party attempted to reduce its antagonism with intellectuals and from the 1990s onwards (Tsang, 2000) the intellectual community appears to have largely distanced itself from socio-political realms and instead devoted itself to either academic pursuits or joined the think tank to serve the party (Fewsmith, 2008).

With regard to HE, the CEE was soon resumed to select the elite few for HE, and so was the dual system of keypoint institutions and the regular ones. Concerns for social equality were dropped as a highly stratified education system prevails, and the persistent major goal of HE has been to produce a mix of skilled personnel for the developing economy. But, nonetheless, the demand for political loyalty

Historical stages	Principles			
	Focuses	*Ends*	*Means*	
			Model	*Dominating Ideology*
Late Qing	Personnel for the immediate national crisis	National salvation	German and Japanese	Confucian canon
Republican China, before 1927	Knowledgeable experts in the service to the needs of the nation	Liberal development of individuals, who would in turn make contribution to the socio-economic development of the nation in general	European and American	Liberalism and Democracy
Republican China, 1927-1948	Personnel in service to the newly founded party state	National development under the guidance of party doctrines, and later national salvation at the time of foreign invasions	Hybrid	Nationalist Party doctrine
People's Republic of China (P.R.C), 1949-1966, two-line struggle	Radical -intellectuals from worker-peasant background	Social equality in HE access, and the development and political and ideological consciousness of the people	Anti-Japanese University	Mao's egalitarianism
	Moderate - technocrats for national reconstruction	Scientific and technology advancement, the improvement of material beings of the people	Soviet model	Technocracy of Soviet style
Cultural Revolution, 1967-1978	HE in a halt			
Post-socialism, 1979 onwards	Personnel for socialist market economy	Socialist modernisation	Hybrid	Neo-liberalism with Chinese characteristics

Table 4, Prevailing HE Principles in Different Historical Periods

persists. In 1998, the Higher Education Law of People's Republic of China was issued. The discourse of the use of HE remained largely unchanged in term of personnel production, but it emphases more

that HE should serve the needs of economic development.

> 'Article 4, Higher education must implement the educational policy of the state, serve socialist modernisation, integrate itself with production and labour to train those educated to be builders and successors of the socialist cause with all-round development of morality, intelligence and physique.'
>
> 'Article 5, the task of higher education is to train senior specialised talents with innovative spirit and practical capability, develop science, technology and culture and promote socialist modernisation'.

From these two articles, one can see that the principle of HE coheres with the dominant themes in the previous decades - the focus of HE remains upon the collective – 'senior specialised talents', and the authoritarian ideology remains largely visible in terms such as 'social cause' and 'social modernisation', and the emphasis upon science and technology stays prevailing. Some might argue Article 4 introduces a discourse of personal development – 'all-round development of morality, intelligence and physique', but one should also pay attention to the condition of such development – the socialist cause. In other words, this is not the kind of 'full and complete development' as the liberal tradition would expect, but rather a kind of development that is allowed and endorsed within certain ideological pattern, or as I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, under the guidance of 'neo-liberalism with Chinese characteristics'.

I hereby make a summary of the prevailing principles in various historical stages in the following figure.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I trace the articulatory struggles of HE principles in modern China. This genealogy of HE principles concentrates on both the contingent circumstances in which HE principles were established in modern China, with its limited cultural techniques, institutions and modes of reflection at disposal, and also the articulation of principles that underlies the development and deployment of HE, principles that later establish themselves as rationalities of HE in contemporary China, rationalities that struggle for hegemonic articulation of the means and ends of HE. The picture that emerges is thus a combination of one of HE's improvised assemblages as a device to meet the contingencies of a particular historical moment and one of HE as intended projects of government of population.

Despite the discussion above, it would still be difficult for me to even attempt to suggest a HE principle that best suits contemporary China. In fact, I intend not to be too closely involved with such an ambitious project, which in itself requests another intensive study. My task in this chapter is limited to the exploration of the emergence, development and deployment of HE principles of modern China, to make these principles visible and intelligible.

In the regard of alternative principles, Chen (Chen, 2002, pp. 37-38) puts forward a possible direction based on his historical review of Chinese HE in the past century. He writes,

> 'perhaps one day, the university ideal of Cai Yuanpei – the tradition Confucian and Mencius sprits, combined with characteristic building of Britain, specialised and condense research of German and France, civic duties to the society of the U.S – can be realised; but before that happens, scholars may be advised to comprehensively engage with how to coordinate between western styles and China's traditional sprits, governmental conduct and popular academia, humanistic cultivation and vocational preparation, university size and teaching quality, liberal thoughts and the harmonious coexistence of different schools, and also the structure, subject, function and duty of university'.

At this point, I will not further explore the feasibility of Chen's suggestion, but I will return to this issue in my final chapter. In the next chapter, I will discuss the construction of HE systems in modern China.

Chapter 5 The Construction of Systems

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discuss the articulations of HE principles in modern China, by using a genealogical approach. I trace out the difference and similarity among these principles that emerge out political struggles, and display certain rationalities of HE that seem to cohere across the historical development, around for instance the role of HE serving the needs of the state and individuals, the association between HE disciplines and socio-economic growth. In this chapter, I will also make use of the same approach to explore the constructions of HE systems in this same historical span from the late Qing to the contemporary. My concern is not primarily about the establishment of various institutions at different historical stages, but the rationalities behind the emergence of the notion of a HE system, and the rationalities that shape the contemporary structural appearance of this system. I also look into the formulation of the connection between the pre-HE sector, the primary and secondary school system, and the HE sector, and the rationalities that underpin this connection.

Systems

By systems, I am referring in this chapter to two respective structures – first, the particular characteristics of the HE system marked by a diversity of institutions in terms of their history, traditional focuses of disciplines, academic reputation, finance and other socio-political variants such as whether they are recognised by the government as keypoint universities; second, the complete state education system in modern China, meaning a entirety of the primary and secondary sectors and the HE sector, with a particular focus on the connection between the pre-HE sectors and the HE sector.

With regard to the HE system alone, the focus of my genealogical exploration is upon two issues – first, the emergence of a system of HE, meaning the historical contingence in which various institutions were organised into a fairly coherent structure that can be called 'a system', and the organisational rationalities that rise out such a contingence and their effects on later development of HE; second, the formation of an internal hierarchy among various HE institutions within a system, in terms of their academic, financial organisational and political statuses, and the standard and practices that are used to legislate, regulate, diversify, and rank the institutions to make this hierarchy possible and sustainable.

With regard to the educational system as an entirety, I want to explore the emergence and development of public schooling in modern China as a socio-political response to a number of historical contingencies, and in particular the rationalities of the connections between the pre-HE sector and the HE sector. As the following analysis will show, HE has always been prioritised over the primary and secondary sectors in modern China – not only did the establishment of HE institutions precede public schools, but also it enjoyed sustained privilege in the form of investment and status over the regular sector. Due to the insistence on education as a response to immediate crisis, HEIs, to use a pertinent turn of phrase, were given priority, while the regular sector was viewed as a turgid, amorphous, overly long-term developmental matière subtending HEIs. Furthermore, it bears noting once more that the establishment and development of the regular sector in China was to better serve the former, the production of properly qualified candidates for HE.

The Emergence and Development of HE System

From the very beginning, the government initiatives in education in China did not begin with the bottom of an educational hierarchy but rather the top – a number of special colleges and a university were created before any serious planning of a comprehensive regular education sector. HE was prioritised as it was believed to be able to perform more immediate and relevant services to governments. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, in coping with the diplomatic crisis starting from 1860, the Interpreter's College was set up in 1862 to provide language training for future diplomats. Similar language institutes were set up in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hubei, and two other forms of institutions were also set up in a similar manner – one is College for Ship Manufacture and Conducting, and the other was Army College. After the traumatic defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the language institutes and special colleges were deemed as insufficient in personnel production (He, 1931). For instance, Li Duanfeng in his *Advocate of School Promotion* pointed out five reasons why the early institutions failed,

> 'one, the institutions primarily teach western languages, but does not cover the principles of proper governance and origins of economic development; two, subjects of studies are not specified and students are not specialised; three, the institutions are not equipped with proper facilities and do not send members abroad for learning, and therefore the education offered ended being impractical; four, students are mostly grown-ups rather than young pupils; five, there are only a few institutions in the whole country, with a few dozen students in each one. Even if every student was qualified for service, it was far from being sufficient to govern the country, not to mention the fact that students are mostly underachievers. (summarised by He, 1931, p. 530, my translation).'

In the light of my discussion of HE principles in the previous chapter, one can see Li's criticisms are targeted upon the principle of the early HE in these institutions – the means of HE, the teaching of western languages alone, the insufficient teaching resources, and the impractical contents of such education, the ends of HE, the small scale of HE that failed to produce a personnel large enough for governmental needs, and the focuses of HE, adults rather than youngster, and a lack of specialisation in training. For Li, these experiments were not sufficiently higher education of a kind that would fulfil the needs of the government, neither were these institutions sufficient in their sizes or ability to produce personnel that was most urgently needed. The late Qing government subsequently decided to build modern universities. In 1898, a proposal for a metropolitan university was made, permitted and carried out, and a graduate school was also included. This leads to the establishment of the Imperial University, later transformed into Peking University, and several other metropolitan universities were established before the end of the Qing Empire. However, all these modern universities were invariably elitist in nature as their students were mainly aristocrats and government officials and their curriculum only include a few modern disciplines. The overall achievements of these universities were regarded as extremely low, which is reflected in the quote of Zeng Pu at the beginning of this thesis.

The National Provisional Educational Conference convened by Cai Yuanpei in 1912 listed three targets for HE in China –'it needed to be built into a well-articulated system, extended to reach all parts of the country, and brought up to modern standards' (Cohen and Goldman, 1992, pp. 369-370). This was a significant moment for HE, because, first, as a discourse it reached a higher degree of abstraction as a unique form/stage of educational activities subject to certain standards; second, HE could be established as a coherent and integrated national system, led and regulated by certain administrative organisations. The establishment of a national system would make it possible and perhaps more convenient for various political forces to exert their influences. As the subsequent development of HE in modern China shows, the discourse of a HE system is not a mere linguistic convenience for a cluster of institutions; on the contrary, it is the most useful administrative unit and tool for governmental controls over all forms of HE activities.

Some failed attempts of Cai Yuanpei can help to illustrate my argument. Despite Cai Yuanpei's endeavour to foster academic freedom in the early years, the government's attempts to monitor and control the entire HE system never stopped. An important step in the securing of central government leadership over HE was taken in the form of a newly ascendant nationalism in China – an 'educational rights recovery' campaign, a campaign that aims to eliminate the influence of Catholic education approaches on HE pedagogy and curriculum in private universities. As a result, all foreign-founded

Christian colleges and universities were requested to register with the Ministry of Education, and the heads of such schools or colleges must be Chinese nationals. This campaign was largely successful, and

> 'by 1933 all the major Christian universities and colleges had completed registration with the Nationalist government...Thus, in spite of local problems ... these institutions were brought into the formal structure of China's educational system. (Cohen and Goldman, 1992, p. 389)'

It was after such a forced integration was completed that we then could claim the birth of a system. The naming process was only a start. It was the integration that mattered. In the case of this HE system under the Nationalist regime, we have seen that first an abstract system of HE was firstly established with certain aims and standards, and gradually this abstract system as a discourse was turned into an institutional organisation by including the institutions that it named and targeted. Once this abstract system was integrated into the state machine as a public sector, it was unavoidably subject to government intervention and regulations, so were all the institutions that were included in that very system.

Another policy also contributed to this process – the strengthening or creating of national universities across the country. These universities were brought under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Education. Qinghua University, for example, was designated a national university in 1928, and soon it was transferred from a preparatory school for US colleges into a regular four-year university, and was placed under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. In 1931, the University of Chengdu, Sichuan University and Chengdu Normal College were amalgamated into the National Sichuan University, and it was also ordered by the Nationalist government that the salt revenue of Sichuan Province government should be appropriated for this new university. The development of national universities also gives rise to a new rationality of HE administration, that there should be a number of national institutions that are subject to the direct supervision of a central government, in order to set up examples of HE principles and practices that are authorised and supported by central governments, and hence establish some ground for governmental authority. Hence, nationalizing universities becomes a useful approach to enforce governmental influence on HE. The effect of this tool reached its peak under the Communist regime when all HE institutions were nationalised and placed upon central control, and it was not until the 1980s that local governments and universities themselves were given more administrative powers.

By the 1930s, there were mainly three kinds of institutions recognised by the government as universities – National universities, Provincial Universities, and Registered Private Universities. The

first kind was supported by the National Government, the second by Provincial Government, both of which were under public control. Over 90% of the total expenditure of these institutions was supplied by the government, and their Presidents were appointed by a public authority. In comparison, only three private universities received public funding in the year 1930-1931 and over 50% of their operating revenue was derived from tuition fees(Becker et al, 1932a). Most historians of education in China would agree under the Nationalist regime there emerged a HE system of notable scale and diversity (Chen, 2002; Hayhoe, 1996; Pepper, 1996).

The Emergence of Public Schools

Before a proposal of a state schooling system, the majority of educational activities had been carried out in private, in forms of Sishu (home schools with private tutors) and Shuyuan (examination halls). The general philosophy of this educational strategy, as Zhang Zhidong pointed out, was that government throughout Chinese history had only recruited ready-made talents from the public but made no attempts to educate the uneducated. Zhang then further argued that the Imperial Examination, though being capable of serving the government at peaceful times, must be subject to substantial changes at that critical stage of a national crisis. A directive for a state schooling system was issued in 1904, modelled after the Japanese system, which transferred local shuyuan into modern schools, and the Imperial Examination was officially brought to an end at 1905 in order to give way to the new system(Hẹ, 1931).

Judged by mere number, Late Qing was perhaps more successful in the promotion of a schooling system than in the building of modern HEIs. In 1904, the number of schools was 4,222, with 92,169 students, and in 1909 the number of schools increased to 52,34, with 1,560,270 students (King, 1911). However, it was still of a small scale. The growth of the regular sector under the Nationalist regime was also limited. There were 8,839,434 pupils in primary school in the 1929-1930 academic year, approximately 21% of 41.4 million children of the 6-9 age cohort. In 1949, the enrolment rate of primary school was 25.0%, the secondary only 3.0% (Pepper, 1987a, p. 186). A full expansion of the regular sector would have to wait till the 1950s under Mao's guidance of Educational Revolution.

The emergence of a state schooling system in the late Qing was accompanied by an increasingly prevalent understanding that the recruitment of intellectuals should expand from the royal elites to the general public. It was less due to an increasing awareness that the education of general public was vital to the nation building, but more to a concern with a lack of supply to the top of the educational

hierarchy, not to mention a space for proper selections. On August 4th, 1898, Sun Jiading, then Minster of Education Affairs (*Guanxue Dachen*), asked for the Emperor's permission for the urgent establishment of state schools in five cities to ensure a supply of candidates for the Imperial University, Emperor Guangxu granted his permission in his reply as this plan would help to 'recruit young scholars in and outside the capital in education and promote general talents for the selection of the Imperial University' and therefore these schools 'should go parallel with the Imperial University and fulfil the intentions of talent fostering (qouted in Qian, 1999, p. 46, my translation).

The example of Tianjin University also sheds some light on the early connection between HE institutions and the pre-HE schools.

> ' It was realised that middle schools must be established throughout the Provinces as feeders to the Tienstin (Tianjin) University and provincial college. Dr. Tenny, president of the university, began their organisation in some of the fu and chou (zhou) cities, and by the spring of 1904 had 14 such schools organised, with an average of about 50 students in each school.... The Chinese examination halls (shu yuan) were reconstructed for these middle schools, and as a rule are very suitable and commodious. Former students of the Tientsin University were intrusted (entrusted) with the teaching in these schools, and were very successful, often showing much enthusiasm in the work.(King, 1911, p. 41)'

This example of Tianjin University exemplifies the transformation of an old private system to a new public schooling system (shuyuan to middle schools), and also the role of HE in the creation of this very new system. From the beginning, HE did not just precede the establishment of a state schooling system, but also created a demand of the public school system – on the one hand, the state schooling system was to ensure the regular supply of talents to be selected and subsequently serve the nation, and supplied the state schooling system with teaching faculty. An initial alliance between HE and the state schooling was therefore formed, but this was only one single case rather than an example of a massive practice. Nonetheless, the rationality established was of an educational hierarchy in terms of the functions of sectors– the pre-HE sector serving the HE sectors, public schools producing and preparing candidates for the selection of universities and colleges. As we can see from the following discussion, this rationality has not been subject to serious challenge ever since.

Therefore, the emergence and development of the pre-HE sector was more to do with supplying the HE sector with candidates than the cultivation of a broad range of citizens. This rationality still rang true under the Communist Regime. A meeting of the chairmen of the various administrative-region cultural and education committees set out the major tasks to coordinate educational development with the 1st Five Year Plan, including 'the appropriate development of secondary schools in order to

guarantee the quality and numbers of students for the tertiary level' (Pepper, 1987a, p. 208). From the end of 1950s onwards, continuous efforts were made to further expand primary and secondary schooling, mostly with the support of Mao Zedong himself. After his political triumph over the moderate faction, as mentioned in the previous chapter, he continued to be devoted to expanding the pre-HE sector. Mao's educational evolution, and the later Cultural Revolution, shifted the focus of education from the small group of technocrats to a general population, hence the pre-HE sector enjoyed tremendous development while the HE sector was largely suspended. However, it would be mistaken to take the Mao era as a discursive continuity rather than a rupture. Post-Mao, all his achievements in the development of the regular sector were eradicated from the public discourse. However, soon after his death and the moderate faction led by Deng Xiaoping came into power, the secondary section in particular was subject to rapid reduction. In 1983, Jiang Nanxiang, then Minister of Education, in his response to the criticism about the soaring competition for university admission after a sharp reduction of senior secondary schools, seemed to have already taken it as an established fact that 'the purpose of secondary schooling was to prepare for college (Jiang in Pepper, 1987b, p. 586)'. This belief still holds true in contemporary China, which I will return to in my discussion of HE subjects in later chapters.

The Privilege of HE

The discussion above displays an organisational privilege of the HE sector in terms of its relationship with the pre-HE sector –schools are designed to produce and prepare candidates for the selection of HE institutions. Another dimension of the privilege of the HE sector is the fact that it has received more attention from the government and educators alike than the pre-HE sector. Cai Yuanpei, as the most influential figure in education in the early Republican era, was also more devoted to HE than the public school system. In a number of occasions he mentioned a conversation between then Deputy Minster of Education Fan Weilian and himself (quoted in Fu, 2005, my translation),

> 'I was holding the opposite view of educational cycle. Fan said "if primary schools are under-developed, how could we have good middle schools? Without good middle school, how could we have good universities? So, step one should be the regulation and development of primary schools". I said, "without good universities, where can we find teaching faculty for middle schools? Without good middle schools, where can we find teaching faculty for primary schools? So, step one should be the regulation and development of universities".'

Also, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the radical faction of the Communist regime led by Mao emphasised the public school system, but the moderate faction emphasised the HE sector, and it is largely the influence of the latter that shapes the outlook of HE in contemporary China.

This largely coherent emphasis on HE is evidenced in government investment on various educational sectors. As Wang (1966, p. 364) listed,

> 'In 1931, for instance, the proportion of the yearly expenses per pupil in Chinese primary schools to that in Chinese universities was about 1:200 as compared with 1:8 in European countries. In 1936 the expenditure on higher education was ten times larger than in 1912, with almost the same number of students; the expenditure on secondary education increased by less than ten times during that period, with a 500 per cent increase in the student body; the expenditure on primary education increased six times, with a 600 per cent increase in the student body. Thus the stress on higher education continues.'

This imbalance was continued under the Communist regime. The following chart shows a distribution of government funding in the two sectors.

Year	**Education Investment**		**Education Infrastructure**	
	HE	*pre-HE*	*HE*	*pre-HE*
1953-1957	29.87	70.13	52.37	46.73
1958-1963	29.84	70.16	44.21	55.79
1964-1965	23.51	76.49	33.45	66.55

Table 5, Distribution of Government Investment in HE and Regular Education, from Fu (2005, p. 510)

Yang (2003) argues that in all developed countries, the share of the HE should not be higher than 20%, but the proportion had been much higher than this figure, in particular in education infrastructure investment – the HE sector was apparently a higher priority. The imbalance was perhaps more obvious in the yearly funding of students. In 1952, the funding among primary, secondary and HE was on the ratio of 1:15: 112. Yang argued that normally the ratio will be lower in more developed countries – in the 1980, this ratio in the UK was 1:1.94 : 6.25, and in France 1: 1.78 : 2.67.

Year	Primary	Secondary	HE	Ratio
1952	7.40	110.48	830.00	1 : 14.93 : 112.16
1953	15.28	83.91	958.30	1 : 5.49 : 62.72
1962	18.70	78.71	645.10	1 : 4.21 : 34.50
1965	19.96	88.89	917.68	1 : 4.45 : 45.96

Table 6, Yearly Expense on Students (in RMB), from Ministry of Education (1984, p. 4)

Another example that indicated the priority of HE over the regular sector is how, during the Sino-Japanese War between 1937-1945, HE was kept from severe interruption through great endeavours of the government and HEIs themselves. As Sun (1992, pp. 411, 414) described,

> 'by 1938 the academic community had accepted the continuity of its education task as essential for China's future. In the midst of major military upheavals and population dislocation, the leading universities and colleges chose the strategy of moving to safer locations in the interior. The migration of dozens of institutions of higher education – involving the various stages of planning the move, negotiating for quarters in the target locations, the financing and logistics of physically moving faculty, students, staff, books and equipment, and the preparations necessary for the travellers en route – was a stirring saga in itself. Its execution demanded determination, organisation skill, coordination and adaptability. The academic community accomplished it within the first year of the war and the process brought modern education into the less-developed hinterland.
>
> ... No one questioned the propriety of expending human energy and material resources in such long-distance, large-scale moving: clearly the institutions of higher education were a most valuable national resource and therefore, as a matter of course, must be saved so far as circumstances permitted.'

The Shaping of a Structural Hierarchy

In this section, I look into the process by which a structural hierarchy in the educational system came into being. By a structural hierarchy, I mean a descending order in the size of primary, secondary and higher education, an educational pyramid. This is achieved by two steps – first, the connection between the pre-HE sector and the HE sector needs to be established, a connection that links the production of HE candidates in the former to the selection and admission in the latter; second, the shaping and adjustment of the accommodation capacities of various sectors, to establish an educational pyramid and to intensify the competition for the next level of education, and eventually the access to HE.

Under the Nationalist regime, according to the Act I of the laws governing colleges and universities in 1912, graduates from middle school could directly go to HEIs for the preparatory courses without examination, and those who completed the preparatory courses could immediately continue their study in regular HE courses. But it would be mistaken to take it as a sign of a smooth transition between the two sectors, not to mention the introduction of an examination procedure by the modified Act I in 1917. In reality, the transition from the regular sector to the HE sector was far more difficult than one would expect. First, there were a small number of the positions available; for instance in 1928 there

were only around 90 students recruited by Qinghua University(Su, 2000, p. 160). Second, the academic requirement of HEIs were claimed to be too high; Shanghai Jiaotong University used the standard of its own affiliated middle school in its admission examinations, making it extremely difficult for students from other schools to match the requirement(Yang, Zhu and Zhang, 1992). Furthermore, there was an inconsistency between middle school curriculum and examination contents; for instance English was used as the examination language but it was not requested as the instruction language for middle school education (Yang, Zhu and Zhang, 1992, p. 574). Though a centralised college entrance examination and a standard curriculum were later experimented with by the Nationalist government to improve the consistency between two sectors, they were all largely unsuccessful because of the resistance of the students and faculty and the interruption of the Sino-Japanese war (Pepper, 1996).

The connection between the pre-HE sector and the HE sector was made possible under the Communist regime by two approaches, first the introduction of a centralised approach of supervision over education, by using standard national curriculum and a unified college entrance examination, and second a repeated adjustment of the size and shape of the two sectors via robust educational policies. In December 1950 the People's Education Press was set up by the Ministry of Education and Publication Administration Office to take charge of the composition of a standard curriculum for all subjects in the regular education sector. In April 1954, a 12-year standard curriculum was completed. Also, the college entrance examination as a form of national and standardised selection mechanism was introduced in 1952 and was promoted on a national scale from 1959 onwards (Baidu, 2008). Though both practices were interrupted during the cultural revolution, the curriculum replaced by Mao's political writings and the entrance examination suspended, they were both resumed immediately afterwards, and remain largely unchanged till today. The combination of these two practices made it possible for the regular sector to correspond to the requirement of the HE sector and therefore much easier for teachers and students to make proper preparations for the entrance examination. But at the same time, this would indicate a change in the power relation in two perspectives: first, by creating the bond between the two sectors, the standard curriculum entrance examination, the state immediately takes away the selection authority from HEIs; at the same time HEIs, via the introduction of standard curriculum and examinations, penetrated into the regular sector and created a new set of pedagogical practices. This will be further discussed in the next two chapters.

I now discuss the step in the shaping of structural hierachy. Compared with its predecessors, the Communist regime was much more ambitious and to some extent more successful in the construction

and development of the regular education sector in term of state planning and management. This massive expansion in the regular sector was made possible by the participation of the public - min-ban (run by local residents in Communes) schools predominated in the rural areas. The primary objective of these schools was literacy training and partly political as in propagandizing land reform and other event topics. The number of students in primary school rose from 24 million to 64 million from 1949 to 1957. However, this rapid growth was still regarded as insufficient. Mao wrote at the end of 1955 that

> '... the scale and speed of China's industrialisation and the scale and speed of the development of science, culture, education, public health and so on can no longer be carried out entirely as was first intended; these should all be appropriately expanded and accelerated. (translated and quoted in Pepper, 1987a, p. 212)'.

According to the new twelve-year programme for agricultural development adopted in 1956, the goal of universal compulsory primary schooling in rural China was to be realised within 7 to 12 years. This was an ambitious plan – the gross enrolment rate of primary school in 1956 was only 52%, and 78% of the total population was still illiterate. However, the development of the regular sector was sustained and accelerated in the following two decades under Mao's guidance. In 1976, the gross enrolment rate in primary school was 95% and slightly dropped to 93% in 1979, and the net enrolment rate of secondary school in 1979 was 46%, much higher than other developing countries at that time.

But it would be mistaken to treat that this pyramid pattern of transition rates as a result of a natural development. In fact, it was again a result of an intended adjustment. The attempt to build up proper connections between sectors began in 1953, as Zeng Zhaolun (1953, p. 12)summarised the achievement in HE within the first three years of the new regime,

> 'the new school system on the one hand singled out the importance of education for the working people and the worker and peasant cadres in all grades of schools, and on the other hand stresses that proper connections and relations should be maintained between all grades and categories of schools, the new pedagogical system preserves harmony and unity within the educational system'.

In reality, such harmony and unity was still difficult to achieve. At that time, primary school was far from being able to accommodate the total school-age population, but secondary school offered more positions than the number of graduates from primary schools, and yet again the supply of secondary school graduates was insufficient to meet the demands of HEIs. In 1956, the majority of the graduates of senior secondary schools were able to enrol in HEIs, and so could graduates from junior second proceed to the senior level. In this regard, Zhou Enlai, then Premier, stated in the First Report on the Work of Government,

'After liberation... higher education institutions and secondary specialised schools recruited a large number of students. This gave rise to the situation in recent years that almost all those graduating from senior secondary schools could proceed to higher education, and most graduates from junior second were able to continue to senior level ... But, it should be pointed out that this situation was temporary and abnormal, and it will gradually become normal after some proper arrangement of the state. This year, higher education institutions and secondary specialised schools will reduce their enrolments according to the plan... Therefore, from now on, on the one hand there will be more graduates proceed to higher level; on the other hand there will be more graduates from primary, junior and senior secondary schools who take part in labour work. In this way, it is therefore possible to increase the number of labour workers with education and culture, and to expand the group of intellectuals. This will be a normal and healthy phenomenon, and will also be a long lasting phenomenon from now on' (Zhou, 1959, p. 516).

Zhou's statement was particularly important in understanding the discourse of the connection between two sectors. A normal system, according to Zhou, would be a system that was capable of educating, selecting and distributing manpower, and proper connections between all grades would mean both a process of inclusion and exclusion, and as educational needs among different individuals are bound to differ, an educational system should also be designed to divide the population and select people for different educational ends and social positions. Hence, an educational hierarchy among grades must be established, not only because it was useful, but it was normal, the way it supposed to be - the society needed not only intellectuals, but also worker and peasants with proper educational preparation.

Another change to the shape of the hierarchy began in the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Secondary schools were subject to a sudden reduction, as the previous policies in educational revolution 'were said not only to have tried to universalize schooling prematurely but also to have sought to unify education in a manner inappropriate to China's needs and level of economic development' (Pepper, 1991, p. 579). The new policies led to a drastic and deliberate decline in the number of secondary schools, in particular senior secondary. Within the five years between 1978 to 1982, the number of students in secondary schools decreased by one third - 20 millions from 65 million 45 million, and approximately two thirds in senior secondary (Pepper, 1991, p. 581).

The educational hierarchy was further narrowed and sharpened as the net result of this new stage of educational development. Educational resources were to be concentrated for the few, while more would receive less. The competition was hence made even fiercer.

The Hierarchy within the HE System

In this section, I will explore the shaping of an internal hierarchy within the HE system, among various HE institutions, and the rationalities that are introduced to diversify and rank these instructions, the approaches by which a hierarchy is understood as reasonable and necessary.

As mentioned previously, the system took shape in the 1930s under the Nationalist regime, a system of high institutional diversity with various academic objectives. But it was nonetheless a small system, and it would be very difficult to claim the existence of a hierarchy – some private universities, such as Nankai and Yanjing, were equally competitive, if not more so, as the national universities, such as Peking University and Qinghua University (Chen, 2002).

It was actually under the Communist Regime that an internal hierarchy began to take shape. This was first the result of two strategies – first the reconstruction of HEIs in the Soviet Model, and second, the construction of a dual track between the regular institutions and the key institutions.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the principles of HE under the new Communist regime directs that HE was to serve two objectives, the cultivation of intellectuals of working class background, and the production of personnel for the national reconstruction and socio-economic development. The attempts made in realising these two objectives lead to two sets of educational policies, as my discussion in the previous chapter shows.

The first set of policies, the reorganisation of existing HEIs in the Soviet model was conducted in the belief that a Soviet system would better serve the second objective. Accordingly, all higher education institutions were reorganised into three types – first, comprehensive universities, formed by arts and science departments from large universities with all liberal arts college eliminated; second, polytechnics, with a number of applied science faculties in a single institution, formed by the remaining departments, schools and colleges of the old universities or merged with existing institutions of the same kind; and third, specialised colleges, each with an individual faculty, built under the assumption that narrower specialisation provided the most efficient training. By December 1953, the reorganisation was largely completed. The system now had 14 comprehensive universities, 39 polytechnic and 129 specialised colleges.

Though Mao himself wanted to eradicate the differences among these three types of institutions, he might have succeeded, it was exactly this categorisation that the HE expansion in the 1999 was based on, with comprehensive universities at the very top, institutions upgraded from polytechnics and

specialised colleges at the second tier, and with newly established two-year colleges at the very bottom. In other words, this categorisation of institutions along the Soviet model later becomes a rationality to diversify and rank institutions.

The second set of communist polices led to some new forms of institutions being introduced to the system in pursuance of the first objective, including people's universities for the HE sector and worker-peasant short course middle schools for the secondary sector. These two forms of institutions are aimed at creating an alternative route for educational transition to the traditional one that is considered by the radical faction as elitist and bourgeois, to make sure that students from working class background, presumably disadvantaged in their academic preparation and performance in schools, can have their own route of educational progression. Qian Dunsheng (Qian, 1949, my translation) stated in his summary of the First National Conference on Higher Education in 1949,

> 'This new education is national, scientific and public…its aims to serve the people, primarily workers, peasants and soldiers, and the current revolution battles and constructions… (we will) establish people's universities, and produce personnel for construction. This is the starting point of a completely new higher education system. (We will) at the same time establish some worker-peasant short course middle schools to transfer adult cadres of worker-peasant origin to intellectuals.'

In 1950, the only people's university, China Renmin University was established as the first people's university in China, and later became one of the most prestigious universities in China. The worker-peasant short course middle schools, in comparison, were rather short-lived. It stopped recruiting new students in 1955. In 1958, there came another round of quantitative expansion. Number of HEIs shapely increased from 227 in 1957 to 1,065 in 1958. Moreover, a new forms of HEIs was introduced to the system – 23,500 spare-time 'Red and expert' (political loyalty and skills) colleges and part-work part-study universities had been set up by autumn 1958. These new institutions were run by local factories and communes for adult workers and peasants, without government support in funding and teaching faculty. It was not surprising to see that the majority of them did not survive the period of consolidation and the upcoming economic hardship. In other words, the educational strategy put forward by the radical faction of the CCP was largely unsuccessful.

In comparison, another strategy of educational development was able to establish itself as a stable institutional stream and also a discourse of educational righteousness - the model of key institutions. The concept of key institutions was not a new invention. It can be traced back to the 'central school',

which was promoted in 1942 in Yen based on the Communist Party's economic development strategy during the wartime – concentrating manpower and material for the purpose of economic construction in the impoverished rural base areas. Key schools in the 1950 simply referred to the most prestigious schools from the Republican era. But it was no until the 1960-1966 period that the system was developed in a concerted fashion throughout the country. Premier Zhou Enlai (Zhou, 1959, p. 517) explains the rationality of keypoint public schools in the First Report on the Work of Government,

> 'full-time regular schools at all levels should make it their constant and fundamental task to raise the quality of teaching and studying; in the first place, we must devote relatively more energy to perfecting a number of "key" schools so as to train specialised personnel of higher quality of the state and bring about a rapid rise in our country's scientific and cultural level'.

The new Education Minister Yang Xiufeng made the point more explicitly – the mass-level work-study schools must be treated separately from the quality-oriented full-day schools, as this division could help to utilize reasonably the limited resources and thus make it possible to popularize education while simultaneously raise standards. The elite keypoint schools were therefore institutionalised at the apex of the education hierarchy at every level of the full-time school system from kindergarten though university. The selection of keypoint schools was entirely based on a narrow form of examination-based meritocracy –

> 'Schools with the highest pass rates from junior to senior middle and on to college were designated as keypoints ensuring that they would receive the best teachers, the most generous financial appropriations, the best equipment, and a continuing supply of the best primary and junior middle graduates. Students who scored highest on their secondary school entrance exams were channelled into the first category schools, and so on down the scale of academic achievement' (Yang qouted in Pepper, 1987b, p. 422).

The function of work-study schools was therefore defined as the production of talent for the countryside, and the urban-based keypoint system was primarily responsible for the production of talent for higher learning. Therefore, the keypoint system emerged as an exclusive institutional stream of college preparation leading to an elite route of learning, and in discourse a superior form of learning leading to higher reward and better life chances. If the division between full-day school and work-study school was not clearly a sign of elite-mass dichotomy, it proved that the division between the keypoint system and the regular system was undeniably so. The influences of this division on students will be further discussed in the following chapter.

The rationality of keypoint schools also applies to HE institutions. As mentioned previously, the HE inherited from the Republican era does not have a distinction between keypoint and regular

institutions, only diversifies according to their respective governing bodies, therefore, national, provincial and private institutions. The idea of 'keypoint university' as such was first introduced in The Resolution on keypoint HE institutions and the scope of expert work, and named 6 universities as the first group of keypoint universities – China Remin (People's) University, Peking Univerity, Qinghua University, Beijing Agriculture University, Beijing Medical University, and Harbin Institute of Technology. This list includes two traditional universities known for their academic reputation, Peking and Qinghua, a university that is designed to serve the interest of the working class, Renmin University (which was intended to recruit those from working class background), and three other universities in each of the disciplines that are regarded as most essential to the development of the new nation. The rationality behind this selection coheres with the establishment of keypoint public schools for the secondary education sector – that the new nation only has a limited resources at its disposal after a long period of warfare, and needs to focus what is available on a few institutions to produce personnel of the highest achievement for the national reconstruction.

In The Decision to Designate A Group of Keypoint HE Institutions issued at 22th March 1959, the number on the list rose to 16, and on 28th August the same year, 4 other institutions in medicine and military affairs were added, at the time when China was in diplomatic conflict with the Soviet Union. By 1960, a number of specialised colleges such as Beijing Petroleum University, Beijing Geological Institute, the Central Conservatory of Music, Beijing Institute of Physical Education were added to the list. By 1963, the number of keypoint HE institutions amounted at 68.

During the Cultural Revolution that follows, the keypoint system was completely dismantled, and almost the entire HE sector was not functioning, except a small number of institutions which accepted students from the Recommendation route. Once the Cultural Revolution ended and the moderate faction of the CCP came into power, this keypoint system was reinstalled immediately. Using the same discursive markers as in 1958's policy of 'Walking on two leg', Deng Xiaoping (1977b, p. 1) stated in his speech at the Science and Education Work Forum in 1977,

> 'Education should still walk on two legs. In terms of higher education, regular universities and colleges are one leg, and work-study universities and spare-time university are the other leg; walking on two legs. Among regular universities and colleges our strength should be concentrated on a number of key universities. Key institutions should not be limited to the jurisdiction of Ministry of Education, but should also be operated by various provinces, cities, self-regulated regions and various industrial Ministries.'

And also his widely circulated speech "Respect Education, Respect Personnel',

> 'Education should be walking on two legs, one on popularising, the other on quality improvement. We are to have keypoint primary schools, keypoint secondary schools and keypoint universities. We are to concentrate the most competent in keypoint secondary schools and universities. (Deng, 1977a, pp. 4-5)'

In 1978, the State Council listed 88 institutions as 'National Keypoint Universities'. By then, these national keypoint institutions were only set as models in academia, but soon the notion of keypoint began to be used as a rationality to diversify governmental investment within the HE system. In 1984 the State Council approved in the 7th Five Year Plan to prioritise the construction of 10 keypoint HE institutions and the investment in 15 others . In the 9th Five Year Plan, the '211 Project' was introduced in 1993 and implemented in 1995, and the '985 Project', started in 1999-2001. The 211 Project approved funding from a pool of RMB 30 billion for 100 universities to improve teaching quality and build a network of institutions aiming at the production of high skilled professionals for economic development. Priority was therefore given to the development of capacities in engineering and technological sciences, physical sciences and biological sciences. The 985 Project offered additional funding of RMB 14 billion to some 36 tertiary education institutions, and in the first funding phase nine institutions were given world-class university status: Peking, Qinghua, Zhejiang, Fudan, Nanjing, Shanghai Jiao Tong, Science Technology China, Xi'an Jiao Tong, and Harbin Institute of technology, constituting the top tier of the system. For instance, Qinghua and Peking were each given 1.8 billion by the Ministry of Education in 1998. Funds are intended to recruit internationally renowned professor and develop international collaboration and student and staff exchanges (Gallagher et al, 2009). As the Ministry of Education report (2007)lists, there were 1,731 regular HEIs in 2004, out of which 111 national institutions were under the supervision of central Ministries (73 were affiliated with the central Ministry of Education in Beijing, 38 with other central government ministries), 1,394 administered by local governments of provinces, 226 privately-run. The list of centrally supervised institutions overlaps with the list of the '211 Project', and hence these enjoy better funding than those under the supervision of local government. In other words, it is fair to say that these 111 institutions are in practice the elite sector of the system, and the rest the mass sector (perhaps with only a few exceptions).

A related dimension to the internal hierarchy of the HE system is a change in the student accommodation capacity among different kinds of institutions – from 1998 to 2001 alone, the share of student population of centrally supervised institutions dropped from 33.76% to 17.80%, while that of other institutions supported by local governments and private resources rose from 66.24% to 82.20%. Among local institutions, colleges of higher vocational technology (offering two-year diplomas) had

the most rapid growth in number and capacity, and by 2001 these institutions had 12% of the entrants, making the fourth largest share of student population in the system, after universities of science and technology, comprehensive universities and Normal universities (Ministry of Education, 2007). In other words, the keypoint universities further ensure their privilege not only by securing better public funding, but also by restricting the growth of their enrolment, while other institutions contribute to the majority growth in student intakes. In 2003, key institutions, accounting for 10% of the total number, were granted 71.44% of the government funding, while other institutions had 28.06% of the funding. If we are, for the sake of convenience, to label the keypoint HE institutions as the elite sector of the system, and the rest as the mass sector, then this division within essentially shelters the former from the intrusion of non-traditional students, while leaving the mission of social inclusion to the mass sector. As a result, the elite sector in Chinese HE system emerges not as a result of ongoing academic competition, but mainly as a consequence of robust state intervention in forms of unbalanced financial support and favours in various other policies.

Apart from the binary between the keypoint institutions and the others, there is also another significant binary between the academic and the vocational tracks of student preparation. In 2008 new entrants in these two tracks were equal in number – 2,820,971 in the former, and 2,838,223 in the latter (China Statistic Bureau, 2008). Students in the academic route are considered intellectually superior as they normally outperform their counterparts who choose the vocation route. In the job market, a university degree is attached to higher economic values/returns than a vocational diploma. I will return to this academic-vocational binary in Chapter 11 on the subjects of HE.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored the emergence and development of the HE system in modern China, the emergence of a public school system and its connection with the HE sector. More importantly, I have explored the underlying rationalities for both processes. I argue that, first, although the first group of HE institutions were established in the late Qing, the HE system emerged in the Republican era, particularly under the Nationalist government which enforced its intervention in the system. Second, I argue that the privilege of the HE sector over the pre-HE sector is established in two ways - the emergence and development of the public school system establishes a rationality that the primary mission of the pre-HE sector is to produce and prepare candidates for the selection of the HE sector, and the conventional emphasis on HE over the primary and secondary education is also evident in the

sustained imbalance in the public financial support for the two sectors. I argue thirdly that the shaping of a structural hierarchy, an educational pyramid with a descending size in primary, secondary and higher education, is the result of political struggles in educational policies. There were policies that introduced new forms of institutions and an alternative route of educational transition, policies that drastically reduced the size of the senior secondary education to enhance the competition for the academic route of social division, policies that 'normalised' educational selection at each stage of schooling and establish it as a rationality of social selection. My fourth point is that the internal hierarchy within the HE system, among various institutions, emerges out of a various policies under the Communist regime, and mainly as a result of the introduction and prevalence of a keypoint rationality that favours an emphasis on a selected few institutions. I argue this keypoint rationality gives rise to a clear division between the elite sector made of national keypoint institutions that receive disproportionally large amount of government investment, and the mass sector that contributes to the majority of the student enrolment growth in the current wave of HE expansion with considerably smaller amount of public financial support. Also, there is now a noticeable divide between the academic route and vocation route of HE in China, which, as I will display in Part IV, gives rise to a discourse of their respective economic values among the public.

In the next chapter, I will discuss other three components of HE apparatus – curriculum, pedagogy and campus space.

Chapter 6 Curriculum, Pedagogy and Campus

Introduction

In the previous two chapters, I examine two apparatus components of HE, principles and systems, and in this chapter, I continue to explore other three components – curriculum, pedagogy and campus. As in the previous two chapters, my analysis to follow also make a reference to its social and political dimension, but I nonetheless refuse to understand any of the three components as a mere reflection of dominant ideologies, as resources used in the service of political powers, as being 'driven and shaped by political and professional interests, serving to legitimate and mask the manipulation of human beings for the ends of social order and private profit' (Rose, 1999, p. xiii).

It is true that HE curriculum, pedagogy and campus in modern China has been subject to the influence of socio-political forces, and have been adjusted to perhaps a radical extent to pattern foreign models that are favoured by various educational thoughts or political ideologies at different historical points, but it was not my primary intention to establish such connections. What I have attempted to display is the actual formation of various HE practices, practices that render curriculum, pedagogy and campus intelligible and governable, practices that were intended to direct the formation and development of HE towards certain objectives that were deemed appropriate in various socio-political settings.

To this end, I will focus on two dimensions of HE practices connected to the three components – the first dimension is 'genealogical', focusing on the ways in which these components began to take shape, such as the various streams of knowledges that are included in HE curriculum, the adaption of certain forms of pedagogy to organise teaching and learning at an advanced level, and the emergence of campus space to perform certain functions for teachers and students; the second dimension is 'political', focusing on the ways in which these components were established as targets of various forms of government and technologies, such as how to govern the formulation of HE curriculum, how to govern the use of pedagogy and how to govern the arrangement of campus, and also what aspects to govern, and who should govern and to what ends.

I will first explore the formulation of HE curriculum in modern China, with a focus on the ways in which various knowledges are rendered 'higher-educational', educationally appropriate for universities and colleges, dependent on the historical circumstances in which various rationalities and technologies of knowledge production, organisation and transmission are invented and utilised.

HE pedagogy has for long been a contested field of educational research. However, in this section I will not engage with questions such as 'what are the best teaching approaches for HE?' Or 'what are the changes brought to HE pedagogy by globalisation?' My concern is rather how pedagogy as a particular field of activities has been deployed in the government of HE and HE subjects, what technologies and techniques have been invented, developed and transformed in the process, and what the effects of such deployment of pedagogy on HE and its subjects actually are.

In term of space, I will explore how campus is utilised as a means of governing in HE. I will first engage with the logic of campus building in the early Republican era and also how regulations over HE space were invented and enforced. Second, I want to explore the exemplarity of HE campus in HE discourses in contemporary China. Third, I discuss the ways in which space is made into a form of governing in contemporary HEIs.

Knowledge, Curriculum and Sociology

There has been a long tradition of sociological inquiries into the notion of knowledge. This particular branch of sociology, the sociology of knowledge, is concerned with the social or existential conditions of knowledge (Pickles, 1985; Schutz, Walsh and Lehnert, 1972). To this end, scholars in this field have engaged with a wide range of intellectual products such as philosophies, ideologies, political doctrines, and theological thought. For instance, Karl Marx(1991) in *German Ideology* attempts to establish the relations between philosophical ideas and the social structures in which they emerged, with a focus on the ways in which systems of ideas depend on the social positions, in particular class positions.

Underpinned by a central assumption that the social organisation of a particular society affects the dominant form of knowledge within it, the sociology of knowledge examines the construction, interpretation and understanding of 'reality' among human beings and their home society. It concerns the social determinants of knowledge, and also the non-intentional structuring of knowledge that can be used to achieve and promote standards and assumptions of 'truth'. The New Sociology of Education in the early 1970s questions the epistemological claims about the objectivity of knowledge (see the edited collection Young, 1971 for instance). For instance, Michael Young (1971)challenges the knowledge base of the prevailing liberal academic curriculum among grammar and public schools and the universities, and argued that such academic curriculum is historically constructed to preserve the status quo of a class society by ensuring the failures of the majority of the working-class pupils. Michael Apple's (Apple, 2000) Official Knowledge analyses the effects of conservative beliefs and strategies on educational policy and practice, particularly how the Right is attempting to impose its values and re-impose its control on the school system through the curriculum, textbook adoption policies and the efforts of the private and business sectors.

This section is intended as a genealogical inquiry with a focus on how various knowledge practices are integrated with governmental agenda and socio-political changes, and are further developed into techniques of knowledge organisation and management. This genealogical exploration is a certain kind of 'historical epistemology' that is intended to reconstruct the 'epistemological field' (Rose, 1999) that allow certain knowledges to be considered as appropriate, sufficient and readily prioritised, and the kinds of rationalities and technologies that are invented and utilised if the curriculum formulated is to count so.

Techniques of Curriculum

I explore how the deployment of knowledge practices, or what I term the techniques of curriculum, creates a space for power relations to be established, developed and exercised.

The formulation process of HE curriculum, in this regard, can be understood as the generation of formal curricular materials of a clear educational nature and pedagogical aims. The formulation of HE is beyond the mere printing of textbooks, but instead it is a complicated process that resolves around socio-political struggles upon what kind of knowledge is appropriately and sufficiently 'higher-educational' for a given society. In this chapter, the notion of knowledge refers knowledge presented in formal educational setting such as schools and universities, in textbooks and evaluations, in forms of a variety of disciplines, and the knowledge practices are what I term the techniques of the curriculum, the ways in which different streams and forms of knowledge are included or excluded, legitimised or delegitimised, produced, maintained, reproduced or adjusted, improvised or entrenched, and perhaps abolished. Inspired by Foucault (1977; Foucault, 1998), Rose (1999), and Bernstein (1971), I put forward a list of four techniques that play significant roles in the formulation of HE curriculum, including

1.the integration of existing or borrowed knowledges into curriculum in forms of textbooks, syllables and references;

2.the categorisation of these streams of curricular knowledge in forms of institutional units – schools, departments, disciplines or subjects;

3.the production of new curricular knowledges, either as an extension of the existing body, or new streams;

4.the regulation of curricular knowledge to ensure both a maximised utilisation of and a minimised deviation from socio-political agenda set by the given society or government.

I will now discuss these four techniques respectively.

Integration

What I mean by integration here is the process by which various bodies of knowledge are transferred into the forms of curricular and extracurricular materials – textbooks, references, examination papers, and extra-curriculum readings, etc. - and therefore make these bodies of knowledge educational.

This first step is vital to the deployment of curricular knowledge as it clarifies the nature of these bodies of knowledge. Once these bodies of knowledge are presented in textbooks, references and examination papers, they are no longer only informative but officially educational, and therefore would and should be exposed to a different sets of regulation and intervention from various sources. Secondly, it also signifies, again if not a change, at least a clarification of the ownership of these bodies of knowledge. As mentioned in the preceding discussion, educational practices before the late Qing were mainly conducted by private schools in forms of Sishu and Shuyuan, and the state tended not to participate directly in the organising of formal public schooling and therefore could claim no ownership of these bodies of curricular knowledge in circulation despite the repeated exercises of its supervisory power over the circulation process. When these bodies of curricular knowledge were integrated into public schooling curriculum, the state could also announce a new ownership over them, and therefore a new power relationship come into being.

In this historical development of Chinese HE, there are normally two major resources that have been put into use – China's own historical collections and that of its foreign counterparts. Under the late Qing regime, new streams of knowledge translated and introduced from mainly European and Japanese works were integrated into curriculum. Tongwen Guan (the School of Combined Learning), for example, taught some courses in western natural science and social science into its curriculum, such as mathematics, physics, international law, and political economy. However, it should be restated that the domestic curricular knowledge was still regarded as the absolute core of curriculum. The Charter of Imperial University for instance listed Confucian classics as the head of its eight faculties, which to include 11 courses of the traditional Confucian canon such as Zhouyi (Book of Change), Liji (Book of Rites), Lunyu (Analects), and Lixue (Confucian school of idealist philosophy). It was fairly understandable that Confucian canon, the core curricular knowledge prevailing for the past two centuries, was firstly integrated into official curriculum – it was regarded as more immediate, relevant and mature in operation for the Late Qing regime than knowledge from other sources.

During the Republican era, the hierarchy of curricular knowledge from the previous regime was overthrown – new streams of curricular knowledge introduced from Europe, the U.S and Japan were given higher status than their native counterparts. The new governors and educators were mainly under the influence of western education, and far more enthusiastic in introducing new forms of curricular knowledge.

In the new Communist era, it was the Soviet Union that became the dominant provider of curricular knowledge. According to then the Ministry of Education, the new entrants of 1952 academic years

were to use Soviet teaching syllables and guidance, and HEIs were to set up specialities[7] and teaching-research offices after the Soviet model and organise the translation and compilation of Soviet curriculum. Between 1952 and the end of 1956, there were 1393 translated versions of Soviet curricular materials published (Yang, 2003, p. 121). However, this wave of integration was brought to an abrupt end when China and Soviet Union split towards the end of 1960. By that time, curricular knowledge from the Soviet provider had been deeply integrated into the curriculum of HEIs, and remains deeply influential even today.

Categorisation

Categorisation here refers to the process by which curricular knowledge is divided into separate, distinctive and connected units of various sizes - schools, faculties, departments, majors and courses, etc. which make the bodies of curricular knowledge (more) organisable. This process involves not only a managerial arrangement in the style of book catalogues in a library, but also a selection, a reorganisation, and an exclusion of certain sectors from the existing bodies of curricular knowledge. Moreover, the effects of categorisation can be magnified tremendously once used in combination with certain pedagogical practices.

The categorisation process has two major effects: first, it introduces itself as a new managerial rationale in the deployment of curricular knowledge, which can be used in both curriculum development and pedagogy organisation; second, it creates a new space for power relationships, as a web of educational units – schools, faculties, departments, specialities, and courses- is produced and can serve as a principle based on which various forms of HEIs can be assembled, adjusted and reorganised. HE policies in different historical periods introduce varied ways of structuring HE institutions, and in the light of my discussion in the previous two chapters, these structures created, reflect in them different underlying principles and systematic designs of HE. And consistent with the emergence and development of HE principles and systems, this categorisation process of HE curriculum, in various historical periods, was either modelled after foreign practices or inspired from China's own educational tradition, or both. It was constantly subject to changes, initiated by governments or university heads or teaching faculties, etc. It is therefore also a field where power struggles are most visible.

[7] Referring to university subjects in the English tradition, but this expression was used here to avoid confusion in the following chapters on educational subjects

To further elaborate my argument, I will use the example of philosophy in HE curriculum, a discipline, judged from the Marxian perspective that is most likely to be affected by political ideologies. Its development and transformation in HE curriculum in modern China is a case where this assumption certainly rings true.

As mentioned previously in this chapter, to start with, the Confucian canon remained the prevailing philosophical stream of knowledge in the late Qing. The Confucian classics remained the principle faculty among the eight faculties[8] listed in the Charter of Imperial University. But in the Republican era Confucian classics no longer occupied the top of all faculties, and instead it was dismantled and placed in various disciplines, the majority of which were called Chinese philosophies. According the University Regulation in 1913 (reprinted in Yu and Tang, 1991, p. 698), the Department of Philosophy was to include the follow two streams: Chinese stream and western stream, and the traditional Confucian classics were only a few amongst many courses.

