

**Education and Social Class  
Formation in Contemporary Egypt**

**Thesis Submitted For A Ph.D. By  
Mahra Amin Dyab**

**London University Institute of Education  
June 1990**



## ABSTRACT

The main concern of this research is to study the influence of class power, culture and ideologies on educational policies, access and practices in the context of the changing political, economic and social policies of Egypt during the modern period.

In order to study that, the thesis works on two levels, theoretical and empirical.

The theoretical level presents the historical, methodological and theoretical broad context for the empirical study. This includes the study of the following:

- 1.- The economic and political situation in Egypt,
- 2.- State power and social class formation, and
- 3.- The system and policies of education in Egypt.

The empirical study is concerned with study of the following subjects:

- 1.- Cultural and ideological perspectives of members from different class positions,
- 2.- Class perspectives on general educational issues,
- 3.- The ways in which 1 and 2 influence the distribution of educational opportunities for members from different class positions, and
- 4.- Differences between and within social classes concerning the above points.

### ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I wish to thank various people who have helped and encouraged me in this study.

My thanks must firstly go to my supervisor Mr Anthony Green, Lecturer in Sociology of Education at the Institute of Education of London University, for his stimulating suggestions, intellectual discussion and for his encouragement and support during my period of research.

I would like also to express my gratitude to the late Professor Abu Al Futouh Radwan, the former Dean of Faculty of Education, Ain Shams University, and to Dr. Nadia Gamal Eddin from Faculty of Education, for encouraging my work in this area of research and helping me to develop my first proposal for research before coming to study at the University of London.

The research could not have been completed without the co-operation of the families I interviewed. I would like to thank them for being very generous, friendly and helpful.

I owe a great debt to the Egyptian tax payers who financed the expenses of my study in a time of very difficult economic circumstances.

Finally my heartfelt thanks go to my family for their love, encouragement and support throughout the period of my studies in London.

## CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	3
<u>Introduction</u>	7
I. The Problem	9
II. The Place of this Research in the Field of Social Class Studies and Educational Research	12
III. Methodological Remarks	28
IV. The Study Plan	29
NOTES AND REFERENCES	31
<u>PART ONE</u>	
<u>HISTORICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS</u>	34
<u>Chapter One: Conceptual and Theoretical Discussion</u>	35
Introduction	35
I. Developing Countries: Main Characteristics and Theories	37
II. The Concept of State	46
III. The Concept of Class	54
IV. Education in Relation to Development, State and Social Classes	77
V. Conclusion	98
NOTES AND REFERENCES	101
<u>Chapter Two: The Economic and Political Context of Egypt from 1952 to the Present Day</u>	110
Introduction	110
I. The Present Economic Crisis	111
II. The Economic and Political System Under Nasser (1952-1970)	114
III. The Economic and Political System Under Sadat (1970-1981)	121
IV. Egypt Under Mubarak	127
V. Conclusion	131
NOTES AND REFERENCES	132
<u>Chapter Three: State Power and Class Formation in Egypt</u>	137
Introduction	137
I. The Theoretical Background of the Study of the Class Formation of Egypt	138
II. The Historical Background of the Class Formation of Egypt	139
III. The Composition of the Present Class Formation of Egypt.	141
IV. Conclusion	171
NOTES AND REFERENCES	174

<u>Chapter Four: Educational Policy in Egypt: Historical background and the class nature of the system</u>	180
Introduction	180
I. The Historical Background of the Education System	181
II. Education Under The Revolution (1952 to the present)	188
III. The Class Nature of the Education System in Egypt and the Reproduction of the Class Structure	206
IV. Conclusion	228
NOTES AND REFERENCES	233
<u>PART TWO</u>	240
<u>THE EMPIRICAL STUDY</u>	
<u>Introduction to Part Two</u>	241
<u>Chapter Five: Tools and Procedures for the Field Study</u>	244
Introduction	244
I. Selection of Criteria for Classifying the Field Study Sample	244
II. Methodology and Procedures for the Field Study	263
NOTES AND REFERENCES	264
<u>Chapter Six: Social Class Membership and Cultural and Ideological Perspectives</u>	267
Introduction	267
I. Sample Profile	268
II. Image of Society	276
III. Political, Economic Interests and Class Consciousness	291
IV. People's Image of the future:	306
V. Conclusion	309
NOTES AND REFERENCES	318
<u>Chapter Seven: Class Perspectives on General Educational Issues</u>	319
Introduction	319
I. The Role of Education in Society	321
II. Evaluation of the Education System	327
III. Equal Rights in Education	350
IV. Spending on Education	361
V. Future Educational Change	377
VI. Conclusion	384
NOTES AND REFERENCES	394

<u>Chapter Eight: Class Provision and Appropriation of Education</u>	395
Introduction	395
I. Class Membership and Perceived Opportunities for Social Advance and Ambitions for Children's Education	396
II. Educational Practices	424
III. Children's Future	460
IV. Conclusion	462
<u>Chapter Nine: Conclusion</u>	476
APPENDICES	507
BIBLIOGRAPHY	548

## INTRODUCTION

Egypt is well known to the world as one of the ancient nations that made a great contribution both to the world and to civilization. That contribution includes areas of science, art, and human knowledge in general. Alexandria was one of the world's capitals of education and knowledge.

In spite of this, Egypt today is among the underdeveloped countries that look forward to the achievement of socio-economic and cultural development. A short history of Egypt is necessary in order to identify the main concern of this research, which is the influence of class power, cultures and ideologies on education policies, access and practices in the context of changing political, economic and social policies of Egypt during the modern period. These policies aimed at the achievement of socio-economic and cultural progress. Such socio-economic and cultural progress in modern times can be traced back to the period of Muhammad Aly Pasha, who ruled Egypt from 1805 to 1845. Muhammad Aly established a modern state in Egypt; he introduced modern industry, transportation and improved agriculture by digging canals for irrigation.<sup>1</sup>

Muhammad Aly understood that building a modern state required a qualified labour force, prepared on a new basis and with specializations which would be different from the traditional religious elite.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, he introduced a modern educational system which included such specializations as medicine, engineering, and military study, and he sent students to study abroad, especially in France.

Muhammad Aly's educational policy was not for mass education, access to modern education was only available to the upper and middle classes, and the masses were still educated in the traditional religious institutions such as mosques and kuttabs.<sup>3</sup> Muhammad Aly's modernization programme did not continue for very long, because he was threatened by the European powers, and not long after Egypt came under British

occupation (1882-1923).<sup>4</sup>

Egypt became part of the British Empire. The Egyptian economy was integrated into the world capitalist market after the Second World War. Egypt's industry was destroyed, and the economy came to depend on the production of cotton for British industry. The Egyptian state lost control over education. The British reduced student numbers, introduced fees for education, and gave only the minimum financial support to education.<sup>5</sup>

In 1952 the Egyptian Revolution took place under the leadership of Nasser, who is considered the first indigenous Egyptian to have ruled modern Egypt. Nasser's Revolution is a turning point in the modern history of Egypt. Nasser influenced the political, economic and social structure of the country. He introduced a programme of industrialization, land reclamation, and agrarian reform. These changes had socio-political consequences, particularly in terms of the social and political power which, before the Revolution, was left in the hands of the feudal landowners.

Nasser introduced a programme of mass education, and health and social services which have had a major impact on raising the standard of living of the people. Nasser's programme of development was undermined by the defeat of 1967, which forced Egypt to devote most of her financial and human resources to the war effort.

After Nasser's death in 1970, Sadat came to power. Once he had consolidated his power in the war of 1973, he introduced his "economic open-door" policy, which opened the Egyptian economy to western, and especially American, investment. This policy has had political, economic and social consequences. It led Egypt into political and economic dependency and widened the gap between Egypt's social classes.



In economic terms, Egypt is now faced by a growing economic problem, with a huge foreign deficit, estimated to be \$40 billion in 1988. Industrial and agricultural production are not keeping pace with the increase in population, which currently increases by 2.8 per cent annually. The general standard of living is low, and the per capita annual income was estimated at \$390 in 1978, which put Egypt among the middle income group of Third World countries.<sup>6</sup>

Education is suffering from many problems: drop-out from primary school in 1978/79 reached 5.2 per cent in the first six grades of primary education; enrolment in primary education increased to 93.9 per cent nationally. but there are great differences between urban and rural areas. Whereas in urban areas enrolment may reach 88.1 per cent, in rural areas it may only be 32.7 per cent. Illiteracy, according to the 1976 Census, was 56.3 per cent of the total population over the age of ten.

Within the national economic strategy education is expected to play a tremendously important role. From the figures above it is clear that the education system is not reaching large sections of the population, and this hinders any expected development. Education is very important in the preparation of specialized manpower, and the pursuit of full employment, which is the back bone for any programme of socio-economic, scientific and technological development. Education can also be influential in reshaping the attitudes, behaviour and mentality of the Egyptian people under the existing conditions.

## I. The Problem

The problem which the current study addresses is the influence of class political, cultural and ideological power in educational policies, access and practices. The present thesis discusses and analyses how members of different social classes in present day Egypt perceive, respond to, and evaluate

official educational policies in relation to their concrete social needs, in the context of the socio-economic and political changes during the period since the Egyptian Revolution in 1952 and also in the context of their perceptions of these changes for contemporary Egyptian society.

Education in the existing political, socio-economic and cultural conditions has failed to live up to expectations which were held for it. Under Nasser there was a movement towards free university education, a massive quantitative growth in student numbers, from 2 million in 1952 to 6 million by the end of the sixties. New specializations were created and more stress was placed on equality of opportunity. However, education faced many difficulties; it suffered from lack of equipment and finance, and could not produce the qualified manpower needed to meet the economic plan. Quantitative growth was achieved at the expense of the quality of education and coherent policy development.

Under Sadat, educational policy changed. There was an expansion of private fee-paying schools, which mainly teach subjects in a foreign language. The government has established so called government language schools, which are fee-paying and teach all subjects in a foreign language, following the example of the missionary schools in Egypt. Besides these measures, basic education was introduced, which gave technical training to children in the age range 7 to 15. The number of university students was controlled. Under these policies, which have continued to the present day, education continues to suffer from problems of drop-out and low enrolment, illiteracy persists, and there is an ever widening gap between the different classes as far as their access to education is concerned.

From this brief summary of the characteristics of policy under Nasser and Sadat (which will be more fully elaborated in Chapter Four), the thesis assumes that changes in policy

cannot be seen as a merely technical response designed to solve educational problems. Rather, they have to be perceived as being rooted more deeply in the changing politics of development policies and ideologies, and, as such, to changing class relations, class alliances, and class interests in the different periods. With this in mind, the research focuses on the influence of class cultures, ideologies and power relations on policies of education and on the provision of education for different social classes.

This line of analysis accepts that the study of class is an important, even indispensable, element in social thought. Social classes have been seen as major social forces, that arise out of fundamental, structural features of society, are expressed in the processes of social relations, and have significant and wide ranging social and political consequences.<sup>7</sup>

In order to address class influences on education, this study will work and integrate two 'levels': the level of empirical study and the level of theoretical analysis. The empirical study is concerned with the investigation of class cultures, ideologies and common sense of the parents in sixty families, which represent different class positions, by studying their perceptions of social, economic and educational matters as a basis for identifying:

1. cultural and ideological perspectives of the members of different social classes,
2. class perspectives on general educational issues,
3. how 1 and 2 influence the distribution of educational opportunities for members of different social classes, and
4. differences between and within social classes concerning the above points.

At the theoretical level, the four main issues will be analysed, as will be made clear by the theoretical formulation of the problems, in the light of the following social factors:

1. the economic and political situation in Egypt,
2. state power and class formation, and
3. the system and policies of education in Egypt.

The analysis of these factors will explore, in the context of education and culture, the multi-faceted crisis generic to Egyptian society. The main aspects of this crisis are:

- the crisis in social issues, i.e. the inability of the system to achieve a more equal and just division of wealth, power, and life chances between people,
- the crisis in political issues, i.e. the inability of the system to broaden the base of democracy,
- the crisis in economic issues, i.e. the inability of the system to run and develop the economy,
- the crisis in national issues, i.e. the inability of the system to retain its independence, and
- the crisis in civilization issues, i.e. the inability of the system to answer the questions of authenticity and modernization of the culture.

## II. The place of this research in the field of social class studies and educational research

In line with the subject of this research, two main issues will be dealt with. These are the study of social classes and the study of systems and policies of education in Egypt. Consequently, this research must identify its place in the two fields, in order to determine the points on which it will benefit from previous studies in the field, and to identify the differences between this research and other studies, in terms of the new ground and conceptualization which this research will introduce. The following is a critical analysis of studies and researches in the two fields of class analysis and education system and policies in Egypt, and will help to specify the terrain of the present study.

### (A) Social class studies in the Egyptian literature

Before proceeding to the discussion of social class studies

in the Egyptian literature, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the sociological research in Egypt in general, to illustrate the beginnings of Egyptian sociology. This will be helpful for an understanding of the limits and problems which are faced in such studies.

In its early developments, Egyptian sociology was deeply influenced by western schools of thought and approaches. This was one feature of the Egyptian cultural dependency upon the west. The introduction of western theories and western movements of thought into Egypt began early in the nineteenth century when Muhammad Aly sent his first mission to Europe to study modern science (1809), and has continued down to the late twentieth century under certain national and international socio-political circumstances, namely;

- the increasing tendency towards secularism and the integration of Egypt into the world capitalist system after the Second World War,
- the emergence of a new capitalist class in Egypt in the 1920s which sought to replace the old feudal class, and
- introduction of western modern liberal thought accompanied by the beginning of the liberal democratic movement in Egypt, which started with the 1923 Constitution and the partial-independence of 1936.<sup>a</sup>

Under these political, economic and cultural conditions, educational and sociological research has for a long time reflected western thought. For example, the functionalist theory has dominated this field of research for a long time. The influence of this and other theories was brought to the field by the first generation of sociologists and educationalists who were academically prepared in the west, notably in Britain and France.

The first department of sociology was established in the 1920s at Cairo University. The first academic effort was primarily the translation of Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, and Max Weber. Thus became established the classical sociology of

functionalism which concentrates on consensus and social cohesion. That trend of English and French sociology was dominant until the 1950s, when other sociologists started to open the door for the Marxist school of thought. With this new school of thought, academic production shifted from being confined to the translation of western theories towards empirical and applied research. These empirical research studies have introduced the problems of Egyptian society, development, and the class structure into the literature.<sup>9</sup> The following is an example of the studies which concentrate on the class structure and class formation of Egypt.

A review of class studies in Egypt shows that most of the studies are still conducted by Egyptian Marxists. These studies mainly concentrate on the structural level of class analysis, and deal with class position on the economic level. One example of these works is Gamal Magdy Hasanein's study *Class Structure in Egypt: 1952-1970*.<sup>10</sup> In this study he identifies the class structure of Egypt before and after the Revolution of 1952. He identifies the following classes after 1952:

1. the feudalist bourgeoisie,
2. the middle bourgeoisie,
3. the bureaucratic bourgeoisie,
4. the petty bourgeoisie and poor farmers, and
5. the proletariat and semi-proletariat.

Some other studies go further than the mere identification of class formation. They analyze the nature of the state in terms of class conflict to control the state apparatus and in terms of the economic and political functions of the state. Some of these studies concentrate on one social class in particular, the new petty bourgeoisie.

One example of the studies which concentrate on the political function of the state and the role of the new petty bourgeoisie is the work of Mahmoud Hussein, *Class Conflict in Egypt*. He discusses the class conflict in Egypt to control the

state apparatus, mainly concentrating upon the conflict between the traditional bourgeoisie and what he calls the state bourgeoisie, who run and control the state apparatus.<sup>11</sup>

The main point in Hussein's analysis is his critique of the new petty bourgeoisie as having no clear ideology about the way to develop Egypt. They adopted a mixed economy policy, with no clear choice between the capitalist or the socialist model of the economy. He also criticized them for not allowing for the development of the social and ideological power of the working class, and of oppressing the working class movement.

The other study which concentrates on the new class in Egypt is Adel Ghoneim's study, *The Issue of the New Class in Egypt*.<sup>12</sup> In this study, Ghoneim concentrates on the factors which led to the development and increase of the number and political power of this class after the 1952 Revolution. He identifies this class as those who occupy senior positions in the government and public sector. This includes managers, bureaucrats, technocrats and military cadres. He analyzes the factors which led to the expansion of this class, which he sees as including the increase of industrialization, and the nationalization of the big projects which demanded new cadres and bureaucrats to run. He also notes the expansion of education, which resulted in the increase of professionals, bureaucrats and technicians.

These two studies pay attention to the growing role and power of the new class in Egypt. Other class studies concentrated on the study of the economic function of the state and the political economy of Egypt. They refer to the issue of class from this perspective.

Examples of such studies are Abdel Fadil's study of *The Political Economy of Nasser*,<sup>13</sup> and Adel Ghoneim's study of *The Egyptian Model of Dependency Capitalism*.<sup>14</sup> There will be more detailed reference to these studies, particularly because of the use of a neo-Marxist approach to the study of class, and

will therefore be helpful in setting out the approach to be used in this research.

In Abdel Fadil's study he discusses Nasserist policies in the field of employment and income distribution. In order to study income distribution Abdel Fadil draws a class map of urban Egypt based on Poulantzas three economic, ideological and political criteria. The study of Egypt's class structure is not his main point, and it is not a variable for his analysis. His main focus was the study of and analysis of the state economic and policy functions.

In spite of the fact that Abdel Fadil does not make class central to his study, and for this reason is prepared to leave some of the theoretical bases for his criteria unclear, his work is important in moving away from socio-economic scales which are based mainly on occupations. By suggesting criteria for classification, he introduces a critical element, and prepares some of the ground for the present research in terms of using Poulantzas' theory of class in analyzing the Egyptian class formation and in providing criteria for the field study based on a developed theory of class.

In his Study of Sadat's economic policy Adel Ghoneim argues that Egypt under Sadat's open-door policy has moved away from a model of independent state capitalism towards a model of dependent state capitalism. He uses this framework to analyze the economic and class changes which took place in Egypt from 1974 to 1982. He concentrates in his analysis on the economic function of the state, and the class implications of the economic policies. In doing this, he employed some of Poulantzas' concepts, particularly the concepts of class and of power.

The concept of class is relevant to Adel Ghoneim's work because he studies the class implications of the economic policies, i.e. who benefits from and who is harmed by these policies. He conceptualizes class as being identified by the



three levels of economic, political and ideological. In this way his work covers relationship with the means of production, and the positions of the classes in political and ideological conflict. He uses this conception of class to criticize those researchers who, like Abdel Fadil, concentrate upon the economic level of class and use only socio-economic groups in their class analysis. Adel Ghoneim's analysis permits him to differentiate between the top bureaucrats in government and the merchants, whereas Abdel Fadil, by concentrating only on economic position, cannot. This is a point which will be elaborated in Chapter Five, where Abdel Fadil's model will be developed in detail.

Adel Ghoneim follows Poulantzas in considering power to be constituted in the field of class practices, and that class relations are relations of power. He says that political and ideological power are not mere reflections of economic power, and that the class which dominates economically is not necessarily the one which dominates politically.

Using this approach to power, he is able to criticize those researchers who, like Abdel Basett, consider that the class which dominates economically must also be that which dominates politically. In this way he is able to explain some of the phenomena in Egypt: that is, after the open door policy the emerging wealthy bourgeoisie, in spite of their economic power, could not take power politically. This will be taken up when the researcher discusses state power and class relations in Chapter Three.

In his study Ghoneim has presented a concept of class, but he does not present any analysis of class formation within society, nor of the changes which took place during the period under investigation. Although he introduces the concept of class in the first chapter of his book, he does not carry on his analysis of economic change in terms of class and its content. He tends to concentrate on economic analysis rather than sociological analysis of class. In the last five chapters

of his book he gives a detailed account of the movement of pecuniary, commercial, and industrial capital, without giving much attention to the class implications of these developments.

The review of social class studies shows that some aspects of class analysis have been neglected. This is notably the case for class culture, ideology and consciousness. These aspects have not received enough attention in sociological studies, in part because the history of these studies is very recent and more work is needed in this field. This consideration gives this research the opportunity to concentrate upon these points and contribute to the literature of class analysis and education in Egypt. These opportunity can be further clarified by noting a number of conclusions which can be taken from the literature of class formation in Egypt.

I. From the review of the previous studies it can be noticed that there is a tendency to use Poulantzas' neo-Marxist approach to the analysis of class structure and class formation, which takes into account the economic, cultural, ideological and political aspects of class. However, the studies concentrate upon the economic level. This research will try to avoid the limited economic approach. In particular, in the field study reference will be made to people's consciousness, ideologies and perspectives on social, economic and educational issues. This approach comes from adopting a concept of class which considers class not simply as a matter of economic wealth and occupation, but also as a matter of culture, consciousness and common sense. This conceptualization stresses aspects of culture and cultural power of classes as part of their political power. It also assumes that class does not exist only by the power of force and coercion, but also by the power of culture, ideology, common sense, consensus and hegemony.

The neo-Marxist approach will provide a framework for the study of complicated interactions between economic, political

and ideological levels, and the implications of such interconnections for social change. This is different from functionalist theories, which tend to equate class with professional or occupational positions and status differences, and have difficulty in accounting for social change. A more detailed discussion will be introduced in Chapter One.

II As mentioned above, most of the previous studies have conceptualized class mainly at the economic level, and when they approach the superstructure they concentrate on the political aspects and on political power of the class. They neglect other aspects of class cultural and ideological power. This is supported by a recent survey by Abdel Basett Abdel Moatty concerning social class formation and social structure studies in Egypt.<sup>15</sup> The survey found that most of the studies about the superstructure of Egyptian society have concentrated upon the study of the political aspect and on the role of different social classes and different power groups in society in the conflict for political power. The survey records no studies addressing class consciousness, ideologies or the cultural power of classes. This absence gives an opportunity to this research to break new ground by working on social class and education, and in particular on how class cultures and ideologies influence the education system.

III The identification of the concept of class on neo-Marxist lines provides the theoretical background for considering the following points:

- A the logic behind interviewing ordinary people and studying their perspectives,
- B the rationale for paying special regard to the new petty bourgeoisie,
- C the basis for choosing criteria to classify the sample of the field study.

A The design of the field study, to investigate the economic, social and educational perspectives of parents of sixty families of ordinary people coming from different class

positions, is based upon the consideration that ordinary people have their own views, even though they might not be professional or intellectual, or that they might not be able to express themselves in a sophisticated way. This belief was expressed by Gramsci: "All men are intellectuals, but not all have in society the function of intellectuals".<sup>16</sup>

Gramsci's view places stress upon the ability of human beings to perceive reality, and he says that, "Each man outside his professional activity carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a philosopher, an artist, a man of taste; he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world as to modify it to bring into being new modes of thought".<sup>17</sup>

Building the field study on that principle implies that two important points have to be taken into account in the analysis. These are:

- Considering people's perspectives does not mean that all people are equally or uniformly conscious and have a fully developed ability to perceive the surrounding reality. A range of perceptions and limitations to people's consciousness will be demonstrated.
- The study of class based perceptions, ideologies and consciousness do not imply that members of the same class will express the same perceptions and interests. Rather, different perceptions and interests between and inside the one social class are expected. This comes from the fact that people's interests are not only influenced by sharing the same material positions at the economic structure, but also influenced by living in a complicated culture where economic, social, ideological and political factors come together to generate different patterns of thinking and perceptions.

B In terms of paying special attention in the field study on a particular class, the review of the previous Egyptian studies has shown that attention has been given to the

development and expansion of the new class or what this research calls the new petty bourgeoisie, and the increasing effective role it plays in developing society and the effective position it occupies in the state apparatus. This provides an indication for this research to concentrate on this class in the field study in order to throw more light upon the consciousness and ideologies of this growing social power.

C In terms of choosing the criteria for the classification of the sample of the field study, the research will follow previous studies which applied Poulantzas' criteria for classifying Egyptian Society, for example, the study of Abdel Fadil in which he draws a map of the class formation of Egypt. However, this research will be critical of some elements of Poulantzas' criteria, which are not suitable for the analysis of Egyptian class formation. This criticism required the research to look at the work of Erik Olin Wright who has attempted to resolve the contradictions of Poulantzas' criteria.

#### (B) Educational Research

If we move to the educational research, to give an overview of the beginning and development of educational research, it can be seen that that field is dominated by western theories in much the same way as the sociological field is. Egyptian educational research was greatly influenced by pragmatism, especially that of John Dewey, and by functionalism. Pragmatism was introduced into the educational field as "the philosophy" of education, not as "a philosophy"<sup>of</sup> education.<sup>18</sup>

In the field of educational reform in the 1920s, American and British were invited to share in the reform of Egyptian education, to write books for education students, and to give lectures. Western educational thought became institutionalized through the establishment of the Institute of Education in Cairo in 1929.<sup>19</sup> The Marxist approach in educational research

was introduced in the late fifties and sixties by those who were educated in the USSR. However, this approach has not yet established itself to form a school of thought in education. Their main effort were directed towards the translation of the progressive works of Mao Tse Tung and Paulo Freire.

The other main tradition which still exists alongside the liberal one is that of Islamic studies in the field of education. The movement of Islamic studies calls for the establishment of modern Islamic studies in science. Research which has followed this approach in education is mainly historical. It does not raise questions about existing problems in education, since the tradition does not have the tools for social analysis.

Islamic studies in education do not introduce the socio-political and economic context of the Islamic era they study. They represent Islamic society as if it were influenced only by one factor, which is the Islamic faith. They neglect the influence of other factors, like the thoughts of the Greeks, Indians, and Persians, which influenced the Islamic philosophy.<sup>20</sup> Islamic studies have failed to raise, or answer, the critical questions in the field of education, such as free education, equality and inequality, and other questions which have a sociological and political nature.<sup>21</sup>

The following survey of educational research will only concentrate on the studies conducted as part of M.A. or Ph.D. research which deal with similar areas to this research, namely in the area of class and education, education policy and equal opportunities in education.

A survey of M.A. and Ph.D. research which deals with similar areas to the present research indicates that research undertaken up to now can be divided into two groups: the first group deals with educational policy, and the second with equality and inequality in education. Within this, there is a lack of class based studies in education. Where class is

addressed, it is done in a particular way which tends to exclude and marginalize a consideration of cultural issues in the politics of education. Drawing selectively from the research, this will be illustrated by taking three main studies which deal with educational policy, and then those which deal with equality and inequality in educational opportunities.

The first study, by Aly Mahmoud Raslan (1974), concentrates on the trends in educational policy from 1952 to 1970.<sup>22</sup> The study introduces a historical analysis of the main characteristics and developments in educational policy. The historical period starts with the period of British occupation (1882-1922), and continues through the period of partial independence (1923-1952) into the period since the Revolution (1952-1970). The research represents a documentary study of educational policy, and uses a range of documentary sources, including formal policy announcements by politicians and educationalists, the Constitution, and educational laws.

The researcher criticizes the policy of the Revolution for being too rapid, not being comprehensive, and for showing a lack of co-ordination between educational policy and other institutions such as the mass media. He also suggests that policies were applied without being adequately tested. The conclusion of the research is that policies were mainly affected by the personality and attitudes of the Ministers of Education, rather than by the state and general state policy. This is an almost inevitable conclusion, since the research presents changes in policy as matters of the personal choice of Ministers of Education, and neither the policies, nor the author's criticism of them, are given any social context in the descriptive analysis.

The second study, by Fathy Hussein Moabeid (1980), is about the effect of the philosophy of the 1952 Revolution on educational thought.<sup>23</sup> (This comes into the category of policy studies, because the author has concentrated more on policy

than on educational thought.)

This study follows the same broad line of approach as the previous one, i.e. a historical analysis of the development of educational policy, and it deals with the same period (1952-1970). The researcher analysed educational policy and thought in the context of the political, economic, and social situation which prevailed in Egypt from the time of the First World War. The analysis of the political system does not introduce the notion of the state, and the social analysis makes no reference to the class structure of Egyptian society. The study is heavily dependant upon official documents like the Charter of 1961, the economic plan, and the educational plan.

The conclusions of the study concentrate on educational policy rather than educational thought. The author criticizes educational policy on the grounds that:

- it has concentrated on quantitative rather than qualitative aspects of education,
- there were frequent changes of educational policy and the curriculum, and
- the educational plan did not work in harmony with the economic plan in terms of supplying sufficient people.

The third study, by Shibl Badran, concentrates on educational policy in relation to the economic plan.<sup>24</sup> The study follows the human capital theory, which stresses the importance and the significance of spending on education for economic growth. Badran studies the ability of the educational policy to meet the needs of the economic plan by providing certain numbers of trained, qualified, manpower in specific specializations. The study places this problem in the social, economic and political context of Egypt. In the political analysis, the author introduces the main political organizations under Nasser. Although he does describe the social class structure of Egypt in his social analysis, the researcher does not use class as a variable for the analysis. The study is only a



description of society, rather than an analysis of class relations. Since Badran restricted his research to the relationship between education and the development plan, and in particular to its economic aspect, and did not concern himself with studying class aspects involved in education and development, he depends upon a documentary analysis of educational policy, as set out in Ministry of Education documents, education laws, and the Constitution. It uses a statistical analysis of the number of workers demanded by the economic plan, compared with the number of qualified graduates in different specializations. The study comes to the conclusion that educational policy could not meet the needs of the economic plan in terms of qualified manpower.

These three pieces of research are mainly documentary, descriptive, and historical in their analysis. The present research differs from these three in exploring educational policy in terms of class relations, and in viewing educational policy as biased towards certain classes. The state is crucial to these processes.

The second group of studies discusses equality and inequality in education. They mainly concentrate on the study of the concept of equality as it appears in the state documents of educational policy, which is mainly concerned with access to education.

The first study, by Elewah Ibrahim Elewah, discusses the principle of equal opportunity in general education.<sup>25</sup> The aim of the study is to discuss the development of equal opportunity as a principle in the Egyptian educational system since 1952. It shows that the main efforts made by the Revolution to achieve equal opportunity took the form of generalization and unification of primary education, and the establishment of preparatory schools, and the extension of state control over education. The research refers to the problems hindering the achievement of equal opportunity:

- high illiteracy rates,

- low enrolment rates in primary education,
- the low quality of teacher training and teacher qualifications,
- overcrowded classrooms, and
- the low percentage of girls in education compared with boys,

It can be noticed that, although all these points have social class implications, the study does not mention or refer to the class structure of society, and does not use class as a variable for the analysis.

The second study, by Abdel Azeem Taha Shaaban, discusses social justice and efficiency in Egyptian education.<sup>26</sup> The study examines the basic assumptions of educational reform in Egypt since 1952, which have been intended to serve the principle of social justice. Social justice has been seen by the Revolution in distributive terms, i.e. the equal distribution of education services. In line with this, education fees were abolished and educational benefits were distributed according to the abilities and capacities of the student. Shaaban reached the conclusion that, although the Egyptian government has adopted equality of opportunity as a the aspiration for distributing social and economic goods, the education system is still dominated by educational elitism.

The review of the previous studies in education presents the critical background and the framework for this research to study class influence on education. The following critical analysis of those previous studies will concentrate on the aspects which have been overlooked by those studies and on other dimensions of class, social relations and education which this research is going to develop.

- In spite of discussing subjects which have clear relation with the class issue, previous studies tend either to ignore the class issue completely, or to mention the class formation of Egypt without integrating it into the analysis by making class the variable of the analysis. The neglect of concept of

class in educational research might be due the fact of the complexity of the concept and the lack of research on class, culture and ideologies which could provide solid ground for researchers in this field. Consequently, when those studies address an issue such as equality and inequality in education, they mainly concentrate on documentary study of education acts and laws. Since the aspect of class is neglected, this research is going to concentrate on the class issue and will study equality and inequality in a broad context of class influence and cultural power relations in education.

- The previous studies have limited theoretical approaches, where they mainly concentrate on the descriptive and historical approaches. Although these are to a certain extent useful, they cannot stand by themselves to provide a critical and comprehensive analysis of society and social class relations. Their limited approach appears in their concentration upon analyzing state documents and neglect of how the system works in reality. That is, they do not employ the methods of empirical studies which give an opportunity to link the abstract theoretical analysis and the complexity of social reality. Consequently, this research will depend on both the state documents, to study policy of education, and the practical level of how ordinary people themselves perceive and are conscious about different aspects of state policy.

- In addressing the problem of education and development, the study of Badran adopted the human capital theory, and following the theory he stressed the positive impact of investment on education as influencing development. At the same time he defined development as equivalent to economic growth and economic planning. This theory has its limits where it see development in a narrow perspective of economic growth and it sees educational expansion and growing expenditure on education as bringing equality and raising standards of living. However, experience of developing countries has shown that spending on education and the expansion of the system do not automatically bring equality, attack poverty or increase

income. This research will take another, broader and more dynamic approach which sees development and under-development in terms of international economic relations between the centre and the periphery. It will see development in its broad social dimension as influenced by class power relations, and the role of the state and the new class as essential in the process.

In such an approach education will be conceptualized in terms of its role in reproducing the unequal class society, and will present the role of class cultural power in appropriating education opportunities as it appears for the new class in particular.

- Although previous studies have concentrated on the analysis of state documents, they have not addressed the state as problematic and have not paid any attention to the analysis of the nature of state. This research will study education and development in the context of the essential and central role of the state in Egyptian society.

### III. Methodological remarks:

The discussion of previous studies in sociology and education has highlighted one important point; that is, the influence of Western thought in the two fields of sociology and education. However, illustrating that point does not mean that this research will avoid using concepts developed in the west. On the contrary, it is very difficult to analyze and to build an understanding of Egyptian society and its complexity in isolation from very important concepts such as development, class, ideology and hegemony. The point is that this research tries to develop these concepts in a way which permits their application to the Egyptian context, bearing in mind the difficulty of the task because of the differences in class formation and culture between Egypt and the Western countries where concepts developed.

#### IV. The Study Plan

This thesis will be divided into two main sections: Part One: Historical, methodological and theoretical analyses which set the broad context for Part Two: The empirical study.

Part One will be in four chapters

Chapter One: Conceptual and Theoretical Discussion. This chapter discusses the main concepts and presents the theoretical framework for the study. This includes the conceptualization of development, concept of class and the study of education in the context of development, state and social class.

Chapter Two: The Economic and Political Context of Egypt from 1952 to the Present Day. The main subject of this chapter is the analysis of the economic and political context of Egypt and the different models of development adopted in different historical periods. This introduces the background for the study of the changing policies of education under different models of development.

Chapter Three: State Power and Class Formation in Egypt. This chapter is a continuation of some themes in Chapter Two. It continues the study of the economic and political context, but goes beyond the subjects of Chapter Two to study the complexity of development in terms of mediation by class relations and the state. In that context the chapter concentrates upon investigating state power and social class, to see how much power the state has with regard to different social classes, which classes have the power to secure their own interests, and which classes are deprived of power.

Chapter Four: Education Policy in Egypt: Historical Background and the Class Nature of the System. This chapter analyzes the class nature of the education system in the context of a critical analysis of policies of education from the time of

Muhammad Aly to the present day. The analysis in this chapter will answer some questions concerning the influence of colonial rule on the education system and the extent to which formal education in Egypt could attack poverty and illiteracy, and increase social opportunities.

#### Part Two: The Empirical Study.

Part Two presents the second level of the study of education and social class. In this part, the empirical study, designed to interview parents from sixty families with children in primary education in order to study their perspectives of different economic, political and educational matters, will be reported.

#### Chapter Five: Tools and Procedures for the Field Study.

This chapter discusses in detail the criteria which will be followed to classify the sample of the field study. This necessitates a discussion of the critical basis for different types of criteria. The chapter also includes a short explanation of the tool 'the guide for interview' used in the field study, and the procedures for conducting the interviews. The details of the field study procedures can be found in the appendices.

Chapter Six: Social Class Membership and Cultural and Ideological Perspectives. This chapter analyzes the part of the field study material concerned with illustrating people's consciousness and awareness of general social, economic and political issues. People's consciousness of their own class position and the image they have of the class formation of society will be a focus of attention. This will form a broad cultural context for the following two chapters which deal with specific educational issues.

Chapter Seven: Class Perspectives on General Educational Issues. This chapter concentrates on people's perceptions of specific educational issues such as the evaluation of

educational policies under the Revolution, equality and inequality in education and the debate around free and fee-paying education. The analysis of this chapter will throw light upon some theoretical issues about class consciousness, the nature of common sense and the role of class cultural power in debate about education.

Chapter Eight: Class Provision and Appropriation of Education. This chapter is concerned with how education opportunities are distributed in reality, how members from different class positions evaluate their children's opportunities in the present and future and how they evaluate the quality of education that their children receive. This chapter will illustrate some theoretical issues such as the role of education in class reproduction and the power of class culture in appropriating educational opportunities for children.

Chapter Nine: Conclusion. The conclusion will draw upon the main theoretical issues and problems raised by this research and will discuss the main findings of the field study and suggestions for its development.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Derek Hopwood (1985) Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984 (Allen and Unwin, London) p.9
2. Saad Mursy and Saeid Ismail (1983) The History of Pedagogy and Education (Alam Al Kottob, Cairo) p.279 (Arabic)
3. Ibid: p.279  
Kuttab is a Quranic school where children learn reading, writing and arithmetic, as well as reciting the Quran.
4. The year 1923 is the year of the announcement of the Constitution and the partial-independence of Egypt. The agreement of British withdrawal from Egypt signed when Nasser was in power in 1954.
5. Saeid Ismail (1974) Issues of Education under Occupation (Alam Al Kottob, Cairo) p.147 (Arabic)
6. Ankie M. Hoogvelt (1982) The Third World in Global Development (Macmillan Press, London) p.19

7. Barry Hindess (1987) Politics and Class Analysis (Basil Blackwell, Oxford) p.1
8. Abdel Sameiaa Sayed Ahmed (1985) "The Identity Crisis of the Egyptian Educational Thought", in Educational Studies (Irregular Book, Vol.1, November)(Arabic), p.136
9. The trend of empirical and Marxist approaches were presented by Hamid Ammar and Abdel Menaem Shawki, who studied the problems of development, while Farouk Ahmed and Samir Naeim have introduced the Marxist sociology to the Egyptian literature. See a detailed review of the history of sociology in Egypt in Abdel Basett Abdel Moatty (1981) Theoretical Trends in Sociology (Alam Al-Maarefa, Kuwait) (Arabic)
10. Gamal Magdy Hasanein (1981) Class Structure in Egypt 1952-1970 (Dar Al Thakafa Lil Tibaah Wa Al-Nashr, Cairo)(Arabic)
11. Mahmoud Hussein (1977) Class Conflict in Egypt 1945-1970 (Monthly Review Press, New York)
12. Adel Ghoneim (1968) "The Issue of the New Class in Egypt", in Al-Taleaa February
13. Mahmoud Abdel Fadil (1980) The Political Economy of Nasserism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)
14. Adel Ghoneim (1986) The Egyptian Model of Dependent State Capitalism (Dar Al Mostakbal Al Araby, Cairo)(Arabic)
15. Abdel Basett Abdel Moatty (1968) Studies of Social Class Formation and Class Structure in Egypt: The national studies (The National Center for Sociological and Criminological Research) (Arabic)
16. Antonio Gramsci (1982) Notebook (Lawrence and Wishart, London) p.9
17. Ibid, p.9
18. Abdel Sameiaa Sayed Ahmed, op. cit., p.138
19. Ibid, p.136
20. For examples of Islamic studies within this tradition see;  
Ahmed Shalaby (1982) Islamic Education: Its systems, philosophy and history (Nahdat Misr, Cairo) (Arabic);  
Abdel Ghany Al Nory and Abdel Ghany Aboud (1979) Towards an Arab Philosophy of Education (Dar Al Fikr, Cairo)
21. The researcher does not mean to imply that there is no critical thinking in Islam. Muhammad Abdouh (1849-1905) introduced and promoted a new renaissance in Islamic countries by criticizing decadent traditions in the light of common sense and reason.



22. Aly Mahmoud Raslan (1974) "The Trends of the Policy of Education in Egypt from 1952 to 1970" (Ph.D. thesis, Faculty of Education, Al Azhar University, Cairo) (Arabic)
23. Fathy Hussein Moabeid (1980) "The Philosophy of the 23rd July Revolution and its Effect on the Educational Thought in Egypt in the Period from 1952 to 1970" (Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Women, Ain Shams University, Cairo) (Arabic)
24. Shibl Badram El-Ghareib (1982) "The Economic, Social and Political Dimensions of the Egyptian Education in the Period from 1952 to 1967" (Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Education, Tanta University) (Arabic)
25. Elewah Ibrahim Elewah (1974) "The Principle of Equal Opportunity in General Education in Egypt" (M.A., Faculty of Education, Ain Shams University, Cairo) (Arabic)
26. Abdel Azeem Taha Shaaban (1981) "Social Justice and Efficiency in Egyptian Education: A critical investigation of the bases of Egyptian Educational Philosophy" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A.)

**PART ONE****HISTORICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS**

## CHAPTER ONE

## CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

Introduction

In this chapter the researcher intends to define the main concepts that constitute the theoretical framework of this study. As explained in the introduction, this research is concerned with the study of education and social class in urban Egypt. The study is not only concerned with the unequal distribution of educational opportunities between the different social classes but also with the cultural and ideological power of social classes in influencing access, control and demand on education and in the perspectives of members of social classes on education and society.

The study of educational policy and popular perspectives, as explained in the introduction, will be analyzed in the light of the study of social, economic, political and cultural factors represented in the study of the economic and political situation in Egypt and the central role of the state in introducing economic, social and educational policies.

In order to study these points at the theoretical level and at the empirical level, represented in the analysis of popular perspectives, a study of the main theories and concepts used in the analysis is needed. The main theoretical and conceptual points which this chapter deals with are:

Firstly, The conceptualization of development and of developing countries.

Since this research is concerned with the position of Egypt as one of the third world countries which is looking to develop and change her economic, social and political reality, it is important to identify the characteristics of the developing countries and the main problems and challenges they face on the internal and international levels. It is important

as well to introduce the different conceptualizations of development and underdevelopment through the discussion of the two main traditions in the field, the Marxist and the functionalist, which have both influenced the understanding of education in the developing countries.

Secondly, the concept of state.

The study of the concept of state adds another dimension to the previous point about underdeveloped countries. This dimension is represented in the role of the state in leading the development programmes in these countries, in particular after these countries got their independence from colonial rule and started to carry out economic, social, cultural and educational programmes of development. Consequently, it is essential to analyze the nature of the state in these countries in terms of the role it plays in development and how it is different from that in advanced capitalist countries, and in terms of the state power in relation to different social classes. This will lay the ground for the study of the economic and political policies in Egypt under Nasser and Sadat which will be presented in Chapter Two. It is important, also, in the study of class formation in Egypt in relation to state power which is the subject of Chapter Three, and the analysis of educational policy in Egypt as presented and influenced by state power and the power relations between the state and social classes which is the subject of Chapter Four.

Thirdly, social class.

There is a need to study the concept of class and to present the concept as it will be used at two levels. These are; first, at the level of the general theoretical analysis which will be guided by a conception of social classes as dialectically constituted at two levels; a) the level of the 'objective' dynamics of economic relations, and b) the 'subjective' relations of consciousness, ideology and common-sense; and second, related to both a) and b) above, a more

specifically technical level of social classes as a system of categories for classifying respondents in the sample of the field study of this research. This implies using objective criteria to locate people at certain places. The discussion of the criteria will be fully presented in Chapter Five, while in this chapter the main focus will be on the theoretical issues of objective and subjective relations.

Fourthly, conceptualizing education in the context of development, state and social class.

Education will be conceptualized in the context of development and developing countries, to show the challenges and contradictions which underdeveloped countries face in their policies of education and how theories of development and modernization have influenced the understanding of education in these countries. Education will be analyzed in relation to state and social classes, so that the analysis will present education as one of the ideological state apparatuses, working to reproduce the unequal class relations and to reproduce class cultural capital.

#### I. Developing Countries: Main Characteristics and Theories

There is no agreement on terminology for developing countries. Some authors refer to them as 'underdeveloped', 'poor', 'backward', or as the 'third world'. As there is no agreement about the terms, it is very difficult to determine the main characteristics of the developing countries. There is no agreement about the nature or the number of socio-economic indicators necessary for a country to be included with a certain group.<sup>1</sup> However, some general characteristics can be identified, bearing in mind that there are some exceptions and differences between individual countries.<sup>2</sup>

Developing countries are compared with developed countries which are classified in this category because they have a relatively high per capita income, and significant degree of

industrialization, as well as their high levels of living, good standards of health, housing and welfare.<sup>3</sup> By definition, the developing countries lack most, if not all, of these characteristics.

Developing countries have other characteristics, like a high rate of population growth, low levels of urbanization, low standards of health and education, poor housing and nutrition and limited social service provision.<sup>4</sup> (See Appendix 1.)

Until the 1950s and 1960s underdevelopment was usually seen as a socio-economic situation: developing countries lack industry, capital, technology and educated workers.<sup>5</sup> This view introduced a simple model of development for the third world countries. According to that model the underdeveloped countries have to acquire the missing elements, perhaps from the rich countries through the economic aids.<sup>6</sup>

This model does not take into account the complexity of the economic, social, political and international relations of these countries. In reality, the nature of international relations of exploitation between the third world and the developed countries does not allow for equal relations and equal exchange, with the poor countries being permanently disadvantaged in the market place.

This model of development was accepted inside the Third World countries, by the leaders and intellectuals, especially in the immediately post-colonial period, and is still accepted by many leaders who wish to maintain the status quo and existing inequalities.<sup>7</sup>

It became increasingly obvious to these countries by the end of the sixties, with the limited results of this simple one dimensional model of development, that economic growth is only one aspect of development. Development is seen at the present as a comprehensive process which include social aspects i.e. the issues of equality in society, and political aspects i.e.

allowing for more popular participation.

In fact there are different views about development, and whether it is the simple acquisition of the missing economic aspects or is a more complicated process of economic, political and social changes conducted in the context of international relations. These two views have their theoretical roots in two different theories, that is, the functionalist and the Marxist theories. Each has produced a theory of development, the "modernization" and the "dependency" theories.

From a functionalist view point, social change is seen as increasing social differentiation of the social system, as a result of which the system is going to adapt to its environment.<sup>8</sup>

The theory places stress upon equilibrium, harmony and integration, while conflict is seen as disfunction. This question of equilibrium has become the target of criticism. It is difficult to explain social change from this perspective, because it is mainly concerned to explain the status quo in society.

This functionalist perspective of social change has become the base for one of the dominant development theories which is the modernization theory. The theory sees the path to modernity as one way, which is the western one, i.e. the replacement of traditional economic, social and political systems by western ones. If we look at the writings of some western writers, for example, Eisenstadt and Shils, they see modernity as the western model of economic development i.e. the capitalist system supported by its political system of liberal democracy and its modern technology.<sup>9</sup> In Shils' words "modern means being western without the onus of dependency on the west, the model of modernity is a picture of the west detached in some way from its geographical origins and locus".<sup>10</sup> Shils speaks of the western model of modernity as the only model possible

for the developing countries: he speaks of the independence of these countries, but he does not explain how countries which are part of an unequal capitalist system can be independent.

In general the modernization theory gives the following image of political, economic and cultural systems which should be followed in the developing countries.

In economic terms, these countries should make their industry grow, using capital intensive technology, concentrating their decision making, developing a high degree of specialization of the work force, and becoming integrated in the international capitalist market.<sup>11</sup>

In fact, industrialization and integration in the international capitalist system do not necessarily lead to equality, raise standards of living, or provide jobs for the majority. In some cases, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Applying advanced technology may well create unemployment.<sup>12</sup>

In an analysis by World Bank officials, it was clear that the nature of the capitalist development in the Third World countries will only allow a relatively small sector of active population to be engaged in economic activity, while it marginalizes the rest and keeps them outside the capitalist sector as an industrial reserve army.<sup>13</sup>

In political terms, the modernization model means the replacement of the traditional religious ethnic authority by a single secular national authority and the development of democracy. This image of the desirable political system can be criticized and argued against. The western democratic political system is not the only suitable system for developing countries, which might need one central party and firm state control in order to be able to face and tackle development issues without being distracted by the needs to



win votes.<sup>14</sup>

In cultural terms, modernization theory refers to the psychological aptitudes that individual members of modern societies are likely to have.<sup>15</sup> The modernization theory builds the character of individuals on Parsons' functionalism which takes into account the modern economic, technological complex and its high degree of occupational specialization. According to these circumstances, the theory favours attitudes that are functionally specific, achievement-orientated, universalistic and affectively neutral.<sup>16</sup>

According to this view, the individual has to accept occupational and geographical mobility, meritocracy, tolerance of impersonal working conditions, a desire for a nuclear rather than extended family.<sup>17</sup>

In fact, the talk about changing behaviour and attitudes from traditional to modern as a part of moving toward modernity, is not simple and linear process as suggested by the modernization studies. One example of these studies is Inkeles and Smith who present a direct causal link between five sets of variables. These are: modern institutions, modern values, modern behaviour, modern society and economic development.<sup>18</sup> They believe that these variables are connected in a chain, and that once you start one you reach the end, which is the economic development.

In reality these relations are more complicated and vary from one society to another. And what may be considered a factor of backwardness, hindering development and modernization, in one society, may be seen as a positive factor in a different society and under different circumstances. In Japan, where a traditional commitment to the Emperor and family relations were among the factors which promoted economic growth, while in the west they were seen as obstacles.<sup>19</sup>

Modernization theory has given a model of development based on copying the socio-economic structure of the west. The theory could not explain the backwardness of the periphery of the capitalist system, especially of those countries which followed a western model but were still underdeveloped. The theory does not show the exploitation of these countries by the west: that exploitation took the form of draining human and material resources from the underdeveloped countries to the centre of the system.

These critiques have paved the way for another perspective which stemmed from the neo-Marxist approach, which presents an interpretation of Marx's original ideas and thoughts.<sup>20</sup> An example of this approach in the field of development is dependency theory. The theory has its roots indirectly in Marx's thinking about colonialism and the stunting effect it sometimes has on development. However, Marx never extended his ideas to deal with underdevelopment.<sup>21</sup> The theory was originally presented by Paul Baran,<sup>22</sup> and has been further elaborated by Andre Gunder Frank.<sup>23</sup> They explain the underdevelopment of the Third World in relation to the world capitalist system.

Dependency theory has concentrated on the unequal economic, cultural and military relations between developed and underdeveloped countries. According to dependency theory, the world can be divided into the core and the peripheral countries. These countries are seen as part of a global system dominated by a capitalist economic network.<sup>24</sup>

In this perspective, the global economy is conceived in terms of a hierarchy of economic centres, which, through military, political and trade arrangements, extract an economic surplus from subordinate, peripheral economies. So, the backwardness of the peripheral economies is a consequence of their dependence on various core economies and not only the effect of their poor resources, illiteracy, traditionalism or political instability.<sup>25</sup>

This theory has been criticized for concentrating on the factors external to these societies and neglecting their internal structure in relation to underdevelopment.<sup>26</sup> This critique of dependency theory has some validity, because it concentrates on one side of the causes of underdevelopment which is the relations of exploitation, but it does not tell us very much about the internal aspects which might hinder development plans. Even so, this theory has opened the way for fresh dimensions and possibilities for a new style and direction for development, different from the capitalist model, that is, the independent model of development, which is based upon self-reliance, co-operation between developing countries and the satisfaction of the basic needs of the masses.

This model does not reject all western analysis of the underdevelopment, but it shows how some elements of these western models might not be suitable for the circumstances of these countries. For example the proponents of this model argue that introducing the western model of family, behaviour and of life, which were presented as a coherent package by Inkeles and Smith, may not be a necessary element in development in culturally diverse countries.

They start by attacking the belief that the developing countries can follow and repeat the model of the capitalist countries, which is based on the capitalist ownership of means of production, the free market and the profit motive as one of the most important incentives for progress, as well as on other cultural aspects of developed capitalist societies.<sup>27</sup>

The industrialized countries have been able to achieve their progress under certain privileged circumstances, which are not available for the Third World today. These are:

- the technological advancement which these countries could exploit for increasing their domination over the international market,

- the exploitation of the resources of the third world countries,
- the exploitation of the working class at the beginning of the industrial revolution, and
- the important factor of discovering new territories and using their resources, as in the case of Australia.<sup>28</sup>

These factors are not available for the Third World today which has to look for an alternative. That alternative, which is presented by the Third World itself, is based on the redistribution of wealth and national income, taking major procedures like nationalization, securing a minimum level of wages and providing the basic need in both education and health. All these elements are part of a socialist model which is based on two foundations; the collective ownership of the means of production and national planning.<sup>29</sup>

This model presents some principles for the Third World to follow. Some of principles are political in nature, like popular participation in development through the broadening of democratic practices. Others are cultural in nature, like self-reliance, and the collective self-reliance between the developing countries and the economic principle of satisfying basic needs for the majority of poor population.<sup>30</sup>

The circumstances which traditional Marxist views suggest are necessary for the building of socialism in the Third World countries might not be available in these countries today. The traditional Marxist view addresses the possibility of building socialism in the advanced capitalist societies. However, in Third World countries today there is a strong tendency to argue that the political conditions in the periphery of the capitalist system of the present time are suitable for building socialism, because of the increasing oppression of the capitalist system to the masses of these countries. This presents a historical opportunity for these countries to mobilize the masses against that system which divides the world into a centre and periphery, where the centre dominates

the periphery and is still extracting surplus-value and preventing these countries from building their national, central economy.<sup>31</sup>

Achieving this in reality is not an easy task for the developing countries, who have made some efforts previously to confront the capitalist world, asking for more equal relations. In 1955, they asked for the stabilization of international prices and demand for their primary exports.<sup>32</sup> In 1964 the Third World countries faced the capitalist world for the first time as a group in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. They demanded economic reforms, including price stabilization for primary products, market access for manufactured goods from developing countries and greater financial transfer from the rich to the poor.<sup>33</sup> These demands were repeated and elaborated in the call for a new international economic order in 1974.<sup>34</sup>

In spite of these international collective movements by the Third World countries, they are still under the pressure of their huge debts to the United States and the west, and conflicting internal class interests. In spite of the wealth of some Third World countries, like the oil countries, they tend to send their capital to be invested in the U.S.A and the west but not to the Third World. Independent development needs the continuation of the solidarity of the Third World countries, which itself is not easily established and maintained.

The discussion of these different trends in development has two tasks: the first is a general task of setting a broad context for the particular Egyptian model of development. It will show how Egypt has moved from the independent model to the dependent model and establish the basis for understanding how it is difficult to get out of the trap of the foreign debt. This will be discussed further in Chapter Two.

The other task is to discuss different trends of development theory in order to aid the understanding of the central point of this research, which is the social, political and cultural aspects of education in contemporary Egypt. The link between development and education will be made clear later in this chapter, when the influence of different theories of development will be discussed. These theories include the Marxist and the functionalist approaches to the policy of education and the conceptualization of education in the developing countries.

Later in the chapter it will be explained how human capital theory emphasizes the importance of investment in education as having a direct and significant impact on economic growth. It considers that the failure of many ex-colonial nations which achieved independence after second world war was related to the absence of mass education at the primary level and specialist education at the secondary level. The theory argues that education was a major source for economic growth in the west.<sup>35</sup>

While modernization theory looks at education in its national setting, dependency theory look at education from an international perspective. It shows the influence of the colonial role in the educational systems of the ex-colonies and it sees education as a form of economic and political control.<sup>36</sup> It also shows how the education system in the Third World helps to produce and reproduce patterns of cultural dependency on the West. This research will also show the effects of cultural diversity and differentiation associated with education.

## II. The Concept of State

The study of the state contributes to our understanding of developing countries. For underdeveloped countries, the role of the state is essential in leading and carrying out the task of development. Consequently, the concept of the state will

be elaborated with an emphasis upon the state's role in development programmes. This role is different from the role of the state in advanced capitalist societies.

This discussion will lead into a study of social class, and the class nature of the state in terms of its relative autonomy, and its role in satisfying or attacking the interests of certain classes. The specific analysis of the Egyptian state will lay the ground for the study of the economic, political and educational policies in Egypt, and the analysis of class formation in Egypt in relation to state power.

#### (A) The History of the Egyptian State

The state and the central government in Egypt both have a long history. According to Iliya Harik, "It is hard to think of any time in known history when Egypt did not have a central government of some sort or another".<sup>37</sup> This statement asserts the fact that Egypt has built one of the oldest civilizations in which the central government played an essential role.

The central government in Egypt was always a natural necessity. That is to say, in order to organize the irrigation and for military reasons to defend the country against the threat of nomads. It is the geo-political vulnerability of Egypt which led to the building of both the central government and a strong army.<sup>38</sup> Because of this geo-political position, Egypt had what is known as a bureaucratic military oligarchic state.<sup>39</sup> This type of state has been present since Muhammad Aly (1805-1848) who established a large army, administration and civil service. The importance of the state, central government and the army have continued throughout the recent history of Egypt.

#### (B) State Capitalism in Egypt

After the 1952 Revolution the state and central government

have carried out economic, political and ideological functions. Since that date the role of the Egyptian state in these aspects became very obvious, especially after the establishment of the state sector in 1961. The state control over economic activities in Egypt has produced what can be described as "bureaucratic state capitalism".

What the term "state capitalism" means is different in developed and underdeveloped countries. In developed countries it means, "the restriction and regulation of economic spontaneity stemming from the existence of private capital".<sup>40</sup> State intervention in the underdeveloped countries has a different starting point and level from that in developed countries. The state in underdeveloped countries intervenes, "to liquidate economic underdevelopment, that is, to eliminate the factors hindering the rapid development of the productive forces".<sup>41</sup> So the function of state capitalism in developed countries is to regulate the already highly developed productive forces, while in underdeveloped countries, "It must rather be aimed at *creating the conditions for rapid growth of the hardly developed productive forces*".<sup>42</sup>

In the case of Egypt bureaucratic state capitalism emerged in 1956. It took the form of state intervention and the establishment of the state sector. Since 1956 state capitalism in Egypt has engaged in distinct economic activities. In the early period state capitalism established holding companies designed to compete with one another in production, sales and profits. By 1961 this type had been replaced by sectoral monopolies. Competition was eliminated. New goals appeared, such as job creation, planned production and planned prices, and guided industrial strategy with minimal support for the private sector.<sup>43</sup>

In the early stages, Egyptian state capitalism was characterized by an increase in the number of bureaucrats who were needed to carry out the state programme.<sup>44</sup> It was also characterized by the intervention of the military into



political and economic affairs, which resulted in tensions with the bureaucrats. This tension came from the military view that their coalition with the bureaucrats was to work mainly in the economic field, while political control should continue to rest entirely in their hands.<sup>45</sup>

The major change in the activities of state capitalism came in 1974 after the introduction of the open door policy. As will be explained in Chapter Two, the role of the public sector was at that time undermined, and the private sector and foreign capital were given opportunities. The implications for internal and external relations of this policy will be fully explored in Chapter Two.<sup>46</sup>

The movement and the change of state capitalism must be understood in terms of the internal socio-political situation, in the class power relations, in international relations, and in economic relations.<sup>47</sup>

In the case of Egypt the change in state capitalism was influenced by internal and external factors. These, in brief, are the pressures of the long established capitalists and top bureaucrats to weaken the state's hands on the economy, the conflict inside the military which led to the defeat of 1967, and the emergence of the oil wealth which changed the political and social map of the Arab World, where the conservative Arab states emerged as the key political power.

### (C) The Class Nature of the State

As explained above, in underdeveloped countries the intended role of state capitalism is to remove obstacles to development. In doing that the state has to deal with private and foreign capital, either by supporting or restricting them. At that point, the class content of state capitalism appears, because by supporting or restricting capital the state may take a position which supports the interests of one class to the disadvantage of another. While all classes may benefit in

absolute terms when the economic situation is improving, class conflicts may arise with regards to how those benefits are distributed relatively between classes, and the state cannot be regarded as neutral.

For a full understanding of this class content of the state, and the relationship between state power and social classes which will be fully explained in Chapter Three it is necessary, first, to look at some general theoretical issues, before proceeding to the analysis of state power and class formation in Egypt. The theoretical focal point for the class content of the state is the issue of state relative autonomy.

#### (D) State Relative Autonomy

The idea of state relative autonomy has been clarified by Poulantzas, who tried to overcome the crudeness of the Marxist assertion that the state is always, simply and everywhere the instrument of the dominant class. Poulantzas explains that in capitalist society, "The state is supported by certain dominated class of the society, in that it presents itself, through a complex ideological process as their representative. It encourages them in various ways to work against the dominant class or classes, but to the political advantage of the latter. In this way it succeeds precisely in making the dominated classes accept a whole series of compromises which appear to be their political interests".<sup>48</sup>

It is clear from that statement that the state is usually supporting the capitalist interests and advantages against the dominated classes, but the state has to 'compromise' in conducting such a relation. This means that the state might occasionally sacrifice the interests of the dominant class. The state can fulfil this role so long as it enjoys "a *relative autonomy* in relation to one or another of its fractions or to one or another of its particular interests".<sup>49</sup>

It is clear that the relative autonomy of the state is associated with the existence of a dominant class or classes. For that reason, some writers, like Tlemcani, refuse to entertain the idea of relative state autonomy in the Third World, because they consider Poulantzas' discussion only relevant to advanced capitalist society, where there is a 'functional' correlation between the state's relative autonomy and the existence of a hegemonic class. Tlemcani continues to argue that as far as the post-colonial state is concerned, such a relationship has never been established.<sup>50</sup>

In addition, he argues that the existence of the power of the army in many third world countries, and the structural heterogeneity of the army, has maintained a precarious balance of class forces. He suggests that the army has not been subordinated to the particular interests of the propertied classes because of the absence of an organic social class in third world countries. Hence the state, in his view, tends to appear as floating above society.<sup>51</sup>

This view seems to attribute absolute power to the state. Tlemcani speaks, for example, of the state acting as a lawmaker, investor, planner, importer, exporter, manager, owner, judge and police officer. For him, the state in post-colonial society is everything.<sup>52</sup>

In fact this kind of view presents a simple picture of the state which does not help in making a sociological analysis of the role of the state. It makes it impossible to explain the evolution of the system in third world countries in terms of class and class struggle for economic, political and cultural domination.

Following a similar line of argument, Waterbury supports the view of the autonomy of the state in third world countries in relation to social classes. In arguing the case for the autonomy of the state, Waterbury draws upon the support of Alfred Stepan and Kay Ellen Trimberger. Stepan discusses the

Latin American case. He explains state autonomy in cultural terms, and maintains that the Catholic Church exercises secular power, while the state should achieve the good of the whole society, independent of any of its constituent parts.<sup>53</sup>

Waterbury draws an analogy between this trend in the Catholic culture in Latin America and the Islamic culture, which in his view mirrored this value, where there are, "Muslim umma or community believers whose secular leaders God has charged with managing the collective interests of its members".<sup>54</sup>

The case which Waterbury describes might have been the case of the Islamic World throughout the Muslim dynastic history, but at the present time the situation is different. Because we cannot speak of one unified Muslim Umma, sharing the same type of state, and the establishment of the state in Egypt has a different history. That is, at the present time we can speak of different types of state in the Arab World. For example, there is the type of the Imam - chief system or the alliance of chiefs and imams (Saudi Arabia), there is the traditional secular system, or the bureaucratic military system. So some countries might keep the old Islamic system, but this is not true for all Arab states.<sup>55</sup>

The other view which Waterbury presents to support his idea is that of Trimberger, who deals with the autonomy of some of the Third World countries, including Turkey, Egypt and Peru, which, by the fact of their military rule, represent "revolution from above".<sup>56</sup> Waterbury comments that it is not the case that military rule will necessarily create autonomy.

Waterbury presents his own account of state autonomy in some developing countries, by arguing that these post-colonial states were already autonomous. The states in these societies were constructed by colonial powers, yet in spite of this some indigenous classes shared in ruling society, even though they remained dependent and did not constitute a hegemonic class.<sup>57</sup>

In the case of Egypt, the discussion of state relative autonomy, especially after the 1952 Revolution, should take another direction, i.e. not whether the Egyptian state is relatively autonomous or not, but rather the extent of state power over political, economic and social decisions with respect to other social powers in society during different historical periods.

In that sense, one has to agree with Fitzgerald, who argues that, for developing countries, in order to achieve capital accumulation in critical periods of development, such as the transition from agrarian- dominated, export based growth to that of an import substitution industry, the state, "... must possess a certain degree of autonomy relative to the dominant elite, particularly the traditional agrarian and financial groups on the one hand and foreign interests on the other, and seek support among other classes because in restructuring capital it must inevitably jeopardize the interests of those fractions of capital that benefit from the existing order of things, *even though in the long run the effect is to allow capitalism to develop more effectively*".<sup>58</sup> On this view, the state has relative autonomy, and determines its position from the national and foreign bourgeoisie, and may at times hit their interests while supporting them at others. The trend of relative autonomy depends upon internal and external circumstances.

The most useful approach would seem to be that state relative autonomy in third world countries, taking into account that state power in respect of the political, economic and social issues, and in relation to social classes, differs from one period to another, i.e. the amount of relative autonomy that the state enjoys is not constant but changes over historical periods.

The significance of state relative autonomy, i.e. the class content of the state, will be more fully identified in Chapter Two, where the political and economic policies of Egypt under

Nasser and Sadat will be discussed, along with the social consequences of these policies in terms of their effect on different social classes and class alliances.

The degree of state relative autonomy in relation to different social classes will be the main point for the discussion of state power and class formation in Chapter Three. The discussion will reflect differences, in degree and amount, in the relative autonomy that the state enjoyed in different historical periods under Nasser, Sadat, and at the present time.

This will be illustrated through the discussion of the main political and economic decisions taken in different historical periods. These decisions are expected to be in favour of some classes and against the interests of others. The discussion will show when and how the state enjoyed a great amount of autonomy, and when it became weak and threatened by the power of the bourgeoisie.

### III. The Concept of Class

A central feature of this research is concerned with the study of social class and education, and so it is necessary to identify what is meant by class. The identification and conceptualization of class will be studied as a complex matter, where social class will be identified at two levels:

- A - The objective level of the dynamics of economic relations, and
- B - The subjective level of culture, ideology, consciousness and common sense.

(A) - The objective level of the study of social class:

The study of social class at its objective level will address some main points. The two main traditions for conceptualizing class are the Weberian and the Marxist approaches. The neo-Marxist approach will be given special attention, in particular the work of Nicos Poulantzas in class analysis and the useful elements of his analysis to the understanding of the class structure of Egypt will be identified. There will be a reference, also, to the analysis of class as a category system, in order to classify the sample of the field study. However, the criteria of the classification will not be fully discussed in this chapter, since a full discussion will be presented in Chapter Five.

(i) The Concept of Class in the Weberian and Marxist tradition:

As a part of conceptualizing class, it is important to ask first what class is. Class has different meanings in different sociological approaches. In some views, like those of Warner, Parsons or Williams, classes refer to categories of people occupying common positions within a status hierarchy.<sup>59</sup> Class may also be seen as conflict groups determined by their position within authority or powers structure; this view is adopted by Dahrendorf and Lanski.<sup>60</sup> In the Weberian tradition, class is seen as a group of people with common market position in competition with each other, while the Marxists have defined class in terms of common structural positions within the social organization of production.

The Weberian and the Marxist theories represent the two main traditions in the sociological study of class. Both theories have been used to look at class in the relational term i.e. they define classes by their structured social relationship to other classes. The difference between the two approaches is in the way that they conceptualize this relation.<sup>61</sup>

### The Weberian analysis:

The Weberian class analysis in terms of market relationships concentrates on the study of relations of exchange between sellers and buyers of various kinds.<sup>62</sup> In defining class Weber says: "In our terminology, 'classes' are not communities, they merely represent possible and frequent bases for social action. We may speak of a 'class' when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, insofar as (2) the component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possessing of goods and opportunities for income and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets. This is 'class situation'".<sup>63</sup>

### The Marxist Analysis

The Marxist class analysis uses a different approach. As explained above, Weber sees classes as phenomena of the commercial life of society, while Marx sees them as phenomena of the organization of production, which in turn locates class conflict in the structure of production rather than in social exchange.

In comparing Marxist and Weberian class analysis, there is an important tendency in sociological studies to see early Marx and Weber as having identified class on the same basis.<sup>64</sup> That is to say that both of them identify class according to three dimensions; namely, private ownership, production and struggle. This view states that Weber has identified propertied and propertyless classes, and he allows for a similar differentiation of individuals into social strata within these groups according to different types of property, services and skills that people possess or control.<sup>65</sup>

Marshall, who defends this view of the similarity between Marx and Weber, explains that the analyses differ on one point, which is that for Weber class is identified in market



relations, and it is the chances distributed by the capitalist market which distinguish the various classes. In contrast with this, for Marx the crucial point is that because of the labour theory of value, the contract between capital and labour in the market is not an exchange of equals, and that symmetrical exchanges in the market are an illusion behind which surplus value is extracted from labour power in the process of production.<sup>66</sup>

According to the present writer, Marx clearly identified the principal difference between classes, that the owner of the means of production, and those who sell their labour power in the market, are completely different, and that the market favours one group to the disadvantage of the other.

Marxist analysis is based on the fundamental assumption that economic relations play a basic role in structuring other relations, and that with economic relations the social relations of production structure both technical relations of production and the social relations of exchange.<sup>67</sup> The classical Marxist analysis considers the economic level as the base which affects and determines other social relations. This view has been revised by neo-Marxists, who have moved to consider other aspects of the 'superstructure', such as culture and ideology, as having a role in both social change and class relations.

This approach is represented in the 'base / superstructure' debate, where a number of Marxist theoreticians ('culturalists') have rejected the classical ('structuralist') Marxist notion that, "the economic infrastructure determined in a kind of one to one correspondence all aspects of the so-called superstructure, law, religion and ... arts".<sup>68</sup> In this approach the economic does not represent the determinant factor in structuring social relations and other aspects of culture and ideology. Ideological and cultural aspects also have an influential role in social transformation.

This debate about the relative role of base and superstructure has contributed to class analysis in terms of developing cultural analysis which gives an important role to the study of human consciousness, ideology and the role of human agency in changing social reality. Consequently, this move towards giving the political and ideological levels an effect on their own has political and theoretical implications, partly because it considers class consciousness as an important factor in social change. Traditional Marxism, on the other hand, considers that the economic level is dominant, and that changes in the mode of production lead to social change.

This point in Marxist theory is problematic, since it raises the question of whether political changes are caused by active class struggle, or whether they are the effect of mechanical transformation from the dominance of one mode of production to the dominance of some other mode of production within a given social formation.<sup>69</sup>

The political consequence of this debate is that, if we consider that political change and revolution are caused by class struggle, this means that it is important to study class at its cultural level, i.e. to study class consciousness. If we consider that transformation happens at the level of the mode of production, this puts less stress on class consciousness and does not emphasize the cultural and ideological organization of the masses for social change. The implications of this debate to this research will be discussed later.

The contribution of the neo-Marxist approach to the class analysis by their reconsideration of the relationship between base and superstructure will give this research the opportunity to carry out a complex class analysis in which social classes will be considered at the objective level of economic structure, and at the subjective level of class consciousness, common sense and ideology.

So, a neo-Marxist approach to class analysis will be adopted, in particular the work of Nicos Poulantzas because of its general contribution to Marxist class analysis. This will be discussed more fully below. Taking into account that Poulantzas did not only contribute to the general theoretical analysis of social class, but also presented criteria for classifying and locating people in certain class positions, it will play an important role in this research in classifying the sample of the field study. The criteria will be discussed in general terms in this chapter, and will be fully analyzed in Chapter Five.

Moreover, Poulantzas' analysis has some applicability to this research because Poulantzas' approach to the study of class and of the criteria for class stratification has attracted the attention of a number of Egyptian researchers, who have adopted his approach in their analysis of the class structure of Egyptian society, as was explained earlier in the Introduction. A particular set of issues for Poulantzas, his Egyptian interpreters and this research revolves around the intermediate classes, the new middle classes.

#### (ii) Poulantzas' Contribution to Class Analysis

Poulantzas has identified classes as, "groupings of social agents defined principally but not exclusively by their place in the production process, i.e. in the economic sphere. The economic place of the social agents has a principal role in determining social classes. But from that we cannot conclude that this economic place is sufficient to determine social classes. Marxism states that the economic does indeed have the determinant role in a mode of production or a social formation; but the political and the ideological (the superstructure) also have a very important role".<sup>70</sup>

Poulantzas' contribution, according to this definition, comes from his consideration of social classes not as mere reflections of the economic structure, but as determined by

a complex structure of three levels; the economic base, the political and legal structure, and social consciousness or ideology. This combination of three levels arises from the Marxist debate over base / superstructure, as discussed earlier.

The debate about the relative role of base and superstructure led Poulantzas to reject the idea that only the economic base is determinant of social formations, and to introduce his notion of three linked levels into class analysis. He supposed that the political and ideological levels have relative autonomy, and have their own effects, while the economic level has determination in the last instance.<sup>71</sup> In other words, class structure imposes limits on class formation, class consciousness and class struggle. However, this does not imply that these four sub-concepts within the general concept of class are definable independently of each other, or that they only have 'external' inter-relationships. This means that classes have structural existence which is irreducible to any of these aspects.<sup>72</sup>

Related to the debate about base and superstructure and the place of class consciousness and ideologies in class analysis and the study of social change, Poulantzas was aware of the problem referred to earlier, of how social change occurs. That is, whether social change occurs at the level of the mode of production, at the level of class practice, struggle and consciousness, or as a result of some combination of these, where the influences are mutually interdependent.

Poulantzas proposed a solution by differentiating between the analysis of the impact of class on the mode of production level (theoretical level) and its impact on social formation (the concrete level).

This distinction has the important function of making it possible to say that in a concrete social formation, political practices have an effect on structural change.<sup>73</sup> The

implication is that the abstract analysis of the mode of production cannot be a substitute for the study of concrete social formations. The study of social formations is very important because it is the only level at which we can study the class struggle and its role in social transformation.<sup>74</sup>

The debate concerning the role of social classes in social transformation, i.e. whether social changes are the cause or the effect of social change, has been more fully elaborated by Hindess and Hirst, who argue that, "the conditions of existence of the mode of production are secured, modified, or transformed as the outcome of specific class struggles<sup>↑</sup> of the economic, political and ideological levels of the social formation".<sup>75</sup>

The consideration of political and ideological factors in class structure and social change has implications for this research, where it deals with class practices and consciousness. In this context, the place of the popular masses is very important, because, if men and women are determined by powers outside their control, there would appear to be little point in organizing for political action. On the other hand, if one adopts a theoretical position which suggests that class conflict can indeed change society, then it will be important to study class relations and class power in specific social formations, and the organization of the masses for political action.

This point is important to the cultural analysis of this research, which will adopt a dialectical perspective in analyzing social classes and their practices and influence in education. This will be put into practice through the study of people's consciousness and experience in the empirical study. The research will not simply concentrate on that level of people's consciousness, however. It will consider the determinants which work outside people's consciousness also, for example, the influence of the state, economic and political structures, which are expected to have an influence

upon people's experience, and constitute significant structural centres for action.

Poulantzas does not only contribute to the critical debate about the conceptualization of social class. He also defined criteria to identify different social classes. These criteria take into account the economic, political and ideological aspect, and can be used to differentiate four distinct social classes. These are:

1. the bourgeoisie who own the means of production,
2. the proletariat consisting of wage earners, productive workers who do non-supervisory work,
3. the new petty bourgeoisie, including white collar employees, technicians, supervisors and civil servants, and
4. the traditional petty bourgeoisie, like independent artisans and shopkeepers.

Poulantzas' criteria help to draw the boundaries and to identify the relative size of each class. A major reason for interest in the relative size of social classes and the boundaries between them arises because in the case of Egypt the lack of distinction between the working class and the new petty bourgeoisie was masked for political reasons during the sixties. Even without this complication, identifying the boundary between these two classes is no simple task. This situation, which prevented the working class from playing their political role will be explained in Chapter Two.

Beside Poulantzas' criteria for identifying social classes and drawing boundaries between the working class and the new petty bourgeoisie, he also undertook the task of identifying and defining classes to which insufficient attention had been given by other sociologists. This is developed in his theses on the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie, crucial as 'intermediate classes'.

Poulantzas' differentiation between traditional and new petty bourgeoisie will be discussed in detail, since the identification of the latter class is essential because of the role and position it occupies in Egyptian society. This class is seen as the vehicle for economic, social and political modernization because of its technical capacities and modern education.

#### How the new petty bourgeoisie emerged:

Poulantzas explains that the new petty bourgeoisie has emerged from the development of capitalism which led to the increasing number of non-productive wage earners. An example of this group is commercial and bank employees, those who are called "white collar".<sup>76</sup>

The identification of the class position of this group is problematic. In the views of some, they are classified as part of the bourgeoisie. This is based on the consideration of the kind of work they do, since in modern industry they do the supervising and the managing of the work that the bourgeoisie used to do for themselves.<sup>77</sup>

Another view is that this group belongs to the working class, on the grounds that they are wage earners, and they are in opposition to the bourgeoisie since they lack the ownership of the means of production.<sup>78</sup>

A third view identifies this group as "middle class". According to this view, this group is seen as a third force in society. Poulantzas explains that on this view the middle class faces the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the working class, and can be seen as the mediating pillar and the basic "stabilizing" factor in bourgeois society.<sup>79</sup> Poulantzas criticizes this view of middle class in terms of its theoretical and political conceptions. He suggests that the "middle class" cannot be seen as a homogeneous group, and that it is loosely defined in terms of income criteria and criteria

of mental attitudes and psychological motivations.<sup>80</sup>

According to the same view, the middle class is supposed to be the result of the dissolution of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and the movement of large sections of the working class to the bourgeois position. This class is supposed finally to form the stew in which classes are mixed together and their antagonisms dissolved.<sup>81</sup> For Poulantzas, using the term "middle class" in that way means that classes no longer exist, since, for him, classes exist at different positions, and on the two levels of economic relations and ideological and political class struggle. Therefore, claiming that issues of class antagonism can be simply dissolved would be to deny the existence of social classes.

After introducing these different views, which place the new group of wage earners with the working class, bourgeoisie or middle class respectively, Poulantzas argues that this group does not properly belong to the bourgeoisie, nor to the working class. They belong together with the traditional petty bourgeoisie (small scale production workers and owners, independent craftsmen and traders), and with them form one class, the petty bourgeoisie.<sup>82</sup>

Poulantzas says of the new petty bourgeoisie:

"It is in no way destined to follow the traditional petty bourgeoisie, threatened with extinction, and that its development and expansion are conditioned by the extended reproduction of capitalism itself".<sup>83</sup>

This classification of the new wage earning group with the traditional petty bourgeoisie needs further discussion. First of all, it is accepted that this new group does not belong, as Poulantzas argues, to the bourgeoisie, since they do not own the means of production. At the same time they do not belong to the working class either, since, according to Poulantzas, not all wage earners are working class. Poulantzas identifies this group of wage earners from the working class



by political and ideological factors. That is, although the two groups are wage earners and do not own the means of production, still, in terms of the social division of labour, the new group is maintaining and exercising power over the working class through their supervisory work, and by extracting surplus value from the workers for the benefit of the capitalists. So they represent the political domination of the capitalists over the working class.<sup>84</sup>

In ideological terms the division between mental and manual labour is not just a technical division of labour. Rather, the division is essentially based on political and ideological relations. Since the new petty bourgeoisie's work is legitimized on the basis of knowledge and knowing the secrets of work, while the working class is excluded from this knowledge, this situation ensures that the working class is not only exploited economically, but politically and ideologically as well.<sup>85</sup> In fact, this point about the difference between the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class with respect to knowledge represents the main difference between the two classes at the cultural and ideological level, which also has to do with the kind of education the two classes receive. However, this point about the education of the two classes is not central to Poulantzas' analysis, which gives an opportunity for the present research to do more cultural and educational analysis to investigate how the educational system contributes to this cultural and ideological exploitation.

Poulantzas agrees that it might seem strange to identify two groups, the traditional and the new petty bourgeoisie, who have different places in the economic relations, as belonging to the same social class.<sup>86</sup> Elsewhere, he argues that the traditional petty bourgeoisie do not even belong to the capitalist mode of production, but rather belong to the simple commodity form of production which was historically the form of transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production.<sup>87</sup>

The question is how Poulantzas, after making these points, can classify the two groups in the same class. He justifies it by arguing that this class unity is a consequence of the relationship of both the traditional and the new petty bourgeoisie as the class who struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. He explains this by saying that, "If the traditional and the new petty bourgeoisie can be considered as belonging to the same class, this is because social classes are only determined in the class struggle, and because these groupings are precisely both polarized in relation to the bourgeoisie and the proletariat".<sup>88</sup> This means that they both share the same interests and ideologies in relation to their position from both the working class and the bourgeoisie.

Poulantzas explains the ideological unity between the new and the traditional petty bourgeoisie in terms of the following three points:

- 1) They are both ideologically anti-capitalist since they are exploited by capital. They believe that the way to change society is through institutional changes and not in revolutionary ways.<sup>89</sup>
- 2) They are both scared of moving down to the position of the working class. Their aspiration is to move up to the bourgeois position, and they believe that this move depends upon individual ability.<sup>90</sup>
- 3) As an intermediate class polarized between the bourgeoisie and the working class they tend to see the state as an inherently neutral force whose role is that of arbitrating between the various social classes.<sup>91</sup>

Poulantzas has introduced these factors to show the unity of the two groups. However, his argument can be theoretically criticized on the basis that the two classes occupy different economic positions, and that they also differ in terms of the influence of the expansion of monopoly capitalism on them, and finally that they have different interests in the expansion of the state. These theoretical points will be more fully

elaborated in Chapter Three with reference to the case of Egypt.

The study of Poulantzas' concept of class and the criteria he presents for social stratification emphasize the importance of conceptualizing social classes at both the objective level of economic relations and at the subjective level of politics and ideology. This means that the three aspects of economics, politics and ideology do not exist independently from each other. In the following point the ideological aspects of class will be focused upon, taking into account the fact that the distinction between the objective and the subjective in the analysis is only made for the purpose of the study. The study of the ideological aspect of class conceptualizes class as a matter of consciousness, culture and common sense, which presents itself in the image that a social class has of society, and that individual people have of their positions and possibilities, as well as of those they identify as being "like themselves".

(B) - The subjective level of study of social class

The debate over conceptualizing social class at the objective or the subjective level has resulted in two approaches. These are the objective approach, which takes the form of the study of class relations as defined in terms of market or economic relations, and the subjective approach which interprets these relations in terms of group awareness and consciousness of these relations, i.e. the concepts and images they have of these relations. The perspective adopted by this research attempts to combine the two approaches, and to give a theoretical justification for that where it argues that concentration on the objective aspect of the analysis will displace human agents and their understanding social reality, and present a mechanistic version of class analysis. At the same time it argues that concentration solely upon the subjective aspect of the analysis could only present a descriptive report of social relations.<sup>92</sup>

This approach will give the opportunity to avoid the inadequacies of the sharp distinctions between the objective and the subjective. It also gives the opportunity for more consideration of the cultural aspect of class formation as it appears in the dynamics of culture, ideology and common sense. The cultural level of class will be developed in the field study of this research, where social perspectives and class consciousness are studied.

The field study will examine members' of social classes images of society in terms of their views about the past, present and future of society. They were asked to describe society before and after the Revolution of 1952, in terms of the class structure of society and the size of those classes. To study their present consciousness of the present movement and interaction in society, they were asked to identify their own class position, to discuss changes which took place in Egyptian society in the seventies, and which social classes benefited and which were harmed by those changes. They were also asked to describe their expectations for the movement of society in the future. People were asked to evaluate the system of education in the past, present and their own expectations for the future. People were asked to express their perspectives on some key issues in education such as free / fee-paying education, and the level of spending on education, which were expected to reveal a diversity of interests.

In order to understand the diversity of people's images of society and why and how people from different class positions and inside the same class express different views and interests, one needs to understand the culture, ideology, consciousness and common sense.

(i) Class Culture

In modern society the most fundamental groups are social classes and the major cultural forms are class cultures. Each individual is born not into a set of particular economic relations, but into a particular set of institutions and relations i.e. in 'culture'.<sup>93</sup>

The word 'culture' refers to, "that level at which social groups develop distinct patterns of life, and give expressive forms to their social and material life experience".<sup>94</sup> In its social definition, culture is a, "description of a particular way of life, which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour".<sup>95</sup> The analysis of culture from such a definition means the clarification of the meanings and values implicit and explicit in a particular way of life, i.e. particular culture since culture includes a wide range of knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals and customs.

In other words, culture refers to quite concrete relationships, the actual ways of life which become distinctive to a group or a class in a particular period. It is the beliefs common sense, ideas which actually inform their practical collective social life.<sup>96</sup>

These definitions of culture, which mainly speak of 'class cultures', give signals that one would expect, since culture is the product of a class society which consists of more than one fundamental class. Consequently, there are more than one set of ideas or cultural forms in society.

There will be more than one tendency at work within the dominant ideas of a society, and more than one major cultural configuration in play at a particular historical moment.<sup>97</sup> Since 'cultures' are the product of a class society, and classes are unequally ranked in relation to one another in terms of their productive relations, wealth and power, so

'cultures' are differently ranked and stand in opposition to one another in relationships of domination and subordination.<sup>98</sup>

The talk about cultures in the plural does not mean that people do not share some aspects of the 'same' culture. In fact, groups which exist within the same society and share some of the same material and historical conditions do understand and to a certain extent share each others 'culture'.<sup>99</sup>

At the same time, the talk of dominant and subordinate cultures, does not mean that the subordinate culture will be passively subordinate to the dominant culture. They will enter into struggle with, seek to modify, negotiate, resist or even overthrow its reign or its hegemony. In addition, they may coexist for long periods, negotiating the space and gaps in it.<sup>100</sup>

In order to understand such a complicated and contradictory cultural configuration, in which social classes, who may share and understand each other's culture, but also express different values, views and consciousness and in general represent a diversity of images of the social reality, the concepts of ideology, common sense consciousness and hegemony will be necessary. They are essential conceptual tools for the analysis of the complexity of culture.

#### (ii) Ideology

Ideology is one of the most 'difficult' concepts in social science, which has been given different meanings and functions in different theoretical approaches.

In the classical Marxist view, Marx identified ideology as false consciousness. This false consciousness arises from the division of labour, i.e. the division between the commercial and the industrial, between mental and manual labour, and between capital and labour. These divisions have been

translated by Marx into a division between private interest and communal interest, which is to say a division between the dominant and the dominated.<sup>101</sup> The division of labour leads to contradictory classes, and on the ground of that contradiction Marx has conceptualized ideology, which in his sense was formed to defend the interests of certain social classes. In this sense, the traditional Marxist view of ideology is that it is false consciousness, or a system which distorted reality in order to serve the interests of the dominant classes.<sup>102</sup> In Marx's words, "Ideologies are not only false ideas, but they match particular interests. Ideologies claim to be the truth, but reflect the needs of specific groups."<sup>103</sup>

In other approaches, which, in part, will be adopted here, ideology is seen in a positive sense, as the world-view expressing the values of a particular social group.<sup>104</sup> This sense of ideology means that one can speak of 'ideologies' in the plural, as the opinions, theories and attitudes formed within a class in order to defend and promote its interests.<sup>105</sup>

The positive sense of ideology, linked to the political class struggle, has been used to describe the challenge to the ruling class ideology, which in itself is ideology too. The concept of ideology here indicates the point of view of each class and refers to class political ideas, rather than to the making of contradictions.<sup>106</sup>

From that definition of ideology, it follows that ideology does not exist only at the theoretical and political level of discourse. It also exists and represents ordinary people's beliefs, ideas, and views. It presents their practical consciousness of every day life, i.e. their 'common-sense'. This level of ideology, is the subject of Part Two of this research, since ordinary people's views, beliefs and ideas about social, economic, political and educational matters are studied.

At this level of ideology, i.e. the level of common-sense and people's daily experience, people's views, beliefs and ideas are not usually unified. Rather, they are different and often contradictory. To understand this, one needs to look at how people's consciousness and ideologies are formed.

Marx explained how consciousness is formed. He said:

"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness".<sup>107</sup>

According to this, thought and its production cannot be separated from one's world, and forms of consciousness are forms of life that are social and historical in nature.<sup>108</sup> So, according to the above view, if consciousness, ideologies or common-sense are formed in a certain group or social class who occupy the same position in relation to means of production, i.e. have the same material position and are influenced by conditions of existence, then these conditions will produce one prescribed form of consciousness.

It is true that circumstances and conditions do set real limits on how ideas and meanings develop and change, and they also affect which ideas become 'common' and take popular root.<sup>109</sup> However, one cannot unproblematically 'read off' what the ideology of a class must be simply from knowing its material conditions.<sup>110</sup> This is one justification for the approach of this research in introducing an empirically based study of people's ideologies which will examine the extent to which members of the same class position and from different class positions agree or disagree about some economic, social and educational aspects of society.

The differences in people's ideologies come from the fact that they live in an circumstances more complicated than just being influenced by their relations to the economic base of society and by their place at that material level. Rather, they live in culture, which means that concrete forms of economic,



social, ideological and political life come together to generate distinctive patterns and arrangements.<sup>111</sup>

The broad complicated sense of culture in which people live, and generate different views and ideas, does not mean that belonging to a certain social class has no influence on the formation of people's consciousness and beliefs. Rather, it means that classes are 'of crucial but not final causal importance' in forming beliefs.<sup>112</sup>

At this point of understanding ideologies and beliefs as formed in a class position, Marx introduces a contradictory theory of ideology in which he presented people on the one hand as having conflicting interests and views, and on the other hand as influenced by the single system of beliefs and views of the dominant class.

Marx draws a link between the beliefs and the interests which stand behind them in a dynamic way. That is, he does not refer to a unified system of beliefs and interests, but to conflicting interests between individuals and individuals, between individuals and the state, between individuals and the social classes of which they are members, between different elements within a social class, between different aspirations of classes and between social class and social class.<sup>113</sup>

This picture of conflicting interests that Marx introduced can be seen in people's every day life and in the way they debate different social, economic, political and educational matters, examples of which will be introduced in the field study of this research.

The picture of conflicting beliefs and interests is only one aspect of Marx's theory of ideology. He also argued that all social classes are incorporated within the single belief system which is appropriate to the interests of the dominant class.<sup>114</sup> This picture of ideology as having integrative capacities has predominated in sociological analysis,

supported by the comparative stability which can be recognised in the capitalist social order in western societies.<sup>115</sup> This view of ideology presents society as over-integrated and it may conceal the fact of class conflict. To explain that, an interpretation of Gramsci's concept of hegemony will be adopted here.

### (iii) Hegemony

By this concept Gramsci explains how the political and economic interests and supremacy of a particular group is maintained. He explained that these interests and supremacy cannot be created and maintained by force alone. It demands 'consent' and persuasion, intellectual and moral leadership as well, which Gramsci called hegemony and identified as;

"an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society, in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all tastes, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in the intellectual and moral connotations".<sup>116</sup>

The introduction of hegemony in this sense explains the situation in western capitalist societies where there is the use of consent, often more in the form of acquiescence than consensus, rather than coercion by the state. This is explained by the fact that civil society, which includes a complex institutional array of political parties, schools, churches and mass media, has developed alongside the political society, which includes state, army, government and legal system.<sup>117</sup>

The development of the civil society in western countries has made it predominant over political society. Hence, hegemony and consent are more likely to be used by the state than coercion, though it is always there 'in reserve'. Gramsci

explains that the relationship between state and civil society varies from one society to another. In some cases the state is more developed in regard to civil society. In this case one may expect more use of coercion by the state organs.<sup>118</sup> This point has to be taken into account when one applies the concept of hegemony for a sociological analysis of societies like Egypt, where, as a peripheral society, the civil society is relatively poorly developed in relation to the state and the use of coercion by the state organs is not uncommon. However, this does not mean that the state only functions by coercion, since the state itself is an instrument of hegemony as well as coercion, and the main point is the particular balance in the use of both means.

The concept of hegemony has developed from a matter of political relations of domination between states to the relations between classes. That is to say, it is not limited to matters of direct political control but seeks to describe a more general domination which includes, as one of its key features, a particular way of seeing the world and human nature and relationships.<sup>119</sup>

Hegemony is an aspect of ideology in that it is seen to depend for its hold not only on its expression of the interests of a ruling class but also on its acceptance as 'normal reality' or 'common sense' by those who are in practice subordinated to it.<sup>120</sup> This analysis of hegemony and the way that hegemony is formed and works in society and works as common-sense, may help to explain why, in Egypt, the masses of the working class appear to give their support to government policies which may well be harming their interests. This leads one to ask whether hegemony is always successful in gaining the consent of the subordinate classes. In fact, Gramsci was aware that hegemony should not be understood as producing over-integrated societies. That is why Gramsci said that the hegemony of the capitalist class is not complete, and hegemony does not achieve perfect control of subordinate classes.<sup>121</sup>

Gramsci explains the incomplete dominance of hegemony by his explanation of the nature and the way the working class consciousness or common-sense is formed and how it works. Gramsci explains that workers do not give complete support to the capitalist class since workers have two consciousnesses. On the one hand is a consciousness determined by life-experience and interests which unite workers "in the practical transformation of the real world" where this kind of consciousness is implicitly oppositional. On the other hand, they have another consciousness formed as a whole traditional way of thinking, informed by the dominant culture and "uncritically absorbed".<sup>122</sup>

From this way of forming working class consciousness, Gramsci explains the contradictory nature of 'common sense' or the 'thought of the masses'. For Gramsci, common-sense or human consciousness is viewed as a complex combination of 'good' and 'bad' sense, a contradictory realm of ideas and behaviour in which elements of 'accommodation' and 'resistance' exist in an unsteady state of tension.<sup>123</sup>

In other words, common sense for Gramsci is made of subjectivity characterised by forms of discursive consciousness imbued with 'insights' into the social reality as well as with 'distorting' beliefs that mystify and legitimate the reality.<sup>124</sup> So, the contradictory nature of common-sense gives the two possibilities for the working class to accept and co-exist or reject and try to overthrow the hegemony of the dominant class, which explains why hegemony is never complete.

The explanation of the nature of common-sense as contradictory, may explain the contradictions in the working class ideologies and consciousness with regard to economic, political and educational aspects of social relations, which will appear in the analysis of the field study material.

From the example of taken for granted attitudes, the benefit of applying concepts of ideology and hegemony can be seen. Ideology as a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, and hegemony as the partial domination of one ideology over others, expose those taken for granted beliefs to critical analysis. What people perceive as normal and natural matters in economics, politics and education, will be rather analyzed as hiding certain relations of domination and subordination in society. The dynamics of ideology, hegemony and common-sense do not only explain the general aspects of social relations in economics and politics, but they also can be found to exist in the educational system. They exist and function at different levels in the system, which range from the specific practices inside the classroom and in the school knowledge, to the general level of education and the reproduction of class relations and cultures, which will be more fully elaborated below.

#### IV. Education in relation to development, state and social classes

In this part of the theoretical discussion of education, one can concentrate on certain educational aspects which relate to the subject of this research. This research is concerned with education and social class. It deals with the quantitative unequal division of education opportunities to some extent, and the qualitative aspects of class cultural and ideological power relations and how they work to influence the policy of education, both at the level of the state, where policy is formulated, and at the level of class ideologies and practices, represented in people's perspectives of education and other social, economic and political matters.

In order to study the main concern of this research a theoretical discussion is needed in this chapter, to lay the ground for the coming detailed discussion of education in Chapter Four which will be concerned with the study of the system and policies of education in Egypt, especially the

crisis of education in Egypt as one of the developing countries, the influence of colonial rule on education and the role of the state in educational policy and the class nature of the system. For the coming discussion, theoretical tools will be needed to analyze the material of the field study which is concerned with how people from different class positions perceive economic, political and educational matters.

In order to study these questions, two main theoretical issues will be addressed in this chapter. These are:

- (i) The educational crisis of developing countries, and
- (ii) Education and class reproduction.

The discussion of these two points will use the previously discussed theoretical and conceptual framework of state, class, ideology, hegemony and common sense.

#### (i) The Educational Crisis of Developing Countries

In the 1960s there was an international trend which placed great confidence in formal education as the main means of promoting development. According to this view, developing countries have invested in the expansion of education and have set ambitious enrolment targets at the different levels of education. Developing countries have invested in education to achieve economic, political and cultural objectives.

In economic terms, spending in adult literacy programmes and primary education was expected to enhance social mobility. Secondary education graduates were needed to perform technical and administrative functions, university graduates were needed to supply professional and managerial skills needed in both the public and private sectors.<sup>125</sup>

In cultural terms, spending on education was seen as a contribution to public socialization and cultural homogenization, expanding the use of national languages and deepening the understanding of national history.<sup>126</sup>

When setting these targets, developing countries thought that more schooling would create equal opportunities for millions of people to develop their individual abilities to their maximum potential and escape the vicious circle of poverty.

Behind these ideas stands a theory which has dominated educational thought in developed and developing countries, namely, human capital theory.

Human capital theory is an expression of modernization theory in the educational field. As explained in earlier in this chapter, modernization theory has its roots in the structural functionalist perspective and sees modernization in terms of change in the central value system. From this perspective, to be modern means resocialization of the population and the selection and allocation of talented and trained manpower which will be able to work in the modern sector of the economy.<sup>127</sup>

According to the theory, education in western countries is a major source of that amount of economic growth which cannot be attributed to the growth of fixed capital only, and that investment in human capital is a necessary component in

achieving economic growth.<sup>128</sup> Consequently, education is considered important in increasing labour's productivity by embodying in the labour force increased skills and knowledge. At the same time, school develops individuals to their fullest potential, and increasing the amount of schooling for individuals will increase their wages and reduce social inequality.<sup>129</sup>

These targets, which the expansion of formal education was expected to achieve, have not been fulfilled. The view that formal schooling would achieve economic growth, social equality and upward mobility for the poor have all come under criticism. However, the critique of expansion of education in developing countries does not mean that it was a complete failure, because it could achieve some positive results: it opened up new opportunities for millions of disadvantaged young people and gave them upward mobility. Education could also increase the domestic reservoir of middle and high level educated manpower, who are essential for developing these countries further.<sup>130</sup>

In spite of these successes, other facts about education and development in third world countries came under criticism. That is, although these countries have increased their GNP, increased educational enrolment and participation rates, economic and educational development was lopsided and inequitable.<sup>131</sup>

The inequitable pattern of economic and educational



development is clear in the rural / urban gap, where, according to the rural surveys, 40 per cent of the rural population live in absolute poverty with very poor health, food and educational facilities.<sup>132</sup>

Even in the cities, where the main modernization projects were constructed, and the modern sector was established with modern industry, government, buildings, schools and colleges, showed signs of inequality. The modern sector, with its educated labour force, capital intensive industry, and high wages, still constituted only a small fraction of the whole urban economy. The majority of the city dwellers are uneducated and unemployed, who have moved from smaller cities and rural areas to the large cities. Urban poverty is no less than rural poverty.<sup>133</sup>

In addition, these countries still suffer from high drop-out rates, high levels of functional illiteracy among primary and secondary school graduates, and a high percentage of school failures. These elements constitute the picture or surface of the crisis of development and education in the developing countries. Behind this picture lies a complicated range of factors which add to the difficulties of these countries. Some factors indigenous, and can be seen in the dilemma that the governments of these countries face in determining their educational and developmental priorities. This dilemma is mediated by class power and class relationships in society, and demands reference in this analysis of the role of the state and class relations influencing educational policies.

The other factors, which add to the problems, are external, and can be seen in the fact that most of the developing countries are ex-colonial countries, and their education system was, and still is, influenced by colonial rule. Colonial influences take different forms, ranging from the direct control of the developing country's educational system, to indirect influence through cultural domination and foreign aid.

#### **State, Class and Choices for Educational Policy**

In the analysis above, it was argued that the state in developing countries is not completely autonomous, but is influenced by class power relations in society. In that respect, the state has relative autonomy. This point about the class content of the state is essential to the analysis of education policies, since these policies cannot be regarded as neutral, or as working for the interests of all classes. Rather, these policies and choices in education will be seen as formed in tension and conflict between different class interests. Example of these difficulties emerge when the developing country's leadership has to choose between the expansion of expensive secondary and higher education, and the relatively cheaper expansion of the first nine years of schooling. The complexity in the choice has economic, political and class origins. That is, in order to spend on expensive secondary and higher education the government would need to shift resources to education from other sectors of the

budget such as agriculture, housing or health, which is not an easy matter.<sup>134</sup>

That is, in spite of the fact that these sectors of health, housing and agriculture are parts of the state apparatuses, it cannot be assumed that they all have a common purpose or that they operate in the same way and in harmony. In reality there are differences in interests and in methods of state apparatuses which result in tensions between different apparatuses.<sup>135</sup>

On the other hand, shifting resources towards primary level education would mean cutting back on secondary and higher education, which is demanded by the upper and middle classes. Restricting these levels of education means that the state has to face the anger of these classes, who are important for political support.<sup>136</sup>

The choice between these alternatives will be associated with the model of development adopted by the country, and this again will reflect the complexity of educational choice and policy. In this process, state, development, class and power relations are all involved. To explain this, it will be assumed that a country will adopt a development model in which economic growth is the main target for the development plan, spending on higher and upper secondary education will be reduced, more spending will go to primary and vocational education, and there might also be a reduction in the percentage of the national budget going to education.<sup>137</sup> If the

main goal of the development plan is to improve the standard of living for the poor majority of the population, spending on education will be more oriented towards adult education programmes, providing funds for rural areas where villagers can organize themselves to improve their circumstances, and in urban areas, planners might set quotas for the proportion of students from different income groups who could be admitted to higher education which would be consistent with their proportions in society as a whole.<sup>138</sup>

The choices which are related to the development model and the ideology which stands behind these models, create political problems, since any reduction of higher education will affect the upper and middle classes, and the choice of spending on adult education means that the state is ready to change the social order and give more opportunity to the poor. This seems a difficult political choice, since it hits the interests of the upper and middle classes.

From these examples it seems that educational choice and policy are not easy or straightforward to design and apply, and that the national government in developing countries is faced by tremendous challenges. Part of these challenges is external, and is represented in the influence of colonial rule on their education system.

#### The Influence of Colonial Rule on Education

Most of the developing countries were under colonization. At

the present time, most of them have achieved their independence, but they still suffer another kind of colonization which binds them to their old colonizers.

The new relations no longer take the form of direct, armed occupation, but they take the form of economic and cultural relations. The new colonization relations are established through education systems and the schools established by the colonizers. In spite of independence, the colonial education system still exists in some third world countries.

The colonial power created in the third world countries different kinds of education, marked by class differences. It created a duality between two systems, the indigenous system (the traditional one) and the modern one established by them. The schools established by the colonizers were closed for the majority of indigenous people, because of the selective admission practices and the high cost.<sup>139</sup>

Colonial schooling did not aim at developing and improving the traditional occupations like agriculture and the handicrafts. It created a dual system of traditional and modern occupations. Colonial education was tied to employment outside indigenous occupations, and prepared the colonized for limited roles in colonial institutions.<sup>140</sup>

According to these conditions, and the privileges that this kind of colonial education could give, it was expected that the indigenous people would send their children to these

schools, where it was considered as a means of social mobility and getting a well paid job.

By this duality in the educational system, colonial education can be considered as a logical extension of class relationships within the colonized country, and it involves, in this case, class relations between countries. Altbach and Kelly argue that education under classical colonialism was modeled on the working class variant of the metropolitan education.<sup>141</sup>

The model of education that the colonizers introduced to the elite of these countries was in almost the same relationship to the metropolitan working class education as that working class education was to the elite education within the metropole.<sup>142</sup>

That was the situation and type of education introduced under direct colonization. After liberation, the colonial relations still exist in the educational field, and represent one mechanism of what has come to be called neo-colonialism.

The cultural and educational relationship between independent countries and the advanced countries represent another dimension of the centre/periphery relations. The western countries could constitute "centres" of international educational and intellectual life, by virtue of their wealth, advanced technology and well established educational institutions and research centres. The third world countries

are at the "periphery" and dependent upon the centre in getting modern education and technology.<sup>143</sup>

Dependency in the cultural and educational field leads to the important question of knowledge dissemination in the world, especially between the centre and the periphery. The advanced world has control over knowledge, by virtue of having the scientific institutes, the big publishing houses, journals and the ability to finance all these activities. The third world is still dependent upon the industrialized countries, or in Altbach's terms suffer from, "an unfavourable balance of intellectual payments".<sup>144</sup> This means that these countries import more knowledge than they export. Under these conditions, the third world is not allowed easy access to knowledge.

The third world countries suffer from many obstacles which hinder them from overcoming this situation. A shortage of finance does not allow them to establish advanced research units, limits the number of publishing houses, laboratories and library facilities, and limits the market.<sup>145</sup>

In fact, these very particular problems of technology, transforming knowledge, and lack of finance, lead these countries to accept foreign aid.

#### Foreign Aid

Because of the shortage of resources, most third world

countries welcome foreign aid in different fields, whether economic, military or cultural. The cultural and educational aspects of aid are no less important than other aspects, such as military and economic. The importance of this field led Philip Coombs to consider the educational and cultural aid as the "fourth dimension of American policy", i.e. it has the same importance in foreign policy as the political, military and economic dimension.<sup>146</sup>

The countries of the centre gain more benefit from this aid they pay to the third world countries, since it helps them to perpetuate their hegemony over these countries, not by force but through ideological and cultural domination.<sup>147</sup>

Most aid is channelled through international organizations like the World Bank and Unesco, but it is very well known that these organizations are influenced and under the control of the west and the United States. Third world countries are trapped in a vicious circle of shortages of finance and equipment, and they have to depend upon the west and the USA. Most research about the third world itself has been conducted by the west and western intellectuals. In order to learn about their own societies, scholars from the third world must learn from the west, who can in this case represent and form the facts about these societies in a way that serves their interests. Hence the developing countries remain suffering from the vicious circle of economic and cultural dependency.

In summary, in this part of the chapter which dealt with the



educational crisis in developing countries, the analysis concentrated on the critique of the functionalist approach, which considered that the expansion of formal education would in itself allow for attacking poverty, would provide people with jobs, and push the modernization process forward. Reality was very different, since these countries still suffer from a great deal of unequal educational opportunities, and increasing poverty in urban and rural areas.

The analysis has focused upon two important factors which reveal the structural roots of inequality and the difficulties these countries are facing. These two factors are

- the challenges faced by the independent states in their developmental and educational choices and their class implications, and
- the impact of the colonial rule on education opportunities and the quality of education provided to people in these countries.

The consideration of the state and class power relations as the structural factors which lie behind the educational crisis in developing countries takes the analysis of education to a step further. Aspects of education crisis, like illiteracy, drop-out, low level of enrolment and school failures will not be regarded -as a functionalist perspective would do - as technical matter which requires strengthening planning methods and improving teachers training and salaries.<sup>148</sup>

Rather, from a Marxist perspective, these aspects will be

analyzed in a wider perspective which involves institutions and power relations in society, and which considers education as working against certain groups in society, limiting their opportunities in developing their abilities. In this respect education does not necessarily lead to upward social mobility but it may work to reproduce the existing class structure and social inequalities. The analysis of education in this direction will bring to the discussion concepts of ideology, hegemony and 'common sense' as employed in the process of reproduction.

#### (ii) Education and Class Reproduction

It has been mentioned earlier that in order to study the influence of class power, culture and ideologies on education policy and practices a theoretical framework is needed.

Part of this framework must deal with the theory of reproduction in education. This point is important for the later analysis, in Chapter Four, of the system and policy of education in Egypt which will address the question of the extent to which the education system in Egypt could work as a means of providing the possibilities for social mobility for the masses or whether it works as an apparatus for reproducing the class structure of the Egyptian society. The following is an analysis of what is meant by reproduction and a critique of the negative and positive aspects of conceptualizing education in that sense.

The concept of reproduction comes from Marxist theory, which explains the cycle of production-reproduction. Reproduction is not confined to the economic field, but extends to the re-creation of the physical, social, political and ideological conditions for the function of a given society.<sup>149</sup>

The Marxist view of reproduction refers to the case of the contested reproduction of a society's fundamental relations, which enables society to reproduce itself but only in the form of a dominant and subordinate, i.e. antagonistic, not functional, social order.<sup>150</sup>

This kind of reproduction at the political and ideological level, with its antagonistic nature, brings to the analysis of the dynamics of this process concepts of ideology and hegemony as well as the role of the education system.

As one can understand from the early discussion of hegemony, hegemony is a set of practical activities and a world view through which the ruling class exerts its dominance. The function of hegemony is to reproduce on the ideological plane the conditions for class rule and the continuation of social relations of production.<sup>151</sup>

At this point, the educational apparatus as involved in ideological work can contribute to the process of creating hegemony and in the reproduction of social relations of production. Althusser explains the process of reproduction and how hegemony and ideology are involved. In that respect he

stressed, following Gramsci, that no class can hold state power without exercising hegemony over and in the ideological state apparatuses, where these apparatuses work to mystify the workings of social formation through ideology.<sup>152</sup>

In this sense ideology exists in apparatuses and institutions. That is, according to Althusser, it has material existence in the form of rituals and practices which exist in particular social institutions, and education is one of them.

So, the education apparatus is an important means for the ruling class to represent their ideas. However, this is not a simple task and does not mean that education is simply controlled by members of the ruling class, as will be explained in detail later.

In creating and maintaining the hegemony of the ruling class, the role of the state appears, since the state is the sphere where the organisation of class power takes place. Since the state does not function by coercion alone, but by consent as well, the state plays an important role in the creation of hegemony. Hegemony is not merely concerned with economic domination but also with ideological domination and with the maintenance of spontaneous consent through both economic concessions and through political and ideological organisations.<sup>153</sup>

Education is one such organization, and Althusser considers it as part of the ideological state apparatuses which enable

the state and the ruling class to function by consent.

From this conceptualization of ideology and state, Althusser explains how education as part of the ideological state apparatus plays its role in the reproduction of the productive force, i.e. labour power and the relations of production. According to him, it is not enough to ensure the material conditions for the reproduction of labour power, but the labour power must be "competent", i.e. "suitable to be set to work in the complex system of the process of production".<sup>154</sup> This means that the labour power must be reproduced diversely, according to the requirements of the socio-technical division of labour. This preparation and reproduction of labour power is the responsibility of the educational system.

Althusser also explains how the school contributes to the reproduction of relations of production i.e. to the ideological level of productive forces. He explains that by looking at school knowledge, i.e. the subjects that children learn at school, one can see that they transmit certain ideological messages which tend to be those of the ruling class. Some of the ideological messages that children receive are directly and simply loaded by the ruling class ideology; for example, the subjects of ethics, civil instruction and philosophy. Others have with less direct ideological messages, like arithmetic and science.<sup>155</sup>

Since not all the students carry on to the same level and they do not stay in education the same length of time, these

differences locate them in different positions in relation to production. That is, masses of students leave school at an early age and indulge in the world of work and they become workers, while others carry on to a level which allows them to occupy the posts of small and middle technicians, white collar workers, small and middle executives i.e. petty bourgeois of all kinds. A third group carry on to the top level and those come out of the system to provide different sorts of intellectuals, like the 'intellectuals' of collective labour, agents of exploitation like managers, agents of repression like soldiers and policemen and professional ideologists like priests and teachers.<sup>156</sup>

From Althusser's view one can understand that education is reproducing classes not only at the economic level, in terms of the places they occupy in economic production, but also at the level of ideology and consciousness.

However, Althusser's view in the role of education in reproducing relations of production and hence in contributing to the hegemony of the ruling class, may depict the hegemony of the ruling class as unchallenged. This view can be criticized in the light of the previous analysis of ideology, common sense and hegemony, since education is one of the institutions which produce and is involved in ideological activities.

It has already been pointed out that ideology is filled with contradictions, since ideology is seen as lived experience,

practices and social relations which are often internally inconsistent. It was also noted that common sense has elements within it which can see through to the heart of the unequal benefits provided by society, at the same time as it tends to reproduce the ideological relations and meanings that maintain the hegemony of the dominant class.

However the hegemony of the ruling class is never complete, since people's common sense, according to Gramsci, has elements of accommodation and resistance which exist in an unsteady state of tension and struggle.

Another important point in the reproduction critique is that, the reproduction process is not all negative and does not tend in all cases to produce agents of repression or professional ideologists who perpetuate the ruling class hegemony. The education system also produces intellectuals who may ally themselves with the subordinate classes. And according to Gramsci, who identified intellectuals by their commitment and social function rather than by their intellectual skills and kind of education, this identification opens the way to bring those with conventional academic education into the service of the working class as working class organic intellectuals.<sup>157</sup>

From this critique, the reproduction process must not be simply understood as a direct and simple process. Rather, it should be analyzed as complicated and contradictory in nature and institutions. Since other institutions such as family, mass media, and others, are involved, it is set of processes which

includes more than education.

The above analysis of the role of education in reproducing the class structure is mainly derived from the experience of the western capitalist societies. So, when reproduction theory is applied to developing countries one must consider the differences in the economic, political and ideological system of these countries and see how this may reflect upon the dynamics and patterns of reproduction in these societies. This will be more illustrated in Chapter Four when the system and policy of education and their class nature will be analyzed.

In spite the fact that Althusser stresses the role of the Ideological State Apparatuses in the process of reproduction, he concentrates on the role of the school more than other ideological apparatuses, like the family. The family gets more attention in theories of cultural reproduction which stress the analysis of the principals underlying the structure and transmission of the cultural field which includes two aspects: the study of the role of the family cultural capital and the study of how school culture and knowledge is selected and produced to satisfy the interests of certain social classes.

Pierre Bourdieu explains that family cultural capital includes different sets of linguistic and cultural competencies that individuals inherit by way of the class-located boundaries of their families.<sup>158</sup> This means that a child inherits from his or her family sets of meanings, qualities of style, modes of thinking, and types of dispositions that are accorded a



certain social value and status as a result of what the dominant class or classes label as the most valued cultural capital.<sup>159</sup>

The role of school in legitimizing and reproducing the dominant culture comes from the fact that school transmits this kind of dominant culture through the school knowledge, and only specific students are familiar with its codes. This familiarity comes from the set of skills that particular students have received from their family background and class relations, which are essential for success and continuation at school.<sup>160</sup>

The two theories of reproduction offered this research the opportunity to look at reproduction at its general level of class power and hegemony and at its specific level of family culture. Both are included in the analysis of the system and policy of education in Egypt and in the specific study of the case of sixty families from different class positions to analyze their perceptions of different economic, political, social and educational matters.

The theoretical point of reproduction, ideology, hegemony and common sense will raise some important questions about the dynamic of class relations, power and interests, as well as class ideologies and beliefs. Examples of these points will be addressed later in the analysis of the field study. These are:

- the extent to which people's ideologies, consciousness

and common sense are influenced by their class interests, in terms of whether they would express the same interests, or divided and conflicting ones.

- what are the dynamics which lie behind people expressing ideas which may act against their own interests.
- the extent to which class cultural capital could influence parents' relations with the school, parents' evaluation of school knowledge, or their ability to deal with the school and to facilitate or hinder children's success and continuation at school.

#### V. Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the main theoretical points which are essential for the following analysis of the Egyptian context in terms of social, economic, political and educational matters.

- The discussion of development and developing countries has introduced the main characteristics of these countries and the difficulties they face in developing their economic, social and political system, due to internal and external factors as peripheral societies exploited by the advanced capitalist societies. These considerations lay the ground for discussion of Egypt's development programmes since 1952. In this discussion the main characteristics that Egypt shares with other developing countries will be shown. There will be a

discussion of Egypt's movement from the independent model of development in the sixties to the dependent model in the seventies. The discussion of these two models of development will be presented in the light of their class content and the political systems which accompanied them.

- The discussion of the concept of state, in which it was argued that state in Third World countries in general and in Egypt in particular does not float above society, but has a class content and relative autonomy. This conceptualization of the state, will be more fully illustrated in the theoretical discussions which follow, in two places:

First: in Chapter Three, state power and social class formation will be discussed. In the discussion, state power and relative autonomy will be analyzed in relation to social classes, taking into account that the amount of power and relative autonomy that the state enjoys, differ from one historical period to another according to the development and the power of social classes in their struggle to control the state apparatus and to secure their own interests.

Second: in Chapter Four, the policy of education and the class nature of the education system in Egypt will be examined. The study of the class nature of the state will be reflected in the discussion of policies of education, where the policy and the system of education is controlled by the state and the fundamental changes which took place in policies of education under Nasser and Sadat will be analyzed in terms of the class

content of the state and in terms of class power and alliances.

The study of the concept of class has taken into account the two levels of class, that is, the study of class as located in both the objective level of economic relations and the subjective level of ideology, culture and consciousness.

From that theoretical background the research can move further in the analysis of the influence of social class on education which will be presented in Part Two of the thesis, where a case study of the perspectives of sixty families will be presented. This will demand the use of a theoretical conceptualization of class in building categories for classifying the respondents in the sample of the field study, and this framework will be presented in Chapter Five.

The theoretical discussion of the concept of class provides the research with some conceptual tools, like culture, ideology, hegemony and common sense, which are essential in the analysis of people's perspectives. These include an interest in people's perception of some general political and economic issues in the past, present and future of Egypt and people's perception and evaluation of some general aspects of policy and the system of education in Egypt. Also included are some of their perception of their immediate relation and experience with the education system as it appears in their own children's education.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Margaret Hardiman and James Midgley (1962) The Social Dimensions of Development (John Wiley and Sons, Chichester) pp.10-11
2. There are some countries which are classified as developing although they have the highest per capita incomes, i.e. the oil countries such as Kuwait.
3. Margaret Hardiman and James Midgley, op.cit., pp.11-12
4. Ibid
5. Mark Bray et al. (1986) Education and Society in Africa (Edward Arnold, London) p.1
6. Ibid
7. Ibid, p.5
8. Bryan S. Turner (1984) Capitalism and Class in the Middle East: Theories of social and economic development (Heinemann, London) p.3
9. S.R.Eisenstadt (ed.) (1970) Readings in Social Evolution and Development (Pergamon Press, Oxford)
10. E.Shils, "Political Development in the New States: The will to be modern", in Eisenstadt, op.cit., p.382
11. Mark Bray op.cit., p.5
12. Ibid, p.6
13. Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, (1979) "Investment in the Poor: a critical analysis of the new World Bank policy", Bickerveld, Department of Sociology, Unpublished manuscript, quoted in Ankie Hoogvelt, op.cit., p.101
14. Mark Bray, op.cit., p.5
15. Ankie Hoogvelt, op.cit., p.117
16. T.Parsons (1951) The Social System (The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill.) quoted in Ankie Hoogvelt, op.cit., p.117
17. Mark Bray, op.cit., p.6
18. Jacques Delcroix and Charles Ragin, "Modernizing Institutions", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 84, July 1978 / May 1979, p.125
19. Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced polarities in the study of social change", The American

Journal of Sociology, Vol. 72, July 1966/May 1967, pp.354-355

20. Ingermar Fagerlind and Lawrence J. Saha (1983) Education and National Development: A comparative perspective (Pergamon Press, Oxford) p.21
21. Ibid, p.21
22. Paul Baran (1967) The Political Economy of Growth (Monthly Review Press, New York) (First published in 1957)
23. Andre Gunder Frank (1967) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (Monthly Review Press, New York)
24. Fagerlind and Saha, op.cit., p.22
25. Nicholas Abercrombie (1984) (et al.) Dictionary of Sociology, (Penguin, Harmondsworth) pp.35-36
26. Ibid, p.23
27. For an Egyptian economist who supports this model see Ismail Sabry Abdalla (1977) Towards a New International Economic System (Al Hayah Al Misriyah Lil Kitab, Cairo) (Arabic), Samir Amin (1976) Some Thoughts on Self-Reliant Development, Collective Self-Reliance and the New International Economic Order (United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, Dakar)
28. Ismail Sabry Abdalla, op.cit., p.191
29. Ibid, pp.192-193
30. Ibid, pp.202-245
31. One of the Arab intellectuals who presents and supports the argument of building socialism in the Third World countries is Samir Amin. For his writings on centre and periphery, see, Samir Amin (1985) Class and Nation (Heineman, London), and Samir Amin (1985) The Crisis of the Arab Society (Dar Al Mostaqbal Al Araby, Cairo) (Arabic)
32. Ankie Hoogvelt, op.cit., p.77
33. Ibid, p.76
34. Ibid, pp.80-87
35. Stephen Ball, "The Sociology of Education in Developing Countries", The British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol.2, No.3, 1981, p.302
36. Ibid, p.304

37. Iliya Harik (1987) "The Origins of the Arab State System", in Gahassan Salame The Foundations of the Arab State, Vol.1, (Croom Helm, New York) p.34
38. Anwar Abdel Malek (1968) Egypt: Military Society (Random House, New York) p.xxiii
39. In this type of state the authority originates in urban based garrison commanders who in time develop an extensive bureaucratic apparatus. See Iliya Harik, op.cit., p.33
40. Tamas Szentes (1971) The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (Akademiai Kiado, Budapest) p.311
41. Ibid, p.312
42. Ibid, p.312 (Emphasis in the original)
43. John Waterbury (1983) The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The political economy of two regimes (Princeton University Press, Princeton) p.19
44. Ibid, p.20
45. Abdel Malek, op.cit., p.xiv
46. The prospects and future of state capitalism in developing countries is discussed by Szentes, who gives four possible developments. These are: it might move towards state monopoly capitalism, based on highly developed productive forces; it might move towards socialism and state planned economy; it might move towards bureaucratic state capitalism, which is characterised by state ownership of the means of production and the increasing numbers of the state bureaucratic elite, who might form a strong social category using their privileged position in the state apparatus; or it might move towards dependency, in which case state capitalism declines and gives way to private capital, and falls again under the domination of foreign capital, where national capital rejects state intervention and foreign capital monopolizes economic development.  
See Szentes, op.cit., pp.315-316.
47. Ibid, p.318
48. Nicos Poulantzas (1982) Political Power and Social Classes (Verso, London) p.285 (emphasis in the original) Poulantzas presents his concept of state relative autonomy in the context of a discussion of Bonapartism in France, which refers to the complicated functioning of the capitalist state in relation to the small holding peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie: "As against the bourgeoisie, Bonaparte looks on himself, at the same time, as the representative of the peasants and of the people in general, who wants to make the lower classes

of the people happy within the frame of bourgeois society". Ibid

49. Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power and Socialism, quoted in Waterbury, op.cit., pp.13-14 (emphasis in the original)
50. Rachid Tlemcani (1986) State and Revolution in Algeria (Zed, London) p.11
51. Ibid, p.12
52. Ibid, p.13
53. Alfred Stepan (1978) The State and Society: Peru in comparative perspective (Princeton University Press, Princeton) p.26, quoted in Westbury, op.cit., p.14
54. Waterbury, op.cit., p.15
55. See the typology of the Arab state systems by Iliya Harik, op.cit., pp.30-33
56. Trimberger presents four requirements for military rule to achieve revolution from above:  
1) that their links with the class owning the means of production be absent or severed, 2) that they be politicized around an ideology of nation building, 3) that they feel threatened by popular movements from below, and 4) that they be able to exploit contradictions in the international power constellation that augment national autonomy.  
See Ellen Kay Trimberger (1978) Revolution from Above: Military bureaucrats and development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru (Transaction, New Brunswick) quoted in Waterbury, op.cit., p.15
57. Waterbury, Ibid, p.15
58. E.V.K. Fitzgerald (1979) The Political Economy of Peru 1956-1978 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) p.36, quoted in Waterbury, Ibid, p.14 (emphasis added by Waterbury)
59. Erik Olin Wright (1973) Class Structure and Income Determination (Academic Press, New York) p.3
60. Ibid, p.3
61. Ibid, p.6
62. Ibid, p.8
63. Max Weber (1978) Max Weber: Economy and Society (edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich) (University of California Press, Berkeley) 2 vols., quoted in Anthony Giddens and David Held (eds.) (1984) "Max Weber: Selections from Economy and Society, Vols 1 and 2" in Classes, Power and Conflict (Macmillan, Houndmills)



64. See, for an example of this approach, which suggests no major differences between the Weberian and Marxist analysis, Gordon Marshall et al. (1988) Social Class in Modern Britain (Hutchinson, London) p.16
65. Ibid, p.17
66. Ibid, p.17
67. Wright, op.cit., p.
68. S.Aronowitz (1981) The Crisis in Historical Materialism: Class, politics and culture in Marxist theory (Bergin, New York) quoted in Henry Giroux (1983) Theory and Resistance in Education (Heineman, London) pp.122-123
69. Bryan Turner (1978) Marx and the end of Orientalism (George Allen and Unwin, London) p.76
70. Nicos Poulantzas (1975) Class in Contemporary Capitalism (NLB, London) p.14
71. Barry Hindess, Politics and Class Analysis, op.cit., p.30
72. Erik Olin Wright (1985) Classes (Verso, London) pp.27-28
73. Brian Turner, Capitalism and Class in the Middle East, op.cit., p.8
74. Ibid, p.8
75. Barry Hines and Paul Q.Hirst (1975) Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production, (London and Boston), p.15, quoted in Bryan Turner, Marx and the end of Orientalism, op.cit., pp.76-77
76. Nicos Poulantzas, Class in Contemporary Capitalism, op.cit., p.193
77. An example of this view is presented by Renner, Croner and Bendix. See Nicos Poulantzas, Ibid, p.194
78. This view is presented by Theader, Geiger and Wright Mills. Ibid, p.195
79. Ibid, p.196
80. Ibid, p.197
81. Ibid
82. Ibid, p.204
83. Ibid, p.209
84. Ibid, pp.228-229
85. Ibid, p.255

86. Ibid, p.205
87. Ibid, pp.285-286
88. Ibid, p.294
89. Ibid, p.290
90. Ibid, p.299
91. Ibid, p.292
92. Howard H.Davis (1979) Beyond Class Images: Exploration in the structure of social consciousness (Croom Helm, London) p.10
93. John Clarke et al. "Sub-cultures, Cultures and Class" in Tony Bennett et al. (eds.) (1986) Culture, Ideology and Social Process (Batsford Academic and Education in association with The Open University) (First published 1981) pp.53-54
94. Ibid (Emphasis in text)
95. Raymond Williams (1984) The Long Revolution (Penguin Books, Middlesex) (First published 1961) p.57
96. Stuart Hall (1982) "Culture and the State", Unit 28, The Open University, The State and Popular Culture, (1) Block 7, p.8
97. John Clarke, *op.cit.*, p.54
98. Ibid
99. Ibid
100. Ibid, pp.54-55
101. Jorge Larrain (1984) The Concept of Ideology (Hutchinson, London) p.45 (First published in 1979)
102. Henry Giroux (1981) Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling (Falmer Press, London) p.19
103. Quoted in Daniel Bell (1962) The End of Ideology (The Free Press, New York) p.396
104. Jorge Lerrain, *op.cit.*, p.14
105. Ibid
106. Jorge Larrain (1984) Marxism and Ideology (Macmillan, Houndmills) pp.64-65 (First published 1983)
107. Karl Marx, from the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, quoted in Nicholas

- Abercrombie (1980) Class, Structure and Knowledge (Basil Blackwell, Oxford) p.12
108. Henry Giroux, Theory and Resistance in Education, op.cit., p.151
109. Stuart Hall, "Culture and the State", op.cit., p.8
110. Ibid
111. Ibid
112. Abercrombie, Class Structure and Knowledge, op.cit., p.13
113. Ibid, p.14
114. Ibid, p.114
115. Ibid
116. Ibid, p.115
117. Ibid, p.116
118. Ibid
119. Raymond Williams (1985) Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society (Flamingo, London) (First published 1976) p.145
120. Ibid
121. Abercrombie, Class Structure and Knowledge, op.cit., p.117
122. Ibid, pp.117-118
123. Henry Giroux, op.cit., p.151 (emphasis added)
124. Ibid (Emphasis added)
125. John Simmons (1980) "An overview of the policy issues in the 1980s", in John Simmons (ed.) The Education Dilemma: Policy issues for developing countries in the 1980s (Pergamon Press, Oxford) pp. 20-21
126. Ibid
127. Stephen Ball, The Sociology of Education in Developing Countries, op.cit. p.302
128. Ibid
129. John Simmons, op.cit., p.24
130. Philip H.Coombs (1985) The World Crisis in Education (Oxford University Press: Oxford) p.18

131. Ibid, p.16
132. Ibid
133. Ibid, p.17
134. John Simmons, op.cit., p.2
135. Roger Dale (1981) "The State and Education: Some theoretical approaches", Unit 3, The Open University, The State, and the Politics of Education, Part 2, pp.10-11
136. John Simmons, op.cit., p.2
137. Ibid, p.3
138. Ibid, pp.3-4
139. Philip G.Altbach and Gail P.Kelly (1985) Education and Colonialism (Longman, New York) p.7
140. Ibid, p.15
141. Ibid, p.42
142. Ibid
143. Ibid
144. Philip G.Altbach, "The Distribution of Knowledge in the Third World: A case study in neocolonialism", in Altbach and Kelly, ibid, p.302
145. Ibid, p.313
146. Philip H.Coombs (1964) The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Education and cultural affairs (Harper Row, New York)
147. See how Coombs explains the role of cultural aid in representing a good image of the USA in the outside world, and how it helps the USA to secure more sympathy and support for her policies. Ibid, p.120
148. John Simmons, op.cit., p.24
149. Samir Amin, (1977) Imperialism and Unequal Development (The Harvester Press, Sussex) p.153
150. Michael Apple (1985) Education and Power (ARK, Boston) p.14
151. Rachel Sharp (1980) Knowledge, Ideology and the Politics of Schooling (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) p.102
152. Madan Sarup (1978) Marxism and Education (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) p.151

153. Ibid, p.104
154. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", in B.R.Cosin (ed.) (1972) Education and Society (Penguin Books in association with the Open University: Middlesex) p.245
155. Ibid, p.260
156. Ibid, p.260
157. Harold Entwistle (1979) Antonio Gramsci: Conservative schooling for radical politics (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) p.117
158. Henry Giroux (1983) Theory and Resistance in Education op.cit., p.88
159. Ibid
160. Ibid

## CHAPTER TWO

THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF EGYPT FROM  
1952 TO THE PRESENT DAYIntroduction

This chapter is concerned with the economic and political context of Egypt and with the different models of development that Egypt followed in different political and historical periods.

The study of the political and economic systems and the models of development relate directly to the study of the class influence upon education, in particular at the level of educational policy. As will be shown in Chapter Four, policies of education were changed under different models of development, i.e. under Nasser and Sadat.

In brief, under the socialist policies Nasser aimed to construct national industry, increasing agricultural production, the raising of the standard of living for the poor majority by following a planned state-controlled economy and a massive nationalization programme and the establishment of a public sector. In such a development programme education appeared as an essential element in preparing the cadres needed for these programmes, at the same time as education was seen as having other social and cultural impacts in terms of social justice and cultural integration. The policy of education reflected these aspects in the form of a massive increase in the number of students, free education at all levels up to university, and the control of foreign and private education.

Under the open door policy, private and foreign capital were encouraged with market competition. When this was introduced into educational policy it encouraged more private, fee-paying education, created the duality inside government education

between basic education and fee-paying language education, and controlled student numbers at university level.

Consequently, the study of the political and economic system and the model of development will present the background against which educational policies will be analyzed. However, the relationship between education policy and the development programme is not simple and direct, since it is mediated by the complexity of class power and class practices and the role of the state, as will be illustrated in the discussion of the political system in Egypt. In this discussion the main focus will be upon class power and class relations, as presented in the political organizations. In addition, some indications will be given as to whether the state could play the role of arbitrator between social classes or not.

### I. The Present Economic Crisis

Egypt has been in a continuous economic crisis for a long time. This economic crisis represents one of the main characteristics that Egypt shares with other developing countries. The crisis of these countries can be seen in <sup>the</sup> very high levels of foreign debt, a shortage of hard, foreign currency, and limited production in agriculture and industry which cannot satisfy the needs of an increasing population.

The present monetary situation shows that Egypt suffers from a shortage of hard currency which was mainly coming from remittances of the Egyptian overseas work force. In 1984 the amount of these remittances was \$4 billion, and this fell to \$3.7 billion in 1985, and to \$2.7 billion in 1986.<sup>1</sup> The other factor which decreased Egypt's foreign currency is the fall in oil prices where Egypt's income has dropped by \$1.1 billion between 1985 and 1986. Egypt's hard currency reserves fell from \$9.7 billion in 1985 to \$6.9 billion.<sup>2</sup> Egypt's foreign debt grew from \$38 billion in 1986 to \$40 billion in early 1988.<sup>3</sup>

Egypt's increasing fiscal crisis is accompanied by other problems, including a growing population, high rate of unemployment and low levels of agricultural and industrial production. The increasing population is one of the problems which puts a strain on the development programme.

According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), in 1985 Egypt's population was increasing by 1.294 million. By the middle of 1986 the population was 50 million. This represents an annual growth rate of 2.8 per cent.<sup>4</sup> The increasing population of Egypt is made worse by the fact that the population is not distributed throughout the country, but concentrated in the narrow Valley of the Nile, which comprises only 3.6 per cent of the total of Egypt's area.<sup>5</sup>

The growth of population is the result of a range of health, economic, cultural and religious factors. In terms of health, there is no doubt that the growth and improvement of the health service has helped to decrease child mortality, and has raised the population growth rate (See Appendix 2). Economic impetus has been given to the population growth, as children are good resources for income, especially in rural Egypt.

Cultural and religious factors have negated government programmes for birth control. For Muslims, contraception is seen as a sin, in spite of the Al Azhar 'fatwa' which legitimised contraception. The Christians consider themselves a threatened minority and see contraception as a threat to their existence.<sup>6</sup>

The large population of Egypt is only one problem among many which have hindered the development programme. As mentioned earlier, Egypt is suffering from low productivity and high foreign debt. The issue of the increasing population is a complicated one, because in some societies, as in South Asia for example, the large population is a source of cheap labour which also provides a large market for the economy.<sup>7</sup> It is important to understand this point, because some developing



countries view population increase as the sole source of problems in their countries. In this way, population increase is sometimes used to conceal other reasons for the failure of development programmes.

Employment is another major problem. With the increasing urban population of Egypt, the labour force has become urbanized. Rural Egypt and the agricultural sector no longer absorb the majority of the work force, and the sector decreased from 42 per cent to 34.6 per cent between 1985 and 1986.<sup>8</sup> The increase in urban employment has largely been in the service and government employment sectors, rather than in the productive sectors. Government employment and service industries rose from 23.6 per cent of the work force in 1976 to 30 per cent in 1984.<sup>9</sup>

In the two main sectors of commodity production, i.e. agriculture and industry, the rate of production is not keeping up with the growth of the population. Particularly in agriculture, the rate at which additional land is brought under cultivation is well below the rate of increase of the population. For example, from the beginning of the century to 1927, the population increased by 46 per cent, while agricultural land increased by only 10 per cent. Similarly, from 1947 to 1966, the population increased by 62 per cent and agricultural land by only 9 per cent.<sup>10</sup>

At the present time agricultural production is still falling behind the increasing population, where agricultural productivity increases by only 2 per cent per annum and the population by 3 per cent. Agricultural production, as a share of GDP, declined from 16.3 per cent in 1981 to 19.3 per cent in 1985/86.<sup>11</sup> (See Appendix 3, which shows the share of different sectors in the GDP.) According to these figures, Egypt has moved from being self-sufficient in food and an exporter of agricultural commodities in the 1970s to the point where the current annual net deficit in agricultural trade is \$3 billion.<sup>12</sup>

The position of industrial production is not much better. Industrial growth slowed markedly in 1985/86, owing mainly to growing foreign exchange constraints. Industrial exports (mainly textiles, and metallurgical and engineering goods) were equivalent to only 7 per cent of the value of industrial production in 1984/85, which is a very low percentage.<sup>13</sup>

This general view of the Egyptian economy in recent years reflects the critical situation of Egypt. This situation has its historical roots dating back to the different economic policies followed by Egypt under different political systems. Egypt has followed two distinct lines of policy: the "independent" socialist model under Nasser, and the "dependent" capitalist model under Sadat. The different economic models were conducted under different political systems and with different methods of organization.

## II. The Economic and Political System under Nasser (1952-1970)

### (A) The Economic System

The economic system under Nasser went through several different stages; each one had its own aims and ideologies.

The first stage, which started with the beginning of the Revolution, lasted from 1952 to 1956. This period was marked at the political level by the abolition of the monarchy, and the abolition of political parties and powers in order to build a new, modern and independent society.<sup>14</sup>

In the economic field, Egypt continued her capitalist model of development, and the Egyptian big bourgeoisie were still active and cooperating with the new system. Although agrarian reforms reduced the power of the large land owners, they could find other activities, such as the construction industry in urban Egypt.

The period 1956 to 1961 can be identified on the political level as the crucial years for the Egyptian Revolution, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, and participated in the non-aligned movement.<sup>15</sup> In general, it was a period marked by the struggle for independence from foreign powers, to emancipate the Egyptian political decision making process from the hegemony of the imperial powers. This period laid the foundation of independent development in Egypt, since Nasser was aware that economic and political freedom are inseparable.