However, this was soon to be changed under the Communist regime. According to the Provisional Regulations of Departmental courses in Universities, vocational colleges, and Colleges of Liberal Arts and Law (Higher Education Committee of North China Region, 1949, webpage, my translation), the philosophical courses should include:

> '(1), dialectical materialism (including dialectics of nature), (2), historical materialism, (3), history of Chinese philosophy (should stress the history of recent thoughts, in particular after May 4th movement, and stress the unification of Marxist Philosophy and Chinese revolutionary practices, but also include an introduction of a history of accent philosophy), (4), western philosophy (should stress a history of struggle between materialism and idealism. On the period after Hegel, the course should have the historical development of dialectical materialism and historical materialism as both the lecture and research focus), and (5), logic.'

Philosophy was narrowed to a particular stream out of its enormous schools of thoughts, with only Marxism and some of its derivative applications ordained as the legitimate branch. It should also be pointed out that the regulation not only lists what is to be taught as authorised educational knowledge in the domain of philosophy, but also how these authorised courses should be taught, with what purpose and focus, and to what ends.

[8] Other seven faculties included Politics, Literature, Medicine, Natural Sciences, Agriculture, Technology and Economics (Yang, 2003, p. 14)

Production

The production process refers to the way in which new bodies of knowledge are generated as either extensions to their existing counterparts or completely new streams. The production process sustains the assemblage of curriculum as it expands both the width and depth of curricular knowledge, which can in turned be integrated back into curriculum. It enables HE to generate new forms and streams of knowledges and absorb them into the existing curriculum.

For the sake of convenience alone, I argue that there are mainly two forms of knowledges that are generated in this process – the first is 'epistemological', largely based on the development and exploration of existing curricular knowledge, and the second is 'political', or in Foucault's term 'disciplinary', with HE itself as the focus of the studies, as the resources and also the ends of various knowledge practices, and with regard to how to govern HE institutions and the subjects within.

As for the former, the production was largely done by the research units of HEIs. The first modern university, the Imperial University, was to include a Tongru Yuan (graduate school) with the 'aim to advance academia in China on a daily basis, to produce new knowledge for publication, to invent new pieces of technology for the use of the public (Charter of Imperial University for Royal Permission , reprinted inYu and Tang, 1991, p. 339, my translation)'. But it is not until the Republican era when HE enjoyed a rapid development that research activities emerged. In June 1928, Academia Sinica, as the first national scholar community, was founded in Shanghai and following its lead HEIs soon established their own research units. Peking Union Medical College was founded by the Rockefeller Foundation from 1915 to 1947 to be a research and training hospital, and contributed especially in parasitology and in dealing with communicable diseases. The Institute of Chinese Studies was founded by Peking University in 1921 under the directorship of Shen Yinmo, where research students worked independently with individual professors in pursuit of particular topics. Nankai University established the Nankai Institute of Economics (Sun, 1986).

During the Maoist era, however, the research function of HE very much diminished. Patterned on the Soviet model, the research units in HE institutions were largely suspended, and the Chinese Academy of Science was set up to conduct advanced research separately. The underlying rationale for this adjustment is that HE should be devoted to teaching alone, and should be focusing on the preparation of technocrats. This situation lasted until the 1980s when research units began to emerge again among HEIs.

With regard to the second form of knowleges, the political or the disciplinary, it is worth noticing that in the recent two decades there has emerged a substantial amount of studies of HE system as an institutional objects and also university teachers and students as subjects. There has been a fairly large body of research done in this fashion, in academic journals (for instance, China Higher Education published by Ministry of Education, China) published as books (Pan and Liu, 1993; Pan, Wu and Zhang, 2003; Wu, 2004), which has also been integrated back into the HE system in China as guidance, references, textbooks, and specialties in universities[9]. Also, there are increasing numbers of studies in recent years that have university students and teachers as the research focus. To use The Notification of applications for specific research projects in humanity and social science (ideological and political work in HEIs) by Ministry of Education 2010 as an example. This document lists 10 tier-1 projects, each entitled RMB 80,000 research funding (approximately £8,000 in 2010), and 60 tier-2 projects, each entitled RMB 20,000 research funding (approximately £2,000 in 2010).

These proposed studies are to be targeted on 'specific issues in the ideological and political work on university students on a daily basis' and expected to produce 'new means, solutions and techniques in enhancing and advancing ideological instead of abstract and void discussion'. The focus of most of these projects are very articulate in their titles alone, in particular among the tier-2 projects – a research of model university students from the Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Part, a research on economic globalisation and patriotic education among university students, and a research on the significance of the use of university BBS (Bulletin Board System) in promoting the construction of harmonious campus, to name a few. This serves as an example of political guidance and intervention in the production process – what is to be researched, with what focus, in what manners, and for what ends. I will return to this discussion in the chapters in Part III.

Regulation

The regulation process does not work entirely separately from the three processes discussed above. Instead, it is embedded in the production chain of integration, categorisation and production. We have already noticed the traces of regulating techniques in the preceding discussion – the setup of priority in the integration process, the selection and exclusion in the categorisation process, and the political

[9] For example, there is a specialty named 'Higher Education Studies' in Xiamen University, Beijing Normal University, and East China Normal University.

guidance and intervention in the production process. There are a number of techniques that are worth mentioning here.

One of the most effective means of regulation is the exercise of censorship. This is by no means a new invention, but we will focus on its uses in curriculum in the past hundred years. For instance, the late Qing regime was on the one hand eager to integrate orthodox Confucianism into new curricular materials, and on the other hand worried of the influence of new ideas and theories introduced into the same materials outside the official channel. In 1898, Sun Jiading, the Minister of Educational Management, suggested to the emperor that all translated works should be reviewed by the official organisation to ensure all rebellious works are ruled out, and 'one stream of thought' should be employed to 'expand public intellects' and 'consolidate public minds'. In 1903, then the Ministry of Education established educational principles as 'loyalty to the emperor', 'veneration for Confucianism', 'advocacy of collectivism', 'advocacy of practicality' and 'advocacy of disciplines and strength'. In 1905, then Ministry of Education requested that

> 'curricular materials for primary and secondary schools should be composed quickly ... and to be assessed on (educational) principles and evaluated by the Ministry before passing on to schools. In doing so, public thoughts can be unified and the national foundation can be kept from destruction. (Zhang, 2009).'

The Ministry performed strict censorship over the publishing houses that promoted new ideas and schools of thoughts. For instance, Intensive reading of the Four Classics by Mengbiao Publishing House was printed for 20 editions and highly influential, but was also banned for the suspicion of circulating new ideas, and the publishing house was shut down soon afterwards (Zhang, 2009). Under the Communist regime, this censorship was carried out to yet another extreme. All curricular materials were censored and edited to fit the ideology of the new regime. This has been discussed in the previous chapter and so will not be repeated here.

Another example is the shutdown of 'High Culture Fever' in 1989 (Wang, 1996; Zhang, 1994). The 1980s witnessed a wave of integration of curricular knowledge -large volumes of western works in sociology, psychology, and politics, etc. were translated into Chinese and hence a sudden expansion of curricular knowledge for the public intellectuals and HE students alike. This gave rise to a social movement later known as the 'High Culture Fever' - referring to a nationwide discussion of notions such as culture, tradition, modernity, and particularly the meaning and implications of Western theories ranging from Nietzsche, Freud and Sartre[10] to neo-authoritarianism, emerged in China in early 1985 -

[10] In this dissertation, I will not explore the reasons behind the popularity of these three authors, as the phenomenon itself deserves another dissertation on its own. Please refer to, for instance, Wang's (1977) *High Culture Fever politic -aesthetics, and ideology in Deng's China* for the discussion of this issue.

was brought to a sudden end in 1989 when these knowledges were believed to propose political challenges to the ruling party. After the Tiananmen crackdown, all new knowledge in circulation was announced as harmful and illegitimate, undermining orthodox Marxism. As an article on People's Daily in June, 1989 criticised,

> 'many course books on political theories were lacking contents that would facilitate students to develop great expectations of Communism. In particular the extra-curricular readings, majority of which are unhealthy. In recent years, there emerged "Freud fever", "Sartre fever", "martial art novel fever", "Qiongyao[11] fever", "physiognomy fever", "sex studies fever", etc., all having negative effects on students thoughts to varied extents.'

Therefore,

'to enhance thought education is not a mere issue of adding some instruction lectures, but more important to treat ideological and political work as the lifeline, to place it at a proper position, and to turn it around from a gradual withering (Zhuang, Yong and Zong, 1989, my translation)'.

In other words, censorship as a regulating technique over curriculum is not just a political action upon its physical forms, but also, with the circulation of hegemonic discourses, emerges as a rationale of spiritual inspection, or a technology of the mind. I will further discuss this issue in the chapters to follow.

Summary

This section continues with a genealogy of HE apparatus components, with a focus on the formulation of curriculum. The discussion above covers four important techniques at work, integration, categorisation, production, and regulation - techniques that make bodies of knowledge appropriately educational, organisable, organic, and controllable. I now move on to the discussion to pedagogy.

[11] Qiongyao is a romantic love novel writer based in Taiwan.

The Use of Pedagogy

Like the domain of curriculum, there have been numerous studies regarding pedagogy in general and HE pedagogy in particular (Bell, Neary and Stevenson, 2009; McLean, 2006). For instance, both Bourdieu (2000) and Bernstein (1996) explore pedagogy from the perspective of sociology, and also much work has been done in the field of critical pedagogy (most noticeably by Giroux, 1997; 2001; Giroux and Shannon, 1997) that is intended 'to help students develop consciousness of freedom, recognize authoritarian tendencies, and connect knowledge to power and the ability to take constructive action' (Giroux, 2010). However, it is not my intention in this section to engage fully with the domain of pedagogy in theory, neither is it to develop an alternative form of pedagogy for HE in modern China. Instead, I intend to explore HE pedagogy to the extent that it bears relevance to certain forms of government and technologies. To this end, I engage primarily with the notion of 'exemplarity' introduced by by Bakken (2000) and developed by Kipnis (2011).

As Bakken (2000) and Kipnis(2011) argue, education in China has long been dominated by an exemplarity logic, featured by lectures as the main teaching approaches, and imitation, memorisation and repetition as the main learning approaches. Under this rubric teachers are made the authorities of knowledge transmission and students are not encouraged to debate and question what is taught and how teaching is conducted. Education has been largely reduced to the following of examples and models. This is what I term 'exemplary pedagogy' and as my discussions will show, it is manifested in HE in a rather coherent way across the history of modern China, and remains noticeable in the contemporary HE system. Under this exemplary logic, students in HEIs have largely been understood as passive targets of pedagogy. In the following discussion, I look into the early criticisms, mechanism and effects of such a pedagogy.

Early Criticisms

Though much has been said about the liberal atmosphere in the Republican academia, and the prevalence of laissez faire mentality among HEIs, pedagogy during the period was not primarily configured by liberalism and autonomy. The League of Nations' Report (Becker *et al*, 1932) for instance, made harsh criticisms over the ways in which teaching and learning was conducted in the Republican HEIs. In terms of teaching, the report raised concerns of the use of lectures as the principal and sometimes even the sole teaching approach. To the authors of the report, such a heavy proportion of lecturing was regarded as dangerous, as

> '(i)t tends to produce in all but the ablest students an attitude of unthinking dependence on the teacher's words, which does not necessarily imply a corresponding respect for his opinions or personality... Students who are habitually over-lectured have little interest or independent study; nor, if encouraged to rely with docile receptiveness on notes taken down from a teacher's dictation, are they likely to realise the necessity for it. Too often, as a consequence, instead of learning to consult serious works and to compare the views of different authorities, they confine their reading to text-books of a type, which, even if suitable in a school, is miserable nutriment for active-minded young men' (Becker *et al*, 1932, pp. 160 -161).

Concerns were raised over the negative effects of this teacher-centred approach on the initiatives of students. Over-lectured students, as the authors argue, may become 'docile' bodies of knowledge transmission, and are less likely to critically engage with the production process of knowledge, also to participate in the process of knowledge production themselves. What also worried the authors, in term of learning, was the fact that students were introduced to curricular materials that were irrelevant to their own experiences outside the classroom, as a large number of school materials were introduced from Europe and the U.S,

> 'students (were) dealing with materials which (were) necessarily remote from their own experience and slip insensibly into the disastrous habit of memorising books, instead of observing facts and using books, in a critical spirit, as one instrument for interpreting them (Becker *et al*, 1932, p. 166)'.

The prevailing learning approach identified by the report – the 'disastrous habit of memorising books', or root/repetitive learning, was put in comparison with the more European styled learning approach of critical engagement, of 'observing' and 'interpreting facts' for students themselves. The report further argue that the heart of the problem was not merely a matter of choices over teaching approaches, or to what extent learning was promoted as a means of critical engagement with knowledge, but how to understand the function of a modern university in terms of its pedagogic aims. The report argues,

> 'if a some professors suppose that their duty is completed when they have delivered a lecture, and some students that no more is required of them than to hear it delivered – the reason is not, as a rule, that better methods are impracticable, but that the importance of adopting them has been obscured by a fundamental misconception of the function of a university. That function is not to supply students with information prepared for them in an easily digestible form by their teachers, but to cultivate in them an enquiring, critical and reflective spirit, to show them the methods by which knowledge is acquired, and to train them, in some small measure, to acquire knowledge for themselves. An education which neglects these essentials may be given in a university, but it is certainly not a university education (Becker *et al*, 1932, p. 161).'

The Chinese Learner Debate

The report's observations and concerns may be applied to the HE system throughout the history of modern China. In recent decades, a number of educational studies have engaged with the 'pedagogical

deficits' identified by the authors of the report. In terms of learning, a large number of studies are conducted around with the notion of 'the Chinese learner' (Biggs and Watkins, 1996b; Biggs and Watkins, 2001; Brennan, Patel and Tang, 2009; Bretion, 2003; Bridger, 2007; Bröckling, Krasmann and Lemke, 2009; Brownlie, Feniak and Schnellert, 2006; Burke and Jackson, 2007; Nield, 2004). Researchers into this domain are concerned with a 'paradox of the Chinese learner'(Biggs and Watkins, 1996b; Biggs and Watkins, 2001) that Chinese students outperform their Western counterparts in certain subjects (in particular mathematics) although they may appear as rote learners who heavily rely on repetitions and memorising. Also, studies suggest that Chinese students did not give answers that indicated that they preferred to learn by rote when asked about their learning preferences (Watkins, 2000). Therefore, studies of the Chinese learners tend to suggest that it may be misleading to assume that Chinese students are merely rote learning simply by observing their learning approaches. As Biggs and Watkins argue (1996a; Biggs and Watkins, 2001), in Chinese culture, memorising may not be separate from understanding in learning, rather they belong to one connected and interlocking procedure. Chinese students may rely on memorisation only as a part of the learning process and by doing so they become familiar with the text first and then they can understand it, reflect upon it and then question it. Therefore, this Chinese approach of learning through repetition is believed to lead to a deeper understanding and high levels of achievement.

'The Chinese learner' argument revolves primarily around how memorizing and repetition can also lead to deep learning, and how it is misleading to regard the Chinese learners as rote learners. As I understand it, this argument seems to explain the ways in which the Chinese learner survives a pedagogy that is regarded undesirable in the western educational discourses. It seems to justify such a pedagogy without a critical engagement with its effects on educational subjects. Also, this argument does not properly address the questions of the emergence and prevalence of such a pedagogy[12].

Exemplary Pedagogy

Drawing on LeVine and White (1993) and Bakken (Bakken, 2000), Kipnis (Kipnis, 2011) identifies pedagogy in China with its agricultural tradition, Confucian texts and the Imperial Examination. He first argues that the emergence of such a pedagogy of imitation was a result of agricultural practices - copying farming techniques of other successful farmers can reduce one's risk of poor harvests, and

[12] I conducted a more comprehensive investigation of this issue in my unpublished MSc dissertation (Guo, 2006) *Teaching the Chinese learner - a study of trans-national higher education in China* at Department of Education, University of Oxford

also the natural social hierarchy of age in agricultural empires makes young people depend on the elders for the knowledge of how to farm; therefore 'the disciplined, rote memorisation and the imitation of ideal models are considered the most virtuous of pedagogical techniques'. However, one may argue that such a pedagogy should be universally applied to other societies with agricultural traditions, not only limited to China. With regard to the prevalence of such a pedagogy in China, Kipnis further argues that memorisation as a learning approach was essential to the educational success and social advancement in imperial China - via the Imperial Examination, the Confucian texts that underpinned all educational activities in imperial China, 'were held to be morally lifting, and their memorisation was thought to improve the morality of students', and the relation of Confucian texts to the worldly power of the imperial bureaucracy made such a pedagogy beneficial and persuasive.

With regard to the effects of such a pedagogy, in his excellent book The Exemplary Society, Bakken (Bakken, 2000) engages with the issue from a sociological perspective. He argues that imitation is an important governing technique as exemplary governing involves models of various types such as essays, speeches, people and conducts. Such models are used in early schoolings of children when they first learn to write the Chinese language, but also in various domains of governing. The word 'study' (*xue*) in the Chinese context often means to imitate a model in the process of mental and bodily memorisation. He further argues that such a pedagogical preference is closely connected to the maintenance of social order. He writes,

> '(n)ot only are educators preoccupied with imitation; the bureaucrats of social orders are equally intensely involved in this discourse. In the case of repetition, ...(it) is seen as a guarantor for stability, and as a reminder of the way of conduct so early promoted in moral education. ...In fact, imitation and repetition have been important instruments in this process of instrumentalisation of education, and there has been an educational administrative institutionalisation of imitative and repetitive practices. (127)'

Therefore, Bakken concludes education based on such pedagogy has become synonymous with social control in China. He writes,

> 'much of what has been called pedagogy in China has been less preoccupied with methods of creative learning than it has been directed towards finding methods of effective control. Education has been more about the ways to rule than the ways to teach. Discipline, loyalty, submission, control – these are some of the most important "synonyms" of the Chinese word for education' (96).

Despite its critical tone, this argument seems to have certain elements of truth. And it is also echoed by many contemporary critics of such pedagogy. The contemporary criticisms suggest that teaching through exemplarity serves to support authoritarian ruling and eliminate the justification of critical questioning. If one learns by imitating, then 'debate and questioning becomes irrelevant' (Kipnis,

2011, p. 91). Educational reformers in contemporary China object to this 'latent authoritarianism' in Chinese pedagogy. Mo Gong (2005) argues in an editorial in Southern Weekend that

> 'Our schools put forth all sorts of authoritative models: thought models, political models, model schools, model academics, model teachers, and so on. These authorities cannot be doubted, cannot be criticised, and cannot be analysed; they can only be followed. This sort of education is far removed from the type of citizenship education that a modern society should promote' (quoted in Bowie, 1970, p. 92, author's translation).

Socialist Exemplarity

These criticisms target the authoritarian aspect of the socialist form of government. The logic of exemplarity interweaves with HE pedagogy under the Communist regime, and has in fact been pushed even further. In the same way that HE curriculum was reorganised under state socialism, HE pedagogy became an important part of educational reorganisation. The controls over pedagogical exemplarity were conducted in a more robust manner, as the Communist regime became the sole producer of authoritative exemplarity, and the enforcement of such pedagogical exemplarity was made possible by even fiercer governmental administration and intervention. The Soviet model of pedagogy was introduced and implemented to combine the indigenous exemplary logic with the socialist arts of government.

Up to 1953, a mix of teaching plans and materials had been used in various institutions, some directly translated from the Russian and some originally formulated. But after 1953, curriculum development was made more centralised and standardised. A single set of teaching plans, syllabi and materials was developed for each subject or speciality and even each course within, and was soon used nationwide. Consequently,

> 'teaching plans specified the aims, requirements, and the contents of each major (specialty), including the courses to be taught within it. The syllabus for each course was so detailed that it included the items to be taught, their sequence, the time to be spent on each item, and the exact material to be covered during each hour of instruction. Textbooks and teaching materials were also similar complied…once they were authorised to use, were treated as sacrosanct and enforced like the law' (Pepper, 1996, pp. 186-187).

This form of 'standardisation and uniformity' was extremely difficult to imagine under the Nationalist regime in the pre-1949 period. Not surprisingly, such rigid control over HE pedagogy inevitably received criticisms from teachers, a majority of whom found the Soviet model difficult to adjust at best and inappropriate at worst. In the name of adapting the Soviet model to the Chinese realities, Chinese educators from the previous era objected to the radical increase in enrolment and the overemphasis on

standardisation and conformity, which led to heavy loads in teaching and learning and too many students, a neglect of studies in theoretical and foundation courses because of the rush to specialised courses, and the Soviet model of 'all-round development' which overlooked the individual aptitude of students, etc. These criticisms were acknowledged by the government and in provisional regulations authorised by Ministry of Education in 1956 allowed teachers to modify the teaching plans and present their personal opinions, but it should still remain as the guiding document for instruction. Moreover, students were given more time for independent studies and some new courses (such as European philosophy and economic theories of Keynes) were introduced in some universities for the purpose of criticism and contrast with the mainstream dialectical materialism (Hayhoe, 1996; Liu, 2005; Pepper, 1996). However, this period of relative openness was brief. The open criticism of the Party monopoly over HE was soon silenced by the 'Anti-rightists' campaign in 1957, during which the intellectuals were targeted by a number of policies and social movements – some were assigned to low-status jobs, some imprisoned, and some exiled.

After the anti-rightist campaign, the Party decided to strengthen their control over HE with a number of measures. The exemplarity logic was further enforced with socialist forms of government – 'the red and expert working class intellectuals' became the new model for one to imitate and hence students (at all levels) were assigned manual or menial work as compulsory in order to appreciate the contribution of the worker-peasant class; an additional thousand middle-ranking cadres (added to the almost one thousand existing cadres) were sent to universities to shore up leadership work; teachers and students were required to prepare teaching plans and course outlines together in a form of close contacts, and students were also to assess the performance of other classmate; non-Marxist social sciences were not allowed and political course would not be made optional; etc. These measures not only put faculty and students under closer surveillance of the personnel officials but also imposed the practice of mutual surveillance. Teachers and students alike were turned into docile bodies of HE pedagogy.

These pedagogical practices were further practiced in the following era of the Cultural Revolution. But as the Cultural Revolution reached its end and the Reformist faction of the CCP led by Deng Xiaoping came back into power, practices introduced in the Maoist era were largely dropped together with all other regulations that were regarded as 'destructive towards the order of HE' (Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian Bianjibu, 1984). Between 1979 and 1989, universities enjoyed a period of academic freedom and openness. The first half of the 1980s saw the revival of educational exchange programmes with support mainly from OECD countries. These programmes opened up opportunities of overseas studies, and also launched a series of World Bank projects providing overseas training for university faculties

in 180 institutions. Those faculties who received 2 years overseas training normally returned in mid-1980s and took up leadership positions in their own universities, from dean of departments to vice presidents and even presidents (Hayhoe, 1996). A large number of these returnees from overseas training struggled for greater academic autonomy.

In the realm of pedagogy, the Maoist radicalism was replaced by the conventional exemplarity logic. Lewin et al (1994) confirms that the exemplary pedagogy prevailed - university education at diploma and undergraduate level was still dominated by classroom teaching, characterised by uninterrupted lectures with no student participation in discussion. Debates, discussions and interaction between teachers and students were still as rare as before, from the early Republican universities to the ones of Soviet Model (classroom activities were basically non-existent during the Cultural Revolution, as mentioned previously). Moreover, study loads continued to be heavy, in particular for first year students in humanities and social science who needed to attend 17 -20 hours compulsory classes a week. As result, students still lacked of time for independent learning. It is again in this regard that social memory of conventional teaching and learning approaches proved most consistent and robust.

Summary

In this section, I have explored the use of pedagogy in HE as a particular form of technology, with reference to the notion of 'exemplarity'. I argue that an exemplary pedagogy has for long prevailed in HE throughout the history of modern China, reaching its extreme during under high socialism. This exemplary pedagogy is intended to shape students as passive targets of HE, and encourages certain forms of teaching and learning such as lectures and memorizing. In this next section, I go on to discuss the final dimension of HE apparatus in my framework – space, and one can also find this exemplary logic in the arrangement of HE campus.

The Arrangement of Campus

Space

There has been substantial amount of studies on the notion of space in philosophy (Heelan, 1989; Reichenbach, 1958) and sociology (Gieryn, 2000; Urry, 1996). Foucault, for instance, explores particular spaces in his examination of power and technology, for instance the architectural plans for asylums, hospitals and prisons (Foucault, 1967; 1973; 1977). As Elden and Cramptons(2007) suggest, spatiality for Foucault is 'an integral part of a larger concern', and 'a tool of analysis'. In the interview, Space, power and knowledge, Foucault (1984) further elaborates the political dimension of space with reference to his notion of power, government and technology. For Foucault, space, knowledge and power are closely related. He states,

> 'it is somewhat arbitrary to try to dissociate the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and the spatial distributions in which they find themselves. If they are separated, they become impossible to understand' (Foucault, 1984, p. 246).

Following Foucault's lead, other geographers, philosophers and social scientists have further explored the notion of space and spatiality in a range of other areas. With regard to educational settings, Jones and Williamson (1979) in their excellent work The Birth of Schoolroom discuss the spatiality of English popular education in the first half of 19th century. Pike (2008), also drawing on Foucault, explores the spatiality of primary school dining room in the frame of power relations and governmentality. Authors in the collection *Spatial Theories and Education* (Gulson, Symes and Armstrong, 2007) draw on a wider range of theories of spatiality and look into a broader scope of issues in relation to space, such as disability, inequality, exclusion and social mobility.

My discussion is inspired by Foucault's discussion of spatiality, power and technology, and I first explore the emergence and presentation of campus in HE discourses and institutions, and second I look into the government of HE campus spaces and also the deployment of campus in the government of HE subjects.

Exemplary Campus

Similar to the case of HE pedagogy, the exemplary logic of education in China also applies to HE campuses. Two of the most famous universities in contemporary China, Qinghua and Peking (Beida), both have spacious campuses in the northwest of Beijing. But Peking University did not own its

campus from the beginning. It belonged to Yanjing (Yenching in early texts) University, which was merged with Peking University in 1949. In the Republican era, both universities were much admired for their campus facilities. And their advantages in both facilities and academic reputation have been well maintained in their later development. Nowadays, the two campuses remain the most popular and cited images of HEIs in China. One of the most popular cramming materials in China, 'Three key points and One Test' (Sandian Yice) series (which I will further discuss in the next chapter), use the images of the gates of Qinghua and Yanjing (now Peking) in their cover designs. The images of gates of two universities (see next page) here imply successes in admission into the most renowned universities in China, and also promising life chances afterwards.



Figure 4, Cover pages of Sandian Yice, left the Gate of Qinghua Yuan, and right, the entrance building of now Peking University.

In the Republican era, Qinghua and Yanjing enjoyed secure finance and their campus facilities were in much better condition than those of the Chinese universities, which had their offices and classrooms converted from former temples (Beida), public shrines and government offices (Fudan), imperial examination halls and Qing academies. Yeh (1990, p. 207) describes the campus facilities of Yanjing University. She writes,

> 'Yenching students were housed 2 to a room; their dormitory buildings received high praise as models of structural elegance, modern comfort and practical utility. In addition to baths, showers, hot and cold running water, drinking fountains, telephones, newspaper reading rooms, laundry facilities, and small kitchens on every floor, there were servants hired by the university as the students' beck and call. These buildings, ablaze at night, with reflections shimmering in the Weiming Lake (Lake Without a Name), the centrepiece of Yenching's 200-acre landscaped campus, were elegant symbols of the life of ease and tranquillity enjoyed by the privileged and Westernised cosmopolitan elite of the Nanjing decade'.

Yanjing's landscaped campus, with Weiming Lake and Boya Tower as the centre, remains the most famous image of HE in contemporary China. The image now means more than tranquillity and ease, namely, a combination of academic elitism (the most renowned university) and cosmopolitan elitism (campus located in Haidian, the high-tech and HE district of Beijing). Also, the advantage of Yanjing University in the early years of HE in modern China was further manifested in other 'hardware' facilities such as 'libraries, laboratories, social halls, auditoriums, athletic fields, swimming pools, gymnasiums, and dormitories, in addition to administration and classroom buildings' (Yeh, 1990, p. 207). Qinghua University, the neighbour of Yanjing University, with its secured finance, was also admired for its facilities such as 'the granite exterior and wood floor of its half-million-dollar library, the pianos and violins in its neo-classical-style auditorium, the imported equipment in its gymnasium, laboratory, and observatory' (207).

The overall high standard of the facilities of the two campuses are well maintained today, with enormous government investment (each university receives annual investment of 1.8 billion RMB from the Ministry of Education, to build 'the world class universities'). Their campus images have now sent a particular message. Campus as a symbol of academic success, of spiritual pursuit of knowledge, of industriousness and autonomy. I now look into the images of both campuses.

Both universities have set up particular sections of 'campus landscape' online. Peking University posts 360 degree panorama photographs and Qinghua posts pictures and introductory texts[13]. In the two pictures of Weiming Lake[14], there are students reading by the lake. The two pictures both present images of natural tranquillity and ease, but they are also presented as educational sites where students are with their reading. The counterpart of Weiming Lake in Qinghua campus is the landscape of 'Shuimu Qinghua', featured by a Chinese classical garden space with a pool, a mansion, garden rockery and small woods. In the introductory text, this space is also interpreted as an educational site.

---

[13] http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/th/6259/index.html for Qinghua University, and http://www.pku.edu.cn/about/xyfg.jsp for Peking University.

[14] http://www.pku.edu.cn/images/ylbd/virtual%20tour/wming-1.swf and http://www.pku.edu.cn/images/ylbd/virtual%20tour/wming-2.swf

It says, 'because of its scenic views, Shuimu Qinghua is often a place for Qinghua students to read, study and rest'. These two of the most famous HE campus landscapes are not only presented as exemplary scene of academia, but also educational sites for those who are industrious enough as to make it into the campuses. In other words, these two landscapes are both presented as scenic and spiritual rewards for those who make it to the most elite universities in China.

Also, in the landscape section of both university websites, images of libraries stand out as most noticeable. Libraries are presented as another symbol of HE, as it is in libraries that one can search and pursue knowledge for oneself; it is an educational site marked by industriousness and autonomy. The introductory text first reviews the history of the building, then it goes on presenting the library in a symbolic tone.

> 'It is said that architecture is frozen music. If Qinghua campus is understood as a beautifully toned symphony, then the library is without doubt one of the most melodic notes. Regardless of the changes of seasons, of mornings and dawns, when you walk into the Qinghua library, you are greeted with a delicate scent of books, and you see figures of students who are industrious in their studies. This is the ocean of knowledge, the heaven of knowledge pursuit, the spiritual paradise leading to a different world, the path to success and glory'.

In this text, the library of Qinghua is associated with a number of 'characteristics' of HE, such as persistence (anytime in the year, in the day) and industriousness, and it is also given a romantic tone, such as melody, scent of books, and it also bears some meanings beyond its worldly function, such as spiritual paradise and the path to success and glory. In a way, libraries are the most exemplary image of HE in general. It bears all the positive imaginations of HE, such as laissez faire styled autonomy, industriousness, provision of a wide scope of knowledge, and above all, promises of a successful and glorious future.

Enclosed Space, Governable Space

Apart from the exemplarity of campus, some governing logics of HE space also emerged in the Republican era. Campus space was turned into the target of HE government. On the one hand, university campuses were isolated by the mundane world, either from geographic distance or specific regulations; on the other hand, different locations within campuses became associated with a variety of conducts, and the governing of space became integrated into the governing of conducts.

Yanjing and Qinghua were both located in the relative isolation of the northwest suburbs of Beijing at the time. The location of the campuses was intended to create 'an enclosed community with the weight

of (their) social life within (themselves)' (Yeh, 1990, p. 208). Dormitory residence was required and hence there was virtually an entire body of students in residence. Therefore, students were governed by an enclosed lifestyle, but this did not mean that this lifestyle was suffocating. Students were exposed to a variety of activities on campus, such as interacting 'at dances, picnics, and lectures, or while attending chapel, studying in the library, and dinning in the refectory'. Similarly, students at Qinghua were also subject to the lifestyle of an enclosed campus, and 'among the favourite campus recreations were fishing, ice-skating, picnics, and movies (Yeh, 1990, p.209)'.

At the first glance, student activities on campus were very much in a fashion of lassiez faire, with a hint of academic romance. But these activities were also under order and control, all organised within an enclosed and isolated campus. This logic of enclosure and isolation is also at work in contemporary China. University campuses are usually separated from its immediate area by walls. Fang Zhouzi, a well-known contemporary critic in China, writes in his much-cited article on Southern Weekend, University without Walls,

> 'I went to Heqi Technique College (now China University of Technology) in the 1980s. The entire campus was enclosed by red-brick walls, with broken glass shards of Chinese characteristics plugged on the top. Only two gates for access, both closed by 11PM...
>
> I have visited some renowned universities in recent years. The stares of the guards at the campus gate on every passerby made me feel guilty inside, as I do not usually carry a valid ID... I read in a news report that the east and west gates of Qinghua University are now fixed with card readers, so everyone needs to swipe their card to get in or to register at the door.'

Qinghua University is now in the heart of Haidian district of Beijing, known for the density of high-tech corporations and HEIs, and therefore is no longer isolated by geographic distance from the urban area. Therefore, the enclosure of contemporary campus, Qinghua, China University of Technology and many others alike, is now maintained by the campus walls, gates and security checks. Fang in his article goes on criticising the use of university wall as a form of spatial government as hypocritical and pointless. He argues that no such walls exist in American universities, and no walls can stop the lure of the mundane world. There might be some elements of truth in Fang's criticism, but it is not my intension to make further criticism of this form of spatial government at the moment. It is sufficient to

point out that the logic of enclosure and isolation remains noticeable in contemporary HEIs in China, particularly with the walls as the symbolic gesture[15].

Another technique of spatial government was also invented during the Republican era. In comparison to Qinghua and Yenching, the private colleges in Shanghai were often in the urban areas, and therefore needed to enforce certain regulations to keep its distance from the outside world, and 'to shelter their students from the lure of the larger urban environment' (Yeh, 1990, p. 210). In particular, the space of dormitory was used as a site of governing. Fudan University, for instance, insisted upon university supervision of the housing arrangements of all students.

> 'Students were assigned rooms in residential halls in accordance with their classes: junior and seniors in the two buildings a few blocks of the main campus, and freshmen, sophomores, and women students in the buildings on campus. To house oneself differently a students had to go through a slow and complicated process of petitioning. Permission for off-campus residence was granted only if a student was to stay with a parent or a legal guardian'.

Under such housing arrangements, students' whereabouts during after-class hours were rendered visible to the university administrators, and students were put under mutual supervision among occupants of the same dormitory unit. Yeh traces the origin of the dormitory system to the baojia, or the neighbourhood responsibility system. She writes,

> 'each unit elected its representative who was responsible to the university for keeping tidiness within the immediate area of the room, for maintaining proper peace and order, for reporting cases of illness and leaves without absence, and, above all, for guaranteeing the condition of school furniture and property used in the room'.

Therefore, a dormitory unit became the local centre of spatial government on campus. Students were turned into self(group)-responsible subjects (for hygiene, order and property of the room), and also supervising and supervised subjects (for each other's whereabouts and health conditions) within their residential unit. This system is still in wide use in contemporary HEIs. In the Dormitory Regulations of East China Normal University (1995), the clauses of hygiene, tidiness, order, property use are written in a similar fashion. For instance,

> 'The occupant should keep the room tidy and clean, and should not put clusters on desks and beds, and beds and duvets should be attended to on a daily basis. The unit should set up a daily cleaning schedule among the occupants, with one copy of the schedule on display in the room and another submitted to the dormitory administrators. The occupant on duty should clean the room before 8AM, and urge others to maintain a good condition of the room – all

[15] The logic of enclosure and isolation is also noticeable in the form of 'university town' (*daxue cheng*). The 'university city' is usually a suburb area that hosts a number of universities, in particular their first year and second year students. The location of the 'town', on the one hand, is also intended to keep students away from the lure of the urban areas, and on the other hand, is to absorb private investment in campus construction and to promote economic development of the town area. I will not engage with this issue for the concern of word limits.

> furniture in order, the floor, the windows and the corridor clean and tidy, with no spider web and dust' (my translation).

In this contemporary version of dormitory governing, students are put under even tighter supervision, with their personal duty visible to administrators via the cleaning schedule, and also detailed requirements of room maintenance at work. In addition, the dormitory halls in general are also sites of governing. The Regulations of East China Normal University also state that 'in order to maintain the peace and order of the dormitory', all halls are put under a time management system – visitors are only allowed from 10.30AM to 12.00PM, and from 3.00PM to 10PM; all halls are closed between 12.00AM and 5.00AM, and occupants need to display their ID to get access after 12.00AM, and those who return late will be subject to 'behaviour guidance'(East China Normal University, 2009, my translation). Here, time is also integrated into the space governing – occupants are not allowed to have visitors after the visiting time and are advised to return to their residence on time. In a way, the dormitory system is also a technology of the body, which renders the bodies of HE subjects highly visible and governable.

Configuring Campuses

Furthermore, the arrangement of campuses in contemporary HEIs is subject to the 'Area Index of Architectural Design for HEIs' by Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education, 1992), which requires that

> 'every HEI must be equipped with 13 forms of architectures, including classroom, library, laboratory and experiment site, indoor gymnasium, University administrative site, departmental administrative site, auditorium, student dormitory, student cafeteria, faculty residential hall, faculty dormitory, faculty cafeteria, and sites for social welfare and other uses'.

This regulation also details the scale of each of the architectural forms, from the size of entire campuses for different type of HEIs (comprehensive universities or specialised colleges, etc.) to the average dormitory space for each student (different standards for undergraduate, postgraduate, and overseas students). In other words, campus space itself has been made the targets of HE government as well. The arrangement of 13 forms of different architectures also indicates the forms of conducts and subjects that this contemporary HE government intends to produce. The indoor gymnasium is to make sure that physical education classes can go on uninterrupted during the rain seasons or bad weathers, which indicates the importance of the exercise of the HE bodies (this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8); student dormitory as a spatial management of student bodies is still in use on every HE

campus; faculty is housed on campus as well in a fashion of the socialist work unit, which also makes it convenient to supervise the faculty members, etc. Also, the so called welfare sites are noticeably legacies of the socialist work unit system, including kindergarten for children of the university staff, nurseries, clinics (or hospitals), student activity centre, student bathroom, faculty bathroom, boiler room, laundry, etc. (Butler, 1997, p. 10; Ministry of Education, 1992, p. 10). The HE campus is still designed to offer an enclosed lifestyle, with most of needs of mundane life accommodated on site.

Space, Time and Pedagogy

I also want to explore the ways in which space, time and pedagogy are infused together in a particular technique that prevails in HE in contemporary. This particular practice – 'evening-time self-study' (wan zixi) is very common in contemporary Chinese universities, and most of the HEIs have similar regulations of 'self-study'[16]. This practice manifests in itself a strong sense of socialist governmentality, as it once again understand HE subjects as passive target of administrative intervention. For instance, Anhui Polytechnic University posts its regulations online, which states

> '1, Evening time self-study is an important part of pedagogy, and students are advised to conduct self-study. The evening time for self-study is from 19:00 to 21:00, Sunday to Thursday.
>
> 2, During the listed evening time, students should in principle leave their dormitories and conduct self-study, attend lectures, or participate in other learning activities in educational sites such as classrooms, libraries, labs, or lecture rooms…
>
> 3, During the listed evening times, all units, organisations, and student groups in principle should not organize any activities that are not relevant to studies, in particular entertainment activities, in order to maintain a good order and environment for self-study.
>
> 4, … Special attention should be paid to the attendance supervision and management of the first year students, and to the cultivation of good habits of self-study among them.
>
> 5, Student cadres are responsible for the attendance supervision of evening time self study of each class. Those who cannot make it to the self-study as a result of personal matter or illness should report to the cadre on duty…

As one can see, regulations as such are not to recommend a certain way of learning, but to enforce it with administrative method. Students once again are turned into passive targets of HE pedagogy, as they are requested to restrict themselves to one particular conduct (academic studies) within a listed

[16] http://www.ahpu.edu.cn/s/17/t/167/16/73/info5747.htm last accessed 4th August, 2011, my translation. By using the keyword '大学晚自习管理规定' (university regulations of evening time self-study) one can easily find numerous regulations of HEIs in contemporary China, such as Jiaozuo University http://www.jzu.edu.cn/wyxy/show.php?itemid=786 , Northern Normal University http://denmark.chsnenu.edu.cn/news.asp?id=381&code=AB , and Shenyang University http://college.syu.edu.cn/jingji/showart.asp?id=98.

time (7PM to 9PM) at certain sites (libraries, classrooms, etc,). In other words, the 'evening time self-study' is a form of government over conduct, time and space. It is noticeably disciplinary in nature, and students as HE subjects are once again turned into docile bodies of pedagogical 'management' and 'supervision', in particular those who are considered lacking self-discipline (first-year students).

This practice of evening time self-study did raise some controversy recently. Renming web (www.people.com.cn), one of the governmental portal sites, posts a news report entitled 'The promotion of evening time self-study in Chongqing University of Technology and Business raises controversy'[17]. Some of the students objected to such a practice, and argued that they were now adults and should be given more space for 'self-development', while the university administrators argued that four to six hours of classroom studies were far from enough if one is to become a 'talent' after 4 years of university education, and therefore extra hours of self-study should be imposed to make sure that students from this university will graduate as 'qualified talents' (hege rencai) for the nation and society. The news report concludes with the opinion of Professor Meng Dongfang, who was described as an educational authority (one with special allowance from the State Council). Meng argues that students in contemporary universities are likely to be the single child of the families, 'clever but lacking self-discipline', and implies that such a practice can be beneficial to them.

From this news report, one can pick out the socialist rationality of HE pedagogy, which still understands students, subjects of HE, as targets of administrative interventions. But such an intervention is for their own good, to make sure that they come out as 'qualified' products of HE pedagogy. Students are also problematised to justify such an pedagogical intervention - they are mostly single child of their families, and are likely to be spoiled and lacking self-discipline, and HE pedagogy should accordingly address this 'problem'.

Summary

In this section, I have explored the issue of HE campus space, including its emergence, presentation, government and deployment. I make reference to the notion of exemplarity, and look into the ways in which certain exemplary HE campuses took shape and how they are presented in discourses in certain forms. I also look into the ways in which certain spaces such as dormitory and study room are deployed as ways of governing HE subjects, and I will discuss this in more depth in the following chapter in Part III.

[17] http://edu.people.com.cn/GB/4156977.html edited by Yin Guan, last accessed 4th August, 2011, my translation.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I explore three components of HE apparatus – curriculum, pedagogy and campus. From the genealogical dimension, I argue that throughout the history of HE in modern China, there are only limited resources at disposal at any given historical moment for HE practices such as curriculum formulation, pedagogy adaption and campus design. For instance, it is not surprising that the first major group of curricular knowledges included to modern HE institutions in the late Qing is the Confucian canon, and under the Communist regime the Soviet Union becomes the major provider of HE curricular knowledges. Also, the exemplary pedagogy, which understands students as passive targets of education, became the principle pedagogical choice in HE settings and has remained so during most of its modern history and till today, with perhaps only a brief interruption during the Cultural Revolution. The enclosed campuses of Qinghua and Yanjing (Yanching in early texts) are still models of contemporary campus design and some of the early techniques of spatial government are still in use today, such as the dormitory regulations.

For the political dimension, ongoing attempts have been made by various governing regimes to influence all three components, such the inclusion and exclusion of knowledges for HE curriculum, the introduction of new forms pedagogy under state socialism, and the regulation upon the size and function of university campus in contemporary China. I am not suggesting that these attempts necessarily determine the construction of HE curriculum, pedagogy and campus, but considering the fact that China has been for the most part of its history subject to the governance of authoritarian regimes, these attempts may have been more successful in establishing hegemonic accounts and forms of these components, and this is perhaps the case as my discussion above has shown. And such hegemonic accounts and forms have within them a polemical purpose, knowleges, pedagogy and spatial practices are suffused with socio-political agenda and cultural assumptions. These agenda and assumption resolve around norms, discourses and strategies of what streams and factions of knowledges should be prioritised in the knowledge production and transmission, what pedagogical practices can best serve the aims of HE, what shapes and functions of HE campus can best reflect and serve the 'spirit' of modern universities.

Summary of Part II - The Will to HE

In Part II, I have analysed HE as a complex apparatus made of a variety of components; each of these components – principle, system, curriculum, pedagogy, and campus, involves multiple power relations and cannot be reduced to a single powerful will. Therefore HE as an apparatus should not be regarded as 'ideological state apparatus', as a mere reflection of dominant ideologies. Instead, during the emergence and deployment of HE, some alternative forms of HE discourses and practices competed with their dominating counterparts, which were mostly promoted and directed by the successive authoritarian political regimes.

Such enduring competitions between the dominating and the alternative forms of HE give rise to a certain hegemonic account of HE. This hegemonic account of HE revolves around a number of issues, such as what ends HE should be intended to achieve, what needs HE should primarily serve, what forms of subjects HE should attempt to produce, through what means, and regulated by whom; it also involves some more detailed issues, such as what curricular contents HE should choose, what pedagogical practices HE should be organised through, in what campus space HE should be carried out, etc. This hegemonic account of HE is what I called 'the will to HE'.

Though certain political forces have been more influential than others in directing this will towards certain objectives, there has been some room for agency and resistance. As my previous discussion has shown, the will to HE is a complex assemblage, through which struggles over the discourses and practices of HE in modern China constantly take place. However there has been a noticeable imbalance of power relations in the struggles over the will to HE, and that HE in the history of modern China has been deployed to serve certain ends more often than others; for instance, the needs of the nation/state has been often prioritised over those of individual subjects, and the emphasises on sciences and technologies over social sciences and humanities have been noticeable in most periods, in particular under state socialism. This power imbalance, however, does not determine the will to HE entirely, but only serves to shape it, and such an imbalance among multiple power relations, among different voices and authorities, among various discourses and practices, is not stable, and but rather is constantly shifting among different social-political forces. And during this constant shifting that alternative forms of HE may begin to emerge. I shall return to this in the final chapter.

Part III

Governing Through HE

Framework for Part III

Governing Through HE

In this section, I put together some of the theoretical tools that are particularly useful (but not exclusive) to my discussion in Part III, including subject and subjectivity, government and governmentality, etc.

To analyse government 'is to analyse those practices that try and shape, sculpt, mobilise and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups'(Dean, 1999, p. 12). To do so, Dean puts forwards a method of what he terms an 'analytic of government'. For Dean (1999, p. 21), an analytic of government should focus on what can be termed as 'regimes of practices', or organised practices through which one is governed and through which one governs oneself. Rather than focusing on particular practices of government, Dean argues that 'an analytics of government examines the conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintained and are transformed'. Here, Dean suggests that one should shift one's attention from the empirical activities of government to the emergence and development of particular regimes of practices that aim at shaping human conducts towards certain desirable objectives. He also calls for attention to the maintenance and transformation of regimes of practices apart from their emergences.

In this regard, if one is to understand of HE as such a regime of practices in modern China, one should

Governing HE subjects	1, Rationality
	2, Authorities
	3, Technologies and Techniques
	4, Desires and choices

Table 7, Dimensions of Government through HE

look into the ways in which HE is invented and deployed as a form of government, as an assemblages of various technologies and techniques, as a ways in which attitudes, understandings, desires and choices of a particular form of advanced learning come into being, how these desires and choices in turn shape and adjust the conducts of populations and individuals, how these populations and individuals as subjects of HE are encouraged to participate in a variety of activities that resolve around HE, may they be believing in the effects of HE in national salvation, preparing intensively for the

College Entrance Examination, reading university life guides, joining various university clubs and societies, and seeking career opportunities on one's own, etc.

The Foucauldian notion of government and governmantality, and Dean's approach of an analytic of government can be very useful for this research, as they enable one to cut across a succession of political regimes in modern China, to look beyond chaos of regime changes and societal upsets for perhaps a certain coherence in the rationalities, strategies or logics of HE. Despite the contradictions among rival political philosophies and ideologies in the history of government in modern China, these rationalities strategies and logics may continuously serve to shape human conduct in similar fashions. For instance, concerns with education and productivity of population are shared by various political regimes in modern China – late Qing Empire, the Nationalist government, and the Communist government in both socialist and post-socialist eras, and also the ways in which HE has been promoted to serve the greater good of national prosperity are very much consistent across the history of modern China.

Moreover, if we are to understand HE as a form of government, and as a part of governmentality, this notion of government provides us with a framework that makes visible the ways in which HE is used to shape the conducts of populations and individuals in modern China, how governmental objectives are translated into the norms of individual conducts, desires, aspirations, and beliefs. To do so, one can explore government via HE by looking at the dimensions of government – first, what is the rationality of HE in modern China with regard to its aims, development and deployment?; second, what are the authorities and agencies involved in the undertaking of government via HE?; third, what are the technologies and techniques invented and deployed in the undertaking of government via HE?; fourth, what are the desires, beliefs, choices and other normative activities are introduced and fostered to facilitate the government via HE?

My discussion in Part III is based on the framework in the table below, and resolves around these questions above. In Table 8, I summary the framework for my discussion in this Part.

Chapter 7 Rationalities and Authorities

Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss the notions of government and governmentality, and how these notions can be useful in a critical history of the government of HE and its subjects in modern China. Also, I will engage with two dimensions of the governing process – rationalities and authorities.

Rationalities

The Foucauldian perspective of government and Dean's analytic approach enable one to move beyond the gaps, inconsistencies and contradictions among policies and political regimes, etc., and to seek rationalities, or logics, and strategies of a particular regime of practices across time, space and cultures, to trace 'any systematic way of representing, thinking and acting upon a particular field of intervention such as a school, community, or workplace' (Ball, 2003, p. 2, footnote). For instance, if we are understand participation of HE in contemporary societies around the world as a regime of practices, we can then go beyond the differences among HE policies such as funding and enrolment procedures among countries, and instead focus on the ways in which HE as an assemblage of human technologies is integrated into contemporary socio-political mechanism of 'talent cultivation' (rencai peiyang), meritocratic selection and social development. As Dean (1999, p. 21) further argues that,

> 'an analytics of government will seek to constitute the intrinsic logic or strategy of a regime of practices that cannot be simply read off from particular programmes, theories and polices of reform. The strategic logic of a regime of practices can only be constructed through understanding its operation as an intentional but non-subjective assemblage of all its elements. That is to say that regimes of practices possess a logic that is irreducible to the explicit intentions of any one actor but yet evinces an orientation toward a particular matrix of ends and purposes. It is necessary to be extremely careful to distinguish between the strategy of regimes of practices and the programmes that attempt to invest them with particular purposes.'

To make reference to HE in modern China, one can argue that, in the light of my discussion in Part II, HE can be understood as an intentional assemblage of principles, systems, curriculum, pedagogy and campus space, and its underlying strategic rationalities seems to orient it towards this matrix of ends and purposes resolving around the fostering, mobilising and deployment of educated personnel or 'talents', primarily for the good of the nation rather than individuals. Although various political regimes at different stages devise different policies and practices to serve their interests and agendas—

for instance, the Communist regime introduced positive discrimination against the working class in the college enrolment procedures—they may to great extent agree upon the strategic logic that the cultivation of skilled personnel is essential to the national development.

In this section, the focus of my discussion is the rationalities of HE as a means of government and a part of governmentality in modern China. I will make reference to my discussion in previous chapters, in particular Chapter 4 on the articulation of HE principles. I will also engage with other historical materials and discursive elements. But first, I want to discuss the applications of government and governmentality in the Chinese context.

Governmentality and China

Until recently, governmentality studies has been predominantly associated with advanced liberal democracies and overlooked non-liberal forms of governmentality in both western and non-western contexts. As it has been subject to authoritarian rule for most of its history, China has been mostly left out of the discussion of governmentality.

The discussion of China's governmentality is made possible first by Dean, who reveals both facilitative and authoritarian dimensions of liberal government. He notes that the distinction between liberal and authoritarian forms of rule rests on the grounds that the former governs through freedom, whereas the latter rejects a conception of limited government and the rights of individual citizens. But he questions this distinction by arguing that 'liberalism is itself interlaced with forms of despotism for those who are deemed not (or not yet) to possess the attributes required of the autonomous and responsible subject'. Such groups include indigenous peoples, women, homosexuals, etc.

A number of scholarly works have addressed the notion of China's governmentality, for instance in the special issue of Economy and Society (Jeffreys and Sigley, 2006) and the most recent completion of China's Governmentalities (Ball, 2006). Sigley, for instance, has produced a series of works in this regard (2003; 1996; 2004a; Sigley, Jolly and Ram, 2001). He borrows Dean's idea of 'art of government', which refers to

> 'various forms of thought about the nature of rule and knowledge of who and what are to be governed, and ... particular techniques and tactics in achieving its goals ... and definite identities for the governed and the governors, and ... about all, it involves a more or less subtle direction of the conduct of the governed' (Dean, 1999, p. 18).

In contrast to 'liberal art of government', Sigley introduces the notion of 'socialist arts of government or Chinese governmentality, which governs not through familiar tactics of 'freedom and liberty', but rather through a distinct planning and administrative rationality (Jeffreys and Sigley, 2009, p. 5)'. In his studies of population policies in socialist and post-socialist China, Sigley further articulates the features of China's socialist governmentality that

> 'Chinese governmentality differs from liberal western variants in its perception of the limits regarding what can be known about the object to be governed. Liberal reasoning is "sceptical" about the possibility of knowing the object to be governed in detail and thereby employs an array of indirect methods of shaping human conduct. In contrast, China's socialist governmentality, especially as its developed under the Maoist period, claimed that through the science of Marxism-Leninism it was possible not to "know" the object to be governed, but also to predict the precise outcome of any possible intervention (Jeffreys and Sigley, 2009, p. 7).'