The radical change in Egypt's economy and ideology came in the period 1960 to 1967. The main characteristic of this period was the adoption of a socialist policy. This policy translated into different forms, starting with the nationalization laws, the constitution of public sectors and the First Five Year Economic Plan (1960-1965), and the building of the High Dam at Aswan in order to increase the supply of water and electricity for agriculture and industry.<sup>16</sup>

The new economic policies and the new ideologies of socialism had to be justified and legitimized. The justification came in the form of the "Charter of National Action". This charter expressed the new ideology of socialism as a means not only for economic development, but also for social freedom. The charter stated that, "Socialism is the way for political freedom".<sup>17</sup> The Charter also states that, "Scientific socialism was the suitable style for finding the right method leading to progress".<sup>18</sup>

The profound change in the Egyptian economy had to find legitimacy in the socio-political field. This was achieved by the discussion of the new policies in the National Congress of Popular Forces, which included national capitalists, peasants, workers, professionals, civil servants, university staff, students and women.<sup>19</sup>

The new economic policy and the First Five Year Plan achieved an annual growth estimated at 6.4 per cent.<sup>20</sup> The plan included measures to cover importation, and private and foreign investment. In spite of the drive towards independence, 40 per cent of investments came from foreign aid in 1963/64, since the domestic saving ratio was only about 12.7 per cent of the total national production.<sup>21</sup>

The Egyptian economy suffered from a deficit in the balance of payments of £413 million, which represented 5 per cent of the total national production.<sup>22</sup> These figures deteriorated after the 1967 defeat: for example, the saving ratio declined in the period 1970 to 1975 to 4 per cent of the total national production, and the deficit of the balance of payments rose to £969 million in 1975, i.e. about 21 per cent of the total national production.<sup>23</sup>

In spite of these problems which faced the economic plan in the sixties, the policy achieved its main targets, which were the increase of production in the main sectors - agriculture and industry - and the achievement of social justice through the redistribution of national income.

A number of measures were taken to ensure the redistribution of national income. The Nationalization Laws of 1961 included the control of the income of some groups, by reducing the income of the big bourgeois, and setting a ceiling on the top income of employees in the nationalized enterprises.<sup>24</sup> Other measures were taken to control rents from buildings, commercial and industrial profits, interests and dividends. These sources of income were directly controlled by nationalization and sequestration. This has proved more effective in reducing disparities in income than other systems of progressive taxation in the capitalist system.<sup>25</sup>

The process of redistributing income has been by the above direct measures, along with other measures such as the programmes of industrialization, social, health and education

services.

In the two main sectors of the economy, agriculture and industry, Egypt has increased her production. In agriculture, from 1952 to 1970, about 884 thousand feddan were reclaimed.<sup>26</sup> Land reclamation almost stopped in the seventies. Industry has achieved a growth in different aspects. For example, factories employing more than ten workers rose from 100 factories in 1960 to 383 in 1960, electricity production increased by 800 per cent between 1952 and 1970, and industrial workers have increased from 350,000 to 1.2 million.<sup>27</sup> The share of industrial production in the national product has risen from 9 per cent to 22 per cent between the fifties and the beginning of the seventies.<sup>28</sup>

In the health service, the figures show that the provision of basic food needs has improved, and individual daily intake has risen from 2,300 to 2,600 Calories.<sup>29</sup> Medical care has developed in terms of numbers of doctors, which rose from 5,000 doctors in 1952 to 18,000 in 1970, an increase of 375 per cent. As a result, the ratio of people to doctors has fallen from 4000 to 2000.<sup>30</sup> The improvement of health services has helped to reduce mortality rates from 18 per thousand to 13 per thousand, and the average life expectancy has risen from 42 to 53 years.<sup>31</sup> In education, student numbers increased from 2 million in 1952 to 6 million by the end of the sixties.

The previous figures indicate that the development in agriculture and industry has led to an increase in the availability of basic goods, which has helped to satisfy and secure the basic needs of the masses. The discussion of developments in education and health show how the surplus value was used and invested to meet the basic needs of the people also.

The Nasserist independent development programme depended upon a planned economy, run and controlled by the state, which aimed at, and succeeded in, increasing the production of the

two main sectors of production, namely agriculture and industry, and concentrating on satisfying the basic needs of the masses.

(B) The Political System

Although the Nasserist development programme worked for the majority of the masses, the political system under which these policies were carried out did not allow for democratic freedom. The system in 1952 abolished all political parties, and established itself in the form of a one party system. In the early years of the Revolution two organizations were established, that is, The Liberation Rally, from 1953 to 1958, and the National Union, from 1958 to 1961.

With the move towards socialism in 1961, the system established a new organization, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Membership was universal and voluntary. Membership was very important for appointment to any cooperative board, local, regional or national assembly, or the board of any union.<sup>32</sup>

The ASU was meant to represent the national alliance of popular forces consisting of the workers, peasants, intellectuals, national capitalists and soldiers.<sup>33</sup> This kind of organization was meant to represent the Revolution's ideology that the new regime was above class and that it represented all social powers in society, which gave the image of a state which could arbitrate between classes. This idea proved to be false in reality and in practice, where, inside the ASU, members from different social class positions did not stand on the same footing in terms of their cultural, ideological and political power.

An example of this was the position of the workers and farmers in relation to the intellectuals who could exert more cultural and ideological power, in spite of the fact that fifty per cent of the seats in all committees of the ASU were allocated

to farmers and workers in an attempt to mobilize those who were at the margins. However, in reality this did not work effectively, because the intellectuals and the professionals were against this allocation, on the grounds that farmers and workers were not educated, and consequently not able to express themselves.<sup>34</sup>

The intellectual resistance has coincided with another critical problem of identifying the farmers and workers. The definition of farmers and workers was wide, unrestricted, and vague. According to the definition, a peasant is "one whose personal and family holdings should not exceed ten feddans, agriculture should be his main occupation and source of income and he should live in the countryside".<sup>35</sup> This definition excluded the rural workers and the small land owner, and in 1962 the definition was changed to raise the permissible land holding to twenty five feddans for a peasant, which in turn excluded more farmers from the right to stand in elections for assemblies as representatives of the farmers.

A labourer/worker was defined as "one who is not eligible for membership in the professional unions, and not a graduate of a university, higher institute or military college."<sup>36</sup> The loose definition of workers meant that technicians and intellectuals have been included. This has led to a misrepresentation of the working class. That is to say, groups like technocrats, university teachers, company directors, heads of syndicates, heads of agricultural reform societies and cooperatives were elected as workers and farmers.<sup>37</sup>

The problem of definition is not simply a technical one. Rather, it has ideological and political origins and consequences. It gives a lesson to those who work in the development field, that vague definitions do not allow in reality for a genuine representation of the working class, and consequently they lose their chance to be heard and to defend their interests and to share in decision making in society. This point is important for this research, which is concerned

with access to, and control of, education in Egypt, i.e. with what kind of education, and how much, is given to different classes. In order to study that, clear criteria to identify social classes are needed so that one social class should not be confused with another. A clear definition is needed, not only in the political field, but also in any other field where development programmes are designed, and the needs and interests of different classes have to be identified.

The ASU has suffered from a structural problem, namely, the domination of the bureaucrats, who concentrated on their executive activities more than on the ideological and political ones.<sup>38</sup>

In general the ASU has failed to represent the workers and the farmers. It was divided internally between the top politicians from the left and those from the right. Hence it could not represent the interests of the social alliance of popular power, and it remained, until 1974, the arena of political and ideological conflict between the left and right, and between Sadat and those who represented the Nasserist system.

As was pointed out in Chapter One, the ruling class uses both coercion and consent to secure its economic, political and ideological supremacy. In that respect the Nasserist political system worked to contain different political powers. The process of containment occasionally took the form of direct and explicit confrontation, where some groups, in some cases, refused to be contained. An example is the case of students in their uprising after the 1964 defeat. Another is the case of the workers in the early years of the Revolution in 1952.<sup>39</sup>

Containment has taken the form of implicit coercion in the case of the professional syndicates of doctors, engineers, lawyers, journalists and teachers. These syndicates were put under the regime's control, because they were regarded as a potential source of resistance to the new policies for socialism.<sup>40</sup> The syndicates were not abolished, but the leaders



were sometimes effectively appointed, as the elections were manipulated by syndicate members who were loyal to the ASU. They could influence the results and ensure the victory of the ASU candidates.<sup>41</sup>

The press, also, was under state control. Newspapers were owned by the ASU. Journalists were automatically members of the ASU. Any suspension of their membership of the organization also meant automatic suspension from the practice of their profession.<sup>42</sup>

The Nasserist political system moved between the containment of different political powers, co-option of people in sensitive positions in the mass media, and explicit coercion of the workers and intellectuals.

In spite of the limited political freedom, the Nasserist system restored to the Egyptians and to the Arabs their lost identity and pride, after centuries of submission to the colonial powers. The system achieved remarkable progress at the social and economic level, by following principles of social justice and equality, which were demanded urgently by the poor and the deprived. The system gave priority to the issues of independence, social justice, development, and Arab unity, while it postponed for a long time the issue of democracy.

### III. The Economic and Political System under Sadat (1970-1981)

When Sadat came to power in 1970 he had two tasks to achieve in two different periods.

The First Period: 1970-1973

Sadat could get rid of his political opponents, i.e. the heads of state, who represented the system he inherited from Nasser. The second task was the preparation for war.

## The Second Period: 1973-1981

By 1973, Sadat had consolidated his power and secured his legitimacy, which allowed him to reorientate Egypt towards the west. He announced the new policy in the October paper of 1974, which has become known as the open door economic policy.

### (A) The Open Door Economic Policy:

The October paper explained the meaning of the open door policy as the opening of the Egyptian economy for direct private investment of both Arab and foreign capital alongside Egyptian capital.<sup>43</sup>

The open door policy ('Infitah') was seen as justified as the cure to Egypt's economic ills. These problems were identified in terms of the decline in the country's development rate, which fell from 6.7 per cent in 1956-1965 to less than 5 per cent in the mid seventies. Military expenditure was seen as a heavy burden on the economy, and the country was in urgent need of foreign resources.<sup>44</sup>

The open door policy represented a model of development based on the functionalist ideas of modernization which consider the western model of development to be the model which underdeveloped countries need to follow. This model stresses industrial growth through the intensive use of technology, and more integration into the international capitalist market. In political terms, it places stress upon the adoption of the western democratic political system. The open door policy which followed such a model of development did not, in reality, solve Egypt's economic crisis. Rather, it increased Egypt's foreign debt, and in social terms it widened the gap between classes, and in political terms, as will be explained later, the multi-party system was not a guarantee for widening the base of democracy, and it did not prevent the state from using its repressive apparatus when it was needed.

### The Effect of the Open Door Policy on Social Justice and Economic Distribution:

The open door policy widened the gap between classes. There are no statistics or official information concerning income distribution in the seventies. All that is available are the efforts of some researchers to draw a picture of income distribution at that time.<sup>45</sup>

One of the indicators of the income gap in Egyptian society is the share of both wage and ownership revenue from local income. That is to say, the logic of economic development allows for an increase in the wages of workers at the expense of the entrepreneurs and owners. A comparison of the share of ownership revenue and wages from local income shows the following:

- From 1959/60 to 1969/70 wages, as a share of local national income, increased from 44.8 per cent to 49.1 per cent.
- Over the same period, the share of ownership revenue decreased from 55.2 per cent to 50.9 per cent.
- After 1971 the share of wages decreased, so that by 1979 it stood at 30.3 per cent, while ownership revenue increased to 69.7 per cent.<sup>46</sup>

Even though these percentages give some indication of income distribution, they do not tell the story of uneven distribution among the wage earners themselves, i.e. between those who work in the foreign investment sector, and those with similar qualifications and experience who work for the government and in the public sector.

Another study of differences in incomes was made by Ramzy Zaki, who designed a scale for measuring social distinction.

Lacking statistics about income distribution in Egypt, Ramzy Zaki had to depend upon personal observations and accounts in designing his scale. The scale was based upon measuring the wealth of different classes, which he considered to be a function of the level of income. The scale shows people who benefited, and those who have been harmed, in terms of wealth accumulation and income during the seventies.

People who benefited in terms of wealth were the capitalist class in agriculture, industry and real estate owners, because they depended upon material wealth - land, houses, jewels - of which prices rose during the seventies. The people who were harmed were the middle class, workers and craftsmen because they do not usually own material wealth but monetary wealth - shares, money on deposit - of which the value went down or fluctuated.

The Egyptian economy under the open door policy has witnessed a state of false circulation and false economic growth. This state reflected itself in the increasing consumption in urban and rural Egypt, increasing saving and investment rates, and increasing resources of hard currency.<sup>47</sup> However, this state of circulation and growth was not a sign that the Egyptian economy was doing well under the new policy. Because the Egyptian economy could not develop production in the main national sectors of agriculture and industry, it depended upon unreliable and insecure sources of foreign exchange, such as oil exports, remittances of the Egyptian workforce abroad, the Suez Canal and tourism.<sup>48</sup> When the oil price declined, along with a reduction in the other resources, Egypt was left with a very high foreign debt, as was explained earlier.

#### The Open Door Policy and Dependent Development

The influence of foreign organizations over the Egyptian economy increased during the seventies, and this has continued to the present time. The Egyptian economy today is designed and supervised by international organizations such as The

World Bank, The International Monetary Fund, and The Consultative Group. In fact, Egypt accepted the principle of international supervision over her economic policy as a condition for financial aid from Arab and western sources.<sup>49</sup>

The World Bank: The first start to its activities in 1974 was for the Bank to send one of its advisors to Egypt to recommend a development strategy.<sup>50</sup>

The International Monetary Fund: This organization introduced another form of domination over the Egyptian economy. Egypt was obliged to introduce the so called "Letter of Intent" in order to get credit from the Fund. The letter is linked to the implementation of a set of measures in the economic field.<sup>51</sup>

The Consultative Group: This third organization is an association of aid donors. In Egypt's case it consists of all countries and regional and international organizations providing aid. The meetings of this organization are usually to review the policies adopted by the country receiving aid, and the process made towards reform.<sup>52</sup>

These organizations are still working in Egypt and represent the external control in the redirection of the Egyptian economy and social policies. A lesson can be learnt from history. In 1876 the Egyptian economy came under foreign control in the rule of Ismael. Britain and France formed a mission to supervise the Egyptian economy and to ensure the payment of foreign debts. The members of the mission had the final word on Egyptian economic, financial and transport affairs.

#### (B) The Political System

Sadat's open door policy was accompanied by political liberalism, which presented itself in the establishment of so called independent "platforms",<sup>53</sup> who contested parliamentary elections in 1975. These platforms were authorized as

political parties in 1976.

The ASU resolved to establish political parties after public discussion called the "listening committee" in 1974.<sup>54</sup> The resolution of the ASU was supported by different social groups, especially the intellectuals of both left and right. The only group which opposed the ASU was the workers, who wanted to protect their 50 per cent representation, but the weak workers' organizations and unions could not defend the workers' interests.<sup>55</sup>

In 1977 official permission was granted for the formation of political parties. In 1978 Sadat announced his intention to establish his National Democratic Party, and pronounced his ideology of "democratic socialism". The party programme reflected his own slogans based on Islam and rural Egyptian traditions and morality.<sup>56</sup> The election of 1979 resulted in a massive majority for the NDP, without any representation for the left or religious right.

#### The Limits of Sadat's Liberal Policy

The multi-party system under Sadat did not mean that Egypt enjoyed more political freedom than under Nasser. The new pluralist system was controlled by the very highly concentrated power that the president enjoyed. This authority enabled the system, when faced by major problems, to suppress opposition by explicit and implicit means of coercion.

These problems were of an economic, political and religious character, and included:

- the economic problem and the rising prices and increasing cost of living which led to the food riots from north to south Egypt in 1977,
- the increasing criticism of the peace treaty,
- the sectarian struggle between Muslim and Christian, and
- the increasing Islamic fundamentalism, which was supported by Sadat himself in order to attack the left

and to attract the rich Arab countries so as to get financial support from them.

Facing these problems, Sadat used implicit means of coercion against the popular masses and his opponents, by authorizing new laws which restricted people's freedom to protest.<sup>57</sup>

The media, especially the newspapers, were under Sadat's control. This he achieved by appointing the heads of those newspapers, and when the opposition newspapers became too critical he banned them, especially after the food riots in 1977.<sup>58</sup> In reality, the pluralist system under Sadat was working and using the same authoritarian measures as Nasser.

Sadat's regime had to face the economic, social, religious and political crises which challenged the system and ideology. The climax of the crisis was in September 1981 when, after bloody clashes between Muslim and Christian, 1,536 Egyptians were arrested.<sup>59</sup> Those who were arrested represented different political powers and different ideologies. They included Muslims, Christians, left wing and right wing intellectuals, journalists and university staff. Muslim and Christian associations were closed, newspapers were banned and the Coptic bishops were suspended.

By October 1981 Sadat was in conflict and hostility with all political powers. This situation was ended by his assassination by fundamentalist Muslims.

#### IV. Egypt under Mubarak

Mubarak inherited a very complicated social, economic and political situation. Mubarak faced the increasing economic crisis, the rising cost of for the masses, and sectarian conflict and corruption. Politically he faced Egypt's isolation from the Arab World, and internally he had to reconcile the different political powers in Egypt.

### (A) The Economic Crisis

In his first speech as president in 1981, Mubarak announced his economic, political and social line. In facing the economic problems he would bring benefits to the poorer members of society, and attack those who created illegal wealth. The open door policy would continue, but it had to be productive; important food subsidies would remain, but luxury goods would be stopped.<sup>60</sup>

Mubarak called for an economic conference in 1982 to discuss Egypt's crisis. Mubarak himself participated and gave his account of the size of the problem and of prospects for the future.<sup>61</sup> These future prospects included the predictions that by the year 2025 the population would reach 140 million. This increasing population would demand services, housing, food, health care and education. In line with this increase in population, by the year 2000 Egypt would need to create 24.1 million jobs for workers, and by 2025 53.3 million jobs. In education, by the year 2000 the education system would have to absorb 12 million children in primary school, compared with 6 million in 1976.

In the face of these future problems, Egyptian economists have introduced their own views and recommendations to meet the problems. The first important recommendation is to return to a system of national planning in running the Egyptian economy. By this means, foreign aid could be controlled, subsidies which protect the popular classes could be maintained, additional manpower training programmes introduced, with priority given to industrialization. In addition, the rate of local investment could be encouraged, a more equal distribution of resources between rural and urban Egypt secured, more resources allocated for land reclamation and increasing agricultural production, while at the same time reducing public expenditure in all fields except defence and the military. An important aspect of this policy would be a



narrowing of the gap between the rich and the poor, by imposing a high tax rate on the rich, and increasing work opportunities, services and training programmes for the poor.<sup>62</sup>

By 1986/87 the crisis of the Egyptian economy had increased as a result of the loss of oil resources, tourism and the remittances of the Egyptian workforce abroad, and the increasing current account deficit was estimated to be four to five billion dollars, i.e. more than twice the export earnings. In order to face the crisis Egypt had to follow, not the recommendations of the Egyptian economists in 1982, but the recommendations imposed by the USA and IMF.

The USA and IMF pressures resulted in the so called 1986/87 economic reform. The reform comprised a group of measures. Decree No. 121 of 1986 gave the private sector more opportunities to import corn and a wide range of foodstuffs. In the five year plan starting in 1987, the private sector was given a greater share in investment.<sup>63</sup> In order to get the IMF loan in 1987 Egypt had to devalue the Egyptian pound, and to reduce consumer subsidies by 20 per cent. The government sold off what were supposed to be unprofitable public sector firms to the private sector, and some hotels to European hoteliers.<sup>64</sup>

In the agricultural sector the government declared that the subsidy on corn would be terminated by the end of 1987. The private sector was allowed to import fertilizers. The state was no longer responsible for reclaiming land, but would provide the infrastructure in the newly reclaimed areas before selling them to private investors.<sup>65</sup>

These measures, which mainly deprive the poor of Egypt, are part of a wide process of the dependent development policy which started in 1974 with the open door policy, and which is part of a strategy to integrate the Egyptian economy with the world capitalist order. The policy of integrating Egypt in the world capitalist system started soon after the Second World War. At the present time, the process of reintegration is

carried out under pressure from the USA on Egypt to adopt the so called new orthodoxy in development, which is based on the abolition of policies of import substitution, the protection of the national economy through measures like tariffs, and the promotion of policies which involve reducing government control, encouraging the private sector and directing foreign aid towards the private sector.<sup>66</sup>

#### (B) The Political System

Mubarak faced his first political crisis in 1986 when police riots had to be broken up by poorly paid soldiers. This situation reflected the frustration and suffering of this group of young people of working class origin. Mubarak also had to face the growing political and militant power of the fundamentalist Muslims.

Under Mubarak two elections have been held, in 1984 and 1987. The electoral law in Egypt put many obstacles and restrictions on the formation of parties, as mentioned earlier. The new Electoral Law No. 114 of 1983 has introduced still more restrictions. It introduced a new system of elections based on proportional representation, according to which no parties are allowed representation in parliament unless they obtain at least 8 per cent of the national vote.<sup>67</sup>

The two elections have allowed a massive majority for the government party, the NDP, while it excluded the left progressive elements and allowed for the first time the representation of the fundamentalist Muslims. (See Appendices 4 and 5 for the composition of the People's Assembly after the two elections.) In these two elections the opposition had to face the same kinds of control which was practised under Sadat, including rally breaking, ballot rigging and newspaper seizures.<sup>68</sup>

Recognising this control and corruption, the masses have reacted with political apathy, since they know that the

results have already been decided in favour of the government party. The political apathy may result from the worry of securing everyday necessities, and from the high rates of illiteracy in the country. All this has resulted in low turn-outs for the elections. According to the official figures, only 54 per cent of the registered voters (14.3 million) cast their vote in the 1987 elections.<sup>69</sup>

The political picture of Egypt shows that many radical changes are needed on the level of political laws, political freedom and political practices.

#### V. Conclusion

This chapter discussed the economic and political system of Egypt and different models of development adopted in different historical periods. The discussion of the model of development was essential as a basis for the analysis of the changing policies of education under each model of development, which will be analyzed in Chapter Four. The study of the different models of development has shown how Egypt has moved away from the independent model of development under Nasser to the open door policy. The discussion at the political level has supported the argument that the state in Egypt is not autonomous, but has relative autonomy in respect of different social classes. This is in contrast with the political propaganda which claimed that the state fairly represented the interests of different social classes. Even inside the political organization of the ASU, which was meant to present a national alliance of different social forces, these forces did not enjoy the same amount of political, cultural and ideological power. This point of class cultural, ideological and political power will be the subject of Chapter Three, which concentrates upon the relationship between state power and the social class formation of Egypt. The discussion will trace when and how the state has enjoyed a considerable degree of power in relation to different social classes, and when and how the state was under pressure from the growing power of

the bourgeoisie.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Robert Springborg (1989) Mubaraks's Egypt: Fragmentation of the political order (Westview Press, Boulder) p.8
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (1985) Press Release (mimeographed) (Cairo) p.1, quoted in Mourad Wahba, "Social Aspects", in Lillian Craig Harris (Ed.) (1988) Egypt: International challenge and regional stability (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)
5. Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (1984) Statistical Year Book 1952-1983, p.4. The total land area of Egypt is 997,739 square kilometres, of which 35,200 square kilometres are inhabited.
6. The Al Azhar 'fatwa' was an opinion on matters of religious law, produced by the theological authorities at Al Azhar.
7. Mourad Wahba, op.cit., p.17
8. Arab Republic of Egypt, Shura Council, Minutes of 28 December, 1982, p.30
9. Arab Republic of Egypt, Shura Council, Minutes of 4 March, 1984, p.30
10. Amro Muhye Al Din (1978) "The Evaluation of Industrial Strategy in Egypt and the Other Alternatives in the Future", in Development Strategy in Egypt: Papers and discussions of the second conference for Egyptian Economics, Cairo 24 - 26 March 1977 (Al Hayah Al Misriyah lil-Kitab, Cairo) p.178 (Arabic)
11. Ali Abdallah and Michael Brown, "Economy", in Lillian Craig Harris, op.cit., p.34
12. Ibid, p.31
13. Ibid, p.36
14. Anwar Abdel-Malek Egypt: Military society op.cit., p.xiii
15. Ibid, p.xiv
16. Ibid, p.xv
17. The Charter of National Action, Chapter 6

18. Ibid
19. Abdel Malek, op.cit., p.xvi
20. Adel Hussein (1985) Towards a New Arab Thinking: Nasserism, development and democracy (Dar Al Mustaqbal Al Araby, Cairo) p.162 (Arabic)
21. Galal Amin (1982) The Crisis of the Economy and Culture in Egypt (Al Markas Al Araby lil Bahth wa Al Nashr, Cairo) p.14 (Arabic)
22. Ibid, p.16
23. Ibid, pp.14-17
24. Abdel Fadil, The Political Economy of Nasserism, op.cit., pp.67-68
25. Ibid
26. Galal Amin, op.cit.
27. Aly Al Greitly (1977) Twenty five years: Analytical study for the economic policies in Egypt 1952-1977 (Al Hayah Al Misriyah lil Kitab, Cairo) p.39 (Arabic)
28. Ibid
29. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1983) Egypt Reconsidering Herself (Dar Al-Mostaqbal Al Araby, Cairo) p.42 (Arabic)
30. Ibid
31. Ibid
32. John Waterbury (1984) The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, op.cit., p.314
33. Ibid
34. Nazih N. Ayubi (1981) "The Development of the Political and Administrative System in Egypt 1952-1977" in Saad Eddin Ibrahim (Ed.) (1981) Egypt in a Quarter of a Century 1952-1977 (Al Maahad Al Araby Lil Inmaa, Beirut) pp.107-108 (Arabic)
35. Al Ahram Newspaper, 15 November 1968, quoted in R. Hararair Dekmejian (1977) Egypt Under Nasser (University of London, London) p.271
36. Ibid
37. Ibid
38. Nazih N.Ayubi, The Development of the Political and Administrative System in Egypt: 1952-1977, op.cit., p.103-105

39. Ahmed Abdalla (1985) The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973 (Al Saqi Books, London) pp.119-120
40. Waterbury, op.cit., p.343
41. Ibid, p.344
42. Ibid, p.346
43. October Paper 1974. In fact, the preparation for the open door policy started earlier than 1974, as can be seen, for example, in Law No. 65 on the investment of Arab capital and Free Zones. This law included guarantees against sequestration, nationalization or transfer to public use without compensation.
44. Gouda Abdel Khalek (1981) "Looking Outside or Turning Northwest? On the meaning and external dimension of Egypt's Infitah 1971-1980", Social Problems, Vol.28, No.4, April, p.395
45. Some economists have complained that, in spite of the presence of several statistical centres in Egypt, there are no figures for income distribution in the seventies. It would seem that this kind of information was deliberately neglected, and most of the information which is available comes from surveys of family budgets, which is usually based on limited samples. On this point see, Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil (1983) Reflections upon the Egyptian Economic Issue (Dar El-Mostaqbal El Araby, Cairo) p.129 (Arabic)
46. Muhammad El Tayeb (no date) "The Policies of Prices and Wages" in The Eighth Scientific Conference on Social Justice in the Light of Monetary and Economic Policies (The Institute of National Planning, Cairo) pp.1-3 (Arabic)
47. Mahmmoud Abdel Fadil Refelctions upon the Egyptian Economic Issue, op.cit., pp.86-87
48. Ibid, p.88
49. Ali E. Hillal (1981) "Policy Making in Egypt: A case study of the Open Door Economic Policy", in Social Problems, Vol.28, No.4, April, p.414
50. The World Bank advisor wrote, "There is a need to define the role of public decision-making in the national economy... reorienting government activities from a regulation of prices, production and foreign exchange allocation towards determining the main directions of the economy and the 'rules of the game' applicable to the public, private and foreign firms". He closed his report by stating clearly, "The recommendations made in this essay include determining the scope and operations of public, private and foreign firms, setting priorities in

infrastructure investment, decentralizing decision-making in public enterprise, and providing appropriate incentives through the reform of the exchange rate, interest rates, and product prices". See: Gouda Abdel Khalek, op.cit., pp.402-403

51. Ibid
52. In the first Consultative Group meeting the Egyptian Delegation announced that Egypt, within the framework of 'Infitah' has taken a number of measures to encourage the private sector: (a) amending Law 43 of 1974 to give more incentive to the private sector, (b) approving a large number of private sector projects in free zones, (c) ending the monopoly of foreign trade held by the public sector, (d) minimizing administrative obstacles confronting investors, and (e) activating the stock exchange. The Egyptian report continued, "In order to overcome the problems outlined above, as well as to strengthen the country's capacity to enunciate and implement bold and effective policies and programs, a major reordering of priorities is taking place in the context of the reconsideration of the 5 year development plan. The reordering of priorities after peace involves significant modifications in the direction and methods of economic management as well as in the pattern of Government investments and the role of the private sector". Ibid, p.404
53. By December 1975 four platforms were announced:  
 "Right" socialist and liberals, led by Mustafa Kamel Mourad,  
 "Left" progressive nationals, led by Khaled Muhy Al Din,  
 "Nasserist", Kamal Ahmed Muhammad, and  
 "Centre" socialist democrats, led by Mahmoud Abu Wafia (the brother-in-law of Sadat)
54. Waterbury, op.cit., p.365
55. Ibid, p.358
56. Sadat's National Democratic Party's basic goals were:  
 The building of a modern state founded in science and faith;  
 The affirmation of spiritual values;  
 The reconciliation of individual and collective interests;  
 The affirmation of national unity and social peace;  
 Striving for Arab unity;  
 The Shari'a as the principal source of law.  
 See Ibid, p.370
57. The laws, which replaced the Emergency Law, were:  
 In June 1978 the parliament approved a law directed at the opposition who had written or published critical articles abroad. It was a new kind of law for political isolation.

In May 1980, the Law of Shame was promulgated. The law was to protect the fundamental values of Egyptian society and to punish those who in any way violated them. Some of the offences included: "Allowing children or youths astray by advocating the repudiation of popular religious, moral, or national values, or by setting a bad example in a public place". Sadat issued this law when his policies were criticized by the opposition. He considered the critique to be a personal assault, and hence an assault on Egypt as a whole.

58. In 1977 Sadat closed two intellectual periodicals: "Al Kateb" and "Al Taliaa". In 1981 he closed the progressive party's newspaper "Al Ahaly".
59. Waterbury, op.cit., p.363
60. Derek Hopwood (1985) Egypt: Politics and society 1945-1984 op.cit., p.18
61. For Mubarak's complete speech at the conference, see Al-Ahram Iktisadi, Vol.684, 22 February, 1982 (Arabic)
62. For details of the discussions of the Egyptian economists see Ibid
63. Springborg, op.cit., p.259
64. Ibid, pp.259-260
65. Ibid, p.260
66. Ibid, p.3
67. Nazih N. Ayubi, "Domestic Politics", in Lillian Craig Harris, op.cit., p.63
68. William Zartman, "Opposition as Support of the State", in Adeed Dawisha and William Zartman (Eds.) (1988) Beyond Coercion: The durability of the Arab state (Croom Helm, New York) Vol.3, p.75
69. Mona Makram Ebeid (1987) "The Role of the Official Opposition": Paper presented at the Conference on Politics and the Economy in Egypt under Mubarak (SOAS, University of London, London) May 1987, p.1



## CHAPTER THREE

## STATE POWER AND CLASS FORMATION IN EGYPT

Introduction

In Chapter Two the analysis stopped at the level of identifying the economic and political policies which were associated with different models of development which have been applied in Egypt since 1952. Reference was also made to the impact of these policies on educational policies in Egypt, taking into account the fact that this influence is complicated, as it is mediated through class power and the state. This chapter will take the analysis one step further, giving a detailed analysis of the class formation of Egypt at the present time in relation to state power. This kind of analysis is essential to achieve a number of theoretical and practical goals:

- In theoretical terms, the identification of the class formation comes as a part of the study of class at its objective level, where the place of each social class in relation to the means of production is identified. The subjective aspect of class in terms of class culture, ideologies and consciousness, has been introduced. The general theoretical analysis of this approach has been set out in Chapter One. This chapter will deal with the specific case of Egyptian society.
- The class formation of Egypt is analyzed in relation to state power, since the approach adopted here to the study of class and education in Egypt shows the state to be central to any development plan, and the state also controls the education system and shapes educational policy, as has been explained earlier.

From that reality it is important to study the relationship between the state and social classes and to know how much power the state enjoys with regard to different classes. From this relationship can be deduced

the state's power in applying social, economic and educational policies. The place of each class in practising economic, cultural and ideological power can also be understood. Hence, their opportunities in defending and maintaining their economic, cultural and educational interests can be identified.

- In practical terms, the identification of Egypt's class formation is essential in order to prepare the categories for the analysis of the field study material, which will be analyzed using "class" as a prime classification and variable.

#### I. The Theoretical Background of the Study of the Class Formation of Egypt

The study of class formation in Egyptian society, as mentioned in Chapter One, will be influenced by the neo-Marxist approach to the study of class, especially the work of Poulantzas. Following him the analysis will take into account not only the economic position of social classes, but also will consider the political and ideological aspects. This will be covered through discussion of the conflict between the state power and social classes over economic, political, ideological and cultural interests.

In the analysis, four social classes will be identified. These are: the bourgeoisie, the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the new petty bourgeoisie, and the working class. In the analysis of these classes reference will be made to the different fractions of the bourgeoisie, to show how they differ in their amount of power in society. There will be, following Poulantzas, an analysis of the group of new wage earners whom Poulantzas calls the new petty bourgeoisie, which was referred to earlier in Chapter One. In this chapter it will be explained how this research coincides with or differs from some points in his analysis. In addition, this class will be given a more theoretical focus, since there is a debate around

the possibilities and capacities of this class in leading the modernization of Egypt. In the present research attention will also be directed to the working class and how this class can be divided into the proletariat and the lumpen-proletariat.

## II. The Historical Background of the Class Formation of Egypt

### (A) Class Formation and Egypt's Integration in the World Capitalist System

The discussion of class formation in Egypt cannot be understood away from the study of Egypt's integration in the World Capitalist System. Egypt's integration in the system means that the economic and social structure was controlled by the laws of the system. That is to say, in the centre, the development of the capitalist mode of production tended to destroy the former social classes to a certain extent and substitute two antagonistic classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.<sup>1</sup>

In the periphery, the situation was different. That is, the integration of the periphery in the World Capitalist System has created a weak bourgeois and proletariat. That is, both bourgeois and proletariat in the periphery had to work under the conditions of the system, i.e. to do what the division of labour inside the system allowed them to do. The activities that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat practice differ from one phase of the system to another. In the first phase of the imperialist system the periphery bourgeoisie was prohibited from investing in industry; it was allowed only to invest in agricultural production. In the second phase, and with the revision of the international division of labour, the bourgeoisie became allowed to invest in industry but in the mode of substitution for imports.<sup>2</sup>

This situation created a weak and dependent bourgeoisie, and divided the working class. Even so, the bourgeoisie of the periphery had to struggle for revision of the international

division of labour, but this struggle did not change the fact that the political parties of the bourgeoisie were unstable and weak.

Egypt, in this respect, shares many of the peripheral countries' main characteristics: the population is concentrated in rural areas and the agricultural sector dominates; the working class is fragmented, and mainly active in small firms, and there is a high level of unemployment.<sup>3</sup> Egypt was allowed to invest in light industry, depending upon foreign capital and technology.

Egypt's dependency was dictated by the British occupation, which allowed Egypt to specialize in cultivating cotton. Egypt was different from other colonies in one point, that is, it had a limited degree of capitalist development and a growing market, due to foreign capital investment in banks, insurance, trade and industry.<sup>4</sup>

This situation in Egypt created a bourgeoisie integrated with the imperialist power, sharing the main interests with the British occupation. The working masses were opposed to the occupation, and received much lower wages than the foreign workers inside and outside the country. So Egypt's integration in the World Capitalist System has resulted in a weak and divided bourgeoisie and working class.

#### (B) Changes in Egypt's Class Formation since the 1952 Revolution

After the 1952 revolution, the class formation of Egypt witnessed two major changes: the change in authority and the change in wealth. The change in authority came as a result of moving the authority from the hands of the king, the bourgeoisie and the British to the hands of the army and the state. The change in wealth, which also had an impact on the practice of authority and political power, came first as a result of the agrarian reform of 1952. It resulted in

undermining the power of the large land owners and the emergence of a new class of rich farmers who own from 20 to 50 feddan. The land reform limited the maximum ownership to 50 feddan.<sup>5</sup> About a million feddan were redistributed, which helped to improve the life of 342,000 families, mainly the families of tenant farmers and permanent wage labourers, but it did not do much for the poorest in rural Egypt, i.e. the unsettled rural workers.<sup>6</sup>

In 1961 came the nationalization of industry and the banks, which helped to liquidate the authority of the capitalists. At that time the public sector was established, and a greater number of bureaucrats and technocrats were needed to run the new projects. This resulted in the increase of the new petty bourgeoisie. The establishment of modern industry created a modern working class in Egypt.

These are the main changes in the class formation after 1952. The following is a detailed discussion of each social class before and after the Revolution, illustrating the relationship between the state and different classes.

### III. The Composition of the Present Class Formation of Egypt

#### (A) The Big Bourgeoisie

Before the Revolution the Egyptian bourgeoisie could be divided into two groups: The originally Egyptian and the Egyptianized bourgeoisie. The Egyptianized bourgeoisie came from Greek and Jewish origins. They were active in all non-agricultural activities, such as the stock market, export, wholesale trade, and they were opposed to the growth of the national Egyptian bourgeoisie.<sup>7</sup>

The Egyptian national bourgeoisie was developed in the context of the domination of the Egyptianized branch. The Egyptian bourgeoisie cooperated with the Egyptianized bourgeoisie and with the foreign interests. The activities that they were

allowed to do, according to the international division of labour, were, the cotton trade, banking, insurance, and in industry they were allowed textile manufacturing, mainly for cotton, food production associated with agriculture, and light industry such as paper, leather and glass.<sup>8</sup>

Politically, the Egyptian bourgeoisie were divided. The division was characterised by the absence of strong, coherent political parties. Instead, they formed numerous small political parties which resulted in their inability to constitute an independent political entity able to pose a solution to the crisis of independence and developing the society.<sup>9</sup>

After the 1952 Revolution, and according to the changes in wealth and authority which were set out above, the economic and political power of the bourgeoisie was restricted. However, in the early years of the Revolution, the new system decided to achieve development in nearly the same context as that which existed before the Revolution. Consequently, the Revolution gave a chance to the Egyptian bourgeoisie to share in the development programme.

The main domains which the bourgeoisie monopolized between 1952 and 1959 were construction, provision of marine transport, storage facilities for small scale manufacture and the assets required for financial, commercial and trading services.<sup>10</sup> Doing these activities, the traditional bourgeoisie could not give up its quick and high profits or abandon its traditional perspective of close association with western private capital.<sup>11</sup>

Because of this attitude, the relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie underwent a major change when the state sector was established in 1959, and later, in 1961, when most of the banking, industrial, financial and commercial enterprises were nationalized.

In political terms, the abolition of the political parties served to undermine the power of the bourgeoisie with regard to the power of the new regime. The bourgeoisie, in the early years of the Revolution could not control the state apparatus. They could not direct national development policies.<sup>12</sup> However, the bourgeoisie could penetrate the political organizations such as the Liberal Rally and the National Union by means of corruption.<sup>13</sup>

The economic and political measures taken by the new regime allowed a considerable degree of state autonomy. The increasing power of the state represented Nasser's influence over the state apparatus, and Nasser's view that an attempt should be made to place the state above class interests, so that the state was not representative of one class. In reality, this did not work without tensions and conflicts. There was a tension between the new regime and the old, established bourgeoisie, who resisted the new economic policies, and another tension between the state power and the state bourgeoisie, i.e. the managers of the public sector and the government executive organs, who were, for some time, the stronghold of Nasser and were his close associates.<sup>14</sup>

As mentioned earlier, these patterns of power and authority were not fixed. Up to 1967 the state still enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy from the interests of the bourgeoisie and the state bureaucrats and technocrats. After the defeat of 1967 the bourgeoisie, consisting of large landowners, businessmen, capitalists and elements of the state bureaucrats and technocrats, started to gain more power and to express their own interests and ideologies. They aimed towards a reassessment of the public sector, increasing opportunities for private and foreign capital, the export of Egyptian manpower and the promotion of emigration.<sup>15</sup>

After Nasser's death in 1970, Egypt under Sadat entered a new phase of her history. As mentioned earlier, Sadat's open door policy had economic and social consequences. Even today, there

is no consensus on the exact effects this had on the relationship between state power and the bourgeoisie. In some views, exemplified by the view John Waterbury set out earlier, *the state* is autonomous from different social forces.<sup>16</sup> On the opposing view, there is a belief that after the open door policy the bourgeoisie enjoyed increasing power, and that they could influence decision making.<sup>17</sup>

The problem in deciding what is the actual position of the bourgeoisie in Egypt is that evidence exists which supports both cases: on the one hand there is the increasing power of the bourgeoisie, on the other the increasing autonomy of the state. For example, the way in which state revenue is spent can be seen as favourable to the bourgeoisie and taken as a sign of their increasing power.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, the power of the state appears to have increased to the point where the state could launch an attack on the Islamic bourgeoisie in 1986.<sup>19</sup>

Many examples like these can be found to support either view. In order to reach a conclusion it is necessary to study the reality of the bourgeoisie in Egypt under Mubarak today. Through such a study it can be seen whether they constitute a coherent class in terms of their activities, political power and culture. Any such coherence will be influenced by historical factors, and the traditional division of the bourgeoisie into different economic, social and political tendencies. Consequently the present bourgeoisie must be treated in two main sections: the secular bourgeoisie and the Islamic bourgeoisie.

What distinguishes the secular from the Islamic bourgeoisie is the Islamic character and the kind of financial activities practised by the Islamic bourgeoisie, who are, for example, absent from the financial and economic organizations used by the secular bourgeoisie such as the chambers of commerce and councils of businessmen.<sup>20</sup>



(i) The Secular Bourgeoisie

In discussing the secular bourgeoisie in terms of their power, several different fractions must be identified. That is, after the 1952 Revolution, the commercial bourgeoisie and those who were involved in trade could keep their position as the most prosperous fraction of the Egyptian bourgeoisie since the Revolution attacked the economic and political power of the landowners and the industrial bourgeoisie. This attack has taken the form of agrarian reform, the nationalization of industry and the establishment of the state sector.<sup>21</sup> With the open door policy the commercial bourgeoisie has benefited from the new policy, which mainly encouraged the commercial activities through new laws on investment and import-export regulations.<sup>22</sup>

In terms of political power, some of the commercial bourgeoisie have exercised overt political activities, such as ministerial responsibility, or indirect political power, through their contacts, family and friendship relations. They could exert political influence through their individual and collective participation in a number of legislative, planning and advisory organs.<sup>23</sup>

While the commercial bourgeoisie has enjoyed more opportunities to act, the industrial bourgeoisie has been controlled by nationalization and the state sector. Under the open door policy they did not get many opportunities, as they were restricted to work in the small and intermediate industries which were connected to foreign investment.<sup>24</sup>

Apart from the differences in activities and political power between the different fractions of the bourgeoisie, other differences appear in cultural aspects, including religion, education, places of residence and social background.<sup>25</sup>

At the present time, however, there is some evidence which suggests that the secular bourgeoisie is moving towards

becoming more coherent. This can be seen in the coalition of businessmen in joint venture banks, which bring together businessmen who started their activities with the open door policy with foreigners and Egyptians from the old aristocratic families who were harmed by Nasser's regime. The other evidence is the increasing organizational activity of the bourgeoisie, such as the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Industry.<sup>26</sup> So the secular section of the bourgeoisie is gaining more power, and to a certain extent moving towards more coherence, but not yet to the extent that would make it certain that they could control the state.

(ii) The Islamic Bourgeoisie

These are distinguished culturally by their Islamic character and by the Islamic nature of their economic activities, which mean that they operate on Islamic principles, which does not allow for usury in the profit given to investors. By this Islamic character they could attract the savings of those Egyptians who were working in the Arab oil countries. In 1977 the number of investors was estimated to be one million.<sup>27</sup>

The activities of the Islamic bourgeoisie are concentrated in two main fields, banking and what are called investment companies. The investment companies started with the open door policy in 1974. In order to protect themselves from government attacks, they claimed that they invested in activities which were going to help Egypt's economic problems and represent essential needs for the public. These activities are the stock exchange, food production (dairy farms, poultry installations, bakeries) and housing.

In spite of the claims that they work in these productive and vital activities, the Islamic banks and companies were first attacked for illegal activities by the left wing newspaper "Al-Ahaly", which maintained they had smuggled about 16 billion pounds out of the country and invested them abroad in the world capitalist market and stock exchanges, and exposed

such parasitic activities as speculation on the Egyptian pound and working on the black market for hard currency.<sup>28</sup>

Like the secular bourgeoisie, cultural and political divisions can be found in the Islamic bourgeoisie. These differences appear between those who are engaged in Islamic bank activities and those who run the Islamic investment companies. Those who are associated with Islamic banks are more likely to come from upper class origins than those who are associated with Islamic companies. Those who are in the Islamic banks keep themselves distant, socially and politically, from those who are in investment companies, since they consider them to be new rich and competing with them for investments.<sup>29</sup>

In terms of political relations, those who are engaged in Islamic banks are more associated with traditional Muslim Brothers and the National Democratic Party, while those who are in investment companies are more connected to the more radical Islamic movement.<sup>30</sup> This point will be illustrated more fully later.

Those who work in the Islamic companies could penetrate the state apparatus and make strong relations with some government executives, and they hired the religious leaders of Al Azhar in order to give fatwa, i.e Islamic legal opinion, that the activities of their companies truly follow Islamic law.<sup>31</sup>

The activities of both the secular and Islamic bourgeoisie are giving signals of the tendency of this class to organize itself by establishing their own organizations which can defend their interests and consolidate their power.

#### (B) The Petty Bourgeoisie

The analysis of the category of the petty bourgeoisie as an intermediate class has been given a great deal of attention by Poulantzas, as was explained in Chapter One. In his analysis of the petty bourgeoisie, Poulantzas has identified

two groups of petty bourgeoisie. These are the traditional and the new petty bourgeoisie. However, in the final analysis, he combined both of them in one class, and stressed their unity. Poulantzas' unification of the two classes raises some theoretical problems, especially when it comes to the question of applying the analysis to the Egyptian class formation. It will be argued that it is important to separate the two groups as having different class positions at the objective and subjective levels of class, as will be explained below.

From the point of view of this research, the two classes of the traditional and new petty bourgeoisie are not only occupying different economic positions, but also are different in the effect which the expansion of monopoly capitalism has had on them. The traditional petty bourgeoisie is constantly threatened by the growth of monopoly capitalism, while the new petty bourgeoisie is dependent upon monopoly capitalism and its relations with the state for its reproduction.<sup>32</sup>

If one looks at the case of Egypt, one sees that the traditional petty bourgeoisie were harmed by the open door policy, and were threatened by big industry and foreign capital. The discussion of the new petty bourgeoisie in Egypt will show how they developed and expanded under the establishment of modern industry and large production. In terms of interests, it will be shown that the new petty bourgeoisie, especially those who occupy senior positions in the state and government, could benefit from the new open door policy by collaborating with the big bourgeoisie and take advantage of the foreign sector in the Egyptian economy which opened new job opportunities for them, while it threatened the interests of the traditional petty bourgeoisie. The new petty bourgeoisie has, in general, an interest in the expansion of the state, while the traditional petty bourgeoisie are generally worried by and less interested in big government and large state expenditures.<sup>33</sup>

In political terms, it will be shown that the traditional petty bourgeoisie are mainly likely to be recruited into fundamentalist Muslim groups. In contrast, the new petty bourgeoisie are more likely to be organized through the political parties.

Another feature which differentiates the two classes is a cultural one. The educated new petty bourgeoisie have a different way and style of life, and attitudes which, in general, are more orientated towards the west than the traditional petty bourgeoisie.

This theoretical discussion of the identification of the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie has been necessary in order to provide the theoretical underpinning, and to give an explanation, of the classification of the two groups in different social classes.

It is worth noting as well that the analysis of the Egyptian new petty bourgeoisie tends to depart from Poulantzas' identification which combines the two classes. The analysis followed here will be nearer to those who speak of a new middle class as a mediating pillar and as a basic stabilizing force in society.

#### (i) The Traditional Petty Bourgeoisie

The traditional petty bourgeoisie consists of those who possess a small amount of capital which enables them to live from their own work without having to sell their labour power and without buying the labour power of others, except marginally.<sup>34</sup>

The history of the traditional petty bourgeoisie before the Revolution shows that this group of small owners suffered oppression from the foreign power, the big and middle bourgeoisie.

After the 1952 Revolution, this class changed in terms of its weight and size. The change came as a result of the building of modern industry and the state sector of the economy, which needed bureaucrats and technocrats to run it. This led to expansion of the new petty bourgeoisie. However, this did not mean that the traditional petty bourgeoisie had no role in production. On the contrary, there are still large numbers of small shopkeepers working and engaged in handicrafts, repairs, service and small scale commodity production. Appendix 6 shows the structural duality in the composition of establishments according to the number of persons employed. While one finds modern large and medium sized factories form the core of manufacturing industry in Egypt, this core is surrounded by a large fringe of small businesses.<sup>35</sup>

From the table, the predominance of establishments which employ only one person can be seen. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates a clear trend in the decline of the relative importance of small establishments in the 1960s.<sup>36</sup>

The figures show that, although the percentage share of establishments employing ratio of establishments employing 2 to 9 persons to the total number of establishments employing 2 or more persons remained more or less the same over the period 1960 to 1964, the relative share of the smaller businesses in the percentage of employment declined from 59 per cent to 45 per cent. Moreover, the share in employment of establishment which employed twenty persons or more went up from 41 per cent to 55 per cent over the same period.<sup>37</sup>

More recent figures from the World Bank for 1980 show that the small scale industries, i.e. those employing between 10 and 50 workers, accounted for about one third of the total value added generated by industry, and 54 per cent of the total industrial employment, while the artisan sector, which includes small firms which employ 1 to 9 workers, employed around one third of a million workers.<sup>38</sup> (See Appendix 7)

## Interests, Ideologies and Political Power of the Traditional Bourgeoisie

The position of the petty bourgeoisie in Egypt is a contradictory and complicated one. As owners, they have a privileged position in a society where the majority do not own any instrument of labour. However, before the Revolution they were defenceless against the political and economic pressure exerted by the interests which dominated the Egyptian market.<sup>39</sup>

In this context, they found themselves in a contradictory position: that is, they could not be promoted to capitalists, and at the same time they were more and more driven into the ranks of the working class and the disinherited.<sup>40</sup> They are ideologically and politically in conflict, caught between supporting the bourgeoisie who oppress them, and at the same time represent the ideal example for them, or supporting the working class which they afraid to fall down into.

Under the open door policy of the seventies, the small scale firms were threatened by the modern larger ones. the new economic policy favoured the modern large firms and restricted the smaller firms' access to credit and raw materials.<sup>41</sup>

They had to fight to survive under such conditions, by absorbing the reductions in remuneration and the deterioration in working conditions, where workers in these firms had to work longer hours for less pay than those who work in large modern industries.<sup>42</sup>

So, in terms of their interests and benefits in general, they did not benefit from the open door policy as much as the large, modern and foreign projects in the country.

The situation and desperation of those who work in the small firms and of those who own them have political and social consequences. This group is economically productive, even though it is ignored by the government and is socially

marginal. From this situation they are a greater threat to political stability than peasants or workers in modern industries who are organized into unions and have different means of protest. That is to say, this group are not engaged in the protest activities and strikes practised by industrial workers, and are more likely to be recruited into the militant Islamic groups.<sup>43</sup> This point will be explained in more detail as part of the discussion of the political power of the bourgeoisie.

(ii) The New Petty Bourgeoisie

As mentioned earlier, the petty bourgeoisie is divided into two groups, the traditional and the new. The new, or the modern, group of the petty bourgeoisie are referred to in a number of different ways in the Egyptian literature. They are called the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the new middle class and the state bourgeoisie. All those who use these terms mean to speak about this group of wage earners who work in the government, public sector, administration, military and technical cadres and those who have intellectual and cultural skills.

The rise of this group in Egypt and in the Middle East has attracted the attention of some writers like Manfred Halpern who noticed the emergence of a new social class which can work as revolutionary and is 'potentially' a stabilizing force.<sup>44</sup>

This is supported by the realization that the leadership in all areas of Middle East life is increasingly seized by a class of men inspired by non-traditional knowledge, and this group is clustered around a core of salaried civilian and military politicians, organisers, administrators and experts.<sup>45</sup>

However, the new class does not consist of one group. Rather different interests and concerns can be found inside the different strata of this class. While some are interested in ideas, action, and careers, and represent the most influential



core of this class, other strata are mainly concerned with safe careers, like clerks.<sup>46</sup>

The idea of the rise of a new class in the middle East and in Egypt as the potential power which going to lead society, has come under attack from others like Amos Perlmutter, who argues that, in the case of Egypt, neither the new middle class nor the army, after 1952, are even potentially one social, ideological or political class. They are not cohesive, and consequently they are not a source of stabilization and are unable to modernize society.<sup>47</sup>

He developed his argument from his analysis of the policies and the role this class played in Egypt. He considered that this class has failed in mobilizing people and in increasing the political participation of the masses, and that stability in Egypt was due to the traditional political apathy, coercion and dependent bureaucracy rather than consolidation of social and political groups.<sup>48</sup>

In spite of this critique, Perlmutter admits that Nasser and his followers in Egypt worked to change and modernize the country. He says "Nasser's inner circle has moved Egypt to a point of no return, is unquestionable that they are modernizers is a fact."<sup>49</sup>

This sentence contradicts Perlmutter's other conclusions that there is no need to look to a class other than the traditional middle class to understand social change in Egypt.<sup>50</sup> In effect, Perlmutter admits that there is a group in Egypt who are modernizers, and it is clear that the group of Nasser and his followers were not traditional middle class.

In fact, the view that there is not a new class in Egypt and in the Middle East makes it very difficult to understand who shapes politics and makes the fundamental decisions in this area, and this may lead to a simplistic understanding of these changes as merely performed by individual personalities.

From the viewpoint of this research, changes in the Middle East and in Egypt in particular must be understood in terms of their class content. The following historical analysis of the role of the new class in Egypt since Muhammad Aly until the present time will illustrate the extent to which this class could carry out the modernization process, what kind of challenges it had to face and what choices and kind of alliances it went through.

#### The History of the New Petty Bourgeoisie in Egypt

The history of the new petty bourgeoisie can be traced back to the era of Muhammad Aly (1805-1849). By acquiring modern education a secularly educated group was created and occupied the important positions in the military and civil state apparatuses as well as in the all production and service institutions. That is, since Muhammad Aly, a group of technocrats, bureaucrats and professionals was created to run his project of modernization.<sup>51</sup>

By creating this group Muhammad Aly attacked the traditional middle class of Aulama, Shekhs and merchants whose political role was restricted and the last significant role they played was leading the resistance against the French expedition at the end of the eighteenth century.

The creation and the formation of the new class in Egypt is different from that in Europe, since in Egypt it was created by modern education, and it did not start with commercial activities and making capital and then move to modern industry, as was the case in Europe. So, the difference between the new class in Egypt and in the Middle East in general, in contrast with their counterparts in the West, is that Egypt and the Middle East moved into the modern administration age before it reached the machine age. The salaried middle class attained power before it attained assurance of status, order, security or prosperity.

Consequently, this class uses its power not to defend order and prosperity but to create them.<sup>52</sup>

In the struggle to build its political, economic and social power, the new class in Egypt had made three attempts to control state power and the state apparatus.

The first attempt was the Auraby revolution (1879-1882): at this time Egypt was under the rule of Ismail, who was ambitious to modernize Egypt on the western model. The new class became more ambitious and they felt that they had an important role to play. However, Ismail's policies of modernization brought Egypt into debt and led to more foreign influence which ended with the British occupation in 1882.<sup>53</sup>

This situation led Auraby and his colleagues in the army to lead a revolution which demanded two main things: the maintenance of the national independence and the establishment of the constitution. This attempt was defeated by the foreign powers.

The second attempt by the new class at the political level was in the 1919 revolution led by Saad Zaghlol, who mobilized people in the cities and villages. This time they had the same demands as the previous movement, that is the independence and the constitution.<sup>54</sup>

This time, the movement of the new class succeeded in achieving partial independence in 1922 and the constitution in 1923. However, these gains allowed only the upper strata of this class to play a political role, while the middle and lower strata remained isolated from practising a political role.<sup>55</sup>

The upper strata of this class, which was allied at the beginning with the middle and lower strata, turned against this alliance after they gained political power and changed their alliance to the palace and the British occupation power.

As a result they became more isolated from the middle and lower strata.<sup>56</sup>

From the movements of the new class it can be noticed that they did not go for a comprehensive programme of change at all political, economic and social levels. Rather, they concentrated on the demands of independence and democracy, which were very urgent at that time because of the challenge of the foreign occupation of the country.

The split in the new class between the upper strata on the one side and the middle and lower strata on the other side, led the latter strata to form their own organisations in the forties of this century. These organisations included the Muslim Brothers, Young Egypt and the Marxist group. Through these organisations the new petty bourgeois intellectuals from the middle and lower strata led the resistance against the British occupation, since they had no interest in the survival of the oppressive system, while they had an interest in the growth of national capitalism which enabled them to achieve higher social levels. That is to say, the expanding capitalist system would need middle level cadres and intellectuals and cultural spokesmen.

In these circumstances, and by the intellectuals' efforts, cultural life revived with a critique of the existing social, political and economic system; students' and workers' movements increased. This atmosphere led to the emergence of more demands from the national movement. That is, beside the demands of national independence and democracy, more demands of social equality and justice, cultural authenticity and more Arab Unity emerged.<sup>57</sup>

In these circumstances the new class launched its third move and attempted to gain political power and control state power and the state apparatus in the 1952 Revolution, which brought the new class into power.

Under Nasser and after the establishment of the state sector and the nationalization movement, this class has expanded in number and gained many benefits under the socialist system, especially on the level of the professionals and the top managerial level. The expansion of the professions can be measured by the increasing membership of different syndicates, in particular in the period from 1962 to 1972, where in some specializations numbers were doubled (as in the case of teachers) or tripled (in the case of engineers). For more details see Appendix 8.

It can be seen that some of the professionals have gained authority and an effective political voice, as is the case with engineers, especially after the expansion of modern industry under the state bourgeoisie.

The second group which has witnessed an expansion in size, authority and benefits was the managers. They are classified into a hierarchy of levels which imply different authorities and responsibilities. The top managerial jobs are those required to coordinate and integrate diverse functions.<sup>58</sup> Administrative and supervisory jobs are those primarily concerned with running activities and monitoring results against policy objectives. In between, holders of middle management jobs are concerned with organizing, staffing and directing to achieve policy aims.<sup>59</sup>

The standard of education for this group is high. Among the managers employed, about 20,000 (57.7 per cent) had received a university degree (including about 400 with post graduate degrees).<sup>60</sup> This shows that this stratum of the petty bourgeoisie does not only occupy important positions for policy implementation, but they are among the most highly qualified in a society in which more than fifty per cent of the population is still illiterate.

One other privileged group inside the new petty bourgeoisie is the "special cadres". This term covers people who work in

the army, police, judicial bodies, the staff of universities and research institutes, and members of the diplomatic and consular service.<sup>61</sup> The privileges they have include a higher salary than other employees with the same qualifications. They also get special allowances attached to certain groups in top administrative and specialized jobs.<sup>62</sup> The number of employees who enjoyed these privileges rose from 42,064 in 1961 to 212,028 in 1971/72.

At the top of the new petty bourgeoisie in Egypt stand those who can be called the elite of the petty bourgeoisie. They can be divided into three groups, occupying different positions, practising different power, and gaining different interests.

The top elite comprises the Prime Minister, other important ministers, the military command, top army leaders and presidential advisers.<sup>63</sup> They mainly have control over the creation of state policies in the political apparatus, and the production of ideology in the ideological apparatus.

The middle elite consists of ministers and governors of the provinces. They have authority in their own domains, but still depend for their tenure upon the president.<sup>64</sup> They are involved in the execution of state policies and the dissemination of ideology.

The sub-elite are the group which is supposed to link the elite to the population, and comprises the civil servants in the various departments of state, commanders of military units, public sector managers, editors of newspapers and the leaders of syndicates and chambers of commerce, and the local notables who head branches of the state party.<sup>65</sup> They have different ideological roles. For example, editors of newspapers are working to produce and disseminate ideology, while a group like the civil servants are excluded from creating or disseminating ideology.

From the figures and numbers, it is clear that the new class which emerged under Muhammad Aly at the beginning of the nineteenth century has reached its great expansion and gained political power and controlled state apparatuses in the middle of the twentieth century. However, the role of this class in leading modernization and in changing society was not totally successful. It was influenced by the divisions inside this class and by internal and international challenges which it had to face. That is, any project for modernizing society must involve painful decisions about who shall receive rewards and who shall not and what kind of targets and needs are to be satisfied immediately and which ones to be postponed.<sup>66</sup>

This kind of choice may create divisions inside the strata of this class since they are not all expected to have the same views. At the same time they will create in society some alliances and some enemies between those who benefited and those who were harmed.

The new class under the leadership of Nasser made its choices and alliances among the farmers and workers and the lower strata of the new class. However, in setting their priorities, Nasser and his followers gave more priority to the issues of social justice, independence, development and Arab Unity while the issue of democracy was postponed.<sup>67</sup>

At this point we can understand, in contrast with Perlmutter, that the new class did not fail. It was not that it was incapable of leading development. Rather it had to decide priorities, in response to the internal demands of the situation and the international pressures. The combination of these considerations brought issues of social justice, and of the wide gap between different people, to the fore. It also accentuated the importance of the defence of national independence, and the resistance of foreign hostility.

After the 1967 defeat, the new class has entered a critical phase of its history, marked by a crisis in identity and doubt

in their abilities to lead the country. This has been linked to a growing attack from other social powers, in particular the pre-revolutionary bourgeois, who claimed that this class is not capable of leading the country. This paved the way for the later changes in the new class alliance and priorities, under Sadat in particular, after the open door policy in 1974.

The new alliance comprised:

1. The middle class, civilian and military who made very good use of the Revolution and benefited from it socially and politically but were looking for more political and economic power.
2. The remains of the pre-revolution upper class who were harmed by the Revolution's land reform and nationalization.
3. The new rich of the entrepreneurs and wholesale and merchants.
4. Those who work in the Arab oil countries and wanted to invest their savings.<sup>68</sup>

These four groups which formed the alliance came from different class backgrounds. They have no common history and they do not occupy the same position in relation to the means of production. However, they were united by one main target, that is, to make wealth and to increase their economic and political power in Egypt.

The priorities which the new class with its new alliances has decided for Egypt are democracy and the cultural authenticity, while it postponed the issue of social justice and Arab Unity. And even the two issues which they claimed to adopt i.e. democracy and cultural authenticity, have not been fully achieved, since the political parties did not actually share in the political life which remained dominated by one party. This did not increase mass participation. In terms of cultural authenticity, Egypt became more dependent in the West than before.



The new alliance was led by the new class, especially the elements of the top and middle elite, who became a conservative power under Sadat and the open door policy. They became anti-socialist, more inclined towards the west, more resistant to the redistribution of resources which began under Nasser, and they also supported the market policy and privatization.<sup>69</sup>

The top and middle elite have moved to this conservative ideology for some objective reasons, i.e. the changes which took place under the open door policy, which opened up new possibilities for them to work in foreign companies and banks, and to have some private commercial activities.

The lower strata, especially the civil servants, have seen their standard of living decline because of inflation, and the high prices and low salaries. The emigration to the Arab oil countries has opened the door for these strata to achieve social advancement and not fall down completely.<sup>70</sup>

The history of the new class that has been presented so far shows that this class, for more than a century, was continuously attempting to obtain economic, social and political power, until it finally succeeded in 1952. The attempts of this class in modernizing Egypt show differences and divisions inside the class in determining the priorities and which issues should come first and what kind of social alliance they should go into.

These challenges and failures throughout the history of the new class in Egypt raises important questions about the ability and the capacities of this class to lead modernization in Egypt. In particular, in comparison with the power of other social classes like the big bourgeoisie, the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class, it raises questions about the kind of alliance that this class will go for. These questions will be addressed in the field study of this research, where it may be possible to throw light upon aspects

of consciousness, agreement and disagreements among the members of this class concerning political, economic and educational matters in Egypt. In addition, the kind of policies, particularly in the educational field, that they are more likely to support will be examined. Taking into account that the results will be drawn from a limited sample, it will not be possible to make sweeping generalizations on any of these matters.

### **The Political Power of the Bourgeoisie Facing the State**

The Egyptian bourgeoisie is politically divided and her political parties constitute a weak opposition. The existing parties could not succeed in recruiting members from other social classes such as farmers and workers. The political efforts of the bourgeoisie are channelled in a variety of directions. Four different parties with different ideologies and class representation can be identified.

The National Democratic Party was headed by Sadat, and he was followed by Mubarak. The party is the party of government. In terms of power, it holds the presidency and all the government power. The party is composed of officials, functionaries, technocrats, and increasingly traders, contractors and rural magnates.<sup>71</sup>

From its composition the party has attracted the big bourgeoisie in urban and rural Egypt and some elements of parasitic "Infitah" bourgeoisie. Although the party maintains 50 per cent representation for farmers and workers, the party is more influenced by the interests of the big bourgeoisie.

The Wafd Party is a reformation of the pre-Revolutionary Egyptian Wafd Party founded in 1918. The party presents itself as the party of individual freedom and "true" capitalism: they are anti-Nasserist.<sup>72</sup> It usually attracts the Copts, rural middle class and urban liberal professions, mainly lawyers.<sup>73</sup> The Wafd Party, like the National Democratic Party, also

attracts the parasitic bourgeoisie who are too removed from the centres of state power to become truly parasitic.<sup>74</sup>

The Socialist Labour Party was created by Sadat in 1978 to represent a tame opposition. The party is an extension of the pre-Revolutionary populist Islamic Young Egypt Party, founded in 1933.<sup>75</sup> It is difficult to identify which social classes this party represents, since it cannot claim that it represents the farmers, the workers, or the petty bourgeoisie. In a survey about the class bases of political parties, 35 of Egypt's leading scientists gave the following answers about the social categories which the SLP represents: 18 said, "None"; 7 said, "The middle class"; 3 said, "Capitalists"; and 2 said, "Workers".<sup>76</sup> The party has a clear Islamic orientation. It went into coalition with the Muslim Brothers in 1987, which secured them some seats in the People's Assembly.<sup>77</sup>

Influenced by their coalition with the Muslim Brothers, they had to neglect policies on socialism and Arab unity, in favour of putting more emphasis upon relations with the Islamic World and the struggle to apply the Shariaa law.<sup>78</sup> This reflects the growing influence of the Muslim Brothers in Egyptian politics following their entry into parliament. With their Islamic slogans they meant to attract the majority of ordinary, illiterate people.<sup>79</sup>

The Liberal Socialist Party is a fundamentalist party, supposed to represent the "National Bourgeoisie". They went into coalition with the Labour Party and Muslim Brothers in 1987, which gave them 11 seats in the People's Assembly.

The Nationalist Progressive Unionist Party is the most left wing of the political parties. The main recruiting ground and base of support is to be found among socially mobile people of modest background (sons of workers and peasants) who work in public sector industry and government administration. The majority of active members are recruited from the ranks of the lower level white collar employees, i.e. the new petty

bourgeoisie and the intellectuals.<sup>80</sup> Ideologically it represents the alliance between Marxists, some Nasserists and the few progressive religious scholars.<sup>81</sup>

The main task facing this party is how to establish itself in rural Egypt and in industrial areas. This is not an easy task because there is no opportunity for the opposition parties in general and the progressive party in particular to reach the people through the mass media, which are dominated by the government. Radio and television, especially, are government controlled, and they suffer from other restrictions which were explained in Chapter Two.

From the social background and the class bases of the political parties of the bourgeoisie it is clear that neither the government party, the NDP, nor the opposition parties could attract the working class or farmers. The bourgeois parties are politically divided between the government and the opposition, and subdivided into corporate and pluralist groups. Although the Egyptian bourgeoisie represent the only politically articulated class, they are still lacking the cohesion to reach the point of dominating the state.<sup>82</sup>

Discussing the political power of the bourgeoisie through their political parties must lead on to a discussion of one important phenomenon in Egyptian politics, which is the rising power and influence of the Islamic movement. It appears, in comparison with the political parties of the bourgeoisie as the political power which is challenging the state, both by its violent activities and by the kind of economic and social services they advocate for the local people.