Among the authoritarian arts of government, what stands out as most significant is the technoscientific reasoning under state socialism, in particular during Maoist period. This technoscientific reasoning is most distinguishable by its reliance on administrative commands to reach state objectives; the human body in this reasoning is acted upon in a very instrumental way, as passive target of administrative and planning intervention. Sigley (2009, p. 549) points out that this technoscientific reasoning equates human (re)production with material production, and therefore brings human reproduction under the dictates of the administrative planning state. This observation also applies to the government of HE. The socialist state would predict the need for personnel for each post in every industry in the country, and accordingly set up plans for HE recruitment and graduate assignment. The application of technoscientific reasoning has not gone uncontested. Also, it overlooked the possible mismatch between the production of the graduates and the needs of the state sectors that might arise as a result of, for instance, the time gap between the prediction of the needs and the completion of personnel production (university education normally takes 4 years), or simply the changes of personnel demands in the enormous machine of socialist production. But nonetheless, this technoscientific reasoning pervasive in the government of HE did not change fundamentally until the reform era when the market mechanism was introduced to supplement the planning mechanisms. Although this reasoning disregarded the wishes and needs of individual students, which is consistent with the authoritarian arts of government in modern China, it gave rise to a discourse of socialist security – students who are enrolled in HE will not have to worry about their future employment as the state has already made plans for them. This discourse of socialist security is still cited with admiration with perhaps misguided confidence in state socialism by the contemporary students who are now invariably faced

with the risks of a market economy – meaning one is responsible for one's own career after graduation. I will map out these socialist forms of government and technologies later in this Part.

But in the post-socialist China, the socialist governmentality is infused with other forms of government, most noticeably some element of neoliberalism. In Sigley (2006), he discusses the change from 'Jihua' to 'Guihua' in the official discourses, most noticeably in the Eleventh Five-year Plan (Zhonggong zhongyang, 2005). 'Jihua' was the official phrase for the socialist plan in China, which implies detailed planning and orthodox socialist interventions, while 'Guihua' implies a more managerial and supervisory role for the CCP and Government[18]. This new approach in China, as Sigley (2006) points out, is characterised by the rise of a discourse of 'governance' (zhili), which suggests a shift in the forms of exercising authority. The notion of 'governance' draws upon 'a neoliberal vocabulary of empowerment, responsibility and accountability' (p.6), but in the Chinese contexts, it does not suggest an immediate connection with neoliberalism as an ideology in a simplistic fashion; it rather understands neoliberalism as a form of practice for government, 'insofar as it extends the scope of government to include not only the state but also other actors and process that appears to be of greater conceptual utility' (p.9).

In the recent Chinese discussions of government, this shift is integrated in the context of 'changing functions of the Government' (zhengfu zhineng zhuan bian), which means a shift in the task of government from 'planning' (jihua) and 'administration' (xingzheng) to one that is featured by 'management' and 'governance'. And with regard to the governing of subjects, Sigley points out,

> 'in the context of present-day China … one-party rule increasingly is achieved through recourse to a rule of law and associated conceptions of citizenship, as well as through governmental interventions that seek to govern certain subjects from a distance, by relying on their individual choices, aspirations or capacities.' (6)

But this is not to suggest the neo-liberal arts of government have supplanted the socialist governmentality. Sigley argues, governance in China

> 'is best understood as an amalgamation of "socialist" and "neoliberal" statecraft. "Governance" as it relates to the "socialist market economy" in many ways continues the scientific and technocratic tendencies of socialist government (p.13)'.

As Sigley explains, the neoliberal arts of government have become integrated into

[18] I will use Government with a capital 'G' to refer to the political regime, the party-state apparatus.

> 'the new technoscientific-administrative Party-state – a mixture of conventional Chinese socialist technologies of government such as "the mass line" and seemingly neoliberal strategies designed to govern through the desires of individuals conceived of as consumers, property-owners, job seekers, and citizens (not as workers for the revolution). It is this combination of market autonomy and technoscientific-administrative regulation that characterizes the "socialist market economy" and Deng Xiaoping's notion of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" (p.9).'

The shift in the forms of government and the mixture of technologies manifest themselves in the governing of HE subjects, most noticeably in the post-socialist technologies of the social and of the self that promote autonomy, choices and accountability in the management of one's own HE experience and job hunting. I will engage with these issues later in the following chapters. Now I turn back to the discussion of rationalities of HE.

Based on the discussions of governmentality literatures and studies (Bakken, 2000b; Bröckling, Krasmann and Lemke, 2009; Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991; Foucault, 1979; Jeffreys, 2009; Jeffreys and Sigley, 2006; 2009; Sigley, 1996; 2004b; 2006; 2009; Sigley, Jolly and Ram, 2001; Yang, 2011), I intend to discuss the idea of rationalities of HE with regard to three perspectives of governmentality – the mentality of government, concerns disclosed for population and economy, and the alignment between government and individuals (Dean, 1999). I will not engage with the perspective of governmentalisation here as it belongs to a different political register, and bears little relevance to this discussion of governing HE subjects.

HE as a Solution

I now discuss the rationalities of HE with regard to these three dimensions in turn. By focusing on the mentality aspect, governmentality emphasises

> 'the way in which the thought involved in practices of government is collective and relatively taken for granted, i.e. not usually open to questioning by its practitioners. To say that these mentalities are collective is … to say that the way we think about exercising authority draw upon the theories, ideas, philosophies and forms of knowledge that are a part of our social and cultural products' (Dean, 1999, p. 20).

In this regard, I want to address the issue of the role of HE in modern Chinese society, essentially, to what HE is understood as a solution? My question is not to what extent HE actually helps to solve various social, political and managerial issues such as equality of access, scientific advancement and integration between research and the world of work, but rather to what problems, dilemmas, issues has

HE been introduced, developed and positioned as a solution, as a cure? This very question is perhaps the most unexplained dimension of the rationalities of HE in modern China.

The Leagues of Nations Report (Becker *et al*, 1932b) on Chinese education provides us with a clue. This report was commissioned by then the Nationalist Party, and was intended to help prepare a plan for a comprehensive education reform. This report, which is highly critical, tackles the early thinking of educational development in republican China, but also provides a benchmark for the evaluation of pre-communist education system (Pepper, 1996, p. 37). In the section on HE, the reports concludes that the Chinese had not yet understood the function of a modern university, with a particular reference to the pedagogical practices in HEIs – a modern university should not aim to supply knowledge to passive students but to train them to acquire it for themselves. Also, with regard to the rationalities of HE, the report points out a prevailing misunderstanding of HE among Chinese educators of the time, who

> 'continually put forward the argument that the Europe and America of to-day are the products of the scientific development of modern times, and that in consequence, China has only to adopt the scientific and technical equipment of those countries in order, thanks to the intellectual energy of the people, to attain a standard of culture as high as that of America or Europe. Our invariable answer to this argument was that the contention is a false one; that modern science and technique did not give birth to the present-day America and Europe; that, on the contrary, it is European and American mind which has engendered modern science and technique and brought them to their present high level... The fundamental problem which arises in regard to education in China is not a question of imitation but of creation and adaption' (Becker *et al*, 1932b, pp. 27 -28, emphasis in original).

The report argues here that modern Europe and America were not the products of science and technology, but it was the other way round. Therefore, China could not become similarly advanced simply by acquiring Western science and technology. Also, it would be misleading for Chinese educators to equate modernisation with the mere imitation of foreign models of schooling and HE. With regard to the rationalities of HE, what the report implies is that, first, the Chinese had overestimated the contribution of HE and its institutions to the scientific and technological and social development of modern Europe and America, and hence its potential contribution to China as a nation in crisis; second, by simply adapting to the foreign models of HE, the Chinese HE system would not necessarily succeed in adapting to the conditions of its home culture.

As my discussions in Chapter 4 have shown, HE in modern China has occurred under the very conception the report criticised as 'false'. The early development of HE was influenced by a variety of foreign models, Japanese, European, American and Soviet. Additionally, the discourses still prevail

that HE is indispensable to the development of the nation as it produces highly educated personnel the provision of which makes the scientific, technological and social advancement of the nation possible. Therefore, I argue that HE in modern China was proposed as a solution to two problems – first, the scientific, technological and societal disadvantages of China in comparison to its foreign counterparts, America, Europe and Japan; second, its shortage of highly educated personnel that were essential to the process of catching up with these foreign countries. In contemporary discourses, these two problems still prevail – first, the disadvantage in science and technology between China and developed countries still exists, and accordingly Chinese universities should catch up with their foreign counterparts and strive to be 'world class' (as the '985' project suggests) so that in turn Chinese universities can accelerate scientific and technological advancement in China; second, China is still in great needs of 'talents' to compete with other countries in an age of global economy.

The idea of 'talent cultivation' (*rencai peiyang*) has underpinned the development of HE in modern China. The idea of 'talents' has been most closely integrated into the rationalities of HE – it is the primary aim to produce 'talents' to serve the social, economic, political, scientific and technological development of the nation. Therefore, 'talents' in the Chinese contexts refer to highly educated personnel that are equipped with knowledge, professional skills, expertise in particular areas, and devotion to their nation. Their bodily and intellectual capacities are to be fostered, cultivated and optimised primarily for the use of a collective, may it be the Party, the state, or the nation. If one fails to serve the requests of one's nation, regardless of what these specific requests may be under different political regimes, even if he or she is equipped with professional expertise, one will not be acknowledge as 'talents'. Moreover, the discourses of 'talent cultivation' also imply that the requests of the nation, may they be national salvation or reconstruction, or socio-economic development, need the production of the 'talents'; this directs HE to serving its own agenda as institutions of laissez faire spirits, but to serve the agenda of the nation by producing 'talents' with desirable characteristics for other broader objectives than their own individual goods.

A quick historical review of 'talents' production in modern China would help to illustrate my arguments here. In late Qing, modern HE institutions and curriculum were introduced to produce highly educated personnel to cope with the immediate national crisis in diplomacy and warfare. In the Republican era, HE was still strongly associated with the discourse of national salvation and modernisation, although in the first half of the era, HEIs institutions enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy, an age of laissez faire, in the second half of the Republican era, the Nationalist government soon sought to seize control of the HE system by launching its 'Party-doctrine education' campaign

and HE was directed to make immediate contribution to the national salvation and strengthening by producing 'talents' in science and technology and with loyalty to the party doctrine. Under the Communist rule, the entire HE system underwent a radical transformation after the Soviet Model in the 1950s, with all institutions nationalised and reorganised into three forms – comprehensive universities, polytechnics and specialised colleges, no such a HE system as such could best serve the national restoration and development by producing technocratic 'talents' who would serve the socialist development of the nation with narrow yet specific experts in their assigned posts. In the post-socialist China, the new form of 'talents' includes a certain degree of autonomy and accountability (in managing one's HE experience and job choice) and contribution to the development of a socialist market economy and to the over-all national strength (*zhonghe guoli*).

Apparently, the repeated warfare in the first of the 20th century provides a persuasive justification for the argument that talents production should serve the needs of the nation. In the second half of the century, this argument was sustained by fighting against 'foreign imperialism' (e.g. the U.S), and enhancing 'overall national strength' in a global age. To some extent, one might say social Darwinism, which was introduced into China in late Qing, and later via manpower planning strategy in high socialist China and human capital theory in the post-socialist China have been integrated into of the rationalities of HE – the cultivation and production of 'talents', of highly educated personnel, is most essential to the survival and revival of the nation; with the development of HE and the personnel it fosters, the development of the nation is made possible by advancement in science, industry, technology and economics, etc. Without HE and the talents it produces, China is vulnerable to the hostility of foreign powers, may they be military invasion or market competition or financial wars.

HE as Social Selection

A second perspective of governmentality refers to a form of conceptualizing and exercising of power in certain societies' that resolves around the connection between economy and population. As Dean explains,

> 'the emergence of this modern governmentality can be identified by a particular regime of government that takes as its object 'the population' and is coincident with the emergence of political economy (and its successor, economics). Government, henceforth, will be required to be a government of 'each and all', evincing a concern for every individual and the population as a whole. Thus government involves the health, welfare, prosperity and happiness of the population... The new object of government, by contrast, regards these subjects, and the forces and capacities of living individuals, as members of a population, as resources to be fostered, to be used and to be optimised.

> (Moreover), governmentality seeks to enframe the population within what might be called apparatuses of security… (which) includes health, education and social welfare systems and the mechanisms of the management of the national economy. It thus encompasses those institutions and practices concerned to defend, maintain and secure a national population and those that secure the economic, demographic and social processes that are found to exist within that population (Dean, 1999, pp. 19-20)'.

This perspective of government sheds some interesting light on the role of education in modern China. For now, I will only focus on the issue of population. Education as a form of government in modern China can be understood as a government of 'each and all'. From late Qing to contemporary China, continuous efforts can be identified to promote education within the entire nation, to reach into the most remote regions, to include every child whether in wealth and poverty. The late Qing regards a lack education of its population as the reason for its defeats against foreign invasions; compulsory education was introduced in early Republican era by a number of warlords and was integrated in the discourses of social modernity; the contemporary regime links a low participation rate in compulsory education in certain regions with their socio-economic backwardness, which become an obstacle to the national development and the improvement of the entire population. Education in modern China, and as I have shown in previous chapters, HE in particular, is clearly a component of an 'apparatus of security', insofar that education improves the physical, moral, and intellectual wellbeing of the population and hence contributes to the defence of the nation in repeated warfare and other turbulences. Education can be understood as a optimizing technology in terms of its contribution to the improvement of wealth, health, happiness, prosperity, efficiency of its targeting population (Zhang and Ong, 2008).

However, education does not only serve to optimize, but it also selects. Its selection function is most evident in the HE sector. A variety of discourses and technology of HE aims to mobilize as many candidates as possible for HE so the society can make a selection of the best, the most suitable and the most promising, and also by promoting this form of social selection, the general quality of the population is also to be improved. These two objectives, social selection and improvement of 'population quality', are much imbedded in the discourse of human quality in modern China. A number of scholars have addressed this issue of human quality (see Sigley, 1996; 2009 for a good review of the discourse of the body in modern China), and in particular its contemporary version of 'suzhi' (Anagnost, 2004; Jacka, 2009; Kipnis, 2006; Kipnis, 2007; Murphy, 2004) and 'suzhi education' (1932a; Kipnis, 2007; Woronov, 2009).

The discourse of population quality in early modern China, as Sigley (2009) explains, was closely associated with the dissemination of theories of race and citizenship (Yan Fu's translated works, for instance, which I mentioned in Chapter 5), and knowledge of modern medicine and science. The notion of population quality enables 'the calculation of the value of a particular subject in relation to the overall national stock', and also requires regulation and protection of life itself. A key concern was to shrug off the image of China as the 'sick man of Asia' (dongya bingfu) rising from the military defeats from late Qing onwards, and to ensure that China would never be humiliated by foreign powers. In the Republican era, it was widely understood that the physical, mental and moral attributes of the citizen were significant to the survival and revival of the nation, and also to the modernisation of a 'backward' society'. In the socialist era, the population quality was understood as both the physical and quantifiable features of the body and also forms of human conduct that can be measured in terms of technical moral and cultural value, both of which are open to governmental intervention and administration and can be improved either by the subjects themselves through 'self-improvement' or by other administrative measures.

In the post-socialist China, the notion 'suzhi' began to prevail. Jacka (2009, p. 524) for instance, provides an excellent review of the suzhi discourses in modern China and related studies. She (p. 524) points out that suzhi

> 'refers to the innate and nurtured physical, psychological, intellectual, moral and ideological qualities of human bodies and their conducts … (It) is of critical importance to contemporary China's booming, globally oriented market economy and to new, "postsocialist" forms of state governance and social control. It plays a central role in contemporary processes of citizenship, simultaneously contributing to understandings of the responsibilities, obligations, claims, and rights that connect members of society to the state; to determinations of which individuals and social groups are included in this set of rights and responsibilities and which are excluded; to discourses on how to produce the "ideal" citizen as well as what to do about the less-than-ideal citizen; and to processes and institutions that produce and reproduce boundaries and gradations between different types of citizenship and citizen … suzhi is very much a part of contemporary public culture, being reproduced by numerous different social actors and in a variety of popular, as well as official, discourses.'

The all-embracing concept of 'suzhi' itself is hard to define. It is closely connected to other keywords of socio-political development in the history of modern China such as modernity and civilisation. From the perspective of social inequality, a number of scholars (Anagnost, 2004; Kipnis, 2006; Murphy, 2004) argue that suzhi is not merely a normative goal or substance that is supposedly attainable by all; more importantly, the discourses of suzhi implies a form of lacking, an absence of particular qualities among some social groups, and therefore justifies the systematic social inequalities

that put these groups in social and educational disadvantages. Murphy (2004, p. 3) suggests,

> 'Suzhi derives part of its ideological potency through its reinforcement of related systems of valuation already embedded within Chinese development discourse, such as town versus country, developed versus backward, prosperous versus poor, civilised versus barbarian, and to have culture (you wenhua) versus to be without culture (mei wenhua)'.

Ann Anagnost (2004, p. 190), one of the first to write about suzhi, argues that

> 'the discourse of suzhi appears most elaborated in relation to two figures: the body of the rural migrant, which exemplifies suzhi in its apparent absence, and the body of the urban, middle-class only child, which is fetishised as a site for the accumulation of the very dimensions of suzhi wanting in its "other".'

Anagnost further draws on research on rural-to-urban migrant women and argues that suzhi plays an important role in China's neoliberal governmentality and its incorporation with global capitalism. She points out that suzhi serves as a 'value coding' to differentiate and highlight gaps between various social groups and in this case between migrant workers from rural areas and the urban middle class. In this way, suzhi is used to justify worker exploitation and to legitimate and reinforce the systemic causes of levels of social inequality in contemporary China.

Another important perspective connected to suzhi is the concept of suzhi jiaoyu (education for quality), which has since the late 1990s come to dominate discussions of suzhi in China and has, indeed, become a national obsession (Kipnis, 2006). Suzhi jiaoyu is proposed as an pedagogical alternative to yingshi jiaoyu (education for passing exams), and is intended to foster creativity, civic responsibility and overall personal development. Reforms to promote suzhi jiaoyu include 'encouraging self-expression, manual dexterity, life skills appropriate to the local environment, and extra-curricula activities such as music, sport and art' (Murphy, 2004, p. 4). But the concept of suzhi jiaoyu has been widely criticised as being empty, all-inclusive and therefore difficult to practice in real-life educational settings, and as it requires better-trained teachers and educational resources for students, suzhi jiaoyu is usually exclusive to urban schools (Kipnis, 2006).

Murphy (2004) engages with the discouses and practice of suzhi jiaoyu (education for human quality), identifies a similar situation to that of migrant workers in rural educational setting. She argues that the education system in China puts students in rural areas in further disadvantages to their urban counterparts by labeling them as low suzhi and by filtering them out in social selections and accordingly preparing them for rural lives. She states,

> 'the education system disseminates a meritocratic ideology that labels and filters out low suzhi rural people, legitimizing structural biases... Filtering may be seen in the view common among university recruiters that "a child with high ability and low grades is preferable to a child with high grades and low ability." In practice this means that local urban children are favoured because they possess artistic, sporting or English language abilities which bring honour to the university in regional competitions. Students from predominately rural provinces with fewer universities are further disadvantaged because most major city universities stipulate a higher entry requirement for applicants from outside their area'.

The role of HE in the discourses of human quality and suzhi lies in first its 'exemplary' effects, (Bakken, 2000a), that the subjects of HE, may they be applicants, students or graduates, are supposed to be at the highest of the human quality hierarchy. Despite the fact that the measurement of 'quality' may vary greatly from one another across the history, those who are eventually chosen by HE are nonetheless the ones who best match the standard of ideal 'quality'. This is confirmed by the old discourses of those who succeed in the Imperial Examination as 'the student of the Emperor' (tianzi mensheng) and the contemporary discourses of university students as 'the treasured children of the heaven' (tianzhi jiaozi). In other words, presumably, those who succeed in the social selection via HE are believed to possess the best of 'human quality' in various perspectives. In reality, this assumption is repeated challenged by news reports on wrong doings of university students. I will further engage with this issue of human quality in the discussion of the technology of the social in the next chapter, and further the role of the suzhi discourses in promoting certain forms of subjects and subjectivities in Chapter 10.

HE as Self-governance

A third perspective of government 'refers to the structures of power by which conduct is organised and by which governance is aligned with the self-organizing capacities of individual subjects'. (35) The usefulness of this approach toward the notion of government is the way in which it provides a language and a framework to conceptualise the linkages between questions of government and politics with questions of subjects, self, identity and personhood. It offers us a new perspective to understand the relations between politics and subjectivities. Such linkages, or relations, between the micro-practices of mundane everyday lives of the many and what one normally calls government in capitals and concrete buildings, in other words, between the micro-physics of power and the objectives of government, are made possible through what Rose terms the 'translation' process. He writes (1999, 48 50),

> 'In dynamics of translation, alignments are forged between the objectives of authorities wishing to govern and the personal projects of those organisations, groups and processes of various sorts that linkages are assembled between political agencies, public bodies, economic, legal, medical, social and technical authorities, and the aspirations, judgements and ambitions of formally autonomous entities, be these firms, factories, pressure groups, families and individuals'.

In terms of the translation from governmental objectives to individual drives, such a process under the authoritarian governmentality may appear greatly different from that under the neoliberal governmentality, as it underplays the importance individual desires and rights. Instead, the authoritarian discourses state that the wishes, desires, choices, and freedom of individuals should all give way to the needs and demands of the collective, simply because if the collective is destroyed, there will be no protection of individuals.

This perspective is most useful if one is to understand the operation of HE as a contemporary form of government in the post-socialist China. HE is increasingly promoted as an individual investment in one's capital, may it be human, social or intellectual, and participation in HE is associated with a neo-liberal vocabulary of 'choice', 'freedom', and 'value', and participants are equipped with a variety of desires of 'social mobility', 'economic return' and 'personal development' and hence turned into 'desiring subjects' (Rofel, 2007, p. 35). Moreover, the state is withdrawing from its involvement in HE, for instance, the abolishment of the job assignment system in the mid-1990s to allow university graduates to seek employment opportunities on their own, to make them 'autonomous choosers' and at the same time,'self-responsible individuals' (Hoffman, 2003; 2006; 2010).

In post-socialist China, technoscientific reasoning is now infused with a Neoliberal reasoning. On the one hand, the production of highly educated personnel is held as a national strategy of global competition; on the other hand, the optimisation and cultivation of such personnel can be better facilitated if each individual is given a certain degree of autonomy to allow themselves to explore and foster their own interests, needs, desires and aspirations and ask them to take responsibility and govern themselves. In this regard, some scholars focus on how the discourses and practices of suzhi serve to produce certain forms of self-governing subjects (Jacka, 2007; Kipnis, 2007; 2009a; Tomba, 2009b). Woronov (2009), for instance, understands suzhi jiaoyu as a set of biopolitical techniques intended to cultivate a generation of children that embody and enact China's modernity and power on the world stage. He suggests, that these techniques and disciplines, such as self-assessment grid, are to produce a unified cohort of high-quality young citizens who are capable of self-governing for the good of the nation.

Within the discourses and practices of HE, this self-governance may include making choices of their specialties, selecting some optional courses, arrangement with join various clubs and societies on campus, and most importantly, choosing their career path. I will discuss this issue in more detail in both Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 under 'the technologies of the self' and 'desires and choices'.

Hegemonic Authorities

Although I refuse to understand HE as a mere reflection of dominant ideologies and political powers, it is perhaps rather noticeable that the central Governments have played a significant role in the shaping and directing of HE in the history of modern China. I am not suggesting that the central Governments, either the late Qing or the Nationalist or the Communist, have determined the functions and outlooks of HE, but my previous discussion has already shown that they did have significant influence in this regard. Most noticeably, I have indicated that it was the successive central Governments that established certain hegemonic principles of HE, and despite the changes of political regimes, these hegemonic principles of HE appeared largely coherent in that, for example, HE should provide direct and immediate serve to the needs of the nation/state, rather than those of individual subjects. My discussion of other dimensions have also revealed that hegemonic accounts of HE established by the central Governments have also deeply affected the shape of the system, the formulation of curriculum, the choice of pedagogy and the arrangement of campus.

Sufficient to say, the successive central Governments are the hegemonic authorities in the government of HE in modern China, and the assemblage of HE apparatus has been largely shaped, if not determined, by such hegemonic authorities. But the central Governments as the hegemonic authorities have not been without challenges from other alternative authorities, most noticeable those from academia and the public intellectuals.

Alternative Authorities

From late Qing onwards, the public intellectuals became increasing active and reflective upon the future of a nation in deep crisis, and in the early Republican era, a large number of them devoted themselves to HE and schooling; some of the most influential figures that I quoted in early chapters, such as Cai Yuanpei, Jiang Menglin, and Hu Shi are examples of the early founders of modern HE in China. These early founders had either been exposed to foreign HE, in Europe, America, or Japan, or deeply imbedded in the traditional Confucian education mentality, or both. They were among the small circle of social and intellectual elites in early modern China, and their understanding of HE and schooling gave rise to different forms of modern educational institutions, underpinned by a variety of educational philosophy and logics, which in turned shaped the early structure of HE.

Their articulations and criticisms of HE in modern China also became the authoritative voices, which are still echoed in contemporary China. Most noticeably, they are now generally regarded as the 'great masters' (*dashi*), as a particular group of outstanding achievers in their professions, who made massive contributions to the nation. China Central Television produced a documentary series of 100 great masters, most of whom are influential figures from the Republican era. And the prevailing discourses of HE teaching tend to present these great masters as the ideal form of university staff, as a benchmark against which teachers in contemporary universities should be evaluated.

In fact, the influence of academia and the public intellectuals of the Republican era on the government of HE was rather brief. It was only because of the absence of a strong central Government in the first half of the period that they managed to direct HE away from the hegemonic accounts mentioned above. In the second half of the Republican era, officials at the central Nationalist government also attempted to established themselves as the authorities of HE, as they represented the ruling party of the state, and hence the interests of the state. The Nationalist officials demanded that HE should provide immediate service to the Party-state, and that academia should accordingly follow the guide of the Party rather than the laissez faire mentality of the early years. The resistance of academia was fierce, but the struggle was unresolved as war followed.

It was under the Communist regime, in particular under the Maoist period, that the academia and the realm of public intellectuals were put under the close supervision and scrutiny of the ruling Party, and their authorities over educational affairs, HE and schooling alike, were almost entirely destroyed (Yang, 2003). This triumph of the central Government over the intellectuals was achieved by a series of political campaigns, personal attacks and prosecutions (Goldman et al, 1987; Goldman and MacFarquhar, 1999). There is a huge volume of scholarly work on this issue and it would be redundant to repeat even a small portion of it here. Suffice to say that the central government or the CCP leadership established itself as the sole authority of HE in socialist China by ruling out other alternatives, and laissez faire in HE has been largely absent in the Chinese context.

Derivative Authorities

In the post-socialist China, some new forms of authorities emerged. They do not intend to articulate alternative forms of HE, but mainly to interpret the existing system, to make it sensible and reasonable by revealing (partially) its mechanism, and also explore ways to make the best of the system by following its mechanism rather than working against it. In that sense, they can be called 'derivative

authorities', and their authorities are built upon and through a new knowledge of HE in contemporary China, a knowledge that serves to articulate the existing system but not to challenge it, to make a better use of it but not to criticise it. These authorities manifest themselves in mainly two forms of publications – the first is the cramming materials for the CEE, and the second is the university life guide. For the former, one example, which I have mentioned in my discussion of the exemplary campus, is the 'Sandian Yice' (*Three Points and One Test*) series published by Longmen Books, one of the most successful publications in this regard. The series is a bundle of extra-curricular materials, and specialises in linking the curricular materials with what may be tested in the CEE – in other words, it provides 'short-cuts' to the success of college enrolment selections. It treats high school education in a very instrumental way. Its 2010 edition says in the introduction that

> 'by presenting a selection of the real questions in the CEE over the past three years, this series explores the common question patterns and the methods and techniques in solving them… everyone is able to closely experience and understand the CEE. From compulsory to selective subjects, each book in the series details all kinds of questions that repeatedly show up in the CEE and techniques required to answer them. With the possession of the book, you have an encyclopaedia of analysis and techniques of the latest CEE'[19].

The authority of this series, and this form of cramming materials, lies in its contribution to the success of HE candidates who later become the valuable assets of the nation after they have achieved a high degree of academic success. As the series introduction states,

> 'since its first appearance, the Sandian Yice series have frequently ranked No.1 in the National Book Sales Board in the past 13 years, with its total publication of over 3 million. A large number of those who have used this series now have post-graduate degrees or doctoral degrees, and are the backbones of this nation'[20].

The underlying logic is that if the value of a student lies in his or her academic success, and the measurement of academic success is the acquisition of HE degrees, and the most vital step is the success in the CEE, and therefore, this form of publication does not only provide tips for a set of examinations and tests, but makes a direct contribution to one's value in the society, one's chances of success in the future; and the popularity of these materials prove the righteousness of this logic and this mentality of examination preparation, and should therefore be trusted by those who are currently preparing for the CEE and fighting for a better future for themselves.

---

[19] http://baike.baidu.com/view/303756.htm , last accessed 28th July, 2011, my translation

[20] http://baike.baidu.com/view/2093561.htm , last accessed 28th July, 2011, my translation

I now turn to the second form of authoritative publications – universality life guide. These guidebooks are fulfilled with personal experiences of HE, or personal reflections upon HE, yet these personal accounts turn HE experience into a public issue. In articulating their understandings of HE experience, such as how to manage your time, how to build up your social connection, how to deal with the reality of university campus, not only do these accounts make HE experience more visible and intelligible, they also establish themselves as the authorities on conduct. These personal accounts serve as a reference of the 'truth' of HE, also as an exemplary model of how to make the best of HE for the public. However, these accounts are essentially elitists. These guides are either authored by some self-claimed successful educationalists (Zhou, 2008), or some regional champions (*gaokao zhuangyuan*, who achieve the highest marks in the examination) of the CEE (Ren and Zhang, 2007), or exceptionally successful individuals in business (Tan, 2009) – in other words, some exemplary figures who have achieved great success via HE. Zhang (2009, p. 4) the author of one of this series, University students – competence decides life chances, states in the preface of this collection of dialogues between Zhang himself as 'an expert in elitist education' and 50 'outstanding' university students,

> 'My purpose of writing this book is rather simple – to tell the people that, whether you go to a renowned university or a regular university, you should spontaneously cultivate your own core competence, and on your day of graduation, if you can prove you are competent enough, you will have good life chances'.

The figures in this book are from renowned universities such as Qinghua, Beida and Fudan. This is not to say that only students from these renowned universities can turn themselves into elites or outstanding figures; the point is rather to initiate people to think: how should I mange my own university experience? What are my disadvantages in comparison? The influences of the exemplar figures are enormous.'

Zhang's statement is rather interesting. On the one hand, he argues that students from universities of different academic reputations can have equal chances of success, if they enhance their own core competence. On the other hand, In Zhang's book, there is no account of those who achieve reasonable success after graduation from regular (non-elitist) universities; instead, his interviewees are invariably from the top elite universities, as only these students represent 'true' academic success and hence are recognised as exemplary figures of HE, as references against whom others should compare themselves, as authorities of HE. The word 'people' in Zhang's statement seem to refer to regular students outside the elitist group, a people who is less likely to conduct successful management of their own personal experiences of HE, and should be taught the codes of university performatives (such as

time management and social networking) and potential to be fully realised (or core competence in Zhang's terms).

Apart from the 'successful' entrepreneurs, some other 'successors' in HE selection also join the camp of 'derivative authorities'. Students who enrolled into renowned universities such as Qinghua and Peking have been invited to author university life guides or to provide 'authentic' information in forms of small essays or proses or interviews about either preparing for HE or experiencing HE. Another book published by People's Press, Perfect University, is authored by two former students of Peking University, both of whom were Gaokao Zhuangyuan (highest achievers of the CEE) of their respective provinces, and not surprisingly their accounts of HE were based on their Peking University experience. Though the book is written in Chinese, the authors repeatedly use contemporary English phrases and expressions throughout the book, such as Globalisation and integration, leadership experience, educational plan and resume-oriented, self-education awareness, human capital, high profile, etc., often without translation or explanation. It seems that the authors are readily to show their authorities of HE experiences regardless of their readership, which according to the afterword of the book, should be students outside Peking University (Ren and Zhang, 2007). On the contrary, Ren Yunzhong, one of the authors, in the summary section of the book articulates his idea of university studentship mainly based on intellectual elitism. He writes,

> 'the massification of HE in China is already a fact. However, no matter how much we expand our HE system, only a minority of the enrolment age group can make it to university, and university students remain the elites of the society, or at least should strive to be as such. A true university, in comparison with other technique schools, is most distinguishable in its aim to produce "liberal gentlemen" beyond mere experts. His mastery of knowledge, basic manners, and dispositions should be different. (p. 169, my translation)'

It is clear that Ren does not intend to tackle what is behind the 'fact' of HE in China, but instead he tries to persuade his readers to first of all accept such a fact regardless, and to hold on to the conventional values of HE such as the privilege of regular HEIs to technique schools, in other word a university degree to a technical diploma. One should strive to become 'different', or privileged to those who do not have access to 'true' universities, to model oneself after 'liberal gentlemen'. Though he does not articulate this model further, Ren's idea of liberal gentlemen is not modelled upon Newman's idea, but rather perhaps an infusion of a number of exemplary figures, both native and international, including Confucian intellectuals, such as Zhou Dunyi and Cai Yuanpei, and some global figures such as Bill Gates. By using these exemplary figures, Ren and others who produce and/or act as 'derivative authorities' try to maximize the contribution of personal efforts in individual 'success', whether in

academic pursuits or contemporary business or other domains, so if one fails to achieve as big as these exemplary figures, one only has him/herself to blame, not the wider 'fact' of HE or the contemporary society.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I first explore the usefulness of government and governmentality to my inquiries in this Part. In particular, I make a comparison between socialist arts of government and neoliberal arts of government, and explore how these two forms of government are infused in post-socialist China, and how they are manifested in the government of HE subjects.

I also engage with the first two dimension of government via HE. With regard to the rationalities of HE, I make reference to the three perspective of governmentality and argue that the rationalities of HE in modern China are characterised, first, as a solution to the problems of national disadvantage in science and technology and a lack of 'talents'; second, as a means of social selection and improving population quality; and third, as a form of self governance.

With regard to the authorities of HE, I trace out a variety of authorities in the history of modern China, including the hegemonic authorities - the central Governments, the alternative authorities, most noticeably the academia and the public intellectuals in the Republic era, to the 'derivative authorities' in the post-socialist China such as cramming materials of the CEE and university life guides. These authorities all serve to enforce certain subjects and subjectivities, and I will further engage with them in later chapters.

Chapter 8 Technologies

Introduction

In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) identifies a series of technologies of disciplinary power, and such technologies may manifest themselves in the organisation of space, the development and deployment of hierarchical observation, and the documentation of individuals in cases. In *The Care of the Self* (1990), he begins to concern himself with the technology of the self – the knowledges, practices and methods and techniques through which human subjects constitute themselves. But Foucault does not articulate his notion of technologies. A further elaboration is provided by Rose (1996, p. 26). He says,

> 'The notion of technology may seem antithetical to the domain of human being, such that claims about the inappropriate technologisation of humanity form the basis of many a critique. However, our very experience of ourselves as certain sorts of persons –creatures of freedom, of liberty, of personal powers, of self-realisation – is the outcome of a range of human technologies, technologies that take modes of being human as their object. Technology, here, refers to any assembly structured by a practical rationality governed by a more or less conscious goal. Human technologies are hybrid assemblages of knowledges, instruments, persons, systems of judgment, buildings and spaces, underpinned at the programmatic level by certain presuppositions and objectives about human being.'

By applying the notion of technologies to contemporary institutions, Rose (1996, p. 26) also usefully points out that,

> 'One can regard the school, the prison, the asylum as examples of such technologies, those which Foucault termed disciplinary and which operate in terms of a detailed structuring of space, time, and relations among individuals, through procedures of hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment, through attempts of enfold these judgments into the procedures and judgments that the individual utilizes in order to conduct his or her own conduct'.

The objectives of technologies are to 'produce and enframe humans as certain kinds of being whose existence is simultaneously capacitated and governed by their organisation within a technological field'(Rose, 1996, p. 27). With reference to my discussion in previous chapters, HE can be understood as an assembly of such human technologies (Rose, 1999, p. X), technologies that may present themselves as, first, 'means of judgment', such as unified examinations and tests that are used to define and measure one's intellectual capacity, and physical examinations in China that rule over one's bodily qualification for academic studies at HE level; second, 'the techniques of reformation and cure', such as pedagogic supervision that is aimed to direct students towards certain desirable academic outcomes, and psychological counselling provided to students who have difficulties in coping with stress and anxieties from their HE experience, etc.; third, 'the apparatuses within which intervention is

to take place', such as the design of university campus that aims to produce certain docile bodies in dormitories, study rooms and libraries.

Rose further places the notion of technologies in the frame of government, and explains that

> 'Technologies of government are those technologies imbued with aspirations for the shaping of conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting certain undesired events. I term these "human technologies" in that, within these assemblages, it is human capacities that are to be understood and acted upon by technical means. A technology of government, then, is an assemblage of forms of practices knowledge, ... traversed and transected by aspirations to achieve certain outcomes in terms of the conduct of the governed (which also requires certain forms of conduct on the part of those who would govern).' (Rose, 1999. 52)

HE in modern China has revolved around the cultivation of human capacities, as my previous discussions have shown. It not only cultivates a small group of youngsters, but also intends to channel and develop the physical, moral and intellectual capacities of the entire population so as to turn a population into candidates of HE. But I am not suggesting that HE as an assemblage of human technologies is suppressive in nature. At this point, I would agree with Rose, who writes,

> 'To say that they are human technologies is not to subject them to a critique. It is not to imply that technology is somehow antithetical to humanity, and thus a human technology is actually an inhumane technology, a technological rationalisation of the human soul or technological reduction of human subjectivity and creativity to that which can be acted upon the interests of government... It is to suggest that all the essential, natural and defining conditions that tend to be ascribed to the human world – modern forms of subjectivity, contemporary conceptions of agency and will, the present-day ethics of freedom itself – are not antithetical to power and technique but actually the resultants of specific configurations of power, certain technological inventions, certain more or less rationalised techniques of relating to ourselves. One cannot counterpose subjectivity to power, because subjectification occurs in the element of power; one cannot counterpose freedom to technology, because what we have come to understand as our freedom is the mobile outcome of a multitude of human technologies'(Apple, 1993, pp. 54-55).

Based on Agamben (1998) who suggests that the main difference within the realm of political is between 'bare life' (*zoe*) and political existence (*bios*), referring respectively to natural being and a human being's legal existence, Lemke (2009) puts forwards a categorisation of technologies, as shown in the following table. This categorisation not only distinguishes two subject forms of politics, individual and population, but also two forms of life, *zoe* and *bios*.

Subject Form / **Life Form**	*Individual*	***Collective***
zoe (physical being)	Technologies of the Body	Technologies of the Population
bios (moral and political being)	Technologies of the Self	Technologies of the Social

Table 8. Different Biopolitical Technologies, from Lemke (2009, p. 175)

We can now understand technologies in the following four forms:

1.technologies of the body, aiming at the speculation, assessment, direction and deployment of individual bodies in terms of their physical and mental fitness, in order to maximize, not only their docility, but economic utilities, such as hygiene education and personnel documentations of one's physical conditions for each and every student in China;

2.technologies of the population, aiming at governing collectives by analyzing and directing life processes at the level of population with the help of disciplines such as statistics, demography, epidemiology and biology, such as the discourse of 'quality birth and quality breeding' in China that ties up single-child policy with the distribution of educational opportunities within families (families in rural areas are advised not to produce more than two children as this will diminish their chances of receiving good education);

3.technologies of the self, aiming at establishing a relation with the self, certain self-steering mechanisms, or as Rose explains, 'the ways in which individuals experience, understand, judge, and conduct themselves …for example, requiring one to relate to oneself epistemologically (know yourself), despotically (master yourself), or in other ways (care for yourself)', as can be seen from practices such as confession, diary writing, and filling self-evaluation forms;

4.technologies of the social, aiming at a promotion of a recognition of oneself as part of a society, a social utility, a nation or a state, such as citizenship education or patriotic education that aim to formulate some 'essential' or 'generally applicable' values among persons and institutions.

For these four forms of technologies, I will begin with technologies of the population, and my focus in on the promotion of sportsmanship and physical fitness among university students in modern China. With regard to technologies of the body, I will look into the ways in which bodily inspection and selection is enforced upon individual students and documented in the personal dossier system (*dang'an*) and serves as a gaze of the state into the bodies of HE subjects. In terms of technologies of the social, I will discuss the role of HE expansion in modern China in the expansion of HE candidateship, the ways in which the desirability and feasibility of HE participation becomes intelligible among a wider population. My discussion of technologies of the self will cover both the use of socialist forms of self-governance in student self-reviews and other documents in the personal

dossier system, and neoliberal forms of self-governance promoted by university life guides, which intend to formulate new subjects of self-understanding, self-planning, self-cultivation and self-presentation, etc. I now begin my discussion with technologies of the HE population.

Technologies of the Population

Technologies of the population aim at governing collectives by analysing and directing life processes at the level of population with the help of disciplines such as statistics, demography, epidemiology and biology. In this case, the technologies target the physical conditions of HE subjects, applicants, students and graduates alike. The aims of such technologies are to monitor, measure, improve and optimise the bodily capacities of the subjects, which can be achieved by, for instance, standard of physical qualification, medical examinations and campaign of physical fitness, etc.

Physical Examinations

One example here is the CEE which requests a profile of student physical conditions. This practice started in the early 1950s after a significant proportion of new entrants in the first few academic years dropped out for health issues, which was considered a waste of valuable resources. Large scale health evaluations were introduced in 1954, such as the establishment of Student Health Record System for the final year students in senior high schools who were also likely to be applicants for HE (Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian Bianjibu, 1984, p. 456). Detailed standards were finalised in the 1958 Regulation on disqualification in health examinations for university and college enrolment. This regulation lists 13 diseases or physical disabilities as disqualifications, including, for instance, infiltration of advanced pulmonary tuberculosis, active pulmonary tuberculosis, non-full-recovery from leprosy, corrected visual acuity of each eye lower than 0.4, and mental illness or epilepsy with an episode within the past two years, etc. (Xie and Tang, 1985, p. 824). The contents of this regulation remained largely unchanged till the 1980s. The 1985 Standards on health examinations for university and college enrolment lists 16 diseases or physical disabilities, with even more nuanced criteria, such as

'blood pressure higher than 140/90 mm hg, and/or lower than 86/46 mm hg; individual systolic blood pressure higher than 160 mm hg, and/or lower than 80 mm hg; single diastolic blood pressure higher than 80 mm hg, and/or lower than 50 mm hg (qouted in Xie and Tang, 1985, p. 825 my translation)'

The physical examinations are mandatory for all HE candidates, the number of which in 2011 was 9.33 million (Ministry of Education, 2011). Those who fail to meet the requirement of the tests will not be qualified to take the CEE and hence will be excluded from any forms of HE. Their bodily disqualification also means their disqualification from HE candidateship. And candidates who are diagnosed with certain illnesses or physical disabilities in the tests are denied access to certain specialties, or regarded as unsuitable. For instance, HE applicants with

'slow olfactory, stuttering, abnormal gait, hypnosis, facial scar, hemangioma, black nevi, or vitiligo, are not suitable to be admitted to the following majors or specialties: education, public security, law, journalism, music, performance. (qouted in Xie and Tang, 1985, p. 825 my translation)'

This practice of physical examination has been firmly established as a technology of the population of HE candidates and introduced a logic of bodily selection for HE - if one fails to prove to be bodily qualified, one will most likely to fail in the process of HE, which is regarded as highly demanding of one's intellectual and physical capacities. If a student who is not physically qualified is given the opportunity to enter HE, and ends up failing to complete, this is regarded as a waste of the educational resource, and a wasted opportunity which could have been better utilised by one that is physically fit for HE. Additionally, if a student with an infectious disease is allowed on the university campus, he or she will pose a threat to the health of other students; if a student with certain physical disabilities is allow to choose certain specialties, he or she will still be denied the opportunities to the jobs in the disciplinary domain, and hence a gain a waste of educational resource and students' own investments in HE. Till now, this rationality of bodily selection remains largely unchallenged.

On the open forum 'Baidu knows' (Baidu Zhidao) of www.baidu.com, the Chinese equivalent to Google, the question 'what is the main purpose of physical tests for the CEE?' is posted by a user, and the 'best answer' ranked by the website say[21],

> '(it is) to examine whether students' physical conditions are qualified, whether he or she is with disabilities, and (to make sure) one will not drop out during the studies of his or her subjects because of health, and also to keep away those with malignant diseases from universities, such as hepatitis B, to prevent their transmission to other students. How should I say? A bit cruel, perhaps? But this is quite the necessary evil. Better than being found out when one has infected others with his or her diseases. What do you think?'

[21] http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/22341014.html , last accessed on 13th July, 2011. This open forum 'Baidu knows' allows users to post questions, and others can post answers directly. One of these answers is listed as 'the best answer' by the webmasters. This function of the website is very popular, and a wide range of questions can be found on this open forum.

In this 'best answer', one can sense a prevailing rationality of bodily selection. It intends to present a reasonable and hence persuasive account – those who have certain disabilities will fail the studies of certain specialties for sure, and those who have infectious diseases are potential threats to others. But so far this logic has not been subject to the scrutiny on the basis of basic human rights in China, at least not fully. The 'nude examination' practiced in Guangdong in 2011, in which students for the physical examinations were requested to remove all clothing, gave rise to a wide dispute in Chinese media (Xu, 2011). Examinees argued this was a violation of privacy and expressed concerns that pictures of their nudity might be taken by others. However, this dispute revolves only around one exceptional procedure of the physical examinations, while the underlying logic of bodily selection has not been challenged in the slightest.

Campaigns and Standards of Physical Fitness

'Project Sunshine for Physical Exercise' was initiated by the Ministry of Education and the General Administration of Sports in 2006 to promote physical exercises in all sectors of education, from primary schools to universities. The project was to address the problems that

> 'a large number of students suffer from a decrease in their physical fitness and athletic ability, many students have poor vision, and the proportion of overweight and obesity among students have increased (Wang, 2006, webpage, my translation).'

This problematisation of the student bodies justifies the implementation of compulsory physical exercises. The physical 'deficits' such as poor vision and obesity of a small group of students is here generalised to enframe each and every individual student in the country, as everyone should be kept away from such failings and should strive to maximize one's physical fitness and capacity. The endeavours towards this end will not only benefit students themselves in their work and lives, and eventually also the nation which deploys their bodies and minds. The logic of bodily qualification arose in the late Qing and prevailed at the early Republican era has echoes in such contemporary techniques practiced on student population – to some extent, every student is still reminded not to be the 'Sick Man of East Asia'. But in comparison, the contemporary discourses of physical fitness among students comprise articulated policies, detailed practices, and exquisite requirements. For instance, 'Project Sunshine'

> 'raises the goal to meet the requirements of and excel in physical fitness as the goal, to strengthen one's body. (It plans) to implement the physical health standard for students among 85% of educational institutions, and to enable

> 85% of the student population to spend one hour on physical exercises daily. At the same time (the project) requires every student to at least pass the physical health standards, and to master at least two forms of daily physical exercise. The project introduces this slogan of "one hour of exercise a day, fifty years of healthy work and a lifetime of happiness"(Wang, 2006, webpage, my translation).'

This project still uses the language pattern of socialist campaigns, setting goals, percentages and standards. It also employs 'happiness' to translate the governmental objectives into personal drives – the exercises of the bodies of students, though promoted by a central government, are aimed to benefit students themselves. If one is to follow the campaigned plan to do daily exercises, one can achieve better physical fitness and can in turn better enjoy one's work and one's life. Therefore, by articulating the personal benefits from daily exercises, this 'project' manages to translate the government objectives of population health control into practices of self-governing that is said to contribute to personal happiness.

If one is to accept this logic, then a standard of physical fitness is needed to differentiate among students of various physical conditions, and to encourage one to achieve better results, such as the National Standard for Students' Physical Health which was introduced in 2008 by the General Administration of Sport of China[22]. With such a standard of physical fitness is in place, the population will be divided into at least two forms of subjects – the physically 'qualified' and the physically 'unqualified'; for instance, according to the National Standard, a male university student needs to complete 11 pull-ups in one session to pass the test and prove his physical fitness (one is waived from this evaluation process if medical documents can be provided for one's disability or equivalent)[23].

Also, the costs of failing the Standard are rather high – as the *Implementation Measures of for National Standard for Students' Physical Health* states

> 'Students who achieve 'Excellent' and above by the standard are eligible for the applications of "Three Good students" and scholarships… If graduates of …HE institutions have scores less than 50 points in physical tests by the Standard, they will be rewarded Certificates of Attendance only' (Guojia Tiyu Zongju, 2008, my translation).

According to this 'measures', those who prove physically unqualified will be faced with punishments in other domains of their academic lives, such as losing one's candidacy for certain scholarships and honorary titles such as 'Student of Three Goods' (*sanhao xuesheng*, students of excellence in three

---

[22] http://www.sport.gov.cn/n16/n1092/n16879/n17321/358582.html , the Standard is available at www.csh.edu.cn which lists both the standard height and weight and detailed requirements for each of the compulsory form of exercises for students of a number of age groups in schools and for students of HE in general.

[23] The standard for male HE students is available at http://www.csh.edu.cn/csphw/press/dx3.html

perspectives – ideological, intellectual and physical fitness), or even denials of HE degrees (certificates of attendance are not valid degree credentials).

Technologies of the Body

Technologies of the body aim at the speculation, assessment, direction and deployment of individual bodies in terms of their physical and mental fitness, in order to maximize, not only their docility, but economic utility. The discussion above suggests that the bodily quality of HE subjects have for long been a concern of the state, and I have also briefly discussed the discourses of population quality in the previous chapter. In this section, I will engage in more detail concerning the deployment of the HE body from the perspectives of compulsory physical exercises on university campus and the inscriptions of bodily health information on every single subject via the personal dossier system.

Yan Yangchu in the 1920s proposed to use hygiene and medication education to cure the bodily weakness of the rural population in China (Yan in Yang, 2003, p. 90), and the New Education magazine argued in 1919 that citizens of the new Republic should have 'physical constitution that is strong and vigorous' (reprinted in Su, 1985, pp. 367-369, my translation). With regard to HE, the missionary colleges and universities in the Republican era placed an emphasis on sport training of their students. For instance, Qinghua University was a preparatory school in the 1910s and 1920s, and sent 100 students to the U.S for HE annually. In order to change the stereotype of the Chinese being the weakly 'Sick Man of East Asia' (Dongya Bingfu) when these students arrived in the U.S., sports and physical exercises were made compulsory for the students of Qinghua. Yeh (1990, p. 213)records,

> 'Students were required to set aside their books every afternoon at 4:00 p.m. to spend an hour in the gymnasium. School officials locked up dormitories, libraries, laboratories, and classrooms during this period so that students had nowhere else to go but the gym and the athletic fields. To ensure that students strived to build up their physiques, qualifying tests in swimming, in the 100-meter and 400-meter runs, in the shot-put, and in high jump were introduced as part of the hurdle to pass on the eve of graduation. Knowledge of soccer and basketball and some competence in archery were also required'.

From the description above, one might say that these techniques of the student population were disciplinary in nature. Students were kept away from all other forms of activities than sports and physical exercises at the specific time of the day, and each one of them needed to prove their bodily qualification in standardised tests. In this regard, this technique of mandatory physical exercise was simultaneously collectivising and individualizing, as all students were forcefully included in the exercise programme, and the individual students who failed the qualifying tests might be faced with certain forms of punishments. Wu Mi, who later became one of the most renowned classical scholars in the Republican era,

> ' ... had to postpone his study trip to Harvard for six months and exercise hard to improve the distance of his long jump because of these requirements (of the qualifying tests): On the eve of his Qinghua graduation, Wu Mi's long jump was a mere 11 feet, a whole foot short of the minimum requirement' (Yeh, 1990, pp. 213-214).

Ma Yuehan, the head of the Qinghua's physical education department for four decades, strived to introduce the dimensions of sportsmanship and physical fitness into university student culture. For instance, he persuaded the academically competent to join the sports teams and Qinghua's sports teams proved to be outstanding in various intercollegiate championships. This sportsmanship seemed to have integrated into the subjectivities of Qinghua students, as Feng Youlan, who later became one of the most famous philosophers in modern China, recalled that

> 'Qinghua graduates tended to be aware of their physical selves and attentive to their personal appearance... They walked briskly. The seemed at ease in Western-style clothing. They were younger looking and cheerful. Beida's graduates, by contrast, were laggardly, solemn, and gray' (Feng in Yeh, 1990, p. 215).

These techniques were echoed in the policies and practices of the Communist regime. Standardised tests, for instance, were used to decide upon the bodily qualification of HE candidates and university students; university students in contemporary universities are requested to participate in some mandatory physical exercises such as broadcast callisthenics (Guangbo Ticao) in groups; and the enthusiasm for sportsmanship can be easily spotted in a variety of campaigns for physical fitness among university students.

In schools and universities in contemporary China, sports and physical exercises are still made compulsory for each and every student, and regulations are introduced to enforce the acceptance of these bodily practices. The conduct of such practices for all educational institutions from the early 1950s onwards was summarised in the Generic of Education 1949-1981 (Ministry of Education, 1984, p. 454, my translation), which writes,

> 'for HE institutions, most students live on campus and are subject to unified work/rest regimes, and morning exercises should be included in such regimes. (Students) should do morning exercises for 10 to 20 minutes after getting up in the morning, which normally includes doing broadcast callisthenics in groups for two rounds and then other physical exercises on one's own.'

Fudan University, one of the elite universities that dates back to the Republican era, posts its Regulation of Attendance to Morning Exercises an Extra-curricular Activities online (Department of Physical Education of Fudan University, 2006, my translation), which states that,

'Attendance checking operates via one's University ID card, and between Week 3 and Week 15 … One should have at least 35 times of attendance; otherwise, one will faced with a deduction in one's score of Physical Education class, 1 point for each missing session.'