It is also important to look at the social background of those who are recruited into this movement to know what kind of political organizations in Egypt are able to recruit the lower classes. The Islamic movement is divided between the old branch of Muslim Brothers and the militant groups. The main target for both is to replace the secular government with an

Islamic one. The different Islamic groups have different roles to play. Those who use violence are working to undermine the state apparatus and public confidence in the state.<sup>83</sup>

The moderates of the Islamic movement represent the legal face of participation in the existing political system, and they went into alliance with the SLP in order to get the opportunity to be represented in parliament. However, the Islamic movement is not only working at the political level, but is also gaining social power by participating in community services. The Islamic banks, investment companies and the organizations which collect alms, "Zakat", all together are involved in providing health, education and welfare services.<sup>84</sup> The provision of such social services in a poor, needy community, challenges the state structure and the credibility and legitimacy of the government.<sup>85</sup>

If one turns to the ideological aspect of this movement, one finds that the Islamic movement represents a conservative ideology. That is, they do not intend to shake up the existing class formation, and they are not committed to a major socio-economic transformation in society.

This appears in a questionnaire answered by their representatives about different social and economic issues. When asked about their views on changes to existing tenancy laws, none of the representatives expressed any interest in rural Egypt in general, or in the problems of the peasants in particular. None of them saw illiteracy as a critical problem, and they would prefer the private sector rather than the public sector be responsible for solving economic problems.<sup>86</sup>

The Islamic movement recruits elements of the traditional petty bourgeoisie such as craftsmen and lower middle classes such as clerks and junior employees. The orientation towards this type of protest and political activity is created by the mode of production under which they are organized and produce. They work in small workshops where kinship and other

primordial relations tie the employer to the employed, and this works against such collective protest behaviour as might force the government to change policies.<sup>87</sup> The kind of residential intimacy of their work conditions helps them to form small groups of dedicated members, which in another step can be integrated into a large movement which forms the base for many of the Islamic groups.<sup>88</sup>

One of the Islamic organizations which was arrested in 1985 had 73 members. The social background of the members showed that only one was a peasant, another a factory worker, and a third a construction worker. The remainder were self-employed or working in small firms and traditional artisans. Over 40 per cent of the group were furniture workers, blacksmiths, gunsmiths, tailors, painters, waiters and drivers.<sup>89</sup>

So the traditional petty bourgeoisie in Egypt is not only involved in an old traditional mode of production, but also represents a conservative political power and ideology.

In summary, the political power of the bourgeoisie is divided between the parties of the secular bourgeoisie and Muslim fundamentalism. From the discussion it is clear that, in terms of state autonomy, the state is not yet a tool in the hands of the big bourgeoisie. The relationship between the state and the big bourgeoisie at the present time is very complicated. It is a continuous struggle to gain hegemony over economic and political issues.

Under Mubarak, the government has taken some measures to control those of the bourgeoisie who started their activities under the open door policy, and were very powerful under Sadat. However, their power and influence has not been eliminated, since both the secular and the Islamic bourgeoisie could consolidate their economic and political power through corruption, nepotism, kinship and friendship relations, and through their relations with the international bourgeoisie.

From the discussion it is clear that the relationship between the state and the big bourgeoisie has taken different forms. Under Nasser the state enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy, and could attack the interests of the bourgeoisie, while under Sadat and Mubarak, and with the capitalist economic system, the Egyptian bourgeoisie is gaining more power and influence.

While the traditional petty bourgeoisie has declined in number due to the modern projects established in the state sector, and under the open door policy, they did not benefit that much when compared to the big bourgeoisie. So, they turned, in their opposition to the state, to militant activities which present a threat to state stability.

The new petty bourgeoisie are themselves in power and control both state power and the state apparatus. They entered into different alliances during different historical periods. Their control of state power and the state apparatus has been used to face the threat and the challenge from the growing organizations of the big bourgeoisie and the militant activities which include the traditional petty bourgeoisie.

#### (C) The Urban Proletariat

Made up of the non-agricultural manual workers engaged in the manufacturing industries, construction, railways, ports, public utilities and services within the organized sector, the proletariat are wage earners and they sell their labour power.<sup>90</sup>

The working class in Egypt is divided into two groups; the industrial workers who enjoy stable occupation and a regular income, and the sub-proletariat or lumpen proletariat. If one studies the history of the working class in Egypt, one finds that the industrial workers are expected to be the most organized and conscious group. This is because of their integration into concentrated units of production where a relationship to mechanized social means of production is

established. They live and work in largely undifferentiated and collective conditions, which might help them to take collective action.<sup>91</sup>

The Egyptian proletariat has developed under colonization and their organizations were established under the authority of the foreign power in Egypt. The membership of unions was exclusive to foreign workers. This situation changed after the Second World War.<sup>92</sup>

Getting their independence from foreign workers, they fell under the national bourgeoisie's authority. who were the leaders of the nationalist movement after the Second World War. The proletariat were a social power which was seen by the national bourgeoisie to be an important power to be won. For example, in 1947 the Wafd government enacted for the first time legislation to recognize trade unions, in an attempt to win labour's political support against the king.<sup>93</sup>

The membership of workers' unions, which were established in the nineteenth century, started to attract the Egyptian workers, and the numbers grew slowly because the British and the Palace saw the labour movement as a threat to political security.<sup>94</sup> However, the numbers grew. By 1911 there were 11 unions with about 7,000 members. In 1947 there were 91,604 trade union members, and by 1955 the number had increased to 373,000.<sup>95</sup>

The development of the Egyptian proletariat in number and as an organized group has helped them to play an important role in fighting against British rule in Egypt, especially after the Second World War.

In the period from 1945 to 1947 the proletariat, in an alliance with students, struggled for the withdrawal of the British and against oppression. This fight took the form of mass demonstrations and the ideological and political mobilization of the masses for armed struggle over the Canal.<sup>96</sup>



The workers' struggle started to take a violent form. This was mainly in the big factories controlled by the Misr Bank. This struggle posed a direct threat and challenge to the stronghold of the Egyptian big bourgeoisie.<sup>97</sup>

This history shows that the Egyptian working class has shown that under worsening living conditions they are willing to face state power and to protest to defend themselves and to take direct action against the government. Examples of such action under Mubarak are many. In 1985 about 50,000 workers participated in 44 strikes, sit-in protests and confrontations with the authorities.<sup>98</sup>

The numbers of workers who go on such strikes has increased due to the worsening conditions of living, and work regulations. For example, in 1986, the number of protestors reached 100,000 workers. They succeeded in closing down the textile mill in Cairo.<sup>99</sup> Railway workers have shared in the protest and have closed down the service in 1986.

The question is how these protests and movements can be evaluated, and what amount of political power they reflect. This kind of protest reflects the fact that workers in modern industry are more likely to take collective protest action through strikes. They are different from the traditional workers and craftsmen, who are more likely to be recruited into the fundamentalist Muslim groups. The workers' protests do not mean that the working class is moving towards revolutionary action, or even widespread rebellion, since their disruption of industrial production is mainly carried out to achieve economic rather than general political targets.<sup>100</sup>

The working class as a political power started to organize their power, but they lack a strong organization and unions, since the unions are controlled by the state in a move to demobilize the workers.<sup>101</sup> The state can also control the workers by virtue of the fact that those who work in modern

industry in the public sector depend on the state for their salary, social services and housing, which does not give them the opportunity for political manoeuvres.

In terms of having a political party representing them, as has been explained earlier, there is no party which can claim to represent the working class. The only party which could claim to represent them and depend on their interests is the NPUP, which has some union officials as members.<sup>102</sup> The appeal of the party to the working class might be affected by changes which have taken place within the working class. That is, under the open door policy, workers were allowed to leave the country to work in the oil countries, and to accumulate some wealth. This helped some of them to become self-employed and to have different interests from the working class.

The Egyptian working class is weakened by being divided between those who are in the organized modern sector and those in the unorganized sector, who can be called the sub-proletariat or lumpen proletariat. The latter consists of street vendors and pedlars, domestic servants, porters and the unemployed. They constitute the urban disinherited mass which is deprived of all material resources and access to organized work.<sup>103</sup> The sub-proletariat, according to the 1976 Census, represent 16 per cent of the working class power (492,000 workers).<sup>104</sup>

Having this substantial number of workers who are in marginal activities means that 16 per cent of the labour power is not having the opportunity to participate in collective social production, in which the working class can create and acquire certain social and cultural values. This type of collective social production is the context in which the social power of production can develop and contradict the capitalist relations of production.

#### IV. Conclusion

The analysis of class formation of Egypt reflects the complexity of that formation, where social classes are unsteady and still in a state of formation, and where there are no clear cut and well formed social classes with significant social, economic and political power.

The analysis of class formation was conducted in relation to state power. From the analysis, it can be noticed that the relationship between the state and social classes has taken different trends in terms of the amount of power that the state enjoys in regard to social classes, i.e. state power in enforcing political, economic and social policies.

In relation to the big bourgeoisie, during Nasser's time, the political and economic power of the big bourgeoisie was undermined and the state enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy. Under the open door policy, the big bourgeoisie started to gain more power and to organize themselves, and some fractions could influence decision making in society. Under Mubarak the relationship between the state and the big bourgeoisie is a continuous struggle between them to gain control over political and economic issues. In spite of the growing power of the bourgeoisie, they have not yet reached the stage of making the state a tool in their hands.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie decreased in number due to the expansion of modern industry. However, they still play an important role in national production. They did not benefit from the open door policy as did the big bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they were hit by the expansion of modern, foreign projects in Egypt, which they could not compete with. As a social power they are in a contradictory position between the big bourgeoisie and the proletariat. They take from the big bourgeoisie their ideal which they want to reach, and at the same time they fear moving down to the working class position. Ideologically they are a conservative power and more likely

to be politically recruited by the militant Muslim groups.

The working class is divided between those who work in the modern organised sector and those who work in the informal sector. The latter are the lumpen proletariat. At the beginning of the Revolution, workers gained some social and economic benefits from the nationalization of industry and gained some political rights to be represented with the farmers in the parliament. However, these rights remain limited due to the fact that the working class is not well organised and has no strong unions and the majority are illiterate. The last protest movement by the workers in the eighties did not represent a general political movement: rather it was mainly confined to economic demands. So, workers in Egypt are on the way to becoming more conscious, and the events have shown that they are not totally passive. However, their movements do not present them as a political power able to force their will on the state. The low standard of education and the high level of illiteracy may make them vulnerable to the influence of fundamentalist Muslims.

The new petty bourgeoisie occupies a special position in the class formation of Egypt. It was the dynamic power which led the modernization projects in Egypt since Muhammad Aly. The middle and lower strata of this class could control state power and state apparatus. Under Nasser this class has witnessed a great expansion in number because of the establishment of modern industry and the state sector.

The role of this class in modernizing the country, bringing stability and the kind of class alliance they may choose, was and still is the subject of question, which gives an opportunity for this research, on a limited scale, to investigate the ideologies and the interests of members of this class over particular social, economic and educational issues.

The analysis of this chapter has shown the complexity of the class formation of Egypt which reflects in the practice of political activity in terms of the formation of political parties and the role these parties can play in Egyptian politics. The analysis has shown, in general, that the role of the opposition parties is very limited and that the government party, NDP, headed by the president, is the most powerful one since it enjoys all the presidential power and authority. From the analysis of the political parties of the bourgeoisie two main points can be drawn:

- The farmers and working class in Egypt are not yet strongly represented by any of the existing political parties, which could not yet succeed in attracting them.
  
- The political power of the bourgeoisie is divided between secular and Islamic parties. Inside these two main tendencies, other sub-divisions can be found. That is, the secular parties are divided between traditional liberal, socialist and progressive parties, while Islamic activity is divided between those who practice political activities through the legal channels of parliament and form coalitions with other conservative secular parties and those who go for militant, violent Islamic groups. These divisions and sub-divisions weaken and diffuse the power of the bourgeoisie facing the state.

The analysis of Egyptian class formation and class power relations is essential for the following discussion in Chapter Four of the system and policy of education in Egypt. That chapter will examine the extent to which class formation and power relations in Egypt influence policy and the system of education in regard to equality of opportunity and the openness of the system.

The discussion of the class formation of Egypt is an opening to the discussion of aspects of class consciousness and class interests in relation to different political, economic and

social policies which took place in Egypt in the sixties and seventies, and which give an opportunity for this research to pick up this point again in the field study to give an assessment of how members from different class positions perceive and evaluate these policies in a historical perspective which takes into account the past, the present and the future.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Samir Amin (1985) "The Historical Foundations of Arab Nationalism", in Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Nicholas S. Hopkins Arab Society: Social Science Perspective (American University in Cairo, Cairo) p.33
2. Ibid, p.34
3. For more details of these characteristics of underdeveloped countries, see Chapter One.
4. Mahmoud Hussein, Class Conflict in Egypt, op.cit., pp.16-17
5. One feddan is equal to 1.04 acres.
6. Malak Zaalouk (1989) Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The rise of the new bourgeoisie (Zed Books, London) p.26
7. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., p.22
8. Ibid, p.24
9. Three main political tendencies can be identified among the bourgeoisie. These were:
  - 1) The aristocracy, which consisted of the large land owners of Turkish origin who had close relations with the British and the Palace. Political power was concentrated in their hands. Culturally they considered themselves as a wing of the European bourgeoisie, where French and Turkish became their language which worked as a symbol to identify them with the Palace, and isolate them from ordinary people who spoke Arabic.
  - 2) The nationalist tendency, which included the ruling class members of Egyptian origin. They were discriminated against due to the hegemony of the aristocrats and westerners in the state apparatus. Because of that, they preferred increasing Egyptianization of the state apparatus and the economy by reformist means and tended to lean on the people's patriotic and democratic movement.
  - 3) The modernist tendency, which consisted of the big bourgeoisie who were committed to urban investment and

who were traditionally detached from traditional large land owners. They were closely associated with foreign investment. Their political role was anti-patriotic and anti-democratic. They were incapable of challenging the imperialist monopolies, or envisaging industrial development without continued political, financial and technical subordination to the British. See Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., pp.65-66

10. Patrick O'Brien (1966) The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System from Private Enterprise to Socialism 1951-1962 (Oxford University Press, London) quoted in Malak Zaalouk, op.cit., p.34
11. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., p.1102
12. Malak Zaalouk, op.cit., p.26
13. Ibid
14. Ibid, p.44
15. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1982) The New Arab Social System: A study on the social impact of the oil wealth (Markas Dirasat Al Wahda Al Arabiyah, Beirut) p.112 (Arabic)
16. John Waterbury, op.cit.
17. Alan Richards (1984) "Ten Years of Infitah: Class, rents, and policy stasis in Egypt", Journal of Development Studies, 20, 4 July, pp.323-328, quoted in Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.45
18. Ibid, p.46
19. Ibid
20. Ibid, p.63
21. Malak Zaalouk, op.cit., p.63
22. Abdel Basett Abdel Moatty (1981) "The Social Formation and the Future of the Societal Issue in Egypt", The Conference on the Framework for Social Work in the Arab World, Kuwait, Arab Institute for Planning, quoted in Adel Ghoneim, The Egyptian Model of Dependent State Capitalism, op.cit., p.88
23. Examples of the organizations that the commercial bourgeoisie practice their power through are the Egyptian Chambers of Commerce, The Association for Egyptian Businessmen and the Egyptian-American Business Council. See Malak Zaalouk, op.cit., p.147
24. Abdel Basett Abdel Moatty, The Social Formation and the Future of the Societal Issue in Egypt, op.cit., pp.91-92
25. Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.63

26. Ibid, p.69
27. Ibid, p.47
28. See a series of reports in "Al-Ahaly" newspaper about the illegal activities of the companies:  
Al-Ahaly, Vol.384, 8 June 1988  
Al-Ahaly, Vol.349, 15 June 1988  
Al-Ahaly, Vol.350, 22 June 1988
29. Robert Springborg, op.cit., pp.64-65
30. Ibid
31. Al-Ahaly Vol.350, 22 June, 1988
32. Erik Olin Wright (1978) Class, Crisis and the State (NLB, London) p.58
33. Ibid
34. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., p.28
35. Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, The Political Economy of Nasserism, op.cit., p.90
36. Ibid, p.92
37. Ibid
38. Khalid Ikram (1980) Egypt: Economic management in a period of transition (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore) p.246
39. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., p.30
40. Ibid
41. Khalid Ikram, op.cit., pp.134-135
42. Ibid
43. Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.215
44. Manfred Halpern (1963) The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton University Press, Princeton) p.52
45. Ibid
46. Ibid, p.53
47. Amos Perlmutter, "Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle Class: A comparative analysis", Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. X, No.1, October 1967, p.55
48. Ibid, pp.56-57



49. Ibid, p.60
50. Ibid, p.64
51. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1985) "Society Crisis or Class Crisis?: A study in the crisis of the new middle class", Al Manar, Vol.6, June, pp.18-19 (Arabic)
52. Manfred Halpern, op.cit., p.52
53. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, op.cit., p.20
54. Ibid, p.21
55. Ibid
56. Ibid
57. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, op.cit., pp.21-22
58. Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, op.cit., p.101
59. Ibid
60. Ibid
61. Ibid, p.102
62. Ibid
63. Raymond A. Hinnebusch (1981) "Egypt under Sadat - Elite, Power Structure and Political Changes in a Post Populist State", Social Problems, Vol.28, No.4, p.446
64. Ibid, p.447
65. Ibid
66. Manfred Halpern, op.cit., p.60
67. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, op.cit., p.23
68. Ibid, pp.23-24
69. Ibid, pp.452-453
70. Abdel Basett Abdel Moatty, The Social Formation and the Future of the Societal Issue in Egypt, op.cit., p.93
71. Nazih N. Ayubi "Domestic Politics", op.cit., p.75
72. Ibid, p.76
73. Mona Makram Ebeid, op.cit., p.6
74. "Parasitic" refers to activities in which profits are generated mainly through the subversion of the state and

the conversion of its resources into private wealth. See Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.81 and p.209

75. Nazih N. Ayubi, op.cit., p.76
76. Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.208
77. The alliance won 56 seats, 35 of them won by the Muslim Brothers, 11 for the liberals and 10 by the labour.
78. Mona Makram Ebeid, op.cit., pp.88-89
79. The motto of the party became, "Allah Akbar", "Islam is the solution", i.e. with faith in God, all problems will be solved.
80. B. Heindrick (1982) "The Legal Left: A case study", Middle Eastern Studies, (University of Amsterdam) quoted in Mona Makram Ebeid, op.cit., p.10
81. Nazih N. Ayubi, op.cit., p.75
82. Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.21
83. Ibid, p.219
84. An example of these services is in health, where they have seven clinics in Cairo which serve about 50,000 patients. Service is free of charge. In education they operate Qoranic schools and they give extra help for students in English, French and German languages. Ibid, p.225
85. Ibid
86. Ibid, p.231
87. Ibid
88. Ibid
89. Ibid, p.214
90. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., p.93
91. Ibid, p.42
92. Abdel Azeem Ramadan (1978) Class Conflict in Egypt 1937-1952 (Al Moassah Al Arabiyah Lil mashr, Beirut) pp.187-188
93. Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, op.cit., p.114
94. Ibid
95. Ibid
96. Mahmoud Hussein, op.cit., p.73

97. Ibid
98. Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.212
99. Ibid
100. Ibid, p.213
101. Ibid
102. In a survey 35 political scientists were asked about the class representation of different parties: 16 said the NDUP represented the workers, 19 that it represented intellectuals, 4 that it represented the petty bourgeoisie and 11 that it had not yet identified its position. See Robert Springborg, op.cit., p.209.
103. Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, op.cit., p.93
104. Ibid, p.95

## CHAPTER FOUR

EDUCATIONAL POLICY IN EGYPT:  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE CLASS NATURE OF THE SYSTEMIntroduction

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the class nature of the education system. This will be done against the background of a critical analysis of policies of education from 1952 to the present time, with reference to the introduction of modern education under and since Muhammad Aly and the influence of British rule on the education system.

The analysis of these points will bring into discussion the following issues:

- The impact of colonial rule on the education system and on institutions left behind;
- The extent to which formal education in Egypt could attack poverty and illiteracy, and increase social opportunities.

The discussion will raise questions about the role of the state in education and the extent to which the class nature of society influences educational policy. It will also cover the extent to which the system of education in Egypt reflects the class nature of society, and the contribution of the education system to the reduction of class differences in society.

All these points will be discussed in the light of the previous theoretical discussion of the crisis of education in the developing countries, the class nature of the state, class power relations and the different economic and political policies introduced in different periods and under different development models.

## I. The Historical Background of the Education System

### (A) The Beginning of Modern Education in Egypt: Education under Muhammad Aly (1805-1848)

In order to understand the educational system which Muhammad Aly introduced, one must put it into the context of modernization. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Egypt was four hundred years behind Europe in terms of development, and was under political pressure to shift from a feudal agricultural economy to an increasingly industrial economy, and from doctrines of medieval theology to the laws of modern science.<sup>1</sup> To establish his modern state, Muhammad Aly built up a military machine, a state system, and he had a strategy for educational modernization, which came under the control of the central government that he built.

Muhammad Aly's educational system was an elite organization to provide technical and military personnel for the factories and army.<sup>2</sup> From 1809 he sent students to study military science in Europe, and in the late 1820s established schools of medicine, veterinary science, pharmacy, and technical schools of mineralogy, engineering and applied chemistry, agriculture and irrigation. All these schools were coordinated by a central educational administration.<sup>3</sup>

Muhammad Aly's modern education system was not without its problems. One of these was that by establishing higher education before primary and secondary education, he created an inverse educational pyramid. Students of higher education came from established religious schools and were not adequately prepared for modern higher education.<sup>4</sup> The students from such traditional religious education institutes as Al-Azhar were the only literate graduates in the country, but they brought with them traditional methods of memorizing, and they treated science in the same way as they would theology.<sup>5</sup> A similar phenomenon could be seen with teachers recruited from mosque colleges, who brought with them traditional

methods of teaching.

Schools and students were confronted with a duality between the traditional methods and the modern scientific ones. Language texts were traditional and science texts were modern. The students were expected to apply rote methods in language studies, and critical methods in other subjects.<sup>6</sup> This split in the education of the nation contributed to the creation of a dichotomized and chaotic culture, which resisted change.<sup>7</sup>

The danger that the traditional elite felt was that the critical thinking might be applied to the domain of social and moral values as easily as to the realm of natural phenomena. They tried to ensure that scientific studies were seen as a body of ready made information and laws, surrounded by and standing within the framework of traditional values and ways of thinking.<sup>8</sup>

Muhammad Aly's education reform was not a mass education movement. It was an elitist education designed to replace the traditional religious elite with a modern one. The modern elite, especially those educated abroad, held government posts. This group constituted a new stratum which could appropriate for itself many advantages, including high salaries, gifts and land.<sup>9</sup>

The education system itself was divided between different types which reflected the class nature of society even before Muhammad Aly. These can be traced back to the Mamluks who ruled Egypt from 1256 to 1517, where there was an elite, traditional education, which was mainly religious to prepare spiritual leaders, military and practical training for the ruling class, and on-the-job training for farmers and workers.<sup>10</sup> Some of these characteristics were carried forward by Muhammad Aly into Egypt's educational system.

Although Muhammad Aly was successful in modernizing some aspects of society, his reforms were not wholly positive. He

was the first ruler in an Islamic society to make a massive economic development. He revolutionized agricultural methods, built a strong army, introduced large scale industry and increased trade and commercial capabilities of Egypt.<sup>11</sup> However, his project was entirely dependent upon foreign technology, foreign experts and foreign loans. He planted the seeds of Egypt's future dependency upon the west, not only in economic terms, but also in cultural ones. Foreign minorities of Greeks, Armenians and Jews, who were economically influential, established their own schools, and after Muhammad Aly's death Egypt was increasing subject to the peaceful penetration of European powers.

Rulers who followed Muhammad Aly, including Ismail (1848), Abas (1849-54), and Said (1854-63) were not strongly committed to the development of state education, and many of his educational reforms were reversed, and people returned to the normal manner of living before the intensive reform of Egypt.<sup>12</sup>

#### (B) Education under the British Occupation (1882-1920)

After Muhammad Aly, Egypt entered a phase of economic and financial crisis which ended in the British occupation. British education policy in Egypt, as expressed by Lord Cromer, aimed to achieve four principles:

- 1 to raise the general level of education in the village schools,
- 2 to create an efficient civil service,
- 3 to limit access to secondary and higher education to avoid creating a group of people whose education would "unfit them for manual labour", so that they would look exclusively to the government for employment, and
- 4 to encourage technical education.<sup>13</sup>

To achieve this reduction of opportunity for higher education, free education was abolished in 1907, as Cromer believed that people only valued what they paid for.<sup>14</sup>

The economic situation in Egypt was such that only the middle classes could afford modern education, even though the modern primary and elementary schools were supposed to be for the poor. The children of the poor went to the 'kuttabs' which were founded by the endowment of each mosque.<sup>15</sup>

Education was poorly funded by the British, and what was spent was devoted to a minority. F.O.Mann was sent to Egypt as a British advisor in 1928. He stated that four fifths of Egyptian educational revenue went towards 'Europeanized' schooling (primary, secondary and higher) while one fifth was spent on elementary mass education.<sup>16</sup> Educational achievements were not impressive. The 1947 census showed that only 369,760 Egyptians, from a total population of around 18 million, had certificates from primary, secondary or university education. Only 30 per cent of males and 12 per cent of females were literate. This represents a very modest advance on the corresponding figures for 1917 (12 per cent and 2 per cent respectively).<sup>17</sup>

In spite of the low level of provision, demand for education increased, and parents who could afford it were prepared to pay for their children's education. In 1906, 1,636 students from government schools, and 1,736 students from school funded by private donation, applied for the primary certificate. In the following year, the number of students from government schools had risen to 1,820, while those from private schools went up to 19,636.<sup>18</sup>

Under the British occupation education was used as means of economic, social and cultural domination. It was used to limit economic growth, by restricting access. It prepared people to work in government posts and to be obedient clerks, civil servants and employees.<sup>19</sup> English was made the language of education. Arabic was later made the language of instruction as a response to popular protests, but French and English continued to play an important part in the curriculum.<sup>20</sup> Quite apart from government provision, a whole body of foreign



schools existed in Egypt from the time of Muhammad Aly, and these continued under the British occupation. These schools represented a European, and particularly a French, cultural influence, and were an instrument of cultural dependency and class differentiation. Those who could afford foreign schools, either in Egypt or abroad, could monopolize for themselves the prestigious positions in government service and dominate the professions.<sup>21</sup>

Not all the consequences of education, however, were negative. In spite of the restrictions, the national and popular efforts helped Egyptians to afford education for their children. Those educated Egyptians who formed the middle class and the intellectuals of society were not alienated from the Egyptian masses as the British thought they would be; on the contrary, they were the main source of resistance to the British occupation.

(C) Education under the National Movement (1920 - 1952)

The National Movement was faced by a divided educational system: it was a mixture of 500 years of Islamic 'kuttabs', 300 years of missionary and language schools, and 40 years of British influence.<sup>22</sup> The National Movement aimed for diverse goals, including state control over education, encouraging public efforts to establish schools, the establishment of a domestic university, and the reform of religious education.

The education system also had serious internal problems. Literacy was still low, especially in rural areas. The country needed primary education to prepare secular leaders. This brought inevitable conflict with the traditional religious leaders who taught mostly religious subjects in the 'kuttabs'. To achieve these reforms, teacher training would have to be improved, more resources allocated to education, and salaries improved.<sup>23</sup>

In their attempts to reform and democratize education in the 1940s, the National Movement came into conflict with some parts of the bourgeoisie. Hafez Ahefy, a well known capitalist figure, said in parliament that, "The government cannot spend on education, as it has a limited budget. If parents do not pay for their children's education, this will limit the ability of the government to open more schools or to improve education standards".<sup>24</sup> The bourgeoisie were not unanimous in opposing free education, however, and some figures, like Al Hilaly, argued that the Egyptian government should follow the developed modern world and provide free primary and secondary education.<sup>25</sup>

Similar divisions of opinion can be seen among the intellectuals. Husain Haykal, a leading figure in the Liberal Constitutional Party, and Minister of Education from 1938 to 1939 held conservative views about the general expansion of education. On the other hand he encouraged the expansion of education in rural areas to slow down the drift to the urban areas. He argued that, "If education becomes the rule and illiteracy the exception, the literate peasants would not be able to consider primary education as a means of creating a distinction".<sup>26</sup>

The Egyptian intellectuals also had to answer the question of who should be educated beyond primary level. They found a spokesman in the leading figure of Egyptian literature, Taha Hussein, who was Minister of Education from 1950 to 1952. He was very critical of the religious education of Al Azhar, where he himself had graduated. He was fascinated by western culture, and thought Egypt to be part of the Mediterranean classical civilization. He stressed the importance of education for democracy and for the development of the individual. But on post-primary education his view was that not everybody needed to know about science, history and foreign languages. Higher education, in his view, should be restricted to those who could pay, and to a number of poor people who could prove that they were qualified for this kind

of education through examinations. Taha Hussein's views on education for democracy did not mean that he believed that all people should be allowed to go beyond primary education.<sup>27</sup>

So Egyptian intellectuals supported free and universal education up to a point. But there were other views, apart from those of the capitalists and western secular intellectuals. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1929, and they gained the support of many young people at the university and in the rural class. They had their own social and educational activities, establishing mosques and schools, sending 'rover' groups to villages and urban quarters for literacy and hygiene campaigns, and spreading propaganda.<sup>28</sup>

The National Movement, therefore, incorporated some of the tensions in Egyptian education: between those who promoted popular education for democracy, and those who saw mass education as a threat to the existing social order; between those who wanted a move towards western culture, and those who were promoting traditional fundamental Islamic thought. But in all its different ideological factions, the National Movement was fighting against the British economic, political, and cultural destruction of the society.

From the point of view of the present research, the fundamental questions are whether the National Movement succeeded in crossing the divide between modern and traditional education, and could it succeed in achieving democracy in education. In fact, education remained 'elitist' right up to 1952, and school fees were an obstacle to the democratization of education. For the majority, primary school fees were only abolished in 1944, and high school fees in 1951.<sup>29</sup> If one compares trends in literacy in the period of the National Movement with the period after the 1952 Revolution, one can see how little the National Movement achieved, compared with the potential which was tapped later.

**Table 1: Illiteracy Trends in Egypt, by gender, 1907 - 1960**

	<b>Total persons aged 10 and over</b>	<b>Persons not able to read</b>	<b>Illiteracy Rate Male</b>	<b>Illiteracy Rate Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
1907	2,848,024	2,277,303	87.0	90.6	92.7
1917	9,161,944	8,357,461	84.8	97.7	91.2
1927	10,268,404	8,816,601	76.1	95.6	85.9
1937	11,603,488	9,885,300	76.6	93.8	85.2
1947	13,489,946	10,407,972	66.1	88.2	77.2
1960	17,914,323	12,584,686	56.6	83.8	70.3

Source: Donald C.Mead (1967) Growth and Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy (Richard D.Irwin Inc., Homewood, Ill.) Statistical Appendix 301, Table 11 A 6, quoted in Mahmud Faksh, (1980) "The consequences of the introduction of modern education and national integration in Egypt", in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia Hiam, Modern Egypt: Studies in politics and society, (Frank Cass, London) p.48

According to these figures, we can say that the gap remained between the educated youth of Egypt and the illiterate masses. Modern and foreign education were on one side, and religious education was on the other, and education continued to separate the classes. The tasks of achieving democracy of education, of promoting equality of opportunities, and of bringing cultural unity to the society were among the most urgent tasks which faced the Revolution of 1952. The following section will show the extent to which the system of education after 1952 succeeded.

## II. Education Under The Revolution (1952 to the present)

The analysis of education under the Revolution concentrates upon different policies of education, and different reforms introduced by the state. The analysis will emphasize the different economic, social and political ideologies under which the policies were initiated. The analysis will cover two periods. These are:

- (A) The period under Nasser and the socialist policies, from 1952 to 1970; and
- (B) The period under Sadat and the open door policy, from 1970 to the present day.

(A) Education under Nasser and the Socialist Policies (1952-1970)

From the picture of education before 1952, it is not surprising that Nasser's main priorities were to bring national integration and to enhance the secularization of the system of education. Under Nasser, education reform was concentrated on mass education, science and technology, and the nationalization of foreign education. Arabic language and military training in schools were used as a means of unifying the country.<sup>30</sup> In his speeches, Nasser emphasized the importance of education in liberating individuals, in achieving equality, and in building society. Educational policies under Nasser reflected the ideological, political and economic structure of the society, which is to say they were part of the development plan.

During the early years of the Revolution, from 1952 to 1956, while the emphasis was upon political liberation, education policy was not radically changed, as there was no explicit ideological guide for action at this point.<sup>31</sup> The main reforms of the period were the unification and expansion of primary level education, with revision of the textbooks and curriculum. Instruction was further standardized by the introduction of a sixth grade examination, but the curriculum still depended upon memorization.<sup>32</sup>

In 1953 the education ladder was reorganized to comprise four stages: primary education, with entry between the ages of 6 and 8, and lasting for six years, preparatory education, lasting for three years starting between the ages of 12 to 14, secondary education of three years to follow preparatory education, and higher education starting between the ages of 18 and 20. Higher education involved technical training for 2 years, higher technical institutes for 4 or 5 years, and universities for 4, 5 or 6 years.<sup>33</sup> For the details of the educational ladder, see Appendix 9.

Later on in 1957 to 1961, after the triangular attack on Egypt, and the system started to gain more confidence and legitimacy, more attention was given to education. The main targets were to achieve universal primary education within ten years, and to diversify post-primary education with an emphasis on technical and vocational education, and qualitative improvements in the areas of curriculum, teacher training and educational administration.<sup>34</sup>

Over time the ideological line of the Revolution became clearer. The period 1961 to 1967 witnessed the emergence of the first ideological document, "The Charter for National Action". The whole period was marked by a clear move towards socialism, and setting the first development plan of 1960-65. In the Charter there is an emphasis on science which Nasser considered to be "the weapon with which revolutionary triumph can be achieved".<sup>35</sup> Socialist policies were based on the nationalization of the industry and banks and the establishment of a public sector. In education the emphasis was on rationalization and the politicization of schools, and relating educational policy to the requirements of the development plan, and achieving equal opportunity for all people.<sup>36</sup>

This period witnessed the establishment of new organizations and institutions, including the Supreme Council for National Planning, and the Institute of National Planning, and the Committee on National Education. This last committee had responsibility for the politicization of the schools, and was charged with the task of forming "a new generation of youth who understand the stage through which their nation is passing".<sup>37</sup> These ideas had to find application in the textbooks. There were compulsory lessons on socialist principles, textbooks stressed the correctness of government policies, and emphasised the links between Islam and socialism.<sup>38</sup>

In this period, Egypt, like many other developing countries, used education as a means of achieving political legitimacy for the system, by spreading political doctrine. Education was used to achieve economic goals by preparing the labour power for development, and education was used to achieve social integration in terms of expanding the system in order to bridge the gap between the illiterate majority and the educated minority.

There were also quantitative changes in the educational system which went alongside these qualitative changes. There was an enormous expansion in the spending on education under Nasser, which gave formal education a great value in achieving economic, social and political targets in the sixties. The figures show that enrolment in primary education rose from 1.5 million in 1952/53, which represented 45 per cent of the children of primary school age, to 2.7 million, or 65 per cent, in 1960/61, and 3.7 million, or 80 per cent, in 1967. In preparatory education the rate of development was less than in primary, and in secondary education it was lower still. Only a quarter of the students who finished primary education were to move to preparatory education and then secondary education. According to estimates of the Ministry of Education, only 40 per cent of those who finished six years of primary school entered secondary school.<sup>39</sup>

The enrolment in secondary education rose by approximately one third over the period 1951 to 1961. The number rose from 92,062 to 126,607 for industrial and commercial schools, while agricultural schools more than quadrupled, from 14,356 to 67,895. By 1969/70 the number of students enrolled in academic institutions had more than doubled, rising to 293,144, while the number of students receiving technical education quadrupled to 241,590.<sup>40</sup> Expansion over the period 1952 to 1972 is shown in Appendix 10.

University education grew by 325 per cent between 1950 and 1970. This expansion took place in the four major universities

in Egypt.<sup>41</sup>

In the academic year 1970/71 the number of students who attended higher institutes was 36,414, and 23,741 students attended Al Azhar (the Islamic University). The total number of students in different higher education institutes reached 212,437 students.<sup>42</sup>

The great expansion of the education system under the Revolution cannot be denied. However, the system could not achieve full primary enrolment, and was still suffering from high drop-out and illiteracy rates. The particular class implications of these points will be discussed in detail later.

Over this period, expenditure on education rose. The figures show that spending went up from about LE 23 million in 1952/53 (less than 3 per cent of gross domestic product) to about LE 130 million in 1970/71 (4.1 per cent of GDP).<sup>43</sup> The class distribution of benefits from this increased expenditure will also be discussed later.

(B) Education under the Open Door Policy (1970 to the present)

In 1970 Sadat came to power after the death of Nasser. In Chapter Two it has been shown that many of the political, social and economic efforts of the Nasserist period had been brought to an end by the defeat in the 1967 war. More fundamental changes came to the social, economic and political system only later on, with the economic open door policy of 1974. The important point about the open door policy is to recognise its social impact, and the class nature of the policy. This must be related to an analysis of education policy in the seventies. The open door policy opened Egypt to foreign and private capital, encouraged the private sector, and in social terms worked for the benefit of the middle and upper classes. This development model, as will be shown in the following analysis, was linked to an educational policy which



favoured the same classes.

The application of these policies led to an educational crisis in the seventies. But before that can be studied it is necessary to identify the main characteristics of the educational system, as defined by the Constitution of 1971 and Law No. 139.

According to the Constitution, the four principles guiding the education system are:

1. Education is a right, guaranteed by the state.
2. The state shall supervise education.
3. Education is free in all state institutions and at all levels.
4. Primary education is compulsory.

The educational system is organized under Law No. 139 of 1981. According to the law, the system of education consists of the following stages:

1. Basic education for 9 years (subsequently reduced to 8 years in 1988)
2. General and technical education for 3 years.
3. Advanced technical education for 5 years.<sup>44</sup>

For details of the education ladder in the seventies see Appendix 11.

Theoretically, the main principles which guide the education system have not changed since the sixties, although the educational ladder has been changed in its basic level, where compulsory education was introduced for nine years in 1981, and reduced to eight years in 1988.

The whole education system is suffering from a crisis in finance, in quality of education, in buildings, teacher training and management. The roots of this crisis date back to 1967, when all Egypt's efforts and resources were allocated to the preparation for war. At that time, most of the economic and social development programmes were suspended. The size and

gravity of the crisis is identified by a report by the National Council in 1980.<sup>45</sup> The report concentrates on primary education, and identified the following problems:

1. The total annual cost is LE 28.8 per pupil per year (LE1 = approximately \$1) of which LE 20.5 is appropriated for wages, with the pupil actually receiving approximately LE 9 per year.
2. There are in excess of 10,000 teachers of some specializations, most of whom have not received educational training, and a "grave shortage" of classroom teachers. However, the report does not specify which specializations suffer from shortages.
3. 48.8 per cent of the teachers have been trained in teacher training institutes. The rest are not certificated.
4. There is a discrepancy between the required 846 class periods and the 648 actually taught.
5. Of the total 8,027 primary buildings, only 4,453, or 56 per cent, are suitable for educational purposes, 907 (11 per cent) need to be pulled down, and the remaining 2,667 buildings need basic repairs. For more statistics on educational buildings see Appendix 12.
6. 1,903, or 24 per cent, of the primary school buildings lacked sanitary utilities, 560 lacked drinkable water, and 4,837 (60 per cent) lacked electricity.
7. 1,970 schools operated only in the afternoon, and 1,972 schools were on a double shift system.
8. Failures in the second and fourth grades amounted to about 15 per cent of each grade. The total drop out rate between the ages of six and twelve was about 20 per cent.

Wastage through failures and drop out was evaluated at LE 27 million per year.

If this was the situation in primary schools, things were not any better in preparatory education, where classes were crowded, and building not originally designed as schools were used for educational purposes. In technical education there was a problem in that graduates were of poor quality and not fitted to the needs of the labour force. Teacher training was poor, and the low salaries of teachers led many to look for other jobs, or to supplement their income with private tuition. The problem of illiteracy persisted.

Facing these problems, the state introduced a number of acts and reforms throughout the seventies and eighties. The two main reforms were "Developing and Innovating Education in Egypt" in 1980, and "The Strategy for Developing Education in Egypt" in 1989. The 1980 reform had to take into account the fact that illiteracy still stood at 56.5 per cent in 1976, that incomplete enrolment reached 75 per cent in 1980, and that there was a need to expand technical education and to supply schools with better equipment and buildings.

The reform programme was based upon:

- \* the expansion of pre-school child education,
- \* fostering basic education,
- \* developing general secondary education to prepare students for life as well as university,
- \* presenting some vocational programmes in academic schools,
- \* the expansion of technical education,
- \* promoting education in the regions of a special nature, including the reclaimed agricultural areas, Sinai and new communities, and
- \* consolidating non-formal education.<sup>46</sup>

The policy of 1980, which was designed to face the deteriorating situation in educational finance, buildings,

curriculum and enrolment, could not achieve its targets, and led to the 1989 strategy for developing education. The strategy identified the continuing problems in the education system and the education process.

The strategy criticizes the system of education for having no comprehensive policy, and for having no national character. It argues that education is not integrated with other sectors in society, and that education policies are designed without reference to teachers and parents. Most educational reforms had been partial, and not part of a comprehensive strategy to change society. The strategy also criticized people for not cooperating with the government in building new schools and sharing the expense of education with government.<sup>47</sup>

The strategy identifies a number of problems in education, including curriculum development, teacher training, educational management, the examination system, drop out and school buildings, which have reached a very poor state of deterioration.

The strategy introduces six axes for solving these problems, which at the same time form the basis for educational policy for the eighties.

1. The increase in the efficiency of educational democracy, by quantitative expansion, building new schools, reducing class capacity, full enrolment in primary education and the control of private lessons.
2. The expansion of technical education, and raising its standard by improving the curriculum, using new technology, planning and preparing the technical school teacher.
3. Teacher training; teachers should be trained at university level, improving their social position.
4. Finance of Education:  
Facing the problems of finance the strategy refers to the study by the World Bank on "Financing Education in the Developing Countries" of 1986. The World Bank study

advises the developing countries to reduce spending on higher education, to give grants to distinguished students in higher education and to decentralize education administration and expand private schools. The strategy comments upon these suggestions, and in so doing identifies its own position from that of the World Bank. On reducing spending on higher education, the strategy says that such a reduction does not fit with the aims of the policy, which are to give more care to higher education, because of its high social return. However, the policy does believe that more spending should go to primary education.

The strategy does agree with the decentralization of the system.

On private education, the strategy notes that expansion is acceptable as a way of reducing government expenditure.

5. Increasing educational management efficiency, and the decentralization of the educational administration.
6. Improving educational quality, by improving educational content, the examination system and the educational ladder.

(i) The Core of the Policy of Education in the Eighties:  
Critical Analysis

From the different reform programmes the core of the policy of education can be identified and critically analyzed. The critique of policy will comprise some of the theoretical ideas behind the policy. The presence or absence of equality of educational opportunity will be taken as an indicator of the class nature of the policies and the dependency of the system.

The main trends which control the policy are:

1. At the primary level, the adoption of basic education, and the introduction of a differentiated education service at this level in the form of fee paying schools run by the government, where the language of instruction

- is English or French.
2. At the secondary level, the control of general secondary education and the expansion of technical education.
  3. At university level, the control of the expansion of higher education.

#### Primary Education:

The quantitative analysis of this level shows that the main target of reform is to expand enrolment. In 1980 the enrolment was 75 per cent, i.e 4.3 million males and females in the age range 6 to 12. This number nearly doubled to 7.7 million in 1984/85.<sup>48</sup>

To help deprived areas, the Ministry of Education applied the experiment of one or two classroom schools as an attempt to depart from the traditional method set for primary schools. As part of a long term plan, 1,650 schools of this type were inaugurated up to 1976/77 as part of a plan to build 5,000 schools in five years.<sup>49</sup>

In terms of quality and kind of education presented at this level, two main changes have taken place. Basic education was introduced in 1979, and experimental government language schools were set up in 1979.

Basic education is a compulsory education for nine years. It comprises both primary level for six years and the preparatory level for three years. The meaning and aims of this education were identified in the programme of developing and innovating education in 1980 as a compulsory stage of nine years, aiming to provide learners with values, codes of conduct, knowledge and practical skills that are suited to the various environments (agricultural, industrial, urban and rural), so that those who have completed the stage of basic education can either engage in the world of work or continue to higher stages.<sup>50</sup>

An Egyptian/American team identified the objectives of basic education as:

1. Expanding enrolment
2. Education content relevant to regional needs
3. Instruction for social needs (citizenship, health, hygiene, sound behaviour and religious values)
4. Emphasis on skills formation and practical training
5. Coordination with other education skill training by employers, adult and non-formal education, secondary and higher education.

The aims and objectives of basic education are not achieved in reality. The report on the condition of primary education in the eighties which was discussed earlier shows that schools are suffering from bad conditions for buildings, a shortage of equipment and qualified teachers. When basic education was applied in these schools, there were not the right conditions in terms of physical provision and staff qualifications.<sup>51</sup>

The experimental government language schools were established by Ministerial Decree No. 2 in 1979. The aims of the schools have been identified in the internal regulations of these schools as:

1. The expansion of teaching foreign languages, science and mathematics by foreign language, following the example of the foreign language schools
2. Giving an individual care to each child. In order to achieve that, the capacity of each class should not exceed 36 pupils.

31 experimental schools were opened in 1978/79, mostly in Cairo and Giza. 19 of the schools were in Cairo, while each of the other governorates had one or two schools. The schools are not evenly distributed in Cairo, with 8 in Heleopolis, but North Cairo, with a population of 4 million, having only two. 64.5 per cent of the students enrolled nationally were in Cairo.<sup>52</sup>

## Secondary Education:

There are two kinds of technical schools at this level:

1. Three year technical schools for skilled workers, and
2. Five year schools for technicians in commercial, agricultural and industrial field.

The main target of the government is to expand this type of education. In 1976/77, this education enrolled 40,000 students, or 52 per cent of the students in secondary education.<sup>53</sup> The five year plan aims to raise this percentage to 63.5.<sup>54</sup>

Technical education is described as a panacea for all the problems of education. But this form of education also suffers from two problems. The first is the quality of the entrants, and the second is the distribution of students between different types of technical education.

Technical education is not popular, and the entrants are generally poor quality students who could not obtain the grades necessary for general secondary education. This admission process may discourage some more able students from applying. The best graduates of preparatory schools go to general secondary education; the next best group go to commercial, industrial or agricultural schools; while the lowest graduates go to teacher training institutes to be trained as primary school teachers.<sup>55</sup>

Internally, there is an uneven distribution of students between the specializations of industry, agriculture and commerce. There is a surplus of graduates from commercial schools, while there is a shortage of graduates from industrial schools. Table 2 shows the figures for graduates and job vacancies in the different fields. Because of this unbalanced distribution, technical school students will be allocated as follows: 47 per cent going to industrial schools, 40 per cent to commercial schools and 13 percent to agricultural schools.<sup>56</sup>



**Table 2: Shortage and Overproduction in Different Technical School Specializations: 1978**

Graduates (000's)	Kind of Education	Applicants for jobs (000's)	Job vacancies	Surplus Shortage	
30.8	Industr'1	20.1	65%	22.6	- 2.5
71.6	Commerc'1	48.8	68%	30.4	18.4
12.3	Agric't'1	9.8	80%	7.0	2.8

Source: Ministry of Labour Power (1983) The Implicit Effects of the Population Change and Development of Education on the Labour Power in Egypt: Trends and Expectations, p.152, Table No.414 (Arabic)

The reasons for these surpluses and shortages have something to do with the poor financial state of these schools. Industrial schools, with their need for equipment, new technology and machines, are expensive to equip properly. Commercial schools are cheap by comparison. This leads into a discussion of the financing of education.

The Ministry of Education has made it clear that new projects in technical education will be financed by the World Bank. The allocation of resources is a major problem. Three solutions or sources have been suggested to date.<sup>57</sup>

1. The technical schools should have their own projects, where they can produce and sell the production. This is called "The permanent capital educational project".
2. Technical schools should be linked to commercial projects, and the students allowed to work and earn wages, and at the same time receive training in the projects.
3. Loans should be obtained from international organizations. This is the scheme which is most likely to operate.

The five year plan for 1987 to 1992 envisages the establishment of 53 industrial schools, 18 agricultural and 29 commercial at a total cost of 73 million pounds: 21 million

for educational projects and 52 million for general projects. To equip these schools during the five year period would cost a total of 235.8 million pound (120.1 million in hard currency, and 48.7 million in national currency).<sup>58</sup> This strategy notes that, "This money must be allocated from production sectors and self efforts, or through foreign loans and aid".<sup>59</sup> The 1987 strategy admitted that the schools had been poorly equipped, with shortages of buildings, equipment and teaching staff.<sup>60</sup>

The pervasive nature of technical education in all level of education in Egypt suggests that it has a theoretical foundation. This theoretical base lies in what is known as adaptive education, or relevant education, which was well known in Europe and America in the nineteenth century, where this education was used to bring together the world of school and the world of the surrounding community.<sup>61</sup> This kind of education is seen in many developing countries as a means of attacking rural poverty and connecting the school experience to the world of work and community life. However, this kind of education has not been successful in many developing countries, and has been rejected by people in some cases. Examples can be found in India under colonial rule in the nineteenth century, where families rejected the curricula of the rural schools which emphasized the indigenous system of arithmetic and accounting and agriculturally relevant topics. These families wanted their children to be qualified for higher schooling and government service, which was only open to those who had followed more orthodox urban schooling.<sup>62</sup> This clearly has a direct bearing upon the equality of access to higher level of education.

Similar experiments were unsuccessful where an attempt was made to substitute vocational education for general education, in the hope that the school would be able to adjust to meet new economic demands. When these experiments failed, some critics were moved to observe that, "Schools are remarkably clumsy instruments for inducing prompt, large-scale changes

in underdeveloped countries".<sup>63</sup>

According to this argument, schools alone cannot change the poor reality of societies where, "The crucial variables lie instead in the structure of incentives within the economic system and the degree to which the institutional milieu is supportive of entrepreneurial activity. Without such a milieu, no amount of vocational instruction can be effective since the skills required will not be utilized".<sup>64</sup>

If one applies this argument to the case of Egypt, this expansion of technical education cannot be expected to solve the problems of education, because these changes are not part of a radical change in the economic and social structure. Moreover, this education has been introduced in Egypt to be an education for the working class. Class differences in the approach to technical education will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

#### University Education:

As part of the policy of controlling admission to general academic education, university level education has witnessed a decline in student numbers since 1984/85 (see Appendix 13).

#### (ii) Other Features of Reform Programmes and Educational Policies:

One feature which is prominent in recent reforms is a move towards fee paying education, as a solution to the financial problems of the system. This has clear class implications, as will be discussed later. As will then become clear, these class differences are, as one would expect, in favour of the upper and middle classes. It needs only be noted here, that in its justification of increasing fee paying schools, the government argued the exact opposite; that poor families would be unduly disadvantaged by the provision of universal and free education. "It has been noticed that free education will

increase the pressure upon educational institutes, and the rich can make good use of it because they can guarantee better opportunities for their children, while the poor cannot find a place because of that increasing pressure upon the limited places. Besides the sharing of the rich and poor in free education will limit the opportunity of the poor to make good use of free education".<sup>65</sup>

The report on developing education suggests some ways to overcome the problems of education:

1. The establishment of a "treasurer's office for education" to be financed by a tax paid by the people, this money to be allocated for education.
2. Owners of private schools and parents who have their children in private schools should pay money to this office, because that is one of the obligations of "social solidarity".<sup>66</sup>

The Decline in Spending on Education, Compared with Other Sectors:

The strategy of 1989 stresses that spending on education should rise, from LE 571 million in 1981/82 to LE 1,614 million in 1988/89, and that the percentage spent on education as part of the national budget should also increase. It has increased from 8.21 per cent of the budget in 1981/82 to 8.87 per cent in 1983.84 (see Appendix 14) which shows that there has been some progress. However, this has to be seen against changes in the seventies, when the proportion of the budget going to education decreased, while the proportion of spending on the oppressive state apparatus (security forces and the army) rose sharply. See Appendix 15.

The Influence of Foreign Organizations on Egyptian Education:

In the discussion of the finances of education, the growing role of international organizations, and particularly the World Bank, has already been noted. Foreign pressure has

influenced the decision to reduce the length of basic education, and British consultants have been used by the Ministry of Education in reforming the examination system and establishing the Open University in Egypt, French consultants in developing science and mathematics curricula, German consultants in developing technical education, and Americans to advise on financing education projects.<sup>67</sup>

Such intervention from foreign organizations reflects the indirect forms of neo-colonialism which represents itself in the cultural hegemony of the west and the undermining of the independence of decision making in education.

**The Missing Aspect in the Reform and Policy: A Literacy Programme:**

The reform and policy in the eighties has paid lip service to the issue of a literacy programme. As will be explained later, literacy is still one of the major problems which faces Egypt. However, the LE 50 million allocated for literacy programmes amounts to no more than LE 2 for each illiterate person, since it is estimated that there will be 25 million illiterates in Egypt by the year 2000.<sup>68</sup>

The strategy referred to the literacy problem as a "national issue", i.e. it is not only the responsibility of the state to solve the problem, but also a responsibility of the unions, popular organizations and different economic and social establishments. In reality, calling the problem a national issue has resulted in dividing the responsibility to the extent that there is no one authority which can be held responsible even to monitor the progress in applying the programmes.

### III. The Class Nature of the Education System in Egypt and the Reproduction of the Class Structure

After discussing the main features which characterize the policy of education in Egypt, this section concentrates upon the class nature of education in Egypt, and how the education system works to reproduce the existing class structure of society at the economic, cultural and ideological level.

The reproduction of the existing class structure and the contradictions of the school are both existent in developed and developing countries. However, the way that reproduction operates differs in the developing countries and must be understood in those countries and in relation to the international order as well.

In the advanced capitalist countries there was capitalist support for the expansion of primary schooling in order to develop a habit of respect for the liberal state and other forms of bureaucratic authority which could replace traditional religious authority, at the same time as preparing skilled workers for modern technology.<sup>69</sup>

In capitalist society, both workers and capitalists have an interest in promoting education among wage earners, while in developing countries capitalists, landlords and the traditional elite were opposed to universal education in their societies. The opposition to universal education can be understood in terms of the mode of production in the underdeveloped countries, which constitute the periphery of the capitalist centre. That is, those countries which are integrated into the capitalist market are forced to adjust their production to the requirements of the market, and tend to specialize in one form of production, which is mainly the production of raw materials, which does not require advanced technology. Consequently, workers do not need to be trained in school. In addition to that, in such a mode of production, education is a means by which children escape from the

traditional economy.<sup>70</sup>

So the nature of the accumulation process and the class alliances in the periphery are different from those in the centre, and they are likely to produce different patterns of educational expansion. Popular pressure from different classes, and for ideological considerations, produced expansion in the education system, which took the form of a dual education system. This consisted of a cheap and second rate education system for the majority and a relatively expensive education system just sufficient to promote productivity and to prevent labour shortages in the capitalist mode.<sup>71</sup>

The Egyptian education system is a case in point, where the dichotomy is found between free and fee paying schools, between foreign and Arabic schools, and between secular and religious education. Consequently, the role of the Egyptian education system in reproducing class structure will be studied on five dimensions:

- (A) Illiteracy, drop out, enrolment and rural-urban differences in education opportunities.
- (B) The changes in primary education and their class nature.
- (C) Technical education and its social value.
- (D) Higher education and its social value.
- (E) Foreign education and the expansion of private education.

(A) Illiteracy, Drop Out, Enrolment and Rural-Urban Differences in Education Opportunities

According to the 1976 census, the total illiteracy rate for the country was 56.3 per cent. However, these were not evenly distributed, and illiteracy rates and level of qualification give some indication of the differences between rural and urban areas and between males and females. In 1976 68.5 per cent of illiterates were in rural areas, although 57 per cent of the population live in those areas. Table No.3 shows this

distribution in more detail.

**Table 3: Distribution of Levels of Education in Rural and Urban Areas in 1976**

Educational State	Urban %	Rural %	Total % in society
Illiterate	39.2	70.4	56.3
Read and write	24.9	17.1	20.6
Qualified	34.3	10.6	21.3
Undefined	1.6	1.9	1.8

Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, 1976 Census

There is also a major difference in enrolment levels between rural and urban areas. A comparison between Cairo and one of the rural governorates of Fayom in 1982 shows that enrolment in urban areas can be as high as 88.1 per cent, and in rural areas as low as 32.7 per cent.<sup>72</sup> The national total enrolment for Egypt for young people between the ages of 5 and 15 is 54.2 per cent, according to the same source. Enrolment for the first year of basic education was 94.2 per cent in urban areas, and 31.3 per cent in rural areas. Recent figures for enrolment at the national level in 1986/87 show that 93.9 per cent are in the first year of basic education.

There are also differences between the enrolment rates for boys and girls. There are more boys than girls enrolled in all levels of education, but this difference is even more extreme if one considers rural areas alone. The figures are given in Table 4.

These percentages show the gap between rural and urban Egypt, and between male and female. One must also suppose that there are dramatic class differences which parallel the differences noted in these tables.

With reference to drop out rates, a longitudinal study was



**Table 4: Enrolment of Boys and Girls in Education in Urban and Rural Areas in 1982**

	Rural Areas		Urban Areas	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
First year of basic education	41.5	19.2	95.8	93.5
Primary education overall	50.7	16.1	96.4	89.8
Basic education	53.9	16.1	93.1	83.0

Source: Samir Lewis Saad (1982) Enrolment of children in basic education schools (The National Center for Educational Research, Cairo)

conducted over the period from 1956/57 to 1978/79.<sup>73</sup> At the beginning of the period, in particular in 1959/60, where the study could find statistics, the percentage of drop out from the whole six grades was 9.3 per cent. At the end of the sixties, in 1968/69, it became 8.8 per cent, while in the seventies it dropped to 5.2 per cent in 1978/79. Table 5 shows estimates of the wastage produced by drop out, translated into terms of percentage of the education budget.

**Table 5: Percentage Wastage on the National Education Budget through Drop Out: 1956-1979**

Year	Percentage Wastage in the Education Budget
1956/57	11.39
1973/74	5.76
1977/78	6.7
1978/79	5.4

Source: Samir Lewis Saad (1980) Prop out in Primary Education from 1956/57 to 1978/79 (The National Center for Educational Research with the World Bank, Cairo)

Other recent figures on basic education (i.e. primary and preparatory) show that drop out from basic education in 1983/84 amounted to 25.1 per cent of the total number of children of basic school age.<sup>74</sup> This means that drop out is increasing and persists as a major problem. Probably, the open door policy has encouraged the tendency to leave school and make money without qualifications.

The figures show that drop out persists as a major problem. Although there is no direct study of the social background of drop outs, Samir Lewis gives some indicators for the reasons for drop out, which can be understood in terms of class position. These factors, which are social, economic and educational, include size of family, the early marriage of girls, especially in rural areas, a weak relationship between the child and his school and teachers, and punishment at school which makes the child hate school. Many schools operate shift systems, which shorten the amount of time a child may be in contact with teachers, and this situation is made worse by teacher shortages. Many rural children will also live a long way from their school.<sup>75</sup>

Studies from other developing countries concerned with the sociological and economic aspects of education have supported the notion that the lowest income groups typically have not been able to have the same effective access to primary education as the higher income groups, because of social and economic factors. These include the opportunity cost of labour of primary education is higher for these groups, the benefits are lower, and consequently the private rate of return from such education is much lower. These factors contribute to the high drop out rates and the low enrolment rates in primary education.<sup>76</sup> These considerations of the opportunity costs of education naturally lead into the consideration of child labour.

The Labour Law of 1981 rationalized the position of child labour, but did not eliminate the phenomenon. According to the

law, employing or training children who are under 12 years of age is banned, and against the law. The law is not applied in agricultural areas, where there is a persisting need for child labour. The law would appear to be in flat contradiction to the basic education law, which states that compulsory education lasts to the age of 15.<sup>77</sup> The figures show that the percentage of workers in the age group 6 to 12 has risen from 2.7 per cent in 1974 to 7 per cent in 1984, expressed as a percentage of the total labour force. For further details see Appendix 16.

The majority of children (around 71 per cent) work in agriculture. In urban areas there is a shortage of information and studies on child labour and the kind of activities they are involved in. However, some indication is given by a sample conducted by the Ministry of Labour in 1985. The survey studied the cases of 83,397 industrial projects which employed children under the age of 17. Table 6 shows their distribution between sectors.

**Table 6: Distribution of Child Employees between Different Economic Sectors in 1985**

---

Activity	Number of Children
Manufacturing industry	9,774
Commerce, restaurants and hotels	7,175
Service	3,325
Enterprise	308
Electricity and water	123
Agriculture	119
Insurance	102
Transportation	96
Mining	33
Other activities	202

Source: National Center for Social and Criminological Research, Seminar on Child Labour in Egypt, 1988

---

The factors which produced this phenomenon, as presented at the "Seminar on Child Labour in Egypt", are mainly poor social and economic background of the children, the increasing population, the inability to achieve full enrolment in primary education, and the high drop out rate from primary schools.

In a study by the National Centre for Educational Research and the World Bank in the eighties, about drop outs between the third and sixth grades of primary schools, 2,203 children were asked about the jobs they wished to get. The results showed that very few of them were in careers they would have chosen, with 45 per cent aspiring to government jobs, 11 per cent to manual work and 9 per cent to agricultural work. Table 7 shows their actual distribution between areas of economic activity.

**Table 7: Survey Results of the Sector of the Economy in which Primary School Drop Outs Work**

Activity	Percentage of Children
Agriculture	44.1
Carpentry	12.1
Service	8.3
Grocery	4.8
Mechanics and car service	4.1
Plumbing	3.5
Construction	3.2
Tailoring	2.9
Electricity	2.3
Other activities	14.7

Source: National Center for Social and Criminological Research, Seminar on Child Labour in Egypt, 1988

The kind of activities practised by these children reflect the social and economic pressures on them at that early age, while their answers about career aspirations also reflect their frustration at that age.

High drop out rates and poor enrolment rates clearly have an effect upon the illiteracy rates. Child labour also has an impact on illiteracy, by encouraging children to leave school early. It is rare for such early school leavers to return to other courses for training or to literacy programmes, especially in rural areas. This is why lowering drop out rates and raising enrolment levels are seen as prime ways of removing illiteracy at source. Studies have shown that even those who leave primary school after six years may revert to illiteracy, and not retain reading and writing skills.

#### (B) The Changes in Primary Education and their Class Nature

It has been mentioned earlier that there were two major changes to education at the primary level. These were the application of basic education and the opening of the experimental government language schools. The documents of the Ministry of Education state that, "Basic education is a unified education for all males and females in the nation, whether in a rural or urban setting, and it is open-channelled qualifying for subsequent educational stages".<sup>78</sup> This statement means that all kinds of education, either government free school, or foreign language and the experimental government language schools are all introducing basic education. In reality each of these types of schools has different aims.

For example, the government language schools aim to prepare people who master foreign languages. So if one applies the idea that basic education prepares for different environments, and prepares people to adapt to those environments, this means that language schools prepare for an elite environment, and the graduates can get opportunities to work in the most distinguished sectors in the economy, namely foreign companies and banks. In contrast, basic education aims to prepare people who have manual skills, which means they are adapted to a less privileged environment, and jobs in rural or urban areas.

In fact the rhetoric of basic education is contradicted by the aims of parents who send their children to foreign language or government language schools, because it is not consistent that parents would sacrifice and pay fees for their children to learn a manual skill in order to enter into the world of work.

If one looks at the experimental government language schools, one finds that the distribution of these schools is largely in upper and middle class areas. For example, about 61 per cent of these schools are in Cairo, while none are in rural areas.

Dividing primary education into these two kinds of schools, government language and free schools (the experimental schools also extend to the preparatory and secondary level) is not the only feature of the class nature of this level of education. Since 1988 the basic education level, which can be seen as the popular level of education, has been reduced from nine to eight years, under Law No.233 of 1988. The strategy of 1989 describes this reduction as a response to the advice of Unesco to many developing countries to reduce the number of years spent in this level of education.

The argument of the Ministry of Education is that, by saving money at this level, there will be an opportunity to improve the quality of education by developing the curriculum, methods of teaching, teacher training and improving administration.<sup>79</sup> As the Ministry explains, the reduction of one year will also help in saving places and buildings, shortages of which are affecting this level of education.

In fact, the reduction of the years of primary education was discussed as early as 1965, when there was a suggestion to reduce primary education from five years to four. However, this proposal was rejected by the ministerial committee on the grounds that it would violate equality of opportunity between those who carry on to higher levels of education and those who

stop after primary school.<sup>80</sup>

The same issue was discussed in the seventies by the National Council for Education and Scientific Research. The council discussed two options, of making a consolidated primary and preparatory education last for either 8 or 9 years. The decision was for the latter system. The Council justified this decision by saying, "We chose an alternative which is not going to disturb the existing system and is not going to put people who are responsible for education in trouble, and it allows for the gradual application of the system".<sup>81</sup>

The other main argument against the reduction was that six years did not allow enough time for the students to master and to retain their reading and writing skills, and it was expected that reducing primary education to five years would make this worse.<sup>82</sup>

There is a class aspect to this decision. The reduction of primary education will mainly harm the interests of the lower classes, whose children do not usually carry on after the basic education level, while the upper and the middle classes can compensate for their children for any disturbance which might happen at that level. That is, the parents can help their children in their study, and they can afford for them to carry on to higher levels. So, the government has taken the decision to reduce the education level, where the majority of people who benefit from it are not politically effective. It could therefore apply the decision without too much pressure or resistance.

### (C) Technical Education and its Social Value

Technical education has a low social status in Egyptian culture. People give more respect to academic education and mental work. This tendency towards technical education and manual work has its historical roots in many of the developing countries which were under colonial rule. The colonial power

in these countries presented themselves in the form of the elite administrators and government servants. This partial image of European society affected the type of demand in colonized African countries, to be "oriented to the acquisition of that kind of education that was perceived to be the key to European-type occupational roles".<sup>83</sup>

The same attitude was created in Egypt by the British occupation, whose main target in the educational field was to produce government employees. The effect of colonial rule and its educational policies still exists in these countries, even after liberation. However, the social position of technical education and craft jobs are a very complicated subject to discuss, and to give an assessment of people's attitudes, because the relationship between level of education and income has changed.

During the sixties the individual return from education was represented in the phenomenon of "certificate pricing", where wages and salaries were determined and fixed according to the number of successful years spent on the educational ladder. This meant that the graduate of a university would get a higher wage than one who graduated from technical education, and technical graduates would get more than preparatory graduates.<sup>84</sup> According to this process, higher education in the sixties had both social and economic returns, which led young people, and their parents, "to make the necessary sacrifices whenever it was possible, in order to complete higher education".<sup>85</sup>

The difference between higher and technical education was not only in terms of the economic return, but in the hierarchy and position inside different organizations, mainly in the government and public sector. Promotion and career development were closely linked to the level of education obtained, and it was rare to find "a graduate of a technical secondary school or even secondary academic education, is able to climb the career ladder to the top".<sup>86</sup> This put limits to the



increase of wages or salaries and affected the total life earnings of the individual.

Unfortunately, this discrimination in wages and promotion opportunities for the two kinds of education has tended to "downgrade technical and vocational education and training to a type of education in which only poor or less gifted young people enrol".<sup>87</sup>

There has been some change in this position in the seventies and eighties, especially after the open door policy. The shortage of skills in some areas because of the increasing demand from the Arab oil countries for skilled workers, and the expansion in construction projects in Egypt, resulted in a rise in wages of craftsmen in different sectors. If one takes the construction sector as an example, the wages of workers in this sector increased by more than 480 per cent between 1970 and 1977, while the wages of 3 million government and public sector employees rose by only 52 per cent over the same period.<sup>88</sup>

The figures show a great income gap between the employees who are educated, and the workers who are not. Uneducated workers could earn more money than educated employees, which probably means that the certificate has lost its economic value. This raises a question about people's attitudes to education and their demand for it, and whether they still want certificates or prefer to join a skilled and manual occupation. It is perhaps too early to be able to come to any firm conclusions as to whether this is the attitude or not.

The most likely effect is that there has been a change in attitudes which is still in the process of formation, towards joining some skilled and manual occupation. Some university graduates have started to join training courses and work as craftsmen, but it is difficult to translate this into an estimate of how much this will reduce demand for university education. Even the graduates who accept work in occupations

which are considered inferior like it to be known that they have a university degree, because of its social status.<sup>89</sup> Another factor which might help the continuation of the pressure on higher education is the range of new opportunities which the open door policy has opened for the educated people. Foreign companies and banks pay high wages, and offer the opportunity to emigrate to an Arab oil country also requires higher education.

It is very difficult to evaluate exactly how people calculate their chances and make their choices: the field work in this study may help to cast some light on people's attitudes and choices.

#### (D) Higher Education and its Social Value

A discussion of higher education opportunities in Egypt cannot be completely separated from discussion of technical education, because the expansion of technical education means a decline in student numbers in academic education, and hence at the university level.

The control of higher education in Egypt is, today, one of the main targets of the policy of education. The Ministry of Education referred to that policy, stating that the Ministry "takes pains to limit the number of university admissions. This is evidenced by the decrease in the number of students admitted to the universities to 63,000 in 1976 against 73,000 in 1975".<sup>90</sup> The decline in student numbers must be seen in terms of its class connotations. Where there is a heavy demand for higher education, there will be increased competition between students, and students from different class backgrounds will be unequally prepared for that competition.

Although university education was expanded in the Nasserist era, it retained its class nature to a major extent. This can be seen in the social background of the students, and in public spending on higher education.

There is little research which deals directly with the social background of the students. However, some studies were carried out in the sixties into the social background of some public employees, and of university students. The first study, carried out by the Institute of National Planning in 1962, conducted a survey of public sector employees. It showed that those who had obtained university or secondary school certificates were mostly the sons of businessmen, merchants and employees, and this in turn reflects on the social background of those who got higher education in the sixties.<sup>91</sup> Table 8 shows the father's occupation of the educated people included in this survey.

**Table 8: Father's Occupation of Educated Public Sector and Government Employees: 1962**

Father's Occupation	Employees with Higher Education (%)	Employees with S e c o n d a r y Education (%)
Business	30.8	33.5
Liberal professions	26.9	17.7
Clerical work	2.7	18.0
Salaried technical work	4.1	12.7
Higher administrative posts	3.9	0.8
Science and engineering	2.3	0.7
Manual work	1.4	2.8
Other occupations	27.9	13.8

Source: Nazih Nassef Al Ayobi, (1978) Policy of Education in Egypt: Political and Managerial Study, (Center of Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo), p.72

The second study, conducted on 475 students in Cairo University and 175 students in Al Azhar University in 1966 studied the father's occupations of those students. The results are shown in Table 9. The table shows that education during the sixties reflected the class nature of society, and the bias of university education towards those from the upper and middle classes. The notable exception was Al Azhar

University, where 45.5 per cent of the student's fathers were farmers. This reflects a historical fact and social reality, that Cairo University, when it was established as the national university in 1920, was mainly for the urban middle classes, while Al Azhar continued to recruit people from the less advantaged background of people in rural Egypt.

Table 9: Father's Occupation of University Students: 1966

Father's Occupation	Cairo University (%)	Al-Azhar University (%)	Population (%)
Professionals	33.2	17.9	3.7
Small employees and clerks	23.0	1.8	3.8
Land owners and businessmen	29.3	19.6	8.1
Workers	5.6	7.2	28.3
Farmers	5.0	45.5	54.3
Undefined	3.1	8.0	6.8

Source: Mahmoud Abdel Raziq Shafshaq "The Role of the University in Forming the Egyptian Elite", National Review of Social Studies, Nos.2 & 3 (Arabic) quoted in Nazih N. Ayubi (1978) Policy of Education in Egypt: Political and managerial study (Center of Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo) p.72

As far as the funding of higher education is concerned, it is paid for almost entirely from government funds. In a study of public spending on higher education, Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil examined the distribution of the tax burden implicit in this government subsidy to higher education. His study was based on the hypothesis that, "Patterns of government subsidization of education will reflect the class bias in society, since the middle and higher income groups are likely to benefit disproportionately from higher education, and the masses disproportionately more from primary education".<sup>92</sup> This hypothesis of increasing rates of subsidization by level of education fits the Egyptian case, where the state subsidizes

higher education more than primary education.

In his study, the author identified three criteria in order to assess the equitability of government spending:

1. The equal opportunity criterion: a fiscal programme is equitable if different socio-economic groups in the population have access to the programme in proportion to their numbers in the population, irrespective of the cost paid by the different groups in relation to benefits received.<sup>93</sup>
2. The cost benefit criterion: a fiscal programme is equitable if the cost paid by different socio-economic groups in the population are proportional to the benefit they each receive, irrespective of access to the programme.<sup>94</sup>
3. The ability to pay criterion: a programme is equitable if the cost-benefit ratio of the programme rises as a function of income.<sup>95</sup>

Abdel Fadil reached the conclusion that on the first criterion Egypt's higher education system is inequitable, intergenerationally, since those who receive higher education benefits are disproportionately the children of the well to do, whether measured by income, class or various indices of socio-economic status.<sup>96</sup>

An assessment on the other two criteria is more complicated, because one has to take into account taxation studies in Egypt which cover all tax burdens in the years 1950 to 1959, 1964 to 1965, and 1974 to 1975. These taxation studies show that there is a steep increase in tax burdens at relatively low levels of income (up to LE 250) but that the increase in tax burden is much milder at medium and high levels of income.<sup>97</sup> Taking these tax findings into account, Abdel-Fadil concludes that in terms of his second and third criteria, higher education in Egypt is inequitable, and that the children of middle class families whose children receive higher education are subsidized by both the low income families whose children are not educated at this level and by high income groups in

the state sector, who shoulder a high tax burden relative to income received.<sup>98</sup>

So the studies indicate that, in spite of all the Nasserist efforts in expanding higher education, the benefits of this education still go to the middle and upper classes more than to the lower classes. At the same time it cannot be denied that education under Nasser was a factor for upward social mobility, especially in urban areas. This point has been researched by Saad Eddin Ibrahim, in a sample survey carried out in Cairo in 1979. The survey was conducted on a three generation basis - father, respondent and sons. He concluded that the middle generation enjoyed greater mobility (mostly upward) than did the younger, present generation.<sup>99</sup> His results are shown in Table 10.

Table 10: Education and Social Mobility in Cairo in 1979

Level of Education	Generation		
	1 Father (%)	2 Respondent (%)	3 Son (%)
Secondary	4.7	16.4	34.7
College	4.4	15.1	16.3
Post graduate	0.6	1.6	2.1
Total	9.7	33.1	53.1

Source: Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Social Mobility and Income Distribution in Egypt, 1952-1977" in Gouda Abdel Khalek and Robert Tignor (eds) (1982) The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt (Holmes and Meier, New York) p.411

It is clear that the second generation has nearly quadrupled the percentage in secondary school and college education in comparison with the first generation, while the third generation (sons) doubled its percentage in secondary education and slightly increased its college and post-graduate education in comparison with the second generation. The middle

generation was occupationally placed in the 1950s and early 1960s; the younger one in the late 1960s and 1970s.<sup>100</sup>

Saad Eddin Ibrahim comments that, "Egypt's stratification system reached its maximum fluidity from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, along with ambitious programmes in education and with bold socialist policies of equalizing opportunities, the Egyptian society witnessed more social mobility than in any single decade in this country".<sup>101</sup>

As a result of the decline of the opportunities in higher education, today there is pressure from the upper and middle classes to establish a private university for those who can afford to pay, but who cannot meet the entry requirements. The call for a private university was announced by the Minister of Education, and a good deal of discussion and debate were published in the newspapers in 1988.<sup>102</sup>

#### (E) Foreign Education and the Expansion of Private Education

Since 1952 under Nasser there was a tendency to control different types of foreign and private education in Egypt. After the 1956 Suez crisis most foreign schools were either nationalized or put under tight state control.<sup>103</sup> The control of these schools came as a move to bring unification to the cultural life of society which was divided between different kinds of education, such as Arabic, foreign, private and public.<sup>104</sup> Table 11 shows the decline in the numbers of private schools after 1956.

After 1974, private education in its different forms had been increased, and the government established fee paying schools in 1979 as was explained earlier. Table 12 shows the number of foreign schools, and the authorities which were responsible for them.

**Table 11: The Development of Primary Schools (Government and Private) 1953 - 1958**

Year	Government primary schools	%	Private Primary subsidized and other	%	Total
1953/54	5,140	76.1	1,611	23.9	6,751
1954/55	5,168	72.0	1,984	28.0	7,152
1955/56	5,399	64.5	2,967	34.5	8,366
1956/67	5,586	72.5	2,115	27.5	7,701
1957/58	5,674	76.5	1,748	23.5	7,422
1958/59	5,670	77.5	1,642	22.5	7,312
1958/60	5,744	79.6	1,469	20.1	7,213
1960/61	5,872	82.0	1,289	18.0	7,159

Source: Amir Boktor (1963) The Development and Expansion of Education in the United Arab Republic (American University, Cairo) p.30

**Table 12: Numbers of Private Schools and Their Competent Authorities: 1979/80**

Authority	Number of Schools
State of Vatican	71
Foreign Countries	5
Christian Religious Associations	8
Independent Educational Associations	23
<b>Total</b>	<b>107</b>

Source: The General Administration of Private Language Schools (1980) (Ministry of Education, Cairo) p.7

Figures include primary, preparatory and secondary schools.



#### 1. Schools under the State of Vatican:

These schools are owned and run by Christian groups of monks and nuns. There are different groups: Bon Pastear, Jesuit, and Frere.<sup>105</sup>

#### 2. Schools under the Supervision of Foreign Countries:

In these schools, the foreign country has full supervision of the finance and the follow up of work. The school has two directors, one Egyptian for public relations, the other a foreigner who has authority inside the school. There are two schools in Cairo, the German School under the West German Government, and the American College under the government of the USA.<sup>106</sup>

#### 3. Schools under Religious Associations:

These schools are run by Egyptian Christians who represent these associations. There is a co-supervision between the Ministry of Education, and the Catholic or Evangelical Church running the school.<sup>107</sup>

#### 4. Schools under Independent Educational Associations:

These are originally the French and English schools which were nationalized in 1956. The administration and the supervision of these schools was given to an Egyptian organization, formed to run these schools called The Educational Cooperative Association for National Institutes. This association was dissolved and each school has its own educational cooperative.<sup>108</sup>

These schools accept both Christian and Muslim children of the Egyptian elite. Table 13 shows the numbers of children attending.

**Table 13: Christian and Muslim Students in Foreign Language Schools: 1977/78**

Competent Authority	Student Numbers in 1977/78					
	Muslim	%	Christian	%	Foreigners	%
State of Vatican (10 Schools)	6,663	70.4	2,795	29.5	247	2.6
Religious Associations	1,880	65.5	911	34.5	58	2.0

Source: Shibl Badran, "Education and Dependency in Egypt: A study in the Foreign Education", in Contemporary Education, Vol.3, p.49 (in Arabic)

The increasing demand after the open door policy led to the expansion of private education, especially in schools which teach foreign languages. This demand can be understood in terms of three factors:

1. The opening of foreign companies and projects in Egypt which demand people who have mastered a foreign language.
2. People from different social backgrounds who could make money, either in Egypt or outside in the Arab oil countries, and who demanded more and better education for their children.
3. The long neglect of government schools, and the encouragement of the building of private schools which were seen by the government as a means of reducing the pressure on government free schools.

The figures show the increase of private education during the seventies in different school levels, reflecting the growing demand. (See Table 14.) If one compares the figures for pupil enrolments in private education in the sixties and the late seventies, one can see that the statistics show an increase in private education, especially at the preparatory and

**Table 14: The Size of the Private Education Sector Compared with Government Education in Egypt: 1976/77**

	A Primary Education			B Preparatory Education			C General Secondary Educ.		
	Govt. (nos.)	Private (nos.)	Private as % of total	Govt. (nos.)	Private (nos.)	Private as % of total	Govt. (nos.)	Private (nos.)	Private as % of total
Number of schools	9,607	303	3.0	1,578	242	13.8	323	121	27.2
Total class rooms	96,368	5,267	5.2	28,141	7,747	21.6	7,718	2,139	21.7
Enrolm't (thousands)	3,940	212	5.1	1,134	302	21.0	302	912	3.1
Teachers (thousands)	121	5.4	4.3	33.4	11.4	34.2	15.7	1.81	0.5

Source: Computed from Ministry of Education Statistical Department, Statement of Total Number of Schools, Classes, Pupils, and Teachers, at the Different Stages and Kinds of Education: 1975/77, quoted in Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, Educational Expansion and Income Distribution in Egypt, in Gouda Abdel Khalek and Robert Tignor (eds) (1982) The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt (Holmes and Meier, London) p.356

secondary level. In 1965/66 the number of pupils in preparatory private schools was 227,000. This number grew to 302,000 in 1976/77. The corresponding growth in secondary schools was from 55,000 in 1965/66 to 91,000 in 1976/77.

These figures show that private schooling became significant to those who wished to climb the educational ladder. The expansion of primary education, the large numbers of children at that level, meant that private education came to represent 5.1 per cent of total enrolment, but as one goes further up the educational ladder private education becomes still more significant. By the preparatory level, private education accounts for 21 per cent of total enrolments, and at the secondary level 23.1 per cent.

As has already been noted, private education is not only of

one type, but has different levels, so that investors in education can use the entire system according to their income. Thus they may choose government free schools or private schools according to choice, and within private education tend to gather together according to their ability to pay.

These schools represent a special educational service, and the results of these schools are taken as an indicator of their quality, along with the future social destinations of the students, which researchers assume the schools play a significant part in achieving.

The statistics show the difference in the results between different types of schools. For example, the results for primary school certificates in 1978/79 were that foreign language schools attained passes for 98.1 per cent of boys and 99.2 per cent of girls, while in official and subsidized schools 76.4 per cent of boys passed and 76.4 per cent of girls. For more details of these results of primary education and other levels of preparatory and secondary education see Appendices 17, 18, and 19.

#### IV. Conclusion

In this chapter the history of the educational system and policy in Egypt has been reviewed. The analysis concentrated upon the roots of the class nature of the education system, and the cultural impact of introducing modern education since the time of Muhammad Aly. From that analysis it can be concluded that the education system in Egypt has reflected the class nature of society since modern education was introduced by Muhammad Aly in the beginning of the nineteenth century, because his education programme was far from being a mass education movement. Rather it was an elitist system which worked to produce specialists for the modernization projects.

The elitist nature of the education system continued and increased under the British occupation, where education

opportunities were limited, free education abolished and the duality of the system between traditional Arabic education on the one side and the prestigious foreign education on the other was increased.

The national movement (1920-1952) was confronted by great challenges in the education field. That is, the education system was divided between Arabic/foreign, and religious/secular. There was a high illiteracy rate and very limited enrolment at the primary level. The national movement made efforts to unify the system and increase enrolment, and to achieve the democratization of the system. However, these efforts remained limited in crossing the divisions of the system and in achieving the democratization of education.

Under the 1952 Revolution, one of the main targets, as it was in many developing countries, was to introduce a mass education movement, which took the form of expanding formal education, nationalizing foreign education, enhancing the secularization of the system and concentrating on science and technology. These educational policies were introduced by Nasser and reflected the class bias of the system towards the interests of the popular masses.

Under the open door policy, the class alliance changed, and the state supported the interests of the upper and middle classes. Hence, education policies moved towards more fee paying and private education, increased foreign education and limited access to university level.

The 1952 Revolution's policy of education succeeded under Nasser in particular in providing qualified man power, narrowing the economic and cultural gap between classes and gave real opportunities for the masses to attend education. However, the system still suffers from drop out, high illiteracy rate, incomplete enrolment and the duality between Arabic and foreign, free and private education, which all reflect the class nature of the system. Many of these features

significantly increased under Sadat. From these concluding remarks some general issues can be drawn to form part of the basis and context for the second part of this research i.e. the field study.

#### **Education and Cultural Integration: The Impact on Social and Educational Issues**

It was explained earlier that education in Egypt, since the early years of Mahammad Aly, has suffered from several tensions and dichotomies. These are, the dichotomy between religious and modern secular education, between foreign and Arabic education, between free and fee paying education, and between the education of the elite and provision for the illiterate majority. These dichotomies have created cultural gaps among those who have been educated in different types of schools, and between those with some kind of education, and those with none, the illiterate majority.

The high illiteracy rate would tend to support the dominance of the traditional cultural beliefs and practices, which could block the integration between those who are educated and the illiterate majority, since both will have different outlooks and views. Illiteracy will limit the knowledge of the individual about his/her society and beyond the boundaries of the local community.<sup>109</sup>

The cultural gap in Egypt does not exist only between the educated and the illiterate. It exists between different sections of the educated as well. For example, those who have graduated from foreign education and have been instructed in foreign languages might have different attitudes and values with regard to their own language and culture, since being in these schools, they know that they are culturally privileged. They know that they are well qualified to control and to occupy most of the high positions in society, and those positions which demand mastery of a foreign language. Foreign education has been strongly encouraged in the seventies

through the expansion of private education and the government language schools. This combination of factors may lead those educated in this way to undervalue their own culture.

Another major dichotomy exists between those who have been educated in religious institutions and those who have been educated in the modern secular system. In order to bring about cultural integration, the Revolution has tried to reform Al-Azhar by a new law in 1961. This reform has allowed Al-Azhar to provide modern studies in science and human studies alongside the traditional religious studies. In fact, the reform has created another dichotomy inside Al-Azhar, since the reform has failed to have the desired effect upon the traditional core of religious studies.<sup>110</sup>

So the dichotomy in Egyptian culture and society exists between the educated and the intellectuals of the society who represent a culture, "marked by a crisis of identity, ambivalence of attitudes, values, and beliefs, not only towards the traditional order of society but also towards the new national order and the elite".<sup>111</sup>

These cultural differences lead one to ask how this is influencing people's perceptions of Egypt's problems and the ways to tackle these problems, which the field work will shed light on. That is, in the field study there will be an analysis of how people from different class positions perceive some general social, economic, and political issues of the past, present and future which reflect class consciousness as it connects with perceiving social and political history and the ongoing present. This will be the subject of Chapter Six, where people's cultural and ideological perspectives will be discussed.

The study of the views and ideologies of different members of social classes, besides its general concern with general economic and political issues, will concentrate upon their views on some educational issues, since this is the main point

of the study. This concentration on educational issues can be supported by the fact, which emerged from the literature review, that the education system in Egypt is facing some critical decisions. That is, there is a large debate in Egypt today over whether spending on education and the state finance of different levels of education, should be arranged on the basis that education is a right for all people, or on the basis that it is a discretionary subsidy, similar to subsidies which can be found in other economic fields. If education is seen as an economic subsidy, this would legitimize government cuts in expenditure in times of economic crisis.<sup>112</sup>

Related to this debate, there is a strong attitude in Egypt today, presented by pressure groups, to soften the state control over education, and to let it be more free to the private sector.<sup>113</sup>

These points, which are concerned in general with the right to education and equal opportunities, will be the subject of Chapter Seven, which presents the way in which members of different social classes perceive particular educational issues.

#### Educational Provision

From the review of the history of education in Egypt, it can be understood that the education system was, and still is, class biased and elitist, especially at the level of higher education. The education system is also influenced by foreign powers. This has been represented in the form of missionary schools, which were established as a form of elitist education, and which created the attitude that education and instruction in a foreign language is "proper education". This trend has continued to the present time, and appears in the form of private schools teaching in foreign languages, and the government language schools.



The general class nature of the education system can be seen in the diverse kinds of education: free and fee-paying, Arabic and foreign, modern and religious. This leads to the question of the extent to which there is unequal provision of educational opportunities in terms of levels and kinds of education that members from different class positions can afford for their children, and the role of the family economic and cultural capital in increasing or decreasing these opportunities. This will be the main point of Chapter Eight, which discusses educational opportunities for members of different social classes.

Through the analysis of the field study material, there will be reference to more cultural aspects related to the clash between the old and the new forces in Egyptian society and education, and the ways in which some of the old forces in the educational field are currently enjoying a revival.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Abu Al-Futouh Radwan (1951) Old and New Forces in Egyptian Education (Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia, New York) p.83
2. Bill Williamson (1987) Education and Social Change in Egypt and Turkey: A study in historical sociology (Macmillan Press, Houndmills) p.62
3. Ibid
4. Judith Cochran (1986) Education in Egypt (Croom Helm, London) p.4
5. Abu Al-Futouh Radwan, op.cit., p.89
6. Ibid
7. Mahmud Faksh (1980) "The Consequences of the Introduction and Spread of Modern Education: Education and national integration in Egypt", in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia Hiam, Modern Egypt: Studies in politics and society (Frank Cass, London) p.42
8. Abu Al-Futouh Radwan, op.cit., p.4
9. Heyworth Dunne (n.d.) An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt (Luzac and Co., London) p.170

10. Abu Al-Futouh Radwan, op.cit., pp.69-72
11. P.J.Vatikiotes (1980) The History of Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Sadat (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London) p.53
12. Heyworth-Dunne, op.cit., p.287
13. Bill Williamson, Education and Social Change in Egypt and Turkey, op.cit., pp.79-80
14. Saeid Ismail Issues of Education under Occupation op.cit., p.164
15. Judith Cochran, op.cit., p.10
16. Robert Tignor (1982) "Equality in Egypt's Recent Past: 1945-1952", in Gouda Abdel-Khalek and Robert Tignor (eds.) The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt (Holmes and Meier, London) p.38
17. Ibid
18. Saeid Ismail, op.cit., p.103
19. Saad Mursy and Saeid Ismail The History of Pedagogy and Education, op.cit., pp.375-381
20. See the ordeal of the Arabic language under the British occupation described in Saeid Ismail, op.cit., pp.290-322
21. Bill Williamson, op.cit., p.80
22. Judith Cochran, Education in Egypt, op.cit., p.32
23. Ibid
24. Saad Mursy and Saeid Ismail, op.cit., p.470
25. Ibid, p.471
26. Charles D.Smith, (1980) "The Intellectual and Modernization: Definitions and reconsiderations: The Egyptian experience", in Comparative Studies in Society and History: An International Quarterly, Vol.22, No.4, October, p.524
27. Saad Musry and Saeid Ismail, op.cit., pp.462-464
28. Michael Gilsenan (1982) Recognizing Islam: An anthropologist's introduction (Croom Helm, London) p.220
29. Mahmud Faksh, op.cit., p.46
30. Georgie D.M.Hyde (1978) Education in Modern Egypt: Ideals and realities (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) pp.5-6

31. The first ideological guideline for the Revolution came later on in the form of the 1961 "Charter for National Action".
32. Judith Cochran, op.cit., p.49
33. See Georgie Hyde, op.cit., pp.79-80
34. Education Planning in the United Arab Republic (UAR Ministry of Education, Documentation and Research Centre for Education, 1962) quoted in Joseph Szeliowicz (1973) Education and Modernization in the Middle East (Cornell University Press, London) p.260
35. See Charter for National Action, Chapter 7, "Production and Society".
36. Joseph Szeliowiz, op.cit., p.261
37. Derek Hopwood Egypt: Politics and society 1975 - 1984, op.cit., p.137
38. Ibid
39. Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil (1982) "Educational Expansion and Income Distribution in Egypt, 1952 - 1977", in Gouda Abdel-Khalek and Robert Tignor op.cit., p.352
40. Szyliowicz, op.cit., pp.268-269
41. The four major universities in Egypt, up to 1970, were Cairo, Alexandria, Ain Shams and Asyot.
42. CAPMS (1971) Statistical Indicators for UAR 1950 - 1970 (Cairo)
43. Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil, "Educational Expansion and Income Distribution in Egypt, 1952-1977", op.cit., p.352
44. Notice that all these levels are divided between free education introduced by the government and fee paying education in all levels provided by individuals or foreign missionaries.
45. See The Report of the National Council for Education, in Judith Cochran, op.cit., p.56
46. Ministry of Education (1980) Developing and Innovating Education in Egypt: Policy Plans (National Centre for Educational Research, Cairo)
47. Ahmed Fathy Suror (1989) Developing Education in Egypt: Its policy, strategy and implementation plan (Ministry of Education, Cairo) (Arabic)
48. Developing and Innovating Education in Egypt, op.cit., p.5

49. National Centre for Educational Research (1979) (Cairo), Data About Education in Egypt, in response to questionnaires forwarded by the International Conference on Education, Geneva, 1979.
50. Developing and Innovating Education, op.cit., pp.66-67. Note that the idea of basic education is not new for the education system. Similar experiments were applied since 1916, where schools were established for boys and girls to learn ordinary subjects besides manual and practical experience. In 1943 rural elementary schools were established where students studied agriculture and rural industry. At the end of the forties and the beginning of the fifties "Manayell Schools" were established in rural areas, along with what were called "schools of cooperatives" for the same purpose of rural development. These schools and experiments were never integrated and became part of the education system, since they were considered only as new experiments. See for more details on the history of these experiments, Mansour Hussein and Yosef Khalel (n.d.) Basic Education: Its concepts, principles and applications (Gharib, Cairo) (Arabic)
51. Yosef Khalil Yosef (n.d.) A Report about the Experiment of Basic Education (The National Centre for Educational Research)
52. Ministry of Education, Statistics of Primary Education 1986/87 (Arabic)
53. Developing and Innovating Education, op.cit., p.72
54. National Centre for Educational Research (1984) The Development of Education in Egypt from 1981/82 to 1983/84 (Cairo)
55. Judith Cochran, op.cit., p.62
56. Strategy of Developing Education in Egypt, (Ministry of Education, July 1987) pp.132-133
57. These suggestions can be found in both Developing and Innovating Education (1980) and Strategy of Developing Education in Egypt (1989)
58. Strategy of Developing Education in Egypt, op.cit., p.135
59. Ibid
60. Ibid, pp.132-133
61. M.E.Sinclair and Kevin Lillis (1980) School and Community in the Third World (Croom Helm, London) p.21
62. Ibid, p.28

63. Philip J. Foster (1977) "The Vocational School Fallacy in Development Planning", in Jerome Karabel and A.H. Halsey (eds.) Power and Ideology in Education (Oxford University Press, New York) pp.356-357
64. Ibid
65. Strategy of Developing Education in Egypt, op.cit., pp.147-148
66. Ibid
67. Information taken from an interview with Minister of Education. See, Al Ahaly, Vol.370, 9 November 1988
68. This estimate is taken from Hamid Ammar, Al Ahaly, Vol.341, 20 April 1988
69. Samuel Bowles (1980) "Education, Class Conflict, and Uneven Development", in John Simmons, The Education Dilemma, op.cit., p219
70. Ibid, pp.218-219
71. Ibid
72. Samir Lewis Saad (1982) The enrolment of Children in Basic Education Schools (The National Centre for Educational Research, Cairo) quoted in Saeid Ismail Aly (1984) Crisis of Education in Egypt (Al Ahaly Book, Unperiodical Book, Cairo) pp.105-106 (Arabic)
73. Samir Lewis Saad (1980) Drop out in Primary Education from 1956/57 to 1978/79 (The National Centre for Educational Research with the World Bank, Cairo) (Arabic)
74. CAPMS (1986) Systems of Education and Employment in Egypt Vol.5, p.22
75. Samir Lewis, Drop out in Primary Education from 1956/57 to 1978/79, op.cit., pp.71-75
76. Jgdish Bhagwati, "Education, Class Structure and Income Inequality", World Development, Vol.1, No.5, May 1973
77. The new law on basic education has reduced compulsory education from 9 to 8 years, and consequently the leaving age from 15 to 14.
78. Developing and Innovating Education, op.cit., p.67
79. Ahmed Fathy Suror, Developing Education in Egypt, op.cit., pp.117-125
80. Ministry of Labour Power (1965) The Report of the Ministerial Committee of Labour Power on the Policy of Education (Cairo) (Arabic)

81. The National Council for Education and Scientific Research. Third Period. October-- July, 1975/76 (Arabic)
82. See Hamid Ammar, "The Relapse of Mass Education at the Primary Level", Al Ahaly, Vol.351, 29 June 1988
83. Philip Foster, op.cit., p.359
84. Bent Hansen and Samir Radwan (1982) Employment Opportunities and Equity in Egypt (ILO, Geneva) p.252
85. Ibid
86. Ibid
87. Ibid
88. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1982) The New Arab Social System: A study on the social effects of the oil wealth (Centre of Arab Unity Studies, Beirut) pp.123-125 (Arabic)
89. Bent Hansen and Samir Radwan, op.cit., p.252
90. National Centre for Educational Research Data about Education in Egypt, op.cit., p.3
91. Nazih N. Ayubi (1978) Policy of Education in Egypt: Political and managerial study (Centre of Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo) p.72
92. Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil, "Educational Expansion and Income Distribution in Egypt, 1952-1977", in Gouda Abdel-Khalek and Robert Tignor, op.cit., p.361
93. Ibid
94. Ibid
95. Ibid
96. Ibid
97. For details of the taxation system in Egypt see: El-Edel, "Impact of Taxation on Income Distribution: An exploratory attempt to estimate tax incidence in Egypt", in Gouda Abdel Khalek and Robert Tignor, op.cit.
98. Abdel Fadil, Education Expansion and Income Distribution in Egypt, op.cit., p.365
99. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Social Mobility and Income Distribution", in Gouda Abdel Khalek and Robert Tignor, op.cit., pp.410-411
100. Ibid
101. Ibid

102. The Minister of Education announced in an interview that there will be a private university financed by banks, Arab countries and private capital. In his view this did not violate equal opportunities of education, since private education at the school level already exists. See Al Ahaly, Vol 375, 14 December 1988.
103. Mahmud Faksh, op.cit., p.47
104. The history of foreign education in Egypt goes back to the French expedition of 1798, when they established their own school. Other schools were established in the last years of Muhammad Aly's rule, including Jewish schools in Cairo and Alexandria in 1840. Later on a Greek school was established in Cairo in 1925, and American school in Cairo in 1928 and the Catholic missionary schools in 1940. For more details see: Heyworth Dunn, op.cit.
105. Shibl Badran (1985) "Education and Dependency in Egypt: A study in the Foreign Education", in Contemporary Education, Vol.3, p.50 (Arabic)
106. Ibid, pp.49-50
107. Ibid, p.51
108. Ibid
109. Edward Shils (1960) "Political Development in the New States", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2, p.273
110. Daniel Crecelius (1970) "Al-Azhar: A millennium of faithfulness to tradition", Mid East, April, 34-41
111. Mahmud Faksh, op.cit., p.48  
The split between the Egyptian intellectuals can be traced in what is called the crisis of the intellectuals of 1961, which created the great debate of March - July 1961. In this debate, many Egyptian intellectuals contributed, such as Abdel-Malek Auda, Zaki Nagip Mahmoud, Louis Awad and among them Lutfi El-Kholy who identified the crisis as a crisis of creativity, crisis of depth of understanding our culture, and crisis of method. See Anwar Abdel Malek, Egypt: Military Society, op.cit. The crisis has continued in the seventies and some Egyptian intellectuals have seen the crisis in the seventies as the crisis of the decadence of society. See the details in Ghali Shoukri (1981) Egypt: Portrait of a President, 1971 - 1981 (Zed, London)
112. See debate in Al Ahram -Iktisadi, Vol. 919, August 1986
113. See Hamid Ammar, "Dismantling the Relationship between State and Education", Al Ahaly, Vol.375, December 1988

**PART TWO**

**THE EMPIRICAL STUDY**



## INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO

As has already been noted in the Introduction to Part One, this research is concerned with the study of the influence of class power relations on education in Egypt, and with the provision of education for different social classes.

In order to study this, the research must work on two levels. The first level is a theoretical discussion of the class nature of society, education, and the provision of education for different social classes, as represented in the policies and reforms of education which embody state ideologies. The study on this level has been introduced in Part One, which contains the study of some relevant aspects, such as the concepts of class, culture and ideology, state power and class formation in Egypt, and the study of educational policies and the education system in Egypt.

In Part One it was explained that the study of class cultures, ideologies and views of different economic, political and educational matters is not easy, because people's ideologies cannot be directly deduced from their class positions. People live in complex cultural situations, where economic, social, ideological and political factors interact. In order to study the complexity of the dynamics of class cultures and ideologies, where people live their everyday social relations, an empirical study is needed. The empirical study represents the second level, and the second part of this research. Parents of sixty families with children in primary education were interviewed in order to study their perspectives on different economic, political and educational matters. The sample concentrated upon the new petty bourgeoisie, because these are considered to be an essential class in the process of modernization and development in Egyptian society, in the framework of a sociological analysis of class formation in a historical perspective. This was discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

Part of the class cultural analysis is people's consciousness and awareness of their class relations, their place in society, and their interests, i.e. the image they have of themselves and of their society. These represent an essential aspect of social classes, and are developed in Chapter Six.

In addition to the study of people's consciousness and awareness of general economic, social and political issues, there will be a more specific analysis of people's perceptions which will be discussed in two chapters:

In Chapter Seven general issues of education and society, and educational policy will be discussed. Examples of these issues are equality of educational opportunity, state spending on education, and whether education should be free or fee-paying. These points are presented on the theoretical foundation laid by the literature review of history, policies and system of education in Egypt, where these issues have been seen to be the centre of debate. The analysis of these points throws some light on the way in which the education system plays a part in the reproduction of the class structure of society, where the process of reproduction is mediated by class relations, class power and class interests. The analysis of the material of the field study will illustrate the dynamics of this process in Egyptian society.

In Chapter Eight more specific issues of personal experience of using educational provision will be studied for members of different social classes. The analysis of provision of education will be analyzed against the theoretical background of the discussion of the historical bias of the educational system in Egypt and the role that the family's cultural capital may play in contributing to the unequal provision of education.

It should be noted that the material collected from the field study provides a rather limited range of information in terms of the quantitative analysis of access and provision of

education, since the material is drawn from a small sample. Nevertheless, the data provide opportunities for a complex qualitative cultural analysis of the dynamics of class cultural power relations and class interests influencing access, provision and control of education.

From these points raised in the three chapters of the field study, the main concerns of the empirical study are the ideologies and consciousness of parents with children in primary education, as part of the analysis of class, culture, ideologies and common sense in Egypt.

To achieve this, the technique which will be used in the field study is based upon interviews with parents who come from different social class backgrounds. As was explained in the introduction, the study of the ideologies of ordinary people concerning education has not been given much attention in educational and social research in Egypt. This research aims to contribute towards filling that gap.

The study of people's ideologies is presented in Part Two of this thesis in four chapters. Chapter Five deals mainly with two points:

- the method of classifying the sample, i.e. the selection of criteria for classification, and
- a short summary of the process of selecting the sample and the tool used in the interview. Details of the field study procedures can be found in Appendix 22.

The subsequent three chapters will deal with the analysis of the material of the field study as follows:

Chapter Six presents the culture and ideologies of the members of different social classes.

Chapter Seven deals with the specific points of education, where it will be shown how members of different social classes perceive general educational issues.

Chapter Eight deals with the actual provision and direct experience of educational opportunities for the members of different social classes.

CHAPTER FIVE  
TOOLS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE FIELD STUDY

Introduction

This chapter explains the process by which the field study was conducted. This will include a discussion of the criteria which will be used to classify the sample of the field study in terms of their class positions. In order to select those criteria, there will first be a review of the different criteria available, and a critical review of those criteria. This will be followed by a detailed discussion of the criteria which have actually been adopted for this research, namely Poulantzas' criteria, which will be presented in terms of their theoretical bases, their positive and negative aspects, and the way in which the work of Erik Olin Wright has criticized Poulantzas' criteria, and developed the neo-Marxist analysis at this point, by introducing an alternative way to deal with the negative aspects and the ambiguities of Poulantzas' criteria.

This chapter will present a short summary of the methodology employed in conducting the field study, which includes the way in which the sample was chosen, the organization of work with members of the sample, and the design of the research tool used in the field study.

I. Selection of Criteria for Classifying the Field Study Sample

Choosing the criteria for classifying the sample of the field study is not a matter of technical process. The choice must be based on theoretical grounds and supported by a theory of class.

The following discussion will give examples of different criteria used in educational and social research. While presenting these criteria, the theoretical problems they raise will be illustrated. After that, the criteria upon which this

research was based will be presented, that is, Poulantzas' criteria, with an explanation of the theoretical grounds for choosing them.

The first example of criteria is taken from the Egyptian literature. It is a scale for the "standard of socio-economic classes in Egypt" designed by Farouk Al-Bohy.<sup>1</sup>

The scale is based on the consideration of social class as a gradation, rather than looking at class on a relational basis. That is, social classes are categorized as upper- middle- and lower-classes. There is no clear demarcation between some classes, such as the working class and the new petty bourgeoisie, since both of them are considered to be wage earners and distributed on the scale according to the material objects they obtain, including occupation, housing, education and income. The approach of identifying classes on a socio-economic scale provides no opportunity for this research to deal with social classes as defined in relational terms, i.e. classes in their structured social relationship to each other as defined as bourgeoisie and proletariat.

A second model is based on occupation ranking. The example of such criteria taken here is the Registrar General's class schema. The Registrar General's scheme is usually adopted by the British Government in official reports.<sup>2</sup> This schema rests on the assumption that society is a graded hierarchy of occupations ranked according to skills.<sup>3</sup> Occupations are allocated to social classes commensurate with the degree of expertise involved in carrying out their associated tasks and the resulting categories are assumed to be homogeneous in these terms.<sup>4</sup>

The classification provides a comprehensive list of occupations and explains the classification procedures to group them under one of five headings. These headings are, professional and managerial, intermediate, skilled, partly skilled, and unskilled.<sup>5</sup> In fact, this kind of classification

is not usually based on a consistent theory of class, and for this theoretical reason it cannot be applied in the present research.

The third model, presented by Goldthorpe, is based on sociological rather than taxonomic bases. At its foundation is the Hope-Goldthorpe scale for grouping the social grading of occupations, based on a popular assessment of the social standing of several hundred occupations. The scale was developed by the Oxford sociologists John Goldthorpe and Keith Hope in the process of an inquiry into occupational mobility.<sup>6</sup>

Goldthorpe's scale is based on a Weberian concept of class, as defined by the market and work situation of the particular occupations. The classification attempts "to combine occupational categories whose members would appear... to be typically comparable, on the one hand in terms of their sources and levels of income, their degree of economic security and chance of economic advancement; and on the other their location within systems of authority and control governing the process of production in which they are engaged, and hence their degree of autonomy in performing their work-tasks and roles".<sup>7</sup>

Although the scale is based on a developed theory of class, in practice the categories given by Goldthorpe are very similar to those adopted by the Registrar General.<sup>8</sup> (For details of Goldthorpe's class categories, and the Registrar General's, see Appendices 20 and 21.)

The theoretical bases of the scale can be criticized from a Marxist viewpoint. That is, since the classification is based on occupation, it mistakes categories defined by technical relations of production (the prevailing state of technology) with those defined by social relations of production (ownership and non-ownership of productive means).<sup>9</sup>

### (A) Poulantzas Criteria

The criteria which will be adopted in this research to classify the sample of the field study is based upon the theoretical and conceptual analysis of class presented in Chapter One. In summary, the present research adopts a Marxist concept of class, which has been justified earlier. From the Marxist perspective, classes are seen in a relational perspective, and from the neo-Marxist perspective, which has also been explained earlier, classes are identified not only in economic terms, but also in terms of their political power, ideologies and consciousness. This view gives more chance for making a comprehensive analysis which deals not only with the economic base of society, but also its cultural and ideological superstructure.

These aspects of conceptualizing class have been fulfilled by Poulantzas, who, in addition to his conceptualization of class, introduced criteria which serve to draw the boundaries between social classes. Poulantzas introduces three criteria. These are the economic, the political and the ideological criteria, which are based on his understanding of social classes as influenced by these three levels.

The important point about Poulantzas' criteria, beside being based on a developed theory of class which considers the cultural and ideological aspects, is that it gives attention to social classes which have not been the subject of sufficient study. That is to say, he analyzes the new petty bourgeoisie, how to identify them, and how to draw the line between them and the working class. This is significant in the case of Egypt, which gives an opportunity to study the new petty bourgeoisie as a growing class in society.

From the literature review of class formation in Egypt it was noted that there has been a substantial growth of the new petty bourgeoisie, in terms of their numbers, their important role in management and directing different state projects.

Consequently, we need clear criteria to identify this growing class and to differentiate them from the working class, since, as mentioned in Chapter Two, the working class has frequently been confused with the new petty bourgeoisie, on the grounds that both are wage-earners. This point of drawing clear boundaries between the two classes is important for this research, where it will deal with how educational opportunities are distributed, and who gets what.

The following discussion will present Poulantzas' criteria and will illustrate that point of identifying the new petty bourgeoisie from the working class.

#### Economic Criteria:

This is very important and the prime criterion in identifying the bourgeoisie, because it separates those who own from those who do not. It is also important in identifying the new middle class from the working class.

Economic criteria refer to:

1. Economic ownership, which is, "real economic control of the means of production, i.e. the power to assign the means of production to given uses and so to dispose of the products obtained".<sup>10</sup> This definition refers to "possession" which is defined as "the capacity to put the means of production into operation".<sup>11</sup> This differentiation is important, because some people can be in a position to put the means of production into operation, i.e. they have possession, without being the real owners, i.e. they do not have economic ownership. In this category would be, for example, managers.
2. The other element in the economic criteria is the distinction between productive and unproductive work. This factor is important in identifying the boundaries between the working class and the new petty bourgeoisie. That is, Poulantzas does not consider wage earning in



itself as a criterion of membership of the working class, because every worker is a wage earner, but not every wage earner is a worker.<sup>12</sup> So Poulantzas considers that productive/unproductive work, in terms of producing surplus value, is a suitable criterion to identify the working class from the new petty bourgeoisie on the economic level.

#### Political Criteria:

These criteria are very important in identifying the working class from the new petty bourgeoisie and in defining the position of the managers. The political criteria refer to the relations of domination/subordination in terms of supervisory/non-supervisory division of labour. To understand this relation we have to refer to Poulantzas distinction between technical and social division of labour. Technical division refers to the structural position derived from the particular technology used in production, while social division of labour derives from the social organization of production, or relations of production.<sup>13</sup> This means that technical division of labour inside different organizations is a matter of different levels of technology used, while the social division lies in the structure of social production. This distinction is important in identifying domination/subordination relations, where some groups could be exploited in terms of the social division of labour but they are themselves exploiters on the technical level. For example, the managers and supervisors present this double situation. In terms of material production they are productive in terms of coordinating and integrating the production process. But in terms of social division of labour they represent the political domination of capital over the working class.<sup>14</sup>

**Ideological Criteria:**

These are the second important criteria in identifying working class from the new middle class. The ideological criteria refer to the ideological domination within the social division of labour between mental/manual labour.

This division shows that the working class which performs the manual work is not only exploited economically and dominated ideologically, but also excluded from the "secret knowledge" of the production process, and this exclusion is necessary for the reproduction of capitalist social relations.<sup>15</sup>

Poulantzas goes far beyond the simple meaning of mental/manual labour, i.e. for him it is not just doing something by hand or using one's brain. It is, as he says, "We could thus say that every form of work that takes the form of knowledge from which the producers are excluded, falls on the mental labour side of the capitalist production process, irrespective of its empirical/natural content; and that this is so whether the direct producers actually do know how to perform this work but do not do so (again not by chance), or whether they in fact do not know how to form it (since they are systematically kept away from it) or whether again there is simply nothing that needs to be known".<sup>16</sup>

The classes which are more likely to be identified in terms of this division are the working class and the new petty bourgeoisie. For example, engineers, technicians, white collar workers, low level clerks and secretariat all have been identified mainly because of their position on both mental/manual work and supervisory/non-supervisory work. According to these criteria, the technicians are excluded from the working class because they practice ideological domination over the working class and they are considered part of the new petty bourgeoisie.

The following table shows the distribution of different criteria between different classes.

**Table 1: General Criteria for Class in Poulantzas' Analysis**

	Economic Criteria			Political		Ideological	
	Exploiter	Exploited		Domina-	Subordi-	Domina-	Subordi-
	Appropriates Surplus Value	Surplus Labour Extorted	Surplus Value Extorted	tion	nation	tion	nation
Bourgeoisie	+	-	-	+	-	+	-
Proletariat	-	+	+	-	+	-	+
New Petty Bourgeoisie	-	+	-/+	+/-	+	+/-	+
Traditional Petty Bourgeoisie	-	-	-	-	+	+	+

Key: + criterion present - criterion absent  
 +/- criterion usually present but sometimes absent  
 -/+ criterion usually absent but sometimes present

Source: Erik Olin Wright (1978) Class, Crisis and the State (NLB: London) p.45

So, from this review of Poulantzas criteria it can be noticed that the economic criteria are essential in identifying the bourgeoisie, while the political and ideological criteria are essential for the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class.

From the review of Poulantzas criteria, and especially the political and ideological ones, it can be noticed that he uses them in a circumscribed way, since he confines them to the labour process to explain domination and subordination relations. This research uses Poulantzas' criteria to classify members of the sample of the field study. However, the political and ideological criteria are used in a wider sense than that of Poulantzas, which has residues of economism. That is, political criteria in the general analysis of class

relations are not confined to relations of domination and subordination in the work situation, i.e. doing supervisory or non-supervisory work. Rather, they refer to the class political power, to political parties and organizations, as illustrated in the analysis of the political context of Egypt in Chapter Two, and in the analysis of class political power in Chapter Three.

Similarly, in the use of ideological criteria, they are not confined to the domain of doing mental or manual work. Rather, an ideology of a world view is identified which expresses the values of particular social classes and represents people's beliefs, ideas, consciousness and interests. This is important for this research in order to move from the limited level of identifying class at the economic level to the cultural, ideological and historical analysis of a specific class formation.

As mentioned earlier, this research accepts with modification Poulantzas' criteria for identifying social classes on theoretical grounds, and because they have the advantage of drawing clear lines between the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class. However, in his classification of the different social groups, Poulantzas has misplaced one group; he classified managers, not with the new petty bourgeoisie, but with the bourgeoisie. Poulantzas justifies this classification on the grounds that managers have control on the economic level over the means of production, even though they do not have economic ownership, and they exercise the power of capitalists over the workers.<sup>17</sup> For that reason, Poulantzas' solution was to exclude managers from the new petty bourgeoisie, and to arbitrarily group them with the bourgeoisie.

This leads to a position where a certain social group may occupy a dual position in the class structure, which is to say, according to the criteria might be classified in one of two different classes. To resolve this problem, and in

preference to resorting to arbitrary classification, Erik Olin Wright introduces the idea of "contradictory class locations". He considers that an alternative way to deal with ambiguities in the class structure is to see some positions as occupying objectively contradictory locations within the class relations.<sup>18</sup> Wright argues that, bearing in mind that all class positions are contradictory locations, then it can be said that certain positions in the class structure constitute doubly contradictory locations: they represent the basic contradictory class relations of capitalist society.<sup>19</sup>

In his early formulation of contradictory class locations in 1978, the only such location discussed was that of the managers who simultaneously occupy bourgeois and proletariat positions. They are bourgeois since they have the capacity to tell workers what to do and to punish them, and they are proletariat since they were themselves told what to do and could be fired.

Wright has identified three contradictory class locations which can be found between the two main classes in society, that is the bourgeoisie and the working class. These are:

- 1 Managers and supervisors, who occupy a contradictory location between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat,
- 2 Semi-autonomous employees, who retain a relatively high level of control over their immediate labour process, and occupy a contradictory location between the working class and the petty bourgeoisie, and
- 3 Small employers, who occupy a contradictory location between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie.<sup>20</sup>

In recent development of his concept of contradictory class location, Wright uses the concept to solve the problem of locating the middle class as a whole, not only the managers. In order to achieve this, Wright made his criteria more complicated, in order to provide an opportunity to differentiate more contradictory locations, especially among those who occupy non-managerial jobs.

Wright's criteria are based upon a distinction between 'ownership' and 'possession', where 'ownership' means real control over investments (the flow of financial resources into and out of production. By 'possession' he refers to control over the actual operation of the means of production. This kind of control can be divided along two dimensions: (a) control over the physical means of production, and (b) control over labour within production (authority and supervision).<sup>21</sup>

Wright identified several levels of control within each of these relations, ranging from full control to no control, through partial and minimal.<sup>22</sup> According to these scales, he could discriminate between different levels of control that managers practised. Their control ranged from having full or partial control over some, but not all, of the dimensions (top executives) to having no control over money capital and physical capital, and only partial or minimal control over labour (foremen).<sup>23</sup>

Wright also classified the class character of non-managerial technical and professional jobs, such as teachers and research scientists. These were characterized as occupying petty bourgeois and proletariat positions. They are proletariat since they sell their labour power, but they are petty bourgeoisie because they have real control over their own immediate labour process within production.<sup>24</sup>

The last group which were identified as being in a contradictory class location was the small employers who combined bourgeois and petty bourgeois class positions. They are petty bourgeois since they are self employed and direct producers, and they are bourgeois since they employ wage labour.<sup>25</sup> The resulting schema of contradictory class locations is shown in Table 2.

The idea of contradictory class locations is useful in this research in practical and analytic terms. In practical terms

Table 2: Basic Class Map of Capitalist Society

Capitalist mode of production		Simple Commodity production
Capitalist Class	-----	
	Small Employers	
-----		
Top Executives		Petty Bourgeoisie
Managers		
Supervisors	-----	
-----	Semi-autonomous Employees	
	-----	
Working Class		
-----		
	Classes	Contradictory locations
	-----	

Source: Erik Olin Wright (1985) *Classes* (Verso, London) p.48

it is useful since it draws attention to the special position of some groups, such as managers and small employers. This will help to prevent confusion in locating such positions in the sample of the field study of this research. In analytical terms, the idea of contradictory class locations is important for the analysis of the possible coincidence of class interests and formation of class alliances over political, economic and educational interests, and in particular for the new petty bourgeoisie who occupy such a contradictory position.

As Wright explained, class struggle does not occur between two perfectly homogeneously organized classes. Rather, in a class formation, the typical situation is one in which alliances are formed between classes, segments of classes, and between contradictory class locations.<sup>26</sup> Consequently, individuals find themselves in contradictory class locations and in the situation of struggle for class interests they face the choice among three broad strategies:

- i) to try to use their position as exploiters, to gain entry as individuals into the dominant exploiting class itself, which can be seen as the case for managers and professionals who buy property and stocks;
- ii) to attempt to forge an alliance with the dominant exploiting class; this can take different forms, as when the exploiting class try to tie the interests of those in contradictory class positions to their own interests, or in an indirect way, as when they reduce exploitation, by, for example, giving extremely high salaries for upper level managers;<sup>27</sup>
- iii) to form an alliance with the popular exploited class; this only happens under certain historical conditions, and is probably the most difficult alliance to achieve, since the exploited classes do not have many material benefits to offer to the people in contradictory class locations, and the exploiting classes do.<sup>28</sup>

However, the prediction of which alliances will occur is extremely difficult, especially when considering the position of those in contradictory class locations, since they may, themselves, have contradictory views and interests. The whole issue of the relationship between class culture and consciousness and class objective location at the economic level is problematic.



(B) How Poulantzas' Criteria, and Erik Olin Wright's Model of Contradictory Class Locations will be Applied to the Case Study of Urban Egypt

One previous attempt has been made, by the Egyptian economist Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, to draw a class map of urban Egypt using the idea of contradictory class locations in an attempt to identify within Egyptian society which groups occupy these positions.

In his analysis, Abdel Fadil identifies two central classes in urban Egypt, the bourgeoisie and the working class, while both the new and the traditional petty bourgeoisie occupy an intermediary position between the two polar class positions. Within the class structure, Abdel Fadil identifies three basic contradictory locations in class relations in urban Egypt.

- 1 Self-employed artisans and line supervisors, who occupy a contradictory location between the petty bourgeoisie and the working class,
- 2 Small employers as well as technical, professional and administrative staff, who occupy a contradictory position between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, and
- 3 Elements of the lumpen proletariat, who occupy a contradictory position between the organized working class and the lower ranks of the petty bourgeoisie.<sup>29</sup>

The following table shows how Abdel Fadil gave a statistical assessment of the size of different classes and the size of contradictory class locations.

**Table 3: Distribution of different socioeconomic categories into broad social classes in urban Egypt, 1970/71**

Class	Constituent socioeconomic groups	Approximate number (000s)	Data sources
Bourgeoisie	Top government officials	1.9	State budget 1971/72
	Top managers in the public sector	1.9	Survey of employment 1972
	Top independent professionals	26	Guess estimate, one fifth of professions
	Wholesale traders	10	Extrapolation of 1965 survey figures
	Industrial entrepreneurs	9	Industrial census 1966/67 (updated)
	Contractors and other businessmen	n.a.	
	Middle managers	10	Management survey 1972
	Government special cadres	20	State budget 1971/72
Petty Bourgeoisie	<i>The new petty bourgeoisie</i>		
	Technical, professional and administrative staff	204	Survey of employment 1970
	Government employees (general cadre)	907	State budget 1971/72
	Government employees on 'special cadres'	190	State budget 1971/72
	Line supervisors and foremen	35	Survey of employment 1970

*The traditional  
petty bourgeoisie*

	Bottom group of independent professionals	-	Difficult to estimate due to high risk of 'double counting'
	Enumerated small retailers and shopkeepers	250	Informed estimate based of 1965 trade survey
	Self-employed artisans	170	Census of industrial production 1967
	Salesmen and their assistants	12	Survey of employment 1970
Proletarian Workers	Production workers	474	Survey of employment 1970
	Workers in the civil service	170	State budget 1971/72
Sub-proletariat	Enumerated casual workers on building sites	474	Survey of employment 1970
	Cleaning, maintenance and security workers	78	Survey of employment 1970
	Domestic servants	150	Guess estimate
	Openly unemployed people in urban areas	86	Labour force sample survey 1972
	Persons not classified by any occupation	138	Labour force sample survey 1972

Source: Mahmoud Abdel Fadil (1980) The Political Economy of Nasserism (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge)

A number of important features can be noted in Abdel Fadil's distribution of the different social classes. In the first place, he introduces a classification of four categories similar to that of Poulantzas, i.e. the bourgeoisie, the new petty bourgeoisie, the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class. In his classification, Abdel Fadil has placed the top government officials and the managers and the special

Table 4: Class map in urban Egypt, 1970-71

Bourgeoisie 80,000-100,000 (3-4%)	Technical, professional and administrative staff 204,000	
		(high estimate)
	Self employed artisans 170,000	Petty Bourgeoisie 1.8 million  (59%)
	Line supervisors and foremen 35,000	
Working Class 644,000 (21%)		Lumpen proletariat 492,000 (16%)  (low estimate)
	Classes	Contradictory locations

Source: Mahmoud Abdel Fadil (1980) The Political Economy of Nasserism (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge)

cadres with the bourgeoisie. That is to say, he puts them in the same class with wholesale traders and industrial entrepreneurs. The author of the present research does not agree with the classification on this point. As was made clear in the earlier analysis of the new petty bourgeoisie in Chapter Three, this group is related to the state apparatus

and the 'superstructure' of society, while the bourgeoisie, i.e. the capitalist class, relates to the 'base' of the society. In consequence of this, in the present analysis such groups will be grouped with the new petty bourgeoisie. This classification will be adhered to in the analysis of the sample of the field study.

A second feature which differentiates the class map of Egypt from that of the capitalist advanced societies described by Wright can be identified. That is the class map of urban Egypt indicates that the working class is small compared with the traditional and new petty bourgeoisie, which account for 59 per cent of the population. The working class, unlike the working class in advanced industrialized countries, is divided into two groups: those who work in modern industries and form a relatively privileged class which enjoys a stable occupation, the lumpen proletariat, which includes occasional labourers, street vendors, peddlars, domestic servants and porters. The former group accounts for 21 per cent. From this picture, one cannot conclude, as Abdel Fadil did, that the two major classes in urban Egypt are the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, since one can observe the growing number and influence of the new petty bourgeoisie, which leads the present researcher to make them a special feature in the field study, while at the same time not neglecting the other social classes.

So, in urban Egypt, there is an increasing concentration in the new petty bourgeoisie. At the same time the traditional petty bourgeoisie is declining. This view is supported by figures taken from different years which show a shift in the working status of the urban workforce over the years 1962 to 1976.

The table shows the steady decline in the self-employed group and the increase among wage earners, which includes both the working class and other employees. There has also been an increase in unemployment from 3 per cent in 1962 to 7.3 per

Table 5: Shifts in the Working Status of the Urban Workforce, 1962 - 1976

---

Working Status	1962	%	1972	%	1976	%
Employers and entrepreneurs	185,000	8	234,000	7	171,139	3.2
Self-employed	454,000	20	635,000	18	832,649	4.9
Salaried employees and wage earners	1,443,000	63	2,300,000	66	4,092,702	73.3
Unpaid family	141,000	6	214,000	6	-	
Unemployed	71,000	3	112,000	3	408,756	7.3
Undefined	-	-	-	-	75,343	1.3
TOTAL	2,294,000	100	3,495,000	100	5,580,489	100

---

Source: Figures for 1962 and 1972 taken from Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, *op.cit.*, p.90. The 1962 figures taken from a labour force sample in June 1962, and 1972 figures from a similar sample in May 1972. Figures for 1976 are the present researcher's estimates from the 1976 census.

---

cent in 1976.

From this discussion, the general concentration of this research upon the new petty bourgeoisie can be understood and justified, both in terms of the theoretical reasons set out in Chapter Three, and in terms of the statistical importance of this groups, as established here.

For the purposes of the present research, the sample of the field study will be classified on the following criteria:

Economic criteria, which means the position in relation to the means of production, i.e. the division between owners and non-owners,

Political criteria, which means the position in relation to supervisory / non-supervisory work, and

Ideological criteria, which means the division between mental

/ manual work.

From these criteria, the sample of the field study will be classified into four classes identified as follows:

- 1 The bourgeoisie or the capitalists are the owners of the means of production, who employ at least ten workers.<sup>30</sup>
- 2 The working class, who are wage earners who have no supervisory role and who do manual work.
- 3 The traditional petty bourgeoisie, who own their means of production, either employing other people on a small scale, or working by themselves doing manual work.
- 4 The new petty bourgeoisie, who are wage earners, do not own their means of production, and do mental work.

It should be noted that these criteria still represent a fairly economic model, which mainly depends on the position in relation to the ownership of the means of production, and on doing mental / manual work, so it does not really go very far towards Poulantzas' wider theoretical views of political and ideological criteria.

## II. Methodology and Procedures for the Field Study

In this part a short summary of the process of choosing the sample of the field study is presented, along with the procedures followed to conduct the interviews. As mentioned earlier in the introduction, the aim of the field study is to present empirically based data about the economic, social, political and educational perspectives of people from different class positions. The researcher decided to take the sample from the parents who have children in primary schools. The schools were chosen in such a way as to provide parents from different social backgrounds. The sample includes parents who have children in the following kinds of primary schools:

government free schools, government language schools and foreign language schools. The pilot study and the survey of fathers' occupations in these schools demonstrated that these schools contain children from different social backgrounds. Where the government free schools mainly draw children from working class and traditional petty bourgeois origins, the government language and foreign language schools mainly recruit those from new petty and big bourgeoisie backgrounds.

The sample for the main study consisted of the parents of sixty families chosen from six schools, two schools of each kind. Members of the sample represent the following class positions:

31 families represent the new petty bourgeoisie, 9 families represent the traditional petty bourgeoisie, 9 families represent the big bourgeoisie and 11 families represent the working class.

The method used in the field study was the interview and the tool used was a guide for the interview which consists of a variety of questions which covered a wide range of different economic political, social and educational issues. To conduct the interviews the researcher arranged through the schools to visit the parents' houses where the interviews took place. For more details about the content of the interview, the selection of the sample for the pilot and main study, description of the schools and the social background of the pupils in the schools see Appendix 22.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Farouk Shawky Al-Bohy, "Scale for Determining Socio-Economic Classes", Contemporary Education, Vol.5 & 6, July 1986, February 1987 (Arabic)
2. Jack Demaine (1983) Contemporary Theories in the Sociology of Education (London: Macmillan) p.45
3. Gordon Marshal, et al., Social Class in Modern Britain, op.cit., p.18
4. Ibid.



5. G. Terry Page and J.B. Thomas (1979) International Dictionary of Education (Kogan Page: London) p.66
6. Ibid, p.165
7. John H.Goldthorpe (1980) Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain (Clarendon Press: Oxford) quoted in Marshall, op.cit. p.21
8. Marshall, Ibid, p.23
9. Erik Olin Wright, "Class and Occupation", Theory and Society, 9, pp.177-214, quoted in Marshall, Ibid
10. Nicos Poulantzas (1975) Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (NLB: London) p.18 quoted in Erik Olin Wright Class, Crisis and the State op.cit., p.41
11. Poulantzas, Ibid, p.19, quoted in Wright, Ibid, p.41
12. Ibid, p.20, quoted in Wright, p.35
13. Ibid, p.225, quoted in Wright, p.37
14. Ibid, quoted in Wright, pp.36-37
15. Ibid, pp.227-228, quoted in Wright, p.30
16. Ibid, p.238, quoted in Wright, footnote, p.38
17. Wright, op.cit., p.59
18. Ibid, p.61
19. Ibid, p.62
20. Ibid, p.63
21. Erik Olin Wright Classes op.cit., p.46
22. Ibid
23. Ibid
24. Ibid, p.47
25. Ibid
26. Ibid, p.124
27. Ibid, p.125
28. Ibid
29. Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil The Political Economy of Nasserism op.cit., p.94

30. This research follows the classification which has been set out by Muhammad El Gohary to identify between big and small bourgeoisie in terms of the size of their projects. He estimated the big project to be one which employed more than ten workers, and the small to be one that employed less than ten. See Muhammad El Gohary (1979) Studies in Social Development (Dar El Maarif: Cairo) (Arabic)

## CHAPTER SIX

SOCIAL CLASS MEMBERSHIP AND CULTURAL  
AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVESIntroduction

This research is concerned with education and social class formation. In order to proceed to investigate the influence of class power and class interests on education in the next two chapters, it is important in this chapter to illustrate the respondents' consciousness, awareness and sense of their own position in society, and their sense of their economic and political interests. These issues are important in order to throw light upon the nature and the development of the present class formation of Egypt, which has already been presented in Chapter Three in relation to state power. This chapter presents another dimension of the study of class formation, where class is considered as a matter of culture, ideology and consciousness. To study class at that level, this chapter focuses upon four main points:

- i) It is going to describe part of social reality as it appears in the differences between members of the sample in their way of life, education and income.
- ii) It will present people's image of society and their identification of their own class position, their parents' and their children's position, and that of those they identify as "like themselves". The image they have of Egypt's class formation in historical perspective will also be studied. This will include questions covering periods back to before 1952, and is important to throw light on the degree of the development of class consciousness, i.e. the possibility of the the development of class for itself.

iii) There will be an analysis of people's perceptions of the changes which took place in the sixties and seventies, and the extent to which they created a conflict or unified class interests between classes and inside the same social class. This point is built upon the theoretical analysis of the political and economic system of Egypt undertaken in Chapter Two.

iv) Finally people's perceptions and images of the future of society will be addressed.

The discussion and analysis of Egyptian culture set out in Chapter Four, relating to the cultural dichotomies between the educated and the illiterate, and between the religious and secular ideologies, will be further developed. The ways in which these dichotomies influence people's perceptions and abilities to understand, criticize and give solutions to economic and social relations will be examined. The role of these dichotomies in influencing the fragmentation or cementation of the class formation will be studied.

### I. Sample Profile

The sample consists of sixty families represented by the father and the mother of each family. In terms of religious belief, Table 1 shows that most of the sample are Muslim and the minority are Christian. The sample fall into the age group 30 to 50 as shown in Table 2.

Table 1: Distribution of the Sample by Religion

Religion	New petty bourgeoisie	Traditional petty bourgeoisie	Big bourgeoisie	Working class
Muslim	24	6	7	9
Christian	7	3	2	2

Table 2: Distribution of the Sample by Age

Age	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Less than 30								1
30 - 34		4		1		1	1	3
35 - 39	1	12	1	3		5		3
40 - 44	8	11	2	2	5	3	5	1
45 - 49	12	3	3	3	3		1	3
More than 50	10	1	3		1		4	

## (A) Social origin

## Place of birth:

Most of the members of the sample were born in urban areas, apart from the working class mothers, most of whom were born in rural areas. These details are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Place of Birth

Place of Birth	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Rural	12	11	2	2	4	3	5	8
Urban	19	20	7	7	5	6	6	3

## Family origin:

Place of birth is not the only indicator of social origin. Those who were born in urban areas generally have parents who came from rural areas originally, as Table 4 shows. In that sense, more than half of the members of the sample, representing different social classes, have origins in rural

Egypt.

Table 4: Family Origin

Family Origin	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Rural	19	18	6	4	8	5	8	10
Urban	11	13	3	5	1	4	3	1
Foreign origin 1 (Turkish)								

Coming from rural origin and living in Cairo means that these families have migrated from rural to urban Egypt, either as the first or second generation migrants.

The factors which have influenced these families to migrate are similar to those factors which influence the migration from rural to urban Egypt in general. Information gathered from the respondents indicates that, in the case of the new petty bourgeoisie, a major motivation for the move to Cairo was education, while the search for employment was another major motivation. The trend of being the second generation to move to Cairo can also be found in other class positions, where half of the fathers and a quarter of the mothers of the traditional petty bourgeoisie are second generation migrants to Cairo, as are two thirds of the fathers and mothers from the big bourgeoisie, and roughly a quarter of the fathers and mothers of the working class. However, the factors which led these different groups to migrate to Cairo are different. That is, from the social background of each class it can be seen that the working class migrants come from parents who are themselves rural workers, so when they leave the village to the city, they usually leave in the hope of making a better living. The opposite is the case of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie, who moved for education as their parents were educated. They moved to Cairo attracted by the positive features of city life, as well as the economic

attraction.

Another feature of the migration shown in the sample is that of female migration. Women from different social classes have moved to Cairo through two main channels, namely, with their parents or after marriage, The only exception in the sample is the case of a mother from the big bourgeoisie, who moved to Cairo alone to carry on her University education. From the limited sample of this research one cannot generalize about female migration in Egypt, but it is at least probable that it is connected with and controlled by the family movement, as the movement of the sample shows. However, in the seventies the movement of women was influenced by the opportunity to work in the Arab Oil countries and it is noticeable that women were allowed to move more independently outside the country.

#### **Social Origin and Different Ways and Styles of Life**

Most of the members of the sample have come from rural origins and settled in Cairo. In spite of coming from rural Egypt, the bourgeoisie have their own way of life which is adapted to urban areas, while the working class who came from rural Egypt did not change their way and style of life. Some of these differences between members of the sample can be illustrated as they appear in different styles of dress, housing and language which can be noticed in day to day life.

Most of the working class and traditional petty bourgeois members of the sample wear the Egyptian traditional dress (galabya), while the big bourgeoisie and the new petty bourgeoisie wear the western style of clothes for men and women. In fact, differences in dress have their social and economic functions which go beyond external appearance, since the different styles of dress separate the different strata in urban Egypt. The style of dress has an economic role to play. For example, the working class traditional dress reduces expenses since they do not need a variety of clothes, in contrast with the middle class dress which requires more

money. Middle class dress is related to education and familiarity with western culture, which is why, in the working class families, the educated boys and girls do not dress like their parents but they dress like the middle class. This means that the way of dressing is signalling a move and a change from one social class to another.

The style of housing differs between the members of different social classes. The working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie tend to occupy small dwellings consisting of one or two rooms, while the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie tend to live in houses with four to six rooms. The style of furnishing the houses is different, since the working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie have simple and necessary furniture, while the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie tend to have western style furniture. The different styles of living also appear in the residential area, where the working class and traditional petty bourgeoisie live in the traditional alleys (harah) which are marked by their close social relations, and work as one social unit while the new bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie live in modern buildings in complete physical separation from each other.

Class differences appears in language since the working class, even though they have settled in Cairo, still keep the rural accent while the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie have urban accents and, due to their education, use some foreign words in their speech.<sup>1</sup>

#### (B) Education level

Table 5 presents the level of education for all members of the sample. The table shows the high percentage of illiteracy among the working class mothers while nearly half of the fathers are literate i.e. they know how to read and write without holding any education certificates, since they learned reading and writing in kuttabs. Only a small percentage of



the working class fathers hold a certificate (primary and/or secondary level - technical school). The petty bourgeoisie have the same level of education as the working class.