This attendance checking system works on the collective of current students by enframing itself in the university curriculum (physical education class, which is compulsory for all), and by using the ID card, the system reaches into the everyday physical practices of each individual student. Moreover, this regulation lists the officially recognised times, locations, forms and requirement of physical exercises.

'The exercises for this academic term include middle and long distance race, standing long jump, sit-ups (female: 20 times each for abdominal and back muscles), pull-ups (or push-ups) (Male: 20 pull-ups or 40 push-ups). These exercises are compulsory, with at less 2 sessions each time. For Long Distance race: male students should complete within 6'30 "or less for1200 meters, the girls within 4'30" or less for 800 meters.'

'Morning Exercise is conducted between 6.30 a.m. to 7.00 a.m. Monday to Friday. For students at the South Campus, one should jog for 800 meters at the gymnasium at the Sport Centre, and then swipe one's ID card at the checking point...'

'For other sport activities, (one should go to)

1, the track field of the Southern District Sports Centre, for long distance race, standing long jump, push-ups (Male), sit-ups (female).
Time: Monday, Wednesday and Friday between 15:20 and 16:45 ...'

This regulation displays a rather exquisite technique on the student population with regard to the training of their bodies, with detailed arrangements for each and every group, with clear punishments known to all. And Fudan is far from an exception in this regard – almost all HEIs have their regulations of physical exercises ready to access online[24].

Here I want to further discuss how the technologies of the HE body come to mark each and every subject of HE, as candidates, students or graduates. This is mostly achieved by the compiling of student dossiers (xuesheng dang'an), which is part of one's personal dossier. Yang (2011) makes a useful review of the personal dossier system, and how this system changes in recent year to adapt itself to China's neoliberal governance. Yang explains,

24 By using the keyword '大学早操规定' (daxue zicao guiding, universtity regulations for morning exercises), one can easily search regulations as such in Chinese HEIs, all in similar tones and formats. For instance, Regulations of morning exercise for Jinlin University of Finance and Economics is available at http://xsc.jlufe.edu.cn/news_view.asp?newsid=227 , Shenyang Ligong University http://xsc.sylu.edu.cn/news/n1005c7.aspx and Xuzhou Normal University http://tyxy.xznu.edu.cn/s/27/t/566/c1/9e/info49566.htm .

> 'Dang'an (personal dossiers), the compiling of the minutia of one's work and personal information in an envelope that follows one around, was introduced in Mao's era. As a defining feature of Maoist socialism, the dang'an reveals the inner, hidden bureaucratic workings of the state on the individual. It documents information about each employee's education (including reports from teachers), job history (including reports from employers), family background, political activities, achievements, mistakes, self-criticism, and so on'.

The rule of personal dossiers represents an intimate involvement of the state in individual lives. It is a form of technoscientific administration, which regards the human subjects as objects of administrative intervention in the Maoist fashion. The system of personal dossiers is an individualizing mode of control, which renders the ideological, educational, emotional and physical conditions visible, intelligible and measurable; it registers each subject into the operation of the state system, and subscribes them to the dominant ideologies via self-evaluations and their own pleas to join the Party (I will discuss this later in the section of technologies of the self). The system is the gaze of the state into the inner characteristics of the subjects of state socialism, as the dossiers collect a variety of records, evaluation, diagnosis, and measurement against certain qualitative and quantitative standards. These features are not pre-existing in the subjects, but are part of the subjectivities invented in the gazing process – one can be an outstanding student on record, a hardworking employee, a dedicated civil servant, or a patient with mental disability[25], all based on the subjective evaluations of certain administrative figures of one's affiliated organisations (schools, universities and working units for instance).

The student dossiers are part of the personal dossiers, covering the information of each individual student before one leaves formal education and starts working. For example, within collections of certain documents and forms in the dossiers, students are categorised as 'outstanding', 'qualified', or 'partially qualified', or 'failed', as a result of a series of evaluations of their superiors (teachers, class tutors, school administrators) upon their ideological attitude and academic aptitude, or test results of physical and medical examinations (height, weight, liver function, etc.). The corresponding section to HE candidateship is the section marked as 'Examinee's dossiers', which normally includes the following materials.

For the time being, I will only discuss the information regarding the individual student bodies, and attend to other techniques in later sections. As shown in Table above, the bodily information of each HE candidate is mainly recorded by three documents, one at the top of the main files, Form of Physical

[25] Yang (2011, p. 511) gives an example of a well-known Chinese writer, Tang Guoji, who unexpectedly found out in 2003 about that he had been officially identified as 'mentally ill' in his personal dossiers 20 years before by the some-called 'organisational opinion'. It turned out that one of his college teachers filed in his student dossiers of his 'mental disability', which resulted in his unemployment after graduation and a severe challenge to his career and life.

Examinations, and others revealing the physical record of all three years of high school education, Health Record of High School and Registration card for physical education examinations. In the former, test results are either reported in statistical figures or marked as 'normal'/'abnormal not detected' or 'abnormal'. The tests include the following

1.eye, including visual acuity, colour vision, eye illness;

2.medicine, including blood pressure, growth conditions, heart and blood vessels, respiratory system, the spirit of the nervous system, abdominal organs, etc.;

3.surgery, including height, weight, skin, face, neck , spine, limbs, joints, etc.;

4.E.N.T, including hearing, smell, ear, nose, throat, etc.;

5.dentistry, including chune, stuttering, teeth, etc.;

6.chest perspective;

7.liver function tests, including transaminases, hepatitis b surface antigen.

For each category, the doctors in charge of the examination are requested to give their professional 'opinions' upon the candidateship of the individual examinee, which means filling the appropriate number (1-3) in the blank (also with their signature right below) – 1, qualified; 2, not eligible for certain specialities; 3, unqualified. If any category is marked as 2, for instance as a result of poor vision, the 'conclusion' of the examinations at the bottom of the form will also report the examinee as

Main Files	Supporting Files
1, Form of Physical Examinations	1, Registration form of graduation from high school
2, Form of examinee status	2, Enrolment Record Card of High School
3, Supporting documents for Privileges in admission	3, Health Record of High School
4, Other materials	4, Form of political situation of the family upon graduation from High School
5, Application form (for the CEE)	5, Record of social practices of High School
	6, Registration card for physical education examinations
	7, Registration form of High School graduation examinations

Table 9, Documents in Examinees' dossiers

'not eligible for certain specialities'. Likewise, if any category is marked as 3, the examinee will be reported as 'unqualified' and hence lose his or her candidateship for HE.

In comparison, the latter two documents are less important in deciding the bodily qualifications of the HE candidate, but they do provide a full history of the physical condition of each student. The Health Record of High School records tests results of one's vision, hearing, and functions of other important organs, etc. Also, Registration card for physical education examinations presents the annual summary of evaluations of one's physical education, once again either as 'qualified' or 'unqualified'. But it seems that these summaries are not likely to affect students' HE candidateship. Nonetheless, these two forms represent the continuous gaze of the state into the bodies of each and every student.

Technologies of the Social

Technologies of the social aim at a promotion of a recognition of oneself as part of a society, a social utility, a nation or a state, such as citizenship education or patriotic education that aims to formulate some 'essential' or 'generally applicable' values among persons and institutions. In this case, such technologies are featured in the expansion of HE candidateship in modern China, a promotion of oneself as an eligible candidate of HE. I argue that a successive expansion of HE means more than a mere wider spread of university campus or an increasing number of building, faculty and students – it is an expansion of candidateship among a population, or a growing awareness of the accessibility, desirability and feasibility of HE among social groups that are yet to be included in HE. And to briefly refer to what I will discuss in the next section, such awareness can be promoted and cultivated, turned into a desire for access to HE, an aspiration for the benefits of HE, a longing for the choices and the opportunities that can bring significant changes to one's life chances. Also, I argue that during the process of this expansion across the history of modern China, different subjects begin to emerge, such as the 'wasted' subjects in late Qing, the 'alienated' subjects in the Republican era, the 'mistreated' subjects in socialist era, and the 'willing' and 'expecting' subjects in the post-socialist era.

As mentioned in previous discussions, the first modern university in China, the Imperial University, was mostly open to governmental officials, royal elites and their offspring, and therefore highly exclusive. Despite its royal status and the attention it enjoyed from the Emperor, this early institute was not known for the quality of teaching and learning. On the contrary, a number of sources suggest that the university was filled with largely arrogant and bureaucratic officials and aristocrats (see Yang, 2003 for instance); they did not concern themselves with serious academic studies but only aimed to claim the exclusivity and the titles given to the graduates from the University which were equivalent to those offered by the to-be-abolished Imperial Examinations. They are regarded in historical reviews of the early modern HE as the 'wasted' subjects (see Chapter 1 in Sang, 1995 for an excellent overview of studenthood in late Qing). This is also what Zeng Pu implies in his description of his experience in Tongwen Guan, which is quoted at the beginning of this thesis.

In the Republican era, although there was a significant rise of both HE institutions and enrolments, HE remained highly exclusive as the tuition and fees were much higher than what an ordinary family could afford. According to Yen (1990, pp. 195-199), the household income of wage-earning families (4-5 people in one of the average size) in large cities such as Beijing was lower than 300 yuan a year, which was insufficient to sponsor a student in a public university and even less capable of sponsoring a student in a private institution. In the 1920s, the tuition ranged from 40 to 60 silver dollars (yuan) for

one academic year at state-funded public institutions, and that of private colleges and universities was much higher – Nankai University charged 70 yuan, and Tongji University charged 210 yuan. In addition to tuition fee, the average annual expenditure of HE students in the 1920s ranged between 220 and 400 yuan, reaching 600 yuan in the 1930s. It was only in a small number of normal colleges that tuition was waived, and in a few new public universities created by the Nationalists n provincial capitals in the latter half of the Republican era ,significantly lower tuition fees were charged (20 yuan). It is not surprising that university students at the time were from relatively wealthy families, and also the lifestyle of university students (in particular in metropolitan cities like Shanghai) such as going to the movies and dining out, further enforced their alienation from the real world outside the campus, a world of warfare, supply shortage, and financial crisis. They are described by Yeh(1990) as the 'alienated' subjects.

The expansion of HE candidateship was mostly achieved under the Communist regime, the discourses of educational development revolved on 'a people' that had been traditionally excluded from formal education in public schools and advanced learning at HEIs, meaning the proletariat class such as workers and peasants. In huge volumes of policy documents, campaign slogans, news reports and curricular materials, the discourses of the expansion of candidateship invariably stated that education should be targeted on this people of the proletariat class who had traditionally been treated unfairly in educational provision, the people that made up the majority of the population and therefore the true owners of the country, and the people who had made the survival of the country possible and would be equally important to the prosperity of a new nation. The working class was then made into the 'mistreated' subjects (see Zeng, 1953; 1965 for instance), a group that had been deprived of access to HE and hence should be compensated in this regard.

This determination to expand HE candidateship among the proletariat class was most evidently reflected in positive discrimination in student enrollment policies. The 1953 Regulation of College Entrance Enrollment mandated that priorities should be given to worker and revolution cadres once they fulfilled the basic academic requirements. However, as mentioned in Chapter 4 and 5, the inclusion of students from working class background in HE was not as successful. HE institutions were reported to be dominated by students from the old elite families or from revolutionary cadre families (the new elites). The failing of the system to include working class students on a larger scale was believed to be the trigger of Educational Revolution of 1958. During the Cultural Revolution, the CEE was abolished and replaced by a recommendation scheme. This scheme was implemented for 7 years

between 1970 and 1976, the new standard emphasised practical experience (labour and working experience), and the criteria specifically targeted on the 'mistreated' subjects.

'Workers, lower-and-middle-class peasants, soldiers of the Liberation Army and young cadres, with correct political ideology, healthy physical constitutions, and at least three-years practical experiences, and educational levels equivalent to junior high school graduates; and the age limit should not be applied to workers and lower-and-middle-class peasants with substantial practical experiences and special considerations should be given to young intellectuals who were in the down-to-the-countryside movement and returning to the countryside' (Yang, 2003, p. 194, my translation) .

The new enrollment policies requested no unified written examinations, but instead recommendation by the masses, the approval of the leadership, and administrative reviews of HEIs. According to a survey of 8966 entrants in 7 universities in 1971, students from worker, peasant, revolutionary cadre and other working-class people origins accounted for 99.80% of the total (Yang, 2003, p. 195). But according to Unger (1982), among those who had access to HE during the Cultural Revolution, the majority were still from the cadre families, the new elites under state socialism, who changed their status to workers or peasants in the previous 'Down to the countryside'[26] movement.

In the post-Mao era, the CEE was immediately reinstalled, so was the key school system, both leading to a resumed emphasis on formal education in public schools in urban areas over the diversified provision in rural areas. From the early 1980s onwards, there has been a gradual expansion of the HE system, which began accelerating rapidly in 1998. The decisions to initiate such a rapid expansion were not entirely clear, but the prevailing discourses revolving around the expansion include some immediate concerns of the impact of the 1997 Asian Economic crisis on domestic employment. One of the most well-known documents in supporting the decision to expand HE system was a report by economists Tang Min and Zuo Xiaolei in 1998 recommending the doubling of entrants to HE. This report (Tang and Zuo, 1998, my translation) entitled Recommendations to double the enrolment of Higher Education Institutions based its argument on the following reasons,

> 'first, the expansion of HE enrolment will increase the consumption demand by RMB 100 billion annually... second, the expansion of HE enrolment can to some extent reduce the current pressure of employment... third, existing HEIs are capable of expanding enrolment by one fold via proper utilisation of (existing) resources and (further) investment...fourth, the general republic is willing to pay for full tuition fee with the aid of student loan system.'

26 The 'Down to the Countryside Movement' was a policy instituted between the late 1960s and early 1970s. Mao declared that in order to learn from the workers and farmers, certain privileged urban youth needed be sent to mountainous areas or farming villages and participate in manual labour.

Tan and Zuo base their recommendation almost entirely on a market rationality and economic calculations – how much profit the expansion can produce, how it can help to reduce the pressure of employment at the time of Asian Financial Crisis, how it is feasible by well-planned investment, and how it can be easily funded by the willing families of China. To some extent, Tan and Zuo's plan echos the conventional socialist governmentality – the state sets targets of personnel production for HEIs to accomplish, and in this case the target was to double enrolment. This plan of Tan and Zuo enframes the production of HE subjects in an economic reasoning, resolving upon the feasibility, practicality, and profits of the expansion. What Tan and Zuo describes is a product chain of HE subjects that is profitable and low in state investment and risk; what the central government reads is a technoscientific formula of the acceleration of the production of advanced personnel with a very small state investment, which in turn, according to the human capital theory, will promote further economic growth.

With regard to the fourth reason listed by Tan and Zuo, one should be reminded that HE tuition fee in China began to be charged in the 1990s, and the notion that HE was not free to all was not entirely alien to the public. Tang and Zuo further argue that

> 'the Chinese nation has a long and treasured tradition of valuing education. One can say that it is the biggest wish of all parents to offer their offspring the chances of receiving higher education. A quite few social surveys indicate that the primary motive of saving among the public is to prepare for offspring's possible higher education cost. To invest in offspring's education would be one of the projects that the public will genuinely wish to get involved in'.

Here, Tan and Zuo locate the individual calculation of the HE investment, or economic rationality of HE investment, in what they describe as 'the cultural norm' of Chinese families that suggests a high degree of willingness to share the cost of HE. By doing so, Tan and Zuo further justify their plan to sponsor the expansion by raising tuition fee. Their logic is simply that if the families are willing to pay for HE for their children, the state should make a good use of this enthusiasm of HE and cut state investment. This logic is quite different from that of the funding cut of HE in the U.K. in recent year, which associates individual benefits from HE with 'necessary' individual investment (Barr, 2004; Greenaway and Haynes, 2003). Tan and Zuo do not discuss much about the relation between the possible personal benefits from HE, but instead they translate the government objectives into the willingness of family units rather than individuals. Therefore, according to Tan and Zuo, HE candidates in the post-socialist era are the economically 'willing' subjects, but to what extent their economic willingness is economically rational is apparently not Tan and Zuo's concern.

Another text that represents the official account of HE expansion is provided by Li Lanqing, then Deputy Premier in charge of educational affairs, who recalled this decision to expand HE in his book

Education for 1.3 Billion. In the section entitled HE expansion was to follow the popular demand and to be imperative under certain circumstances, he explained that there were four reasons for this decision (Li, 2004, p. 119, my translation),

> 'first, the Chinese economy is developing at a tremendous speed and we need more high-quality personnel ... Second, the mass all expect HE for their offspring, and the government is responsible to fulfill their expectation in its full capacity. Third, this expansion can also postpone graduate employment, increase educational consumption and is an important practice to enhance domestic consumption and the development of related industries. Fourth, the low enrolment rate and the small number of entrants make it difficult to get into university, and basic education was therefore forced to be devote itself to the preparation of highly exclusive examinations, and subsequently hindered the promotion of education for quality (suzhi jiaoyu).'

Here, Li incorporates multiple reasonings – the first is a conventional technoscientific reasoning of personnel production, the second may appear as a democratic reasoning of responding to the wishes of the mass, but in fact, like Tan and Zuo's argument above, it turns 'the mass', which refer to the entire population of China, into the 'expecting' subjects, the third an economic reasoning of the profits and benefits of HE expansion, and the fourth a managerial reasoning of education system infused with a technoscientific reasoning of human quality (suzhi discourses). Therefore, Li's argument intends to address various 'stakeholders' of HE – the state, the family, and the individual student. With regard to the 'expecting' subjects, Li says,

> 'since there are so many high school graduates expecting to go to university, we should figure out a way to make that happen. It is merely to set up a few more HEIs, and (we could) do it in forms of public education and private education alike. Why should so many high school graduates be rejected (by HE)? Now there are a lot of single-child families (in China), and it is a huge psychological pressure for these families if their children cannot go to university. (Li, 2004, p. 120, my translation)'

Li cites the 'expectations' of the HE candidates (the hoping subjects) in a fashion of a social reality, and he then concerns the state with answering to such expectations. On the one hand, Li's argument tries to bring out a political consistency in this plan of HE expansion with the slogan of 'Serve the People' (wei renmin fuwu) of the Communist Party, and implies that all is planned to better serve the mass; on the other hand, Li also entangles this concern of the mass with the state's concern for the economic development.

Technologies of the Self

Technologies of the self aim at establishing a relation with the self, certain self-steering mechanisms, or as Rose explains, 'the ways in which individuals experience, understand, judge, and conduct themselves ...for example, requiring one to relate to oneself epistemologically (know yourself), despotically (master yourself), or in other ways (care for yourself)' (Rose, 1996, p. 72), as can be seen from practices such as confession, diary writing, and filling self-evaluation forms. The discussion of such technologies have been primarily associated with neoliberal governmentality (Gibb, 1993; Mitchell, 2006; Neave, 1988; Peters, 2001; Simons and Masschelein, 2006). The Special issue of Educational Philosophy and Theory – The Learning Society from the Perspective of Governmentality (Peters, 2006) discusses the notion of 'learning society' as a technology of the self. Besley and Peters (2007) discuss the use of confession in educational setting as a technology of the self.

I argue that such technologies of the self are not exclusive to neoliberal governmentality, but rather, they are common in socialist forms of government. The Confucian ethics places an emphasis on the role of the self in one's education and personal development in general (Ivanhoe, 2000; Nivison and Van Norden, 1996). As my analysis in this section will show, the socialist governmentality does not intend to blindly suppress the subjectivity of the self in order to serve the collective good; but rather, via socialist technologies of the self, it intends to produce a particular form of 'socialist self', a self that is capable of turning itself into the subject of socialist technologies of the government, an active self that is capable of adapting itself to dominant socialist ideologies, a conscious self that is capable of judging itself on socialist values and norms, an independent and responsible self who is capable of managing one's own life under the supervision of the socialist norms, regulations and laws. To explore the use of such socialist technologies of the self, I will return to the student dossiers and discuss several documents that best manifest the technologies. Also, in the post-socialist era, neoliberal technologies of the self also began to prevail, and such technologies are most noticeable in the university life guides, what I term 'derivative authorities' of HE in the previous chapter. In the life guides, certain forms of subjectivities such as 'self-understanding', 'self-planning' and 'self-presentation' are promoted.

Socialist Self

In the student dossiers, documents such as the Annual Review form (xuenian jianding biao, please refer to Appendix 1) may represent the exercises of such technologies. As the following Table 9 shows,

apart from the basic information of individual students, this form is designed as a hierarchical pattern of evaluation, or a hierarchical gaze into the moral and political dimension of subjects of HE. It begins with a self-review, then a 'review of the class', usually done by the head student, followed by a 'review of class tutor', usually by a junior administrator in charge of the class, and ends with the 'opinion of department' by a senior administrator of the department of school or faculty. Therefore, by procedure, the head student reads the self review sections of his or her fellow students, and also adds up his or her review of this individual; then the class tutor also adds his or her review based on the previous two sections and his or her personal observation; in the end, the senior administrator will simply writes 'agree' or 'disagree' as the final judgment of the review procedure.

The hierarchical review procedure displays the mechanism of a socialist technology of the self. Such a technology is individualising and collectivising at the same time – on the one hand, it collects information, reviews, and judgments of each and every individual and places these individuals, or the selves, within units of different sizes and positions within the political structure of government, and makes their moral and political features visible, measurable and open to the evaluations of others who are higher in the governmental hierarchy; on the other hand, it subjects each and every self to the values, norms, languages patterns, phrases, ways of judgment of a collective form of government.

Here is an example of the first year self-review section by Mr. Y, one of the students who, together with his university administrators, granted me the access to his personal dossier.

> 'I have made big progress and improvement within the first year of my university life. In ideological terms, as an "active applicant (for the Communist Party membership)"[27], I further embed myself in the studies of Marx-Leninism, Mao Zedong's Thought and Deng Xiaoping's Theory, and I vigorously participate in various activities organised by the Party branch … In academic terms, I have been hardworking and industrious, and I have studied a lot beyond the knowledge of my own speciality, and my rank has gone up by over 20 in the second term… In terms of daily life, I am able to manage (various aspects of) my personal life such as dining, clothing and grocery-shopping; I have now a steady work schedule and a regular lifestyle. I neither drink nor smoke, (as I) intend to be civilised and healthy university student… Although I am not a student cadre, I nonetheless actively participate in various activities that are good to my academic studies and my health, and support the work of student cadres and teachers, and complete the assigned tasks from them; (I have) embraced a full development[28]. In summary, within the past one year, I have made

[27] The 'active applicant for the Party member' is an honorary title given to students who behave actively and enthusiastically to join the CCP. One needs to be recognised as an 'active applicant' first, then as a probationary member, and eventually accepted as a member of the CCP. This procedure may take a few years to complete, during which the applicant is subject to a series of evaluation. Therefore, students are encouraged to apply for the Party membership in the first year of their university education.

[28] 'A full development' is a slogan introduced in Mao's period, which suggests that students should develop in a variety of dimensions including ideology, physical health, and academic studies.

big improvement in terms of study, personal life, and ideology, and I have pushed myself for bigger achievement, to be ever-progressing, and to be an outstanding university student'.

This section of self-review is made up of arguments from four perspectives – ideology, study, body, and peer relations. And his 'progress and improvement' in those four perspectives, such as further studies of the dominant ideologies, an improvement in the rank of examination scores, a healthy and civilised (non-smoker and non-drinker, for instance) lifestyle and a responsible and attitude towards his daily life (a regular work schedule, and capability of self-management), and a willingness to participate in collective activities and to cooperate with others, all serve as evidence of his efforts in becoming a qualified university student, an 'outstanding-to-be' subject, or a righteous socialist self.

The four categories of this self-review may appear as well-argued and persuasive, as they fit with the language pattern of this evaluation procedure – corresponding keywords can be found in other sections of review form such as 'industrious', 'self-discipline', 'ideologically progressive'[29], and 'collaborative', and together these keywords present a positive review of the student. For instance, the 'review of the class' writes,

'This student is industrious in academic studies and has a strong sense of self-discipline. He is ideologically progressive, and is very self-motivated and capable of living and working with his peers in harmony. He has a good sense of humour. He is collaborative with the works of student cadres and is good with his assigned works by the teachers. He is honest and frugal.'

And the same language pattern can be easily identified in the 'review of the tutor', which writes,

'This student is ideologically progressive, hardworking in studies, and has achieved good results in examinations. He has wide interests (beyond academic studies) and actively participates in various activities organised by the department and the school, and has made some good performances'.

It is also worth noticing that this review of the tutor begins with the evaluation of Mr. Y's ideology. As an administrator of the university, the reviewing tutor displays more than an adherence to correct order of norms. The socialist form of government emphasises political loyalty more than the professional expertise of its subjects (Tsang, 2000; Zhou, 2004). Therefore, in this review procedure, the evaluation of one's ideology is prioritised over one's academic achievement.

At the first glance, such a review procedure may appear a mere bureaucratic formality. But with a closer look, one notices the mechanism of such a socialist technology is rather delicate but effective. This student reviews his first year of HE almost strictly in line with the norms of the evaluation

[29] This is one of the most common phrases in such evaluation forms. Usually it means meaning being enthusiastic in adapting oneself to the dominant ideologies, such as application for the CCP membership.

procedure, which in turn reflects the targeting domains of the socialist governmentality – ideology, body, study, and collaboration. The reviews of 'the class', 'the tutor', and 'the Department' serve to promote, confirm, and evaluate the process of student's subjection of the evaluation standards – in other words, the degree of subjectification of the HE self. In order to pass such an evaluation, to present oneself as a qualified HE self, students actively choose to review themselves in the language pattern, the phrases, the normative values of a socialist technology of evaluation. If one chooses not to do so, he or she will perhaps have negative reviews from those higher in the political hierarchy in these reforms, and these negative reviews will stay with him or her as a part of the personal dossiers, and will be readily accessible to his or her future employers or superiors and hence put his or her life chances in risk.

The same review procedure applies to another document in the dossier – the Registration Form of Graduates of Higher Education Institutions. Apart from the basic information similar to the form above and a full academic record of the individual, this form also includes similar review sections – the review of the class is filled by the class tutor instead, and there is an extra section titled 'the opinion of the university'. In this case, the administrative office of the university serves as the top of the political government of HE. In the self review section, Mr. Y writes the review of his four years of HE in a similar language patterns;

> 'In university, I have been industrious in studies, and respective towards my teachers, and united with my peers; I have been ideologically progressive and frugal in daily life; I have been very self-motivated since my enrolment into the university. Ever since I was accepted by the CCP, I have complied myself to the requirements of the party, and strived to be a qualified member of the CCP. In academic terms, I have successful passed all the examinations of my speciality. In term of daily lives, I have been frugal, and also very supportive towards my peers, and established good relationships with them. In terms of work, I have actively participated in the works of the Party branch, and completed all the assignments of my Party group in earnest'.

Once again, Mr. Y begins his review with the ideological perspective. Now a member of the CCP, he emphasises his status and how he complies with the regulations and requirement of this membership, in order to prove that he is qualified university student, a qualified HE self who has made good performance in various perspectives. This 'qualification' is confirmed by his class tutor, who writes,

> 'This student is ideologically progressive, and hardworking in studies. He takes work (as a member of the CCP) in earnest, and leads a frugal life. He is a qualified university student.'

This review is further agreed upon by his department and university, with simple administrative seals and the word 'agreed' in the sections. This simple conclusion presents Mr. Y's qualification as a university student/graduate at the end of this form, ready for the speculation of his future employers

and superiors. It also signifies the end of a subject formation process, through which the making of a qualified university student, a qualified HE self is encouraged, constantly reviewed, and eventually confirmed.

Neoliberal Self

Now I want to attend to some neoliberal technologies of the self. Compared with their socialist counterparts, these neoliberal technologies of the self may differ in the underpinning of normative values. For instance, within the frame of socialist governmentality, personal autonomy, as Mr. Y writes in his review of the first year in university, is more about one's capability in self management (work schedule, dressing, dining, grocery shopping, etc.) in the line with normative values of state socialism, a socialist concern with the self so to speak. Neoliberal governmentality, in comparison, understands personal autonomy in a sense that one can make choices for oneself but also needs to be responsible for all the choices made (Barry, Osborne and Rose, 1996; Rose, 1996; 1999). In this sense, subjects of a neoliberal government are not primarily concerned with following a particular set of dominant ideologies and norms, but taking responsibility for one's own desires, choices, and decisions. This is the tone taken up in the numerous 'university life guides' in the book markets of contemporary China. I have made reference to some of them in previous sections. Now I engage with them from the perspective of neoliberal technologies of the self.

These guides mostly endorse a managerial language of a market economy, and this market and management language is highly visible in the book titles – one of the guides I mentioned previously is entitled University Student – Competence Decides Life Chances (Zhang, 2009), and others include My University Education, I am in Charge (Chen, 2008), Successful Management of Your University Education (Zhongguo Daxuesheng Jiuye Wenti Yanjiu Zhongxin, 2005), etc. They encourage their readers to obtain better self-understanding, to more vigorously adapt oneself to the norms of the existing HE system and the wider society; in order words, to 'responsibilise' oneself (Davies, 2006) with the task of self-understanding, self-cultivation, self-adjustment, and self-development. In these discourses of self-management, HE is not longer understood as a particular form of education with its specific aims and approaches, but a unique stage of education, a particular period of time when one should be concerned primarily with oneself from various perspectives. These perspectives may include, as Chen suggests in the chapter titles of his book 'My university, I am in charge', one's adaption to university lifestyle, management of academic studies, maintenance of one's physical and

mental health in daily life, participation in various social activities, acquisition of working experience from student cadre posts and part-time jobs, and the expectations of one's own future. One is held responsible for his or her own success or failure in HE, as Ren and Zhang (2007, pp. 12-13, my translation) write in the introduction to their book Perfect University,

> 'University education is an education of self-service. The bigger the name of the university, the bigger the personal space for each student to explore; you can make efforts in your academic studies or social activities, or you can waste it on computer games such as "Saga" or TV shows such as "Super Girl". As expected, we may all have a piece of degree certificate in the end, but the value and meaning of this piece of paper may vary greatly. One does not just happen to have a salary of 4,000 RMB, or a full scholarship from Harvard University; opportunities favour those who are prepared.
>
> ... Therefore, you must not be muddled or follow others' steps; you must not be narrow-minded or avoid challenges; you can only rely on yourself – your mind and courage.
>
> ... The awareness of self-education is essential to any university student. In other words, if we are clever enough, we can design for ourselves the plan of a perfect university education. Within this short period of four years, we will seek our opportunities with careful plans to build up social connections and mobilize resources, and by self-motivated training, we can cultivate in ourselves an outstanding sense of judgment, direction, and a grand vision'.

Ren and Zhang underpin their argument of 'the university education of self-service' with a sense of social Darwinism; each student is responsible for how he or she spends the four years of university education – spend it on the worthwhile (academic studies and social activities) or waste it on the worthless (computer games and TV shows), and how one may end up after the four years – one can be a winner (with full scholarship from Harvard University) or a loser (with a salary of 4,000 RMB[30]). To be a winner, a successful manager of one's university education and life chances, one needs to be equipped with self-awareness, careful plans, strong initiatives, and self-motivation. In this way, one can realize a 'perfect' university education, which is believed by the authors to lead to better life chances.

This idea of social Darwinism endorsed by Ren and Zhang is consistent with the official discourses of post-socialist governmentality, which associates one's life chances primarily with one's own efforts and competence (Jeffreys, 2009; and also Wu and Lansdowne, 2009 talk about the logic of 'winners take it all' mentality in the era of market economy, or in their term, capitalist China). The logic follows these lines: if one is having difficulties finding a good job, it is because he or she is not competent enough; seeking employment is a fair game in a market economy, as a market economy will only

[30] In fact, 4,000 RMB is much higher than the national average incoming of university graduates in recent years. According to Li and Wang (2008)'s report of graduate employment, the average income of a graduate with a bachelor's degree is below 3,000 RMB (6 months after graduation, 2949 RMB among graduates of '211' universities and 2282 RMB among others).

choose those who are competent enough. Not surprisingly, when these guides tackle the issue of an increasing competition in graduate employment, which is arguably a result of rapid HE expansion in the recent decade, the most common solution provided by these guides is first to accept the fierce competition as a social reality (rather than throw 'useless' criticisms on the issue), and then to focus on the improvement of one's own competence in the market. For instance, in the preface of the book Successful Management of Your University Education, the authors from the Research Centre of Graduate Employment Problems in China write,

> 'The fast-growing number of those enrolling in HE, and the increasingly worrying competition in graduate employment, have forced university students to think about their career paths much earlier. The fierce market competition and the gap between dreams and reality have put the new graduate entrants of the job markets in bewilderment and confusion about their future career...
>
> ... for university students, the acquisition of knowledge is without doubt important, but improvement of one's job seeking abilities and professional quality (zhiye sushi) is equally urgent ... The success of most winners, whether in seeking employment or setting up their own business, rests on their personal competence from a long-term cultivation, and their positive and appropriate attitudes. (Zhongguo Daxuesheng Jiuye Wenti Yanjiu Zhongxin, 2005)'

Here, the authors first present the crisis in graduate employment, and then suggest both improvement in market professionalism (job-seeking abilities) and 'positive and appropriate attitudes' towards the crisis, which are again a sense of self-responsibility and self-motivation, as the latter chapters of the book suggest.

According to these guides, to enhance one's personal competence equates to maximizing one's market value. And this can be achieved by a better self-understanding of one's interest, strength, desires, and available choices, etc. and better self-presentation in which one shows acquaintance with the requirements of market professionalism, such as the normative social values and practices, and mastery of practical skills of interpersonal communication, of team work, etc. Zhang (2009) introduces in his book 'eight principles of competence building', such as 'matching your speciality with your internal desire', 'understanding yourself and having faith in your future success', 'building up your advantage and perfecting it', and 'discovering your self- value, and your value to others', etc. Zhang uses such a managerial language throughout the book. For instance, with regard to self-understanding, he discusses the notion of self-value. He writes (Zhang, 2009, pp. 137-138, my translation),

> 'The realisation of self-value can be done in many ways; some are good at studies and often receive scholarships; some are good at socialising, and often hold club events, or become the chairmen of student unions; some are good singers and win singing competitions; some do part-time jobs and earn money and social experience.

> Do what you want to do, and get it done; then you will have a sense of fulfilment, and your self-value is realised. After these attempts of self realisation, you need to be courageous to adjust yourself once you discover your own strength, and devote yourself to do what you are truly good at. What you are good at is where your self-value lies, and is your core competence.'

In this book, Zhang's notion of self-value is not an ethical concept, not an internal reference for what is good, beneficial, important, etc., but one's market value. He argues above that one's self-value can only be realised once his or her own strength is discovered and fully developed, may it be academic study, social skills, special talents (singing, for instance), or making an early start in obtaining working experience. To realise one's self-value, or to increase one's market value, one needs to understand oneself better to discover his or her strength and to further develop it.

With regard to market professionalism, Chen(2008) for example spends the chapter entitled future on how to behave professionally in job seeking. He lists some tips and reminders about how to produce a professional resume, such as cover design, and how to behave properly in job interviews, such as dressing codes, standing postures, eye contacts and necessary courtesy. About rules of eye contacts, he writes (284-285),

> 'When the interviewer is talking, you should look him or her in the eye with sincerity. If your eyes are wandering around, the interviewer may find you impolite or untrustworthy. Of course, to look the interviewer in the eye does not mean to stare at him or her, but you should place your gaze in the triangle area between his or her eyes and nose, with determination and self-confidence, with a small shift of your gaze in every 5 to 7 seconds. (Chen, 2008, pp. 284-285)'

As Chen implies, to behave professionally is about paying attention to details of the rule of the market —one should adapt oneself to such rules—and produce the correct conducts for the specific circumstances, and in this case, how to look interviewers in the eye, in the right area (the triangle between eyes and nose), with the right interval between shifts (every 5 to 7 seconds). He also writes about replying to offensive questions in job interviews,

> 'The worst scenario in a job interview is that you may feel offended by the questions from the interviewer; you should control your emotion when feeling embarrassed. You should not reply in a harsh way, not using a sarcastic tone to strike back. Please remember, you should show courtesy at all times, and you should also have manners even when your interviewers lack of manners. Courtesy is one of the rules of the game of interviews. Of course you can refuse to answer these offensive questions, but you need to do it in a subtle way. As a job seeks, you should not find excuses for your lack of courtesy under any circumstances. (Chen, 2008, p. 284, my translation)'

As Chen suggests here, university graduates as job seekers should be acquainted with such 'rules of the game', the game of a market which may be greatly different from that of a university life. Professional behaviours such as making eye contacts in the correct way, or showing courtesy when

offended should be part of one's code of practice for one to win out in a market, to have a future. To show one's mastery of the codes of market professionalism in crucial to one's survival in a fierce competition, as a tiny mistake of one's own such as not looking people in the eyes can cost one a job offer, and leads to unnecessary obstacle to one's life chances.

Infusing two forms of Self

In this regard, HE subjects are also placed in potential conflict between two forms of self, and two arts of government. On the one hand, HE subjects are encouraged to make choices for themselves, to make plans for themselves and to take care of themselves, but for them these choices are not always available in other domains of HE experiences other than job choice. The neoliberal arts of self-government incommensurate with their actual HE experience. Instead, university students are still under rigid interventions and administration. They have far fewer choices when it comes to pedagogy, as tight schedules, lecture-dominated teaching, and credit systems dominate and students are overwhelmed by compulsory courses, and administrative obstacles if one wishes to change specialties, etc. HE subjects find themselves in an awkward conflict – they are encouraged to govern themselves in a neoliberal fashion, but in reality, they often find themselves still governed by others in a socialist manner. I will further explore this conflict in Part IV.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I focus on four forms of technologies of government in the domain of HE. With regard to technologies of the population, I argue that medical examinations enforce certain bodily qualifications of HE candidateship upon subjects, and select those who are most physically fit for HE; additionally, campaign and standards of physical fitness are introduced to perform intervention into the physical beings of HE.

With regard to technologies of the body, I argue that the gaze of the state into the physical condition of each HE subject is made possible by the medical and physical report in the personal dossier system, and furthermore, a variety of university regulations, practices and discourses are intended to promote sportsmanship and physical fitness among university students, to maximise their bodily capacities, so to speak.

With regard to technologies of the social, I argue the expansion of HE in modern China serves to promote the HE candidateship among populations, to include those who have not been targeted by HE; in the process, different subjects and subjectivities emerged.

With regard to technologies of the self, I argue that both socialist and neoliberal technologies of the self are at work in contemporary Chinese HE, the former aiming at promoting acceptance of socialist norms and values of government, and the latter at promoting self-governance, autonomy and accountability.

In the next chapter, I will further discuss desires, rewards, and choices of HE, and I will conclude with a summary of subjects and subjectivities of HE in modern China.

Chapter 9 Desires and Choices

Desires and Rewards

In the previous chapter, I focus on the ways in which HE as an assemblage of human technologies works on its subjects. In this chapter, I will further investigate the ways in which HE works through the desires and choices of its subjects. This does not only apply to neoliberal government, but also authoritarian forms of government. In this section, I will explore the roles of desires and choices in the government of HE subjects.

In his latest work Governing Educational Desires, Kipnis Kipnis (2011) looks into the educational assemblage of classroom activities, family devotions, school regulations and local educational policies in a Chinese county, and discusses how educational desires serve a means of governing educational subjects. He draws on Deleuze and Guattari (1984; 1987) and suggest that

> '... social organisation depends on lack. Social production and reproduction by necessity rely upon human desire, and human desire ("an abject fear of lacking something") is structured through the social organisation of lack. Such a conception of desire recalls the relation between educational desire and ... suzhi discourse. Governing with the goal of raising the nation's Quality depends on a conception of the nation as a whole, as well as individuals and communities within it, as lacking in Quality. Lack is especially marked in rural, uneducated, and impoverished persons, households, and communities, and thus intense passions may be born in such sites. That the standards determining what constitutes a "Quality" individual undergo constant inflation (from upper secondary school to university education, from undergraduate university education to graduate school levels, from any university education to degrees from the top universities only), and can be redefined by powerful institutions and individuals, only increases the insecurity that surrounds the lack and intensity of the passion. But also ... the discourses that define this lack are not simply the products of unidirectional, top-down, authoritarian governing. Rather these discourses emerge from fantasies deeply embedded in the wider society, circulate among various social classes and groupings...(Kipnis, 2011, p. 133)'

Following Deleuze and Guattari (1984), Kipnis associates desires with lack, and in the case of education in China, this lack is most noticeable in the discourses of suzhi (Quality, with a capital 'Q' in his terms). Educational desires revolve around lacking in Quality, in particular in rural areas and among uneducated populations. For this argument, I have two concerns. First, as my previous discussions point out, the discourses of human quality, from the late Qing's concern of 'population quality' to the contemporary discussion of suzhi, are more closely related to the fear of the state in the face of warfare, economic backwardness, and now global competition, than to the fear of the subjects of governing. It is perhaps true that the subjects also imbed themselves in the discourses of suzhi, and interpret their own educational desires with reference to such a 'keyword'(Kipnis, 2006), but while Kipnis notes that such discourse is 'deeply embedded in the wider society', he does not sufficiently

address the emergence of such discourse from non-state actors. By focusing on the discourses largely initiated and promoted by the state, Kipnis overlooks some of the indigenous desires that exist before the modern era, desires that are produced by other forms of power. These indigenous desires, I argue, resolve primarily around the notion of social mobility, and are well maintained through the history of Imperial China and modern China. Second, Deleuze and Guattari(1984)'s notion of desires as lack can be very useful in illuminating the emergence of desires, but it does not provide much explanation for the maintenance of desires, and also their transformations in different historical periods. Therefore, I argue that desires, in this case, desires for HE in China, are maintained by rewards. These rewards may take a variety of forms, wealth, power, influence, fame, security, etc., and in different historical periods, the exact forms of rewards may vary greatly, which in turn shapes the targeting desires. In formulating such rewards, an authoritarian regime may be more powerful in producing a unified set for its own objectives, for instance under high socialism, and a neoliberal regime may mobilize more forms of rewards with the participation of the market and subjects themselves, rewards of wider life choices and higher autonomy for example. In the light of these two concerns, I tend to agree more with Rofel (2007, p. 14)'s argument that desire

> 'is a historically, socially and culturally produced field of practices. These longings, aspirations, and newly experienced needs articulated with the contradictions and inequalities produced out of neoliberalism in China. They create attachments and active involvement in these transformations. Novel forms of inclusion and exclusion that arose out of economic reform rested on how its policies captured a wide array of desires produced in part out the policies themselves'.

Though Rofel's discussion of desire revolves around the transformations brought about in the name of neoliberalism, I want to argue this also applies to other social transformations in the history of modern China. These social transformations also brought with them new forms and policies of social inclusion and exclusion, which are most noticeable in the contrasts between high socialism and its previous era and aftermaths. As I will show below, new forms of social segregations under state socialism, for instance, greatly shaped the conventional desires of HE, but the desires did not perish but manifest themselves in alternative forms of 'attachments' and 'involvement'. I now begin my review of HE desires as such a field of practices.

Desires

Before the emergence of modern HE in China, there were discourses speaking to the instrumental dimensions of education, with regard to how educational efforts, in particular in preparing for the

Imperial Examination can bring out desirable rewards. Successes in the Imperial Examination lead to posts in the civil service, which can also mean social status and political influence. The most famous saying in imperial China with regard to the rewards of educational endeavours is from Zhao Heng, Emperor Zhen of Song Dynasty. He writes

> 'to bring wealth to family one needs no good farmland, as there are tons of grains in the book; to settle down one needs no high ceilings, as there is a house of gold in the book; ... there is no need to be upset by the absence of a good matchmaker, as there is glowing beauty in the book' (quoted in Liu, 2004, p. 241, my translation).

Its simplified version is perhaps more well known – 'there are tons of grains in the book; there is a house of gold in the book; there is glowing beauty in the book'. What this saying implies is that educational efforts can lead to success for men in the Imperial Examinations, which in turn will bring out a variety of substantial rewards, such as food, money and good-looking women. It associates devotion in the preparation for the Imperial Examination with material rewards in an immediately instrumental way. Although it does not suggest one should study industriously simply for these material rewards, but it does present these rewards as something desirable and admirable. Understandings lie these transfer desires for material returns into motivations of educational efforts.

Also, there are other popular sayings that revolve around the spiritual rewards in this regards, such as 'to endure the suffering (from learning) so one can be superior to others' (chi de ku zhong ku, fang wei ren shang ren, means 'no cross, no crown'), 'decades of oblivion in school may bring you fame overnight' (shi nian huan chuang wu ren wen, yi ju cheng ming tian xia wen), etc. (Yang, 2004, p. 290 summarises a number of popular sayings of education). These two sayings emphasis the social rewards of educational efforts, to be superior and famous. The popularity of these sayings, or their persuasiveness, had been maintained by the historical records of social mobility via the Imperial Examinations – for those who came from humble backgrounds, it was still quite possible to change one's life chances and family situation by the educational path. The spiritual rewards and the material rewards are not exclusive towards each other, but rather they have been intertwined with each other in the discourses of educational efforts and returns, as the Chinese phrase 'to achieve fame and wealth at the same time' (*mingli shuangshou*) suggests. Using educational rewards as motivations can be understood as a human technology, a technology that mobilises the population for the selection of civil servants organised by central governments, a technology that translate governmental objectives (of open recruitments) into personal desires. Considering the fact that such a human technology had been in effect for 1,300 years (605 AD to 1905 AD), with its logic taken over in modern forms of

examinations such as the CEE, one may conclude that the correlation between desires and rewards have been most sustained and persuasive.

After the abolition of the Imperial Examination, the discursive connections between education and material rewards did not perish. Rather they were also deployed in the new era of advanced learning, of modern HE. The edict issued on 5th September 1905 commanded the viceroys and governors to send a number of selected students to study in foreign countries, and stated that

> 'to those who are willing to cross the wide oceans in order to gain substantial knowledge to be of use to their country when they return home we shall certainly show our deepest pleasure and commendations. (King, 1911, p. 38, author's translation)'

The Empress Dowager issued the great edict on September 17th, 1905, regulating the sending of students to pursue advanced learning, which specified the aims of such overseas studies, the procedure of evaluation upon completion and the rewards for outstanding achievement:

> '... young men of scholastic promise and ability (are to be sent) abroad to study any branch of western science or art best suited to their abilities and tastes, so that they may return in turn to China and place the fruits of their knowledge at the services of the Empire. Upon the return of a student from abroad with his diploma, providing the completion of his studies, he may present himself before the viceroy or governor and literary chancellor of his native Province for examination, and, if approved of, may then be recommended to the ministry of foreign affairs for employment, and subsequently memorialised to the Throne for promotion by said ministry (translated by King, 1911, p. 31).'

The rewards for those who went abroad for advanced learning are specified in this edict as governmental posts in the ministry of foreign affairs. Once again, efforts in education, in this case overseas studies, were associated with rewards typical of the Imperial Examination system. The logic of motivating educational efforts remained largely unchanged in this case, as did the primarily targeted desires. However, if one was to make such efforts and to claim the promised rewards, one should also be subject to certain supervision and regulations in doing so. As King (1911, p. 38) points out,

> '(t)he students were reminded that they should study with profit to themselves and their country, so that upon their return they might be of service to their Emperor. They were urged to make careful selections of studies, not choosing simple ones, nor shirking difficult ones, but choosing those subjects which they were best fitted to pursue and which would give them knowledge and ability so that they might upon their return show by examination that they were qualified to take places of responsibility.'

Students were reminded to invest their efforts with care, not to jeopardise their studies with too ambitious a target, and not to waste their chances abroad on 'simple' courses. Their educational efforts to be invested are therefore not simply their individual conducts, their human capital, but also a most

valuable 'investment' of the central government. Therefore, such investment should be handled with care. Under this logic, daily details of advanced learning of individual students, such as the selection of courses, were established as a field of government intervention.

Within the different historical periods that follow, the specific forms of rewards of advanced learning or HE may have varied, but the technology of HE rewards remains at work, and the desires for such rewards remained largely unchanged. In the Republican era, despite the widespread construction of HEIs in western styles, the desires for the HE rewards, and the expected forms of rewards among the public were similar to those of the previous era. As Pepper (1996, p. 116) points out,

> 'education was being relegated to the less exalted status it occupied in the Western countries, in a process largely unanticipated by early Chinese modernizers. Rather, they assumed that just as Confucian learning both epitomised the state and controlled access to the most prestigious occupations, so Western learning would guarantee both national and personal wealth and power. In reality, Western learning did neither, at least not in the manner anticipated. But decisions based on those assumptions continued to influence the new education for decades. Its clientele retained traditional attitudes towards educational status – hence the emphasis on building a college-preparatory system with a literary liberal arts orientation and career aspirations to match.'

The unchanged attitudes identified by Pepper, or the outdated belief in what rewards (higher) education can bring about for those who enthusiastically get involved, are reflections of HE desires, desires of material and spiritual returns, of social mobility, of 'personal wealth and power'. Not surprisingly, for majority of applicants to HE in that period, it was still social mobility and economic incentive that underpinned their HE desires. This went against what early Modernizers intended – to establish aspirations for knowledge as the aim of studies in HEIs. Despite the advocacy of the government and educators at the time, to reshape the HE desires that build up throughout Imperial China would not be easy. Cai Yuanpei, for example, openly warned students of such 'unwanted' HE desires in his much quoted inauguration speech of Chancellor of Peking University,

> 'fellow students (of Peking University) should establish it as the principle (of university attendance) to pursue one's education. Those enrolled in Law should not aim to be government officials; those enrolled in Business should not aim to be wealthy. Once the principle is established, one would be naturally on the right track. Students staying here for 3 to 4 years, a considerable amount of time, would make a tremendous achievement if one treasure every minute and study diligently. If one aimed to be in government or wealth, (I want to remind them) that such rationales (of HE) were misguiding and one was taking the wrong routes (reprinted in Cai, 1993, p. 825, my translation).'

It is perhaps difficult for contemporary researchers to decide to what extent Cai's advocacy was successful in denouncing the conventional HE desires and in promoting his notion of pure academic studies instead, as literature in this regard was rather thin. The League of Nations' report argued that the early students were still keen to use university education as a channel to government posts. The evidence for such a statement was the popularity of subject choices among students at the time[31]. 'The ambition of most Chinese university students (was) a career in public service, central or local, and failing that a post as a teacher. Law and political science (were) regarded as the natural preparation for the former, an Arts course for the latter (Becker *et al*, 1932, p. 151)'. In other words, the HE desires were likely to have remained largely unchanged.

Such HE desires were subject to major adjustment under the socialist governmentality. There were two major changes to the government of HE subjects – first, the new higher education system was designed to produce technocrats rather than bureaucrats, and second, all graduates were put under the centralised graduate placement scheme. In terms of the former, the conventional route between HE and governmental posts was now cut off. The reconstructing of institutions based on the Soviet model gave birth to a highly specialised training mechanism, which led students to positions also of high specialisation in their later employment; the model of general education for managerial elites in the Republican era was replaced by one of specialised education for technocrats in state socialism, which further detached itself from the administrative hierarchy in government posts. As a result, the chances of graduate employment in government positions were greatly reduced; they were greatly excluded from the mainstream status system based on administrative clearance, and found themselves under another upgrading mechanism of technical professions, which was also tied up with the post wage system. This mechanism was believed to modelled after the administrative system, which implied the inferiority of technocrats to government officials in terms of both political authority and incomes (Liu, 2005). Therefore, the conventional HE desires for personal power were not to be realised, at least not immediately, as graduates from the new higher education system would first be recognised as technical elites rather than political elites.

Also under high state socialism, it was almost impossible to achieve personal wealth via HE. In the pre-reform system, Chinese organisations were predominantly publicly owned and controlled by the state, with their reward and sanctioning mechanisms set up accordingly. These mechanisms were

[31] The Report shows that in the school year 1930, students in Law accounted for 36.6% of the total population, and in Liberal Arts 22.5%; in comparison those in Engineering made up only 11.5%, and in Natural Science 9.7%. The reasons for such disparity might be, first the high expenses for advanced scientific and technological equipment and few employment positions in those subjects.

distinctive for two features – the general absence of economic incentives and a strong tendency towards egalitarianism (Cao, 2004). Uniform wage scale, for instance, was carried out nationwide, and differences among scales proved to be small – Walder (1995) reported a mere 8% salary gap between administrators and ordinary workers, and rewards for superior performance were more often symbolic than material. However, this is not to suggest the absence of social inequality. In place of economic incentives, other forms of rewards of job performance were exercised, generally in a discretionary allocation of career opportunities, housing and some other benefits. Only CCP members had realistic chances of being assigned posts with significant powers, and also housing allocation, generally considered as a non-monetary compensation, was in heavy favour of cadres and political activists.

With regard to the second major changes to the government of HE subject, the centralised graduate placement scheme took away the autonomy of HE graduates in terms of how they could choose their employment tracks (also to great extent their life trajectories). This scheme had actually been practiced before 1949, when HE students were all revolution cadres and funded by the government, and accordingly assigned employment by the government. The communist regime carried on with the logic behind this scheme - university graduates were the most needed human resource and should accordingly be deployed by the central government. In 1950 when the scheme was first used, graduates were given suggestions of assigned employment but were also allowed to seek their own employment. In 1952, a basic principle of 'concentrated utilisation and centralised configuration' was established. In 1957 the scheme was given a disciplinary authority to enforce the central placement. The Regulations regarding the employment assignment of graduate by the State Council states that

> 'the graduates of specialties of greatest urgency to the nation must obey the employment placement scheme; apart from them, other graduates can be given graduate certificates if they are to take the need of the nation into no account, and relentlessly insist upon their own needs, and refuse to accept their assignment employment; university administrators in charge should inform them that the government will not be responsible for their employment and they are to seek their own, but they will not be accepted by any governmental organisations, schools, enterprises and public institutions. (qouted in Yang, 2003, p. 133, my translation)'

Such a policy may be understood as a human technology, as the bodies of HE subjects are to be distributed or relocated (from HEIs) by the will of the state rather than by that of themselves. It also enforces strong disciplinary power. Considering the fact that all private institutions had already been eradicated, students who refused to accept the placement scheme would definitely be unemployed and hence unable to survive in a command economy under the state socialism. In other words, the prices for those who chose to fight against the will of the central government would be extremely high.

However, the effects of these two major changes did not mean that HE rewards were entirely devalued, or that HE desires perished as a result. Socialist governmentality introduced new technologies of government, and in turn produced new forms of HE rewards for such rewards. First and foremost, HE remained the most efficient means to achieve social mobility – only now, such social mobility was manifest in other perspectives than personal power and wealth. Under this alternative configuration, HE rewards still promised to enable subjects of state socialism to overcome new barriers of social segregation.

In the Maoist era, though a number of important policies were intended to eradicate class difference, there were two forms of social segregation at play. First, all citizens were assigned to one of the three categories in term of official social status – peasants, workers and cadres. All three statuses were meant to be equal in prevailing official discourses, but in reality they were attached to different standards of social welfares and, less so, economic conditions. These statuses were robustly segregated and the arrangement was extremely difficult to change. Another segregation policy was introduced by Mao in the 1950s to stop massive migration from rural areas to urban areas – the household scheme which tied up individual family's income, social welfare and even food and other daily supplies to its residential unit – mainly commune in rural areas or working units in urban areas. This household scheme made it almost impossible for one to achieve geographic mobility, as one would be denied access to hospitals, schools or food supplies outside one's assigned residential unit (Zhou, 2004; Zhou, Moen and Tuma, 1998).

In the face of these two forms of social segregation, the public soon found the participation in HE as perhaps the most reasonable route to achieve social mobility. Graduates from HEIs via the placement scheme would automatically be assigned employment by the state, most likely to relatively important posts in the urban areas and allowed to change one's household, and also graduates could change their status from workers or peasants to cadres, as all HE graduates were given 'state cadre' (guojia ganbu) titles under state socialism. Moreover, since graduate employment under state socialism was guaranteed, it also gave rise to a discourse of 'socialist security' of HE graduates. Although graduates lost much of their autonomy in job choice and life trajectories, their employment and other parts of daily lives (housing, medical care, and other welfare) were secured under state socialism. Unlike their predecessor in the Republican era, HE graduates under high socialism were exempt from the worries of unemployment.

In this way, socialist governmentality established its own HE rewards as persuasive discourses, also cultivated corresponding HE desires for the rewards. Such desires, to some extent, did not vary greatly

in nature from their counterparts in previous eras, as they still resolve primarily around social mobility and economic concerns, only that these two issues now had different implications. Social mobility did not mean an (immediate) acquisition of political power, but to enable one to cross boundaries of social segregation; economic concerns did not mean an (immediate) acquisition of personal wealth in financial terms, but higher standards of living, welfare, and security in socialist scales.

An example of the persuasiveness of these HE rewards and the persistence of HE desires can be found in the Cultural Revolution period. The prevailing discourses during that period argued that formal education should be not held superior to manual labour and therefore be discouraged, and the change in the graduate placement scheme requested university graduates, who were initially recommended by factories or productive units, to return to their previous posts or localities. In other words, the discourses and new placement policies both challenged the socialist HE rewards and desires.

But in practice, even when HE was mostly discouraged, those in the top social class chose to stick with their belief in HE rewards, to pass on their HE desires to their offspring by securing the few places in HE. As various studies suggested (see Liu, 2005; Unger, 1982 for example), young people from cadre families dominated educational opportunities at all levels, including HE. They managed to secure the scarce positions in HEIs via the recommendation scheme, which was intended to recruit candidates from workers, peasants and soldiers. One explanation for this phenomenon is that a large number of students from cadre families might have already settled in rural areas during the previous rustification campaigns and were recommended for higher education entry after being reclassified as peasants. Also, in terms of graduate employment, Teiwes (1974) examined the first group graduates in post-Cultural revolution in 1974, and reported that the graduates who had had previous schooling and were sent down to the rural areas were most likely to be allocated by central planning agency to various departments. Ironically, those who were most capable in providing aid to rural modernisation did not presumably return to rural production units but were absorbed by the bureaucracy. But considering the fact among them a generous proportion was from cadre families in the first place, their destinations would be less surprising. In the circle of being sent down and absorbed back, the ruling class found a way to secure their share of HE rewards and maintain their HE desires even in the time of great radicalism and scarcity.

In the post-Mao era, the most immediate change to HE was that unified national entrance examinations was reintroduced and enforced for HE in 1977, followed by a remarkable expansion for higher education. Attention should also be given to an important new sector of higher education, adult higher education. Built upon the informal sector during the Cultural Revolution period, this sector includes

television and radio universities, urban adult institutions associated with large enterprises, and colleges of adult educations associated with large enterprises. It was intended to provide massive re-education programmes for old revolutionary elites to prepare themselves for the new 'modernisation' goals (Hayhoe, 1996) and more importantly legitimize their political authority as the 1983 plan required by 1990, a college education as a prerequisite for all leading cadres down to the county level (Fewsmith, 2008). In 1986, adult higher education largely completed this mission, and 'by the time of the Thirteen Party Congress in 1987, college-educated professional cadres had largely replaced the poorly educated, largely peasant cadre forces that had come to power in 1949' (Pepper, 1996, p. 489). The rise of adult education and its specified aim implies a new mentality of government in the reform era, which once again associated HE with government posts. But this new mentality does not suggest that HE was a sufficient condition for government posts, but rather a necessary condition, a pre-requisite, a qualification to be further evaluated by other terms. This is later confirmed by the Civil Services Examination system (CSE), which requires that all applicants must hold a degree of four-year HE. CSE has become increasingly popular in recent years, and is now portrayed as the 'state examination' (guo kao). This is not difficult to understand. In the face of the graduate employment crisis as a result of a rapid expansion of HE since 1998, university graduates can achieve greater security in employment and also access to greater political influence once they succeed in the selection of civil servants via CSE. Via this contemporary form of social selection, the conventional desires of obtaining governmental posts return, now motivating the contemporary HE subjects.

In the post-socialist period, HE desires once again take different shapes. On the one hand, the desires for socialist security began to fade, as the state sector no longer unconditionally absorbed HE graduates, and employment perspectives were not longer guaranteed. With regard to employment perspectives of HE graduates, the period between 1978 and 1999 witnessed a fluctuation. Because the 1983 plan re-established the connection between specialised or professional degrees with particular bureaucratic posts (Fewsmith, 2008, p. 5), university graduates normally had little difficulties finding employment in national and provincial bureaucracies where there was a gap in professional personnel created by the total stoppage of higher education during the Cultural Revolution. However, employment prospects became less favourable after 1985. On the one hand, vacancies in professional and bureaucratic domain were filled up by succeeding cohorts of expanded group of graduates; on the other hand, this situation was worsened by the economic recession in the late 1980s which created fewer posts than previous years.

Additionally, the market mechanism introduced new forms of desires. First and foremost, choices and autonomy in one's job choice (and life trajectories) became increasingly significant as the 1985 reforms started to move away from the unified graduate placement scheme. 'Two-way' selection was carried out in 1989, which allowed graduates to choose among a number of posts, and in 1994, the government largely withdrew from graduate placement (Hoffman, 2006; 2010). Therefore, graduates were faced with the new employment situation marked with more choices, more competition risk, and less security. In the following expansion era of HE, this will become an increasingly severe challenge to students' discourses of employment security and social privilege.

Another important change to the desires of HE was the re-introduction of economic incentives. In the post-Mao era, principles of egalitarianism were gradually eroded. The economic reforms in the post 1992 era further introduced the market mechanism to both the public and private sector of Chinese organisations. By the mid-1990s, a considerable proportion of the public enterprises had been transformed into relatively independent corporate entities, and their obligation to the state was via taxation. According to Wu and Xie (Wu and Xie, 2003, p. 245),

'One of the principal structural changes following the post-socialist transformation has been the gradual replacement of the state by the market as the principal agent of social stratification. This dramatic change has led some theorists to predict an increasing in the importance of market credentials (such as education) and a decrease in the importance of political attributes as determinants of earnings in transition economies'.

With respect to the changing role of education in social stratification, researchers have noticed two trends – first, income/earning returns to education have increased over time and second, they tend to be higher in the private sector than in the state sector (seeWu and Xie, 2003 for a good review of relevant literatures). Hence, HE graduates began to explore opportunities in the market sector and to be more concerned with economic returns of their job choices. Xie and Wang (2001), for instance, report a noticeable trend that graduates in the 1990s chose foreign enterprises and joint-venture companies over the state sector as the former offered higher salaries.

Also geographic mobility becomes an increasingly important factor in HE desires, in particular those who are from economically disadvantaged regions. Therefore, for HE graduates in the reform era, secure and well-paid jobs in metropolitan regions, preferably in coastal areas, become perhaps the most desirable employment perspective. Li and Wang report (2008, p. 5) that coastal areas in 2007 absorb 61.3% of new graduates at bachelor level, though the region only accounts for 34.6% of

entrants and 34.3% of educational resources. This rapid expansion of HE also means a domestic HE migration into urban areas is taking place at a faster speed and a large scale.

In summary, the post-socialist era witnesses a rapid increases in job choice for HE subjects in terms of the type of employers and locations, and how to make the best of the choices available becomes an important strategy for each and every HE subject, every HE self. This increase of choices also applies to other domain of HE such as universities and specialities. This is the focus of the next section.

Choices

The government of HE subjects in the post-socialist period increasingly works via choices, autonomy and self-enterprise, rather than mere robust administrative intervention. As Hoffman(2010, p. 10) points out,

> 'A critical aspect of the governmental change in China was the adoption of more distanced techniques of governing that encouraged self-governance rather than state-directed planning. These techniques... differed from those of high-socialist era, when citizens ... had little autonomy to generate their own plans, ... to pursue individual interests ...'

With regard to HE subjects, students are given more choices in various aspects of their HE participation and also more autonomy in making these choices. This increasing importance of choice-making among HE subjects exhibits what Sigley (quoted in Hoffman, 2003, p. 21) terms a 'reconceptualisation of target subjects from objects of administrative fiat to autonomous agents with vested interests and rights'. With the reconstruction and expansion of HE system from the 1980s onwards, a large number of specialities in humanity and social science were reintroduced into HE curriculum, meaning more choices in what one can study in HE. There was also a significant rise in the number of HEIs, meaning more choices in where one can study for HE. The abolishment of the graduate placement scheme also allowed HE subjects to choose their career tracks for themselves, more choices in what to do after HE.

At first glance, there seems to be more choices, autonomy and freedom for HE subjects. But this is not to say that they are not subject to less government in the post-socialist era. Rather they are now subject to different forms of government (Barry, Osborne and Rose, 1996; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999) which require them to make choices for themselves with all the information they can find, all the counsels they can have access to, and all relevant factors taken into accounts; they are all to be held responsible for all the choices made. In following Rose(1999) and Hoffman (2006; 2010), I argue that, rather than measuring the degree to which subjects are truly autonomous and free, we should focus on how choice, autonomy and freedom act as a post-socialist art of government, a technology of self-governance, and a part of subject formation processes. In this regard, HE subjects are bound to freely make their choices (Apple, 1993). They should aim to be professional in the way they choose; they are bound to 'professionally choose subjects' (Hoffman, 2006; 2010).

In this section, I focus on the choices of HE specialities, institutions and also professions upon graduations, and reveal how choices are introduced, promoted and articulated in these domains, and how choices serves as a part of government in the post-socialist era.

Hot Specialities, Cold Specialities

One domain of such choices is to choose one's specialty of HE. Sina (xin lang, www.sina.com.cn), one of the leading portal sites in China, produces a particular section on how to make choices of specialities[32]. The entire section is organised in the tone of 'insiders', those who are familiar with the rules and games of speciality choosing, or as 'authorities' of HE as noted in chapter 7. For instance, this 'subject choice' section of Sina gives an analysis of 'hot' specialties, meaning those that are popular in the job market and most likely to be well-paid. Such specialities were reported[33] to be Economics, International economics and trade, Public Finance, Finance, International Finance, Insurance, Credit Management, all revolving around economics and finance; but for 2012, the list of 'predicted' hot specialties looks significantly different[34] – it includes Aviation and Astronautics, Monetary Management, PMB Logistics, Alternative Energy and Materials, and Creative Industries, all connected with industries and domains to be rising in the near future. Although all reports put together in this section in forms of 'analysis' or 'prediction' are cast with a tone of 'insiders', they can be confusing and contradictory – for those who had to make choices of specialties in the year 2009, for instance, should they believe in the analysis of the current hot specialties, or the prediction of those of 2012, which is closer to the time of their graduation? Apparently, this section of Sina, like all other reports and forecasts of this kind, only intends to serve as an information portal, the readers will have to make up their own minds.

This section also gives a number of lists that are intended to warn the choosers of the risks involved, such as lists of 'tricky' specialties and the most 'impractical'. The former is entitled 'Don't buy it – top 10 Superficially Beautiful specialties'[35], and presents 'the truth' of the risks of each one. For instance, Environmental Engineering is on the list due to the claim that 'the level of industrial development in

---

[32] http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/hotmajor/index.html

[33] http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2008-04-28/1506136749.shtml, author unknown, last accessed on 20th July, 2011

[34] http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2008-04-27/1902136612.shtml author unknown, last accessed on 20th July, 2011

[35] The article borrows its name from a novel 'Superficially Beautiful' (kan shang qu hen mei), by Wang Suo (1999), a well-known contemporary writer. The novel was made into a film in 2006, by the name of 'Little Red Flowers'.

China is not advanced enough', Mechanics for the reason that 'one has to deal with practices of boring drawing every day', Chemical Engineering and Technology because 'one needs to work in the front line', and Public Administration as 'one will know everything but be good at none'. For the latter, the article titled 'Summarised by the web users - top 16 Most Impractical Specialties' is actually not produced by Media professionals, but is cited from a personal blog. This list of 16[36] even includes some of most cutting edge specialities in China such as Biotechnology and Environmental Sciences. The author[37] explains that biotechnology is impractical as

> 'In China, one can hardly find a good job even with a doctoral degree (in biotechnology) from a renowned university; unless with a foreign doctoral degree, one can do a bit teaching. But this speciality is of highest enrolment scores. Every year, a lot of high achievers get into this specialty with great expectations, but it is a true waste (of their talents). There has not been a proper Biotech enterprise in China, so it will be very difficult to find a job. This specialty of this university is now marked with the lowest employment record of its graduates for the past three years.'

Without proper survey data without knowing the specific university the article refers to, it is hard to verify the statement of this quotation that Biotechnology has the lowest employment record among all. But accuracy is perhaps not the primary concern of articles as such – they are to remind HE subjects the risks behind the 'glorious names' of certain specialties, some that might sound interesting and promising but in fact lead to undesirable employment perspectives. Biotechnology for instance has extremely high entrance requirements, meaning a big investment of one's human capital and intellectual capital, but has a poor employment perspective, meaning a low return in the market; therefore, it is sufficient to say that choosing Biotechnology as one's specialty of 4-year-HE is highly risky and perhaps not wise. The underpinning logic of such conclusions are obviously market rationalities – it does not give account of one's personal interests, but revolves primarily on the return rate of one's 'investment'. Such a logic is aimed to train its audiences, most likely HE subjects, to evaluate their choices with a market rationality, to be professional choosers, to be enterprising selves.

---

[36] The 16 specialities listed (in fact only 14 are listed) are Biotechnology, Environmental Sciences, Marketing, International Politics and Diplomacy, Chinese Language and Literature, Journalism, Economics, E-government, Human Resource Management, Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Physics, Computer Science, Food Science, Information Management, etc.

[37] http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2007-12-20/1906114437.shtml author unknown, last accessed on 20th July, 2011, my translation.

Seeking the Secret Bargains

After the rapid expansion of HE system in recent years, the number of HEIs rises to 1,908 in 2008. This huge system is also a hierarchy of mainly three categories – key HEIs, regular HEIs, and two-year colleges. To choose among such a big number of HEIs could be confusing. For high achievers in the CEE, the first step is perhaps to make sure one gets into the most renowned and elite universities, as credentials from these institutions represent the highest market value. These institutions are most likely among the 'national key universities' (quanguo zhongdian yuanxiao). The most convenient way to decide whether a HEIs is a key institution or a regular one is to check whether it is in the list of the '985' or '211' institutions, the '985' being even more exclusive and elite in terms of reputation (by official standards) of the listed institutions and the governmental investment they receive.

If the key universities represent the highest market values, then for those who are choosing among these HEIs, it is most ideal to secure a position in such institutions and hence to maximize the future returns of one's investment in HE (time, tuition and other fees). However, the positions available in the key universities, in particular the most elite such as Peking and Qinghua, are limited and hence highly competitive, so it is perhaps a better strategy for those who are not among the highest achievers to secure positions in a key institution that is not among the most exclusive – in this way, one secures the market value of his or her degree to be claimed, and reduces the risks of failing in the university game - the worst scenario would be not getting into a key university in the end, even if one is academically qualified, simply because of writing down the 'wrong' choices in their application forms, for instance a highly exclusive university out of one's league. In other words, those who are not among the highest achievers are wise to seek the secret bargains, key universities that are not among the most competitive, the most well-known, but nonetheless with good values in terms of teaching, research, expertises and employment perspectives of their graduates.

For instance, 'Gaofen' (high scores, www.gaofen.com), a website aiming at providing information for educational subjects – supposedly, those who want to achieve high scores at various stages of their education, from entrance examinations to primary schools to the CEE and those for study overseas, posts an article named 'Analysis – eight '211 universities' that are most likely to be neglected by high achievers in the CEE'. It makes recommendations of eight universities that are among the '211' but are perhaps among the least competitive – in other words, the secret bargains in university choices. For instance, it recommends Fuzhou University[38] as it is

[38] http://www.gaofen.com/article/118463.htm last accessed on 20th July, 2011, my translation.

'located in the capital city of Fujian province – Fuzhou. For the reason of climate and geographic location, it is hard to attract students from North China. But this university is among the "211 project" and has its own strength, and desires the attention of those from North China.'

In this case, Fuzhou University is not among the most popular 211 institutions for applicants in North China, and is likely to be far less competitive and of much lower an entrance requirement. For those who are not among the highest achievers in the CEE, and willing to trade possible inconveniences in climate and geography, Fuzhou University may be a most desirable bargain – it is low in risks of gaining admission and high in return in terms of its academic competence and graduate employment perspectives).

It is perhaps, once again, difficult to verify such pieces of information. Information as such is not intended to be precise; it is aimed to present itself as 'popular wisdom', and above all, to promote a certain market rationality, a market logic that focuses on how to maximize one's investment in HE, how to claim the biggest benefits with the lowest risks involved. In this case, for those who are not among the most competitive in the CEE, choosing a secret bargain university would be a good example of a wise investment under a market rationality, of the professional conduct of an enterprising HE self. University choice, according to this market rationality, is a conduct that involves careful calculation of risks and returns, a conduct that requires a collection of a variety of information and a logic and rational decision making process, a conduct of market professionalism. One needs to choose wisely, rationally, and professionally.

Choosing Professions, Professionally Choosing

In my previous discussion of technologies and rewards, I explain how the personal dossiers system, household registration and employment placement scheme helped produce subjects amenable to a socialist art of government, to a planned economy. But major changes were introduced in the post-socialist era. For instance, new forms of labour distribution such as job fairs, face-to-face interviews and career counselling are now in the place of direct job assignment of state plans. The 'Talent Service Centre' (rencai fuwu zhognxin) and 'Talent Market' (rencai shichang) are set up and run by government's Personnel Bureau in big cities to serve as a platform of job hunting among new professionals such as HE graduates (Hoffman, 2006).

Hoffman (2010, pp. 12-13) in her ethnographic study of college graduates in Dalian China, Patriotic Professionalism in Urban China, provides an insightful account of how in the post-socialist era (or the

late-socialist era in her term) job choice serves as 'a part of power relations, a mechanism of regulation, a device deployed to help encourage college graduates to be self-enterprising individuals', and how new practices of choice ... helped to specify new subjects of government'. She gives examples of job fairs on university campus and Talent Market as forms of new forms of job distribution in metropolitan cities such as Dalian, and explores the ways in which the norms of culture/ education (*wenhua*) and human quality (*sushi*) are infused into the hiring process. These practices and discourses, according to Hoffman(2010, p. 27), 'reinforced the idea that people could change their lives by focusing on self-improvement and self-enterprise, redeploying Confucian ideas of self-cultivation and Maoist calls for constant self-study with neoliberal notions of entrepreneurialisation of the self'. In my discussion of the technologies of the self, I have already discussed how HE subjects are encouraged to take control of their own university education, discover their own interests, improve their 'self-value', and enhance their skills of self-presentation in the hiring process. In this section, I will further engage with the prevailing discourses of job choice of HE graduates in contemporary China.

First, one of most common arguments with regard to the graduate employment problem from the early 2000s onwards is that HE graduates are unable to adapt themselves to the current situation of the job market, and are likely to have related 'psychological issues'. This argument treats radical changes in graduate employment perspectives, which are without doubt related to the massive expansion of the HE system in the recent decade, as a kind of social fact, an objective truth, and hence label HE graduates with possible 'psychological deficits'. Wang (1992; 2007, my translation and emphasis) in his An Exploration of Student Psychology in Job Choice argues that there are mainly four problems in this regard,

> 'first, (university graduates) hold too high an expectation of employment; some people have an unclear understanding of the current employment perspectives and of the demands of the employers, and they lack realistic evaluations of themselves, so their subjective expectations are not matched with objective reality, and hence too high an expectation of profession choice and salary. Second, they tend to be too dependent; some rely too much on their parents and universities, and normally give up on fighting for job choice and competition, but instead cast their hopes on parents and relatives. Third, they are too eager for quick success and instant benefits; some people are single-minded on getting into some work units of high salary and welfare, or some joint-venture enterprises or foreign enterprises or the economically developed coastal regions, and are willing to sacrifice their own HE specialties and personal interests. Fourth, they tend to blindly follow others; some lack rational thinking and neglect the demand of the society and fail to understand their targeting employers, and they have no analysis of their own strength and instead take others' job choice as their own, etc.'

Wang's analysis tends to suggest that the common psychological issues with HE graduates resolve primarily around, firstly, a lack of 'self' – self-dependence rather than dependence upon others (families, relatives, and universities), self-understanding rather than blindly following others; and secondly a lack of 'rationality', in understanding the objective reality of the markets and employers, and in planning their own career tracks (sacrifice long term benefits for instant success).

Second, there are also prevailing discourses that provide solutions to the problems identified by Wang, which infuse technologies of the self (promoting self-understanding and governance) with technologies of the social (promoting professionalism and market rationalities in the post-socialist China). These infused technologies can be found in other reports on graduate employment. For instance, Sun (Sun, 2007, pp., my translation) in University students' professional thinking and orientation discusses how to be a professional self in job choice. This can be done in three steps – first, 'evaluate oneself, and understand one's position (in the professional hierarchy)', such as the market value of one's credentials; second, 'have a vision and understand one's professional orientation', which means detailed research about suitable professions and suitable employers, etc.; 'have a clear mind and establish one's life goals', which involves careful and rational choices between many options likely to be exclusive to each other, such as between an immediate job or a sustainable career. In Sun's argument, a professional self in job choice is to embracemarket rationality (clear about one's own market value), of professional choosing ability (capable of detailed research about professions and employers), of self-understanding (aware of one's strength and weakness) self-organising and self-planning (capable of making life plans with various factors taken into accounts).

Lian (2008, p. 11) bases her discovery of an increasing rationality among HE graduate in job choice upon several trends that she picked out of the results of 'A survey of primary job choice of university students'. According to Lian, this increasing rationality is manifested in the facts that, first, in terms of the type of employers, foreign enterprises are no longer the primary choice, but instead state-owned enterprises become the most popular[39]; second, in terms of geographic locations, although students place their primary choice on metropolitan cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and others in the eastern coastal regions, they are increasingly willing to go to the 'basic level'(jiceng jiuye), regions that are less developed such as small cities and towns; third, in terms of starting salary, more students are willing to accept a range between 1,500 to 4,000, which according to the author is more 'realistic'. It is obvious that Lian's notion of rationality is a market rationality, a market professionalism that requires a

[39] The reason behind this change may be that in previous years foreign enterprises are more likely to offer higher salaries but after the financial crisis in 2008 more students prefer state-owned enterprises for they are more likely to offer higher employment security.

quick adaption to changes in job market (from foreign enterprises to state-owned enterprises to seek better job security), a careful analysis of the distribution of existing job opportunities (from developed regions to developing regions to seek wider range of job choice), a realistic evaluation of market situation (from too high an expectation of starting salaries to a realistic expectation).

Also, sending HE graduates to the basic level, meaning towns and villages in less developed regions, has become a new strategy of human resource distribution by the post-socialist state. The strategy intends to guide HE graduates to take administrative posts in government offices of the basic level (these posts are known as 'village official', *chuanguan*, in prevailing discourses), which is argued to solve the graduate employment problems and introduce 'talents' to where they are most needed. This strategy deploys technologies of the population, which guides the distribution of the bodies of HE graduates away from the developed regions to reduce the employment competition; second, technologies of the social, which presents job choice in the basic level as realistic, beneficial and honourable – new graduates can have more opportunities to choose from, to build up their working experiences at the basic level, and to serve the local community, the people and the nation; and third, technologies of the self, as choosing an administrative post at the basic level not only allows one to building professional expertise, but also exhibits a market professionalism that places 'one's own life goals and career plans as the priority rather than blindly following others' (Li, 2007, p. 10, my translation). The strategy also has its own rewarding system, as Li (2007, p. 10, my translation) reports,

> 'Beijing has its regulations that village officials with two years working experiences can have bonus points in examinations for postgraduate studies, priority in the admission process of the Civil Service Examination, and some other privileges in for example applications for Beijing household; these policies reduce the risks of taking up jobs at the basic level, and encourage more people to explore their own worlds at the basic level.'

This strategy of sending HE graduates down to the basic level pervades both socialist arts of government and neoliberal arts of government. For the former, reports in this regard tend to describe taking up posts as an opportunity to answer to the needs and of the rural area and the demands of the nation, to 'make grand achievement and establish enterprise (*jiangong liye*)' (Yang, 2007, p. 1, my translation), to enframe this particular job choice in the socialist mentality of personnel training and societal building. Jin (2009, p. 5, my translaton) quotes Youngsters and the Rural area (Qingnian Yu Nongchun) by Li Dazhong, one of the founding fathers of the CCP, which says 'in order to introduce modern civilisation into the roots of societies, we must blend the intellectuals with the working class' and 'our youngsters should go to the rural area and make their contribution to the development of the areas' (Li in Jin, 2009, p. 5, my translation). Later in this article, she quotes Zhang Xixian, a professor

at the Party School of the central committee of the CCP, who says that personnel training at the front level of the working class has been a good tradition of the CCP, and this new strategy represents a historical consistency with similar practices in history such as the 'Down to the countryside' movement during the Cultural Revolution.

From the perspective of neoliberal arts of government, this job choice is also a feasible and beneficial one for the HE graduates. It is not forced upon the graduates but open to their selection. Li gives an example of Zhang Bing, a history graduate, who, to the amazement of his peers and friends, took up a job at the basic level in rural Beijing after 'a calm and comprehensive weighing'. Taking up a post at the basic level, according to Li, is not just another possible choice, but also a rational and practical choice, one which exhibits an 'appropriate attitude of job choice in the time of mass HE' – 'go to where your talents are needed, and to build your own golden rice bowl[40]' (Zhang inJin, 2009, p. 5, my translation).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I first explore how desires and choices are deployed as means of government of HE in modern China. I argue that desires should be understood as a historical, social and cultural product of a field of practices, and the maintenance and transformations of desires should be studies with reference to material rewards in reality. HE desires in modern China revolve primarily around the idea of social mobility and also other factors in life chances, such as wealth and fame. Despite the radical social changes in the modern history, such desires have been well maintained by a variety of material rewards and the correlation between desires and rewards remains close and appears persuasive.

With regard to choices, I discuss the ways in which choices are deployed as a way of government in the post-socialist era. In particular, I make reference to choices in three domains – specialties, HEIs, and professions, and reveal how choices and autonomy in making choices in the post-socialist era are used to promote certain market rationality and professionalism. Choices serve as a persuasive form of self-governance.

[40] Li makes reference to the socialist phrase 'iron rice bowl', which means a job of lifetime security under high socialism. The idea of 'golden rice bowl' can mean a job of good prospective, also of a good income, but Li does not specify here.

Part IV

Governing the Present

Framework for Part IV

Governing the Present

The title of this Part is borrowed from an early special issue of *Ideology and Consciousness* (1979, vol. 6), in which Foucault published his famous *On Governmentality.* It again appears as the title of Miller and Rose (2008)'s book on the administration of economic lives in contemporary society. My use of this title here indicates both a Foucauldian approach in the final Part, and also a focus on HE in the contemporary context.

This Part aims to answer my third research question - 'What is produced as the truth of HE? And what are the forms of subject, subjectivity, and ethics produced in such a process?' To this end, I bring together three theoretical tools in a Foucauldian frame - truth, subject and ethics. By truth, I follow the lead of Foucault and understand truth as a social construct - it is produced by power and relative to discourses. For subject, I look into different subject forms of HE that emerge in this history of modern China, and I argue these forms of subject are not given but produced and taken up through HE. The notion of ethics in a Foucaudian frame refers to one's relation with oneself, and it includes four aspects - ethical substance, mode of subjection, self forming activity and telos; I explore their respective application to the Chinese context. In the conclusion chapter, I review the contribution and limitation of Foucauldian perspectives and also make suggestion for future research.

I include both interview data and materials from student dossiers. These data shed some interesting lights on the ways in which certain truth sets, subject forms and ethical principles are produced, modified and taken up through HE in contemporary China.

Chapter 10 Truth

Introduction

In this chapter, I make use of Foucault's notion of 'truth' and explore the production, modification and appropriation of certain discourses of HE. The idea of 'truth' plays an important role in Foucault's work. However, Foucault refuses to theorise truth. For him,

> 'truth does not support theorizing because it is neither diachronically nor synchronically monolithic, Truth has been different things at different times and is different things at the same time. Truth is historical and heterogeneous'(Prado, 2000, p. 138).

Although Foucault is not offering a theory of truth, he provides us with a new perspective of truth, 'a novel account of the diverse non-subjective and impersonal mechanics that produce different sorts of truths in disparate discourses and epochs' (Prado, 2000, p. 138). However, the difficulties facing the readers in understanding Foucault's use of truth, apart from his refusal to theorise it, are increased by the fact that Foucault gives many different accounts of truth in different places and these accounts are not entirely consistent. At the first glance, his views on truth may have a flavour of postmodern relativism with an analytic background. Most noticeably, Foucault argues that truth is historical, relative to discourse and produced by power. But this is only part of his perspective on truth. Prado (2000) writes an excellent summary of Foucauldian notions of truth, which include the criterial notion, the constructivist notion, the perspectivist notion, the experiential notion, and the tactic-realistic notion.

The criterial use of truth focuses on the relativistic side of truth, or 'what counts as truth in a discourse'; his constructivist use is concerned with how truth is produced (and sustained) in discourse; his perspectivist use tackles the appropriation of truth by individuals, the process in which 'subjectivities are shaped by power through constraints on individuals to acquire certain beliefs and to adopt certain perspectives'; his idea of experiential truth is 'the outcome or resolution of … "epistemological crises",' namely the circumstances in which 'individuals find themselves forced to question what they previously accepted unquestioningly'(Prado, 2000, p. 128). Prado introduces the last notion, the tactic-realistic to justify Foucault's inconsistency in his uses of truth as either a genealogical critic or in other discursive roles, which is not immediately related to my discussion here. Therefore, I only make reference the first four notions of truth.

Foucauldian Notions of Truth	criterial	what counts as truth in a discourse
	constructivist	the production of truth in discourse
	perspectivist	the appropriation of truth by individuals
		subjectivities being shaped by power through constraints on individuals to acquire certain beliefs and to adopt certain perspectives
	experiential	truth acquired by reflecting upon of what one previously accepted unquestioningly
	tactic-realistic	Foucault's shifting roles as either a genealogical critic or a discourse participant

Table 10, Foucauldian Notions of Truth, based on Prado (2000, p. 128)

The Criterial Notion of Truth

With regard to the criterial notion, Foucault is most explicit in saying that each society 'has its particular regime of truth'. This regime of truth includes different types of discourse which it accepts as true, and is shaped by mechanisms 'which enable one to distinguish true and false statements' and means 'by which each is sanctioned'. In addition, each society has 'procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth' and 'those who are charged with saying what counts as true' (Foucault, qouted in Prado, 2000, p. 118).

In previous chapters, I have started to reveal the most important components of the truth regime of modern HE in China. My discussion of HE principles and rationality of HE government show that, on the macro level, HE has been mainly deployed to serve the needs of the state rather than the individuals (both in principle and in reality), and has favoured science and technology over other disciplines of advanced studies; HE has been endorsed as a solution to a series of linked socio-economic problems in China, most noticeably the challenge of 'modernisation', whether it is during war, recovery, or socio-political transformations; HE functions as the primary means of social selection in Chinese society in recruiting 'talents' with the highest 'human quality'; last but not least, HE is also introduced as form of self-governance, in particular with regard to its targeted subjects in the post-socialist era. At this point, I want to make reference to Zhou Ji, who served as the Minister of Education between 2003 and 2009. In the preface to his book Higher Education in China, an intended introduction contemporary Chinese HE, he writes,

> 'If China is to sustain its social development and change its traditional mode of economic growth, it must count on science and technology and high-calibre constructive members of society. Humans are the first and foremost

> resource to reply in our endeavour to achieve modernisation in a resource-poor and financially strapped country such as China. The 1.3 billion Chinese can emerge as a dynamic pool of human and intellectual resources if they become well-educated men and women of character; otherwise, they can end up being an unwieldy population burden... That is why Chinese government places education as a priority in its strategies – to rejuvenate China through science and education and to make it prosperous by cultivating talent.(Zhou, 2006, pp. xiii - xiv).'

And in a summary of the recent reform of HE in China, Zhou (2006, pp. xiv-xv) lists 'three salient features' of this period,

> 'First, higher education has accomplished a quantum leap in its course of development to keep pace with the public's growing need for higher education and the country's socioeconomic development... Second, teaching quality is improving steadily. Institutions of higher education across the land are meeting the demand of the modernisation drive... enabling them to supply millions of competent professionals for all fields of endeavour... Third, higher education is in a better position to serve the country's socioeconomic development. Its research and innovation have moved up a notch... Colleges and universities around China have emerged as a vital force in sci-tech research and development'.

In the paragraphs quoted above, Zhou includes most of the discursive elements that I identify – HE is understood as a significant drive to social development and economic growth through both teaching and research; HE is also explicitly interpreted as a bio-power over the entire population, a 'tool' that can help transform 'the world's most populous country into an economic dynamo with rich human resources' (Zhou, 2006, p. xiv), and prevent the population from becoming a 'burden' to the state; also, the priority of science and technology is also emphasised, as both a form of education and a field of advanced research.

In quoting Zhou, I am not suggesting that the truth regime of HE in modern (in particular contemporary) China is equated with state ideology; rather, I intend to reveal the most hegemonic components of this truth regime. At the same time, I am not suggesting that these components constitute an ideologically conditioned truth of HE, and hence there is another underlying truth of HE waiting to be discovered - this would go against Foucault's perspective of truth. This has to do with the second notion of Foucauldian truth, to which I now turn.

The Constructive Notion of Truth

With regard to the issue of ideology and truth, Foucault rejects the distinction between ideologically conditioned truth and 'real' underlying truth, or the contrast between 'manipulated sets of ideas and beliefs' and 'deeper, suppressed truths', between apparent truth and truth (Prado, 2000, p. 119). Although Foucault understands truth as a product of power, he refuses the idea that power produces

different categories of truth. But rather, he argues that truth is what comes to be so. As Prado (2000, p. 121) points out,

> 'Foucauldian power does not produce truth by generating 'categories' that organize our awareness of reality. Power does not produce truth in any systematic way; power produces truth blindly and nonsubjectively. It produces truth through actions that enable or inhibit other actions and themselves are unknowing with respect to consequences and occur "at the level of tiny local events".'

Accordingly, I would also reject the idea that in case of modern HE in China, power produces two sets of truth, the dominant, manipulated truth set and the suppressed, real truth. But the question remains – how does what is true in a social or learned discourse come to be so? From a genealogical point of view, what emerges as true (HE can assist national salvation and recovery) may be a result of certain historical contingency, such as foreign invasion in the case of modern HE in China, and what sustains itself as true (HE promises upwards social mobility) may be due to certain technologies and techniques, such as the continuous use of HE as a mean of social selection.

Now I want to turn to 'the level of tiny local events' of contemporary HE, or the micro-level of the truth regime. To do so, I make reference to my fieldwork interviews, and reveal the 'local' truth of HE, and its production and circulation among HE candidates. I want to focus on one particular truth set, a prevailing idea among HE subjects of 'HE as an imagined paradigm shift'.

This truth set is most noticeably marked by a number of keywords – freedom' (ziyou), 'autonomy' (zizhu), 'ease' (qingsong), 'relaxation ' (fangsong) and 'richness and colourfulness' (fengfu duocai, in one phrase in Mandarin), etc. These keywords emerged when I asked my interviewees to reflect upon their primary impression of HE. Almost invariably, my interviewees reported a belief that HE was a new lifestyle and constituted a paradigm shift, a burial of their formerly trammeled selves and dissatisfying pre-HE experiences. Gaining access to HE has been largely described and understood as an ultimate escape from the depressed, heavy, and dire life of high school.

To gain a further insight into this prevailing truth set and its discursive components, I asked my interviewees to elaborate upon these keywords they used. By 'free' or 'freedom', the almost universal answer, was referred to 'less constrain in time management', meaning they would take control of their own time in university – they would no longer be forced into mere academic study and be allowed to explore the world outside the classroom, which is quite the opposite what they experienced in high schools. For instance, in group 13, interviewee No.31 said,

'(freedom) means the right of autonomous choices, like to choose what you want to do at what time, to choose what courses you want to study, to choose your life trajectory afterwards.'

No.32 then added,

'I think in comparison to high school, this freedom is more about time management. In university, you can have much autonomy in managing your time. As far as I know, we don't have a heavy load of class sessions now, so you are much more autonomous. And also, with respect to the future of your life, you are the one to choose. You have much more freedom in doing a lot of things'.

No.33 also joined in and said,

'I think in terms of autonomy, HE is quite different from before. Now you can go out for a stroll after class hours, which is usually more than half of a day. In comparison, high school is all about studies apart from eating and sleeping. So university is quite enjoyable in that sense.'

Within this group, the interviewees were using freedom and autonomy interchangeably, and this freedom for them was first featured as one's control over his or her own time after class. In comparison, only a few interviewees referred to 'freedom' in a political sense that is more familiar to Western readers, meaning a higher degree of tolerance for different thoughts and ideas, wherein students are allowed to expressed their own opinions and argue freely, and no 'standard answers' are imposed upon them. Interviewee No.44 said,

'my understanding of freedom is on the one hand similar to theirs (other two interviewees in the group), for sure it includes autonomy in time management, and doing what one has dreamed of doing for long in university; on the other hand, it is also about freedom in thoughts – because what one had in high school was purely education for examinations, so you needed to answer questions, and you needed to produced the 'standard answers', even if you disagreed with the questions, or disagreed with the answers, you needed to write the 'correct answers'. So I thought, one should have more freedom in thought in university'.

The idea of 'ease' and 'relaxation' also seems to revolve around similar ideas of a paradigm shift - most interviewees referred to the absence of heavy academic pressure of 'examinations'. These ideas have to do with students' completion of 'college entrance examination', which allows one to relax and adopt a new lifestyle. Interviewee No.9 said,

'I had one thought before I came to university: that this was a place of freedom and ease – you don't need to learn too much, because in university you are supposed to develop yourself in various ways, and that should be easy and free, and then in four years' time, you can find a job without much trouble; that was my idea of university'

He then went on describing his prior idea of a *laissez faire* style university life (which was 'proven naive' by his 'actual HE experience'),

> 'my previous idea was that once I am in university, I can get up late every morning. After I get up and have breakfast, I can take a walk around the landscapes around the university, and then come back to dinner. I may have only a session a day after lunch, or two. I can go to some seminars, or some events, or simply pick up a book and read it on a lawn, or go exploring the mountains or take a stroll, etc.'

As for 'richness and colourfulness', most interviewees referred to extracurricular activities and student clubs or societies in university, which are generally understood as somewhere students are able to explore their personal interests and get to know other people through various events. For instance, Interviewee No. 31 recalled,

> 'when I was in senior high, I imagined university life to be rich and colourful, and you can learn whatever you want, outside your academic studies, the extra-curricular – I can learn to play basketball if I want, I can do sports if I want to, I can learn whatever instrument I want; I can fulfil myself. This was my original thought'.

I went on with the interviewees to discuss the production and circulation of this prevailing truth set. There was an almost unanimous answer to my question of truth production - high school teachers and senior graduates were identified as the primary sources of this truth set, this vision of university life. For instance, No.9 commented on the information he received from his teachers and seniors, and said,

> 'much I heard about university came from my teachers and some of our senior who went to university (before me). Especially our teachers, if we were not fully devoted to studies, he would remind us or "stimulate" us, saying what university would be like, how it was a contrast from senior high, and if we were not fully devoted, what we would end up being – he went on talking about university as some place free and ideal. (He did so) to encourage us to study harder I suppose.'

As No.9 described, his teachers from high school repeatedly 'patronised' them with this image of an easy and ideal life, to keep students fully devoted to the preparation for the CEE, to fight with their full capacity in the perhaps most 'decisive' battle of life chances. And he himself showed understanding of this 'necessary evil'. Interviewee No. 25 also recalled similar situations in her urban school,

> 'if we were not paying attention in class, our teachers would say, "are you entitled to have fun now? Not until university!" what they meant was, our task then was all study, and once we made it into university, we could relax. They wanted to deliver this message – you endure now so you can enjoy yourself in university.'

Other interviewees also reported they have been surrounded by similar ideas repeatedly employed by their teachers and senior peers. For those who were cramming for the CEE, the message from their seniors, or recently 'successful' people, also appeared persuasive. The ideas provided by their seniors were largely consistent with those from the teachers, but the former may include more detailed information on what it is like to attend a university. For instance, interviewee No.29 said,

> 'I heard about university from my other relatives and friends. A cousin of mine went to university, and he once told about how relaxing university was, with no schoolwork at all. My first impression then was that there was no schoolwork in a university.'

The quotations above shed interesting light on the process of truth production – high school teachers and senior peers actively participate (perhaps more than anyone else) in the construction of this prevailing truth of 'HE as a paradigm shift'. Recognising as much is not to suggest these two groups are the producer of this 'manipulated' truth. Such a view would be misleading in two ways – first, two groups identified above should be regarded as nodes which power works through; second, the truth of paradigm shift is a prevailing truth set, one set of the entire body of truth that appears as the most persuasive, but it should not be understood as an 'apparent' truth as in contrast to a 'real' underlying truth waiting to be discovered. One should bear in mind, as Foucault suggests, that it is not necessary, nor possible, to display the entirety of truth.

Discourses present themselves to subjects as cultural environments very much like the physical environment, and the sustaining of discourses is made possible by individuals' participation. I have provided insight into the prevailing truth set in the HE discourses above, but another question remains unsolved – how do individual discourse-participants come to believe the truths of a discourse they are presented with? To answer this question, I need to make use of the third notion of Foucauldian truth.

The Perspectivist Notion of Truth

Perspectivism is marked by two linked arguments – it denies 'the possibility of descriptive completeness, … the possibility of a global and correct description of the world'; second, it acknowledges 'a multiplicity of diverse interpretations (but) denies that we might describe the way the world is in itself and thereby integrate and rationalize those diverse interpretations' (Prado, 2000, pp. 122, 124). Accordingly, the perspectivist notion of Foucauldian truth can be understood in two linked aspects – first, individual participants appropriate power-produced truths and come to form beliefs about them and attitudes towards them; second, individual participants are subject to various

disciplinary techniques, which shape the beliefs they acquire, interpretations they adopt, and subjectivities they come to hold. Prado (2000, p. 127) explains,

> 'Individuals appropriate the power-produced truths that are relative to and sustained in discourse when those individuals take those constructed truths as matters of fact and come to have beliefs about them and attitudes toward them. This understanding ... shows that ... subjects form beliefs about things and events, they form beliefs about cultural constructs. Subjects are surrounded by both physical objects and by cultural "objects' presented to them in myriad ways ranging from expert accounts to texts to advertisements to casual remarks, Subjects are inundated with multifarious presentations of "scientific facts" and "common knowledge" directly through formal and informal schooling. (127)

The prevailing truth set can be understood as such 'cultural constructs' surrounding its targeted subjects. One should also notice the space between the power-produced truth and what subjects come to believe—the process in which subjects acquire beliefs in truths—is the adoption of perspectives. In the case of my fieldwork, I asked my interviewees about their beliefs about the prevailing truth set – whether they questioned the authenticity of all information they heard about university or simply accepted it as matters of fact.

The answers to that question were largely negative. Most replied that they did not question the truth set at all, and accepted the information as real, although their reason for a lack of questioning may vary – such as 'everyone seems to repeat the same thing' (interviewee No.8), or 'we got used to listening to what our teachers say, from primary school to senior high' (interviewee No.36), or 'were reluctant to question it' (interviewee No.8) as 'university was like a paradise to us' (interviewee No.9). A number of interviewees reported 'some brief moments of doubts', but chose to believe it anyway 'in the face of great pressure of the CEE' (interviewee No.15). For those who had their doubts, the questionable information 'could still serve as an aim of life' (interviewee No.45). As interviewee No.44 recalled,

> 'I thought about (the authenticity issue). But I still felt that university would for sure be better than senior high. I doubted it; what the seniors said, they told you so with an intention to patronize you, so they dismissed all the negative things you might experience in university and only told you about the positive side – that was for sure. So occasionally I doubt it, but I still have high expectations of university, and these doubts were very brief – I didn't think much about it, so the doubts didn't stay long'.

No.44 talked about the logic that 'it couldn't be any worse'. Even if the information from the teachers and seniors were questionable, university may not be as perfect or as ideal as they had hoped, but it would still be an improvement from what one was experiencing in senior high. Even if one saw through the tricks of the prevailing discourses of 'the paradigm shift', one would still be willing to 'hope for the best', to 'hold high expectations', simply in order to 'survive' hardest times of preparing

for the CEE. The interviewees seemed to indicate that they were willing to be turned, or turn themselves into such 'hoping' or 'wishful' subjects, either because they have gotten accustomed to the patronising, or because accepting the questionable information could do no harm. Therefore even though they had doubts, even though they could refuse to be such 'hoping' subjects, they chose not to do so. Or as some argued, if one questioned the paradigm-shift discourses, it would not change the fact that one still needed to receive HE. The questioning or doubt would not stop those who cram for the CEE and fight for access to HE. As interviewee No. 1 said

> 'I did not question it, because from the perspective of the (social) system in China, and the (educational) tradition, I didn't even think about (the authenticity of) the information. Although society is now developing, I think, regardless our questioning, our doubts, one must still go to university. This is taken for granted. Or you may say you can choose to work (instead). But I believe for the majority of Chinese students, this is a determined path'.

This idea of 'a determined path' indicates a wide and ready acceptance of the prevailing set of HE truth. In this case, the discourse participants, HE candidates in China, represented by these interviewees, form their beliefs of the prevailing truth of HE as a paradigm shift almost unquestioningly. Subjects' appropriation of truth, in this case, is greatly shaped by a number of linked factors – first, the heavy academic pressure of high school that was intended to realize the full potential of each HE candidate; second, the fact that HE still serves as the primary means of social selection and social mobility, something that 'everyone does and believes'. A hegemonic account of HE emerges at the local centres of power relations, and circulates within the local events such as repeated employment of the truth of paradigm-shift. There is a noticeable absence of any alternative idea within the current truth regime of HE for subjects to appropriate, at least not as persuasive and promising as the prevailing set identified above. I have asked my interviewees whether they would choose work after high school instead of HE, and few would do so. The reasons given varied slightly, such as 'HE was a more promising way of investing one's youthful years, and work can wait', or 'those without HE degrees are not well-paid in the job market', or 'work after high school is an option for those who are not (academically) good enough for university'. These discursive components, this rationality, perceived reality, these judgments come together as a powerful technique that suffocates other competing truths against the prevailing set of paradigm shift, and present it as 'forcefully' persuasive.

Although there are few variations in the appropriation of the truth of 'paradigm shift', the interviewees did report different beliefs in other perspectives of HE. I want to illustrate this 'multiplicity of diverse interpretations' that perspectivism acknowledges by making reference to the 'truth' revolving around the 'exemplary campus'. In my discussion in Chapter 4, I have engaged with the idea of HE space,

including the configuration of university campus. I also asked my interviewees to recall their imagination of campus setting before their arrival in universities., the image of a university campus was not alien to the interviewees, perhaps the most familiar apparatus component of HE of all (others covered in the interviews include teaching, learning, teachers, student societies, preparations of employment, etc., please refer to Appendix 2 for all the interview questions), and they were able to articulate their respective ideas of campuses. However, unlike the truth of paradigm shift, the truth of campus was where some competing beliefs emerged. One group takes on a modern image of campuses, with new buildings, advanced multi-media facilities, laboratories, gymnastic equipments and spacious lecture rooms, etc. The other group endorses a classically styled campus, with old-styled buildings, long avenues, and interestingly enough, lakes—all of which should contribute to an atmosphere of 'academic tranquillity' and 'enclosed romance'. For the former campus model, Interviewee No. 25, argued,

> 'I think there should be a lot of open lectures and (therefore) big lecture rooms, and every room, like in high schools now, should be equipped with computers, big screens, and can accommodate open lectures. There should be a lot of computing rooms, and students can have easy access to computers. My idea of a campus is based on this vague image. Whether the campus looks new or old – I think the newer the merrier. If I am told that this university is rather old, aged, and the beds are in poor condition, I will be very much dismayed'.

While for the latter, interviewee 26 argued that

> '(University paths should be) lined with trees; poplar trees or Platanus would be ideal – this is my wish. I want a university with a big book collection, and it should not be too new-looking. I dislike campus ground of a cement style'.

But for some interviewees, HE campus should incorporate modern and classical elements. For instance, interviewee No.11 said,

> 'I thought a university should have a library with an enormous collection; in terms of campus environment, it should have a lot of trees and water, little bridges and flowing streams (*xiaoqiao liushui*) [41]; it should have superb gymnastic equipments'.

In this quote, No. 11 included components from both sets: for the former, gymnastic equipment, and for the latter, trees, bridges and streams; and she also emphasises the importance of a library and its

---

[41] This is an exemplary scene of Chinese styled tranquillity, which is widely used in garden designs in the classical period. The term is also widely used in classical poetry in China. The most famous reference is Ma Zhiyuan (c. 1250–1321)'s Autumn Thoughts (*Tianjingsha Qiusi*) 'A Withered vine, an ancient tree, crows at dusk; A Little bridge, a flowing stream, some huts; An old road, wind out of the west, an emaciated horse; A heart-broken man on the horizon at sunset'.

collection. In the light of my previous discussion in Chapter 7 (space) and Chapter 9 (technology of the population), one can perhaps understand why gymnasium and library are among the most frequently cited components of a campus. The former is an important part of the technology of the HE population that aims to optimise the physical capacity of HE students, while the latter is widely understood as the most symbolic building in a university campus, as it stands for an access to knowledge and empowerment, a path to personal development, power, prosperity and wealth. It was therefore not surprising to see that the essential part of university (per the interviewees' responses) was the library, which was expected to host not only materials in one's speciality, but also 'a collection of a wide range of fields'.

Furthermore, with regard to the truth of HE campus, what fascinates me is the belief of 'campus lakes'. Interviewee 27 said,

> 'Ideally there should be a lake, with lotus blooming in it during summer time'.

The image of lotus blossoms in a lake is renown as a signature view of Qinghua University, as it was depicted in an essay 'Lotus Lake in the Moonlight' (*hetang yuese*) by Zhu Ziqing in 1927, then a professor at Qinghua University[42]. The essay was about Zhu's night stroll around Shuimu Qinghua, which was mentioned in Chapter 4, and it is a text familiar to most students in China as it is included in the national textbook for Chinese Language (*yuwen*) in senior high school. It is therefore perhaps the most well-known representation of university campus for HE subjects in China. Lake Weiming, the counterpart of Shuimu Qinghua in Peking University, was also a widely cited example by the interviewees. In my interview with No.7, 8, and 9, I asked why they thought there should be a lake in a university campus. Interviewee 9 replied,

> 'Because I read in a number of books about the theme that university students do morning readings under the willow trees by the lake side, so I thought there should be a lake in a university.'

Interviewee 8 quoted Zhu's essay and said,

> 'It has something to do what we have learnt from our textbooks. We have all read Zhu Ziqing's Lotus Lake in the Moonlight'.

9 added,

> '(We also heard about) Lake Weiming in Peking University'.

7 recalled,

---

[42] See http://baike.baidu.com/view/153597.htm#sub6169028 (in Chinese) for detailed introduction of the essay.

'A lake in a university has for long been what I desired.'

Later, No.8 talked about her experience of showing friends around the campus,

'My schoolmates (from senior high) came and visited me, and I showed them around in the campus. They would ask first, "Whereabouts is the lake in Renda? Show us."

No. 8's experience implies that this belief of 'campus lakes' is shared by many – the campus lake become a cultural object upon which subjects form their belief. No.9 went on to explain how this belief circulates and emerges as persuasive in the truth of HE,

'Our seniors would have their pictures taken by the side of Lake Weiming, with an introduction below stating their university and department'.