Table 5: Standard of Education

Standard of Education	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Illiterate		4	1	4		1	4	10
Literate			4	2		1	5	1
Primary Level	1	2	1		1	1	1	
Middle Level (Secondary)	5	10	1	2	2	3	1	
More than middle less than university	2		1		1			
University (1st degree)	21	13	1	1	5	3		
More than university 1st degree (Ph.D)	2	2						

Table 5 shows that the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie are mainly educated at the university level, with more than half of the fathers and a substantial minority of the mothers being university graduates. The sample reflects the fact of the low standard of education for the working class and the high percentage of illiteracy among women.

### (C) Income

The range of income for different classes is shown in Table 6. The table shows that there is wide range of income differences among the new petty bourgeoisie since incomes start at the level of 100-199 pounds and go up to the level at 500-600 pounds. This is due to the fact that the sample comprise a group of big and senior employees beside another group of small employees.

It can be noticed that more than half of the petty bourgeoisie

Table 6: Level of Income

Rate of Income (monthly)	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
50 - 99		1						7
100 - 199	2	11		1				3
200 - 299	14	3	2					
300 - 399	6	1	4	1		1		
400 - 499	6	2						
500 - 1000	3		3					1
More than 1000					9			
Total	31		9		9			11

mothers are working women with an income. The big bourgeoisie fall at the level of more than 1000 pounds a month while the petty bourgeoisie occupy the middle level between 200-399 pounds a month. The working class is occupying the lower income level where a little more than half earn 50-99 pounds and about a quarter earn £100-199, the only exception is one worker whose income falls in the range 500-600 pounds, because he works as a welder in a foreign company. This difference among the working class incomes reflects the fact of the big income gap between those who work in the national sector and those who work for foreign companies, which can be found in all the different class positions. One notices as well that the new petty bourgeoisie can compensate for their low <sup>income</sup> by the women working, while the working class who have overwhelmingly got the lowest incomes have no other source of income.

#### (D) Number of Children

The common number of children for all class positions is to have a family size of 3 to 4 children. However, one can notice in Table 7 that families of 1 to 2 children occur mainly in the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie while families of more than 5 children most common in the working class.

Table 7: Number of Children

Number of Children	New petty bourgeoisie	Traditional petty bourgeoisie	Big bourgeoisie	Working class
1 - 2	15	1	3	
3 - 4	13	4	5	6
5 - 6	3		1	2
More than 6		4		3

The number of children is important in two respects: first it shows the burden of subsistence for each class, which in the sample is high for the working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie; second it reflects the fact that birth control and the small family size is a more acceptable idea to the middle class and the educated people than to the lower classes.

The sample profile is important in illustrating some points:

- It reflects, in economic terms, the high gap between different classes. This is important since it is known that, there is no map of income distribution in Egypt. So, even though it is a limited sample, it reflects the economic gap between different class positions.
- The profile shows the differences in the family size which reflect two facts, namely, the traditional resistance of the working class and the uneducated in general to birth control and the high burden of subsistence for the working class.
- The profile shows that the traditional petty bourgeoisie have some similarities and some differences with the working class. Being owners of their means of production they are not exploited like the working class and their small ownership affords them a middle level of income. However, in some aspects, such as education and family size, they share the same characteristics with the working class.

## II. Image of Society

The study of People's image of society will cover the following points:

- The respondents' image of the present class formation of Egypt and the model of class formation they identify and the size of each class. The respondents were asked to identify their own class position, their parents' and the children's position in society.
- The class formation of Egypt will be studied in a historic perspective, where respondents will describe the image they have of Egypt before the 1952 Revolution.
- Respondents' images and perceptions of the future of society will be discussed.

The study of people's image of society will help to illustrate the extent to which people from the same class position present a single, unified, or a different and fragmented picture of society. This is an important issue to study, because it helps to illustrate the complexity of ideology, culture and common-sense as they work in reality in a specific social class formation.

### (A) People's Image of the Present Class Structure

When asked about the present class formation of society, the members of all social classes were in agreement on two major points: people in society are unequal, and the differences between people are very large.

The three kinds of differences people identified are:

#### 1. Economic Differences

These was expressed in terms of differences of wealth and income and standard of living. It was the most

significant difference, being selected by roughly half of all members from different class positions.

## 2. Social Differences

These were identified in terms of the amount of power and authority that people have in society. social position and opportunities. The big bourgeoisie and the new petty bourgeoisie both attached considerable importance to these.

## 3. Cultural and Spiritual Differences

These included differences in educational level, and religion, in the sense that some people are more religious or devout than others. People also differ in their cultural heritage which they derive from their family and their education. This was mainly expressed by the big bourgeoisie and the new petty bourgeoisie.

## (B) Different Models of the Present Class Formation

There is no consensus between the members of different social classes about the present class formation of Egyptian society. They express their views in the form of different class models, which they conceive of in terms of two, three, four or five social classes. The responses are summarized in Table 8.

Table 8: Different Models of Society

Class	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Two groups	8	3	1	1	4		3	4
Three groups	15	20	5	4	5	8	6	4
Four groups	7	6	2	2				
Five groups	1	1	1	1				
I don't know		1		1		1	2	2

The table shows that the new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie tend to give a wide range of responses, ranging from two to five principal groups. In contrast, both the big bourgeoisie and the working class give responses which suggest there are either two, or at the most three, social groups.

The two group model consists of poor and rich. The three group model consists of poor middle and rich. The four group model consists of capitalist (very rich), craftsmen (described as parasitic), employees and the poor. The five group model consists of the very rich, rich, middle class, lower middle class and the poor. It should be noticed that these groups are classified in a hierarchy as mentioned.

When the members of the sample talk about, for example, the middle class or the rich, they may have in mind different groups of people. The 'rich' can cover a very wide range of people from millionaires to just 'rich', and may include businessmen, craftsmen, and merchants. People do differentiate between different degrees of 'rich'.

The term 'middle class' may be used to mean the educated, government employees, or even craftsmen and merchants.

'Poor' usually means the workers, servants and cleaners. Some people put all employees in this class, as they consider that the position of employees deteriorated in the seventies. This tendency is most clear among the new petty bourgeoisie, with members of the sample who are in this group feeling strongly about the deterioration of the position of the middle class.

The content of each class shows how members of the different social classes are giving a picture of fragmentation inside the one social class, in terms of considering that the one class consists of different social groups.

(C) The Size of Different Social Classes as Identified by People

Members of the sample were all asked to give an assessment of the size of each of the classes in society at the present time. In order to give an overview of the responses which will reflect the variety of the answers given by members of different social classes, the responses will be linked to the model which the respondents used.

In the case of the two group model, which was chosen by some members of all classes, there is no agreement about the size of each group of poor and rich.

For the new petty bourgeoisie, fathers and mothers tend to give two kinds of division: according to the first, there is a 10 to 30 per cent minority of rich people, and a 70 to 90 per cent majority of poor people. According to the second view, society is divided more or less equally between rich and poor.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie fathers tend to give a single division between a minority of rich, around 20 to 30 per cent, and a majority of poor, between 70 to 80 per cent. The mothers in this group give an equal division between the two classes.

The big bourgeoisie fathers tend to make a sharp division between a 10 to 20 per cent minority of rich and an 80 to 90 per cent majority of poor, while the mothers gave an equal division.

The working class respondents followed a similar pattern to the traditional and big bourgeoisie, with the fathers giving a division of 20 to 30 per cent rich and 70 to 80 per cent poor, while the mothers gave an equal division.

For the three group model, which consists of the poor, the middle and the rich, there is no easy way to identify certain patterns that people follow in their division of the three classes. The way in which members of the sample from the new petty bourgeoisie and traditional petty bourgeoisie particularly divided the poor and the middle group showed a very wide diversity of opinion as to where the boundary lies.

The new petty bourgeoisie fathers and mothers tend to give a model where the rich are a small group of 10 to 20 per cent, while the division between the poor and the middle covers a very wide range, with either group being seen as the larger. The traditional petty bourgeoisie followed a similar pattern in their classification of the three groups.

For the big bourgeoisie and the working class the division was different and more clear. The big bourgeoisie identified a minority of around 10 per cent as being rich, a relatively small group of middle class, around 20 to 30 per cent, and the majority of between 70 and 80 per cent poor. The working class fathers and mothers followed a similar pattern, although in their case the group of rich people tended to be even smaller.

The four group model was predominantly chosen by the new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie. The four groups are labelled capitalists, craftsmen, employees and poor. The new petty bourgeoisie fathers and mothers gave a model in which the rich and the craftsmen together represented 5 to 30 per cent of society, while the employees and the poor made up the rest. But there was no one model of the division between the poor and the employees. In some cases they were divided equally, in others one or other group was the majority.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie fathers and mothers tended to give a model where craftsmen represented nearly half of society, while the other three groups were seen as being roughly equal in size.



The five group model consisted of the very rich, rich, middle class, lower middle class and poor. This was again chosen predominantly by the new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie. Among the new petty bourgeoisie, the models given by fathers and mothers are different. For the fathers, there is a sharp polarization between a minority at the top consisting of the very rich, rich, middle and lower middle classes, who represent 10 to 20 per cent of society. The remaining 80 to 90 per cent are seen as poor. The mothers tend to give a model in which there is a minority of very rich and rich, making up 5 per cent, a small group of poor, of around 10 to 20 per cent, while the remaining 60 to 70 per cent are in the middle and lower middle classes.

For the traditional petty bourgeoisie both fathers and mothers tend to give a model with a minority of 5 to 10 per cent very rich, a medium size middle and lower middle class, around 20 to 30 per cent each, and a majority of 50 to 60 per cent poor.

The main characteristics which can be identified from these models are that:

The new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie tend to give a wide range of models from two to five groups, while the working class and the big bourgeoisie tend to see society as divided into only two or three groups.

The identification of the relative size of the poor and middle class groups is particularly problematic for the new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie, who gave responses which ranged from the two groups being equal to one or other of them being in a substantial majority. The big bourgeoisie and the working class are more consistent in seeing that there is a substantial majority who are poor.

#### (D) People's Consciousness of Their Own Class Position in Society

People were asked to classify themselves, their parents and their children into social classes. The researcher asked the members of the sample to classify themselves in one of three categories, upper, middle or lower class. However, through discussion, people identified some more categories, such as middle-middle, lower-middle or poor. These classifications have been taken into account by the researcher. The results are shown in Table 9. It can be seen that the new petty bourgeoisie fathers and mothers mainly classify themselves, their parents and their children as middle middle class, although a substantial number classify themselves as poor. The same tendency can be found in the traditional petty bourgeoisie who classify themselves and their parents as middle middle class, but are less uniform about the description of their children, with a fairly wide spread of responses from both mothers and fathers.

For the big bourgeoisie the main classification for themselves and their parents is middle middle class, again with a very wide range of responses when asked to describe the position of their children, ranging from upper class to poor, with a good number saying that it was impossible to predict the class position of their children. One peculiar feature of the big bourgeoisie's classification of themselves is that one in five of the fathers and mothers classified themselves as poor. They explained this classification according to their view of a reference group which was still more wealthy than them. That is, when they compared themselves with other big bourgeoisie who are millionaires, they consider themselves poor.

For the working class, the very substantial majority classify themselves, their parents and their children as poor. One in every ten fathers, and one in every five mothers, classified themselves as lower middle class. A slight majority of the working class identify their children as poor, but a

Table 9: Parents' Identification of their Own Class Position

Different positions	Class	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
		Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Upper Class	Yourself		2			2			
	Your Parents	1	1				1		
	Your Children	5	10		1		2		
Upper Middle Class	Yourself	2					1		
	Your Parents	1					1		
	Your Children	2			2	2	1		
Middle Middle Class	Yourself	16	22	7	7	4	6		
	Your Parents	20	26	7	6	6	6	2	2
	Your Children	17	15	2	2	2	4		1
Lower Middle Class	Yourself	3		2		1		1	2
	Your Parents	2							
	Your Children			3		2		1	
Poor	Yourself	9	7		1	2	2	10	9
	Your Parents	6	4	2	2	3	1	9	9
	Your Children	2	3		1		1	6	6
I don't know about my children	Yourself								
	Your Parents								
	Your Children	4	3	4	2	3	1	4	4
We can't classify Egyptian Society	Yourself	1							
	Your Parents	1							
	Your Children	1							
The secure group	Yourself				1				
	Your Parents				1				
	Your Children				1				

substantial minority say they cannot identify the position they expect their children to reach. So, the working class mainly expect their children to fall within the poor.

Some conclusions can be drawn from these observations:

1. Members of the three bourgeois classes, the big, new and traditional petty bourgeoisie, tend to classify and identify themselves as middle middle class, and in a few cases a minority of the big bourgeoisie mothers identified themselves as upper class. This tendency among the three bourgeois classes to concentrate themselves in the middle position in the class hierarchy gives an indication of the weak sense of class identity which the members of the bourgeois classes have. In contrast with this, the majority of the working class have a much

stronger sense about their position as poor.

2. The uncertainty about children's future position is widespread among members from different class positions. However, two different patterns can be identified among the three bourgeois classes. They expect their children to be anywhere from upper class to poor. The working class for the most part expect their children to be poor.

#### (E) People's Sense of Class Size before the Revolution

People were not only asked to identify the class formation and the size of classes at the present time. They were also asked to give a historical account of the shape of society in the past, and in particular before the 1952 Revolution. This is useful in giving a sense of class consciousness, not only at the present time but also in historical perspective.

In order to ask people about their perceptions of different classes before the Revolution, the question was not phrased in terms of bourgeoisie and working class, but in terms of rich, poor, and middle, which makes it easier for people from different classes to understand. This classification is also much closer to the one they actually use in their everyday life.

Table 10 shows the responses of the members of different classes, giving their views on whether each group was bigger, smaller, or about the same, before the Revolution. Generally speaking, people's picture of society before the revolution is of a society with a small rich group, and a large poor group. What was less clear was how they viewed the middle class before and after the Revolution. For example, the members of the new petty bourgeoisie were almost equally divided between the opinion that the middle class was smaller after the Revolution, that it was bigger, and that it was about the same. A smaller percentage of parents in this group were of the opinion that the middle class did not exist before

Table 10: Size of Social Classes before the Revolution

Different groups	Class	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
		Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Rich	Less	28	27	6	1	7	5	5	2
	More	2	1	2	3	1	3	1	
	The same					1			
Poor	Less	8	5	1	1	3	4	1	
	More	20	23	7	3	5	3	5	2
	The same	2				1			
Middle	Less	10	10	3	2	2	4	1	1
	More	10	8	1	1	3	2		
	The same	8	9	4	1	3	2	1	1
	No m'dle class	2	1			1		4	
I don't know		1	3	1	5		1	5	9

the Revolution, and was created after the Revolution by part of the poor gained advancement and moved up to form this class.

So, the model that the new petty bourgeoisie presents for society before the Revolution is mainly of a majority of poor and a minority of rich. As for the middle class, no specific pattern emerges, with some believing that the middle class is bigger now, some smaller, and some that it did not exist before 1952. This is the case for both fathers and mothers.

A member of the new petty bourgeoisie, an inspector in the Ministry of Education, described the situation before and after the Revolution:

*"Before the Revolution the rich were less and they were very well educated and cultured, not like the new rich today, who emerged from the poor and the middle class. Before the Revolution the poor were more than today, and the middle class were less".*

For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, nearly half of the fathers believe that the middle class was much the same before and after the Revolution, while another third of them thought that it had increased. Over half of the mothers in this class found it difficult to give a response to this question, although the pattern among those who answered was very similar

to the pattern presented by the fathers.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie present a model of a majority of poor, a minority of rich, and a middle class which was either smaller or the same. A member of the traditional petty bourgeoisie who is the owner of a small shop described society before the Revolution:

*"Before the Revolution the rich were a minority, the middle class was small, and the poor were the majority of society: today the middle class has increased".*

The big bourgeoisie gave a model of society where the rich were a minority, the poor were either larger or smaller, and the middle class ranged from less, to more, or the same, or even that the middle class did not exist before the Revolution. The pattern for the big bourgeoisie is slightly different from the pattern of the new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie. For the big bourgeoisie, there was more uncertainty about whether the poor were more or less before the Revolution. A member of the big bourgeoisie who is the owner of a factory described society before the Revolution:

*"Before the Revolution we had a minority of very rich people from big respectable families, a big middle class, and the poor were a small group. The rich were kind and helped the poor".*

For the working class, their responses were substantially different, with nearly half of the fathers and four out of every five mothers finding it difficult to give a response to this question. Of those who did answer, most thought that society before the Revolution had a minority of rich, a majority of poor, and no middle class.

A working class cleaner expressed this view:

*"Before the Revolution there were two classes, the rich and the poor. The rich were a minority, because in my village we knew only one rich person, and that person was 'Al-Pasha'. There was no middle class. People were either poor or rich. The Revolution created the middle class".*

After this exploration of the image of society of the members of the sample which related to the period before the Revolution in 1952 and shortly after it, the next step was to move forward in time and to ask them for their views on the present class structure.

From these patterns of society before the Revolution a general picture can be drawn. This shows a tendency to give a picture of a society of a minority of rich and a majority of poor. However, the detailed picture is more complicated, and considerable differences can be found between classes.

- It seems that the identification of the middle class is problematic for the three bourgeois classes, since there is no unified view about their size and position, with some respondents thinking they are more, some less, and others the same.
- The traditional petty bourgeoisie share with the new petty bourgeoisie the view that there were a minority of rich and a majority of poor.
- The big bourgeoisie in particular are divided about the position of the poor, and whether it was more or less than it is now.
- The working class, in contrast with the other classes, tended to give a picture of society which was strongly dichotomized between the rich and the poor, influenced by their experience of rural Egypt, where class differences were very sharp.

#### (F) Explanations, Justifications and Critiques of Class Differences

In discussion with people as to how they justify and criticize class differences, and how these differences exist, three main

types of explanations are given. The first one sees the differences between classes in terms of the social division of labour. This explanation is mainly put forward by the new petty bourgeoisie. The second model used to explain differences uses the tensions and conflicts that exist between people in society. This model was put forward from members in a variety of class positions. The third explanation is that differences are created by God. This model is put forward by members from all class positions.

The first explanation is a functionalist understanding of the differences, where people see differences not in terms of inequality, but in terms of the social division of labour. This view is mostly expressed by the new petty bourgeoisie.

For example, a father who is an engineer in the public sector said,

*"People are divided into classes in order to have different roles to play in society and this in turn is important for labour distribution in society".*

The second view of class differences is based on tension and conflict in social relations as factors which stand behind social differences and the class system of society. This view was expressed by both the bourgeois classes and the working class. They express the view that God created people equal, but that social relations made them unequal.

A member of the new petty bourgeoisie, who is a father and the director of a public sector company said,

*"God created people equal. It is human beings who make themselves poor or rich by work. Because God knows about these differences, God ordered the rich to pay alms".*

A member of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, a father who is the owner of a photography shop, said,

*"God created people equal. But it is the social life and social relations which made the classes".*



A mother who is the wife of a working class welder expressed her view of how people use each other:

*"God created people equal. Being rich or poor comes from people themselves who use each other. The rich want to increase their money and wealth. That is why they rob other people's money, and from this point differences come between people. So those who make a lot of money must pay high taxes".*

The third view, which was identified by members from different class positions, justifies and understands class differences and inequalities in religious terms, i.e. as created and given by God. For example, a father who is a university professor said,

*"God created us classes. God established this inequality in many verses of the Quran, but never mentions this wide gap between the poor and the rich. The Prophet himself was very kind and helpful to the poor".*

A member of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, a tailor, said,

*"God created people equal as human beings but unequal in means of living, and God ordered the rich to help and pay alms to the poor".*

A father from the big bourgeoisie, who is an engineer working as an entrepreneur, said,

*"God created people in classes, but also ordered them to pay alms and charitable gifts and to have social solidarity. If rich people paid their taxes and alms we would not find this big gap between poor and rich".*

The working class expressed the same view, that class is given by God, and they showed how they accept their fate. A father who is a cleaner said,

*"God created people in classes and unequal. I am poor but I am satisfied with my position. I do not look at people who are higher than me. I only look at people who are poorer than me, and I say 'Thank God, I am not that poor'".*

From these views on class and social inequalities, it can be seen that there are both religious and secular understandings of society spread across the class structure. According to the

religious beliefs expressed by people, inequality is seen as given, and Islam provides a solution to these inequalities, not to abolish them, but to reduce them by asking the rich to pay alms (zakat) to the poor as stated in the Quran. This solution of paying alms was mainly expressed by the three bourgeois classes, while the working class tended to express their acceptance of their fate.

The other views which were expressed gave a secular understanding of the situation. There were two solutions. One is to ask for the rich to pay high taxes, which was mainly put forward by the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class, and this is considered the responsibility of the state. The other solution which comes from those who present a secular understanding of the situation, is similar to the religious solution specified in the Quran, namely the giving of alms and charity. This case was largely advanced by the big bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie.

From that, it can be concluded that both secular and religious understandings and solutions for class differences exist among members from different class positions. The differences which can be found between those who expressed religious understanding is that the three bourgeois classes tended to give the Islamic solution in terms of the rich paying alms to the poor, while the working class who explained differences as created by God tended not to offer a solution, but to accept their fate. Those who gave secular understandings of the differences as created by tensions, conflicts and by the social division of labour, are also divided on the question of solutions. The big and traditional petty bourgeoisie tended to give an Islamic solution, which is the paying of alms, while the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class tended to give a secular solution, which sees a role for the state. This, for example, might be the imposition of higher levels of taxation as a means of redistributing wealth in society.

### III. Political, Economic Interests and Class Consciousness

#### (A) Evaluation of the Policies of the Sixties and Seventies at the National Level

From the study of the political and economic context of Egypt, it is known that Egyptian society has gone through different economic, political and social eras. That is, the era of Nasser which was to a certain extent guided by socialist thinking and the era of Sadat which introduced the open door policy with its capitalist thought. Each era had its different social and political impact upon different social classes.

In discussion with the members of the sample, they were asked to evaluate the impact of the two eras in developing society and in terms of their personal benefit in the two eras.

Table 11: Comparison between Sixties and Seventies in Developing Society, People's Positions and Education

Different periods	Class	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
		Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Aspects of development in different periods	60s	12	12	4	4	4	4	6	5
	70s	12	14	4	5	4	5	2	2
	Never improved	7	1	1		1			
	Before R'v't'n								
	Both 60s & 70s		1						1
Developing our society	60s	12	18	3	4	3	4	6	6
	70s	12	9	4	5	5	5	2	1
	Never improved	4		1		1			
	Before R'v't'n	2		1		1			
	Both 60s & 70s		1						1
50s		1							
I don't know			1				3	3	
I can't compare because I was young			2						

Table 11 summarises different views. On the subject of which period developed society more than the other, it was explained to the respondents that the aim was to investigate the development of the economic standard of society, of political freedom and social life in general. The responses, which

compare the sixties and the seventies, show that the respondents were almost equally divided between the two periods, if one considers only the big bourgeoisie, the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the new petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the working class felt that the sixties were more important, with over half the fathers and nearly half the mother choosing the sixties, and only a fifth of each choosing the seventies.

From this it can be seen that there is a fairly substantial split along class lines as to whether the sixties or the seventies were the more important decade for development. However, this was not the only question about the development of society in which there was a division of opinion according to class. Questions were asked about whether the respondents thought that there had been improvements in society in the sixties and seventies, and whether they thought society did not improve. People justified their judgments concerning the sixties and seventies with social, political and economic reasons.

The general pattern of responses shows that different points were emphasized by different classes. For the new petty bourgeoisie there was a split between those who thought the sixties produced most improvement in society, those who thought that the seventies did, and those who thought society did not improve. The traditional petty bourgeoisie placed greater emphasis on the flourishing of the economy in the seventies, but they were very critical of ethical standards in the seventies.

The big bourgeoisie were divided between those who supported the policies of the sixties, and those who supported the policies of the seventies. This reflected a conflict in attitudes over whether the protection provided by the state in the sixties or the competition of the open market in the seventies were most advantageous.

The working class were clear in their support for the policies of the sixties, and this view came directly from their everyday experience of suffering.

For the new petty bourgeoisie, those who thought that the sixties had brought development cited both positive and negative aspects of the period. A university professor said,

*"The sixties had their good and bad sides. It was a period of national liberation and patriotism, but it was under a dictatorial system, it gave no political freedom and it closed society. The seventies came with the open door policy which encouraged our relations with the West, and created a consumer society. People became more materialistic and it shook all our values and principles."*

Those who chose the seventies also had their justifications. A mother who is a housewife and comes from wealthy rural origins and still has relations with rural Egypt expressed her view from her experience with the developments and changes in rural areas. She said,

*"The seventies improved society more than the sixties. For example, farmers became free to sell their crops in the free market. Before they were forced to give them to the government. People became free to bring money without answering a lot of questions about the source of the money"*.

Those who believed that society improved in neither the sixties nor the seventies argued that the Revolution did not follow a specific programme for change, and if there was any change it was a reflection of changes and developments on the international scene. A university professor expressed this argument:

*"The Revolution did not improve our society. If there was any change, it was only natural and spontaneous. It was part of the developments and changes which took place all over the world. If we compare Egypt with other countries during the same period of the Revolution, i.e. the fifties, we find that other countries, like China, which started their development with Egypt are today more developed than us. I do not believe that there is a big difference between the sixties and the seventies"*.

The views of the new petty bourgeoisie reflect a wide range of economic, political and social explanations and critique of the policies of the sixties and seventies, and they show the diversity of views and ideologies inside one social class. The new petty bourgeoisie are mainly divided between defending the two eras. The views of the traditional petty bourgeoisie reflect mainly an ethical and economic concern and criticisms of the two periods.

A photographer who owns his own photographic shop said,

*"We built our society in the sixties, people were more belonging and faithful to their country than in the seventies".*

Those who are positive about the seventies give clear economic justifications. A tailor who owns his shop said,

*"The country was closed during the sixties, there was no economic freedom. The seventies has opened society and allowed people to make money".*

Another owner of a small shop defended the seventies, saying,

*"The seventies developed our economy more than the sixties. In the sixties the government was working as a ruler and it wanted to play the role of the merchant as well. This was wrong because the government should stick to politics and leave economic activities to the people".*

So, the small owners who run their own businesses express their economic interests which flourished in the seventies with the open door policy. However, in some cases they express how the seventies demoralized society by pushing people towards accumulating wealth.

The same split in views between the virtues of the sixties and the seventies can be found in the big bourgeoisie. Those who support the policies of the sixties gave clear economic, moral and political justifications.

A businessman who has a law degree said,

*"We made our major progress and achievements during the sixties. We built our industry, developed our*

*education and liberated our country".*

Another view from the owner of an electric tools factory reflected the bourgeois conflict between the protection offered them by the sixties and the opportunities given to them in the seventies for more economic activity but with the risk of increased competition:

*"The sixties improved society more than the seventies. During Nasser's time, Nasser encouraged national industry and national bourgeoisie, he opened many work opportunities for many people. The only mistake was that we were a very closed society and we did not have relations with the West. In the seventies we started to be open to the West, but foreign industry is threatening people like me because I cannot stand the competition".*

Those who support the policies of the seventies criticize the measures taken in the sixties. An engineer who works as an entrepreneur said,

*"I do not agree with the sixties' policies like the nationalization which destroyed many companies and created problems like the housing problem, because people became afraid of doing business because of the threat of nationalization. Politically people were oppressed. I agree with the open door policy of the seventies, which solved these problems."*

From that division of the views between the three bourgeois classes and within one class, it can be concluded that the working class, who mainly support the developments of the sixties, reflect views which come from their own direct and personal experiences of their economic problems. It can be seen that their views do not cover the variety of political, economic and social justifications which are given by the bourgeoisie.

A mother, and wife of a bus conductor in the public sector, said,

*"The sixties were better than today. During Nasser's time life was very cheap and income was 4 pounds per month, but it was sufficient. Now income is 80 pounds per month and we cannot manage".*

The working class also reflect the phenomenon of increasing consumption. Another housewife said,

*"In the seventies things like TV, fridges, and videos became available more than the sixties. Many people could buy them and we could afford to buy them as well. However, life in the sixties was more secure and cheaper than the seventies".*

From the views of the different members of social classes it can be seen that the bourgeois classes are divided in their views. This division centres around the two periods of the sixties and seventies, and mean that there is no consensus between them as to which period developed society more. In their discussion of the policies of the two periods, the new petty bourgeoisie give a wide range of explanations of what happened; they perceive the two periods not only at the personal level but also at the national level with all the economic, political and social impacts upon society.

In the responses of the working class, the two periods are analyzed in terms of their direct personal relations and the influence of the two periods on their daily life. They did not give a wide perspective on the effect of the two periods on society in general. However, their comments and explanations of their lives in the two periods express the suffering and deprivation of the working class in the seventies.

For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, i.e. the small shop owners, it would seem that they perceived themselves to have benefited from the open economy of the seventies. If one compares this with the analysis of the position of this class under the open door policy, it would seem that the findings of this research contradict the theoretical argument that the traditional petty bourgeoisie were harmed by the big industries and the influx of foreign capital. What can be suggested is that those who were harmed by the policies of the open door economy were those who were involved in small industries, while those in commercial activities, such as those practised by the members of the sample, were not seriously affected.



## (B) Personal Interests and Development in the Sixties and Seventies

The discussion of the two eras of the sixties and seventies moves from the perspectives upon the influences of the two eras at the national level to their influence on individuals, in terms of how much they benefited and improved their lives. Membership of different social classes again affected the responses.

The fathers in the new petty bourgeoisie divided equally between their views of the two periods, while mothers were more inclined to believe that their position had improved in the sixties. Other assessments were given of personal positions over the two periods: a small but significant number of the fathers believed that their position had not improved in either period, and a similar number thought that life was better before the Revolution. These opinions were much less likely to be held by fathers from the new petty bourgeoisie.

The different personal interests inside the new petty bourgeoisie were expressed, and different reasons were given. For example, some members of this class said that although their income had increased, their standard of living had deteriorated. A mother who is an accountant in the Ministry of Education expressed this view:

*"Our standard of living was better in the sixties, even though we now have more income, but our standard of living went down".*

Those who benefited from the open door policy and the foreign sector companies had a different perception. A father who is an engineer in a foreign company said,

*"I improved my position in the seventies. I had the opportunity to work in the foreign sector. In the sixties life was very terrifying under Nasser, and in the seventies we had more freedom".*

From these views it is clear that not all of the fractions of

the new petty bourgeoisie see themselves as having personally benefited from the seventies. The situation differs according to the sector in which they work. From the material of the field study, the difference in income between those who work in the foreign sector and those who work for the government is large. For example, the engineer who works for a foreign company is 38 years old, and he has a monthly income of 500 Egyptian pounds, while another engineer who is 44 and works in the public sector and has the same university qualifications has an income of only 250 Egyptian pounds, in spite of his greater experience.

For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, roughly half of both the fathers and the mothers believe their position improved in the seventies. The open market and encouragement of the private sector helped them to make more money.

A photographer stated that,

*"I started my project of having my own business and to run my own shop in the seventies. The open market and the increasing money in the country has encouraged many people to start their own businesses".*

A tailor who has his own shop expressed a similar point:

*"For myself, I developed my position during the seventies. My business grew more in the seventies, because people had a lot more money, especially those who came back from the oil countries, so I could make good business and have more customers".*

It would seem that the boom in the Egyptian economy due to the increasing consumption and the increase in the circulation of money helped those who had commercial interests and those in private services increased their income.

The big bourgeoisie mainly benefited personally in the seventies, as more than half of both the mothers and fathers agreed. However, members of this class expressed a feeling of insecurity more than any other class.

A businessman with a degree in law, who has an income of 1,500 pounds per month, said,

*"If you ask me about my position, during the seventies until now I can make a lot of money, but you should ask me whether I feel secure and satisfied. We lost the security feeling in the seventies. We earn a lot of money, but we are insecure. I am always anxious and afraid of tomorrow, because there is no future planning and I think insecurity is one of the characteristics of the capitalist society".*

From these views, the big bourgeoisie, who enjoy the highest income of all the members of the sample, and who mainly enjoyed a growth of income in the seventies, are expressing the nature of the competitive capitalist society, with all its insecurity. This reflects the conflict which the big bourgeoisie have experienced between the protection and security they enjoyed under Nasser's policies, which afforded protection to national industries, but allowed for lower benefits than could be achieved under the open door policy with the threat of competition with the foreign sector and the insecurity of the market.

The working class mainly thought that they were living better in the sixties than in the seventies, an opinion held by over half of both mothers and fathers. They commented upon their suffering and the deterioration of their living conditions in the seventies.

A welder in a foreign company, with a monthly income of 500 pounds said,

*"I was working in the sixties in a steel factory. My salary was 12 pounds, but we were living better than the seventies and today, even with my high salary".*

A cleaner in the public sector, with a monthly income of 70 pounds, said,

*"All that I know about the sixties and seventies is that under Nasser we were living better than today. Now we have a very low standard of living. Prices are very high and things go from bad to worse".*

Other comments of members of the working class which related directly to their personal position have already been quoted in the earlier section of this chapter.

It seems that the working class are mainly harmed by the policies of the seventies. However, some of them enjoyed the effects of the boom in the Egyptian economy, along with the members of other classes, but this did not continue for long, and they continue to suffer from day to day. For them, things have gone from bad to worse.

### (C) The Interests of Occupational Groups in the Seventies

Subjects in the sample were asked to identify their own interests in the sixties and seventies, and to identify in general those social groups who had benefited from, or been harmed by, policies in the seventies. Respondents were asked to select from nine occupations which represented several different social class positions. They were asked to decide which occupations had become rich and powerful, which went down, and which remained the same. There was an additional category if they wished to say that they did not know. The nine occupational groups which they were asked to evaluate were politicians, officers, senior officials, businessmen, farmers, craftsmen, manual wage earners, teachers and Imams. This question was designed to provide a picture of the respondent's overall view of how benefits were divided in society between members of different class positions.

From Table 12 it can be seen that there is a broad measure of consensus between the members of different classes as to who benefited in terms of wealth and power, namely the politicians, officers, senior officials, craftsmen and businessmen. There was uncertainty as to the position of all the other occupations. For example, the position and situation of the farmers is not clear cut since members of the different

**Table 12: The Position of Different Occupational Groups in the Seventies**

Different groups	Class	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
		Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Politicians	Became Rich and Powerful	30	26	9	7	9	8	7	6
	Went Down								
	The Same	1	2					2	
Officers	Became Rich and Powerful	24	26	6	4	9	7	5	4
	Went Down	3		1				1	
	The Same	4	3	2	1		2	3	2
Senior Officials	Became Rich and Powerful	31	27	9	5	9	7	8	6
	Went Down								
	The Same		3				2		
Businessmen	Became Rich and Powerful	31	31	9	7	9	9	9	7
	Went Down								
	The Same								2
Farmers	Became Rich and Powerful	16	15	6	5	8	4	5	4
	Went Down	9	2	1	1	1	1	2	2
	The Same	5	11	2			2	2	2
Craftsmen	Became Rich and Powerful	31	31	8	7	9	9	9	9
	Went Down								
	The Same			1					
Manual Workers	Became Rich and Powerful	12	16	2	1	5	3	4	4
	Went Down	6	1	3	1	3	1	2	
	The Same	13	13	4	5	1	5	3	4
Teachers	Became Rich and Powerful	22	21	6	5	6	5	6	7
	Went Down	4	2	1	1	3	3		
	The Same	5	8	2	1		1	3	1
Imams	Became Rich and Powerful	6	6	1	1	2	2	2	1
	Went Down	4	2	1		3	1	1	
	The Same	14	15	4	3	2	4	5	5
	I don't Know		1						2

social classes would seem to be defining farmers differently, with some referring to those who own the land, and others referring to those who work the land. Similarly, there seems to be some confusion as to whether the reference group for manual wage earners are those who went to work in the Arab oil

countries or those who stayed in Egypt.

In the case of teachers, the majority of respondents from different social classes believe that teachers were able to earn more money because of the increased demand for private lessons, but others thought that they went down or remained the same, because the basic salary of teachers is very low.

The same mixed views can be found for Imams, who are considered as becoming powerful by those who think that they enjoy wide social relations, and that they mix with people from different social classes, so that through contacts they could work for their own benefit. Others believe that they have a very low salary, and that they could not improve their position.

The views of members of different social classes reflect the fact that the benefits of the seventies were not distributed equally between social classes, and even inside one class there are differences between strata.

Members of different social classes expressed their views that there have been an unequal division of benefits and the different ways people have of securing those benefits. In spite of the degree of consensus about how benefits were distributed in the seventies, there are specific points that members from different class positions stressed in their comments. For the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class one main point of comment was the corruption of politicians and businessmen, while the big bourgeoisie tend to condemn workers for the deterioration of production in the seventies. The following comments highlight some of these differences in perspective.

#### The New Petty Bourgeoisie

A father who is a university professor expressed his view of how people accumulated wealth in the seventies:

*"People can change their position in society by*

*different means, by money, work or education. However, in the seventies, people changed their position in illegal ways. People moved up materially but they moved down morally. The groups which benefited in the seventies are the farmers, especially workers who gained more money than the owners because of their high wages, teachers benefited from private lessons, and politicians".*

#### The Traditional Petty Bourgeoisie

A wife of an owner of a photography shop, who is a housewife with a middle level of education, said,

*"People who benefited in the seventies are officers, but not all of them; we have to distinguish between army officers who did not benefit and the police officers who have achieved wide social relations and contacts which they used for themselves. Farmers benefited from working in the oil countries and teachers improved their position by private lessons".*

#### The Big Bourgeoisie

The big bourgeoisie share with other classes the view that benefits in the seventies were unequally divided between classes and within classes.

A father, an entrepreneur, expressed the difficulty of movement in society today:

*"People cannot change their position today. It was possible during the seventies. It is difficult today because of the economic depression. Some people could change their position in the seventies, but I have some comments about the movements of some groups. For example: Farmers; they moved up but it is a superficial mobility, because they abandoned agriculture and sold the land. I believe that the new technology like T.V. and video did not help in developing the countryside. On the contrary, people became busy with these things and left their work. Craftsmen: they earned a lot of money and moved up, but they moved down morally because they spent the money on drugs and their skill standard went down".*

It can be noticed that, when the big bourgeoisie discuss the seventies and how its policies have interrupted society, in

some ways, they blame workers and farmers, because they emigrated to the oil countries and left the agricultural land, and were corrupted by modern technology. However, the big bourgeoisie do not condemn other groups who emigrated to the same extent.

### The working class

The working class fathers and mothers show a clear sense of awareness of what happened in the seventies and which social classes benefited and which were harmed. A father who is a cleaner in the Ministry of Transportation said,

*"It is difficult to change your position today. If you are poor, you have to know that the poor class reproduce poor people. People who can, change their position; those who travelled to the oil countries. Society changed during the seventies, everything became expensive. People who could change their position are: politicians; they could change their position because when they came into power they stole as much as they could and they get away with it. Officers: remain the same. Senior officials became very rich. I can tell from what I see in my work, the directors and the managers became very wealthy. Farmers, went down as well as workers. Imams, could improve their position, they are not rich but the government raised their salaries".*

This cleaner shows an awareness and consciousness about the social movement and the groups which benefited by using their position and corruption. The same person, however, when he commented on his own position in society expressed an opinion which completely contradicts that awareness. He said,

*"I am satisfied with my position. I don't look at people who are higher than me, I only look at people who are poorer than me and say, 'Thank God I am not that poor'".*

In fact, this case reflects the condition of many of the working class, who are conscious of inequality and injustice, but their religious fatalism hinders their resisting what they otherwise see as unjust relations. The issue here is not that they do not know. They know about injustice and those who use their power and corrupt society, but they do not translate



this knowledge into action to organize the working class to resist.

#### Comment

From the views of members of different social classes about interests in the sixties and seventies, some conclusions can be drawn. These are:

- There is no consensus between different members of social classes about the influence of the sixties and seventies in developing and improving society. The division exists between and inside social classes, especially the bourgeois classes. The division is less inside the working class, who are almost unified in the view that they benefited from the policies of the sixties.
  
- In terms of personal benefit, the same division exist between members of the sample, where some of them were in a position which helped them to benefit more in the seventies. For example, the new petty bourgeoisie who work in a foreign company benefited more than others with the same qualifications who work for the government. Both petty bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie have benefited from the open door policy. However, the big bourgeoisie show a sense of insecurity and threat from foreign investment. The case of the working class was very clear: they see themselves as being harmed by the open door policy. However, some of them have enjoyed the boom in consumption in Egypt and they could obtain TVs and fridges. Consequently, one cannot say that they were completely deprived of the seventies consumer society. For them, though, this boom did not last for a long time, since they suffer more deprivation at the present time.
  
- In terms of the effect of the seventies on social groups which benefited or were harmed by the open door policy, the views of different members of social classes have shown a consensus that the benefits of the seventies were

distributed unequally between classes and inside one social class, where some fractions of the same class benefited and others did not. There is also a great deal of consensus about the position of certain social fractions who benefited like businessmen, politicians, officers, senior official and craftsmen, while there is more divided views about the position of other groups, like manual workers, Imams, teachers and farmers.

- In their explanation of those who benefited one notices that all members of different social classes have mentioned the influence of the emigration to the Arab oil countries in making money especially for groups like farmers and craftsmen. The big bourgeoisie, in their discussion of the emigration of workers and farmers to the oil countries show a sense of condemnation of the farmers and workers because they abandoned their land and their skills have deteriorated. They believe that modern technology in rural Egypt, like TV and video, has a negative impact on production and rural life, where farmers became busy watching them and they neglected their work and production, so they spend more leisure time than before. They believe this has interrupted production.
- The discussion with the working class fathers and mothers has shown a clear awareness on the part of both of them of the class interest in terms of those who benefited and those who were harmed by the policies. They know that working in the oil countries has opened the door for their fellow farmers and workers to have opportunities to improve their position.

#### IV. People's Image of the future:

People were asked to give their perception of the future of the whole of society. The question is an open one to help people to express freely what they think about the future.

From the responses of members of different social classes, the main point that all fathers and mothers mentioned was the economic crisis of society, and they identified this as their main concern for the future.

Even though all parents concentrated on the economic problem, they had different ways of looking at that problem.

One group mentioned that they were pessimistic about the future because of the economic crisis; they expected the problem to increase in the future and to make the life of the coming generation very hard. Those who expressed this view of the future economic crisis represent quite a large number of the sample, and represent a full range of class positions. They were distributed as Table 13 shows.

Table 13: The Future and the Economic Crisis

	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Expect economic crisis to grow	12	10	3	6	4	5	10	10

Another group of the sample expressed the same view that the economic crisis will be the main feature of the future, but this group gave some solutions to the problem, which they thought might be effective. This are summarised in Table 14.

The table shows that solutions came mainly from the bourgeois classes, while a small percentage of the working class thought of the future in terms of what should be done. The table shows that a religious solution to the problem came mainly from the three bourgeois classes, who believe in applying Islamic Law (Shariaa) in the economic field, for example to stop different sorts of usury in economic relations, and that people should follow the Islamic law and pay alms (zakat).

Other solutions exist which concentrate on increasing production, economic planning and training skilled labour power.

Table 14: Different Solutions to the Economic Crisis in the Future

Different solutions	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Economic Development and Increase in Production	6	10	2	1	1	1	1	1
Applying Islamic Law	6	5	3	2	1	2		
Trained Manpower and Planning	2	3	1					
Political Reform and More Democracy	6	3			3	1		

Some of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie suggested that, to solve the economic problem, political reform is the first step. By that they mean the eradication of corruption, especially among politicians, and giving more democracy to allow people to share in solving society's problems.

So, the members of different social classes showed great concern over the threat of the economic crisis which they think will make the future a very hard one. The bourgeois classes presented some solutions to the problem. The solutions reflected two different views, that is the Islamic religious solution in terms of applying Islamic law in our economic relations and in social life, which is represented by two out of each ten of the fathers and mothers of the new petty bourgeoisie, and also of the traditional petty bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie. The secular approach to solutions concentrates upon aspects such as economic development, manpower training and political reform. The latter is most

significant for the new petty bourgeoisie, as the table indicates. The working class concentrated mainly upon the impact of the economic crisis in making the future very hard. The images of the future reflect the main factors which influence the different social classes' perception of the present and the future. These are mainly the economic factor and a cultural factor which is seen in religious beliefs.

#### V. Conclusion

The conclusion of this chapter will illustrate the following points:

- The wide economic and cultural gaps between classes.
- People's consciousness of their class position and the extent to which the sense of class identity has developed for different social classes.
- The influence of the dichotomy of Egyptian culture on people's critique and solutions for social and economic matters in the present and in the future.
- The place of the new petty bourgeoisie in social action, and as a coherent social class compared with other social powers in society.
- The perception of the future and the influence of the economic crisis.

#### (A) The Wide Economic and Cultural Gap Between Classes

The study of the profile of the sample has provided essential material about class differences in economic, educational and cultural aspects.

The social origin of the majority of the sample is rural Egypt, where one can find that the parents in the sample either migrated themselves from rural to urban Egypt or their parents were the first generation to migrate. The factors which lie behind their migration reflect the general character of rural-urban migration in Egypt, where the working class

are usually pushed by rural poverty and just looking to make a living in the urban area, while the bourgeois migration to urban areas is usually for education and because they are attracted by the different cultural life in urban areas, as well as economic prosperity.

Cultural differences are clear between members of the sample from outside appearances and differences in dress, language and the way of living, which all give class indications of increasing social distance. The social class distance is further widened if one looks at the economic and educational aspects.

In economic terms, the study of the income of members of different social classes reflects the wide gap between classes and it shows how income is distributed unequally in society, with working class income falling in the range £50-99 and the big bourgeoisie income falling at the level of more than £1000. Since this is a result from a limited sample, it suggests the need for a comprehensive study at the national level to show income distribution in Egypt for other class positions.

The low income of the working class is accompanied by other features which make their circumstances more difficult, like the large families which increase the burden of subsistence for them.

The responses demonstrate an educational fact concerning the working class, which is that they have very high illiteracy rates, especially among women. The other class which shares with the working class some cultural and educational factors is the traditional petty bourgeoisie, since they have the same big family size and low standard of education. However, their ownership of their means of production provides them with a middle level income.

## (B) Image of Society

Members of different social classes gave a variety of pictures of Egyptian society, and introduced different models of class structure. The big bourgeoisie and the working class introduced two and three class models, while the new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie introduced a variety of models with two three four or five classes.

From these models, some points can be drawn about Egyptian social class formation. These are:

- There is a consensus among the members of the sample that the class formation of Egypt is marked by a wide economic gap between classes. There is a diversity in people's social imagery which is revealed in the identification of different models of society, which gives an indication of class consciousness, as will be explained below.

- The identification of Egyptian class formation in terms of a two or three group model, which was mainly chosen by the big bourgeoisie and the working class, reflects one side of the picture of Egyptian society marked by a minority of rich, a majority of poor, and a relatively small middle class of between 20 and 30 per cent. The models chosen by the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie present a variety of models ranging from two to five groups. These reflect another aspect of the class formation and the changes which took place in the seventies and resulted in the emergence of millionaires among the craftsmen who could accumulate wealth. So, the model presented by the big bourgeoisie and the working class puts stress upon the polarization between rich and poor, while the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie, in the models they choose, stress the changes which took place in the seventies and the emergence of new strata, which reflects the complexity of these developments better than the models of the big bourgeoisie and the working class.

- Identifying their own class position, members of the three bourgeois classes tend to identify themselves with the middle-middle class, which reflects a weak class consciousness and weak development of a sense of class identity, while the situation is different for the working class, who clearly identify themselves as poor. The weakness of the development of a sense of class identity in turn reflects in the difficulty which the traditional and new petty bourgeoisie have in identifying the size and position of the middle class, and in identifying who constitute the middle class and who are the poor. The low class consciousness of the new petty bourgeoisie in particular must be seen in the context of changes which took place in society in the seventies, and influenced class formation in terms of changing the positions for certain groups, and the unequal division of social and economic benefits, as was explained in Chapters Two and Three. The new petty bourgeoisie have a relatively low consciousness. Their confusion reflects the social reality of society, in that the new petty bourgeoisie are aware of changes which have influenced the class formation of society.

- In historical perspective, the class formation of Egypt in the immediately post-Revolutionary period gives a picture of a society with a majority of poor, a minority of rich, and no very clear picture of the position of the middle class. This picture is mainly presented by the three bourgeois classes, while the working class tend to give a model of society sharply divided between rich and poor, with no middle class. The view of the working class is influenced by their experience in rural Egypt where class differences and poverty were greater than in urban Egypt.

If one compares the class structure in the seventies and the present time, there is a trend which existed for the majority from different class positions. They presented models of society where there was a rich minority and poor majority with a very wide gap between them. This can be explained if one assumes that the class structure is going back to be similar



to that which existed before the Revolution.

- The identification of the class formation of society was not an easy task for all the members of the sample, since it was difficult for some members to cross the boundaries of their immediate experiences and to think about the wider society. The numbers of those who found it difficult to give a response varied from one class to another. It was a minimum among the new petty bourgeoisie and at its maximum among the working class. The identification of the class formation is even more difficult when it is perceived in historical context, where, for example, nearly half the fathers and nearly four out of every five mothers of the working class did not answer this question. This inability to answer was shared with the traditional petty bourgeoisie mothers, among whom nearly half did not answer this question. The inability of members of these two classes to answer this question may be understood in terms of the lack of cultural capital, which seems important in providing a wide knowledge and perception of the present and past.

- The picture of the class formation of Egypt which was presented up to this point by the members of the sample, in general, gives an image of society with strong potential for class conflict, where the economic gap between the classes is wide. This gap is clearly present between members of the sample, where there is a wide spread of income present between them. However, this possible conflict is diffused by two factors. The first is an economic one. From the responses on economic class interests it is clear that members inside the same class have benefited differentially from the open door policy, so there is no straight line of demarcation between those who have been deprived and those who have not. This situation hinders the development of more unified class interests and class consciousness. The second factor is cultural and ideological, where the religious beliefs reduce the degree of tension, since they lead people to accept class differences, especially economic ones, as given by God. The

working class is particularly likely to accept their fate for this reason.

### (C) Division in Class Interests

The discussions of political and economic interests with members from different class positions proved that class membership does not mean that members of the same class will have the same perceived interests, or will hold the same ideologies about social, economic and political issues. The division and contradictions in respondents' perspectives appear in their views about the policies of the sixties and seventies.

The analysis has shown a division in the view of members of social classes especially the bourgeois classes, over the issues of economic and political policies of the sixties and seventies. They are divided in their views about which era developed society, in general, more than the other. They support their views for or against each era by giving a variety of political, economic and ideological justifications.

The division also exists in their views about their personal benefit in each period, where one finds differences between classes and inside one class. For example, the new petty bourgeoisie who work in foreign companies benefited more than those who work for the government.

The big bourgeoisie has mainly benefited from the seventies, although they express feelings of insecurity because of foreign competition. They reflect their conflict between state protection of national projects, which allows them more security and protection for their production, and the increasing profit and benefit they could make in the seventies, but with the danger of foreign competition. In fact this reflects one of the main characters of the big bourgeoisie in Egypt where they find an interest in dealing with foreign capital but at the same time they feel threatened

by this capital.

The working class shows less division, and they mainly believe that the sixties developed society and developed their position more than the seventies. The views of the working class reflect a class consciousness of their own everyday economic suffering, but they do not reflect a consciousness of the wider dimensions of the policies, i.e. they are not able, like the new petty bourgeoisie, to perceive the policies in a wider perspective of economic, political and social dimensions.

The general evaluation by members of the sample of which social classes in society benefited more in the seventies was that:

- benefits in the seventies were distributed unequally in society,
- that members of social classes were clear about certain class fractions which became wealthy and powerful in society like businessmen, officers, politicians and craftsmen,
- members of social classes recognised emigration to the Arab oil countries as one of the important factors of class movement and making wealth, especially in the case of farmers and workers,
- the big bourgeoisie in particular condemn the emigration of farmers and workers since they see it as the main factor in reducing production, while they do not place the same blame on members of other classes who emigrated at the same time, and they themselves do not rule out the possibility of emigration for their children in their future.

The big bourgeoisie are also opposed to the introduction of mass media especially TV in rural Egypt, since they believe that farmers are taking more leisure time and that they waste the time which they should spend in production.

From the general analysis of the answers of members of different social classes, it can be noticed that the context of the answers given by the bourgeois classes, especially the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie, reflects a wide knowledge and variety of reasons which they give in their analysis, since they are able to draw more economic, cultural and political arguments than the working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie, who are mainly confined to the economic reasons. This again reinforces the cultural power of the big and new petty bourgeoisie.

#### (D) Perception of the Future and the Influence of the Economic Crisis

Respondents' images of the future have one main characteristic, which is their emphasis upon the influence of the economic crisis in shaping the future of society. The economic crisis has led the working class to hold a pessimistic picture of the future which they believe is going to be very hard. The three bourgeois classes tried to think in a positive way, by suggesting solutions for the crisis. The solutions reflect the duality of the respondents' ideologies between the secular and the religious way of thinking.

#### (E) An Overview of Class Cultures and Ideologies

The overall view of the analysis of ideological and cultural patterns of different classes shows that there are different cultural configurations, and that these appear in people's different ways and styles of life, their appearance and their language. Cultural differences also appear in the dichotomy of Egyptian culture between those who are educated and the illiterate, and between religious and secular ideologies, which have been referred to in Chapter Four. This raises the question of how these dichotomies may influence people's perceptions of social, economic and political issues. In fact, the dichotomy between illiterate and educated appears in the difference between those who are educated like the new petty

bourgeoisie, the uneducated like the working class. This affects their ability to bring discussion and argument, and a wide range of political, economic and social knowledge to bear on their problems. These represent part of what can generally be described as cultural capital, which is partly developed through education.

The dichotomy between the secular and the religious ideologies exists throughout the class formation, and appears in people's perceptions and solutions for class differences and economic problems. However, religious belief plays an important part in holding society together and cementing the fragmented class formation. As explained earlier, it plays an important role in diffusing potential class conflict on the part of the working class.

If one looks at the perspectives of the new petty bourgeoisie, which represent an essential class for this analysis, one can see that their perception of the class formation of Egypt is very much influenced by the changes which took place in the seventies. This has its positive and negative sides on their consciousness of the class formation. That is, it is positive in terms of being aware of the changes which took place, not only in the economic aspect of class position, but at the cultural and political levels as well. It is negative in the sense that they are confused about who to consider as middle class and who are the poor of society. This is a misleading situation for members of this class who are in positions of planning and executing development programmes, where identifying those who should benefit from development programmes is essential.

The changes in the seventies left the new petty bourgeoisie with another contradiction in their economic and political interests. Some of them benefited from the open door economic policy, while others were harmed by the same policy. This situation makes it very difficult to predict the policies which this class is going to support and which social class

it is going to ally with. In spite of these contradictions, the new petty bourgeoisie, because of their cultural capital, are able to perceive Egypt's problems in a wide perspective, supported by their wide economic and political knowledge. The issue of the new petty bourgeoisie, their cultural capital, and their ability to give wide knowledge and perceptions will be more fully explored and discussed in the next two chapters, when educational issues will be discussed.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. For a detailed description of ways of life in Cairo especially in traditional poor areas see: Andre B. Rugh (1979) Coping with Poverty in a Cairo Community. American University in Cairo, Cairo Papers in Social Science Vol 1

## CHAPTER SEVEN

## CLASS PERSPECTIVES ON GENERAL EDUCATIONAL ISSUES

Introduction

In the previous chapter social class formation in Egypt and people's consciousness in terms of the development of class and class interests in economic and political issues were discussed. Some of the findings of that chapter are important, and need to be reiterated here, because they will form the background for the analysis in this chapter.

From Chapter Six it is known that Egypt has a complex class formation which is in a state of flux. This complexity appears in the diverse social imagery concerning the class model of society, and in the weak development of class consciousness, i.e. an awareness of class for itself in terms of people's sense of their own class position. This is especially true among the three bourgeois classes, while the working class have a clearer sense and greater consciousness of their position as poor.

Class cultural capital works as a class cultural power in defending and supporting class interests, which appeared in the ability of the big bourgeoisie to bring into their discussions and arguments a wide range of knowledge concerning economic, political and social issues, which the working class and traditional petty bourgeoisie were lacking.

The discussion of economic interests and benefits showed that class membership does not mean that the members of the same class will have the same ideologies and interests.

These general points about the class formation and class consciousness will be used as the basis and context for the analysis presented in this chapter, which aims to address the following points:

- class ideologies concerning education and its value for the individual and society,
- class based critique of the Revolution educational policies,
- control and power over education,
- the core of the class conflict around education,
- future educational change.

In order to study these aspects, some detailed issues will be discussed in the chapter. These include respondents' evaluation of education from the Revolution to the present time, their perception of the role of education in society and for individuals, and their views on equality and inequality of educational opportunities between different classes. The issue of expenditure on education will be discussed in terms of the respondents' sense of which should get more finance and the sources of this finance, and the image that they have for the education system in the future.

These aspects were chosen because they are highly controversial in Egypt, and they are the subject of debate among the state officials and the intellectuals, as was discussed in Chapter Four. Here, these points are discussed from the viewpoint of members of different classes, in order to reveal the class content and class influence of these points, and the extent to which they represent different and clear class interests, and reveal, as well, some other theoretical issues concerning education, social class formation and class consciousness. These points are:

- the correspondence between the diverse social imagery that people have for models of society, and the models they have for the education system, and
- the role of cultural capital in providing individuals with a basis for evaluating and criticizing the education system and education problems in the past, present and future.



## I. The Role of Education in Society

The study of people's perspectives on the role of education in society will include the role of education for both the individual and for society. The analysis of people's perceptions provides the material for seeing class differences in attitudes and beliefs about education. These help in the examination of educational values at the present time, i.e. after society has been influenced by the socio-economic changes which took place under the open door policy.

### (A) The Importance of Education for the Individual

In their perceptions of the importance of education for the individual, five major aspects were made by the majority of the sample, along with some less important points which were mentioned by smaller numbers. (See Table 1.)

As indicated in the table, the moral aspect of education was mentioned by all of the members of some classes and by a majority of other classes. The moral aspect of education appears in people's belief that education makes individuals polite, decent and in general develops their personalities. In order of importance, as measured by the number of respondents giving this answer, the second factor identified by the sample is that education is essential for ensuring a successful future.

The third factor is that education helps the individual to find a good job; this factor was most strongly identified by the bourgeois classes, who equate a good job with a professional one. The working class were more likely to identify a good job as a permanent one, which would imply working for the government.

Other factors were identified by small numbers of the sample, including the idea that education helps the individual to have high status, to know their religion, to be disciplined, to be

Table 1: Parents' Assessment of the Importance of Education for the Individual

Important Aspects	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
To find a good job	3	7	2	2		1		
To find a permanent job							3	5
For a successful future	8	9	4	3	3		2	2
To be polite and to develop their personalities	31	31	7	9	8	9	11	7
To know and understand society and the environment	8	3	2	1	2	4		
High status	1			1		1		1
To know their religion	1							
To know their rights and duties								1
Discipline						1		
To be cultured					1			
At least to know how to read and write							1	

cultured, and to know how to read and write.

The bourgeois classes share with the working class the views that education is important for moral development, and for advancement in the world of work, but where they differ is in their identification of the kind of work for which education prepares individuals.

For example, a working class father who is a waiter said,

*"The educated person who works for the government is very secure, because he is insured and has a high salary and a pension, but the uneducated person like me is insecure, because if I fall down nobody will help me."*

Among the traditional petty bourgeoisie, a similar opinion can

be found: a small merchant said,

*"Education is a weapon for the future, because it allows the individual to secure himself by finding a job."*

### (B) The Importance of Education for Society

The discussion of the role of education in society identified three main points, which are summarized in Table 2:

- education is very important in preparing specialists in different fields,
- education is important in developing society, and
- educated people are more useful citizens for society than uneducated.

Table 2: Parents' Assessment of the Importance of Education for Society

Important Aspects	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
To find specialists in all fields	18	18	6	5	2	4	8	9
To be a developed country	17	15	3	4	7	6	1	2
There is a big difference between educated and ignorant citizens	4	1		2			1	
They work and increase our production							1	

Inside these three main points, differences between classes appear in different conceptualizations of the relationship between education and society. However, one trend can be noted in the bourgeois classes, who believe that educated people are important for developing society, but that it is society or the state which does not make good use of educated people, and that the government fails to plan for the efficient use of educated manpower. This opinion can be seen in a number of the

comments made.

For the new petty bourgeoisie, a father who is an accountant in the government said,

*"Educated people are very important for developing society, but society does not know how to make good use of their abilities and qualifications, they do not give them suitable jobs. This situation puts the educated people in crisis, because they feel that society fails to use their abilities, so they start thinking of themselves, working only for their personal benefit and not for the benefit of the wider society."*

A father who is a petty bourgeois photographer expressed the same view:

*"The problem is that the government does not know how to use and employ the educated manpower. They accept students in unnecessary specializations. The government has the problem of unemployment because of that. The government keep students in education for a long time, i.e. they fail students in order to keep them for a long time to postpone their graduation and hence the problem of employing them."*

A mother from the big bourgeois, who herself is an engineer, described this crisis in society in using educated people:

*"Our country faces the same problem which is faced by many other developing countries, which is the inability of employing educated people."*

These views express how the bourgeoisie perceive what they see as the reality of the situation, and the relationship between educated people and society, which reflect tension and crisis between educated manpower and society.

Other patterns express what members of the sample believe education is capable of doing for society. They are not necessarily describing reality, but they express their view of what could be the potential that education can offer society.

Among the new petty bourgeoisie, three tendencies appear. These are the importance of education for applying technology,

education and the preparation of the elite, and the importance of education from a religious viewpoint. The first tendency is seen in the belief that education is important if society wants to benefit from modern technology.

A mother who is an employee of the Ministry of Culture said,  
*"Education is very important for society especially if we want to apply new technology because ignorant people cannot use them."*

The second tendency among the new petty bourgeoisie expresses the importance of education in the formation of the ruling elite. A father who is an engineer in government service said,  
*"Education is very important because it is the way to form and create the elite of society. This elite is important in running and ruling society."*

The third tendency is to see the importance of education for society in creating strong personalities who work for the benefit of society. This view is supported by the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. A father who is the captain of a ship said,

*"Education is very important for society because it creates strong educated personalities. This is stated in many of the sayings of the Prophet. For example, he says, 'The strong believer is more beloved by God than the weak believer'. I understand this in terms of education and its role in society where education is providing society with those who are strong in their beliefs and in their qualifications, so society will benefit from them."*

The traditional petty bourgeoisie have seen education as challenging their traditional crafts. A father who works as a tailor said,

*"Education is very important for society, especially in applying modern technology, but education is challenging craftsmen like me. Education is killing off crafts, because educated people do not work in small crafts. They prefer to go to modern industries."*

The big bourgeoisie put stress upon the importance of education in adapting to new jobs created in society. A father

who is an engineer working as an entrepreneur said,

*"Education is very important for society, because with the changing and the creation of new jobs in society, only the educated people can adapt themselves to the changing needs of jobs. Educated people are easy to be directed and guided to new jobs."*

Among the working class, there is a tendency to compare educated and ignorant people in terms of what they can offer society. A father who works as a fitter said,

*"Educated people are important for society because education opens their minds, builds their personalities, so educated people can understand and know more about the problems of their society and the needs of their society than the ignorant."*

So, the bourgeoisie concentrate on the technological and practical aspects that education can give society, while the working class concentrate on the different quality of mentality between the educated and the ignorant, which allow the educated to be more understanding of their society than the uneducated.

### (C) Class Beliefs and Attitudes about Education and Society

In terms of class beliefs and attitudes about education and society, and the value of education for the individual, the following main points can be identified:

- There is a strong tendency among people from different class positions to see education as essential in developing the individual personality and in developing society.
- Inside this main trend, different angles of looking at the relationship between education and society, and on the value of education for the individual can be identified.

The following different angles should be mentioned:

1. In terms of the value which education has for the individual, the moral value appears to be essential for different class positions. Preparing individuals for the world of work appeared to be another important factor for all class positions. Moreover, the kind of job which education prepares individuals for is seen as different by people from different class positions. The new petty bourgeoisie identified the job as a professional one, i.e. they tend to put stress upon education for the individual in terms of jobs with high status, while the working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie see the job as any permanent job which offers security for the future, so they stress education for the individual in terms of security.
2. In terms of the existing relationship between education and society, the bourgeois classes tend to see this relation as in crisis, and in tension where society has failed to make good use of the qualified and educated people, i.e. society could not use the output of the education system because of the lack of planning for manpower and unemployment.
3. In terms of how education can be useful for society, a diversity of views can be identified. The new petty bourgeoisie stressed technology and the creation of the ruling elite. The big bourgeoisie placed emphasis upon education and adaptation to new jobs. The traditional petty bourgeoisie expressed their fear concerning the challenge of new technology and big industries to their own small scale crafts. The working class expressed their feeling about the different quality of human beings that education can afford to society.

## II. Evaluation of the Education System

The previous discussion of the value of education for the individual and society has shown a great deal of confidence

in the importance of education in developing society. In this part of the discussion, people were asked to evaluate the education system throughout a historical period from 1952 to the present time. People were asked to identify changes which took place in education after 1952, to compare the system in the sixties and the seventies, to identify the present educational problems, to describe teachers' position in society and to express their views on who they think influences and controls the education system.

#### (A) The Role of the Revolution in Education

Changes which took place in education under the Revolution were identified by the majority of the sample, who believed that the 1952 Revolution changed education in Egypt.

Those who did identify changes which took place in education after 1952 mentioned the following aspects, which are summarized in Table 3: equal opportunity, new curriculum, and free education. However, these changes have been evaluated negatively, by quite a high proportion of the bourgeois classes, i.e. the new petty bourgeoisie, the big bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie. These aspects were seen positively by the working class respondents, who answered the question. Table 4 shows those who evaluate the policies negatively or positively. Comments and views expressed by the members of the sample reflect the attitude associated with their class position.

Among the new petty bourgeoisie, there was a strong antipathy towards the Revolutionary policy of education, in terms of the quality of education and the ideology behind the system.

A father, and member of the new petty bourgeoisie, who is an accountant in the government blamed the Revolution for worsenning the quality of education by increasing the numbers of children involved:

*"The Revolution has opened the door for all people and accepted very big numbers in the schools,*



Table 3: Parents' Assessment of Aspects of Change in Education after the 1952 Revolution

Important Aspects	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Increasing student numbers	17	13	4	2	6	4	2	2
Free education	5	7	5	2	2	1	2	3
Increasing the university numbers	3		1					
New specializations	2	1	1					
More equal opportunities	10	13	6	4	3	3	4	5
New curriculum	4	3	2	1	1	1	2	
Education became worse after the Revolution because there was no stable policy and the low quality of education	14	9	2	3	3	2	1	
Encouraging girls' education					1			1
Superficial change during the seventies					1			
Don't know		2				2	3	5

*without having the resources for that, which affected the quality and standard of education at school."*

Table 4: Parents' Evaluation of the 1952 Revolution's Changes in Education

Evaluation of Changes	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Positive	11	13	6	5	3	3	8	6
Negative	20	16	3	4	6	4		
Don't know		2				2	3	5

Another attack on the ideology of equal opportunity and free education came from a mother who works as an engineer for a foreign company, who graduated herself from a foreign school, whose father is a high ranking officer in a family which was originally among the big landowners:

*"The Revolution has destroyed education by opening the doors to people who should not be educated. Those people from the lower classes, when they go to education and when they mix with the upper classes, the result is that they envy those classes. We are a class society and we have to keep class differences. The result of the Revolution's education policy was the shortage of rural workers and in other crafts and the humiliation of the landowners."*

So, the new petty bourgeoisie, who were mainly educated under free education, criticize those changes under the Revolution as having a negative impact on the quality of education, and that education was used to legitimize the new, Revolutionary system. Ideologies of equal opportunities and free education are also criticized for having a negative impact on the quality of education, since it allowed large numbers of students to enrol, and as having a dangerous effect on the system of power and interests in society, since the new ideology is seen by some of the new petty bourgeoisie as challenging the status quo and the existing class differences, which in their view should not be changed.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie also criticize the policy of the Revolution in terms of the effect it had on the quality of education, and they attack changes in the curriculum, and its use as a means to justify and legitimize the new regime.

A critique of the large number of students at university level came from a father who works as a tailor. He shows how the policy of accepting large numbers has caused unemployment:

*"The Revolution has changed the education system, by introducing free education at university level which led to pressure on university education. The big numbers at university have led to the unemployment problem, since the market does not need all graduates."*

Like the other bourgeois classes, the big bourgeoisie also criticize education under the Revolution for using the curriculum for political propaganda. They also express a wish to undermine the efforts of the Revolution in the educational field.