7 also confirmed seeing photos of similar background, and said,

'(These pictures are normally taken) by the side of Lake Weiming, and include Boya Tower and Lake Weiming both in the picture. That is a classic shot'.

Such pictures can be found in school bulletins in a lot of senior high schools in China. The collection serves as an exemplary image of academic success for those who were preparing for the CEE. The 'classic' shot was presented as evidences of payoff of academic endeavour, and Lake Weiming, the most famous campus lake, was no longer a mere view of a university campus, but a symbol of the highest achievement of academic pursuit. Campus lakes are also sites where academic efforts continue in HE, as 9 said – they are the places where students do morning readings.

However, these previous beliefs held by the interviewees, the appropriated truths of paradigm shift and campus, were not entirely consistent with their later experiences on campus. In fact, these beliefs were put to great challenge. I move on to the fourth notion of Foucauldian truth.

The Experiential Notion of Truth

This fourth notion is characterised by distinguishing between what is learned and what is realised in a challenging experience. The acquisition of experiential truth is not a 'sudden illumination which makes the scales fall from the eyes', but involves 'inquiry to support the deep rethinking of whatever suddenly became problematic and caused the epistemological crisis or limit experience', and may be 'an arduous process extending over a considerable period of time' (Prado, 2000, p. 129).

In the process of interviews, I did sense a strong clash between old and newly formed beliefs of HE. In contrast to the imagined lifestyle of 'freedom, ease, richness and colourfulness', a large number of interviewees complained that in fact this was not the case in real life – they were not given much autonomy in time management, neither were they exposed to enough opportunities for self-exploration and self-development. In Chapter 8 and 9, I have already discussed the reason why this paradigm shift was not in place. HE in contemporary China is still subject to certain technologies of socialist governmentality which render subjects of HE as targets of administrative interventions. Therefore, university students are still subject to certain regulations and practices that require their presence at certain spaces (gymnasium library, or study rooms) during specific times (morning and evening) and their participation in certain activities such as morning exercise and self-study. Interviewee N.43 (first year student) said,

> 'we are in the speciality of Foreign Language (English), and we were asked to do self-study in morning and evening. I felt very much uncomfortable about it. I thought … I had read some books about university education and there were some documentaries too, and I thought I could have complete control of my time, and class sessions won't be too overwhelming. I am much surprised in this regard now. Our speciality is in comparison very heavily loaded, and you have little (time) for yourself every day. This is about autonomy in time management, and also it is about exploring what I want to do; for example, I enjoy singing, and I could look for an opportunity or a stage to present my talent, but I found few chances to do so; they are difficult to find'.

In No.43's complaint, one can see how the paradigm shift truth was put to great challenge. The self-study schedule mentioned here has been discussed previously. It was a technique that combined time and space governing. Though such a disciplinary technique was not alien to those who had graduated from senior high in China, its existence in university was against the prevailing discourses of 'freedom', and the heavy load of class sessions went against of the discourses of 'ease', while a lack of social life after class hours went against the discourses of 'abundance'. In addition, the intensified competition of job market also began to affect the campus life and even new entrants could feel the pressure from the outside world and the future competition. For instance, Interviewee No.9, whom I quote above, commented on his original thought of university as a place of ease, and said,

> 'I now find my previous idea very wrong. What I thought was a rather limited understanding of (attending) university, and was rather simplistically optimistic. What I discover now that university does have a free and easy side, but that is only one side of it. The other side is about academic studies, preparation for the postgraduate entrance examination (kaoyan), looking for a job. When I was preparing for the CEE, the pressure was from the CEE; now (I am in university) the pressure is from survival'.

Considering the fact that No.9 had only spent one month in university, his reflection upon the imagined

easy lifestyle was fairly radical. University for him was no longer a place of mere ease but was bound up with pressure from 'survival'. He was already talking about what he might need to do in four years' time, to continue his study at postgraduate level or to look for a job in the market.

For those reported to be most dismayed by the gap between their previously appropriated truth and their experiential truth of HE, I asked them whether they would interfere with this gap – 'if you go back to your old schools, what would you tell your juniors, those are now in their final year, cramming for the CEE? Would you tell them the reality about university?' This question generally put them to a moment of silence. All three interviewees in Group 3 hesitated and pondered upon the question. Interviewee No.8 was the first to reply:

> 'First of all (I) must give them some encouragement, but perhaps in more realistic terms.'

Interviewee No.7 then added,

> 'you have been through the CEE, you know, you understand how they must be feeling at the moment, and you know they hold high expectations of university in their heart, and they hold deep trust in their seniors, so we must give them a lot of expectations, and in that way they can have more energy to go on; with more expectations, they can be encouraged to complete the CEE'

Interviewee No.8 also agreed and said,

> 'I don't want to destroy the illusion built by themselves'.

Interviewee No.9 expressed a slightly different opinion. He did not think some more elements of truth would cause too much damage. He said,

> 'I don't think it is a kind of destruction. As long as it is different (from senior high), it is an improvement.'

No.9 added,

> 'As long as it is a different life, no matter what the life actually is, they will trade it (the life of senior high).'

No.7 then concluded in a more neutral tone,

> 'In comparison, I will describe it in more optimistic terms'. (Other two nodded on hearing this) But at least I won't tell them that university is a place for fun, a place where you go surfing on internet every day, and you wake up to eat. (I would say) university is still a place where you need to work hard. As Teacher Zhou of our department said, "You guys should save the fun stuff once you make it into postgraduate studies". We have heard this a million times in Year 3 of senior high – you guys should save

the fun stuff for university. Now I am aware of the tough competition in TOFEL, graduate entrance examinations, graduate recommendation scheme, and employment, so at least I will tell them that university is not very easy and relaxing, but at the moment you should focus on getting through the CEE'.

In this conversation, three of the most 'dismayed' interviewees first of all show immediate concerns over how the experiential truth they recently acquired would affect their audience in a negative way, and they fear to discourage those who were working extremely hard for the CEE, those with great expectations, and those who counted on their seniors for 'spiritual support'. Despite their discontent with the prevailing truth of paradigm shift, they chose not to challenge it in a straightforward manner. To understand this reluctance more fully, I make reference to the idea of 'speaking the truth'. As Prado (2000, p.121) explains,

> 'Speaking truth is making the right moves in a discourse, where what is right is what is dictated or allowed by a truth regime's correctness criteria. That is, a discourse's truths are moves that are sanctioned by a discourse's mechanisms for distinguishing truth and falsity and that conform to its expert judgments. What makes some moves right and others wrong is the sum total of contributing actions that shape a discourse's content. It is also the codification of some right moves as disciplinary principles'.

Therefore, their reluctance to interfere with the circulation of the prevailing truth, and their 'sympathy' towards their juniors, those who were placed in the same 'determined path', show that the same disciplinary technique, one that manages to rule out other alternative truths of HE, is still at work even after the subjects experience a clash between old and new beliefs of HE. These subjects allow this technique to further shape their participations in the discourses of HE – they accept their identities as exemplary figures of academic success, and then agree not to bring any major challenges to the prevailing truth of paradigm shift.

But can we say that the interviewees, as representatives of HE subjects in contemporary China, manage to acquire experiential truth of HE once they arrive in the 'real' HE setting? Perhaps not. As Prado argues,

> 'What is important for Foucault is that it is in a limit experience's clash of old and new ideas that we can adopt genuinely new perspectives. Otherwise we only change particular beliefs or make adjustments to beliefs that remain substantially unchanged. The rigidity of our belief structures, the inertia of intellectual habits, and power's ever-tightening control make limit experiences necessary'.

As this case shows, the appropriation of experiential truth has yet to create a significantly distinctive perspective on HE for the subjects interviewed – they only made small adjustments to their beliefs of HE but were reluctant to bring further, more substantial changes to their belief structures. For them, the

clash between old and new beliefs is a gap between 'apparent' truth of HE and the 'real' underlying truth of HE, a distinction that Foucault refuses. They felt 'deceived' in forming beliefs of the prevailing truth set, but they also sign up to this very form of 'deception' by either showing understanding of the 'necessary evil' or not agreeing to participate in the 'deception' process while not interfering with the circulation of 'bad' beliefs. In other words, they fail to inquire further into the production and sustainment of a hegemonic truth of HE, but instead appropriate the logic of 'necessary evil' which inures them further to a hegemonic truth. In doing so, they not only fail to explore their experiential truth, but also adopt certain designated subjectivities, and turn themselves into subject forms that a certain hegemonic power relation intends to produce. I will investigate more properly into the issue of HE subjects and subjectivities in the next section.

Conclusion

In this section I make use Foucault's four notions of truth, and explore their implications for the case of HE in China. I first examine the criterial notion of truth and the produced truth that HE serves primarily as a means of social selection and preparation; I then explore the constructive notion of truth and the ways in which the truth of HE as a paradigm shift is produced in discourses; I also explore the persectivist notion of truth and explore how HE participant come to hold of different interpretations of the HE campus; I finally examine the experiential notion of truth and how HE participants cope with the gap between their imagination and the reality of HE life. In the next section, I will focus on subject forms of HE.

Chapter 11 Subjects

Introduction

In a Foucaudian frame, the conception of the subject has two linked aspects – the first is that an individual is being subject to regulation by others (individuals, social groups, institutions, and the state); the second aspect is that an individual is experiencing subjectivity, meaning that a subject has aims, desires, and a sense of who (and what) one is. For the first aspect of Foucauldian subject, I have tackled how HE has been deployed as a form of government in various historical periods in China; for the second aspect, my discussion in the previous chapter has shown how HE in China has been infused with desires and choices. In this section, I make a summary of different subject forms and subjectivities constructed through HE in modern China. But before that, I shall elaborate more on the process of making subjects.

Foucault does not clearly distinguish between his uses of 'subject' and 'subjectivity'. A convenient way do so is perhaps to understand the former as a member of a governed society and the latter is an abstraction drawn from the capacity/condition of creating a subject. Foucault refuses to understand subjectivity as a 'given' as it is for Descartes and Kant. Instead, he insists that it is the body[43] that bears emergent subjectivity, 'in its habits and gestures, in its postures, in its speech, in how it is dealt with'. A body is invested with a pattern of subjectivity-determining conducts, and assigned certain attributes and a certain status. To illustrate this point, I once again make reference to Zhou Ji's Higher Education in China. In the section of 'Students', Zhou(2006, p. 153) writes,

> 'Notwithstanding its ever expanding higher education and a gross enrollment rate running as high as 19%, the college entrance examination still poses a tough competition for aspiring students. Those who have made it are luckier than their peers who have failed. They are "God's favorites" in people's eyes, the pillars of the country, and the hope of the nation. As a whole, college students themselves likewise feel proud and superior with a strong enterprising spirit and a sense of responsibility and justice. They are quick-witted, open-minded, and sympathetic. Most of them cherish lofty ideas and study hard. Yet, in a fast-changing social environment, they often find themselves in an ambivalent state of mind: they feel superior but at the same time upset about the pressure of finding employment; they hope to contribute to society but are also concerned with their own personal gain. Obviously, the life and mentality of present-day college students in China are undergoing profound changes. '

[43] Here, the idea of a body should be understood in a broader sense than how it is used in my discussion of 'technologies of the body'. The former is understood as the entirety of a bearer of certain subjectivities, and the latter is referred to the physical existence of human subjects.

This 'introductory' text in Zhou's book serves to speak a truth of contemporary subjects of HE, and to illustrate a pattern of subjectivity. In Zhou's description, HE students are marked by certain attributes such as a sense of superiority (which they 'rightfully' deserve as 'winners' of a tough competition), industriousness, and being quick-witted, open-minded and sympathetic. The text also suggests certain determining conducts – the idea of a sense of responsibility implies that one should perform certain desirable conducts to be regarded as 'responsible', such as being willing to service the needs of the state, and the idea of a strong enterprising spirit suggests (although Zhou does not elaborate the use of this term) that HE students should act as independent enterprising selves who are ambitious, clear-minded and capable of self-governance. Furthermore, HE subjects are also problematised – their sense of superiority is now challenged at a time of rapid socioeconomic transformations, and their sense of responsibility are infused with economic rationality (which implies a clash between a socialist mentality and a mentality of market economy).

Zhou's text, in which a HE body is invested with certain attributes and conducts, only illustrates part of the process of subject making. As Prado points out, the making of subjects in a Foucauldian frame, also seeks

> 'a habit-invested body to adopt a certain perspective on itself and its surroundings. The individual comes to experience the world in a certain way as a result of behaving in certain ways, being categorised in certain ways, and being dealt with in certain ways. A constructed subject then is an experiencing self of a particular sort in that an individual internalizes power-assigned attributes and comes to intend power-imposed actions (Prado, 2000, p. 58, orginal emphasis).'

He further explains,

> 'a master of subjectivity …(is realised) in the process of "learning" what one is by internalizing power-produced truths and ""acting as one should" conform to what is learned about oneself. Constructed subjectivity is not a metaphysical emergence but a cognitive result. Becoming a subject is coming to hold certain things as true about oneself, saying certain things about oneself, and intentionally acting in certain ways'.

This said, I now begin to outline the different forms of subject and subjectivity constructed through HE in the history of modern China. In my previous discussions in chapter 8 and 9, I have also begun to tackle some forms HE subject, such as 'alienated' subjects (in the Republican era), 'desiring' subjects (for HE rewards), and 'willing' subjects (to fund their own HE via tuition fees), 'expecting' subjects (to enter HE), and 'professional choosing' subjects (in the post-socialist era), etc. In addition to these subject forms that emerge from my previous discussions of technologies, desires and choices, I want to

in this section bring some other forms of HE subjects to my discussion, and also sketch out the formation processes of these various subjects.

If we are to focus on a historical consistency in subject formation in modern China, or those categorised as 'enduring', there are two forms of subjects that stand out as significant across the period. The first is the 'desiring subjects', i.e. subjects with desires for access to HE and for its attached rewards; and the second is the 'meritocratic subjects', or subjects regarded as higher in the meritocratic hierarchy after a series of exam selections.

If we are to focus on historical particularity in this regard, those in the 'periodised' category, we may be faced with a variety of subjects within the period of 100 years or so in modern China. These forms of subjects are closely related to enduring subjects. For instance, the 'expecting' or 'willing' subjects I identify can be understood as a contemporary variation of the 'desiring' subjects. The conflict between 'meritocratic' subjectivity and the significant fall in the market return to HE degrees in the recent decade contribute to the shaping of 'displaced' subjects, another form of subjects which I discuss below. These subjects may compete with one another at the same time, or be fused together across time, presenting themselves in conflict or in peculiar unity. For instance, in the Republican era, the infused subjects, HE subjects that bear other identity labels than studentship, were competing with the alienated subjects that were largely segregated from the real world outside university campuses. Furthermore, the 'professional choosing' subjects identified in the previous chapter can be understood as a part of the 'governed' subjects, insofar as professional choosing is a practice of self-governance. Moreover, the subject forms in different periods may be connected with one another - the 'governed' subjects, for instance, bear some traces of the 'administrated' subjects, as the government of HE subjects in contemporary China still deploys certain technologies that were prevailing under high socialism. Last but not least, these subject forms may also complement one another – the 'troubled' subjectivity justifies the use of socialist administration in campus, which in turn produces part of the 'governed' subjects. Therefore, it should be noted that subjects forms may compete within particular time periods, or share characteristics across time periods. One example would be the 'displaced' and 'troubled' subjects, which are in fact different ways of describing graduates discovering their degree is now worth less in the job market - identifying HE subjects as troubled in this way, shrugs off any hint of state responsibility for their being displaced.

I summarise the subject forms in the following table, but it does not intend to serve as an exhaustible list of HE subject in modern China. However, these forms are, I argue, the most significant ones that emerged and therefore deserve our attention.

Categories	Subject Forms	Time Scale
Enduring	Desiring	The entire modern period
	Meritocratic	
Periodised	Wasted (previous chapter)	Late Qing
	Alienated (previous chapter)	The Republican Era
	Infused	
	Administrated	High Socialist China
	Expecting/willing (previous chapter)	Post –socialist Era
	Professionally choosing (previous chapter)	
	Governed	
	Displaced	
	Troubled	

Table 11, Subject Forms

Desiring Subjects

My discussions in the previous section on Desires and Rewards have pointed out that there have been prevailing discourses of HE rewards in China, and accompanying discourses of desires for such rewards. The articulation of HE rewards can be regarded as a technology of the social, a technology that is used to promote and maintain participation in HE and all other educational activities that lead to it, also a technology that is used to persuade HE subjects to endure the hardship of studies and to persist in making efforts towards eventual success. HE subjects in this regards are desiring subjects, as HE is accepted as generally desirable, and the expansion of HE candidateship has further spread this desirability into a bigger population; they are also rewarded subjects – once they succeed in the fight to access HE, they are entitled to a variety of rewards, such as social mobility, economic returns, welfare and job security, etc. These rewards may vary greatly in different historical periods, but they are all likely to be related to improvements in life chances in general (see Zhou, 2004 for a quantitative investigation of state and life chances in urban China).

Meritocratic Subjects

With the history of the Imperial Examination taken into account, it is clear social selection in China has for long been based upon formal examinations, with unified procedures and standards imposed on every subject. These procedures and standards, for the most of time in history, were designed to be as much fair, equal and just as they could.

Examinations as such, either the Imperial Examination or the CEE (or other similar forms of examinations) are intended to make selection based on 'merits', be they a mastery of classic readings, literacy and numeracy skills, or critical thinking (Li, 2005; Liu and Li, 2006). These various merits, accordingly, can be identified and measured via (mainly written) examinations, in particular when grades, marks, points and scores are widely used to exhibit one's merits in exact digits. If one is to accept the premise that examination procedures and standards are set to be equal and fair (at least as much as they can be under different circumstances), then at any given stage of formal education, those who make the highest achievement in examinations and stay longest in rounds of social selections based on such examinations are the most 'meritocratic', or with the highest merits, and they are accordingly the front runners for selections at the next stage.

Therefore, those who are identified with the highest merits at one stage of education are to be invested with the best forms of education at the next stage (as the logic of the keypoint school system implies), in order to secure and maximize such merits. It is under this meritocratic reasoning that students with the highest scores in the CEE are enrolled into universities with the highest academic standards. Also, as their previous success in examinations, or their proved merits, would indicate industriousness and self-discipline apart from their academic capacities, the logic is that that those who receive HE of the highest quality (in the most renowned universities such as Peking and Qinghua) will make the best of it, and further augment their existing merits. This will be a virtuous circle of merit accumulation.

In other words, merits can not only be identified, measured, but can also be cultivated and accumulated: those who stay longest in the examination selection process, those who are granted access to the most competitive universities via the CEE and manage to obtain their degrees after four years, are regarded as the most meritocratic, the most capable and hence will receive the highest rewards, whatever forms they may take under different circumstances. However, to what extent this meritocratic reasoning can be held true in the outside world, in particular the world of the market economy, is a different matter. I will return to this shortly afterwards. For now, I explore the subject forms that are historically sensitive.

Infused Subjects

Although the first modern university in China, the Imperial University of Peking, was established under the Qing regime, a proper development of the modern HE system was made possible only during the early Republican era. This period witnessed the rise of a variety of modern HEIs, and these

institutions were normally modelled after their foreign counterparts – Japanese, German, American— and hence were embedded with different academic traditions, values, and practices. Accordingly, the HE subjects that began to emerge in this period were far from unified; on the contrary, there was a regime of competing subjectivities.

As testimony to the makeup of such a regime, I look at a particular indicator of competing subjectivities – clothing. Yeh (1990) identifies three styles of clothing available to HE students in the Republican era – the Chinese gown, the Western suit, and the Party uniform. These three different styles differed greatly from one another in their materials and cutting, and they each represented a certain subjectivity of HE studentship at the time. Yeh (1990, p. 222) writes,

> 'The loose-fitting gown usually in blue cotton was the traditional garb of the educated. The suit, with leather shoes, clothed the financial and professional elites of the treaty ports. The uniform, at first referred to as the Sun Yat-sen suit … was urged upon all college students by the Ministry of Education during the Nanjing decade'.

These three different styles of clothing, along with their corresponding subjectivities, rose to popularity in turn among HE students under different historical circumstances. As Yeh explains, the scholarly gown was favoured by the socialists and anarchists of the late 1910s and early 1920s, as it was a symbol of 'leisure, of freedom from manual labour, and of lack of social responsibility' (p. 223); the party uniform, became popular in the mid-1920s when the Nationalist revaluation was gathering heat, and in comparison to the scholarly gown which was then considered a symbol of weakness and indecisiveness, the uniform 'invoked power, discipline, ideological vigour, the collective resolve' (p. 223); in the late 1920s and 1930s, societal concerns among college students were replaced by sentimental attachments, and Western-styled suits rose in favour among HEIs as a result of the spreading courtship and romance among students. However, during the Nanjing decade, the meanings of three styles changed – the uniform strongly associated with the authoritarian rule of the Nationalist Party, the suit with 'the light-hearted and urban affluent', and the gown as 'the remaining symbol of cultural identity', of authentic Chinese integrity (p. 226).

In Yeh's discussion of the clothing styles, a variety of subjectivities began to emerge, and these subjectivities competed with each other and also displayed both their positive and negative symbolic attachments in turn. A college student in a scholarly gown could claim to stand for authentic Chinese cultural identity, but could also be regarded as being physically feeble and socially irresponsible; one in a party uniform could claim to be disciplined, vigorous and capable of both doing academic studies and defending one's nation, but could also be regarded as yielding to the authoritarian rule of the

Nationalist Party; one in a Western-styled suit could claim to be romantic and appropriate for the laissez faire academia at the time, but could also be regarded as being a dilettante and not concerned with the real world. HE subjects in the Republican era were caught in a particular time of warfare, social movements and ideological competence, and they were inevitably under the influence of various discourses, norms, policies, and practices. In turn, college students may have infused their academic studentship with other subjectivities such as 'protectors of Chinese cultural identity', 'patriotic soldiers for national defense' and 'front runners of cultural import and integration', 'concerned intellectuals for social development', etc., as their national, cultural, social and academic subjectivities were not necessarily consistent with one another.

Administrated Subjects

Under state socialism, some major changes were introduced to the formation processes of HE subjects. First and foremost, the new HE system based on the Soviet model 'transformed the generalist Chinese intellectual into a modern specialist (Pepper, 1987, p. 199)'. HE subjects were no longer regarded as candidates for a bureaucratic system, but instead they belong to a technocratic system – they were 'cultivated' as advanced personnel for the industrial and technological development of the new nation. The entire HE apparatus was also reconstructed to fit that particular agenda. For example, in terms of the curriculum, HE subjects were now excluded from academic studies in almost all humanities and social sciences as they were regarded as 'irrelevant to socialist construction'. Instead, the expertise of HE subjects was marked by their specialties, which were designed to be narrow, practical and immediate for the ongoing nation building projects. The introduction of these new subjectivities were first opposed by the old intellectuals, but their resistance and oppositions were largely disarticulated after suffering from a series of mass political campaigns and political persecutions. By removing the oppositions to official discourses, the authoritarian arts of government helped to impose the new HE subjectivities with overwhelming political force.

HE subjects under high socialism were unremittingly politicised. On the one hand, their class backgrounds were used to assist the political agenda of social equality; HE candidates were given priorities in admission processes for their working class background, or excluded from HE for their 'bad' class background (former landlords and capitalists, etc.). On the other hand, all HE subjects were

to declare political loyalties to socialist construction (and the CCP[44]), which was regarded as more important than their professional expertise.

Above all, under techno-scientific reasoning, HE subjects were understood as certain 'human products' for nation building, and therefore were targets of political intervention and administration, and HE itself was designed to select, cultivate and distribute such products. In order to decide on the qualification of HE candidates and to select the most promising, the state gazed into the physical and ideological records of all via the personal dossier system, and set up standards and measurements for their bodies and minds while introducing unified entrance examinations to decide upon their academic and bodily qualifications. Other forms of technologies and techniques were at work to ensure that HE subjects, during their HE experience, adhered to the dominant ideologies and standards of personnel training such as 'the annual review' system that placed one under the reviews of themselves, their peers, tutors and superior administrators. To distribute HE subjects for the tasks of nation building, the graduate placement scheme was established and thereupon assigned graduates to positions where their 'talents' and expertise were needed, instead of where the graduates themselves would prefer. As 'products' of HE under state socialism, HE subjects did not have authority to make job choices for themselves, or choices in many other perspectives such as ideological preference. Rather, they were administrated subjects.

Governed Subjects

Here, by 'governed subjects', I refer to the fact that HE subjects are both governed by others and governed by themselves. In the post-socialist era, HE subjects are faced with combined technologies of government, those of socialist governmentality and those of neoliberal governmentality.

On the one hand, they are still under certain conventional socialist arts of government like the gaze of the personal dossier system (and its affiliated techniques such as 'Annual Review Form', 'Bodily Qualification Form', and 'Letters of Undertaking'). They are still targets of governmental intervention

---

[44] Political loyalties to the CCP have been removed from official documents of HE application requirements in recent years. In 1977 when the CEE was resumed, this requirement was still clearly stated in the Recruitment Guidance for the CEE (reprinted in He and Wu, 1998, p. 1579, my translation),

> 'first, (one should) have a clear record of a self political history, and support the Chinese Communist Party, and love socialism and physical labour, and be adherent to revolutionary disciplines, and be determined to study for the sake of revolution;'

In the current version of Recruitment Guidance (Ministry of Education, 2010, author's translation), for instance, states that 'applicants for the CEE must 'comply with the constitution and laws of the People's Republic of China'. This is another example of 'government from afar' (Zhang and Ong 2008).

and administration, in terms of their bodily qualification and maintenance (health examinations and group morning exercises, for example), their ideological adherence and articulation (in self-review forms, for instance).

On the other hand, HE subjects are introduced to some neoliberal arts of government. They are given more choices, for instance in university and specialty choice and job choice, and also more autonomy in making these choices; they are enjoined to perform self-governance, for instance in how to organize and plan their studies and other HE experiences, in adapting themselves to the requirements of market professionalism. HE subjects are encouraged to make choices (in a number of domains) for themselves, to take care of their bodies and psychological selves, to take responsibility for their success and failures in their studies, their social experiences, and their search for employment.

However, I am not suggesting that the self-governing subjects only began to emerge in the post-socialist era; on the contrary, some characteristics of self-governance exist in almost all historical periods include the pre-modern history. The socialist arts of government, as my previous discussions have shown, also include technologies of the self and are intended to produce what I term the 'socialist self'. But in the post-socialist era, the socialist self is increasingly incorporated with a 'neoliberal self', a self that is given more choices and held responsible for one's own choices, organisation, planning, management, mastery, and presentation in various domains of one's life, etc. In this regard, HE subjects in the post-socialist era are also increasingly governed by themselves; they are encouraged to be self-governing subjects.

Displaced Subjects

As Zhou's text indicates, the most recent decade has witnessed another round of major changes to the HE system, in particular its rapid expansion in the number of institutions and new entrants, but also the governmentality of HE, with some neoliberal arts of government introduced. It is during this process of infusion of technologies of government, the transformation of HE system from an elite to a mass sector, as well as drops in economic returns to HE degrees after HE graduates flooded the job market, that new forms of subjects began to emerge, subjects that find their previous belief in HE was most challenged by a rather alien social 'reality'. They may be called displaced subjects.

I begin with the challenges to the two forms of subjects that bear the highest degree of historical consistency – desiring subjects and meritocratic subjects. First, since the drastic drop in economic

returns to HE degrees, and also the equally drastic rise in the cost of HE degrees, the desirability of HE is now under question as HE subjects are now much less rewarded, in particular among those who are already at an economic disadvantage. Voices from the media have already begun to warn the public of the risk of 'educational bankruptcy', referring to the fact that students from low income families may not be able to pay off their debts after graduation with HE degree and suffer even further from poverty (Brennan, 2004). Other scholars (Liu, 2005; Wu, 2004; Yang, 2008) have also raised their concerns that the risks in HE investment will drive away students with financial difficulties. Desires are not necessarily persuasive as rewards are increasingly cut off.

Similar challenges are also presented to meritocratic reasoning. One who follows this line of this reasoning would agree that those with HE degrees, including those who are not among the highest achievers, are higher in the meritocratic hierarchy than those without HE degrees, and should accordingly have higher market values. However, the graduate employment crisis in recent decade puts this meritocratic reasoning in great doubt – in comparison to other job seekers without HE degrees, HE graduates drastically lost their market values in their competition in the job markets. Media reports have payed attention to the fact that in metropolitan cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, HE graduates now have starting salaries equal to those of manual workers such as migrant workers on construction sites. In other words, their merits proved by examination selections are now not necessarily acknowledged by the market. Reports such as Chen and Luo (2007) also cover stories of those with HE degrees 'going back' (huilu) to secondary technical schools for diplomas, as it is now believed that technical diplomas are gaining popularity among employers – diploma holders are regarded as more 'employable' as their skills are more relevant to the needs of the market. This case generally opposes meritocratic reasoning, as diploma holders are supposed to be less meritocratic than degree holders, but their respective popularities in the market are in the reverse order. Merits are no longer a guarantee of returns.

Troubled Subjects

In tackling the spreading discontent with the existing HE system in China, official discourses, rather than targeting the issues of the system and institutions, revolve primarily around the 'trouble subjects', referring to HE subjects that are regarded as lacking discipline and a sense of responsibility, and in need of 'character building', 'professional ideological education' (*zhuanye de sixiang jiaoyu*), and

'psychological health education' (*xinli jiaokang jiaoyu*). For instance, Zhen, Jin and Wang (2005, p. 8, my translation) writes,

> 'University students in contemporary China are mostly the single child of their families; they are a special group that bears high expectations of their families and the society. They have high self-regard, and strong urge to become talents, but they have limited social experiences, and they are not psychologically mature and hence likely to have emotional turbulence ... university students face increasing complexity in their social environment, family environment and school environment. They bear escalating stress in studies, employment, economics and emotions, and are prone to various psychological problems. Therefore, they are in need of psychological counselling and adjustment, and psychological health education can help them to build up good psychological character and prepare them for future development.'

Here, Zhen et al present university students as 'psychologically troubled', but these troubles are understood as intelligible and open to remedy – they are results of family and social expectations, increasingly complex environments and escalating pressures in various domains. Such 'troubled subjects' are therefore in urgent need of psychological interventions. As the authors further suggest, there should be 'a protection and intervention system for highly dangerous people with psychological problems', so these people can be diagnosed, their problems addressed and the dangers eliminated as early as possible – 'to prevent the occurrence of suicides or grievous bodily harm toward others that result from severe psychological disorders'. To do so, the authors argue, professional counselling services should be available on campus, and class tutors should be equipped with professional psychological knowledge and intervention skills. Additionally, special attention should be paid to students who are most likely to be troubled, including

> 'new entrants, graduating students, students from families with financial difficulties, and in particular students experiencing difficulties in studies, students who have failed relationships, students with records of disciplinary offences, and students who have strange behaviours and speech' (p.9, my translation).

Here, the authors virtually problematize every single HE subject as having possible psychological problems, from new entrants to graduating students, from those with financial difficulties to those with learning difficulties, from those who have failed relationships to those who violate regulations. To prevent them from getting into trouble, Zhen suggests mobilising some socialist arts of government to practice tighter administration and closer observations of HE subjects, such as setting up 'psychological dossiers' for university students, and having mass campaigns for psychological health on campus; second, he suggests enframing psychological supervision and intervention in the ideological education system.

For the authors, psychological health education should be practiced under techno-scientific reasoning, and student psychology is a domain that is intelligible through scientific research and ideological guidance. This argument is very much consistent with the recent rise of 'research on university students', academic studies that target university students and are intended to build up a new knowledge of 'HE subjects'. The Students' Affairs Research Branch of China Higher Education Association[45], for instance, is a research centre that specialises in such studies. On its website, the centre lists the ongoing projects of its members. For instance, the list of 11 'Key Studies of Students' affairs of 2011' include 'Theory and empirical studies for ideological education practices among university students', 'The attitude towards happiness among university students', 'Psychological health among university students and monitoring approaches', 'Studies of subjectivities and career planning among university students', and 'The use of emotional intervention in keeping university students from internet addictions', etc. These research projects either target the entire HE population or specific groups (those who are addicted to the internet, for example), but they all intend to produce a new knowledge of HE subjects as a special group, a group of potentially troubled subjects.

Conclusion

In this section, I provide a summary of HE subjects in modern China. I first argue that two subject forms have been most consistent through the history – desiring subjects and meritocratic subjects. I then engage with a number of subjects that are historically sensitive. In the next section, I will explore the ethics constructed through HE.

[45] http://www.sarb.cn/About/indexlist.asp?SortID=9

Chapter 12 Ethics

Introduction

In *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1977), Foucault explores the ways in which concrete apparatuses of power/knowledge work on bodies of human subjects in modern societies, such as 'the prison with its regulated time and space, the school with its hierarchically ordered pedagogy, the factory with its constant surveillance and measurement of activity' (O'Leary, 2002, p. 111). In his books *The Use of Pleasure* (Foucault, 1984) and *The Care for the Self* (Foucault, 1990), Foucault turns to explore the idea of self-care and technologies of self. From the perspective of the 'self', Foucault explores the process of subject formation as a result 'a process of self-knowledge', subjects as products of an 'obligation to seek and state the truth about oneself' (Foucault, quoted in Prado, 2000, p. 80).). Per the terms of his treatment, a mastery of subjectivity can be regarded as the ways in which one learns what one is by appropriating power-produced truth, and acts according to what is learned about oneself (Prado, 2000).

To facilitate this inquiry into the 'self', Foucault introduces his idea of ethics. Foucault understands ethics as a component of morality that concerns 'the self's relationship to itself' (Foucault and Rabinow, 2000). For Foucault, an inquiry into a history of morality should move beyond a history of codes of moral behavior, and should include a history of the forms of moral subjectivation, meaning the ways in which humans constitute themselves as moral subjects of their own conducts. Foucault thought of ethics as 'the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, ... which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions' (Foucault and Rabinow, 2000, p. 263).

Foucault's notion of ethics, or the self's relationship to itself, has four major aspects. The first aspect is called *the ethical substance*. It answers the question: 'Which is the aspect or the part of myself or my behavior which is concerned with moral conduct?' The second aspect is *the mode of subjectivation,* 'the way in which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations'. The third is *the self-forming activity,* 'the means by which we can change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects', to moderate our behaviors, to decipher what we are. The fourth part is *the telos,* which is 'the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way?' (Foucault and Rabinow, 2000, pp. 263-265) I summarise these four aspects in the following table.

This said, I can now go back to the question left from the previous section. The consistency and diversity in the subject forms constructed through HE can be accounted for in Foucault's

Four main aspects of Foucauldian Ethics	*ethical substance*	the part of oneself that is concerned with moral conduct
	mode of subjection	the way in which the individual establishes his or her relation to moral obligations and rules
	self-forming activity	ethical work one performs on oneself in order to transform oneself into an ethical subject
	telos	the mode of being at which one aims in behaving ethically

Table 12, Four Aspects of Foucauldian Ethics

conceptualization of ethics. His formulation of ethics allows one to examine the dependence and independence among these four aspects, and hence to understand 'the various ways in which continuities, modifications, and ruptures can occur in one or more of these four dimensions'. As Davidson (2003, p. 131) explains,

> '(i)n some historical periods, for example, the ethical substance may remain constant, whereas the mode of subjection gradually alters; or the telos may stay continuous, whereas the self-forming activity is modified. In other periods, the ethical substance, mode of subjection, self-forming activity, and telos may be so inextricably intertwined that they undergo change together, thereby resulting in an entirely new form of the self's relationship to itself.'

In the case of HE in modern China, the aspect that remains mostly constant, I argue, is the ethical substance, while other three aspects undergo some degrees of alteration. The consistency in the ethical substance may help to explain the two enduring forms of subject – the desiring subject and the meritocratic subject; and the alterations in other three aspects shed some light on the subject forms that are historically specific, such as the infused subject and the troubled subject. However, in this section I will not perform a genealogy of ethics. This is due to a lack of reference of earlier ethical conducts of HE. Instead, I will make use of my interview data and explore the implication of four aspects of Foucauldian ethics to mainly contemporary HE ethics.

Ethics as a practice of Self-care

In my interviews, I intended to explore the ways in which students in China were trying to identify a part of the existence where they were able to show care or concern for themselves. It appeared to me that without being given many other opportunities for self-formation, my interviewees found formal education, in particular HE, an effective and a persuasive one. A common belief is that through the process of HE, one can learn the ways in which one can take care of oneself intellectually, socially, and financially. This is not unexpected - as my discussion in the truth regime of HE shows, HE participation is widely portrayed and cited in school discourses and practices as essentially a form of

self-care, a way (and perhaps the only way) in which one can realise one's potentials, to secure better life chances, and to benefits other individuals and collectives in one's social circle (families, teachers, and the state).

To better understand this link between HE and self-care, the process of HE participation can be roughly split into three stages - *preparation* for HE selection, *acquisition* of 'knowledge and capacities' (Zhou, 2006, p. 164) during HE and *utilisation* of one's intellectual and bodily capacities after HE appears most closely related to the few years of senior high school (normally 3 years) and HE (normally four years). In fact, the process is linked to one's entire educational life. The preparation process actually begins much earlier for the subjects of HE in China. As one of my interviewees recalled, 'As early as primary school, we have been repeatedly told to study hard so we can get into a good university'. As for the acquisition stage, my discussion in the *Technologies* section also shows, HE itself is promoted as a means of self-care, as students are encouraged to take care their own academic and social lives on campus, to manage their own study plans, to attend to their own needs of daily lives, to monitor their own conducts with reference to various regulations, codes, and norms. For the utilisation stage, the effects of HE participation remain after one's graduation - one's identity as a HE recipient stays in one's personal dossier and becomes a permanent proof of self-care, and an important criteria in various evaluation of one's intellectual, bodily and social qualification.

The Ethical Substance

The ethical substance is the part of ourselves or our behaviours that is relevant to ethical judgment. An example given by Foucault is the part of sexual behaviour that is relevant in Greek ethics – 'the ethical substance was acts linked to pleasure and desire in their unity'. He further explains

> '(f)or the Greeks, when a philosopher was in love with a boy, but did not touch him, his behaviour was valued. The problem was: Does he touch the boy or not? That's the ethical substance: the act linked with pleasure and desire (Foucault and Rabinow, 2000, p. 264).'

The notion of the ethical substance is not limited to the realm of sexuality and can be applied to wider socio-cultural inquiries. Linking to subjectivity, Davidson explains,

> 'the ethical substance consists of the forms of subjectivity which are imposed on us, and which we impose on ourselves, through a range of power/knowledge/self practices. These modes of subjectivity can range from forms of sexual identity… to the ways in which we are brought to embrace the ideals of our socio-cultural milieu (O'Leary, 2002, pp. 107-108).'

It was clear from a rough overview of my interviews that students regarded their participation in HE as testimony to their earnestness in assessing opportunities for personal development and an understanding of their capacities in the context of their socio-cultural milieu. But it was perhaps just as clear that considerable hesitation, doubt, and divergence existed among students with regard to their motivations for regarding HE as a site of ethical engagement, as though 'the ways in which (they) were brought to embrace the ideals' had been made friable at the point of their application. This situation prompts me to make reference to the 'ethical substance of HE' on a provisional basis in an attempt to refine our understanding of student motivations in identifying HE's relevance for ethical judgment.

The ethical substance of HE in modern China, I argue, in the link between HE participation and an improvement in one's general life chances, be they intellectual, social or financial or alternative factors. To test this hypothesis, I explore several questions in my interviews which queried the reason why the interviewees decide to 'go to university'[46] and engage upon the first step of HE participation. My purpose is to determine whether a correlative to 'Does he touch the boy or not?' in Foucault's assessment above exists for Chinese students facing the question of HE participation, namely 'Do they (choose to) go to university or not?' Since so much of Chinese primary and secondary education is oriented around avoiding a definitive choice (see below under 'The Mode of Subjection'), problematising a straightforward establishment of an ethical substance, I don't regard this question to be trivial, nor does it become any less relevant for being asked after their matriculation. To engage simultaneously the nearly ubiquitous certainty expressed among students of the opportunity provided by HE and student hesitation and doubt about the limits of those opportunities, I make reference to my discussion with interviewees on the expression of 'HE as a belief'. During the interviews, instead asking a question directly, I asked students to express their opinions in response to an advertisement promoting education.

During the time of my fieldwork in 2009, an advertisement for a private adult learning company appeared at a large number of bus stops in Beijing, including the immediate areas of the universities in which I conducted my fieldwork. Its bold strapline was 'Learning is a belief' (xuexi shi yizhong xinyang), though the advertisement also provided the anodyne English translation, 'In learning we trust'. I asked my interviewees to what extent they would agree that the ad text can be applied to their participation in HE, to what extent they would agree on an expression that 'going to university is a

[46] The expression of 'going to university' (*shang daxue*) is the most common term in the Chinese HE discourses referring to one's participation in HE.

belief', to what extent they would think this expression was relevant to their own decisions of HE participation. By using this advertisement, I hoped that my interviewees would be able to articulate their reasons of HE participation more clearly, and it seemed to have worked the way I expected.



Figure 5, 'Learning is a belief' advertisement at a Beijing bus stop, from http://www.douban.com/photos/photo/378871652/

It should be noted that, while the translation on the ad is acceptable, the Chinese word *xinyang* has semantic parameters roughly analogous to the Roman *fides*, incorporating use with respect to religious belief as well as more mundane forms of trust. Both are clearly operative in certain student responses. For instance, Interviewee 28 said, 'I think education is a belief. And like all other religious beliefs, it is a spiritual drive and support - with such a support, you can survive the times of great difficulties'. A few others suggested the expression that 'a pursuit of knowledge is a belief'. Interviewee 47 argued,

> 'I think ... a pursuit of knowledge is a belief. I think going to university is a pursuit of knowledge, therefore it can be understood as a belief. I think to some extent, going to university is to acquire knowledge and skills, and to improve oneself - this is a rather good belief as well. I think going to university is an act of knowledge pursuit, so knowledge pursuit is a belief.'

In general, my interviewees reported that the expression was actually not alien to them, and they acknowledged that it might be popular in the Chinese. For instance, interviewee No.23 said,

> 'in China, if you think it as a belief, some people in fact would buy it. Because Chinese families and children have already got used to that expression, from the Imperial Examination to the CEE, and believe that (university education) is the only way out.'

However, in addition to a general acknowledgement of the prevalence of this expression, there was also a noticeable variation in my interviewees' interpretations of this advertisement. Those who came from urban background were much less likely to sympathise with this expression of 'going to university is a belief' (*shang daxue shi yizhong xinyang*), and they pointed to some normative or instrumental interpretations of the values of HE as the underpinning logic of their participation in HE, such as better employment perspectives, higher social status, or better life chances in general. For instance, all three of interviewees in Group 8 were from urban areas (two from Beijing) and invariably regarded this expression as 'pretentious'. In comparison to their counterparts from rural backgrounds, those from urban background were faced with fewer challenges in gaining access to HE, and therefore for them, going to university is 'just another option to choose in life', 'a step to take', 'a period of time', 'an experience to have', rather than a *xinyang* to follow. Here, those urban interviewees were in a sense expressing doubts about the 'spiritual drive' provided by HE attendance, but they remained adamant about its instrumental benefits. They attempted to articulate limits to what one should expect from HE, citing a set of moral obligations that were more concerned with themselves as recipients of HE, while concomitantly reducing the choice to one among many, or to a progression without demonstrable emphasis.

Generally speaking, those from rural areas appeared to be more sympathetic towards this expression. Though they too regarded HE attainment in instrumental terms, they tended to see the choice to attend HE in a starker light. Interviewee No.3 (from rural background) said,

> 'I think it is kind of a belief. In our rural neighbourhood, if one speaks of schooling, it is about going to university eventually, and then getting a good job. After all, education is perhaps the only model; you can only choose this path'.

Interviewee No.27 also expressed a similar opinion,

> 'in realistic terms, in the rural areas, our parents, they take it as an absolute belief, and majority of the students also take it as a belief, because all agree that going to university is a good way to change one's life trajectory – to change one's living environment. This may sound secular, but it is very practical; (going to university) can change one's family situation, so the parents hold high expectations of it, and the students are under high pressure'.

Here, the two interviewees from rural background admitted that in their local contexts, such an expression tended to prevail among parents and students alike. They were rather comfortable with the phrases such as 'the only path', 'changing life trajectory' and to improve 'family (financial) situation'. Interviewee 3 said,

'in our rural area, when talking about schooling, people talk about going to university, and getting a good job. This is after all a rather single model of education. You can only choose this route'.

Interviewee 4 said,

'I think it is a compulsory choice. This might have to do with personal development. If one has this vision to be realised, going to university is what one can choose, the best route for one to choose - many would choose it'.

The oxymoronic nature of 'a compulsory choice' cannot be overlooked, but it is not easily explicated. For these students, HE participation would lead them away from the 'backward' areas, from heavy manual work, and lead them to better life chances in urban areas, and benefit not only themselves, but the entire family as well. In other words, the rural participants were citing a slightly different set of moral obligations from that of their urban counterparts. These obligations place emphasis on a radical transformation (rather than strictly related to security) in one's life chances, and include their families as additional beneficiaries of HE. Perhaps as a consequence, they tended to more regard alternative 'paths' as severely restricted in number, scope, or quality, and to attribute greater credibility to the educational path, even adopting their parents' view of this 'belief'.

What is also important to note here is that despite the variations in their interpretations of this expression, the different extent to which they agreed upon the appropriateness of the word '*xinyang*' (or 'belief') in the context of HE participation, my interviewees, it appeared to me, were actually articulating and defending their own 'beliefs' of HE. Whether they stated that their HE participation was aimed to secure better employment perspectives, as in the case of urban students, or to achieve particular forms of social mobility, as in the case of rural students, they all in fact believe in the positive effect of HE participation on their life chances in general. They also actively seek 'evidence' to support such interpretations of HE truth, their own 'beliefs' of HE that are faced with severe challenges by their appropriation of other HE 'reality' such as graduate unemployment, or campus environment or teaching styles that tend to fail their prior expectations. During my interviews, a noticeable proportion of interviewees did state that they were dissatisfied with the HE system they found themselves in. The sense of dissatisfaction may be related to the crowded campus environment, the rigid university regulations, or their dim opportunities after graduation. But all these issues did not stop them from seeing HE as the general domain of improvement. In fact, they appeared compelled to defend this link between HE participation and an improvement in one's life chances, even though other evidence suggested otherwise.

For instance, there exists a prevailing discourse that the social status of HE graduates (in comparison with other job seekers in the market) has now undergone tremendous changes. In the interview section

of social status, I put forward some copies of newspaper reports on the fact that university graduates were making similar incomes to those of migrant workers, those without proper education working as hard labours. In commenting on these reports, most interviewees appeared less negative, and they emphasised the status of 'public intellectuals' attached to HE subjectivity, and regarded themselves as 'the most important group in nation building' as they were 'in possession of the most advanced knowledge'. Noticeably, they comfortably cited the 'suzhi' discourses, and largely agreed that university graduates in general were higher in 'human quality' than those who received less or little education. For instance, in my conversation with Group 10, all three interviewees tended to argue their advantages to the migrant workers remained. Interviewee 30 said,

> 'in term of social status, one should not be too self confident, but should not be self-defeating either. In fact, I think university students are still intellectuals; even with the decrease of their financial values, they are after all intellectuals, with a certain accumulation of knowledge. '

Interviewee 29 added,

> 'I agree that one of the aims of HE is to get higher earnings. But I think what is more important is to improve one's suzhi.'

Interviewee 30 continued,

> 'no matter how badly prepared university students get, how low their salaries get, they make a much easier living than the migrant workers, and their jobs are better secured... We can expect a rise in salary in a couple of years' time'.

Interviewee 28 further articulated this point, and argued that,

> 'I think a university graduate, regardless of his job, his salary, is still advantaged compared to migrant workers... For a university graduate, one might be not well-paid and underemployed for his job, but he has potential to be realised. But as for a migrant worker, how much potential does he have? He might have potential too, but much less in comparison to university student.'

The quote above shows how students moblised multiple discourses such as 'suzhi', 'long-term benefits (market rationality)' and 'potential (educational entrepreneurship)' to defend their own beliefs in the positive effect of HE - the link between HE participation and an improvement in one's life chances. This link is what I believe to be the ethical substance of HE in modern China. My interviewees incited themselves as subjects of such an ethical substance. On this point, it is also instructive make reference to Foucault's notion of spirituality, by which he means 'the subject's attainment of a certain mode of being and the transformations that the subject must carry out on itself to attain this mode of being' (Foucault and Rabinow, 2000, p. 294). HE participation is also a form of spirituality - students

incite themselves as HE subjects, as performers of moral conduct of HE participation as a form of self-care, and as defenders of the ethical substance of HE.

The Mode of Subjection

Now I move on to the second aspect of ethics – the mode of subjection. This refers to the ways in which one establishes one's relation to moral obligations and rules. In this regard, the mode of subjection that is relevant to HE in modern China, I argue, is the sense of moral obligation to recognise, maximise and realise one's intellectual and bodily potentials through HE participation. In other words, if one is qualified for HE by intellectual and bodily criteria (I have explored these criteria in previous chapters), one 'should' make effort to participate in its discourses and practices of HE.

The recognition of one's HE qualification is first made possible by certain evaluation processes in schooling, as Interviewee No.44 explained,

> 'when the kids start their first year in senior high, they are told that if they are ranked beyond what number in exams in their grade, they can go to the Tier-1 universities (keypoint universities), and beyond what number, they can make it to the Tier-2 (regular universities), and beyond what number, they can make it to Tier-3 (two-year technical colleges). Below that, you may not have a chance. So you have to fight to get into the rank. One is told that way from the first year in senior high. So for them, and for us as well, going to university is actually a belief. Three years of preparation is just for admission to university.'

Here No.44 here explained the deployment of examinations as a constant gaze into one's intellectual capacities to determine one's HE qualification. Students are repeatedly assessed for their chances of gaining access to HE by their performances in a series of exams and tests - every student is informed about their chances at all time, and therefore they are held responsible for their improvement or drop in studies. On the other hand, the academic performances of all students are made visible in the ranking system, and also put under continuous surveillance. Schooling therefore is reduced to a certain ranking and racing game for the students – they are made competitors against one another for HE participation.

There was a sense of naturalism in the recognition process. The idea was that if one is intellectually sound, being capable of studying hard, one would naturally want to go to university, or be naturally expected to do so. As Interviewee 22 said,

> 'I think it is rather natural for one to think about going to university. If you are doing well in school, people would expect you to eventually go to university. Your parents and teachers would always remind you that you have to study hard, to keep it up, and not to fail others' expectations of you to go to university. Also, nowadays, with the

expansion of HE, it is even easier to make it to university (or college) education. So if one is intellectually sound yet does not have an ambition for HE, that is rather unnatural.'

This recognition process is further facilitated by a sense of superiority in HE participation endorsed by some my interviewees, in particular those from rural background. For them, HE participation can bring a sense of pride and self-esteem, and a university is interpreted as a sort of 'sacred' place. Interviewee No. 9 (from rural area) said,

'many of us have this feeling that if you make it to university, or even to senior high, you see some people in the society not in schooling but in employment, you would have this sense of pride. I used to feel that I am different from them, and now this feeling is getting stronger when I made it to university. I feel that university is such a different place; it is more sacred than any other places.'

Interviewee No.8, also from rural area, picked up the conversation and cited the educational selection in his local area,

'the dropout rate is fair high in our place. Few of my classmates from primary school are still in education, a few from junior high, and some more from senior high. Few of my classmates from primary and junior high are in education; most of them already got married. I think, for me, going to university is an indispensable stage of life. If I don't have it, I will feel regretful.'

Here, No.8 implied that to survive a high dropout rate and to make it to university was not easy. Therefore, he also felt a sense of pride and self-esteem in comparison to some of his classmates that are no longer in education. Those who fail to stay in for longer period of education, in particular those who already got married and start their family lives at early ages, according to No.8, were excluded from a valuable experience of life and should regret their loss.

To explore the ways in which students understand their obligations regarding the maximisation of their potentials through HE participation, I asked the interviewees to explain (for the first year students) what they planned to or to reflect upon (for the final year students) what they had done to achieve self-improvement during four years in university. The replies to this questions would include a number of dimensions - first, to 'study hard', as 'study is the natural responsibility of a student' and in that sense 'HE is not different from previous schooling experiences'; second, to 'gain self-independence' in various aspects of one's campus life, such as catering, sleeping order, and laundry, or in general to 'take good care of oneself' in everyday lives; third, to 'build up good social relationships with others', including ones' peers, tutors, teachers and other administrative staff. The third dimension was widely regarded as 'a significant part of one's university experience' - for one thing, 'a university is like a small society' and as a member of such a society 'everyone needs to learn to be socialised' as a preparation for 'entering the real society' after graduation; for another, 'in Chinese society, good social

connections are indispensable for your career perspectives' - 'your teachers may recommend a good job to you', and 'your peers are most likely to be the people you collaborate with in the near future'. This socialisation process is made possible in a number of ways (or techniques as some of my interviewees said), such as joining a student society or club, or to act as a student cadre (*xuesheng ganbu*) and organise social events, or making regular contacts with teachers and administrative staff to be integrated into their social circles. In summary, these three dimensions, academic studies, self-independence, and social relationship are the three major moral obligations to fulfill for the maximisation of one's potentials through HE.

To understand the maximisation of one's potential, how students evaluate the extent to which they realise their potentials, I ask my interviewees to summarise (for the final year students) the main effects of HE on them. A number of dimension emerged from the discussion. The most significant improvement would be, not the acquisition of knowledge, but rather the acquisition of social skills - 'how to greet other in social context, 'how to live with others', 'how to deal with different opinions other than your own', which was often understood as an improvement in one's suzhi; secondarily, a better understand of oneself, of one's own 'ambition', 'weakness', 'specialty', of 'what one wants to do in the future' and becoming 'a complete person' in terms of one's 'psychological, physical and ontological existence', and 'broader visions' of the society and the world; thirdly, the attainment of a good career perspective, for instance a job in a public sector organisation, as 'HE is a springboard for employment'. Noticeably, there is a mismatch between the maximisation and the realisation process - the role of academic study was underplayed in the latter. This was closely related to the fact that a large number of final year students complaint that they 'did not learn anything practical' in their three years of HE - 'the curriculum was outdated', 'the teachers are not concerned with teaching', and students 'were forced to learn things they had not interest in'. Nonetheless, all these complaints did not stop them from recognising the positive effects of HE, which in turn further support the ethical substance and protect HE spirituality.

Self-forming Activity

The self-forming activity refers to the ethical work that we perform on ourselves to transform us into ethical subjects. To illustrate the self-forming activity related to the ethics of contemporary HE, I make reference to some materials in the student dossiers. These materials are more closely related to the

second step of HE participation – the acquisition of knowledge and capacities. In this case, I explore the 'capacities' part, which are some behavioural codes that students are conditioned to follow.

In Mr Y's student dossiers, there are other documents that manifest the working of such socialist technologies. For example, there is copy of a *Letter of Undertaking of Behaviours in University*', which include the full text of *Codes of Behaviours of Students of HE Institutions* introduced by the State Board of Education, and a section of 'My Promise', in which students are requested to write their promise to comply with the Codes. As a document of personal dossiers, every student will again be obliged to show their compliance with the regulations in writing. Once their letters are documented, those students are 'subject to the evaluation of their promises in their annual review forms', as the Letter regulation explains.

A more detailed standard of evaluation is presented in a self-review form introduced by Mr Y's university, titled *Self Review Form of Integrity for Graduate of Year 2004 of XX College*. This form breaks the notion of 'integrity into a list of self-forming activities for one to be an ethical subject. The list includes 'moral discipline' (whether one has a record of lying, gambling, theft, or 'talking after lights out', etc.), 'academic studies' (whether one has a record of failure or cheating in examinations, or being late for class sessions, or winning honorary titles or scholarships), 'personal life and finance' (whether one returns loans from others in time, or pays tuition fee in time, whether one dresses in a clean and tidy fashion, or has good habits with regard to personal hygiene), 'Human Quality (Suzhi) Development' (whether one actively participate in various forms of collective activities, social practices, and morning exercises, etc.), 'interpersonal relationships' (whether one has good relationships with peers, and has a record of sleepover of a visitor of the opposite sex[47], etc.).

Students are asked to review their own integrity by answering 'yes' or 'no' to questions of each category, and then based on the answers, they are asked to mark their own integrity by choosing from one of the five 'scale of integrity' responses, *over 90%, 80%, 70%, 60%* or *fail*. Answering 'no' to the questions regarding records of offences to regulations, laws, and social norms, such as 'whether one has a record of damaging public property' will serve as evidence of integrity, as will answering 'yes' to questions regarding compliance with them, such as 'whether one respects one's teacher and obeys to the administration (of the university)' and 'whether one has joined any clubs and societies'.

[47] Apparently, staying over of one's same-sex partner is not recognised in this list as damage to one's integrity. In other words, homosexuality itself is not recognised in the norms of behaviour codes of integrity. But this issue of the attitude towards homosexuality in HE is perhaps worth a dissertation on it own, and I shall not engage with it further here.

According to this self-review form, an HE self of integrity should comply with a variety of university regulations; mistakes such as 'late returns of library loans' will do harm to one's integrity. An HE self of integrity should also actively show, first, concerns of the self, such as dress codes (clean and tidy), personal hygiene, and financial reputation (return loans from others in time), etc.; second, concerns of the collective, such as good relationships with peers, participation in charity works and social activities; third, concerns of one's nation, as rendered visible in the only the first question of the entire form – whether one is familiar with big events of the nation. If one is familiar with the big events, which are not specified in the form but could mean following domestic news, then one is not only politically sensitive, but also an HE self of integrity.

Apparently, this review form is not difficult to trick. If one is to present oneself as a HE self of integrity, he or she only needs to fill the form in line with the normative values that are not difficult to understand. As long as one does not have a record of major 'offences' (violations) to university regulations, such as committing theft, one can easily achieve an integrity score of the highest scale, over 90%, by giving answers that are 'politically correct'. Even if, for instance, one has a record of late returns of library loans or 'has arguments over little things with one's peer', one may be confident that such minor 'offences' will not be checked; and since this *Letter of Undertaking* is to be documented in one's personal dossiers, it is a wiser choice to lie about one's 'offences' and present oneself an HE self of full integrity, or in this form, over 90% degree of integrity. Like other self-review forms, this form also incorporated review sections by others, including the head of one's dormitory[48], the head of one's class, the class tutor, and the administrator of the university. But, again, unless one has a record of major offences, others would be unlikely to disagree. Mr Y for instance, marks himself as a HE self of over 90% integrity, and this result was agreed upon by all others.

One might regard this Letter of Undertaking as another example of bureaucratic formality, for any student can give simple correct answers and be a HE self of integrity. But I argue, by simply filling these forms, the subjects familiarise themselves with this list of self-forming activities and may consciously engage with them, as these activities are presented as a collection of behavioural codes against which one is constantly to evaluate oneself. Also, such form filling procedures are to some extent disciplinary in nature – the form is compulsory by the administrative sector of the university, and one could jeopardise one's own life chances by not complying with the codes, norms and values

[48] In Chinese HE institutions, students are unlikely to live alone in a room, but normally to share with at least three other students or more. The specialization of the university dormitory is in consistence with the socialist governmentality. By purposely placing individual students in collective units such as shared dormitories, one is subject to the gaze of others, and hence needs to be aware of one's own behaviours in the supposedly private time. This is an interesting issue that perhaps needs a chapter on its own, so I shall not include it in this dissertation for mere sake of word length.

underpinning the listed activities. To avoid such damage, one should act ethically as the list suggests, and to present oneself an ethical HE subject, a self with (almost) full integrity.

Telos

The telos refers to the mode of being toward which we aim in behaving ethically. In this final section, I limit my discussion to the third step of HE participation, and explore the telos of HE subjects. In previous chapters, I have discussed the current graduate employment crisis in China, and how HE subjects are directed towards self-governance and market rationality – to prepare oneself for the crisis, to be responsible for one's own success and failure, and to properly understand one's position in the job market. I believe this would initially suggest the construction of a *telos* of job-seeking for HE subjects, but as we shall see, the construct appears largely of government making, and student participation, which determines whether the HE *telos* may be considered an *ethical* one, complicates matters substantially. In the following discussion, I want to examine to what extent the hegemonic account of the HE *telos* as job-seeking is appropriated by students in China by reflecting on my interview data.

To make a quick review of this hegemonic account of the *telos* of HE subjects as job-seekers, I make reference of Zhou Ji's *Higher Education in China.* In the section marked 'Employment', Zhou (2006, pp. 162-163) writes,

> The increasing expansion in higher education over the past few years has put more pressure upon college graduates with regard to employment … (although) the employment rates have topped 80%, quite a few students have still been facing unemployment for a while upon graduation. Under such circumstances, higher education institutions have put more emphasis on a scientific career-launching education, guiding students in forming a rational job-seeking concept, and improving their business start-up capabilities. Previously, the first choice for college graduates in terms of employer were state organs, government institutions, state-owned enterprises, foreign-invested companies, and joint ventures, and in terms of geographical location, large cities. They have become more practical and down-to-earth job hunting, and are considering small and medium-sized firms, township enterprises, low-sounding institutes, the hinterland and western regions, and small and medium-sized cities. Meanwhile, embarking on post-graduate studies or going abroad to pursue further studies have become a means of relieving job-hunting pressures and seeking better job opportunities in the future.

Zhou further argues how this employment crisis shapes the ways in which students engage with learning in HE. He writes (164-165),

> '(a)s social development puts a premium on a student's competence and overall character while employers set greater store by a job-seeker's independent thinking, power of expression and social communicating skills…

> Meaning, they act on their own to sit for a variety of professional qualification certificate examinations... they join debate contests, social practice, etc., to acquire useful social skills with a view to widening their horizons and adding to their qualification for future job hunting.'

In the passages above, I argue, Zhou's account from a state-directed institutional perspective is less a description of the effects of employment crisis on HE learning, and more an indication that these activities, practices, and subjectivities are most desirable for the contemporary HE participants as job-seekers. They constitute the *telos* of contemporary HE, which is primarily marked by market rationality and professionalism. Market rationality endorses a 'practical' and 'down-to-earth' approach towards job hunting, which suggests an HE graduate should give up on a prior elitism and accept jobs that are less desirable than the posts given to their predecessors, such as the ones in small public and private sector organisations and/or in developing regions (other than the coastal region). Professionalism suggests that an HE graduate should have a 'proper' understanding of what a job market requires of its participants - 'independent thinking, power of expression and communication skills', and in order to succeed in market competition, he or she should answer to these requirements and improve related 'capacities' and 'skills' through educational and social events and an acquisition of additional qualifications. Here Zhou's account of an employment *telos* treats the capacities and skills of a HE graduate as necessary attainments prior to success in the job market, but he regards future employment as the most critical aspect of managing HE from an institutional perspective - therein lies the anxiety of the state.

The fact remains, however, that the employment crisis has altered student perspectives on the relationship between HE and employment, necessitating a supplementation of the hegemonic account, in part because the relationship is something the state possesses only limited capacity to address. The question we hope to broach, then, is whether there is an articulation of a field of differential operation for student ethical subjectivity to seek an alternative *telos*, a 'mode of being' beyond job-seeking, or whether they are subordinated to the overarching goal of finding a job.

I now tackle students' assessment of that *telos*, insofar as they are the ones practicing ethics. Zhou's perspective is relevant since my interviewees did pick up on it, but that does not mean students and the state are in complete agreement. The anxieties of students are not entirely focused on employment, and how they treat the corresponding HE elements, such as *suzhi* and social status, factors which play a role in affirming their belief in HE in the face of market constraints, indicate that they view the prospect of unsatisfactory employment differently from the state directives. It would appear that

students have prepared themselves for the possibility of unsatisfactory employment. When asked about the origin, features and duration of the current employment crisis, the majority of my interviewees reported that they were very much aware of certain challenges and difficulties in seeking employment, and interpreted this situation as a rather 'long-term problem', a result of 'the supply of HE graduates outnumbering the demand of the market'; and to cope with the challenges in employment, a considerable number of interviewees intended to study for a postgraduate degree or/and take the 'Civil Servant Exam' (*gongwuyuan kaoshi*) to increase their chances in the job market. The extension of HE participation through further degrees in light of employment problems would of course only be an option available to a minority of HE participants, and therefore perhaps a response on the margins of HE, but the logic of such a play on the margins reveals considerable insight. Consequently, I think it will be important to examine the logic involved in the pursuit of postgraduate studies and then proceed onward to treat the outlooks of those whose entry into the job-market is decidedly more imminent.

For many, postgraduate studies undertaken under China's current employment conditions were not primarily aimed at the further pursuit of knowledge, but rather were to reduce exposure to the rise of unemployment or underemployment. Such an approach involves reaffirming the value of HE subjectivity in light of the *aporia* of employment, which leads to a rather contorted repositioning of the hegemonic goal. For instance, interviewee 30 said,

> 'I think studying for a postgraduate degree is also a kind of employment. It points out where you go next. I think postgraduate studies and finding a job are the same in nature. I think our aim in life, perhaps not our aim in life, but one of of our aims (in life) is to secure a good job, so one can have a stable life. This is the most important. So I think, both postgraduate studies and work point to the same direction – for a better life ahead.'

In this passage we witness the actual reduction of postgraduate enrolment to employment itself, a remarkable convergence of the aims alternately treated by Zhou. We note the collapse of a two dimensional model education and employment to one dimension in which they are infused together—there is no transition between them; they are, in fact, one and the same. Unlike in Zhou's account, wherein the goal of employment succeeds upon education, here education has to be remarked as its own end with respect to employment, as a replacement for the (postponed) goal of employment in the market. If this interpretation seems perverse, considering that 'secur(ing) a good job' is highlighted, it is important to acknowledge how it is brought into play with education. Both are, in fact, subordinated to a larger 'aim', which is not that of securing a good job, but having *a stable life* ('so one can…'), which is deemed 'the most important'. It is the larger aim that implicitly underwrites the decision to continue in post-graduate studies, a life that provides greater stability than the job market or the

spectral trials of the Ant-tribe. Thus, postgraduate studies are a replacement for employment in an unemployable terrain.

This passage appears emblematic of the ethical quandary in which Chinese students participating in HE find themselves. We might speculate that those who wish to continue in HE participation for a longer period of time disclose an acute awareness of HE's immanent relationship to the quality of their life, that they account for a 'superior' *telos* of HE participation, if only out of need to justify their decision not to immediately negotiate market rationality. But the discourse of market rationality still acts a subtext to their logic. In fact, even in the passage above, one cannot help but recognize that the replacement of employment by HE participation under the rubric of a 'stable life' should also be equivalent to the replacement of HE by market employment under the same rubric, if both are to achieve the same aim. And indeed, throughout the interviews, it was this latter perspective, the diminishment of the value of HE participation vis-à-vis employment, or a subjection to market rationality, which predominated. However, it is important to note in advance that the diminishment of the value of HE participation vis-à-vis employment gave rise to a development in discourse that employment's replacement by further HE participation did not—namely, an eclipse of that to which both employment and HE were subordinated in the account of interview 30 above: *a stable life.*

Among the interviewees, there was a general acceptance of the *telos* of market rationality. And even among those who saw the aim of employment as potentially distinct from their experience in HE, the motivation of market rationality still provided a subtle undercurrent. So, for example, many argued that university graduates should have 'better understandings of the job market' and their own 'capacities' as 'new entrants into the market', and therefore lower their expectations and start from some junior positions. Interviewee 30, the same gentlemen who articulated the replacement of employment by HE participation above, also stated,

> 'we should not think too highly of oneself, and should not be proud of the fact that one went to a certain university, a certain keypoint university. You have only learnt some abstract knowledge, and your practical social experience cannot be compared with those mature professionals, or those technical graduates. One should acknowledge that fact. I think a university student should have a fair evaluation of oneself. Once you have this fair evaluation, you won't have the issue of unemployment.'

Interviewee 12 said,

> 'I don't worry too much about employment. It all depends on your own criteria (of employment). Some people have rather high criteria to begin with, but the market does not fulfil such requirements, and the salaries are much lower than one expected. Some decline the job offers that do not fulfil their high expectations – (I think) this is not feasible. If you lower your criteria, you can definitely find a job in the market.'

Interviewee 10 drew on his recent experience of seeking internship and made similar comments, further emphasising the diminishment of value they have as HE participants:

> 'I think the problems of graduate employment are mainly due to too high the expectations of university students themselves. University students always think too high of themselves. I am looking for some opportunities of internship, and some people I know are looking for jobs. Our feelings are that in fact we are all rather ordinary. We thought we were all very competitive and should be readily employed. After several blows, we all learnt to swallow our pride.'

Noticeably, a considerable number of interviewees, echoing Zhou's account of HE learner as job-seekers, articulated that employment perspectives are to be decided by one's competence and it was natural for those graduating from regular universities to be underemployed or unemployed – they are simply not prepared for the competition in the job market. This perspective too, it would seem, fits into a conception of the diminishment of the value of their HE experience and the life achieved thereby, though it vacillates from a critical view of personal inadequacy to that of institutional inadequacy. Interviewee 11 argued,

> 'I think, first, now a large number of university graduates ended up being unemployed because they did not learn much from their HE, and they are not what the market needs. If you are a competitive and fast learner, and you are very creative and adaptive to the society, you won't be concerned with the problem of unemployment; second, for me personally, I don't care too much about income, or where I go, how much money I can get. I can manage with a simple life. Above all, graduates from this university, given its position in the (academic) hierarchy (of HEIs), wouldn't end up being too bad.'

One notes that the invocation of 'life' here is markedly different than what we observed in interviewee 30's comments above. In his assessment, 'a stable life' was the paramount aim and guided his understanding of the equivalence of HE participation and employment. Interviewee 11's 'life', in contrast, is not an aim but a means, is subjugated to employment, is 'downgraded' to simplicity , and shows little concern for income, status, or location. His reference to student capacities such as creativity and adaptability are intriguingly emphasised in this context, but they are emphasised specifically to combat the anxiety of (un)employment, not as avenues to alternate subjectivities and ethical practice. Moreover, they are themselves subordinated to the competence/status of the institution ('Above all') that, we understand, would offer better prospects and thus an opportunity for a life which 'wouldn't end up being too bad.'

It is by comparing the manner in which interviewee 30 and interviewee 11 variously adopt Zhou's understanding of HE *telos*, reflected commonly among the other interviewees, that I believe we are best able to assess the potential emergence of a *telos* of ethics in HE participation beyond the

hegemonic *telos*, a mode of being beyond job-seeking. To preclude the drawing of a false dichotomy, it might be conjectured that interviewee 11's articulation has been too strictly considered, that his perspective may be contingent, as interviewee 30's is, on the role employment may play in achieving a better life somewhere in the future, and we are only provided with evidence of his momentary concerns, limited to employment. It may well be that he is willing, as is praised in traditional Chinese morality, 'to eat bitterness' (*chi ku*) for long term gain. I believe such a conjecture would be simultaneously relevant and mistaken. It is certainly relevant insofar as it offers a traditional discourse that could effectively be mapped onto interviewee 11's articulation; and more importantly, it is relevant insofar as it shows the general correspondence of both interviewees' perspectives, insofar as it deemphasises a seemingly arbitrary difference. However, it is also mistaken insofar as it adduces potential progress made later in the interviewee's career, and a subsequent improvement of his life conditions, to *the immediate linkage between HE participation and finding a(ny) job*, doing so precisely at the locus interviewee 11 has, however temporarily, obviated: a concern for a *better* life, one marked by stability. The difference between the two perspectives may signify, but not as the difference between concern for a *better* or more stable life 'now' and potentially 'in the future', for that would suggest the difference may be accounted for by a short-sightedness contingent upon idealism, and yet we see that only a marginal variance between interviewee 11 and interviewee 30's 'idealism' obtains. Interviewee 30 agrees, in fact, that one must humble oneself to deal with the empirical realities of the market, so that 'you won't have the issue of unemployment'.

Both accounts of life are marked by a navigation of the question of employment. The 'stable life' is achieved by a student continuing his studies, and established as a reason for replacing employment with further HE participation. Through a decision to extend his education, the student has acquired a reprieve from unemployment, has effectively become 'employed' in his view. The 'stable life' as aim is therefore equivalent to a being freed from anxiety over employment. 'The simple life' involves the willing subjection of 'life' in the question of employment. Naturally, it would be wrong to suggest the student invoking 'a simple life' *is seeking* a life any worse ('end up not being too bad') than the aim of 'the stable life', but his articulation of life is as a means and not an aim. The key fact for our purpose is that the student's logic indicates *being able* to live a (relatively) *worse life* will allow him to *secure* a job. 'The simple life' therefore also indicates the aim of a being freed from anxiety over employment. Despite the different manner in which they navigate the question of employment, the aim toward which they are directed is effectively the same.

As an excursus, I think comparing 'the simple life' and 'the stable life' mobilised by these two interviewees may yield additional important insights. In particular, I am fascinated by the manner in which 'the simple life' figures as an accepted *biological* reduction—involving a lack of concern from income, status, and location. It appears a type of ascetic existence which practically frees one from the various alternative categories by which one can gauge a self. As such, it accords somewhat to 'a bare life' treated by Agamben and referenced in Chapter 8 on technologies, of physical being divorced, insofar as is necessary, from moral and political being. It is perhaps unsurprising that such a perspective carries connotations of Social Darwinism, evident in interviewee 11's passage and elsewhere in student responses. We might also observe that, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, a relatively 'bare' life here reaffirms a belief in the HE subjectivity formed by HE participation, the qualities of being 'competitive', 'a fast learner', 'creative', and 'adaptive to society'. The biological reduction is entwined with these qualities, as it is with the institutional competence, 'above all'.

But our immediate concern is to conclude this section on the establishment of an ethical telos, a 'mode of being' that students aim to achieve through ethical HE practice. To that end, we've seen from student interviewees an articulation of concerns that largely agree with Zhou Ji's hegemonic account of the HE *telos*. In line with his view that 'embarking on post-graduate studies or going abroad to pursue further studies have become a means of relieving job-hunting pressures and seeking better job opportunities in the future', we have interviewee 30's rationalization of continuing postgraduate studies. In line with observation that '(students) have become more practical and down-to-earth job hunting, and are considering small and medium-sized firms, township enterprises, low-sounding institutes, the hinterland and western regions, and small and medium-sized cities', we have a number of interviewees, including interviewee 11, articulating a willingness to lower their expectations, assessment of their own talents, and even conception of 'life' to find gainful employment. However, what is of special interest to us is the slight displacement which occurs whereby students regard *their lives in relation to* securing employment. In neither case we examined did students precisely articulate an aim of job-seeking, though its influence is palpable. It appears, rather, that they are looking past that point and either assuming employment leads to a preferred mode of being (a stable life) or assuming that a subjection of their lives to market demands, the mobilisation of a simple life, leads to employment. No matter the degree to which market rationality impacts students' attitudes toward HE participation, no matter how realistic or 'down to earth' they are, their aim would appear best expressed as being free from anxiety over employment. This distinction, while seemingly small, is, I believe, a more precise account of the ethical *telos*.

Conclusion

In this section, I make use of Foucault's idea of ethics, and explore the implication of its four aspects to contemporary HE in China. By using my interview data and some other materials, I explore first the ethical substance of HE, the link between HE participation and an improvement in one's life chances; second, the mode of subjection, the ways in which students in China recognise, maximise and realise one's intellectual and bodily capacities and one's participation through HE participation; third, self-forming activity, the behavioural codes for HE participants to follow in order to be ethical HE subjects; and fourth, the *telos*, the mode of being which HE participants aim to become, wherein lies a slight misalignment between the state directives and students' assessment. In the next chapter, which is also the final chapter of this thesis, I will review the contribution and limitation of Foucauldian perspectives and also make suggestion for future research.

Chapter 13 Concluding Thoughts

Apparatus, Government and the Present

In this thesis, I have conducted a multi-faceted investigation into the emergence and deployment of HE in modern China. I have shown in Part II the ways in which HE as a concrete apparatus is built upon its various components - principles, systems, curriculum, pedagogy and space, and also the ways in which a variety of technologies and techniques are invented and deployed to shape the outlooks of HE apparatus in modern China. My inquiry in Part III has displayed the ways in which HE serves as an effective and persuasive form of government over populations and individuals, through the corresponding rationalities, authorities, technologies, desires and choices. Part IV explores the ways in which various truth sets, subjects and ethics are produced through HE, and by integrating my fieldwork data, this Part reveals the ways in which students in China today appropriate a social 'reality' through the lens of HE, and in turn construct their relationships with HE, with others, and with themselves. In this final chapter, I first summarise the contribution of a Foucauldian frame to my inquiry in this thesis. I also discuss Foucault's limitation in this regard. I further explore alternative accounts of HE in contemporary China, and what I believe can be alternative ways of understanding and configuring HE.

Foucault's Contribution and Limitation

The research perspectives and tools introduced by Foucault and his followers have been most useful to my inquiry in this thesis. The approach of genealogy, in particular, contributes greatly to answering my questions concerning 'a history of the present' of HE in China, its emergence as an apparatus and its deployment in governing the subjects. Foucault's idea of apparatus underpins the inquiry in Part II of this thesis, in which I examine the emergence and development of five apparatus component of HE, including principles, systems, curriculum, pedagogy and space. His idea of government, which is later developed by Dean and Rose, underpins my inquiry in Part III, in which I examine a number of perspective of HE government, rationality, authority, technology, desires, choices, and subjects.

Following Foucault, I question some of the taken-for-granted knowledge of HE in China, and open them up for reexamination and further inquiry. For instance, I point out in Chapter 5 that the privilege of HE over other public educational sectors, which establishes HE as the ultimate goal of schooling in contemporary China, was established firstly by the fact that public schools were set up in the late Qing primarily to provide HEIs with adequate candidates, and this privilege was sustained in later decades

by the belief that HE was more capable of producing skilled personnel for the use of national recovery and development; such a belief was put to question for only a short period of time during the Cultural Revolution, but remains dominant in today's China. I also point out in Chapter 5 that a hierarchical educational system in contemporary China, with HE at the top and being the most exclusive of all educational sectors, is not a result of a 'natural' development, but is shaped by a number of policies that targeted the transition rates between sectors; in other words, the HE sector was designed to be exclusive in order to remain effective in its role of social selection.

However, though the Foucauldian frame proves fruitful in this thesis, it does have its limitations in accounting for some of my other findings. First of all, the frame seems insufficient in accounting for the development of HE in China which is more likely to be shaped by certain hegemonic powers than the others. Foucault would refuse to suggest that HE is a mere reflection of dominant ideologies, and I also hesitate to regard HE in China as a simple ideological state apparatus. My starting point of this inquiry is to understand HE as a complex assemblage made of multiple power relations, discourses and practices that are often in conflict with one another. However, my discussions in the previous chapters indicate that the state, or the political regimes in power, seem more successful than other actors in establishing hegemonic accounts of HE most of the time. It was only within a brief historical period in the early Republican era, a period without a strong and stable central government, that alternative accounts of HE, those of academia for instance (Chapter 8), managed to play a more significant role in the development of HE. With the situation of contemporary China taken into account, one would find it difficult to deny that in the case of Chinese HE, the state has been more overwhelming than any other 'stakeholders' in directing HE toward certain 'desirable' objectives (national salvation, recovery, development and global competition), shaping it after certain models and formats (Japanese, European, American, Soviet, and now a fusion of many), and governing it with certain rationalities (social equality under state socialism and social Darwinism under market economy) and technologies (medical examinations of HE candidates, morning exercises and evening studies), etc. At this stage, I hesitate to provide an account for this hegemonic success , as it may require an extensive examination on its own from a number of perspectives that are not tackled in this thesis. If I were to provide some clues for further research, I would point out that this hegemony may have emerged out of particular historical contingencies (warfare till the first half of the 20th century in particular), contingencies that may have produced a high degree of consensus between the state and the general public over what HE, and perhaps education in general, should primarily serve. Once established as a legitimate apparatus and a form of government, HE has its hegemonic rationalities deeply imbedded in the public discourse and practices, which remain largely unchallenged and hence taken for granted.

A related point to the issue of hegemony is that of continuities. Although the framework is useful in revealing the emergence, abruption and discontinuity of certain practices, such as the introduction of medical examinations for HE candidate as a technology of the population, it does not, I argue, provide much explanation for certain continuities in HE discourses and practices in modern China. As early as Chapter 4, I point out that the emergence and development of HE in modern China has been continuously shaped by certain principles over others – for instance, HE should primarily serve the needs of the collective, in many cases, those of the state, rather than those of individuals, and also, HE should prioritise science and technology over other disciplines. Another example of such continuities is a sustained public belief in the value of HE, which survives the radicalness of the Cultural Revolution. Similar continuities can also be applied to the shaping of HE subjects, which I point out in Chapter 10. Certain subjects, such as the desiring subjects and meritocratic subjects, remain fairly consistent across time. Once again, although I am able to identify these continuities, I do not have much room in this thesis to provide a comprehensive explanation; to account for these continuities may require different frameworks or approaches in another thesis.

At this point, I would like to further discuss the limitations of Foucault's work in general, and also with application to my thesis. There have been been a number of charges upon of Foucault's work from other scholars, most noticeably from Habermas (1987), Baudrillard (2007), Noris (1993), Taylor (1986) and Walzer (1986). Habermas, for instance, in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1987), charges Foucault of three forms of skepticism related to his theory of power: *presentism, relativism* and *arbitrary partisanship*. This is well summarised in Olssen (2004, Chapter 6). My discussion in this regard will be organised according to these three charges.

First, by *presentism,* Habermas argues that Foucault lacks a standpoint to establish any forms of assessments from, or certain objective standards to perform any judgment upon. As Habermas points out, Foucault

> 'can only explain the technologies of power and practices of domination by comparing them with one another... In doing so, one inevitably connects the viewpoints under which the comparison is proposed with his own hermeneutic point of departure (1987, p277)'.

This criticism may also apply to my investigation in this thesis. By using a genealogical approach, I have revealed a number technologies in operation, may they be technologies of the social, the population, the body or the self. But so far as I can analyse the ways in which these technologies are introduced, developed and adjusted, I do not introduce or establish any standards to assess the legitimacy, validity, efficiency or necessity of these technologies identified. Therefore, I would find it

difficult to either justify or undermine the operation of these existing technologies. To certain extent, my analysis, though being able to reveal an 'awkward' and 'uncomfortable' present of HE in China, may fall short of criticality in term of assessing to what extent and why one should accept or resist such a state of the present.

Second, by *relativism* Habermas refers to 'an analysis ... that can understand itself only as a context-dependent practical exercise (1987, p 276)'. For Habermas, Foucault's historicism produces an unescapable 'self-referentiality'. He writes,

> '(n)ot only are truth claims confined to the discourses within which they arise, they exhaust their entire significance in the functional contribution they make to the self-maintenance of a given totality of discourse ... this basic assumption of the theory of power is self-referential; if it is correct, it must destroy the foundations of research inspired by it as well (1987, p279)'.

What Habermas argues is that the 'subjugated' knowledges revealed through Foucault's genealogical historiography can not claim more or less validity than those of the dominant discourses of power that they attack, for 'they , too, *are* nothing else than the effects of power they unleash' (1987, p281, italic in the original). With application to this thesis, I point out that throughout the history of modern China, there exist alternative accounts of HE to those of hegemonic political regimes. These alternative accounts may be regarded as the 'subjugated' knowledges of HE. However, the question remains largely unanswered - to what extent, and by what standards, can we claim that these alternative account, or the 'subjugated' knowledges of HE, are more legitimate than their hegemonic counterparts? To complicate this question even further, these alternative accounts are also likely to diversify among themselves as well, and then based on what criteria should we choose among them as 'the way out'? For instance, to what extent and why can we claim that the theories and practices of HE during the first half of the Republican era, the short span that is most closely associated with liberalism, are better alternatives to those of the contemporary Chinese HE system? If so, what are the standards or criteria that support this judgment?

Third, by *arbitrary partisanship,* Habermas refers to 'a criticism that cannot account for its normative foundations' (1987, p276). He writes,

> 'genealogical historiography is supposed to reach behind discourse totalities (within which alone disputes over norms ad values occur) with a strictly descriptive attitude. It brackets normative validity claims as well as claims to propositional truth and abstains from the questions of whether some discourse and power formations could be more legitimate than others. Foucault resists the demand to take sides... For him, there is no "right side"... Foucault understands himself as a dissident who offers resistance to modern thought and humanistically disguised disciplinary

> power... (but his) criticism is based more on the postmodern rhetoric of his presentation than on the postmodern assumptions of his theory(1987, p282)' .

It also may seem that in this thesis I, too, avoid to 'take sides' - to endorse or establish standards for assessments of the emergence and deployment of HE in modern China. But I would hesitate to admit that my analysis, in the fashion of a genealogical historiography, is 'strictly descriptive' - rather it is critical in a different way. The criticality of Foucault's genealogical historiography lies in its reexamination of what is familiar and taken-for-granted, rather than providing an immediate 'cure' to the problems of the present. In fact, Foucault shows little interests in the latter, and this inevitably becomes the limits of what a Foucauldian frame can achieve. Following Foucault, my priority in this thesis is to unsettle a taken-for-granted present of HE in modern China, and to open up space for further investigation and assessment. In a sense, my thesis reveals, if only partially, the web of power relations through the operation of HE, and provides future research with 'hints' and 'clues' as to where one could proceed in an inquiry into HE in China, with one's own sociological curiosity and imagination.

Moreover, to a certain extent, I agree with Habermas in pointing out that Foucault does not intend to 'refine the language game of modern political theory ... and turn it against the pathologies of modernity' but only to 'undermine modernity and its language games'. Through my analysis in this thesis, I hope to have undermined modernity of HE in China and its language games. However, as Habermas argues, this stance may suffice for performing a genealogical historiography, as the one that I carry out in this thesis, but it may not be sufficient to serve as 'a tactic and a tool for waging a battle against a normatively unassailable formation of power'. And in terms of normative foundations, I do not discuss, in the fashion of philosophy of education, the schools of thoughts, theories, experiments and practices that are historically associated with the operation of HE in modern societies in this thesis, but I would be misleading to suggest that such a discussion is not necessary for the 'design' of a better future for HE in China - it is simply not the priority in this thesis. Such a discussion will certain benefit future studies on the development, improvement and reforms of HE in China, as it is from such a discussion that certain normative standards can be established.

Habermas further puts forwards a question that I think is rather difficult to answer within a Foucauldian frame. He writes

> 'if it is just a matter of mobilising counterpower, of strategic battles and wily confrontations, why should we muster any resistance at all against this all-pervasive power circulating in the bloodstream of the body of modern society, instead of just adapting ourselves to it? ... why fight at all? "Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought

domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it" (1987, p284)'.

In terms of 'fight' or 'struggle' against the present, I sense from my fieldwork that students in contemporaries Chinese HE institutions hold various degrees of dissatisfaction of, and sometimes even resentment towards, certain norms and practices of the HE system they find themselves in. But in general, students lack an alternative assemblage of HE to compare in order to demand an improvement of the current system. For this reason, they often limit their fight or struggle to the degree of mere complaints and an unwilling acceptance of the 'fact' that 'this is how things are in China'. From time to time, I was confronted with the argument from my interviewees that 'if we can not change what we do not like, why fight at all?' My analysis in this thesis may shed some light on where one can start a fight against the hegemonic account of HE, for instance by resisting the operation of certain technologies or via a better understanding of the nature of certain desires and choices. However, the Foucauldian frame adopted in this thesis may not suffice in arguing a *necessity* to wage a battle against whatever produces these complains and resentments.

A related point to this necessity to fight, I argue, is that the Foucaudian frame, though powerful in revealing the 'awkwardness' of our present, provides us with limited supports in terms of agency and resistance, and in seeking the possibilities of the alternatives to the existing order. Although agency and resistance have for long been important issues to philosophers and social scientists (Apple, 1982; 1993; Giroux, 1983a; 1983b). Neither is particularly emphasised in Foucault's work, though he does talk about possibilities of resistance (Foucault, 1998) and his fellow scholars such as Judith Butler (1990; 1993) explore the notion of discursive agency.

There is no easy solution to these listed limitations of Foucault and in particular his genealogical historiography. As Olssen (2004, p79) points out, a lack of standards of assessment is perhaps the key problem of Foucault, and it is also not easy to develop such standards within a Foucauldian frame. He writes,

'(o)ne of the key problem for Foucault is how to derive standards of assessment, comparison, and evaluation, without falling headlong into an ahistorical and essentialist epistemology. There can be no assuredness in terms of foundations. All that provides security or assuredness of belief is not any timeless conception of truth but a simple *correspondence* between discourse and practice, and a *coherence* between discourse and other (more mature) discursive systems... Foucault believes that the attainment of truth within limits is compatible with a strong ideological bias. In this sense, the criterion of validity and assessment of the adequacy of statements depends on, or is relative to, the assessments of circumstance of the users, and the rules of agreement and criteria of truth are internal to a discursive system and a given society. Explanations accept the burden of a pragmatic and normative criteria of adequacy. Explanation stops at the point where questioning by the relevant local consensus ceases and there is no

sense attached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are truly rational as distinct from merely being accepted as such within a given historical period, except on pragmatic grounds'.

It is, however, not my intension in this final chapter to propose a solution to Foucault's limitations. But rather, I want to point to a simple fact that all theories and research methods inevitably have their limitations - Foucault's work is no exception in this regard. Such limitations do not entirely undermine the contribution of Foucault to my inquiry in this thesis - it only suggests that there is a limit of what a Foucauldian frame can do for a critical analysis of HE in modern China. Neither do I intend to introduce standards of assessment or ways of improvement with particular application to HE in China - such a project is perhaps what I can proceed from here. The focus of my inquiry in this thesis, as I state early on, is not upon establishing an alternative account of HE that is capable of overcoming its existing problems, and my discussion of HE in Part II and III perhaps do not particularly read of a story of agency and resistance to the hegemonic forms of HE discourses and practices in modern China, neither does my presentation of fieldwork data in the previous chapter. It is not my intention to underplay the space and possibilities of agency and resistance, or to simply sound negative; I only intended to reveal the emergence and deployment of HE in a way that is both intelligible and valid. My discussions of the apparatus components and elements of HE government only serve to discuss the existing HE assemblage in its 'effect' format – how HE is assembled from all its components and elements in this 'effect' history of the present that I brought to lights, how HE comes to establish itself as a complex social apparatus and a persuasive form of government, and how the subjects of HE come to understand their relations to HE, to their peers and competitors, and to the wider society in the ways they do. I am not suggesting, this 'effect' format of HE, or its hegemonic accounts, or its dominant discourses and practices are irresistible – on the contrary, I believe that much can be done to establish an alternative assemblage of HE. But before we set out to seek these alternatives, we must be aware of what we are fighting against, of what we are trying to establish alternatives to, so that we can better understand the targets that we are aiming at in our pursuits of alternatives. That is the reason why I focus on aspects other than agency and resistance in this thesis. However, at this point, I would like to address this issue briefly in the following sections.

Alternative Accounts, Principled Accounts

I now turn to discuss some of the principled accounts of HE in contemporary China as examples of resistance to the hegemonic forms. As I discussed above, there has been an imbalance of power in the field of HE authorities – the alternative authorities are competing against an alliance between the

hegemonic authorities and the derivative authorities, and for the moment, the alternative authorities have not been very successful in designing and developing their own format of HE in terms of a persuasive assemblage of apparatus components and government elements that could compete against the one that is presided by a hegemonic state. Nonetheless, the alternative authorities, in particular after the rapid expansion of HE in recent decades, launched some criticisms over the existing HE system in forms of principled accounts of HE.

My use of principled accounts is borrowed from Ian Hunter (1994, p. XV) in his book Rethinking the school. In this genealogy of popular schools in the UK and Australia, Hunter argues that academic discussion of the school system in various stances – whether from the disciplines of sociology or philosophy or history, or inclined towards liberalism or Marxism or social democracy, invariably tends to be highly principled. He points out that such a discussion

> '... treats the existing school system as the (partial or failed) realisation of certain underlying principles. There are several such principles – democracy, equality, rationality, liberty – but they all cohere around the notion of an ideal formation of the person. This is a formation that, through its freedom from extrinsic purposes and constraints, results in a "complete" development of faculties and thereby allows the person to know and govern their own conduct. We shall meet this ideal of the completely developed person in a number of guises. It is most clearly visible, of course, in liberalism' self-reflective individual subject, but we also find it in the collective personae favoured by Marxian and dialectical thought: the emancipated class, the self-governing community and the rational "public sphere".'

The principles around 'the complete development' held by different academic traditions may vary, and in a similar manner, the partial or failed realisations of these principles also tend to differ. Hunter (1994, p. XV) further explains,

> '(f)or the liberal philosophy of education the supposed gap between principle and actuality is largely a matter of the relation between rational faculties of judgment lodged in the individual and whatever impediments these meet in their worldly exercise: personal irrationality, governmental repression. For dialectical (mainly Marxian) educational sociology the relation between the idea and the real school system assumes a slightly different form. Here it is "history" or "community" rather than the individual that is charged with bringing the principles of democratic and egalitarian education to fruition; although ... the goal of this development is remarkably similar to the liberal one: a school system capable of realising the "full" or complete development of the person, the touchstone for which is the person's free and rational choice of the form of the system itself.'

Similar principled accounts of HE can be found in contemporary China. On the one hand, the liberal accounts argue that HE fails the mission to produce intellectuals that are capable of doing critical thinking and original creation, which can only be achieved by full and complete development of human faculties; on the other hand, the dialecticians argue that alongside the seemingly successful

expansion of the HE system, the issue of social inequality in access to HE, is becoming ever worrying and demanding immediate attention and action.

Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend) is a weekly publication that is best known in China for its traditionally liberal tone and is perhaps also one of the rare places that one can find liberal interpretation of HE in contemporary China. Among the liberal advocators, Hao (2011, my translation) argues that the ideas of HE should be the cultivation of complete and full humans, the exploration and production of knowledge, and the service to societies. He further quotes the 'three doctrines' of Qian Mu, a renowned scholar from the Republican era, and explains,

> '(these three missions) echoes to what Mr. Qian Mu said about the unification of the "three doctrines". "The doctrine of human" focuses on how to educate students to be humans, and it also involves how academics and scholars should conduct themselves as humans; "the doctrine of learning" focuses on how teachers and students conduct scholarship together, exploring and producing knowledge, seeking the truth; "the doctrine of conduct" explores the utilization of what one learns in the real world, how to apply the knowledge and truth one has been exposed to in university to the practices of reforms in politics, economy, society, science, culture and education, etc... These three ideas of university are the values underpinning the three functions of university – education, research and service'.

Hao's liberal interpretation of contemporary HE represents a prevailing account of its kind. The principle underlying HE, for Hao and his fellow liberals, should combine the full and complete cultivation of human faculties with the research function and the promotion of civic duties. Nonetheless, the very foundation of HE should be resolving around the cultivation of humans, the full and complete development of human faculties. However, in contemporary China, Hao argues, the liberal characteristics are being marginalised, due to a number of problems such as the loss of public morality and the prevalence of self-serving doctrines – all these problems may surface as academic corruption and plagiarisms, a lack of concern with social issues, and scientific instrumentalism in academic research and socio-economic development, etc.

Hao's argument sheds a light on the possible contribution of liberal education for contemporary HE. However, one should not be too readily optimistic of what liberal education can achieve, as Liu Dong (2009, my translation), a professor at Peking University, usefully points out in *Deep Concerns of University*, Liu further puts forward a number of questions upon the nature and relevance of liberal education, which overlaps with my genealogical inquiry,

> 'Is the evolution history of western civilisation, including its ever-evolving education history, essentially an open, contingent, and heterogeneous process, or is conducted towards a single permanently correct principle? Hence, is liberation education a predetermined, universally applicable and ever correct pattern of civilisation, or a resolution that is born out a lengthy historical struggles and a balance among various interests? Therefore, considering the ongoing labour division, bureaucratisation and stratification in human societies and the high expense of liberal

education, will this form of education be applicable to the entire society or exclusive to the elite group? The last but not least, although liberal education as such appears close to a western ideal, is itself still subject to perhaps sublation?'

Here, what Liu seems to suggest is that liberal education is perhaps better understood as one of the forms of HE that has been practiced in history, rather than a superior principle that HE in China should blindly follow and work towards. He further warns against a form of essentialism that one can readily find a solution from the origins of western civilisation to the problem of HE in contemporary China, which leads to a blind adoption of some outdated principles of HE in the west. In other words, it is neither desirable nor constructive to simply refer to western principles of HE as the ideal and superior, while totally disregarding the emergence and assemblage of these principles and also the fact that these very principles might have been discarded already by their home societies. As my analysis in the previous section in this chapter has shown, the HE principles throughout the century have been closely associated with immediate adaption of certain western models, Japanese, American, Soviet, etc., but perhaps the criticisms put forward by *the League of Nation Report* that China failed to understand the function of modern universities largely hold true today. What has been missing from the debates upon the principles of HE in China is perhaps a preceding debate upon the ever-evolving nature of HE and its relevance to the contemporary Chinese society, the connection between HE and its home society, the role of HE within and beyond the demands of its home state, and alternative ways and means to conduct HE towards principles that are yet to be discussed and articulated.

As for the dialectician account, HE in contemporary China, in particular after the expansion of the system, is subject to severe criticism over the issue of educational equity. Xie (2003) present a search result of the keyword 'equality in education' in eight newspaper and journals – the number of this keyword rises from 5 in the year 1990 to 1290 in the year 2005, the number of articles on educational equity rises from 3 to 303 within the same period. They divide this period into three stages. During the first stage, 1993-1997, the debates of educational equity resolve around the abolishment of fully funded studentship and the introduction of tuition; during the second stage, 199-2003, the debates focus upon, in terms of HE, the challenge of the system expansion to a fair distribution of HE opportunities; during the third stage, 2004-2005, the debates are primarily concerned with graduate unemployment and underemployment that is believed to be triggered by a radical expansion in the previous years. As one can see, the principled account of social equality, in Xie's term educational equity, is assembled from reflections upon a series of historical contingencies that introduce challenges to the normative understanding of HE. Unlike the principle of liberalism , the principle of educational equity is less articulated in history, and may surface as a rather contemporary pursuit of social goods.

This is partly true. But I would also argue that this principle could be better understood with reference of the principle of HE under state socialism that conducts a positive discrimination toward the working class in the distribution of HE opportunities. The challenges to the principle of educational equity are posting further threat to the traditionally disadvantaged social groups in educational access – the working class, the rural residents, those who were regarded as the primary concerned of the state under high socialism but are now increasingly less supported by the state since the 1980s onwards. Primer Wen Jiaoban, is quoted in Wang's report (Wen in Wang, 2010, my translation), who says,

> 'in the past when we went to universities, students from rural areas account for 80% (of the total), perhaps even higher; the situation is now different, and the ratio of students from rural areas decreased.'

Also, Xie, as the pro-principal of Qinghua University, is a strong believer in educational equity. He (2003, my translation)argues that educational equity should be the imperative order in education.

> 'Such an "imperative order" needs no explanation, even no attribute, adverb, or adverbial. It is unconditional, a sacred imperative embedded in everyone's mind. We have no reason not to explore and understand this educational equity, and we should invest our lives and practices to experience and appreciate this educational equity; this is the imperative order of educational studies…

The most vital value of education is educational equity. Needless to say, if equity is absent from the cultivation of the younger generation, this form of cultivation will only be in service to a minority, even a mechanism to protect social inequity. This form of education cannot and should not be respected and admired by the society. Educational equality is to enable youngsters from various class backgrounds to grow and process together, free from the constrains of their social background and factors; it also changes the social status of those in disadvantaged positions, and offers them equal status with others to engage with the society and their lives.'

Some would perhaps argue that Xie has formulated a discourse of educational equity by turning its most ideal appearance and its most desirable effects into its absolute necessity – in other words, the logic of Xie is that educational equity should be the underlying principle of education, including HE, because without it, education can do more harm than good.

Let us return to Hunter's genealogy of modern school system for now. If we are to follow his lead, we would say that HE in modern China does not have educational equity as the underlying principle, at least not in the sense that its contemporary meaning suggests, so it would be unfair to judge the current system against an assembled principled or a formulated principle by the contemporary critics such as Xie. It may very well be true that HE in modern China is informed by other underlying principles through its emergence, development and deployment, such as the production of personnel for

diplomacy at the time of national crisis or of technocrats for scientific and technological advancement for a newly born regime, and these actual principles at work may have been better realised than the principled accounts of the liberal and the dialecticians.

When it comes social equality, one can readily establish the legitimacy for such claims in the name of social justice, but it is not merely a question of the rise or fall in the participation rate of one social group in HE in comparison with that of others, but a question of

> 'whether and when to begin channeling young people into academic and vocational streams so as to maximize opportunities for them in a way they will accept as fair, but also in ways that are appropriate for what their societies need and their economies can afford' (Pepper, 1990, p. 5).

Hence, in the light of quantitative research in social equality and HE participation, it is legitimate to claim that students from working class background are increasingly vulnerable in their competition for quality HE against their counterparts, for instance, from urban middle-income families, but it is important for policy makers and the public to understand the limits of what HE can do to reverse social inequalities that do not originate with education. It is perhaps not very constructive, again, to use the recent past, such as the era of state socialism, as an ideal for HE development in terms of the pursuit of social equality. Such a past is in itself of great socio-political controversy that remains to be clarified, and it is also unwise to deem the radical and extreme policies invented under a particular historical contingencies as being readily effective and therefore desirable.

Again, we are faced with a dilemma that revolves around the limited resources of HE available, limited forms of social selection and screening that are fair, efficient and economic, and the presiding effect of social background upon educational achievement. Nonetheless, it is significant for policy makers and the general public to be concerned with social equality in HE but one should also not rush to claim one single ideal solution to such a complex issue. As Pepper (1990, p. 5) usefully points out,

> 'Clearly, there are no ideal solutions. Since these problems all interact and compete with one another for the scarce resources necessary to solve them, the most that any government can do is try to work out strategies that balance the costs and benefits of particular kinds of education, in different proportions, for different kinds of students, at any given time and place. Acceptable and affordable strategies also tend to change as ruling coalitions shift and as the dynamic of development itself produces changing interests, expectations, and demands among different sectors of the population.'

Seeking Alternative HE Assemblages

From the conventional sociological and educational perspectives, some claims and criticisms in the principled accounts I quoted above may very well hold true, but my concern here is not to examine the extent to which they are valid. Instead, I want to point out that our pursuit of an alternative HE assemblage can perhaps go beyond the existing frame of HE studies, and to explore possibilities of a HE assemblage that is not necessarily patterned on the existing 'effective' format. Although the focus of this thesis is not to design such an assemblage for future development of HE in contemporary China, I do wish to briefly discuss the possibilities in doing so at this point.

In recent years, a number of American (Harvard and Yale, for instance) and British (Oxford for example) universities upload video clips of some introductory lectures given by distinguished teachers and scholars on YouTube as free open lectures to users worldwide, for instance Yale's lecture series 'Death' and Harvard's lecture series of 'Justice'. Although YouTube is banned in mainland China, these programmes found their ways to Chinese audiences through other channels. These open lectures soon became popular among young students and adults in China to the extent that Sohu, one of the portal websites in China, collaborates with a subtitle team YYeTs which firstly introduced these lectures on their own websites, and brings together a variety of these courses in its 'education tv' section. Each video clip of the open lectures is now equipped with full subtitles in Mandarin. In this way, these open lectures from renowned universities are now made available to a wider range of internet users in China, predominately to university students and graduates as they receive English language education and have interests in a wide range of disciplines such as philosophy and politics.

Professor Shelly Kagan at Yale University, for instance, became popular in China as a result of his open lectures 'Death'. An article on Yale Bulletin quotes a report of China National Radio and writes,

> 'China National Radio in September noted: "Kagan lectures the students while sitting on the podium with legs crossed and wearing jeans and sneakers. His image, resembling that of an 'immortal' in Chinese mythology, has made him a 'star' closely followed by the youth in China. Ever since Kagan's philosophy class 'Death' appeared on the internet through Open Yale Courses, many young people in China scramble for the lectures given by this unconventional professor who could have been considered 'out of line' according to the traditional Chinese standard of teaching style and manner.
>
> "To teach and inspire the students, one doesn't need to read off a textbook and follow all the doctrines," added China National Radio. "Kagan's way and philosophy of teaching should be learned and drawn lessons from by many college professors in our country".'

Kagan's classroom manners, or perhaps his appearance in general, provide Chinese students with an alternative format of the ways in which HE can be conducted differently in classroom settings from

what they perceive as 'in the line'. But I argue that open lectures as like Kagan's may have achieved more than providing alternative ways of configuring HE pedagogy. Open lectures as such are perhaps an example of alternative HE assemblages – they do not specify any particular aims of HE, but allow users to choose the ones that fit their personal interests; they do not follow the conventional ways of social selections based on meritocracy, but are made available to a large population who have access to the internet; they go beyond the conventional pedagogical relationship between teachers and students but nonetheless create spaces of interaction, in particular among users themselves – for instance there are now a large number of forum groups of open lectures on social websites in China with ongoing discussions among group members; they do not impose certain ways of evaluations at the end of course as they do in their hosting universities, so that the audiences are not under pressures to adopt to certain ways of learning in order to 'succeed' in final examinations; although they were videotaped in classrooms, the virtual teaching and learning manage to go beyond the boundary and confinement of enclosed campus spaces; etc.

Apart from the open lectures from foreign universities, some local attempts were made recently in seeking alternative HE assemblages. In their report 'University in its earthly form', Fang and Li, journalists of Nanfang Zhoumo, describe a different form of HE. They write (Fang and Li, 2011, webpage, my translation),

> 'This university named "Li Ren" is a rare existence in the history of Chinese education – it does not have its own school buildings and can only borrow student hall and classrooms of a junior secondary school, the facilities of which are rather backward; it does not have a principle or a full time managerial team, and its funding comes from small amounts of public donations; its first session is a summer school which only lasts 15 days, with no more than 80 students. But it has a faculty that is much admired by many regular universities, and it has a grand vision – to expose students to authentic university education and to explore the possible formats of private HE in an liberal and open way.'

This 'Li Ren' College is an educational programme organized during the summer of 2011by a group of liberal academics and public intellectuals. It is not strictly a HE institution by the standards of the existing HE assemblage in China. It does not have a fixed campus, and its faculty is only a group of like-minded intellectuals; its curricular materials were recommended by its temporary faculty member; its pedagogy was not 'carefully' planned; above all the college does not have the degree granting authority etc.. Nonetheless, its programme sheds some interesting lights on the seeking of alternative HE assemblages. For instance, the enrolment for the 2011 programme departed from the conventional written examinations, but used personal statements revolving around open questions such as 'what do you expect from this programme? Why do you decide to participate in the events organized by Li Ren

College? Why do you think you will be enrolled?' Perhaps we do not need all the conventional apparatus component and government elements for HE to be carried out, and we can go beyond the conventional ways of doing HE for the alternatives to be possible.

In an interview, the principle organiser of Li Ren College, Li Yingqiang, explains the intention of himself and his fellow participants. He says,

> 'our aim is not to compete with Peking and Qinghua, to fight against the existing universities. What we are doing is rather small – some willing to teach, and some willing to learn, and that is all. We do not have grand objectives, not to produce personnel for the future development of the nation, but only to provide a possible alternative for those who want to study…
>
> A real university revolves around "human"; to be human is an aim, not a means. What we do is a form of exploration … perhaps (what matters) is not what Li Ren College can achieve, but what our exploration helps other to achieve. Maybe some rich blokes see that people with few resources like us are not doing private HE, and they decide to join us, and then this (aim of ours) is achieved (Li laughs).'