Those who wished to undermine the changes under the Revolution based this view on political and personal evidence. A father who is an engineer working as an entrepreneur said,

*"Education deteriorated in its qualitative level after the Revolution. I do not think that the Revolution has given much attention to education. In fact, the Revolution was mainly engaged with her outside politics and problems, and did not give enough attention to inside affairs such as education."*

A mother who is a housewife, literate, and from a wealthy rural family in upper Egypt explained her point of view in relation to the experience of her three brothers, who joined the university when it was fee-paying, and subsequently worked as an officer, an engineer and a university professor respectively. She said,

*"I do not think the Revolution has changed education as people say. They wrongly believe that the Revolution opened more schools and educated more people. Before the revolution we had schools and we had university and people were able to go to school and university. All my brothers got their university education before the Revolution."*

The working class, however, mainly support the Revolution, and the changes which they believe gave more equal opportunities and allowed the poor to get the chance to be educated. But a quarter of the fathers and nearly half of the mothers found it difficult to answer the question. Those who did answer tended to answer very directly, and to support their arguments with direct, personal experience.

A father who is a cleaner in the Ministry of Transportation, and who came from a rural area, said,

*"The Revolution allowed the poor people to get*

*access to education. In my village it was only the rich and the wealthy of the village who used to send their children to school and they were very few."*

Another father who is a welder in a foreign company compared the system after the Revolution with that of the present day:

*"At the beginning of the Revolution, education became available to many people, especially the poor. But today things have changed, quality of education has deteriorated and our children are taking low quality education now."*

It is clear that the bourgeois classes are critical of the ideologies which stand behind the policy of education after the Revolution, and they also criticize the politicization of the system through the curriculum. Although the three bourgeois classes have attacked the policy of education after 1952, and they seemed sure about that attack, when they were asked to compare the two main periods of the Revolution, i.e. to compare the sixties and seventies, there was considerable disagreement within classes and between classes about the two periods. This reflects again, as was discussed in Chapter Six, the split around the policies in the two periods, and their educational aspect is no exception to the general pattern. The views of different groups are shown in Table 5.

For the new petty bourgeoisie, nearly two thirds of the mothers and fathers believe that education was better during the sixties. A fairly small minority believe the opposite, that things improved in education in the seventies. The views that education never improved, or that things were better before the Revolution were also recorded. So the question arises as to what people took into account when they compared the two eras in the educational system.

Among the majority who thought things were better in the sixties, a number of different reasons were cited, like the quality of education, especially moral and ethical aspects of a teaching career. A mother who is a member of the new petty bourgeoisie and an accountant in a public sector company said,

*"Education was better in the sixties in terms of the*

Table 5: Parents' Assessment of Developing Education in Different Periods

Period in which education was felt to have developed more	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Sixties	19	21	6	7	7	7	3	4
Seventies	4	2		1		1	2	3
Never improved	4	3	2	1	2	1		
Before the Revolution	3	1						1
Both sixties and seventies	1	1					3	
Fifties			1					
Don't know		3					3	3

*teacher's work and profession. Teachers were working hard with students. But today, because of the big gap between the people and the low income of teachers, they try to make money by private lessons, and then they neglect students and lose their enthusiasm for work."*

Those who approve of the seventies, and the development of education in that period, gave different reasons, covering the policy of education, equality of education opportunities and the new types of schools encouraged in the seventies.

A father and member of the new petty bourgeoisie who is an accountant in the public sector said,

*"Education was better in the seventies because the government encouraged new types of schools like the government language schools. Other sources of education like cinema and theatre were encouraged in the seventies."*

A father who is a director of a tax collecting department said,

*"Education improved in the seventies because we had a stable policy of education, while the sixties was a period of experiments and applying new ideas which did not afford a stability for the system and affected the quality of education."*

Others expressed a total rejection of the ideology of equal opportunity which lay behind the education system in the sixties, so the point about ideology is again reinforced. A father who is an engineer in a foreign company said:

*"Nasser destroyed education by his wrong ideas like equality, which is against religious belief. Because people are classes and they should not be educated like each other. The seventies have moved towards the right direction of restricting education."*

A pilot supported a similar position:

*"The standard of education was better before the Revolution. Opening education to all people has destroyed its quality."*

The new petty bourgeoisie, in their comparison between the sixties and seventies in terms of education policies, are divided in their views. For quite substantial majority there is a belief that the sixties was better than the seventies in two essential points: the teachers' qualifications and standards, and the quality of education. Restricting educational opportunities in the seventies was seen by some members as the right policy in order to control numbers and improve the quality.

A substantial majority of the traditional petty bourgeoisie believe that the system was better in the sixties than in the seventies.

A mother who is a housewife said,

*"Education was better during the sixties because we did not have the problem of private lessons, I mean that the problem in the sixties was not as serious as today"*.

A father who is photographer said,

*"Education was better in the sixties because teachers and students had ethics and morality more than today."*

The big bourgeoisie continued the same theme of evaluating the education system in the sixties as better than the seventies,

with three quarters of them preferring the sixties. They give the same ethical and professional reasons for their view as the other bourgeois classes.

A father who is the owner of a factory said,

*"Education was better in the sixties because at least the problem of private lessons was less than in the seventies or today."*

The working class, when they were asked about education system in the two periods, found it difficult to give an assessment. This reflects the fact that the working class could easily express their views about the economic situation which directly affected their means of living, but found it harder to assess more remote aspects of policy, such as the education system.

However, some of them expressed their views about education in the two periods simply in terms of their economic ability to afford education for their children. A mother who is a wife of a bus conductor said,

*"Education was better in the sixties. Because schools did not ask for things like books and clothes for the children like today. Besides, private lessons were less expensive."*

Another mother said,

*"I do not know about the education system. But I know that the cost of private lessons was less than today."*

The responses of the working class reflect their general impression about the sixties and seventies, where they express from their every day economic suffering that in the sixties they were better off than in the seventies. This reflects upon their views about education.

#### Comment

The discussion and the evaluation of education system after 1952, during the sixties and seventies reflects a clear difference in perceived class interests between the three bourgeois classes on the one hand and the working class on the

other. There is a preference for the policies of the sixties among the working class, while the three bourgeois classes have criticized them on some points and supported them on others.

When members of different class positions were asked to compare education in the sixties and seventies, in contrast to their attachment to the policies of the two periods, the three bourgeois classes mainly supported the sixties as having better education in terms of teacher training and qualifications. This can be understood in terms of the serious problem of the present teachers' standard and qualifications which is reflected in peoples' evaluation of education in the two eras.

It is important to notice that the three bourgeois classes support for the policies of the sixties concentrated on one major point, namely, the quality of teacher training, while their main attack was on the ideologies which stood behind the policies. They carried this attack on ideology into the discussion of other aspects like free and fee paying education. So, their leaning towards one aspect of the policy in the sixties did not change the main division of interests between the three bourgeois class and the working class.

#### (B) Educational Problems

Respondents were asked to identify what they believe are the more important problems in our education system. This point helps to reflect class consciousness and awareness of the negative aspects of the system. From Table No.6 it can be seen that the working class could not identify problems, with more than half of both the fathers and mothers saying that they find it difficult to answer to these questions.

Problems identified by people show that they have mentioned different areas in school and in education in general. These areas are:



- 1 The curriculum: where they identified some problems in the curriculum like the accumulated curriculum, the absence of new subjects, and the lack of practical studies.
- 2 Teachers: shortage of teachers and the problem of unqualified teachers.
3. The school itself: problems of shortage of equipment and buildings, short school day, overcrowded classrooms.

The analysis of people's identification of problems shows that, class differences are not so much in identifying different kinds and aspects of problem, although these differences certainly do exist to some extent, but in the scope and the variety of problems they discuss.

If one looks at the answers of the working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie, one finds that they concentrate on those problems which they face in day to day relations with school, while the new petty bourgeoisie tend to reflect perceptions of more general problems related to aims and policy of education. This will be discussed and analyzed further in the next chapter. They offer critiques of applying new types of education like basic education and put their discussion of problems in political perspective. Beside that, it can be seen that the working class, for example, are to a great extent unable to discuss certain areas like curriculum, since reading is a prerequisite of entering into discussion in this area, which is not available for the majority of the sample.

Examples of the working class discussions reflect that fact.

A father who works as a welder in foreign company said,

*"We have some problems in education like private lessons and lack of supervision of teachers' work and of schools performance."*

A mother described her own direct concern over the link between education and unemployment:

*"The big problem in education is the unemployment of the graduates. I have one of my daughters who*

Table 6: Parents' Assessment of Educational Problems

Important Aspects	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Shortages in school buildings and equipment	17	13	3	1	4	3		
The short school day	6	3			1	1		
Shortage of teachers and untrained teachers	13	10	2	2	7	2	1	
Curriculum problems	8	9	1	1	3	5		
Large classes	20	18	3	1	2	3	1	
Private lessons	2	10	2	3	2	2	3	1
Unstable policy of education	5							
Promotion between grades without exams		1						
Government free schools give no care to students							1	
Government does not employ graduates from education								1
Don't know		2	2	4			6	8

*has been looking for a job for two years after she finished her technical school. It is a waste of money for both government and parents who spend on educating their children and then they stay without a job."*

The traditional petty bourgeoisie reflected the same limited view of education problems. For example, a father who is owner of a small shop said,

*"I do not have a clear idea about education problems: all I know is that teachers neglect children and they do not work hard with them."*

A mother who is housewife said,

*"I know about education problems that students sometimes make problems with their teachers."*

*Students do not care about their lessons and they do not listen to their teachers."*

The new petty bourgeoisie discussed a wide range of problems in a wide political and social perspective. One of the sample's members is specialized in education; he is an inspector in Ministry of Education. He criticized the law which organizes Basic Education. He believes that this law is responsible for the low standard of Basic Education. He said,

*"We have the problem of big student numbers, the short school day because we use the schools for more than one shift, the low standard of teachers' training and qualifications. I consider the new law on Basic Education as a problem, that is, the new law allows a child to repeat the second and the sixth grade of the school if the child failed. I think this will lower the standard of Basic Education, because those who fail should not continue to study because they do not have the ability for study. So it is better for them to leave the school to those who have the abilities."*

The view of the inspector is interesting. It illustrates how the problem of failing the school is seen by some officials and specialists in education as the problem of the individual and of the individual's inability to be educated.

Another view reflects the general problems of educational planning and the wide perspective which this class has on educational problems. A father who is an engineer in a public sector company said,

*"We have many problems. The main reason for our problems is buildings, teaching, and facilities, all come from the effect of the war. Egypt experienced many wars which affected our national educational and industrial plans. One of the main educational problems is that we do not have a stable policy of education; the policy is changing with every new Minister of Education which gives no opportunity to apply any policy."*

The new petty bourgeoisie stress the problem of unqualified teachers as very important, and also the problems of the curriculum. A mother who works as an employee in Ministry of Culture said,

*"We have many problems like problems of teachers training. This problem presents itself in using untrained teachers and allowing any teacher to teach any subject without being specialized. We have the problem of the overcrowded curriculum, the short school day because of using the school for more than two shifts, and there is no connection between home and school."*

The big bourgeoisie, like the new petty bourgeoisie, reflect some of the general problems in education, and stress the problem of teachers. A father who is a businessman and qualified at the university as a lawyer said,

*"Our problems are the same as in any developing country. I think, the most important problem is the problem of teachers training and their low status in society, that is, the state deals with teachers as if they are doing second class work. We give more importance and high status to the university teachers than to primary teachers who are very important. We have another problem which is people who are responsible for education, I mean the senior officials and the minister of education, all of them are occupied and busy of doing many other formal responsibilities like receptions and public relations which gave no time for developing and studying education problems. We have as well the problem of the accumulated curriculum."*

Another father, who is a university graduate, and is the owner of a textile factory, reflected on more general problems at the policy level:

*"We have the problem of the big number of students and the shortage of buildings. The other important problem is in the policy of education. That is, we do not have a stable policy of education because every minister comes with new policy and new experiments, so they do not exactly know what they want and how to reform education."*

The views of the big bourgeoisie reflect a great deal of consciousness about the problem of teachers training and standards, and they ask that teachers should be qualified not only at the first degree of university education but at the standard of post graduate studies.

The discussion of educational problems in general has shown the importance of cultural capital in enabling individuals to

give critical views and to perceive problems in broad perspectives. This is clear from the way that the working class and traditional petty bourgeoisie have discussed education problems, where they had rather limited perspectives, in contrast with the big and new petty bourgeoisie who presented perspectives which covered several areas of the education system.

(C) Control and Power over Education as seen by Members of Different Classes

To study how people perceive the way power and influence are exercised over education people were asked to identify those who have the power and ability to solve educational problems. People were asked about what should happen, and who should solve educational problems.

At another level, people were asked to identify, and to choose from different social groups, those they believed could actually influence education. Table No 7 summarizes people's views about whom they think can solve education problem. From the table, it can be noticed that the majority of the working class found it difficult to give a response to this question. The majority said that they did not know. Fewer of the traditional petty bourgeoisie said that they did not know, but this was still a greater percentage than for either the new petty bourgeoisie or the big bourgeoisie.

The minority of the working class who answered this question have mainly proposed that the government, with people's help and cooperation can solve problems. They concentrate on people's conscientiousness in their work, like teachers for example, who they believe are responsible for problems like private lessons and the low quality of education their children have at school.

A father who is a welder in a foreign company said,

*"The government should solve the problems, but the government efforts can do nothing without people's*

Table 7: Parents' Assessment Those Who Can Solve Educational Problems

Who can solve Educational problems?	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
The government	17	19	2	2	4	5		
Government and people together	5	5	4	4	1	1	3	2
Political parties and social organizations	4	1			1		1	
People as individuals	3	5			2	2		
People who are specialists in education	2		1				1	1
Fee paying education					1			
Don't know		1	2	3		1	6	8

*conscientiousness. People have to change and to be faithful in their work in order to help the government."*

The traditional petty bourgeoisie reflect, like the working class, the importance of the government with the help of the people, and that it is very important for people to be conscientious. Although they stress the role of the government, they reflect one important point about the lack of confidence between people and government.

A father who works as a tailor said,

*"The government can solve education problems with people's help, but the problem is, people do not trust the government and they cannot see any good example of people who are in power."*

A father who works as a merchant commented that it was necessary to change individuals before problems could be solved:

*"In order to solve educational problems we need to be more conscientious and faithful. Because the rulers cannot do anything to such problems, the*

*whole thing depends upon individual's conscientiousness and beliefs. Like teachers who give private lessons, they have to stop that."*

The answers given by the new petty bourgeoisie the big bourgeoisie are mainly stressing the role of the government in solving educational problems. However, this does not rule out other sources, such as the government and people together, people who are specialized in education, and people as individuals. They did not give these as much emphasis as they did to the role of government. For the new petty bourgeoisie the stress upon government is clear in parents' comments.

The view that the government alone is responsible was expressed by a university professor:

*"The government is the competent authority who can solve all these problems and the National Committee for Education as well. The opinions of people and parties are only consultative views."*

The same view was expressed by a director of a public sector company:

*"If we want to solve our education problems we have to start with teachers and the government is the only responsible authority, because it possess all power and authority."*

A similar point was made by an engineer, who criticized the political parties and stressed the responsibility of the government:

*"The government can solve the problems, because I do not believe in the role of the political parties in Egypt. The political parties before the Revolution were struggling and fighting to gain authority, and today's parties, are not any better. They fight between themselves and they do not think about educational problems or any other national problem."*

The collective responsibility of the government and people in political parties and social organizations was expressed but not in the same strong manner as the idea that government alone could solve the problems.

A father who works as an engineer said:

*"The government cannot solve all problems alone. People and political parties must share and take responsibility."*

Another father said,

*"The government with people's cooperation can solve problems. Both of them can communicate through the popular councils."*

The individualist trend was expressed by a minority. However, its importance comes from its basis in religious beliefs. A father who is an accountant for the government said,

*"Any solution must start from the individual. If everyone does his/her duties we would not have problems. If we solve the individual's problem we will be able to reform society and then education. This can be achieved when people become more faithful."*

A mother who is a primary school teacher said,

*"All reforms start with individuals. If individuals were conscientious and faithful, and did their duties we would be able to reform society. After this comes the role of the government and the responsible people."*

The big bourgeoisie responded almost in the same trends as the new petty bourgeoisie, where they mainly emphasized the role of the government. The trend which places stress upon the government is represented by a father, who is a businessman, and said,

*"It is the government's responsibility to solve such problems because people do not have the tools for reform and the government which fails such responsibility is not worthy of any responsibility."*

The importance of individual responsibility was expressed by a father who is an engineer, working as an entrepreneur,

*"If you ask about who can solve these problems it is the individual. That is, we need some one who is very strong - like a minister of education who can penetrate all difficulties and reform education. We cannot rely on political parties because they have*



*no authority."*

The trend of cooperation between government and people was expressed by a mother, who said,

*"It is the government with the help of people who can solve education problems. Political parties have no real role in society."*

#### Comment

At the level of the analysis of those who can control and deal with education problems, members of different class position expressed what they think can be done according to their sense of the circumstances of society. The analysis reflects the limited ability of the working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie to express their views about educational problems and solutions. However, they believe in cooperation between government and people with stress on the moral aspect. That is, if people are not conscientious government's efforts are not going to work.

The views of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie embodies a strong belief in state power and authority. For the two classes, in some cases the state is seen as the only competent authority which has all power, so that it can enforce reform. Moreover, they believe that other political powers in society like political parties have no power or they do not practice pressure which can force the government to change things.

However, the strong belief in the role of the government was not universally accepted. The new and big bourgeoisie particularly believe that the government can act with political parties and other social organizations. They give the example of the fields in which they have demonstrated that they can work together, like building more schools by public donations with the help of the government.

The third view presents a religious approach to the whole

issue and it is in fact not an approach to education problems only, but it is an approach to solve all society's problems i.e. an approach for reform. That approach sees the beginning of change not in the outside circumstances, but in the individual which has to be faithful and religious, so they put stress on the moral aspect, and then comes the secondary role of the government and state.

**(D) Occupational Groups which have influence upon Educational Policy as seen by Members of Different Classes**

The second point in the analysis of who controls and exercises power over education is discussed in this section. This point is viewed from what people think and believe is going on in reality. They were asked to identify which occupational groups they believe have influence over policies of education.

It was explained that what was meant by 'policy of education' were certain aspects of spending and financing education: the decision, for example, for expanding or controlling certain kinds of education.

Table No 8 summarized people's views. The table shows that the majority from different class positions believe that politicians are the ones who control policies of education. In the discussion they explained that they mean by politicians mainly the minister of education.

Others who might influence education system are teachers. This is expressed by a substantial minority of the new petty bourgeoisie and working class. In fact those who mentioned teachers did not mean that they influence the formation of the policy, but they explained that teachers, by giving private lessons, are influencing and affecting the financial ability of the parents to educate their children, and that teachers standards and qualifications are influencing the quality of education.

Table 8: Parents' Evaluation of the Occupational Groups which have Influence over Education

Occupational Groups	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Politicians	25	22	6	4	7	7	8	7
Officers	1							
Senior officials								
Businessmen	3					1		
Farmers								
Craftsmen		1						
Manual wage earners						1		
Teachers	6	6	1				1	1
Imams	2	3	1	1				
Rich people			1					1
Senior employees in the Ministry of Education	2	3	1	2	2	1		
Don't know		1		2			2	2

Senior employees in the Ministry of Education are influencing policies of education, in the view of one in every ten members of the new petty bourgeoisie and one in every five of the traditional and big bourgeoisie. They believe that senior employees in the Ministry of Education are sharing in making policies concerning student numbers in different levels and in designing the curriculum.

'Imams' were expected to have influence not in the formal policy of education, but in the moral aspect of education. The new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie expressed that Imams do not have at the present influence upon policy but they should have a spiritual influence to guide children and youth.

All other groups which were mentioned by small percentages of the sample, like officers, businessmen, the rich, craftsmen and manual wage earners, were seen to have influence to the extent

that they have money and can influence the education system by their ability to afford private lessons for their children, while other groups in society cannot. So they influence education in terms of equal opportunities.

If one looks at the groups that members of different class positions have identified as having influence upon education and compare them with their identification of groups which became economically powerful and rich in the seventies, one can see that there is no typical identification of the same groups for the two aspects. However there is a limited trend among members of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie to identify some groups which have economic power as having power over education, like businessmen and craftsmen.

From that point, the researcher would cautiously suggest that members from different class positions identify separately those who have the economic power and capital, and those who have the cultural power and capital. It is not necessary that those who have the economic power influence education policies.

#### (E) Teacher's position in society

The discussion of the previous point of the development of education has shown that people take the work of the teacher and their dedication in doing their work as one of the factors which determines the standard, quality and development of the education system. In this section, people were asked to evaluate teachers' position in society, compared with other professions. Table No 9 shows the comparison between teachers and other professions in terms of having a higher, the same or a lower position than each.

It is clear that the general evaluation of the teachers' position tends to give teachers a lower position than doctors, engineers, and officers. However some small percentages put teachers in a higher position than those professions. Teachers

Table 9: Parents' Assessment of Teachers' Position Compared with other Professional Groups

Professional Groups	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Higher than doctors	2	1						2
Same as doctors	1	2		1		1	2	
Lower than doctors	28	28	9	8	9	8	9	9
Higher than engineers	3	1						3
Same as engineers	1	2		1		1	2	
Lower than engineers	27	28	8	7	8	8	9	8
Higher than officers	5	5	2	1	1			3
Same as officers		1				1	2	
Lower than officers	26	25	7	8	8	8	9	8
Higher than clerks	23	26	8	8	8	8	9	11
Same as clerks	7	4	1	1				
Lower than clerks	1	1			1	1	1	
Higher than imams	11	17	3	2	5	2	4	5
Same as imams	8	6		1	1	3	3	
Lower than imams	5	1	3	3	1	2	1	4
Higher than factory workers	30	30	9	7	9	9	9	11
Same as factory workers		1		1				
Lower than factory workers	1			1			1	
Higher than craftsmen	30	31	9	9	8	9	9	11
Same as craftsmen								
Lower than craftsmen	1				1		1	

were put in a higher position than clerks, Imams, factory workers and craftsmen by a majority of the sample from different class positions.

So, comparison does not put teachers with the top professions like doctors or engineers, but it gives teachers a middle

position. There is almost a consensus between all respondents, irrespective of their class positions, as to what the teachers' position ideally should be. That is, they believe that teachers are doing a very important job, which is educating and preparing new generations to be qualified for different professions, which is an essential task, which should give teachers higher credit than other professions. However, they admit that the real situation for teachers is that they are not evaluated among the higher or top professions.

### III. Equal rights in education

The discussion of equal rights in education is an important issue in the study of class based interests in education. Equal rights in education will be discussed in terms of the following points:

- A direct discussion of whether people believe that all children have the same right to be educated,
- what are the factors which they think determine their right to carry on in education, and
- Views about free and fee paying education which is going to determine the extent of the openness of the system.

The discussion shows that people from different class positions believe by a majority that all children have the same right in education, as Table No. 10 indicates. However, there is a significant minority of new petty bourgeoisie parents and traditional petty bourgeoisie mothers who believe that children do not all have an equal right to education. The justification given for this view is based in their belief in class differences, and that people are unequal, so they should not have equal rights in education, especially for some social groups like farmers, since they believe that educating farmers will draw them away from agriculture. An example of this view can be found in the words of a mother who works as an engineer for a foreign company:

*"Not all people have the same right to education.  
Farmers for example should not go beyond primary*

Table 10: Parents' Assessment of the Right of All Children to go to School

Do all children have the same right to go to school?	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Yes	29	29	9	8	9	9	11	11
No	2	2		1				

*level otherwise they would leave the countryside and stop working as rural workers. Continuation of education should depend upon the family social standard. Primary education should be free, but all other levels must be fee paying because the government cannot pay for all level especially university education."*

The discussion of the right to education led to the discussion of the factors which members of different classes believe they do influence children's right to carry on education. Table No. 11 summarizes those factors. The table indicates that the majority from different class positions believe that children's abilities are the factor which most strongly determines their continuation in education. Other views select the factor of the social background and the position and status of the family, where higher social positions are more likely to carry on, and a lower position tends to stop at certain levels.

The economic factor also appears. The economic standard of the family influences children's opportunities to carry on education.

#### **Free and fee paying education**

The discussion of free and fee paying education is very important in identifying class interests and it helps in showing the limits of people's beliefs about the right to education. This point of free / fee paying education shows a

**Table 11: Parents' Assessment of Factors Influencing Children's Continuation in Education**

Important Factors	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Child's aptitude	22	27	7	8	7	7	9	6
Family position in society	5	3			1	1		2
Family economic position	3	1	2		1	1	2	3
Government needs for levels and kinds of education	1							
How much family cares about education				1				

wide range of disagreement between members from different class positions. Table No. 12 indicates two main positions, either full support of free education at all levels, or support of fee-paying education. Inside the fee paying view, many varieties and models of fee paying education can be identified.

The following discussion will show class differences and the different models introduced.

The new petty bourgeoisie mainly support fee paying education and they present different models which can be identified as:

1. Dividing the system between levels which should be free, like compulsory and secondary, or compulsory only, and the rest which should be fee paying.
2. The duality of the whole system between free education in all levels, beside another fee-paying system in all levels.
3. Dividing people themselves into two groups, the rich who have to pay at all levels in the private system and the



Table 12: Parents' Views of Education Fees

Views of what should be the case	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Free at all levels	3	5	5	6	1		9	10
Free compulsory education	4	4	1	1		1		
Free compulsory and secondary	2							
University fee-paying for rich, free for people with good grades	6	2	1					
Fee-paying to improve quality	5	4					1	
Free for the poor at all levels, the rich to pay	2	1			1		1	1
Fee-paying at all levels	4	6			1	2		
Free at all levels apart from private schools	5	9	2	2	5	6		
Free primary and secondary levels, university grants for poor students					1			

poor who have the merit and get it free.

Beside these models of fee paying education we find among the new petty bourgeoisie a small group of parents who would wish education to be free at all levels.

Different models of fee paying education and the views about free education, have been justified according to class, social and economic reasons. The following class based examples of what the parents say will illustrate those justifications.

For the new petty bourgeoisie, two university professors introduce their views about fee paying education. Their views

are important not only in terms of their class nature, but they also reflect an example of the views of people who share in decision making and give suggestions in education.

The first, a professor of agriculture, spoke about his part in developing a programme of higher education:

*"I agree that all children have the right to go to school. Continuation depends upon their aptitudes. But education should not be free at all levels. Basic education can be free, other levels should be fee paying for all students. We should offer free education for excellent student only. Quality of education can be improved by these fees. I suggested that fees in government preparatory level should be £20, secondary £50, at the university level, for human studies about £50 and for science about £100. Students who fail in the university should pay full fees in order to allow them to repeat the year and retake the exams."*

The second professor said,

*"All children have the right to go to school, continuation depends upon their abilities. For example, some students have no ability for general education, so they should go to technical school. The right to free education should not be absolute. When people get education free, they do not feel the value of education, but if they pay they would give more care and attention. People should pay for all levels. Excellent, poor students should get it free."*

These two professors argue that fee paying education will improve the quality of education and that people only value what they pay for. However, they say that children have the same right to be educated. Their views about fee paying education place a restriction on this right.

The new petty bourgeoisie rationalized the necessity for fee paying education according to the fact that education is already fee paying in an indirect way, since people pay for private lessons, and the solution is to make it fee paying officially. This view was expressed by a primary school teacher:

*"Free education was a good idea in order to give people the chance to be educated, but now education*

*is not free, even in the free government school, because for example, we ask the new students to bring with them some furniture for the classroom (chair - desk). The child costs the government £40 a year for books alone. If we cannot spend on education we have to be clear and not to cheat each other about the reality of free education. We have to make education fee paying officially, because today it is fee paying but inofficially."*

The new petty bourgeoisie's view about meritocracy and children's abilities is used to justify the control of student numbers in different levels of education through a selective system of those with "high abilities". This view was presented by a father who is accountant in the government. He presents the view that there should be selection of students according to their abilities, especially at the university level.

*"We should have both free and private education. If we offer children good basic education, in this case we can discover children's abilities and we can eliminate those who are not capable. We have to guide students to the suitable kind of education, which depends upon (i) the student's desire and social and economic standard and (ii) teachers and guides who determine children's abilities. At university level, our main problem is the inflation of student numbers, so, we have to restrict the numbers by selecting the best elements among them. I encourage the idea of the private university."*

Fee paying education is also justified on social grounds, where a group of the new petty bourgeoisie believe that Egypt is a class society and according to people's class position their standard of education should be decided. So if they are from a high social background they should carry on; if not, basic education is enough. This view was expressed by a father who is an engineer in a foreign company, and who comes from a family of wealthy, rural origins. His father is a high ranking officer, and he was educated in a foreign language school.

*"Education should not be an absolute right, it should be for basic education only. Continuation depends upon abilities and the family standard. If children are from a high social and economic background they must continue. If not, basic education is enough for them, and it should be free, while other levels should be fee paying because some*

*lower social levels should not go to the university."*

The same justification of fee paying education and the elimination of the opportunities on the ground of class position in society was expressed by a mother who works as a TV censor:

*"Not all children have the right to go to school. Some people like the children of cleaners and porters should not get more than literacy programmes. I do not agree about the extension of basic education to nine years, it should be six years only. People must pay for education in order to feel the value of education. The children of the lower classes should be stopped, because everyone has to know and understand his level, and position in society and to know his limits, which they should not try to exceed."*

Fee paying education was justified on economic grounds. That is, education in effect reduces the number of workers especially in agriculture, and the government is not responsible for affording free education to all people because it is very expensive. A father who is the captain of a ship, put this view forward:

*"Not all children should have the right to go to school. People see education as if it was the responsibility of the government, which is not true. It is the individual and family responsibility. The claim that education is like air and water for all people is wrong, because the spread of education has killed many professions especially in agriculture because when the farmers are educated, they do not want to work as farmers any more, so we have to give people in the countryside literacy programmes only. So, education must be fee paying because free education is very expensive, unproductive and has very low standard of efficiency. In this case excellent students only, should be educated free."*

These different views reflect the new petty bourgeoisie's position on equal opportunities. They show how they draw upon different economic, social and cultural aspects which reflect and justify their ideologies on restricting educational opportunities. However, some fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie (one out of every ten fathers and one out of every

five mothers) support free education at all levels. The study of the background of these families shows that they represent the lower fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie who, through free education, could allow their children to get university education. They represent those fractions which benefited from free education especially at the university level. An example of this fraction in the sample is a family, where the father works as store keeper for the government, the mother is a housewife, and both of them have primary education. They have six children and £140 monthly income. Two of the children are at university, one in a higher institute (at less than university level), two in secondary school and one in primary school. The mother defended free education at all levels:

*"Education should be free in all levels. It is unfair to make it fee paying because poor people will not be able to educate their children. Government free education, is not free in reality because we have to pay for private lessons. I do not think that fee paying education will solve the problem of private lesson, so we will be paying for both fees and private lessons."*

The views of the new petty bourgeoisie on free and fee-paying education show that they mainly support fee-paying education, with a minority of those who are at the lower level being provided with the benefit of free education, particularly at the university level. The new petty bourgeoisie are fractionalized on this issue, and have expressed different interests in the free and fee-paying debate.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie mainly support free education at all levels, especially those families who have their children at university level. A family of a small shop owner is an example of the traditional petty bourgeois families who benefited from free education. The father is literate, with a monthly income of £300; the mother is illiterate. They have seven children at different levels of education. Three of them have graduated from university, one got middle level education (less than university), one is in general secondary education, one is in preparatory school and one is in primary school. The father expressed his support for

free education from the point of view of a tax payer:

*"Education must be free in all levels because actually, education is very expensive. Since we pay for private lessons, how can we pay for fees? We pay taxes and we have the right to educate our children free."*

Among the traditional petty bourgeoisie, there is a fraction who benefited from opening government language schools, which satisfy their ambition to give their children a better kind of education. This fraction defends fee paying education. An example is a family where the mother is a housewife with middle education, and the father is a photographer with middle level education and an income of £300. They have three children all in government language schools. The mother said,

*"Education should be free in all levels but we have to have fee paying schools for those who want better education for their children and can pay for it. So we have to keep both free and private schools."*

The views of the traditional petty bourgeoisie reflect an interest in free education, which allowed some fractions to have their children at university level. They raised the point that the present system of education is fee paying in an indirect way, but they did not reach the same conclusion as the new petty bourgeoisie reached, i.e. they did not take this point as a good reason to justify abolishing free education and make it fee paying altogether. On the contrary, they take it as a reason to support free education in order not to overload people.

Those who find in fee paying education a satisfaction of their ambition for better education for their children, are supporting fee paying in addition to free education and they did not show the same hostility and cultural superiority against other classes, especially the working class, as did the new petty bourgeoisie.

The big bourgeoisie mainly support fee paying education. They present the same models as the new petty bourgeoisie, which divide the system between free and fee paying at all level,

or some levels free and others fee paying, or the model which makes the system fee paying at all levels.

The justification given for fee paying education is based on the ground that education is fee paying in an indirect way, so we should make it fee paying directly. On this point they express the same view as the new petty bourgeoisie. Education fees were justified as well on the ground that fees will help in improving educational quality and in solving the problem of limited resources in education.

A father who is the owner of a factory said,

*"Today, education is not free. It is fee paying in an indirect way because of the private lessons. So, education should be fee paying in all levels. These fees will help in the improvement of the quality of education and in increasing teachers' salaries."*

An example of supporting the duality between free and fee paying is a father who is engineer who works as an entrepreneur:

*"All children have the right to be educated and it is the responsibility of the government to educate them. Education should be free for poor and fee paying for those who can afford to pay in all levels."*

A view which put some restrictions and criteria upon free education was put by a father who is an engineer who works as an entrepreneur:

*"It is the state's duty to afford education for all people. When we discuss education fees we cannot say that it should be absolutely free. There are some criteria, these are: Basic education and secondary level must be free. Basic education must be free and compulsory as it is now. I consider this to be like military service i.e. obligatory for all people. The university could be free but students must go through IQ and ability tests: if they are excellent we give them free education, and we may help them with some money to give them more care. If the student passes the test and he/she is well off, they should pay fees."*

The views of the big bourgeoisie mainly support fee paying

education on the ground of using the fees as a source of improving educational quality. It can be noticed that they did not show that cultural superiority and prejudice against other lower classes as did the new petty bourgeoisie.

The working class are mainly in support of free education; they do not discuss the general issue of free / fee paying education or introduce criteria for applying free education, in the manner of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie. The working class express directly their own problem with fee paying education.

A father who is a cleaner said,

*"Education must be free in all levels, otherwise I will not be able to allow my children to continue in education. If there will be any fees, I will be obliged to take them out of the school."*

A mother supported the same point:

*"Education has to be free at all levels. Actually we do not have a completely free education because we still have to pay for books, notebooks and private lessons and we can not pay more."*

A different view from the mainstream of the working class, which supported fee paying education if it was going to improve educational quality, was expressed by a worker who is a welder in a foreign company, and whose income is in much the same range as the new petty bourgeoisie:

*"Education in Egypt is not free, we pay fees in the government schools, we buy books and notebook, and we pay for private lessons, so how can we say it is free education. I agree to pay fees in all levels on the one condition that is the improvement of the education standard, teachers level and for us not to pay for private lessons: under these conditions, I agree about fee paying education."*

Another view which reflects the fear of the working class that free education will be taken away was put by a waiter who has two children at technical secondary education, and one at primary level:

*"Education should be free in all levels. If they want to open a new fee paying university I agree, but this should be for the rich. They must leave the*



*government university for the poor, otherwise we will never be able to educate our children."*

The working class mainly support free education at all levels, and when they agree about fee paying education, they put many conditions and restrictions to protect their own interests in free education.

The discussion of equal rights in education has shown at the initial level of analysis that the majority from different class positions believe that all children have the same right to education. However, the deep discussion of some issues which are relevant to the right to education, such as the debate around fee-paying and free education, shows that in practice this right is not seen as absolute. There are class differences, both between and within classes, in the perception of interests here:

The new and the traditional bourgeoisie are divided on the matter, with the majority on the new petty bourgeoisie supporting fee-paying, while a fraction of those who benefited from free education, in particular at the university level, supporting free education. For the traditional petty bourgeoisie the main line is to support free education, but there is a fraction which enjoy a higher income which are ambitious for a better education for their children who support fee-paying education.

Both the big bourgeoisie and the working class seem more consistent and coherent in the matter, with the big bourgeoisie mainly supporting fee-paying education, which all fractions of this class can afford. The working class proved to have a clear class consciousness about their need for free education in order to enable them to educate their children.

#### IV. Spending on Education

The discussion of spending on education asked about three points concerning whether there should be more spending on education or not, aspects of spending and sources of money for financing education. These three issues concerning spending

on education are important to illustrate perceptions of the possibilities for the expansion of the education system, in particular which levels get most popular support, since different levels of education have different significance for class interests.

In terms of government spending on education Table No.13 summarizes people's views. It shows that the three bourgeois classes mainly proposed more government spending on education, while a small percentage of the new petty bourgeoisie believe that the government should not spend more on education. Half of the sample of working class fathers and mothers supported more spending, but a substantial percentage of working class mothers and fathers did not.

Table 13: Parents' Views on Government Spending on Education

Should the government spend more on education?	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Yes	24	23	8	7	9	8	6	4
No	3	2		1			4	4
It's not a matter of spending more money, but of how the money is spent	4	4	1	1				
Don't know		2				1	1	3

The Table shows that it is mainly the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class who did not support more spending on education. However, they gave different reasons for that, as their replies reflect. The new petty bourgeoisie are against more spending because they believe that education should be fee-paying and the government should reduce spending, or they believe that the government does not need to increase spending but to rationalize spending and to reduce waste. The working class believe that the government cannot spend more because

of the economic crisis.

The comments of members of the new petty bourgeoisie reflect their reservations about spending on education. A father who is an engineer in a private sector company who was against spending on education said,

*"The government should not spend more on education. They should cut the spending and people must pay fees, but if we talk about aspects of spending, most of the money should go to basic education because it is the base for other levels of education."*

A father who is the captain of a ship was strongly opposed to increasing spending on education, which he thought should be fee-paying:

*"I do not agree about more spending on education, because more spending means more people in education, which should be restricted. People have to pay fees because that is the only way to solve our education problems but the government cannot do that for political reasons. They must be very brave in order to do it. They should not spend more because what they spend has no return. It is wasting money. Most of the spending should go to basic education in order to give a strong base for people who are going to leave the system or those who are going to continue."*

Those who did not support more spending from the new petty bourgeoisie, when they were asked about aspects of spending, said that most spending should go to basic education because it is the level which many children stopped at before they go to the world of work. So, they support spending on primary level to support a conservative view of controlling other levels of education.

The working class who did not support more spending on education, have different reasons from the new petty bourgeoisie, who meant by cutting spending to eliminate education opportunities. In contrast, the working class believe that the government is in economic crisis so it cannot spend more. The answers of the working class suggest that they are highly influenced by government propaganda about the

economic crisis.

The working class also identified three areas, or levels, of spending and they justify them on different grounds than those of the new petty bourgeoisie. They ask for equal spending on education. They believe that people who have children at any level of education are suffering from the economic crisis and they need government help at all education levels. They ask for more spending on university and general secondary education. They are here influenced by the social value of these two kind of education, so they believe that they have high social value and that they should get more money. They ask for more spending on the primary level. They know that it has the highest number of students. So, the working class in their views do not mean to restrict educational opportunities. On the contrary they ask for more help and support for those who have children at any level of education. The following is what members of the working class had to say about that point of spending.

A father who is a bus conductor said,

*"The government should not spend more on education. We hear from the radio and from people that the government has no money and has many problems, so I do not think they can spend more."*

A mother and houswife said,

*"The government shoul not spend more on education, because the government has many economic problems, so the government cannot spend more on education, and they should distribute money equally between different levels because people are suffering and cannot spend on education. People who have children at any level need the help of the government."*

Another mother who does not support more government spending was of the opinion that what the government was doing was enough:

*"The government should not spend more on education because we always hear about the economic problem and that we do not have money. It is enough that the government pays teachers' salaries and they give free education. The government should spend most of*

*the money on basic education because it has the largest number of students."*

It can be noticed that the working class are more affected and influenced by the state propaganda about the economic crisis.

Those who asked for more spending on education have identified different aspects of spending, and it can be noticed that basic education has a higher percentage of support than any other level of education. Table No. 14 shows how members from different class positions gave their main support to basic education.

**Table 14: Parents' Views of which Aspects of Education should get more Funding**

Aspects of spending	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Basic education	26	25	5	5	8	6	2	5
General secondary education			1	1		1		1
Technical education		2	2	1	1		3	1
University education	1		2	2	2		3	2
The level can take more students	3	2		1				
Buildings and equipment	5	5			1			
Teachers' pay and training	7	5		1	1	2		1
Equal spending				1			2	1
Don't know		2					1	2

For the new petty bourgeoisie, as mentioned above, like other classes, their main support went for more spending on basic education. The second aspect for them is teachers training and salaries which expressed was picked out by about a quarter of

fathers and a fifth of mothers.

The new petty bourgeoisie gave less support to other aspects like university level and technical education, and they gave no support for general secondary education. In the following part we look at the way people identified and justified different aspects of spending.

A father who is a university professor and who supported more spending, defended the view that more should be spent on universities:

*"The government should spend more on education, but it is difficult to estimate the amount for each level. We need a detailed study to determine the fund for each level. For example, we cannot spend on primary education at the expense of university level. I am not against spending on basic education, which is essential in building an individual's personality, but university education needs money as well. It needs equipment especially in science colleges."*

The professor's view reflects what might be the case of conflict over the education budget where each level tries to secure more resources.

Other views give support for spending on basic education and teacher's training. These are justified as follows.

A mother who is an employee of the Ministry of Culture said,

*"The government should spend more on teacher's salaries, buildings and on basic education. Basic education is very important in forming a child's personality and at this level children need a lot of health and nutritional care which needs more money."*

A father who is an engineer supported spending on basic education because it is the last stage of education for many children:

*"The government should spend more on education because building schools is very expensive and because the schools need more than building classrooms. They need equipment and laboratories. They should spend more on basic education because*

*it can be considered as the last stage for the majority of the children. We should not spend more on the university because the numbers should be limited."*

These are examples of people who support more spending especially on basic education and give different reasons such as:

- basic education is the last stage of education for the majority of children.
- basic education is the base for building a child's personality and abilities.
- or basic education prepares children for continuing their studies to higher levels i.e. lays the bases for other levels of education.

In fact the new petty bourgeoisie support more spending on the primary level, while they did not support more expenditure at the university level. This is not necessarily what one might expect, as one would anticipate that the new petty bourgeoisie would see it in their own interests to support expenditure on universities.

In contrast with this, they support more spending on the expansion of the primary level, which usually benefits the lower classes, whose children cannot carry on after that level. This seems a progressive attitudes towards more literacy in society. However, when one looks at the new petty bourgeoisie's support for more spending on primary education in the context of the previous discussion of their views on free and fee-paying education, it can be seen that caution must be exercised in arriving at conclusions in the analysis of their attitudes. That is, the new petty bourgeoisie in their discussion of free and fee-paying education mainly supported fee-paying education, especially after the primary level. This leads to the conclusion that the new petty bourgeoisie support the expansion of primary education, but wish to see more restrictions on higher levels. If these higher levels were fee-paying, the children of the lower

classes would be excluded. Their support for more primary spending is linked to a conservative aim of restricting educational opportunities, particularly in higher levels of education.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie mainly support more government spending on education. They support a wide range of spending on different kinds of education like technical education and university level, more than other bourgeois classes like the new petty bourgeoisie. They justify more spending at the university level because they believe it needs equipment, and they justify more spending on technical secondary education because they believe there is a need for more qualified and skilled manpower.

A father who is the owner of a small shop supported spending on university education:

*"The government should spend more on education especially university level. University needs large funds because it needs more equipment than other levels. These equipments are expensive."*

A father who is a tailor supported more spending on technical education:

*"The government should spend more on education especially on technical secondary education, because we need skilled workers. Developed and advanced countries did not achieve their development by university graduates but by the efforts of the workers. Technical education helps as well in solving the problem of unemployment."*

The views of the traditional petty bourgeoisie express more interest in moving towards middle and higher level of education. However, two contradictory views about the role of university education appear: that is, in the view of some, university education must get more money to provide it with equipment which is very expensive; the other view believes that it is not those who graduate from university who are going to build and develop the country, it is technical secondary school education which can achieve that by preparing



workers.

The big bourgeoisie mainly gave their support to more spending on basic education, technical education, and university level, where spending on education is seen as investment which has its return to society and which is essential in preparing labour power.

A father who is a businessman expressed this view that education is investment:

*"The government should spend more on education, because education is not a service which cost the government money, but education is an investment which has its return. The government should spend more on basic education because our main problem is illiteracy. The second aspect of spending should be university level which needs equipments and libraries."*

Technical education is seen as a source for preparing skilled workers needed for the market.

A father who is the owner of a weaving factory supported technical education:

*"The government should spend more on education, especially on technical education, because we need skilled workers and educated farmers who are needed for reclaiming the desert and using modern technology."*

Spending on basic education is seen, as it was by other classes, as important in developing children's personalities and it has been seen as vital because it is the last stage for many children.

A father who is the owner of a factory expressed support for more government spending:

*"The government should spend more on education especially basic education, which is very important in developing children's mentalities. Children need in these schools facilities, equipment, activities."*

The working class did not give as much support to more spending on education as did other classes. However, those who asked for more spending supported spending on university and

technical education. In fact the working class support of university level comes from their support of the poor who have children at that level and cannot support them without the help of government spending, i.e. communal identification with those who have 'done well'.

A father who works as a waiter said,

*"The government should spend more on university level because it is the highest level in education and it is very expensive, so the government should help people who have children at that level especially the poor who suffer too much if they have children at that level."*

A mother who supports more spending on university said,

*"The government should spend more on university level, because it is very expensive education. They need equipment more than any other level and people cannot educate their children at that level without the help of government."*

The working class also offered support for technical education. A father who is a cleaner said,

*"The government should spend more on education. Especially on technical education because we need workers for our industry."*

The analysis of people's views about spending on education shows different subjective perceptions of class interests. The new petty bourgeoisie do not support more spending on education which they consider a waste and that education must be restricted and be fee paying. Even those of the new petty bourgeoisie who asked for more spending supported more spending on primary education in order to afford a good standard of basic education as to be the end of education for the majority i.e. they have a conservative view which aims at restricting education especially at high levels to the elite.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie, from their middle position, since they are not too oppressed like the working class, support more spending on university and technical education which could open more opportunities for their children.

The big bourgeoisie have an interest in more spending on education which they consider as investment in human capital, and which provides society with the qualified manpower needed by the market.

The working class did not mainly support more spending on education, where they are influenced by the state propaganda through the mass media about the economic crisis. However, those who asked for more spending, supported more spending at the university level. They asked for more spending at that level in order to support those who are not well.

#### Sources of spending on Education

People were asked to give their views about three suggested sources of educational finance. These were:

1. Shift expenditure from military to education.
2. Increase taxes.
- 3 Foreign aid.

People were also asked to discuss these three options and to suggest other resources as well. Table No. 15 summarizes different resources identified by people from different class position.

For the new petty bourgeoisie, the table indicates that they mainly support resources coming from increasing taxes on rich people.

The new petty bourgeoisie identified various resources for education like fee paying education, and increasing production. In the analysis of the new petty bourgeoisie argument around sources of spending, three main points can be recognized. These are:

- The majority of the new petty bourgeoisie do not want expenditure shifting from military to education since they believe that Egypt still needs a strong army. Those who

Table 15: Parents' Preferred Sources for Funding for Education

Different sources	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Shifting from military to education	6	7	3	1	4	4	1	1
Increase taxes on the rich	29	29	8	9	2	3	7	9
Foreign aid	1	2	1			2		
Education fees	6	1	1	2			1	
Donations	3	2	1	1				
To increase production	4		3	2	3		3	
Big projects and factories should open schools	1							
People should pay alms (zakah) according to Islamic law					1			
Cut government spending						1		
Don't know		1				1	1	2

agreed to shifting, support their views by the fact that there is a peace treaty with Isreal and that Egypt does not need more spending on the army.

- The majority do not want foreign aid because it adds to the country's problems.
- The new petty bourgeoisie are keen on the idea of fee paying education which they introduce as a solution to different problems. The following views express these points.

A university professor said,

*"I do not agree about shifting from militry to education because we still need to buy weapons. What we can do is to save from other aspects in the army, for example, to reduce the period of military service and to use the recruits in civil activities and services. I do not agree about foreign aid because we do not want more debts. I agree about increasing taxes on rich people. There is another*

*source for education which is getting money from fees."*

Another father who is the captain of a ship did not approve of transferring money from the army or foreign aid to education, but gave his views on fee paying education:

*"I do not agree about shifting from military to education because we need a strong army. I do not agree either about foreign aid because they are debts. I agree about increasing tax on rich people but I think it is very difficult to get the rich to pay tax because they have their own ways of escaping from paying tax. The other possible resource is to let people pay fees. For example, if the child costs the government £150 the parents should pay £75 and the government should pay the rest."*

A mother who is an employee of the Ministry of Culture expressed a different view, which supported the transfer of money from military expenditure to education, but rejected foreign aid:

*"I agree about shifting from the military to education because we are at peace time. I agree about taxes on the rich and the rich have to give donations for building more schools. I do not agree about foreign aid because they are debts."*

A father who is a store keeper, however, supported the use of foreign aid:

*"We are obliged and forced to depend upon foreign aid because we do not have enough resources. The other source could be increasing production."*

It seems from the analysis that shifting from military expenditure to education and foreign aid are not very popular options for the new petty bourgeoisie. However, these two options were supported by some elements of the new petty bourgeoisie. The new petty bourgeoisie mainly support increasing taxes on rich people and they see education fees as one important source of money.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie support the increase of taxes on rich people. This is much more popular than the second choice which was increasing production. The third

choice was the transfer of money from military to educational use, and only a small minority supported the use of foreign aid.

Where the traditional petty bourgeoisie supported increasing taxes, they put the condition of following the Islamic law which bases tax on capital, not on the profit made on this capital.

A father who owns a small shop said,

*"I do not agree about shifting from military to education, but the army can share in the civil projects. I agree about taxes from the rich but they have to change the taxation system and to follow the Islamic one which takes taxes on the capital not on the profit. I do not agree about foreign aid because they are debts. The other source is increasing production."*

As with the new petty bourgeoisie, reducing spending on the military is not very popular. A father who is a tailor, expresses his views against reducing spending on military, where he sees the problem in its international perspective:

*"I do not agree about shifting from the army which is still very important for the country. The super powers in the world, they increase their weapons although they know that nobody is going to attack them, so what about us who live in a dangerous area. We need the army to protect ourselves and in order to keep the peace. I agree about increasing taxes on millionaires."*

From the replies of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, it can be seen that they did not support the idea of shifting from military expenditure to education. This view is similar to the majority of the new petty bourgeoisie. On the issue of taxes, they did support them, like the new petty bourgeoisie, but unlike them, they put on restrictions and conditions. So we find a suggestion of tax on the capital not the profit and another view identify those who have to pay more tax as millionnaires. These restriction did not exist in the case of the new petty bourgeoisie. But it is understandable in the case of the traditional petty bourgeoisie who are themselves

owners.

The main trend in the views of the big bourgeoisie is their opposition to increasing taxes. The table shows that they are the class which agree least with that option.

A father who is a businessman rejects the three sources and suggests another which is increasing production:

*"We cannot reduce spending on the army because we still need a strong army. Taxes in Egypt are a big problem because people refuse to pay taxes because they do not trust the government and are not satisfied with what the government offered them. I do not agree about foreign aid in education because it is dangerous to allow any penetration to our education system and to affect its policy. We can get money for education by increasing production which will increase national income in general."*

An owner of an electrical tools factory said,

*"I do not agree about increasing taxes because the private sector pays very high taxes and we pay high wages for workers and we insure them, so we should not pay more tax. I agree about shifting from military to education because we are at peace. I agree about foreign aid as well, but on the condition that it should be spent on education and in productive projects."*

An engineer who works as an entrepreneur does not approve of increasing taxes, and he introduces an Islamic view on taxation:

*"I do not agree about increasing taxes because we have to change our taxation system and to follow the Islamic one which takes 2.5 per cent from the capital not from the profit. The ruler has the right to increase this percentage. I agree about foreign aid on one condition, which is to be long term loans and interest free and unstipulated due date. I do not agree about shifting from the army because we still need a strong army to protect the country."*

So, the views of the big bourgeoisie reflect their opposition to increasing taxes, since it threatens their interest, and that is why they suggest different alternatives, like increasing production which would help to increase national

income in general. They also suggested not cutting from the army but that the army could share in civil activities. The big bourgeoisie did not suggest, like the new petty bourgeoisie, fee paying education as a source of money for financing education. The big bourgeoisie are mainly interested in introducing increasing production, which in the end is done by workers, as their suggested source of money for education. So, the two views are against workers who are either directly removed from education by fees, or they are indirectly used to supply more spending on education through increasing their production.

The working class mainly support increasing taxes to get resources for education. However, there were some who did not support increasing taxes for different reasons from those of the big bourgeoisie. The views of the workers reflect their fear of increasing taxes, because they know that it is the poor who always pay tax, not the rich.

A father who is a fitter in a public sector company said,

*"We can not increase taxes because of the bad and critical economic situation of the country. When tax is increased it is the poor who always pay. We can shift from military to education because we are at peace but I do not agree about foreign aid because they are debts."*

The working class are against both shifting from military and foreign aid. They still believe that Egypt needs a strong army and they are conscious enough that foreign aid is more debt.

A mother and housewife expressed this view:

*"I do not agree about shifting from the military to education. The army is still very important for the country. I do not agree about foreign aid because we are already drowned in debts and we do not need more. I agree about tax especially on rich people like company owners who make a lot of money."*

Sources of spending on education show different class interests, where sources such as taxation are against the interests of the owners of the means of production like the



big and traditional petty bourgeoisie, while taxation was supported by wage earners like the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class, who demanded that the rich should pay higher taxes. Other sources, like shifting from military expenditure, or relying on foreign aid, proved to be the least popular sources among the majority from all different class positions.

#### V. Future Educational Change

People were asked, in an open question, to give their expectations for future change in education. Table No.16 shows that the majority expect changes in the future, and a smaller percentage are expecting no change. Only the big bourgeoisie go against this general pattern, with a big proportion expecting no change. A high proportion of the working class fathers and mothers found it difficult to give an answer about the future of education.

Table 16: Parents' Assessment of Change in Education in the Future

Future changes in education	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
There will be changes	23	19	4	4	6	2	2	2
There will be no changes	6	7	1	1	3	5	2	
Don't know	2	5	4	4		2	7	9

Those who do not believe in any change in the future gave different reasons shown in Table No.17. The table shows that the new petty bourgeoisie concentrate on three points, which are the absence of any stable policy of education, the shortage of resources, and that the government has other problems to care about before education, for example, the economic problem.

Table 17: Parents' Assessment of Reasons for Lack of Future Change in the Education System

Reasons	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Government has other problems (economic crisis)	1	1		1		4		1
Education is not selective		1						1
Lack of resources	2	3				1		
Lack of stable policy	3	2			1			
Lack of new ideas			1					
Education dependent upon economic, social and political problems					1			

A father who is a university professor said,

*"I cannot expect any changes in the education system without a stability in the policies. Every new minister wants to change the policy which gives no time for any reform. We have to make long term and short term plans, without planning it will be impossible to change the system."*

The traditional petty bourgeoisie gave two reasons, which are the government has other problems to care about before education and that the people who are responsible for education have no new ideas.

A father who is a merchant said,

*"People who are responsible about education have no new ideas to apply in education. They do not change curriculum or methods of teaching. That is why I do not expect change in the future."*

The traditional petty bourgeoisie reflect a religious character in dealing with the future. That is, those who said

that they do not know about future changes justified this by the fact that the future is in God's hands.

A father who is a tailor said,

*"I do not know about education in the future. This is in God's hands. If you want to ask about the future you should ask people who are specialized in education."*

This reply reflects the belief that people who are responsible for education are the ones who must know about the future but not people who are not specialized.

Another father, who is a small shop owner, reflected a religious attitude, but in a different way:

*"I do not know about the future but I know that in the future they have to give more care to the Islamic studies."*

For the big bourgeoisie who believe that there will be no change in the future, they agree with the new petty bourgeoisie about two reasons for there being no change. These are, the government gives more attention to problems other than education and that there is no stable policy of education. The big bourgeoisie has raised two other points which they consider as hindering future change. These are the problem of teachers' qualifications, and that change in education must come as a part of the change of the whole society.

A mother who is an engineer said,

*"I do not expect any educational change in the future because if we are not able to solve the problem of teacher training and raise their salaries, it would be very difficult to expect any improvements and changes."*

A father who is a businessman said,

*"I do not expect changes in the future, because education is a part of the whole system (political and economic) and if we want to have any future changes we have to change the whole society."*

The working class concentrate on the worse economic conditions and the increasing population which will give no opportunity for future change.

A father who is a cleaner said,

*"I do not expect any change in education in the future because everything is getting worse especially the economic situation. Why then expect that education will be better?"*

A father who is a welder in a foreign company reflects the same pessimistic view:

*"I do not expect any future change because of the increasing population and the high price the government has to pay to improve education for increasing numbers, which I think is very difficult."*

Those who expected future change gave different expectations, as shown in Table No.18. For the three bourgeois classes, the main expectations are:

1. more scientific and modern curriculum.
2. more qualified teachers.
3. increasing of technical education.
4. moving towards fee-paying education.

The working class mainly expected the private lessons problem to be solved and that student numbers would be increased. The new petty bourgeoisie expected changes towards more scientific and technological studies.

A father who is an accountant said,

*"I expected changes in teaching technology, because the future of any country depends upon technology."*

A father who is an accountant said,

*"I expect changes in teacher training and standard. Because the Ministry of Education has already started a programme for re-qualifying primary school teachers to get a university degree."*

Table 18: Parents' Assessment of Aspects of Change in Education in the Future

Important Aspects	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
More technical orientation at secondary level	2	3	3	1	4	1		
People more aware of importance of education					1			
Curriculum more modern / scientific	16	13	1	2	1	2		
Private lesson problem will be solved							2	1
More foreign language teaching		1						
Increasing student numbers and expenditure	1						1	1
More qualified teachers	3	2		1	2	1		
Open university etc.		1						
All education fee-paying - a positive move	3							
More discipline and new ministry leaders	1							

A substantial number of the parents expected education to be increasingly fee-paying. A father who is an engineer in a foreign company expected, and supported, the move towards fee-paying education:

*"For the future there is an increasing trend towards the old education system which was fee-paying, which I do support. I expected changes towards more technical education which I find a very good indication. Today we are trying to reform education after what the Revolution did to it."*

For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, future changes lie in their expectations of expanding technical education and the

increasing of teaching of science and technology.

A father who is a photographer said,

*"I expect changes in the future in technical education which is going to be increased in order to face the increasing demand on skilled labour."*

For the big bourgeoisie, they share future expectations with the two other bourgeois classes. Their expectations for the educational future in terms of teacher training, science and technology, stress the point of increasing technical education.

A father who is the owner of a factory said,

*"I expect technical education to be expanded in the future since we have a very serious shortage in the skilled labour and education is going to work towards satisfying the market needs."*

It seems that the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie are influenced in their view about the future of education by their position in the market, where they may notice or suffer from the shortage of skilled workers, so they expect future changes in technical education.

The working class has introduced a different pattern of expectation, that is, from the three bourgeois classes. The bourgeois classes gave expectations about general aspects like the policy of education and the content of the curriculum, while the working class mainly concentrate on their immediate problem with the system, which is private lessons; they expect something to be done about that in the future.

A father who is a fitter in a public sector company said,

*"I expect them to do something in the future to solve the problem of private lessons. They may have to increase teachers' salaries for that."*

The image of education in the future is not the same for members from different class positions. They are divided between those who believe that there will be future change and

those who do not.

Those who do not believe in future change from the three bourgeois classes agree that education problems and development are not the priority in government thinking, since that is concerned with other problems like the economic crisis.

The new petty bourgeoisie concentrated on the level of policy of education which they consider to be unstable, and hence give no opportunity for change and development in education. They are also aware of the limited resources for education.

The big bourgeoisie share with the new petty bourgeoisie their concentration on the policy level, but they care also about the future of teacher training and qualifications, which they consider as an obstacle to developing education in the future.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie believe that there will be no change because people who are responsible for education have no new ideas, and that those who know about the future of education are the specialists in education rather than ordinary people, which is a different attitude from both the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie, who feel that they can themselves judge the educational future.

The working class are influenced in their view about the unlikelihood of change in the future by the worsening economic conditions and the increasing population.

Those who believe in future change may share in general the same areas of change they expect: the curriculum, teacher training, technical education and fee paying education. However each class has stressed certain points. The new petty bourgeoisie emphasized the point of new science and technology and they supported the future movement towards fee-paying education.

The big bourgeoisie share with the traditional petty bourgeoisie have shared the belief that technical education will be expanded in the future in order to satisfy the market needs for skilled workers.

The working class expressed different expectations for the future coming from their immediate suffering and problems with the system, since they believe that the future may solve the problem of private lessons and increase student numbers. In fact these points and the way the working class expressed their views can be taken as their wishes for the future, unlike the case of the three bourgeois classes who tried to formulate a picture of the future based on their understanding of policies of education and market needs.

## VI. Conclusion

This chapter has addressed some general educational issues concerning people's perceptions of policies of education under different political systems, the value of education for society and the individual, power and control over education and the free / fee-paying education debate. From these discussions some concluding remarks about these subjects can be drawn.

### (A) Class Ideologies about Education and Its Value for Individual and Society

The discussion with members of different classes has shown that there is a strong positive attitude towards education in terms of its value for individual and society. This subjective value of education and the role of education in developing society present a point of general agreement on education. This consensus is in sharp contrast with the view that education has lost its perceived currency. This case has been argued by some of the social scientists who thought that education might lose its value because of the dominance of new beliefs in the seventies and due to the influence of the open



door policy which devalued the certificates and allowed uneducated people and craftsmen to get more money than educated people. This situation has raised a major question mark about the value of education and about social demand for education.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of this consensus about the general positive value of education, the precise conceptualization of the value of education took different forms and this was associated with the class origin of the respondents. The three bourgeois classes identified a crisis in the relationship between education and society. They identified the crisis in terms of the inability of society to make good use of the educated people who are important for developing society. For them the crisis can be seen in the high rate of educated unemployment. So, for the three bourgeois classes, education did not lose its value for individual and society but it is in a crisis created by society itself which has no plan to employ those people. So, there is an agreement between the three bourgeoisie classes about the nature of the crisis of education and society.

On other points of difference in interests appeared between the three bourgeois classes. In identifying the importance of education for society, the new petty bourgeoisie stressed that education is important for using technology and in creating the elite who run society. This reflects the importance of education for the new petty bourgeoisie, which, as was explained in the discussion of the class formation of Egypt, was created by the introduction of modern education. This will help to explain why they are against a general expansion education for the lower classes, since it attacks their existence and puts them in competition with those who want to move to a new petty bourgeois position.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie agree about the importance of education in developing society, but they expressed their fear that education and new technology are challenging their old traditional crafts. The view of the traditional petty

bourgeoisie can be understood as reflecting their contradictory class position. That is, although they know that education is essential for developing society, it is threatening their position since they are not using advanced technology. So education and technology do not have the same importance for them as they do for the new petty bourgeoisie who were created by the development in means of production. At the same time they are not at the position of the big bourgeoisie who need well qualified and educated manpower, since the traditional petty bourgeoisie rarely employ others.

For the big bourgeoisie education is very important in creating trained labour power who are able to adapt to new jobs. So they see education in terms of their own interest in having educated labour.

For the working class, education was seen as a means of creating different quality of personalities who are more open minded and conscientious than uneducated people. So, they express what they feel they actually lack as important qualities as human beings.

Education has positive value for all classes, but they have different concepts of that value, and hence for what they mean by education which they have discussed according to their class interests.

#### **(B) Class Based Critique of The Revolutions' Educational Policies**

The discussion of policies of education under the Revolution takes into account two periods, the sixties with its socialist policies and the seventies with its open door policy in economics. Members from different class positions were asked to evaluate the policies in the two periods. People's views and ideologies on this point are very important in identifying which policies will be supported or rejected by certain classes.

The analysis has shown that there is a division between and inside the social classes on the evaluation of education policies. The two bourgeois classes, by a substantial majority, have criticized the policy in the sixties as having a negative effect on the quality of education, while the working class has supported the policies in the sixties from their direct experience with day to day relations with the school, where in the sixties the burden of financing their children's education has laid completely on the state. In the seventies they had to bear a higher burden to finance their children's education. Expressing their views about education in the post revolutionary period, the working class were influenced by their experience in rural Egypt, where class difference were greater than in urban areas. So they explain from this point that before 1952 education was exclusive to the rich in the village. The traditional petty bourgeoisie have mainly seen the policies of the sixties as positive. However, unlike the working class, there is a minority of the traditional petty bourgeoisie criticizing the sixties' policies in the same manner as the new petty and big bourgeoisie.

The crucial point in the critique of the bourgeois classes is that they concentrate on the political and ideological aspects which stood behind these policies. These three classes stressed the point of politicizing the education system and using the curriculum as a means of political doctrine. Education was seen by the three bourgeois classes as a state apparatus which the new revolutionary system used to legitimize its existence, and they believed that by doing that the Revolution destroyed the history of Egypt by presenting all pre-Revolutionary systems as corrupt.

In the attack of the policies of the sixties it is clear that the new petty bourgeoisie felt more strongly about this than the big bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie. The equal opportunity policy of the sixties which opened education

to all people was seen by the new petty bourgeoisie as a threat to the existing status quo of society, especially when education became opened to farmers and workers who might be encouraged by education to climb up the social ladder and to compete for bourgeois position.

When the discussion reached the point of comparing the policies of the sixties with those of the seventies, the results show that the majority of the three bourgeois classes said that education was better in the sixties than seventies. In fact, their answers concentrate on one point which is teachers' training and qualifications, which they believe were better in the sixties. So, this point is dealing with a technical aspect of education concerning teachers' training while their main critique of the ideologies behind the policies remained. This is more crucial than criticizing technical aspects, because it reveals different class interests between and inside one social class, and it underlines the previous critical discussion that membership of the same class does not mean that members of the same class will have the same interests and ideologies. In this case the attack on the ideological aspects which stands behind the policies, have a great deal of influence on class support or opposition to certain policies and it is crucial in determining aspects like how education opportunities are divided in society.

The evaluation of the education system has illustrated another theoretical point which was raised earlier in the chapter. Class cultural capital appeared to be essential for individuals to develop critical views about the education system. This was clear in the ability of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie to perceive educational policies in a wide ideological, political and economic perspectives, while the working class in particular were more confined to their immediate relations with the system and their ability to afford their children's education.

### (C) Control and Power over Education

The study of control and power over education has addressed two points. These are respondents' views about those who should bear the responsibility for solving and dealing with education problems. Respondents were asked to identify also those who, in reality, have power and authority over education policies and system.

Those who should take responsibility for dealing with education problems were identified differently by members from different class positions. The main trend which can be identified for the working class and the new petty bourgeoisie is their belief that education problems should be solved by cooperation between the people and the government. This trend can be understood in terms of the way of life of the working class and traditional petty bourgeoisie in (Hara) Community, where they have strong traditions of helping and of being a caring society. The big and new petty bourgeoisie put the responsibility mainly on the government, which, in some cases, they consider to be the only competent authority for dealing with such issues. This view has its significance in the political life in Egypt, where people usually undermine the role of social and civil institutions, and put more stress upon the role of the state and government. They have little confidence in other organizations like political parties. This feature of political life in Egypt was fully explained in Chapter Two. The minor role of liberal organizations compared to the state, was reinforced when people were asked about those who have control over education in reality. The majority from different class positions tended to agree that it is the government officials and Minister of Education who have real control over education. Only a minority identified other groups, like businessmen and craftsmen, as having influence over education through their economic power. These views indicate that social groups which have the economic power and capital were not typically seen as having control over education.

(D) Free and fee-paying education: the arena of class conflict over education

The discussion of free and fee-paying education has provoked a clash of class interests and a clear class conflict inside the fractions of one class and between classes concerning spending on education and whether the government should spend more and which levels of education should get more.

The new petty bourgeoisie, who are supposed to be most benefited by the free education policy under the Revolution, are mainly against free education. They introduce different models and ways to restrict education, either by dividing the system into two parallel systems of fee paying and free education, or dividing people into two groups, the rich who can pay and the poor who cannot. However, inside the new petty bourgeoisie, free education got support from the lower fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie, who benefited from free education especially at the university level. The big bourgeoisie supported the same policy as the new petty bourgeoisie i.e. dividing the system of education.