It is not difficult to see that Li underpins his notion of 'real' university education with liberal traditions. But at this point, I do not intend to comment on the appropriateness of such an underlying philosophy for contemporary university education. But instead, I argue, attempts at educational explorations made by Li and his fellow participants, are admirable in their courage and determinations to seek alternative HE assemblages. HE without proper facilities and buildings, contracted faculty members or students selected by exams is perhaps a good starting point for our seeking of alternative HE assemblages. This is also what future research in this regard can build upon.

Reference

Agelasto, M. and Adamson, B. (Eds) (1998), *Higher Education in Post-Mao China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Anagnost, A. (2004). 'The Corporeal Politics of Quality (Suzhi)'. *Public Culture,* 16 (2), 189-208.

Apple, M. W. (1982). *Education and power*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Apple, M. W. (1993). *Official knowledge : democratic education in a conservative age*. New York: Routledge.

Apple, M. W. (2000). *Official knowledge : democratic education in a conservative age*. (2nd Ed.). New York ; London: Routledge.

Armstrong, T. J. (1992). *Michel Foucault, philosopher : essays*. New York: Routledge.

Aronowitz, S. and Giroux, H. A. (1991). *Postmodern education : politics, culture, and social criticism*. Minneapolis ; London: University of Minnesota P.s.

Baidu. (2008). 'Ren Min Jiao Yu Chu Ban She'. (5, November, 2010).

Bakken, B. (2000). *The exemplary society : human improvement, social control, and the dangers of modernity in China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baldwin, G. (1994). 'The Student as Customer: The Discourse of "Quality" in Higher Education '. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management,* 16 (1), 125-133.

Ball, S. (1990a). *Politics and policy making in education : explorations in policy sociology*. London: Routledge.

Ball, S. (2003a). *Class strategies and the education market : the middle classes and social advantage*. London: Routledge/Falmer.

Ball, S. (2003b). *The more things change : educational research, social class and 'interlocking' inequalities*. London: Institute of Education University of London.

Ball, S. (2006). *Education policy and social class : the selected works of Stephen J. Ball*. London: Routledge.

Ball, S. J. (1990b). *Foucault and education : disciplines and knowledge*. London: Routledge.

Ball, S. J. (1993). 'What is policy? Texts, trajectories and toolboxes'. *Sociology of Education,* 23 (3), 388–406.

Banbery, M. (1991). *Great expectations? : the realities of student life*. Canterbury, Kent: Ivory Tower Publications.

Barr, N. (1993). 'Alternative funding resources for higher education'. *The Economic Journal,* 718-728.

Barr, N. (2004). 'Higher Education Funding'. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy,* 20 (2), 264-283.

Barrow, C. W., Didou Aupetit, S. and Mallea, J. R. (2003). *Globalisation, trade liberalisation, and higher education in North America : the emergence of a new market under NAFTA?* Dordrecht ; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Barry, C. (2004). 'The enigma of the Chinese learner'. *Accounting Education,* 13 (3), 289-310.

Baudrillard, J. (2007). *Forget Foucault*.

Becta. (2007). 'Further education learner survey 2007'. [Online]. Available at: http // learningandskills.becta.org.uk/content_files/learningandskills/resources/Articles/fe_survey2007.pdf. [Last accessed 16th April, 2008].

Beduwe, C. and Robinson, P. (1996). *Certificates, skills and job markets in Europe*. Thessaloniki, Greece: CEDEFOP.

Beijing Municipal Education Commission. (2009). *Higher Education in Beijing*. [Online]. Available at: http://english.bjedu.gov.cn/BMCE/144284183013045043 2/20061206/25160.shtml. [Last accessed 23rd, June, 2009].

Bernstein, B. (1971). 'On the Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge'. In M. Young (Ed.), *Knowledge and control : new directions for the sociology of education* (pp. [11], 289). London: Collier-Macmillan.

Bernstein, B. (1996). *Pedagogy, symbolic control and identity : theory, research, critique*. London: Taylor & Francis.

Besley, T. and Peters, M. (2007). *Subjectivity and truth : Foucault, education, and the culture of the self*. New York ; Oxford: Peter Lang.

Bettelheim, C. and Ehrenfeld, A. (1974). *Cultural revolution and industrial organization in China: changes in management and the division of labor*: Monthly Review Press New York.

Bian, Y. and Logan, J. R. (1996). 'Market Transition and the Persistence of Power: The Changing Stratification System in Urban China'. *American Sociological Review,* 61 (5), 739-758.

Biggs, J. and Watkins, D. (Eds) (1996), *The Chinese Learner: Culture, Psychological, and Contextual Influences*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Biggs, J. and Watkins, D. (Eds) (2001), *Teaching the Chinese Learner: Psychological and Pedagogical Perspectives*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Blaug, M. (1980). *A plain man's guide to the finance of British higher education*.

Blaug, M. (1990). *The economic value of higher education*. Wassenaar: Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Blaug, M. and Mace, J. D. (1982). *Financing higher education : an economic perspective*.

Blaug, M., Peston, M. H. and Ziderman, A. (1967). *The utilization of educated manpower in industry : a preliminary report*. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd.

Bond, M. H. (Ed.) (1986), *The Psychology of the Chinese People*. Hong Kong, Oxford, & New York: Oxford University Press.

Boudon, R. (1974). *Education, opportunity, and social inequality : changing prospects in Western society*. New York ; London: Wiley-Interscience.

Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J.-C. (2000). *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. London, Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). *An invitation to reflexive sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (1976). *Schooling in capitalist America : educational reform and the contradictions of economic life*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Bowman, M. (1992). *Phenomenology, fieldwork and folk religion*. Cardiff: British Association for the Study of Religions.

Boys, C. J., Brennan, J. and McGeevor, P. (1983). *Higher education and the labour market research programme : CNAA graduate survey : interim report on the first panel wave*. [S.l.]: Council for National Academic Awards Development Services Unit.

Boys, C. J. and Kogan, M. (1984). *Expectations of higher education : commentary on three studies of higher education [institutions] ('The Providers')*. Uxbridge: Brunel University.

Breen, R. (2007). 'Educational Expansion and Social Mobility in the Twentieth Century'. [Online]. Available at: http://www.yale.edu/ciqle/INAUGURAL PAPERS/BreenBinder.pdf. [Last accessed March 10th, 2009].

Brennan, J. (2004). 'The Social Role of the Contemporary University: Contraditions, Boundaries, and Changes'. In M. Keynes (Ed.), *Ten Years On: Changing Education in a Changing World*. Open University Press: Centre for Higher Education Research and Information,.

Brennan, J. and McGeevor, P. (1985). *Higher education and the labour market research programme : CNAA graduates : their experience and views twelve months after graduation*. London: Council for National Academic Awards.

Brennan, J., Patel, K. and Tang, W. (2009). *Diversity in the student learning experience and time devoted to study a comparative analysis of the UK and European evidence*. [Online]. Available at: http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/rdreports/2009/rd06_09/rd06_09.pdf.

Bretion, G. (2003). 'Higher Education: From Internationalization to Globalization'. In G. Breton and M. Lambert (Eds), *Universities and Globalization - Private Linkages, Public Trust* (pp. 21-33). Quebec and Paris: UNESCO PUBLISHING.

Bridger, K. (2007). *Embedding widening participation and promoting student diversity : what can be learned from a business case approach? : summary*. York: Higher Education Academy.

Bröckling, U., Krasmann, S. and Lemke, T. (2009). *Governmentality : current issues and future challenges*. London: Routledge.

Brownlie, F., Feniak, C. and Schnellert, L. (2006). *Student diversity : classroom strategies to meet the learning needs of all students*. (2nd Ed.). Markham, Ont.: Pembroke.

Burchell, G., Gordon, C. and Miller, P. (1991). *The Foucault effect : studies in governmentality : with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Burke, P. J. and Jackson, S. (2007). *Reconceptualising lifelong learning : feminist interventions*. London: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1990). *Gender trouble : feminism and the subversion of identity*. New York London: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1993). *Bodies that matter : on the discursive limits of "sex"*. New York ; London: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1995). 'Contingent foundations: feminism and the question of 'postmodernism". In S. Benhabib, J. Butler, D. Cornell and N. Fraser (Eds), *Feminist contentions. A Philosophical exchange* (pp. 127-143). New York: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1997). *Excitable speech : a politics of the performative*: Routledge.

Butler, J. (2000). *Antigone's claim : kinship between life and death*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Cao, Y. (2004). 'Behind the rising meritocracy: market, politics, and cultural change in urban China'. *Social Science Research,* 33 (3), 435-463.

Carpentier, N. and Cammaerts, B. (2006). 'Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism - An interview with Chantal Mouffe'. *Journalism Studies,* 7 (6), 964 - 975.

Chaffee, J. W. (1985). *The thorny gates of learning in Sung China : a social history of examinations*. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chang, C. and Zhang, Z. (1955). *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society*: University of Washington press.

Chen, P. (2002). *Zhongguo da xue shi jiang*. (Di 1 ban. Ed.). Shanghai Shi: Fu dan da xue chu ban she.

Chen, S. (Ed.) (2008), *Wode Daxue, Wo Zuozhu (My University Education, I Am in Charge)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Chaizheng Jijing Chuban She.

Chen, Z. and Luo, B. (Friday August 10th, 2007). 'Daxue Biyesheng Heyi "Huilu Du" Zhongzhuan (Why University Graudates Went Back To Secondary Technical Schhols)'. *Guangming Ribao*, pp. 5.

Cohen, P. A. and Goldman, M. (1992). *Fairbank remembered*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John K. Fairbank Center for EastAsian Studies.

Court, D. (1981). *The idea of social science in East Africa : an aspect of the development of higher education*.

Crampton, J. W. and Elden, S. (2007). 'Introduction Space, knowledge and power: Foucault and geography'. In J. W. Crampton and S. Elden (Eds), *Space, knowledge and power: Foucault and geography*: Ashgate Pub Co.

Daniels, K. and Macdonald, L. A. C. (2005). *Equality, diversity and discrimination : a student text*. London: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development.

Datt, G. and Chaudhuri, S. (2009). *From poor areas to poor people: China's evolving poverty reduction agenda, An assessment of poverty and inequality in China*: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department, World Bank.

Davidson, A. I. (2003). 'Ethics as Ascetics'. In G. Gutting (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault* (2nd ed., pp. xix, 465 p.). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Davies, B. (2006). 'Subjectification: the relevance of Butler's analysis for education '. *British Journal of Sociology of Education,* 27 (4), 425 - 438.

Deacon, R. (2002). 'Truth, Power and Pedagogy: Michel Foucault on the rise of the disciplines'. *Educational Philosophy and Theory,* 34 (4), 435-458.

Dean, M. (1999). *Governmentality : power and rule in modern society*. London: Sage.

Deer, C. (2001). *Higher Education and Economic Development*. [Online]. Available at: http://www.skope.ox.ac.uk/WorkingPapers/SKOPEWP17.pdf. [Last accessed March 3rd, 2007].

Deleuze, G. (1992). 'What is a dispostif?'. In T. J. Armstrong (Ed.), *Michel Foucault, philosopher : essays*. New York: Routledge.

Deleuze, G. (1994). *Difference and repetition*. London: Athlone Press.

Deleuze, G. (1995). *Negotiations, 1972-1990*. New York ; Chichester: Columbia University Press.

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1984). *Anti-Oedipus : capitalism and schizophrenia*. London: Athlone.

Deng, X. (1977a). 'Guan Yu Ke Xue He Jiao Yu Gong Zuo De Ji Dian Yi Jian'. In G. j. J. Y. W. Y. H. Z. C. F. G. Si. (Ed.), *Shi Yi Jie San Zhong Quan Hui Yi Lai Zhong Yao Jiao Yu Wen Xian Xuan Bian* (pp. 2-6).

Deng, X. (1977b). 'Zun Zhong Zhi Shi, Zun Zhong Ren Cai'. In G. j. J. Y. W. Y. H. Z. C. F. G. Si. (Ed.), *Shi Yi Jie San Zhong Quan Hui Yi Lai Zhong Yao Jiao Yu Wen Xian Xuan Bian* (pp. 1).

Department of Physical Education of Fudan University. (2006). *Fudan Daxue Tiyuke Zaocao Kewai Huodong Kaoqing Guiding (Regulations of Attendance to Morning Exercise and Extra Curriluar Activitie of Fudan University)*. [Online]. Available at: http://www.fdty.fudan.edu.cn/fd_assess_g_f35.html. [Last accessed 13th July, 2011].

Doyal, L. and Harris, R. (1986). *Empiricism, explanation and rationality : an introduction to the philosophy of the social sciences*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Dreyfus, H. L., Rabinow, P. and Foucault, M. (1982). *Michel Foucault : beyond structuralism and hermeneutics*. Brighton: The Harvester Press.

East China Normal University. (2009). *Regulations of Student Dormitory of East China Normal University*. [Online]. Available at: http://xxgk.ecnu.edu.cn/s/3/t/19/12/8a/info4746.htm. [Last accessed 4th August, 2011].

Fang, K. and Li, H. (2011). *Daxue Zai Renjian (University in its Earthly Form)* [Online]. Available at: http://www.infzm.com/content/61722. [Last accessed 10th September, 2011].

Fewsmith, J. (2008). *China since Tiananmen : from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Foucault, M. (1967). *Madness and civilization : a history of insanity in the Age of Reason*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Foucault, M. (1973). *The birth of the clinic : an archaeology of medical perception*. (A. Sheridan, Trans.). London: Tavistock Publications.

Foucault, M. (1977a). *Discipline and punish : the birth of the prison* London: Allen Lane.

Foucault, M. (1977b). 'Nietasche, Genealogy, History'. In M. Foucault, D. F. Bouchard and S. Simon (Eds), *Language, counter-memory, practice : selected essays and interviews* (pp. 240). Oxford: Blackwell.

Foucault, M. (1979). 'On Governmentality'. *Ideology and Conciousness,* (6), 5-22.

Foucault, M. (1980). 'The confession of flesh', *Power-knowledge : selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977* (pp. 270). Brighton: Harvester Press.

Foucault, M. (1984a). *The History of Sexuality Volume 2 - The Use of Pleasure*. (R. Hurley, Trans.). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Foucault, M. (1984b). 'Space, Knowledge, and Power'. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), *The Foucault Reader* (pp. 239–256). New York: Pantheon.
Foucault, M. (1990). *The History of Sexuality. Vol.3, The Care of the Self*. (R. Hurley, Trans.). London: Penguin.
Foucault, M. (1998). *The history of sexuality Vol.1 the will to knowledge*. (R. Hurley, Trans.). London: Penguin.
Foucault, M. and Rabinow, P. (2000). *Ethics : subjectivity and truth*. London: Penguin.
Fu, G. (2005). *San Ge Da Xue Xiao Zhang*. [Online]. Available at: http://book.sina.com.cn/longbook/his/1112168249_shiqudedaxue/38.shtml.
Fuss, D. (1989). *Essentially speaking : feminism, nature & difference*. New York ; London: Routledge.
Gallagher, M., Hasan, A., Canning, M., Newby, H., Saner-Yiu, L. and Whitman, I. (2009). *OECD Reviews of Tertiary Education: CHINA*: OECD.
Gans, H. J. (2002). 'The Sociology of Space: A UseñCentered View'. *City & Community,* 1 (4), 329-339.
Gibb, A. A. (1993). 'Enterprise culture and education'. *International small business journal,* 11 (3), 11.
Gieryn, T. F. (2000). 'A space for place in sociology'. *Annual Review of Sociology,* 463-496.
Giroux, H. A. (1983a). 'Theories of Reproduction and Resistance in the New Sociologyof Education: A Critical Analysis'. *Harvard Educational Review,* 53 (3), 257-293.
Giroux, H. A. (1983b). *Theory and resistance in education : a pedagogy for the opposition*. London: Heinemann Educational.
Giroux, H. A. (1997). *Pedagogy and the politics of hope : theory, culture and schooling, a critical reader*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
Giroux, H. A. (2001). *Theory and resistance in education : towards a pedagogy for the opposition*. (Rev. and expanded Ed.). Westport, Conn. ; London: Bergin & Garvey.
Giroux, H. A. (October 17, 2010). 'Lessons From Paulo Freire'. *The Chronicle of Higher Education*.
Giroux, H. A. and Shannon, P. (1997). *Education and cultural studies : toward a performative practice*. New York ; London: Routledge.
Goldman, M. (1981). *China's intellectuals : advise and dissent*. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press.
Goldman, M., Cheek, T., Hamrin, C. L. and Harvard University. Council on East Asian Studies. (1987). *China's intellectuals and the State : in search of a new relationship*. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University.
Goldman, M. and MacFarquhar, R. (1999). *The paradox of China's post-Mao reforms*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Goldthorpe, J. H. (1996). 'Class analysis and reorientation of class theory: the case of persisting differentials in educational attainment'. *British Journal of Sociology,* 47 (3).
Gramsci, A., Hoare, Q. and Nowell-Smith, G. (1971). *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Greenaway, D. and Haynes, M. (2003). 'Funding Higher Education in the UK: The Role of Fees and Loans*'. *The Economic Journal,* 113 (485), F150-F166.
Gulson, K. N., Symes, C. and Armstrong, F. (2007). *Spatial theories of education : policy and geography matters*. New York ; London: Routledge.
Guojia Tiyu Zongju. (2008). *Guojia Xuesheng Tizhi Jiankang Biaozhun Shishi Banfa (Implementation Measures of for National Standard for Students' Physical Health)*. [Online]. [Last accessed 28th July, 2011].

Gutting, G. (2003). *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*. (2nd Ed.). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Habermas, J. r. (1987). *The philosophical discourse of modernity : twelve lectures*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Haggis, T. (2003). 'Constructing Images of Ourselves? A Critical Investigation into 'Approaches to Learning' Research in Higher Education'. *British Educational Research Journal,* 29 (1), 89-104.
Hao, Z. (2011). *Daxue buda, jieyin jiazhi chule wenti (University is not great, becasue of the wrong values)*. [Online]. Available at: http://www.infzm.com/content/56395. [Last accessed 16th May, 2011].
Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hayhoe, R. (1996). *China' Universities 1895-1995: A century of Cultural Conflict*. New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc.
He, B. (1931). 'San shi nian zhi zhongguo da xue jiao yu (University Education in the past 35 years)'. In Y. Zhuang and S. He (Eds), *Zui jin san shi nian zhi zhongguo jiao yu*. Shang hai: Shang wu yin shu guan.
He, D. and Wu, N. (Eds) (1998), *Zhong Hua Ren Min Gon He Guo Zhong Yao Jiao Yu Wen Xian 1949-1997 (Important educational documents of People's Republic of China 1949-1997)*. Haikou: Hainan Publishing House.
Heelan, P. A. (1989). *Space-perception and the philosophy of science*: Univ of California Pr on Demand.
Higher Education Committee of North China Region. (1949). *Provisional Regulations of Departmental courses in Universities, vocational colleges, and Colleges of Liberal Arts and Law*. [Online]. Available at: http://hprc.org.cn/gsgl/dsnb/gsbn/1949_1/11r/200906/t20090601_1691.html. [Last accessed 27th May, 2011].
Hoffman, L. (2003). 'Enterprising cities and citizens: the re-figuring of urban spaces and the making of post-Mao professionals'. *Provincial China,* 8 (1), 5-26.
Hoffman, L. (2006). 'Autonomous choices and patriotic professionalism: On governmentality in late-socialist China'. *Economy and Society,* 35 (4), 550-570.
Hoffman, L. M. (2010). *Patriotic professionalism in urban China : fostering talent*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Huang, R. (1988). *China : a macro history* Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe.
Hunter, I. (1994). *Rethinking the school : subjectivity, bureaucracy, criticism*. St Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin.
Hunter, I. (1996). 'Assembling the school'. In A. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose (Eds), *Foucault and political reason : liberalism, neo-liberalism, and rationalities of government* (pp. 278). London: Ucl P.
Ichiko, C. (1980). 'Political and institutional reform, 1901-11'. In J. K. Fairbank, K.-C. Liu and D. C. Twitchett (Eds), *The Cambridge history of China. Vol.11, Late Ch'ing 1800-1911*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ivanhoe, P. J. (2000). *Confucian moral self cultivation*. (2nd Ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Pub.
Jacka, T. (2007). Population Governance in the PRC: Political, Historical and Anthropological Perspectives (pp. 111-126): JSTOR.
Jacka, T. (2009). 'Cultivating citizens: Suzhi (quality) discourse in the PRC'. *positions: east asia cultures critique,* 17 (3), 523.
Jeffreys, E. (2009). *China's governmentalities : governing change, changing government*. London ; New York: Routledge.

Jeffreys, E. and Sigley, G. (Eds) (2006), *'China and Governmentality' a special feature*. Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge.

Jeffreys, E. and Sigley, G. (2009). 'China and Governmentality Studies'. In E. Jeffreys (Ed.), *China's governmentalities : governing change, changing government*. London ; New York: Routledge.

Jiang, N. (Oct, 16th, 1956). 'Luelun gaodeng xuexiao de quanmian fazhan de jiaoyu fangzhen (A Brief Discussion of the Educational Policy of Overall Development for Institutions of Higher Learning)'. *Zhongguo Qingnian (China Youth)*, pp. 9-12.

Jin, Y. (Monday July 1, 2009). 'Daxuesheng "Chunguan": Qingnina He Nongchun Guanxi De Yici Lishixing Feiyue (University Student as "Village Officials": A Historcial Step Forwards in the Relationship Between Youth and the Rural Area)'. *Guangming Ribao*, pp. 5.

Jones, D. (1990a). 'The genealogy of urban schoolteachers '. In S. J. Ball (Ed.), *Foucault and education : disciplines and knowledge* (pp. viii,213p.). London: Routledge.

Jones, K. and Williamson, K. (1979). 'The birth of the schoolroom'. *Ideology and Consciousness*, 6, 59-110.

Jones, R. (1990b). 'Educational pratices and scientific knolwedge: a genealogical interpretation of the emergence of physiology in post-Revolutionary France'. In S. J. Ball (Ed.), *Foucault and education : disciplines and knowledge* (pp. viii,213p.). London: Routledge.

King, H. E. (1911). *The educational system of China as recently reconstructed*. Washington: G.P.O.

Kipnis, A. (2006). 'Suzhi: A Keyword Approach'. *The China Quarterly*, 186, 295-313.

Kipnis, A. (2007). 'Neoliberalism reified: suzhi discourse and tropes of neoliberalism in the People's Republic of China'. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 13 (2), 383-400.

Kipnis, A. B. (2011). *Governing Educational Desire: Culture, Politics, and Schooling in China*: University Of Chicago Press.

Laclau, E. (1977). *Politics and ideology in Marxist theory : capitalism, fascism, populism*. London: NLB.

Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (2001). *Hegemony and socialist strategy : towards a radical democratic politics*. (2nd Ed.). London ; New York: Verso.

Lee, T. H. C. (1985). *Government education and examinations in Sung China*. Hong Kong: Chinese University.

Lemke, T. (2009). 'Beyond Foucault: From Biopolitics to he Government of Life'. In U. Bröckling, S. Krasmann and T. Lemke (Eds), *Governmentality : current issues and future challenges* (pp. 165-184). London: Routledge.

Lessa, I. (2006). 'Discursive Struggles Within Social Welfare: Restaging Teen Motherhood'. *British Journal of Social Work*, 36 (2), 283-298.

Lewin, K. M., Little, A. W., Xu, H. and Zheng, J. (1994). *EDUCATIOAL INOVATION IN CHINA - Tracing the Impact of the 1985 Reforms*. Essex: Longman Group Limited.

Li, B. (2005). *Shu yuan jiao yu yu ke ju guan xi yan jiu*. (Chu ban. Ed.). Taibei Shi: Guo li Taiwan da xue chu ban zhong xin.

Li, C. and Wang, B. (2008). 'Zhong Guo Da Xue Sheng Jiu Ye Xian Zhuang Diao Cha (An investigation of graduate employement situation in China)'. [Online]. Available at: http://www.sociology.cass.cn/shxw/shgz/.../P020090120330059680984.pdf. [Last accessed 10th, June, 2009].

Li, J. (2004a). 'Brief Review on the History of Modern China's Higher Education Research'. *Peking University Education Review*, 2 (1), 99-103.

Li, L. (2004b). *Li Lanqing Jiao Yu Fan Tan Lu (Interviews with Li Lanqing on education)*. Beijing: People's Education Press.

Li, Y. (Friday March 28th, 2007). 'Chuanguan: Daxuesheng Youyi Xuanze (Villiage Offcials: Another Choice for University Students)'. *Guangming Ribao*, pp. 10.

Li, Y. (2008). 'Zhi Du Bian Qian Yu Jiao Yu Bu Ping Deng De Chan Sheng Ji Zhi: 1966 - 2003'. In L. Li and Y. Bian (Eds), *Institution Transition and Social Stratification: Based on China General Survey 2003*. Beijing: China Renmin University Press.

Lian, S. (Ed.) (2009), *Yi Zu: Da Xue Bi Ye Sheng Ju Ji Cun Shi Lu (Ant Tribe: an authentic record of the residential villages of university graduates)*. Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chuban She.

Lian, Y. (Wednesday March 26th, 2008). 'Jiuye Xuanze: Daxuesheng Jianqu Lixing (Job Choice: University Students Become More Rational)'. *Guangming Ribao*, pp. 11.

Liu, D. (2009). *Yousi Daxue (Deep Concerns with University)*. [Online]. Available at: http.// zqb.cyol.com/content/2009-02/04/content_2525981.htm. [Last accessed 16th, May, 2011].

Liu, H. (2002). *Zhongguo kao shi fa zhan shi*. (Di 1 ban. Ed.). Wuhan Shi: Hua zhong shi fan da xue chu ban she.

Liu, H. and Li, B. (2006). *Zhongguo ke ju shi*. (Di 2 ban. Ed.). Shanghai Shi: Dong fang chu ban zhong xin.

Liu, J. (Ed.) (2004), *Zhuan Xing Shi Qi Zhong Guo She Hui Jiao Yu*. Shenyang: Liao Ning Education Press.

Liu, J. (2005). *The State, Social Class, and Education*. Beijing: China Renmin University Press.

Lu, D. (1950). 'Xin Zhong Guo De Jiao Yu He Wen Hua'. *Ren Min Zhong Guo*.

Lu, X. (2002). *Dang Dai Zhong Guo She Hui Jie Ceng Yan Jiu Bao Gao*. Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House.

Lu, X. (Ed.) (2004), *Social Stratification in Contemporary China*. Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House.

Ma, X. and Abbott, M. (2006). *Chinese students and the higher education market in Australia and New Zealand*. [Online]. Available at: http://www.crie.org.nz/research_paper/M.Abbott_OP7.pdf.

MacFarquhar, R., Affairs, R. I. o. I., Institute, C. U. E. A., Affairs, C. U. R. I. o. C. and Change, C. U. R. I. o. I. (1997). *The origins of the cultural revolution*: Cambridge Univ Press.

McCallum, D. (1990). *The social production of merit: Education, psychology and politics in Australia 1900-1950*: Falmer Press London.

McLean, M. (2006). *Pedagogy and the university : critical theory and practice*. London: Continuum.

Meadmore, D., Hatcher, C. and McWilliam, E. (2000). 'Getting tense about genealogy'. *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education,* 13 (5), 463-476.

Meredyth, D. and Tyler, D. (1993). *Child and Citizen: Genealogies of Schooling and Subjectivity; a Special Publication of the Institute for Cultural Policy Studies, Faculty of Humanities, Griffith University*.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). *Phenomenology of perception*. London: Routledge.

Miller, P. and Rose, N. (1995). 'Production, identity, and democracy'. *Theory and Society,* 24 (3), 427-467.

Miller, P. and Rose, N. S. (2008). *Governing the present : administering economic, social and personal life*. Cambridge: Polity.

Ministry of Education. (2010). *2010 Pu Tong Gao Deng Xue Xiao Zhao Sheng Gong Zuo Gui Ding (2010 Regulations on the Work of Higher Education Institution Enrolment)* [Online]. Available at: http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2010-03-29/1131241254.shtml. [Last accessed 10th, Jan, 2011].

Ministry of Education. (2011). *2011 Nian Quanguo Gaokao Baoming Renshu 933 Wan, Luqulv 72.3% (The number of applicants for the CEE reached 9.33 million in 2011, admission rate at 72.3%)*. [Online]. Available at: http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2011-06-03/1636298559.shtml. [Last accessed 13th July, 2011].

Ministry of Education, China. (1984). Zhongguo jiao yu nian jian 1949—1981 (China Education Yearbook). Beijing: Ren min jiao yu chu ban she.

Ministry of Education, China. (1992). *Putong Gaodeng Xuwxiao Jianzhu Guihua Mianji Zhibiao (Area Index of Construction Planning for Higher Education Institutions)*. [Online]. Available at: http://www.gxedu.gov.cn/UploadFiles/fzghc/2010/10/2010101012206.pdf. [Last accessed 28th July, 2011].

Ministry of Education, China. (1998). *Mian Xiang 21 Shi Ji Jiao Yu Zheng Xing Xiong Dong Ji Hua.* [Online]. Available at: http://202.205.177.9/edoas/website18/level3.jsp?tablename=208&infoid=3337.

Ministry of Education, China. (1999). *The Action Plan to Vitalize Education Facing the Twenty-first Century*. [Online]. Available at: http://www.moe.edu.cn/edoas/website18/info3337.htm. [Last accessed March 13th, 2007].

Ministry of Education, China. (2007a). *2006 Nian Quan Guo Jiao Yu Shi Ye Tong Ji Gong Bao.* [Online]. Available at: http://www.edu.cn/jiao_yu_fa_zhan_498/20070608/t20070608_236759.shtml. [Last accessed 7th, Februray, 2008].

Ministry of Education, China (2007b). *OECD THEMATIC REVIEW OF TERTIARY EDUCATION: Background Report for the P.R of China*

Ministry of Education, China. (2008). '2007 Nian Quan Guo Jiao Yu Shi Ye Tong Ji Gong Bao'. (7th, November, 2008).

Mitchell, K. (2006). 'Neoliberal governmentality in the European Union: education, training, and technologies of citizenship'. *Environment and planning D: society and space,* 24 (3), 389-407.

Murphy, R. (2004). 'Turning peasants into modern Chinese citizens:"Population quality" discourse, demographic transition and primary education'. *The China Quarterly,* 177, 1-20.

Neave, G. (1988). 'On the cultivation of quality, efficiency and enterprise: an overview of recent trends in higher education in Western Europe, 1986-1988'. *European Journal of Education,* 23 (1/2), 7-23.

Nee, V. (1996). 'The Emergence of a Market Society: Changing Mechanisms of Stratification in China'. *The American Journal of Sociology,* 101 (4), 908-949.

Nield, K. (2004). 'Questioning the myth of the Chinese learner'. *International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management,* 16 (3), 189-196.

Nivison, D. S. and Van Norden, B. W. (1996). *The ways of Confucianism : investigations in Chinese philosophy*. Chicago: Open Court.

O'Farrell, C. (1989). *Foucault: historian or philosopher?*: Macmillan London.

O'Leary, T. (2002). *Foucault : the art of ethics*. London: Continuum.

Olssen, M. (2000). 'Ethical liberalism, education and the 'New Right''. *Journal of Education Policy,* 15 (5), 481-508.

Olssen, M. (2002). 'Michel Foucault as" Thin" Communitarian: Difference, Community, Democracy'. *Cultural Studies↔ Critical Methodologies,* 2 (4), 483-513.

Olssen, M. (2003a). 'Structuralism, post-structuralism, neo-liberalism: assessing Foucault's legacy'. *Journal of Education Policy,* 18 (2), 189-202.

Olssen, M. (2003b). 'Totalitarianism and the'Repressed'Utopia of the Present: moving beyond Hayek, Popper and Foucault'. *Policy Futures in Education,* 1 (3), 526-552.

Olssen, M. (2004a). 'Foucault and Marxism: rewriting the theory of historical materialism'. *Policy Futures in Education,* 2 (3), 454-482.

Olssen, M. (2004b). 'Neoliberalism, globalisation, democracy: challenges for education'. *Globalisation, societies and education,* 2 (2), 231-275.

Olssen, M. (2006). 'Understanding the mechanisms of neoliberal control: lifelong learning, flexibility and knowledge capitalism'. *International Journal of Lifelong Education,* 25 (3), 213-230.

Orleans, L. A. (1960). *Professional manpower and education in Communist China*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Pan, M. (1984). *Gaodeng Jiaoyu Xue (Higher Education Studies)*. (Di 1 ban. Ed.). Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe.
Pan, M. and Liu, H. (Eds) (1993), *Zhong Guo Jin Dai Jiao Yu Shi Zi Liao Hui Bian*. Shanghai: Shanghai Peoples' Education Press.
Pan, M., Wu, D. and Zhang, Y. (2003). *Zhongguo gao deng jiao yu bai nian*. (Di 1 ban. Ed.). Guangzhou Shi: Guangdong gao deng jiao yu chu ban she.
Pepper, S. (1987a). 'Education for the new order'. In J. K. Fairbank and R. MacFarquhar (Eds), *The Cambridge history of China. Vol.14, The People's Republic. Pt.1, The emergence of revolutionary China, 1949-1965* (pp. xvii,722p). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pepper, S. (1987b). 'New directions in education'. In J. K. Fairbank and R. MacFarquhar (Eds), *The Cambridge history of China. Vol.14, The People's Republic. Pt.1, The emergence of revolutionary China, 1949-1965* (pp. xvii,722p). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pepper, S. (1990). *China's education reform in the 1980s : policies, issues, and historical perspectives*. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies University of California at Berkeley.
Pepper, S. (1991). 'Education'. In J. K. Fairbank, R. MacFarquhar and D. C. Twitchett (Eds), *The Cambridge history of China. Vol.15, The People's Republic, part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982* (pp. xxv, 1108 p). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pepper, S. (1996). *Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Perryman, J. (2007). 'Inspection and emotion'. *Cambridge Journal of Education,* 37 (2), 173-190.
Perryman, J. (2009). 'Inspection and the fabrication of professional and performative processes'. *Journal of Education Policy,* 24 (5), 611-631.
Peters, M. (2001). 'Education, enterprise culture and the entrepreneurial self: a Foucauldian perspective'. *Journal of Educational Enquiry,* 2 (2), 58-71.
Peters, M. A. (2006). 'Special issue – The Learning Society from the Perspective of Governmentality'. *Educational Philosophy and Theory,* 38 (4), 413-414.
Pickles, J. (1985). *Phenomenology, science and geography : spatiality and the human sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pike, J. (2008). 'Foucault, space and primary school dining rooms'. *Children's Geographies,* 6 (4), 413-422.
Popkewitz, T. S. and Brennan, M. (1998). *Foucault's challenge: Discourse, knowledge, and power in education*: Teachers College Press, New York.
Prado, C. G. (2000). *Starting with Foucault : an introduction to genealogy*. (2nd Ed.). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Prybyla, J. S. (1975). 'Notes on Chinese Higher Education'. *China Quarterly,*, 62, 271-276.
Qian, G. (1999). 'Guan Xu Huang Di Yu Jin Shi Da Xue Tang'. *Tianjin Shi Da Xue Bao,* 4, 44-48.
Qian, R. (1949). *Zai Di Yi Ce Quan Guo Jiao Yu Gong Zuo Hui Yi Shang De Zong Jie Bao Gao Yao Dian*. [Online]. Available at: http://edu.people.com.cn/GB/12119908.html. [Last accessed 1, November, 2010].
Rabinow, P. and Rose, N. S. (2003). *Foucault today*. [Online]. Available at: http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/publications/2009/04/Rabinow-Rose-Intro-Essential.pdf. [Last accessed 12th April 2011].
Reichenbach, H. (1958). *The philosophy of space and time*: New York.
Ren, Y. and Zhang, R. (2007). *Wanmei Daxue Bixiuke - Ni buneng cuoguo de sinian (Essential Lessons for Perfect University - four years you can not miss)*. Beijing: People's Press.
Robinson, J. (1968). 'The cultural revolution in China'. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),* 44 (2), 214-227.
Rofel, L. (2007). 'Desiring China : experiments in neoliberalism, sexuality, and public culture'. *Perverse modernities.*, x, 251 p.

Rose, N. (1985). *The psychological complex : psychology, politics and society in England, 1869-1939.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Rose, N. (1996). *Inventing our selves : psychology, power, and personhood.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rose, N. (1999a). *Governing the soul : the shaping of the private self.* (2nd Ed.). London: Free Association.
Rose, N. S. (1999b). *Powers of freedom : reframing political thought.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sang, B. (1995). *Wanqing Xuetang Xuesheg Yu Shehui Bianqian (Students of New Schools in Late Qing and Social Transformation).* Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanshe.
Schutz, A., Walsh, G. and Lehnert, F. (1972). *The phenomenology of the social world.* London: Heinemann Educational.
Scott, P. (1995). *The Meanings of Mass Higher Education.* Buckingham: The Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press.
Shen, D. (2002). *Guan Yu Ke Ju She Hui Liu Dong Tao Lun Zhong De Ji Ge Wen Ti (Regarding several issues in the discussion of social mobility in Keju societies).* [Online]. Available at: http://news.guoxue.com/article.php?articleid=17689. [Last accessed 26th, June].
Sigley, G. (1996). 'Governing Chinese bodies: the Significance of studies in the concept of govermentality for the analysis of goverment in China'. *Economy and Society,* 25 (4), 457-482.
Sigley, G. (2004). 'Liberal despotism: Population planning, subjectivity, and government in contemporary China'. *Alternatives,* 29 (5), 557-575.
Sigley, G. (2006). From 'Jihua' to 'Guihua': A Preliminary Critique of Approaches to Understanding 'Governance' in the Chinese Context. In A. Vickers and M. Hanlon (eds), *Asia Reconstructed: Proceedings of the 16th Biennial Conference of the ASAA.* Wollongong, Australia.
Sigley, G. (2009). 'Suzhi, the Body, and the Fortunes of Technoscientific Reasoning in Contemporary China'. *positions: east asia cultures critique,* 17 (3), 537-566.
Sigley, G., Jolly, M. and Ram, K. (2001). 'Keep it in the family: Government, marriage, and sex in contemporary China'. *Borders of Being: Citizenship, Fertility, and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific,* 118–153.
Silver, H. and Silver, P. (1985). *In the suburbs of the celestial city? : a background paper to the study of vocationalism in higher education.* [S.l.]: [Council for National Academic Awards Development Services Unit].
Simons, M. and Masschelein, J. (2006). 'The learning society and governmentality: an introduction'. *Educational Philosophy and Theory,* 38 (4), 417-430.
Su, X. (Ed.) (1985), *Zhongguo Jindai Jiaoyu Shi Ziliao (Historical Materials of Education in Modern China).* (Vol. 2). Beijing: Ren Min Jiao Yu Chu Ban She.
Su, Y. (2000). *Kang Zhan Qian De Qing Hua Da Xue 1928-1937.* Taipei: Zhong Yang Yan Jiu Yuan Jin Dai Shi Yan Jiu Suo.
Sun, E.-t. Z. (1986). 'The growth of the academic community 1912-1949'. In J. K. Fairbank, A. Feuerwerker and D. C. Twitchett (Eds), *The Cambridge history of China. Vol.13, Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sun, L. (Thursday Feburary 15th, 2007). 'Daxuesheng De Zhichang Siwei Yu Dingwei (University students' professional thinking and orientation)'. *Guangming Ribao,* pp. 11.
Tamboukou, M. (1999). 'Writing Genealogies: an exploration of Foucault's strategies for doing research'. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education,* 20 (2), 201-217.
Tamboukou, M. and Ball, S. (2003). *Dangerous encounters : genealogy & ethnography.* New York ; Oxford: Peter Lang.
Tan, B. (2009). *Daxue, jiju du shenme (What to do in university).* Guangzhou: Nanfang Daily Press.

Tang, M. and Zuo, X. (1998). *Kuo Da Gao Xiao Zhao Sheng Liang Yi Bei De Jian Yi (Recommendations to double the enrolment of Higher Education Institutions)*. [Online]. Available at: http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/20041023/15201102716.shtml. [Last accessed 12th, Jan, 2011].

Teiwes, F. C. (1974). 'The Assignment of University Graduates in China'. *The China Quarterly,* 62 (June), 308-309.

Tomba, L. (2009a). 'Gating Urban Spaces in China: Inclusion, Exclusion and Government'. *Gated Communities: Social Sustainability in Contemporary and Historical Gated Developments,* 27.

Tomba, L. (2009b). 'Of Quality, Harmony, and Community: Civilization and the Middle Class in Urban China'. *positions: east asia cultures critique,* 17 (3), 591.

Tsang, M. C. (2000). *Education adn National Development in China since 1949: Oscilating Policies and Eduring Dilemmas*. [Online]. Available at: http://www.tc.columbia.edu/centers/coce/pdf_files/d1.pdf. [Last accessed 15th, June 2008].

Tymieniecka, A.-T. and Kronegger, M. (1991). *Phenomenology and aesthetics : approaches to comparative literature and the other arts : homages to A-T. Tymieniecka*. Dordrecht ; London: Kluwer.

Unger, J. (1982). *Education under Mao : class and competition in Canton schools, 1960-1980*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Urry, J. (1996). 'Sociology of time and space'. *The Blackwell companion to social theory,* 369ñ395.

Vincent, C. and Tomlinson, S. (1997). 'Home—School Relationships:'the swarming of disciplinary mechanisms'?[1]'. *British Educational Research Journal,* 23 (3), 361-377.

Vincent, C. and Warren, S. (1998). 'Becoming a 'better'parent? Motherhood, education and transition'. *British Journal of Sociology of Education,* 19 (2), 177-193.

Walder, A. G. (1995). 'Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order'. *American Sociological Review,* 60 (3), 309-328.

Walder, A. G. (2003). 'Elite Opportunity in Transitional Economies'. *American Sociological Review,* 68 (6), 899-916.

Wang, J. (1996). *High culture fever : politics, aesthetics, and ideology in Deng's China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wang, S. and Zhu, Z. (2003). 'Beijing Gao Deng Jiao Yu Zai Wo Guo Di Wei Fen Xi (An analysis of the national status of higher education in Beijing)'. [Online]. Available at: http://www.bjpopss.gov.cn/bjpssweb/trans.aspx?id=8320. [Last accessed 3rd, July, 2009].

Wang, X. (2006). *Meitian Duanlian Yi Xiaoshi, Jiankang Shenghuo Wushi Nian, Xingfu Shenghuo Yi Beizi (One Hour of Exercise a Day, Fifty Years of Healthy Work and a Lifetime of Happiness)*. [Online]. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhibo43/content_478075.htm. [Last accessed 16th July, 2011].

Wang, Y. C. (1966). *CHINESE INTELLECTUALS AND THE WEST 1872 -1949*. Durham, N. C. : The University of North Carolina Press.

Wang, Z. (Friday November 9th, 2007). 'Daxuesheng Zeye Xinli Tanxi (An exploration of student psychology in job choice)'. *Guangming Ribao*, pp. 12.

Wang, Z. (2010). *Zhongguo: Weixian de Jiaoyu Bugong (China: the dangerous educational inequity)*. [Online]. Available at: http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001031702. [Last accessed 10th May, 2011].

Ward, J. G. and Anthony, P. (1992). *Who pays for student diversity? : population changes and educational policy*. Newbury Park, Calif.: Corwin Press.

Watkins, D. (2000). 'Learning and teaching: A cross-cultural perspective'.

Wei, S. (Ed.) (1982), *Ni Hai Hua Zi Liao (Material of the Ni Hia Hua the novel)*. Shanghai: Shanghai Gu Ji Chu Ban She.

Windolf, P. (1997). *Expansion and structural change : higher education in Germany, the United States, and Japan, 1870-1990*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.
Woronov, T. E. (2009). 'Governing China's Children: Governmentality and "Education for Quality"'. *positions: east asia cultures critique,* 17 (3), 567.
Wu, D. (Ed.) (2004), *Zhong Guo Gao Deng Jiao Yu Wen Ti Yan Jiu*. Bejing: Higher Educatio Press.
Wu, G. and Lansdowne, H. (2009). *Socialist China, capitalist China : social tension and political transition under economic globalisation*. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
Wu, J. (1983). *Wen Jiao Pin Lun Xun Gao*. Taipei: Zheng Zhong Shu Ju.
Wu, X. and Xie, Y. (2003). 'Does the Market Pay off? Earnings Returns to Education in Urban China'. *American Sociological Review,* 68 (3), 425-442.
Xie, Q. and Tang, D. (Eds) (1985), *Zhong Guo Kao Shi Zhi Du Shi (A history of examination system in China)*. Hefei: Huang Shan Book House.
Xie, W. and Wang, H. (2001). *Cong Fen Pei Dao Jiu Ye: Da Xue Bi Ye Sheng Jiu Ye Qing Kuang De Shi Zheng Yan Jiu (From Placement to Employment Choice: An Empirical Study of Graduate Employment Persepctives)*. Beijing: Jiao Yu Ke Xue Chu Ban She.
Xie, W., Wen, W. and Li, L. (2006). *A Study of Higher Education Structure during the Process of Massification 1998 - 2004*. Beijing Education and Sciences Publishing House.
Xu, J. (2009). *Da Xue Sheng Qi Wang Xin Shui Da Dao Hang Ye Nei Ping Jun Shui Ping*. [Online]. Available at: http://dxszk.people.com.cn/GB/8688266.html. [Last accessed 24th, June].
Xu, J. (2011). *Guangzhou Gaokao 'Luojie' Re Zhengyi, Ge Yichu bu Xiangtong (Nude Examiantion for the CEE in Guangzhou Raises Controversies; Standards Vary Among Hopsiticals)*. [Online]. Available at: http://edu.qq.com/a/20110422/000059.htm. [Last accessed 13th July, 2011].
Yang, D. (Ed.) (1991), *Xi Fang Si Chao Yu Dang Dai Zhong Guo Da Xue Sheng (Western thoughts and university students in contemporary China)*. Zhen Zhou: He Nan Ren Min Chu Ban She.
Yang, D. (2003). *Jian Nan De Ri Chu - Zhong Guo Jiao Yu De 20 Shi Ji (The Struggled Sunrise - China's Modern Education in the 20th Century)*. Shanghai: Wen Hui Publishing House.
Yang, D. (Ed.) (2008), *Promote Further Justice In Education*. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China).
Yang, J. (2011). 'The Politics of the Dang'an: Spectralization, Spatialization, and Neoliberal Governmentality in China'. *Anthropological Quarterly,* 84 (2), 507-533.
Yang, X., Zhu, C. and Zhang, H. (1992). *Zhong Guo Kao Shi Zhi Du Shi Zi Liao Xuan Bian*. Hefei: Huang Shan Shu She.
Yang, Y. (Sunday March 28th, 2007). '1612 Ming Daxuesheng Dao Xiangzhen Jiangong Liye (1613 University Students Went to Towns and Villages to Make Grand Achievement and Establish Enterprise)'. *Guangming Ribao*, pp. 1.
Yang, Z. (2004). 'Zhidu Wenhua yu Shengxue Zhuyi (System, Culture and Credentialism)'. In J. Liu (Ed.), *Zhuan Xing Shi Qi Zhong Guo She Hui Jiao Yu (Education in China During Societal Tranasformations)*. Shenyang: Liao Ning Education Press.
Ye, T. and Wu, X. (24th, April, 2006, 2006). 'Bu Shu Gao Xiao Sheng Yuan Ben Di Hua Diao Cha: Beijing Zui Di (A Survey of entrant localization among Ministries-affliated Higher Education Institutions - Beijing as the lowest'. *People's Daily*.
Yeh, W.-h. (1990). *The alienated academy : culture and politics in Republican China, 1919-1937*. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies.
Youdell, D. (2005). 'Sex-gender-sexuality: how sex, gender and sexuality constellations are constituted in secondary schools'. *Gender and Education,* 17 (3).
Youdell, D. (2011). *School trouble : identity, power and politics in education*. London: Routledge.
Young, M. F. D. (Ed.) (1971), *Knowledge and control : new directions for the sociology of education*. London: Collier-Macmillan.

Yu, X. and Tang, L. (Eds) (1991), *Zhong Guo Jin Dai Jiao Yu Shi Zi Liao Hui Bian - Xue Zhi Yan Bian (Document Collection of China's recent education history - the development and changes of educational systems)*. Shanghai: Shanghai Education Publishing House.

Zeng, Z. (1953). 'San Nian Lai Gao Deng Jiao Yu De Gai Jin'. *Ren Min Jiao Yu.*

Zeng, Z. (1965). 'Higher Education in New China'. In S. E. Fraser (Ed.), *Chinese Communist education : records of the first decade*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.

Zhang, B., Rong, Q. and Zhang, Z. (1903). 'Zhou Qing Di Jian Ke Ju Zhu Zhong Xue Tang Zhe (A plea for the gradual abolishment of imperial examination and the stress on new state schools)'. In M. Pan and H. Liu (Eds), *Zhong Guo Jin Dai Jiao Yu Shi Zi Liao Hui Bian*. Shanghai: Shanghai Peoples' Education Press.

Zhang, H. (2009a). *Daxuesheng, jingzhengli juedui chulu (University students – competence decides life chances)*. Guangzhou: Nanfang Daily Press.

Zhang, L. and Ong, A. (2008). *Privatizing China : socialism from afar*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Zhang, X. (1994). 'On Some Motifs in the Chinese" Cultural Fever" of the Late 1980s: Social Change, Ideology, and Theory'. *Social Text,* (39), 129-156.

Zhang, Y. (2009b). 'Wan Qing Jiao Ke Shu Shen Ding Yuan Yin Tan Xi (An exploration of the reasons of censorship over textbooks in late Qing)'. *Chu Ban Ke Xue,* 5 (17).

Zheng, R. (2001). 'Fair of Exam and Fair of Area: A Dilemma in Exam Enrollment'.

Zhonggong zhongyang. (2005). *Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhiding 'shiyiwu' guihua de jianyi'(Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Formulation of the 11th 5th Year Plan)*. [Online]. Available at: http://news3.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-10/18/content_3640318.htm. [Last accessed 28th, July, 2011].

Zhongguo Daxuesheng Jiuye Wenti Yanjiu Zhongxin (Ed.) (2005), *Jingyin Nide Daxue (Successful Management of Your University Education)*. Beijing: Zhongguo Shuili Shuidian Chubanshe.

Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian Bianjibu. (1984). Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian 1949-1981. Beijing: Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu Chubanshe.

Zhou, E. (1959). 'First Report on the Work of Government'. In R. R. Bowie and J. K. Faribank (Eds).

Zhou, H. (2008). *Daxue Daodi Zenme Du (How exactly to do Higher Education)*. Guangzhou: Nanfang Daily Press.

Zhou, J. (2006). *Higher Education in China.* Beijing: Thomson Learning.

Zhou, X. (2004). *The State and Life Chances in Urban China.* Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zhou, X., Moen, P. and Tuma, N. B. (1998). 'Educational Stratification in Urban China: 1949-94'. *Sociology of Education,* 71 (3).

Zhuang, C., Yong, Q. and Zong, B. (28, June, 1989, 1989). 'Bi Xue Zai Gao Deng Jiao Yu Zhong Jian Chi Xi Xiang Ji Ben Yuan Ze - Kong Jun Zhi Hui Xue Yuan Bu Fen Jiao Shou, Xue Yuan Zuo Tan Fan Si Lu (Must upload to the Four Cardinal Principles in Higher Education - reflections in a seminar among faculty and students at the School of Air Force Command)'. *People's Daily.*

Zonabend, F. o. (1984). *The enduring memory : time and history in a French village*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Zuo, J. (1991). 'Political religion: the case of the cultural revolution in China'. *Sociology of Religion,* 52 (1), 99.

APPENDIX 1

Annual Review of Academic Year of ____ and _____

Year ____ Month____ Day _____

Name		Gender		Department		Dorm No.		Speciality	
Student ID		Current Student Cadre post						Political Status	
Self Review									
Review of the class									
Record of Awards and Punishments									
Score of Moral Education of the student Category *ideological and political character *moral and civilised *discipline *extra-curricular activities *bonus point * total score Score * * * * * *									
Review of the tutor									
Opinion of Department									
Appendix									

APPENDIX 2

Interview Questions

Part 1 Entrance

1, How would you describe your perception of a university life before your enrollment? How would you understand the idea of 'freedom' in university life? To what extent does this idea have value?

2, What are the sources of the elements that construct your perception?

3, How did your family, and your high school teachers respectively, explain the idea of 'going to university' to you? To what extent did you believe in their statement? Have you ever expressed your doubt? And if so, how did they respond? Under what conditions specifically would you opt not to go to university?

4, Would it be fair to characterize your faith in higher education as unshakable faith?
Does that mean your subject of study is worthy of your religious devotion?

Part 2 Experience

5, How did you picture university teachers and teaching to be before your enrolment? Why so? Did you regard the characteristics you attributed to teachers and their teaching methods a result of their personal methods or styles, or conversely a result of school regulated curricula and departmental demands? Did you expect to be inspired by teachers?

6, To what extent do you believe performing well in university learning requires any adjustment to your learning approaches developed in high school?

7, Can you describe what type of relationship you anticipate with your university professors and tutors? Why would you hold that expectation?

8, How did you plan to explore your personal interests in university?

9, How did you plan to build up your own social network in university?

10, What would be your requirement on school environment?

Part 3 Exit

11, How would you expect your employment perspective to be given the current graduate unemployment problem? More generally, do you believe opportunities are limited for merely a short period of time, or do you see the unemployment problem as a perpetual issue of concern in the future?

12. Can you imagine a time in the near future where you'll have to return to school to make yourself more competitive in the employment market?

13, How would you expect university education to prepare you for employment? In which ways do you believe your university education is responsible for formulating a career perspective for you? How would your university education affect your choice of profession, employment region, etc?

14, How would you characterize your social status as a university student given the fact that graduates earn the same as 'migrant worker'?

15, How do you and your peers understand 'university education' with regard to its function and its influence on you in particular?