The working class mainly support free education. The traditional petty bourgeoisie, from their contradictory position, mainly support free education at all levels. However, those elements who could send their children to private education support the duality of the system between free and fee paying education. So, the traditional petty bourgeoisie are on one hand like the working class and need free education, and on the other hand, with their better economic situation than the working class are able to afford kinds of education for their children available to the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie.

Conflicting class interests appeared through the discussions and some important theoretical points can be drawn as well. That is, the majority from different class position have

supported more spending, especially on the primary level. The working class are conscious of their interest in free education, but do not support more spending on education, and they give their support to government cuts in spending which harm their interests. However, they seem to have been influenced by government propaganda about the economic crisis and believe that the government cannot spend more on education. The contradiction in the working class ideology about free education on one side and spending on education on the other can be understood in terms of how ideology and hegemony work in society. The working class, because of their low and false class consciousness, are more influenced by the dominant ideology and the hegemonic ideas disseminated by the ruling class about the economic crisis in Egypt. The working class acquiesce to the idea that the government is doing the best for the society.

In terms of which levels should get more finance, the analysis so far demonstrates the result that the new petty bourgeoisie support for more spending upon basic education is working to support a conservative view which seeks to make basic education terminal for the majority of working class children. The traditional petty bourgeoisie has supported a wide range of spending at the university level and in technical secondary education, in order to satisfy their rising hopes for their children. The working class has supported wide range of spending especially at university level, mainly in their view to support the poor who have children at that level.

The big bourgeoisie supported spending at university and technical education to prepare the labour power needed for the market and they have seen education as an investment in human capital, while the new petty bourgeoisie has seen it as wasteful.

If aspects of spending reflect different class interests, sources of spending reflect class alliances, where the big bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie are both

against tax as a source of financing education. The big bourgeoisie in particular has insisted on increasing production as the main source to increase the education budget, i.e. they moved the burden from themselves to the workers who have to increase production and then to increase the amount of surplus value extracted from workers.

The new petty bourgeoisie and the working class both support tax on rich people as source of spending. This is understandable in a system of taxation in Egypt where the tax burden is very high on the wage earners while those who own the means of production have their own ways of avoiding paying tax.

#### (E) Future Educational Change

In their image and perspectives of future educational change, members from different class positions were divided between a majority who believe that future education change will occur and a minority who believe that there will be no future change.

The no change view was explained by the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie by the absence of a stable policy of education, the shortage of resources to develop education, and by the fact that education is not the priority in the government agenda compared with the economic problem. Other factors of no change in education introduced by the big bourgeoisie were the absence of better teachers' qualifications and training which were considered important in any programme for developing education.

The view which believe that there will be future change identified four areas of expected change. These are: curriculum, teacher training, technical education and fee-paying education. Inside these areas, members from different class positions emphasized different areas. The new petty bourgeoisie anticipated changes towards teaching more science and technology. The big bourgeoisie and the traditional petty



bourgeoisie anticipated change towards more technical education to satisfy the market need for labour power.

The working class has expressed a different type of expectation which concentrated on their problems with the system, that is, their expectations of solving the private lessons problems and increasing student numbers.

#### (F) Illustration of Egypt's Class Formation

In general terms, respondents' perceptions of some key educational issues discussed in this chapter help to illustrate some points concerning the class formation of Egypt and class consciousness. That is, respondents from different class positions presented diverse and not very coherent models of society, while they tend to introduce more coherent education models for free and fee-paying education, based on clear and different class interests in education. At this point of the analysis it seems that respondent confusion about the general picture of society does not necessarily apply when they discuss specific issue like education.

With reference to the new petty bourgeoisie in particular, some concluding remarks can be added. The class cultural capital of this class works as cultural power which defends their education interests, through their ability to argue their case with a wide knowledge about economic, social and political issues.

The confusion of the new petty bourgeoisie over the position of the middle class in society, in terms of who constitute this class, seems not to appear in their discussion of who should be educated, and for how long. They appear to have more clear class identity, which will be more illustrated and examined in the next chapter when class access to education and the direct relationship with the education system will be discussed.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See examples of these studies which discuss the devaluation of certificates in the seventies and the increasing income of uneducated people in: - Bent Hansen and Samir Radwan, "Employment Opportunities and Equity in Egypt, op.cit.", and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, The New Arab Social System, op.cit.

CHAPTER EIGHT  
CLASS PROVISION AND APPROPRIATION OF EDUCATION

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to study class differences in the actual distribution and access to education, not only at its quantitative levels, but more importantly at its qualitative level of the underlying cultural and ideological aspects and their reflection upon the class formation of Egypt. In order to do that, this chapter is going to address the following educational issues:

I. Class membership and perceived social advance opportunities and ambition for children's education. This will comprise the following points:

- (A) How parents perceive their children's opportunities for social advance.
- (B) Parents' ambition for the kind and level of education they want their children to have, and the social value they give to different kinds and levels of education, and how educational opportunities are distributed between classes.

II. Educational practices. These comprise the following points:

- (A) Parents' evaluations of schools.
- (B) Parents' evaluations of the school knowledge.
- (C) Extra tuition.
- (D) Other forms of non-formal types of education provided for the children.

III. Parents' image of their children's future.

These educational issues will be analyzed against the background of the theoretical framework which reflects upon certain aspects of the class formation. These are:

- i) Class cultural integration. In the analysis of the class nature of the education system in Egypt, it was shown that the elements which constitute the class nature of the system include drop-out, the duality between free and fee-paying, Arabic and foreign education, between technical and academic education, and the social value of university education. In this chapter, which is based on empirical material, the impact of these dualities will be studied, and the cultural integrity of social classes examined, along with the cultural tensions and conflicts this may provoke.
- ii) Class cultural capital. There will be an illustration of the influence of class cultural capital in assessing class relations with the school, and in being able to evaluate school knowledge.
- iii) The education system and class reproduction. There will be an illustration of the role of the education system in producing and reproducing class positions and class cultural capital through the study of how education opportunities are distributed and the social value that parents attribute to different kinds of education.

### I. Class Membership and Perceived Social Advance Opportunities and Ambitions for Children's Education

#### (A) Opportunities for Social Advance

Before turning to the study of the actual provision of education, social and cultural opportunities for the respondents' children, an examination will be made of how parents perceive their children's opportunities for social advance, and the factors they believe are responsible and important for social advance.

Table 1 shows parents responses about whether their children have opportunities or not. The Table shows that quite a high percentage of all classes believe that their children have opportunities for social advance. Those who believe that their

**Table 1: Parents' Assessment of the Opportunities for Social Advance**

Opportunities for social advance	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Yes, they have opportunities	15	19	6	8	7	8	5	6
No, they don't have opportunities							5	3
Opportunities doubtful because of economic, social and political problems	16	12	3		2	1		
This is in God's hands				1			1	2

children have no opportunity are nearly half of the working class fathers and a quarter of the working class mothers. One can notice that the bourgeois classes have expressed their doubt as to whether their children have opportunities, which they explain in terms of the economic, social and political problems in society. This doubt was expressed by half of the fathers and a little more than a quarter of the mothers of the new petty bourgeoisie, by fewer of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, and by still fewer of the big bourgeoisie.

These answers show how the working class are clear about this matter i.e. as individuals they believe either that their children clearly have, or that they clearly do not have opportunities. Social doubt exists on this point in the bourgeois classes.

The parents were asked to compare their children's opportunities with other children in their residential area and at school and to compare their children with others on a larger scale i.e. the society-wide scale.

When parents compared their children with other children in their residential area, as shown in Table 2, the three bourgeois classes' answers indicate that the majority believe

that their children have as much chance, or more chance, than the children of others.

**Table 2: Parents' Assessment of their Children's Opportunities for Social Advance Compared with Other Children in the Same Residential Area**

Opportunities for social advance	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Same as other children	9	13	4	2	2	5	1	1
Less than other children	10	5	2	4			9	9
More than other children	12	13	3	2	6	4		
Don't know				1	1		1	1

The other point is that the working class are much more likely to believe that their children have less chances than other children, and they are the only class of this opinion.

The choice that their children have more opportunities than others is clear in the case of the big bourgeoisie, with more than half of the father and mothers selecting this option. Fewer of the new petty bourgeoisie, and still less of the traditional petty bourgeoisie were of this opinion, while this choice was not selected at all by the working class.

The trend in the distribution between the three possibilities of chances seems different when the parents are asked to compare their children on a wider scale, i.e. by other opportunities in the society.

Table 3 presents these possibilities, and shows that the category of less chances is the predominant response for all classes, especially for the working class, of whom nine out of eleven thought this was the case. It can also be seen that only a small minority believed that their children had more than others, and that even for the big bourgeoisie only about

a quarter believed this was the case. Even for the new petty bourgeoisie, only a small minority believed their children had more chances than others.

Table 3: Parents' Assessment of their Children's Opportunities for Social Advance Compared with Other Children in Society

Opportunities for social advance	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Same as other children	4	6	2		2	2		
Less than other children	25	24	7	8	3	5	10	10
More than other children	2	1			3	2		
Don't know				1	1		1	1

Parents were asked to identify the factors which they believed were very important in achieving social advancement, and in giving children better or worse opportunities than others. Table 4 summarises their responses to these questions. From the table it can be seen that the main factor selected by parents was an economic one. In all classes more than half the mothers and fathers selected this response, and in the working class this figure rose to 100 per cent - the entire sample believing that the economic factor is primary in determining chances.

The next factor to be considered is social status and power. This factor was selected by slightly more than half the big bourgeoisie, and by about a third of the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie. In contrast, very few of the working class attached importance to this factor, and the working class would appear to identify chances very firmly in economic terms.

Other factors, such as better housing, opportunities to travel abroad, small families, good luck and God's will, were all seen as less important than the economic and social status factors, but were cited by small numbers of parents, and give an indication of opportunities which are not seen purely in terms of income and luxury. For example, a small percentage of the mothers of all the bourgeois classes thought that travelling abroad was important, as it gave a child a good opportunity to see different societies and to have a wider knowledge of different parts of the world.

Table 4: Parents' Assessment of which Children have most Opportunities for Social Advance

Children who have more opportunities	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
The rich	26	20	7	8	5	4	7	9
The well educated	3	6	2	2			1	1
Those with high social status and power	11	7	3	3	5	5	1	
Those who travel abroad	1	1		1		1		
The better housed		3	1					1
Smaller families					1			
Those with good luck and God's favour							2	
Those whose fathers work in commerce							1	

While the previous results give one view of the importance of various factors in making opportunities available in society in general give one picture, a rather different picture emerged when parents were asked to rank factors which are important for social advance. Table 5 shows the patterns of these priorities. In this case, social background, education and personality all come higher than economic factors. In



order to elucidate this seeming contradiction further, the members of the sample were asked what they meant by each factor.

**Table 5: Parents' Assessment of Factors which are Important for Social Advance**

Factors and grades for factors	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
<b>Social Background</b>								
1	18	10	2	1	2	5	1	
2	6	10	2	1	1	1	2	1
3	3	9	2	6			3	6
4	2	2	3	1	4	3	5	2
5	1				1			2
<b>Education</b>								
1	5	6	4	1	3	3	2	3
2	15	16	4	6	5	5	6	3
3	5	6	1	1	1	1	3	1
4	6	2		1				4
5								
<b>Character</b>								
1	8	9	2	4	2	1	2	2
2	8	8	1	1	3	3	2	4
3	12	12	3	1	4	3	3	5
4	5	2	3	2		2	2	
5							2	
<b>Income</b>								
1	1		1	1	1		5	6
2	4	3	2	1			3	3
3	10	4	3	1	3	5	2	2
4	16	24	3	5	5	4	1	
5				1				
<b>Luck</b>								
1				1				
2								
3	1							
4								
5	2	1	1			2		
<b>God's help</b>								
1							1	1
2								1
3								
4								
5	1							
<b>Power and Authority</b>								
1								
2								
3					1			
4								
5	4							

Typically, the new petty bourgeoisie took social background to mean strong family relations, religious upbringing, and an introduction to Islamic principles. Education meant higher education in particular, which can lead to social advance, especially where it involved specializations as medicine. Personal character meant ambition, flexibility, stability and being a religious person who knows his or her duties and has organized and logical thinking.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie mean very similar things, although they have a tendency to think that a wider range of education may be able to promote social advance. Importantly, the working class takes a very similar view, although not restricting the importance of education to higher education, and taking a rather narrower view of personality, namely that it means only to be religious.

The patterns of answers of the members of all classes indicates that religious sentiments are seen as important, both in their influence upon family background and their influence on the formation of character and personality. Consequently, when the bourgeois classes had to compare economic factors which they thought important with other cultural factors are important for social advancement, they tended to stress what might be called cultural capital, in terms of laying emphasis upon the family being religious and educated rather than that it being rich.

A new petty bourgeois father who is a ship's captain expressed his belief in the importance of these cultural aspects in these terms:

*"Some children have more money than my children, but their parents do not know how to spend the money because they are uneducated. Consequently they are ignorant and they cannot open more opportunities for their children with money alone. Money without education gives no opportunity".*

While social and cultural factors were given higher priority than economic factors by all classes, working class mothers

and fathers were more likely to put economic factors at the top of their list than any other class. This reflects the importance attached to economic factors by the working class, which has already been noted in the responses dealing with factors affecting the distribution of opportunities.

A working class mother, who is the wife of a bus conductor earning 80 pounds per month, and who has seven children, explained the importance of income:

*"I do not identify any standard of society which is lower than ours. I do not think that there are other children who have a harder life than my children. Income and money are very important, more than any other factor. Everything depends on whether you have money or not".*

From the discussions of respondents' perceptions of their children's opportunities it can be noticed that the three bourgeois classes perceive their children's opportunities differently depending on whether they are asked to evaluate them in their own residential area alone, or in society at large. They tended to believe their children as having the same opportunities as their neighbours, but as being disadvantaged in society generally. Looking at those who they perceived as having better opportunities in society in general, the main basis for that advantage was seen as economic. However, when the three bourgeois classes selected important factors responsible for social advance, they mainly identified cultural factors like social background, religious beliefs and education, ahead of the economic factor. The working class presented a different pattern, tending to identify their children's opportunities as less than others on both comparisons. At the same time, the working class tended to stress more than other classes the role of the economic factor in social advance.

The stress of the three bourgeois classes on cultural factors, and the working class stress on the economic one, will lead to the following detailed discussion of how members from different class positions try to appropriate more social and

cultural advantages to their children. Our focus will be on their efforts in the education field, in terms of the parents' ambitions for their children's education, the social value they give different kinds and levels of education, and the actual education provision they can afford for their children.

(B) Class Membership and Ambition for Children's Education

The study of respondents' ambition for their children's education will include:

- i) The kind of education demanded for their children,
- ii) The actual provision in terms of level and kind of education, and
- iii) The social value of different levels and kinds of education.

i) Demanded Kind of Education for Children

Parents from different class positions were asked to identify the kind of education they wished their children to have and their ability in reality to send their children to the kind of education they wanted. Table No.6 summarizes the kind of education preferred by parents. The table shows that the main choice for the new petty bourgeoisie parents lies in different kinds of fee paying education including all its different types like foreign language schools. Foreign language schools accounted for roughly half of the preferences of the fathers and the mothers, and were followed by government language schools which accounted for a further quarter.

The extent of achieving these wishes is shown in Table No.7, which indicates that the new petty bourgeoisie families could largely achieve their wishes in having their children in fee paying education. Three quarters of the families in this class could afford fee-paying education for all their children, and more than half the rest could afford it for some of their children.

Table 6: Kinds of Schools Parents Prefer for their Children

Different kinds of schools	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Government free school only	1	1	5	4			7	7
Foreign language school only	15	18	2	2	7	6	2	1
Government language school only	8	7	1	1		1		
Mixed wishes	3	3	1		1	2		
Private school teaching a foreign language	3	2		2	1		1	2
Al Azhar only	1						1	1

Those who could not achieve their wishes of sending their children to fee paying school gave as the main reason the inability to pay the fees which were too expensive for them.

For the traditional petty bourgeoisie only one in five wished their children to attend foreign language school, and only half as many wished them to attend government language school. The remainder, roughly half the parents in this class, wished their children to attend government free schools. One in three of the families were able to secure fee paying education for their children, which means that there was no great gap between what they wanted and what they achieved. This may be because they are realistic about what they can afford for their children, and set their expectations accordingly.

The big bourgeoisie mainly wished to send their children to foreign language schools. Well over two thirds of the parents wished their children to be in foreign language schools, and in almost every case where the parents wished for fee-paying education, the children were in fee-paying education.

For the working class only a minority have the ambition of foreign education for their children while the majority wanted government education which is the only option they could achieve.

Table 7: Distribution of Children in Different Kinds of Schools

Kind of school	New petty bourgeoisie	Traditional petty bourgeoisie	Big bourgeoisie	Working class
Government free schools only	3	6		11
Mixed free and fee-paying schools	5		2	
Fee-paying schools only	23	3	7	

The choice and the wishes show that both the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie have high ambitions for their children, which were completely achieved by the big bourgeoisie and substantially achieved by the new petty bourgeoisie, where a minority of them failed for economic reasons to send their children to the kind of school they wished. The traditional petty bourgeoisie are in a middle position where they are not completely deprived of achieving their wishes, as is the case with the working class, and they are not as highly fortunate as the big bourgeoisie. It can be noticed that their ambitions are less than those of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie.

#### ii) The Actual Provision of Kind and Level of Education

This point will present detailed information about the actual distribution of the respondents' children at different levels and kinds of education. This will throw light upon the equal or unequal division of educational opportunities. Table 8 shows this distribution. The information in the table is based on the number of children that members of the sample have. In this case there are 83 children of members of the new petty

Table 8: The Distribution of Children of the Sample in Different Kinds and Levels of Education

Class	New petty bourgeoisie	Traditional petty bourgeoisie	Big bourgeoisie	Working class
Kind of education				
Govern- Primary	10	11		18
ment Preparatory	3	4	1	4
free General Scndy	1	2	2	
school Tech. Scndy	3	5		3
Govern- Primary	26	3	6	
ment Preparatory	3			
lang. school				
Foreign Primary	17	2	13	
lang. Preparatory	3		2	
schools Geneal Scndy	3		1	
Private Primary	4	2		
lang. Preparatory				
school General Scndy	1			
University	6	8		
Uneducated married girls				4
Working after primary education		2		5
Left school after 4 years				6
Working after preparatory level				1
Working after technical level				1
Below school age				6
Government free nursery	1			
Government language nursery	1	1		
School for the metally retarded	1			

bourgeoisie, 40 children of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, 25 children of the big bourgeoisie and 48 children of the working class. As shown in the table, the main characteristics of the division can be summarized for each class as follows: for the new petty bourgeoisie, they have 20.2 per cent of their children in government free schools, apart from university level, while they have 36.1 per cent of their children in government language schools, and 27.7 per cent in foreign language schools, and 6 per cent in private language schools; for the traditional petty bourgeoisie they have 55 per cent of their children in government free schools, 10 per cent in government language schools, 5 per cent in foreign

language schools and 5 per cent in private language schools; for the big bourgeoisie they have 12 per cent of their children in government free schools, 24 per cent in government language schools and 64 per cent of their children in foreign language schools; for the working class they have 52 per cent of their children in government free schools, and no children in any kind of fee paying education, the rest of their children drop out or, in the case of girls, get married without completing their education.

If one looks at university education, as indicated in Table 9, the majority of parents from different class positions want this for their children. In spite of this high level of ambition, the information collected from respondents shows a significant class differences in the presentation of children at this level. For the new petty bourgeoisie, of their 9 children of university age, 66.7 per cent are at university. For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, 50 per cent of the 16 children of university age are at university. The big bourgeoisie have no children of university age, while the working class have 15 children at university age and none of them at the university. According to the limited number of the sample, one cannot generalize about the distribution of university education in the whole society. However, this limited sample gives an opportunity to see the big differences even in a small scale. It shows that the new petty bourgeoisie are benefiting to a large extent from university education, and the traditional petty bourgeoisie are able to obtain a high proportion of university education for their children.

From the discussion of the kind and level of education wanted for their children, two main trends can be identified. These are:

- The emphasis on foreign education and other types of fee-paying education by the new petty bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie, and to a limited extent by the traditional petty bourgeoisie.



**Table 9: Level of Education Parents want their Children to Reach**

Level of education aspired to	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
<b>Basic Education</b>								
General secondary education								
Technical education								1
University	29	27	9	9	7	7	10	10
Post studies	2	3			1	2		
No ambition as to level								1
Post studies for boy but not for girl		1						
To gain secondary and choose for themselves					1			

- The demand by the majority of the respondents for university education for their children, including the working class parents.

These trends lead to the following discussion with parents about the social value they give to different kinds and levels of education.

### iii) The Social Value of Different Kinds and Levels of Education Chosen by Parents

The discussion of the social value of different levels and kinds of education will address those kinds and levels preferred by the respondents, as well as those kinds, like technical and religious education, which they did not show any interest in.

## University Education and its Social Value

For university education, it was noted earlier that the majority wanted this level of education for their children. Table No.10 summarizes different values people give to university education. The table shows that university education is believed to give high status in society. This was expressed by more than fifty percent of the three bourgeois classes while only one in five of the working class expressed this view.

Table 10: Parents' Reasons for Choosing Certain Levels of Education for their Children

Different reasons	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
To find a good job (pilot, doctor, etc.)	6	7		2	1		6	5
To give good status	17	19	8	7	2	5	2	1
Can't finance to a higher level								1
University degree very important	5	5	1	1	2	3		
To give a good chance of promotion with a degree	3							
To be at the same level as me	1	1			2	1		
To compensate for my lack of education					2	2	3	4
They should choose for themselves					1			

The respect and high evaluation of university education is reinforced by the three bourgeois classes' view that a university degree is very important in itself. That is, it is very important socially to show that the individual holds a university degree. This was believed by a substantial number

of all the bourgeois classes.

University education was seen as significantly enhancing opportunities to obtain a good job. This is mainly the view of the working class, with roughly half of them taking this view, and of the new petty bourgeoisie with roughly a quarter of them agreeing. Fewer of the traditional petty bourgeoisie or the big bourgeoisie took this view.

Other values given to university education which distinguish between classes is the view of the new petty bourgeoisie of the importance of university education in giving better chances for promotion. University education was also seen as a means of compensation for educational deprivation of the parents; this was mainly expressed by the working class and the big bourgeoisie.

So, university level is extensively loaded with values and ambitions for different class positions. In general it has a social value of giving high position in society, or allowing for a good job especially for the social classes who are wage earners like the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class. University education is a means of compensating for lost opportunities in education especially among those deprived of earlier opportunity, such as the working class and some elements of the big bourgeoisie, who have the economic capital but not the cultural capital.

#### **Technical Education and its Social Value**

Parents were asked to identify the most important kinds of education for society. On this question, as shown in Table No.11, technical education received a high percentage of importance from different class positions. However, when people were asked if they would agree to send their children to technical education, their answers are summarized in Table No.12 which shows that although people identified technical education as important for developing society, they rejected

Table 11: Parents' Assessment of the Kinds of Education Important for Society

Kind of education	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Technical education	21	19	6	4	3	4	5	6
Technical and religious				1	1		1	1
Academic	1	2			1	1		
Religious	2	5	1	1		2	2	2
All of them	6	4		2	2	1	2	1
Don't know		1					1	1
I cannot decide because there is no development plan	1		1					
Academic and technical			1	1	1	1		
Academic and religious					1			

this kind of education for their own children. Only a minority of the new petty bourgeoisie said they would agree to their children having technical education, and the case was much the same with the big bourgeoisie. The majority of the working class wanted to send their children to technical education. Two thirds of the traditional petty bourgeoisie wanted to send their children to technical education. This shows that they did not totally accept it as the working class did, but at the same time they did not reject it as the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie.

Technical education was seen as having no future by some elements of the three bourgeois classes especially the new petty bourgeoisie, who value technical education as a kind of education for unsuccessful people as a second chance. The whole working class and a significant proportion of the traditional petty bourgeoisie have no prejudice against this kind of education.

Table 12: Parents' Responses to the Idea of Sending their Children to Technical Secondary Education

Response	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Yes	6	3	6	6	2	1	10	11
It has no future	15	17	2	3	3	6		
Agree, on condition it is followed by university		3	1		1			
If they failed 3 in general education		2						
Agree, when technical education produces cultured people					1	1		
Technical education is not for girls	1	1				1	1	

### The Social Value of Different Kinds of Free / Fee-Paying Education and Religious Education

As mentioned earlier, different types of fee-paying education were preferred by parents, in particular by the new petty and big bourgeoisie. In order to study the reasons behind their choice and the value they give to fee-paying education, parents were asked to compare different kinds of schools, such as government free schools, government language schools, foreign language schools and private schools in terms of their role in developing children's abilities, which include developing intelligence in general school achievement, and talents like music and drawing. Table No.13 shows how people compared different types of schools.

The table shows that the majority from different class positions believe that foreign language schools are better than any other school in developing children's abilities in the three matters identified. This is seen even by the working

Table 13: Parents' Comparison of Schools in Developing Children's Abilities

Kind of School	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Abilities promoted								
Govern-ment free school								
Intelligence				1				
School achiev'nt				1				
Artistic talents		3		2				
No difference				1				
Govern-ment lang. school	6	3		1				
Intelligence								
School achiev'nt	7	3		1				
Artistic talents	7	1						
No difference								
Foreign lang. school	25	27	9	7	9	9	10	10
Intelligence								
School achiev'nt	24	28	8	7	9	9	10	10
Artistic talents	24	26	8	6	9	9	10	10
No difference	1	1						
Private school		1						
Intelligence								
School achiev'nt		1						
Artistic talents		1						
No difference								

class who have no relations with any kind of fee paying schools.

It can be noticed that, the new petty bourgeoisie who complained that the foreign language school does not give enough care to children's activities and prefer to give more time to academic subjects, were inclined to give some credit for promoting children's activities to government language schools and government free schools. However, the majority still believed that foreign language school is better in this matter. So, there is a consensus from different class positions that foreign language schools are the best compared

with government language schools, private schools and government free schools. They believe they develop children's intelligence, talents and school achievement more than any other school.

An example of the belief that foreign language schools are the best comes from a mother who is an employee in the Ministry of Culture, and has her only son in a government language school. She gave her impression of the foreign language school:

*"I wanted to send my son to a foreign language school, but he was under the age of acceptance. The government language school does not give the full meaning of education which is the full development of the individual's abilities. I think foreign schools achieve both aims i.e. giving knowledge and developing individual's abilities and talents. In the government language school they give children a lot of homework. My son hates the school although he is excellent. The school cancels the sports classes in order to teach English and mathematics."*

Those who have their children in any kind of fee paying schools were asked about their reasons for sending their children to these schools. Table No.14 shows the reasons given by the three bourgeois classes, while the working class is excluded since they have no children in fee-paying schools.

For the new petty bourgeoisie the reason that learning foreign language is very important is in order to be well educated and cultured. So they considered that a well educated and cultured person as equivalent to learning a foreign language. The second reason they selected was that the social standard of students in these schools was higher. Finding a good job in the foreign sector, and the belief that the school was better organized than government schools came equal third as reasons.

For the big bourgeoisie the three main reasons are the same as for the new petty bourgeoisie, although there are minor differences between points of emphasis among fathers and mothers of the big bourgeoisie, where the table shows the two main points of emphasis of mothers are the importance of

**Table 14: Parents' Reasons for Sending their Children to Different Kinds of Fee-paying School**

Different reasons	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
It is important to learn a foreign language to be cultured	22	23	1		4	7		
To find a good job in the foreign sector	9	7	3	3	2	1		
They are better organized	8	7	1		5	4		
The social standard of students	11	14			5	6		
Government language schools are cheaper than foreign schools	1	1	2	2				
It's their mother's choice	1				1			
I went to a foreign school					1	1		

foreign language in being well educated and cultured, and the high social standard of students in these schools. In contrast, the fathers stress the importance of the good organization of the school, and the higher social standard of the schools.

The three traditional petty bourgeois families who have their children in fee paying schools gave different pattern of answers from the other two bourgeois classes, thinking that a good job in the foreign sector was most important, followed by the cheapness of government language schools compared with foreign language schools.

From the answers given by the three bourgeois classes it can be noticed that the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie considered that mastering a foreign language is the mark of being well educated and cultured, and they have also shown a class prejudice against other social classes,



since they prefer fee paying schools because they accept children from high social background. The traditional petty bourgeoisie mainly concentrated on the aspect of finding a good job in the foreign sector and the less expense of the government fee paying schools.

The choice between different types of schools is not as simple as the table indicates, since the decision especially for the new petty bourgeoisie is invoking a cultural tension, especially when the discussion involves religious education. The division inside the new petty bourgeoisie is clear between those who support government fee paying schools and those who prefer foreign language schools.

The government language schools were preferred by some because they pay attention to Arabic and religious studies. A father who is a university professor said,

*"I prefer a government language school for my son because it is not very expensive and it is under government supervision. The most important thing about these schools is that they do not neglect Arabic and religion. At the same time they give the advantage to learn English. That is why I prefer it more than foreign schools."*

Others are very clear in their support of foreign schools. A father who is an engineer and a director of a factory, and who has a boy in a government language school and two girls in foreign language schools commented from his experience of the two kinds of schools:

*"I prefer foreign language schools to government language. In the foreign schools the social standard of the children is high, and the English language teaching is good. Language is very important because it gives the children a wide chance to find a good job in the foreign sector. In the foreign school they keep children busy all the time by homework, which I like and prefer for children."*

While this father preferred foreign language school for his children, others condemned this type of school for making children very westernized and these missionary schools are biased towards Christianity.

A mother who is a primary school teacher, and whose two sons attend a government language school, said,

*"I did not like to send my children to a foreign language school because these schools make children westernized, that is why I preferred the government language school. But if you ask me to compare between the education standard of the two schools in terms of teaching standard, of course foreign language schools have a very high standard of teaching and they develop children's abilities more than government language schools."*

A deep and strong religious and cultural tension which is created by the existence of foreign schools is expressed by a father who is an engineer in the public sector and has his children in government language school:

*"I did not like to send them to a foreign language school because in these school missionaries have a very strong religious influence and they are biased against Moslem children which affects their behaviour and achievement at school. So, the advantage of the government language school is that it teaches language and at the same time it is under government supervision. That is why in the government language school there is no monetary or religious exploitation."*

The tension inside the new petty bourgeoisie becomes even clearer when the issue of religious education is discussed. Religious education was seen in different ways. Some take religious education as a step to carry on to university education, since Al Azhar schools lead to the Al Azhar university, where students can study subjects like medicine and engineering. Others are more divided where a conflict between the strong religious feeling on one side and the practical needs of life appears.

A father who is university professor, and views religious education as a step for university education, said,

*"The only advantage of Al Azhar education, is giving a wide access to the university, because students from these schools can apply to Al Azhar university to study medicine, engineering or any other specialization, without needing to compete with other students from general secondary schools."*

It must be understood that Al Azhar in this case is not taken as a religious institute but as a means to achieve a secular purpose which is going to one of the modern science faculties like medicine or engineering. For others, there is a clear tension between their religious feeling and the decisions they have to make for their children's education.

A father who is an accountant in the government explained that he was thinking of sending his children to Al Azhar, and why, in the end, he did not:

*"I thought of sending my children to Al Azhar when Al Azhar announced that they were going to accept children at a very young age for primary school. So, I wanted to send them at that early age because this education concentrates on religious studies which is very important in forming the individual's personality and this education is open to the university. But when it came with taking the decision, I could not send them to Al Azhar because I want them to learn a foreign language, which is very important in finding a job. That is why I sent them to a government language school."*

However, this tension does not appear for all people. There is a group who are clear in their position on religious education: for them it is old fashioned, has very bad image in society and is not a condition of becoming a religious person that one must have religious education. A father who is an engineer and a company director, and has his children in a foreign language school, said,

*"Al Azhar gives good religious education but I never thought of sending my children to this school because it is old fashioned and does not suite the modern time. It could be suitable for me but not for my children."*

In another view, it is not necessary to go to Al Azhar in order to be religious person. A father who is an engineer in a foreign company, graduated himself from a foreign language school, and has his children in a foreign language school, said,

*"I never thought of Al Azhar. All that I wanted from the foreign school is to give more care to religious*

*studies. It is not necessary to learn Quran in Al Azhar in order to be religious. I can be a religious person without going to Al Azhar."*

So, the new petty bourgeoisie are divided in their views about different kinds of education, especially secular and religious education, and it seems that the decision and the choice of the kind of school is causing tension for one section while others have no hesitation about the value of foreign education and they have no conflict concerning religious education.

For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, their choice of the kind of school did not reflect the same conflict as was the case with the new petty bourgeoisie. Their choice of the kind of school was mainly determined by their economic abilities and was influenced at the same time by their limited information about some kinds of education like Al Azhar.

A father who is the owner of a photography shop explained how he made the choice between schools on an economic basis. He said,

*"I know that foreign language schools are the best in teaching standard and in developing children's abilities, but these schools are very expensive. That is why I sent my children to government language school. The fees are reasonable, because I pay £105 a year which I can afford. If you ask me to arrange schools according to their teaching standard and achievement I put foreign schools first, government language schools second and government free schools third."*

Others were influenced in the choice by their limited information about different kinds of schools.

A father who is the owner of a small shop said of Al Azhar and religious education:

*"My children are in government school. I did not think of another kind. Al Azhar: nobody advised me to send them to Al Azhar. I believe that this kind of education is very important. I wish I could send one of them. At least she could be able to recite the Quran."*

His wife said,

*"I have no clear idea about Al Azhar. I think Al Azhar schools are not widespread, maybe there are a few schools. I know one girl who went to Al Azhar, but that was because she was younger than the age of acceptance in government schools."*

A father who is a tailor and owns his own shop said,

*"I thought of sending my daughter to foreign school but many of my friends and customers have told me that all our best doctors, engineers and ministers have graduated from government schools, so there was no point of sending them to foreign school if they can get good education from government school."*

He went on to explain why he did not choose Al Azhar:

*"I did not think of Al Azhar because I had no idea about girls education in Al Azhar."*

It can be noticed from the answers of both the new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie that the latter does not have enough information about certain kinds of education. So they say that they do not know, or nobody told them. They also tend to get their information from friends, while in the case of the new petty bourgeoisie, they give clear information about different kinds of schools and the negative and positive sides of these schools, which may explain why cultural tension and conflict is clearer in their case than in the traditional petty bourgeoisie.

The big bourgeoisie were clear about kind of education they want for their children. They did not suffer the same conflict as the new petty bourgeoisie.

A father who is a businessman was clear about the failure of Al Azhar:

*"Foreign schools are better organized than government schools. I never thought of sending my children to Al Azhar because it failed in teaching both religious and modern subject."*

Another family was clear about their strong desire for foreign education for their children. The father is the owner of a

factory with middle level education, and the mother is illiterate. They never thought of Al Azhar and they sacrificed a lot of money to have their children in foreign school. The father said,

*"My children are in foreign schools - foreign education has many advantages, because learning a foreign language became very important to get a good job in foreign companies. The social standard of the students is high, these schools give more care and better education than any other school."*

On Al Azhar education, he said,

*"I have never thought of sending my children. I thought only of foreign schools. Do you know how important it was to me to get my children in these foreign schools; I had to pay a thousand dollars for each child to be accepted in the school."*

The mother also made a comparison between different types of schools:

*"We were in the Gulf area, my children were in the American school. The standard of teaching of that school was higher even than the foreign language school here. I never thought of Al Azhar because of the low social standard of the students. I want my children to be in foreign schools in order to compensate my deprivation of education, so I want the best for them."*

The working class, in reality, have no choice between different kinds of schools, and only have their children in government free schools. The only other option which was available to them was Al Azhar, where some of them had tried to send their children. The working class expressed a feeling of doubt about their children's abilities for certain kinds of education which were not expressed by any other class.

Those who tried to send their children to Al Azhar explained the difficulties they faced and why they were not successful.

A father who is a fitter in a public sector company said,

*"I sent my younger daughter to Al Azhar but she hated the school because of the way they treated children and because they study many subjects which make it very difficult. I tried to move her from Al Azhar to a government school and it was very difficult. When the government school accepted her*

*they put her in the first year not in the second as she was supposed to be. We accepted that she should lose one year rather than being in Al Azhar."*

Another family tried to send their children to Al Azhar, but the children refused to study because it was very difficult. The mother said,

*"I wanted to send my older son to Al Azhar but he refused because study is very difficult in Al Azhar, but he refuses all other kinds of education as well. He could not get his primary school certificate. I tried with my younger son but he refused Al Azhar, because it is difficult to study and he does not like the way they treat children."*

A father who is a cleaner, and who does not trust his children's ability in education, said,

*"I wanted to send my children to Al Azhar, at least they would learn the Quran, but my children refused education. It is my fate that my children refused education because they have been endowed with a limited mentality."*

The comments of the working class on different kinds of education, indicate that:

- They tend to discuss different kinds of education as outsiders, i.e. they are not involved in that matter. For example, they say about foreign education, "We hear that it is good education", while the new petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie express a practical experience in that field where they have their children in foreign education.
- When the working class discuss Al Azhar education, and why they did not send their children, they already have experience of this kind of education because some of them have sent their children who did not continue in Al Azhar, for the reasons mentioned earlier. So the working class does not reject this kind of education.
- When the working class say why they did not continue in this education, the main reason is the difficulty of this education, i.e. they doubt the abilities of their children in succeeding in this education, while in the

case of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie, they might mention this reason, but they have other important objections about the quality, the value and the future of this education which they reject.

For the new petty bourgeoisie, the main characteristics of their responses is that, while they have a clear attitude against technical education for their children, they were divided in their attitude towards foreign education and religious education, which created cultural conflict for some, but was no problem to others. For the big bourgeoisie there was no tension or conflict in their attitudes to foreign education. The traditional petty bourgeoisie, a minority of whose children are in foreign language or government language schools, did not experience a tension or conflict in their choice, which seems to be determined to a certain extent by their ability to pay and by their economic position.

## II. Educational Practices

At this point, the analysis moves towards the study of parents' specific relations with the school, and their evaluation of the kind of education that their children are already getting at school. This will be studied against a background of the influence of the family through economic and cultural capital in securing more social, educational and cultural opportunities for children and in influencing parents' relations with the school. This will be studied through four main points:

- (A) Parents' evaluations of the school:  
in terms of i) identifying positive and negative aspects of the school, and ii) parents' evaluation of their relations with the school in terms of two points:
- relations with school teachers, and
  - the value they place on the authority they may have through the parent's committee.



(B) School knowledge:

parents will evaluate the curriculum in terms of identifying which subjects they believe are more or less important, and how parents criticize the structure of the curriculum and how they perceive the influence of studying different subjects on their children's future.

(C) Extra tuition:

will be discussed as part of the family's efforts to afford more education opportunities for their children. Reasons behind extra tuition will be discussed, beside the illustration of the role of the family's economic and cultural capital in that matter.

(D) Other forms of non-formal education:

this will show the family's efforts to provide more non-formal types of education which add to their children's cultural capital.

(A) Parents' evaluation of the school

i) Positive and negative aspects of school

As a part of the discussion of the actual provision of education, parents were asked to evaluate their children's school in terms of the positive and the negative aspects they could identify. Answers are summarized in Table No.15. The general trends which can be identified from the table are that discipline of children, the high standard of subjects that children study, the teaching of foreign languages and good teachers are seen as important. In class terms, some similarities and differences can be found between classes in identifying what they consider to be good. For example, discipline is mentioned by different classes, and is pointed to as a positive factor by a very high percentage of the big bourgeoisie more than four out of five of them making this point. Since the big bourgeoisie have their children in foreign language schools, this means that there is a great

deal of confidence about discipline in these schools. Having good teachers at school was expressed by different class positions but not on the same scale as discipline.

Table 15: Aspects that Parents Like in their Children's School

	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Good teachers	3	6	3	2	1	1	3	
Discipline	19	19	3	3	8	8	2	3
Contact parents	2	2	1				1	
Teach well	1	1		1			2	5
Good building			1					
High standard of education subjects	5	6			3	3		
School activities and parties	1			1		1		
Foreign lang. religion and Arabic	2	4	1					
Small classes	1							
I like nothing in my children's school	5	2	2	3			3	3

If one looks at the aspects which each class believe are provided for their children, one finds that for the new petty bourgeoisie their children are getting from school good care in teaching foreign language and Arabic and religion, especially those children who are in government language schools. The new petty bourgeoisie also believe that the standard of education in terms of subjects that their children study is high. For the traditional petty bourgeoisie there is nothing in particular mentioned apart from discipline and teachers, but a small percentage of fathers said that the school contacted them to report on their children's work, and a similar percentage of mothers said they liked the school for its own sake, because it taught their children.

The big bourgeoisie, like the new petty bourgeoisie, believe that their children are getting a high standard of education in terms of the content of education subjects. For the working class, the point that they stressed beside discipline and teachers was that they like the school for its own sake because it teaches children.

From the answers, one can understand that the new petty bourgeoisie believe that their children are provided with a good standard of education content, with a balanced education between foreign language on one side and Arabic and religion on the other, beside a good discipline for their children at school but a limited claim that their children have good teachers.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie did not choose to distinguish anything in their children's education apart from discipline and teachers, and those who have their children in government language school believe that their children are getting a balanced education of foreign language on one side and Arabic and religion on the other side.

The big bourgeoisie believe that their children are getting a high standard of education, in addition to good teachers and good discipline for children at school.

The working class mainly believe that their children are well disciplined at school. In term of teaching standard it is only a quarter of the fathers who believe that their children are getting good teaching, while mothers did not mention that at all. Roughly a quarter of all fathers and mothers did not identify anything which they liked about their children's school, i.e. they did not identify any positive aspect in the actual education of their children.

Moving to aspects which parents believe are missing in their children's education, the problem of teacher's standard appears with a higher percentage than those who are satisfied

with teacher's standard. Related to this point about teachers is the complaint that children are forced to take private lessons, which was noted by members of different classes. (See Table No.16.)

Table 16: Aspects that Parents do not Like in their Children's School

	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	FatherMother
Not strict	2	2	1			1	1
Teachers not well qualified	7	7	3	4	2	1	32
No school activities or hobbies	7	5			2	4	
Children not treated equally		3			1	1	
Religion neglected	2	1					
Children forced to take private lessons	4	6	2	1	2	1	14
Large classes	1	2					
School asks for things I cannot afford							32
Punishment of children	2	1		2		1	21
Poor school results			1	2			21
Government control over foreign language school	2				2		
Nothing	4	4	2				

It can be noticed that the new petty bourgeoisie who have their children in government language school are highly disappointed with teachers, especially those who teach English. Since the new petty bourgeoisie send their children to this kind of school in the hope of getting a good standard of English teaching and to get the opportunity to be educated

in English, they are frustrated when they compare English teachers in government language school with those in foreign language school.

A father who is an insurance inspector expressed this view:

*"I do not like teachers because they are not highly qualified especially in English and this shows the difference between these schools and the foreign language schools where teachers are very highly qualified especially in languages and some of them are originally native speakers of the language."*

The traditional petty bourgeoisie reflected another aspect of problems with teachers, which might exist more in government free schools. This relates to the way in which teachers treat children:

*"I do not like any thing in my children's school. They treat children badly. Teachers always punish and beat children without any understanding of the child's personality. It is the teachers' treatment which makes the child love or hate the school."*

When the traditional petty bourgeoisie have the opportunity to educate their children in the schools used by big bourgeoisie and new petty bourgeoisie, they may express the same hopes and frustrations. A father who is the owner of a photography shop and has his children in a government language school commented on English teachers in the school:

*"I like in my children's school the small number of students in the class. And I like it as a new experiment in teaching languages. I do not like teachers. They are not qualified, and they have no conscience. They do not give full effort in the classroom because they are not well paid. These schools try to imitate the foreign schools but they cannot reach the same level because of the different quality of the teachers."*

The big bourgeoisie express the problem of teachers who exploit parents by expensive private lessons. A father who is a factory owner and has all his five children in foreign language schools said,

*"I like in my children's school the high standard of education they get especially in languages, but I do not like that teachers force children to take*

*private lessons and they ask for a very high price because they teach all subjects in foreign language."*

The working class feel that their children are neglected by teachers, they do not give them enough academic or social care. A mother who is the wife of a welder said,

*"I do not like in my children's school that teachers neglect children, they do not give them enough care in explaining lessons or in social care. They do not try to understand the children's difficult circumstances."*

Looking at the main characteristics of each class, it can be noticed that, for the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie, there is a complaint that schools neglect activities such as music and sports. This was expressed by around one in five of the new petty bourgeoisie, and by even more of the big bourgeoisie. The new petty bourgeoisie who have their children in foreign language school complain that this kind of school neglects Islamic religious studies. This is the exact opposite of the view of those who have their children in government language school, who believe that their children have the advantage of having both foreign language and religion. A mother who is an employee of the Ministry of Culture evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of government language schools in these words:

*"I like in my son's school the care they give to religion and Arabic lessons. The headmistress is well qualified to run such a language school because she got her university degree in English language. I do not like the way they punish children. They make them cowards. They intimidate them. I do not like the school cancelling activities and classes in order to teach more English, and they give them a lot of homework even during the holidays."*

The opposite view about teaching religion come from a father who is military officer and has his children in a foreign language school. He said,

*"I like in my children's school that they have discipline. I do not like that the school neglects Islamic religion because it is Christian school. I do not like that they give children very heavy*

*homework and neglect the school's activities."*

The same problem of neglecting school's activities is expressed by big bourgeoisie. A mother who is the wife of an entrepreneur, and who has a university degree, said,

*"I do not like that the school neglects activities like drawing and music. My children have musical talent and the school does not help them to develop it. I think that the school does not understand the importance of such hobbies. In fact hobbies protect children from deviation because it absorbs all their power, so it is very useful for the child and society."*

The new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie who have their children in foreign language schools believe that their children are not taking enough religious studies. At the same time they complained about the lack of activities such as music and sports, which are very important for the cultural capital of these classes.

The new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie who have their children in foreign language school believe that government control over these schools, in terms of controlling the amount of money that these school charge as fees so that they cannot take the real cost they need to improve teaching methods and pay high salaries for teachers, is affecting the quality of education their children receive. A father who is a captain of a ship criticized government control:

*"I like the discipline and the high standard of teaching in my children's school. But I do not like the financial problems that the school suffers because of the government control of fees in this kind of school. They force the school to charge less than the real cost and then the school cannot improve its methods of teaching or pay high salaries to teachers. This situation forces the school to ask for more money from parents in the form of donations."*

A father who is an entrepreneur made the same point:

*"What I do not like in the foreign language school is the financial problems. This problem is created by the government supervision of these schools. They impose some regulations on these schools such as*

*fees. The school is forced to take a certain amount of money which is not sufficient for the school expenses, and that is the reason the school asks for parent's donations."*

So, the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie are against government control of foreign language schools, which they believe is preventing these schools from improving their education standard.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class have expressed problems of their own. For example, there is the problem of the bad results of the school, which the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie did not mention, while the working class expressed a problem of her own which is the school asking for things that they cannot afford for their children, like sports uniform and books.

A wife of a bus conductor in the Ministry of Transport said,

*"I like my children's school for the sake of the school because it educates children, but I do not like that they asked for things like books and sports clothes which we cannot afford."*

The general picture which members of different class positions have drawn of the actual provision of education for their children shows clear class differences, where the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie, who have their children in foreign language and government language schools, believe that their children are getting a high standard of education in terms of the content they study and because they study all subjects in a foreign language. They also believe that their children are well disciplined at school. However, they feel that their children are deprived in certain areas of education like music and sports where the school concentrate more on the academic subjects. Those who have their children in foreign language school believe that their children are deprived of religious subjects. They also believe that the government control of foreign education is depriving their children of even better education opportunities, since government



restrictions prevent these school from improving their education service.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class feel that their children are disciplined at school, but they did not say that their children are getting good education. They believe that their children are neglected academically and socially by their teachers, the school results are not good, they are forced to give their children private lessons which they cannot afford and for the working class they find it very difficult to afford the cost of books and sports equipment for their children.

ii) Parents' relations with the school

Parents' relations with the school will be studied in terms of two points:

- Parents' relations with teachers, and
- Parents' evaluation of parents' committee influence.

Parents' relations with teachers

Table No.17 summarizes different types of relations with teachers, which reflect differences in class power, and tensions in relation to the school. The table indicates that more than fifty percent of the three bourgeois classes have no problems with teachers. Only a quarter of working class parents were of a similar opinion.

Those who have problems with teachers expressed different aspects which they do not like in their relations with teachers. The new petty bourgeoisie criticized teachers for believing they make no mistakes, for not giving enough time for discussion, or because they feel frustrated after they talk to teachers.

A father who is an engineer criticized teachers who do not accept any criticism. He said,

*"If my children have any problem which is usually*

Table 17: Parents' Relations with Teachers

Different types of relations	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
No problem in dealing with teachers	16	17	5	4	7	6	3	3
Teachers believe they never make mistakes	1	4						
Not all teachers are the same	1	1	1	2		2	1	3
Not enough time to discuss problems	3	3						
I always feel frustrated after I talk to them	1	1						
They don't cooperate sincerely							1	
I leave older brothers and sisters to deal with teachers			1	1			1	
I don't like the way they talk to me							2	
We have no problems		2	1	1				
I leave it to the other parent	9	3	1	1	2	1	3	3
I feel embarrassed to face them								2

*related to their achievement, I go to see their teachers. I discuss with them, but teachers never accept any criticism of their work. They think they are the only people who understand in education."*

A father who is the head of a government department complained that teachers are unfair in their evaluations of children's standards. He said,

*"When I discussed with teachers my children's standard and achievement, they always evaluate the child down in order to force parents to give children private lessons. I always feel frustrated after I talked to teachers."*

Another different criticism came from a new petty bourgeois father, who criticized the way teachers treat the working class parents in his children's school, which is a government free school. He said,

*"I have no problem in dealing with teachers, but I do not like the way teachers treat the uneducated parents. Teachers always attack their children and consider them doing very badly at school. I see that parents cannot argue with teachers and cannot defend their children."*

The comments of the new petty bourgeoisie reflect a great deal of tense relations between this class and teachers, since the parents of this class believe that they are educated, and they trust themselves to argue with teachers who feel that they are challenged by parents.

For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the majority see themselves as having no problem in dealing with teachers, and it seems that they do not have the same level of tension in relations that one finds between teachers and the new petty bourgeoisie who are very critical to teachers behaviour. The traditional petty bourgeoisie, with the working class, may be less challenging to teachers because they have their own way of avoiding dealing with teachers, since they often prefer to send their educated children to deal with them.

A father who is the owner of a small shop, is literate, and has three children with university degrees, said,

*"If there is anything to discuss about the children's achievement at school, we preferred the older sister to go and discuss it with teachers. I think my daughters can do it better because they are educated."*

The working class reflect another kind of relations with teachers, whereby they may completely avoid discussion with them. A mother who is the wife of a cleaner said,

*"I do not go to visit my children's school, even when they send for us. I know this is wrong because we should go and asked about the children, but I*

*feel embarrassed to go and talk to them."*

The big bourgeoisie in general have no real problems with, or challenges to, teachers. However, they reflect a class example of the importance of cultural capital in dealing with teachers. An example is a wealthy family; the father is owner of a factory with a middle level of technical education and the mother is illiterate. The family has her five children in foreign language schools. The mother described how teachers treat her badly because she is not educated:

*"When my children have a problem I go to see their teachers. They treat me very badly because I am not educated. My children have problems in studying foreign language and I cannot help them and the teachers always tell me, if you cannot help them why don't you take them out of this school to any government school. I feel humiliated and I come back home in a very bad condition."*

Discussion with members of different class positions has shown that there is a class difference in relations with teachers and in the opportunity of different class positions to follow up their children's performance at school. The discussion also shows the importance of cultural capital in the direct relations between teachers and parents. It seems that the new petty bourgeoisie are able to a fair extent to follow up their children's performance at school. However, this is done with much tension between parents and teachers, who both stand at the same class position and share the same cultural capital. Teachers are more challenged by this class which considers that they stand on the same ground with teachers and that they are qualified to argue with teachers about educational matters.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie are able to follow up their children's performance at school with no open challenge to teachers since parents themselves avoid contacting teachers and send their educated children on their behalf, which supports the idea that cultural capital is important in forming relations between parents and teachers. This point can be followed and reinforced in the case of the big bourgeoisie

who may have the economic capital but not the cultural capital, which in this case puts teachers in a stronger position in dealing with this fraction of the big bourgeoisie who are uneducated. The working class seems to be the group which has the least opportunity to follow up their children's performance, and in some cases withdraw altogether from the situation of facing teachers.

#### Parents' committee

The discussion of the role of parent's committee, based on parents' beliefs about the reality of the committee, moves the discussion from the level of personal relations between teachers and parents to the collective level of relations between members of different classes and the school. This will lead to the discussion of the amount of influence and power that social classes can practice at that level of relation to the school.

Table 18: Membership of Parents' Committee

	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
I'm not a member but I attend meetings	7	5		1	4	2	1	
I'm a member	4	1			1			
I'm not a member and I don't go	17	24	9	8	4	7	8	11
I used to go but I've stopped	3	1					2	

The actual attendance and membership of the parent's committee is very limited among members of the sample as Table No.18 clearly indicates. In spite of the limited attendance at the committee, parents were asked to give their views about what they think is the reality of parent's committee in terms of the kind of problems they believe the committee discusses, and

the power and authority the committee has in school affairs.

**Table 19: Problems that Parents' Committees Discuss**

Kinds of problem	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Financial	24	24	8	6	4	7	7	4
Teacher / student problems	16	15	3	3	5	5	5	4
Students' achievement	4	6	2	2	2	1	3	3
Courtesy call		1						
School services								
Sanction of the school fund					1			
I don't know	1				1	1	2	3

In identifying the committee activities Table No.19 shows that financial problems are believed to be one of the important issues discussed by the committee. This issue, as the table indicates, has been identified by a majority from different class positions. After that come teacher's and student's problems and student achievement, along with other minor issues.

**Table 20: Parents' Committee's Influence**

Has it influence?	New petty bourgeoisie		Trad'nal petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Yes	8	8	4	1	6	4	4	5
No	22	20	5	6	2	4	3	1
Don't know	1	3		2	1	1	4	5

In terms of the committee's power and influence at school Table No.20 shows a class division in their views about the amount of authority and influence the committee has.

The majority of the new petty bourgeoisie believe that the committee has no influence at school, for reasons that are given in Table No.21. The reasons show that people believe that the committee is a formal one and has no real authority. This case was made by a quarter of the parents in this class. The belief that the committee has no influence because the school and education department has all the authority was cited by a similar number of parents. A slightly smaller proportion felt that the headmaster/headmistress had all the power.

The new petty bourgeoisie are divided in their views about the authority and the power the committee has. Those who believe in the role and influence of the committee concentrate on the role the committee has in solving the school's financial problems. A mother who is an employee of the Ministry of Culture and has her son in a government language school said,

*"I do not attend the meetings but I think they discuss student's problems, methods of teaching and the teacher's standard. They give suggestions like using educational aids and building new classrooms. The parent's committee is very important. It has important role to play in such problems. For example, they collected money to buy educational aids like T.V. and equipment for teaching English."*

This view reflects the aspect that parents believe that the committee can achieve something which is usually financial. However, this is not the only view about the committee. Other parents believe that they have very a limited role and they cannot challenge the authority of the school staff.

A father who is an accountant and has his children in a government language school shows how it is difficult for parents to raise certain problems and topics in the committee:

**Table 21: Parents' Assessment of the Reasons the Committees have No Influence**

Reasons	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
It's a formal committee	8	8	2	2	1	1	2	
School and education departments have all the power	9	7			1	2	1	1
Headmaster / headmistress dominates	5	5	3	4		3		
It has influence	8	8	4	1	6	2	4	5
Don't know	1	3		2	1	1	4	5

*"Parent's committee discuss financial problems, or how teachers explain lessons. But I cannot raise or discuss how teachers force students to take private lessons because I do not want problems for my children with the school."*

A father who is an accountant and has his children in a foreign language school described the relations within the committee and the limits of the parents' influence:

*"I attended the meetings. We discuss financial problems, teachers' and students' problems. The committee has influence in solving financial problems, but has no control over teachers or the teaching process. We cannot, for example, move teachers from the school. Parents become members partly by election and partly by personal relations. The headmistress chooses people whom she knows are going to help her in financial problems."*

So, the new petty bourgeoisie are divided in their views about what the parent's committee can do and the power it has at school. Some believe that it has influence through solving the financial crisis of the school, others believe that the authority is still mainly in the hands of the school administration.



For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the majority believe that the parents committee has no influence. This was the view of more than half the fathers and two thirds of the mothers. They believe it a formal committee, and that the headmaster or headmistress has all the authority.

A father who is the owner of a photography shop and has all his children in government language school said,

*"I have no time to attend the parents' committee, but I think they discuss financial problems, students activities and achievement. They have no influence because the final decision is always for Ministry of Education."*

For the big bourgeoisie, the situation seems different; the majority believe that the committee has influence, and a large percentage actually attend the committee. The big bourgeoisie believe in the committee influence and complain of the obstacles put by the government supervision of the school. A father who owns a factory and has his children in a foreign language school, attends the parents' committee. He said,

*"I am a committee member. The committee is very strong and powerful at school because of the financial problems. Parents have to pay. For example we developed all the school educational aids, we bought T.V. and video which the school could not afford from its own budget. I think the main problem we suffer is the government restrictions on the school because the education department always ask schools where they got the money from, because what we pay is not included in the school fees."*

Another father who is an entrepreneur and has his children in foreign language school said,

*"The committee has a very important role to play. Actually without parents' financial support the school would not be able to improve its education service. We pay a lot of money and since we pay that money parents asked to buy part of the school shares but the school refused."*

It seems that the economic capital of the big bourgeoisie is effective and gives more confidence to this class in their collective action in the school, where they know that the

school can not do without their money.

For the working class it can be noticed that the majority said that they do not know about the parents' committee and that a very high percentage do not attend the meetings.

The working class expressed a different way of looking at the parents' committee. They think it is not their business since the committee asks for money which they can not afford.

A father who is a welder in a foreign company said,

*"I attend parents' meetings. We discuss the school financial problems. At the end of the meeting the school administration ask parents to pay money to repair school furniture, but parents cannot always pay what the school asks for."*

Another father who is a cleaner expressed the same point:

*"I do not attend the parents' committee because they always ask for money which I cannot pay. This kind of meeting is not for poor people like us."*

The discussion shows a class difference in the views about their own collective action and role in school affairs. It seems that the big bourgeoisie are more confident about their role and influence in the school since they can afford a lot of money to solve financial problems. At this point it can be argued that the economic capital of the class is very influential and effective in collective action, more than the cultural capital of the new petty bourgeoisie. This is also clear example in the case of the working class who have stated clearly that they do not attend the meetings because they have no money to pay.

In terms of the parents' committee's influence in different types of schools, it seems that parents' committees in foreign language schools have more influence than those in government free and government language schools. This can be explained in terms of the reliance of the foreign language schools on parents' donations to provide a better education service,

which matches with the fact that parents in foreign language schools are well off and can afford to pay more than the parents of children in government schools.

### (B) Parents' critique of school knowledge

When people were asked about the most important aspects of the curriculum, as Table No.22 indicates, the majority from all classes said that all subjects are important in forming the child's knowledge and it is important to know about different subjects. However, parents from the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie were very critical of the content of the curriculum. Their critique covered different subjects like Arabic and religion, which have direct and explicit ideological messages, and other subjects like science and mathematics which have less ideological messages.

**Table 22: Parents' Identification of the Most Important Subjects their Children Study**

Subjects	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Science and mathematics			1	1			1	2
Religion and Arabic				1			4	4
Foreign language			1	1				
All subjects	31	31	7	6	9	9	6	5

For the new petty bourgeoisie, a variety of criticisms were mentioned, for different subjects. In religion, the curriculum was criticized as unsuitable for the children's age (6-11 years at primary level), and that the content of the verses chosen from Quran were influencing children's personalities in a negative way since it was intimidating them. A father who is a university professor said,

*"The curriculum is overcrowded and very long. Sometimes subjects are not suitable for children's*

*age for example, some of the Quranic verses are not suitable especially the ones that discuss marriage relations, reward and punishment. These verses intimidate children."*

The Arabic curriculum was criticized for being boring to children or as full of fabulous stories, which would be more appropriate to younger children and does not help to develop the children's mentality. A mother who is an accountant raised that criticism of the Arabic curriculum:

*"In Arabic curriculum some lessons are under the child's age. For example in the Arabic reading book, there is a story call 'the knot finger' which is about a very tiny boy whose size is just a knot finger. I think this story is under the mental age of eleven year old children and does not help to develop children's way of thinking. There are many things in the Arabic curriculum which I consider to be fabulous."*

So, new petty bourgeoisie criticisms of religion and Arabic curriculum concentrated on the influence of these subjects in forming children's personality. It shows that the personality created by these subjects are intimidated and the mentality formulated on myth.

The critique of science and mathematics takes a different approach from that of Arabic and religion. There is no problem with the content of science and mathematics subjects as such, or with the influence of these subjects in formulating children's mentality, since they have less ideological messages. The critique of mathematics and science is concentrated upon the size of the curriculum and the distribution of the subjects through different level of education. A father who is a university professor, criticized the complicated science curriculum:

*"In the science curriculum children take information which is higher than their mental age. For example in the sixth grade at primary level, children study in science subjects about plants, animals, alkalies and acids. I think these subjects together are too much and very long for a child to learn all of them in one year."*

A father criticized the practical parts of the curriculum which are part of basic education:

*"Basic education subjects like crafts and agriculture should start at the preparatory level of basic education. At primary level, it is a waste of time since children should concentrate on the basics of reading, writing and mathematics."*

The criticism of the science curriculum reflects a broader problem of organization within the curriculum. A mother who is an employee in the Ministry of Culture criticized the long and complicated curriculum:

*"Curriculum is very overcrowded. I mean by overcrowded that it is very long and it contains many subjects. For example, in science they study sound, light and magnetism. I believe that if they gave them one branch only, that would be better and more concentrated. I give you another example from history. They cover long historical periods from the beginning of Islam until modern times. Because of this long curriculum children cannot concentrate and understand; they only memorize and then they forget all the information after the academic year."*

Basic education subjects were criticized as irrelevant and useless. A mother who is a bank employee said,

*"All subjects are important, but basic education subjects like agriculture and industry have no value for children. It is a waste of time especially for children who are in urban areas."*

The new petty bourgeoisie's critique of the curriculum shows that they believe that all subjects are important in forming a child's mentality and personality, so they prefer a wide range of information for their children. However, the content and the organization of the curriculum was under attack.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie identified all subjects as important. In contrast with the new petty bourgeoisie the traditional petty bourgeoisie did not introduce a wide range of criticisms of different aspects of the curriculum. However, they concentrated on basic education subjects. They have different views among themselves about the value of basic education.

A mother and housewife who has her children in a government language school said,

*"All subjects are important, but I cannot give all subjects the same importance. Basic education subjects like agriculture and domestic economy are less important than languages and mathematics which the children are going to carry on studying."*

An opposite view of basic education, which stressed the importance of manual and practical work, was expressed by a father who is a tailor:

*"All subjects are very important. I find basic education subjects are very important because practical activities in these subjects can absorb children's energy and use it in productive way."*

The traditional petty bourgeoisie, do not have a unified position on basic education subjects, since many of them are themselves in a position where they look at the new petty bourgeoisie and imitate them in having their children in private language education, in which case basic education subjects are seen as irrelevant. At the same time, another part of them is still very close to manual work and they have their children in government schools, so basic education for them is relevant and might have a positive impact by using children's energies in productive ways.

The big bourgeoisie mainly evaluated the curriculum, in a similar way to the new petty bourgeoisie. That is, Arabic was criticized as full of fairy stories, mathematics and science were criticized as being difficult, long and using teaching methods which do not use laboratories and experiments with children only watching teachers doing experiments. Basic education was attacked as well as irrelevant. A mother and housewife who is a university graduate said,

*"I believe that basic education subjects are not important. They waste children's time. The school should give all the time to, and put stress on, language and mathematics."*

The big bourgeoisie, however showed some differences from new

petty bourgeoisie in their reaction to the whole point of criticizing the curriculum. That is, the new petty bourgeoisie seemed more confident and more acquainted with the knowledge of the curriculum and deal with it as part of their own cultural capital, while the big bourgeoisie, especially those who are not highly educated, do not have the same confidence to criticize the curriculum. A father who is a factory owner, with a middle level of technical education, and has all his children in foreign language schools, said,

*"All subjects introduced to children are very important. I cannot criticize the curriculum because the curriculum is designed by specialists who understand children's mentalities and abilities, so they give the amount and level of information suitable for children."*

The working class, compared with other class positions, can be considered as alienated from this area of discussion and debate around the curriculum, due to the fact of the high illiteracy rate. However, those who know how to read and write, might have a general idea about what their children are doing. They identified the science subjects, like other classes, as difficult but they explained this in a completely different way from the three bourgeois classes. The working class considers difficult subjects as a means of eliminating numbers of children from education. A father who is a fitter in a public sector company and has primary level education said,

*"All subjects are important, but some subjects are higher than children's level. For example, science subjects which were designed for preparatory level are now taught to the primary level. They do so in order to make it difficult for children to continue and then eliminate the number."*

This comment from a working class parent proved that science and mathematics are seen by all classes as difficult and complicated for their children's age. However the understanding of the reasons lying behind this was different between the three bourgeois classes on one side and the working class on the other side. For the three bourgeois classes, difficult curriculum was understood as part of the

process of developing and modernizing the curriculum, and if the curriculum was hard this is seen as a mistake in the design of curriculum. The working class saw this as an attack on their children's opportunities in carrying on education.

Comments of members of different classes about the complex curriculum of the primary level indicate that it favours those with high cultural capital, where the children of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie will be able to get parental help and if needed more help with private lessons, while working class children are deprived of both.

Parental evaluation of the importance of curriculum subjects is to a certain extent influenced by how much these subjects contribute to the children's academic future. Subjects like basic education are irrelevant for making a professional future to the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie.

### (C) Extra Tuition

This is part of the educational provision given to children. The discussion of extra tuition will concentrate on families' strategies to secure provision for their children and the influence of the family economic and cultural capital on that. Private lessons will be discussed as a type of extra tuition with reference to how parents perceive the reasons for private lessons.

Extra tuition can be given in different ways, by parents if they are educated, by private lessons given by teachers which is more expensive, or by extra tuition organized by the school after the end of the school day. Discussion with the parents shows why, in their view, extra tuition is needed, especially private lessons, and what strategies they follow to be able to afford their children the maximum opportunity, as well as the reasons behind this phenomenon.



**Table 23: Parents' Position on Helping their Children to Study**

Do you help?	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Yes	25	25	3	4	6	7	5	1
No	6	6	6	5	3	2	6	10

Giving extra tuition to children may involve the parents themselves, but this depends upon their own cultural capital. Table No.23 shows that a large number of new petty bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie families help their children, while the number is less among the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class, especially among working class mothers, only one in ten of whom help their children. One important reason given by working class and petty bourgeois parents as to why they could not help their children was their own illiteracy. Another reply came from the two classes which reflects the lack of confidence of some traditional petty bourgeoisie and working class parents in helping their children even though they know how to read and write, but they feel that they are not educated enough to do so. The reasons given by the new petty bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie were that they have no time to do it. All reasons are summarized in Table No.24

Kinds of help that parents give are shown in Table No.25. For the new petty bourgeoisie fathers and mothers there is a wide range of subjects that they can help their children to study, which almost cover all areas of curriculum. The big bourgeoisie are helping in many areas, while areas for the traditional petty bourgeoisie concentrate mainly in helping in reading, science and mathematics. For the working class the main help they give is in reading.

The figures show that the children of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie are getting, in addition to their privilege of being in private schools, a wide range

**Table 24: Parents' Reasons for not Helping their Children to Study**

Reason	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
I can't read or write		4	1	4		1	4	9
I have no time	5	1	2		3	1		
I'm not interested	1			1				
They should depend on themselves		1						
I'm not well educated			3				2	

of help in different subjects which gives them more chance to carry on successfully to higher levels.

i) Private lessons

As mentioned before, this is the most expensive way of providing extra tuition, and economic capital is an important factor in providing this kind of help for children. Table No.26 shows how different types of extra tuition are divided between classes. The big bourgeoisie families mainly give extra tuition by teachers; the new petty bourgeoisie employ a mixture of teachers and organized groups by the school, and the same is true for the traditional petty bourgeoisie, while the working class has the lowest number using teachers.

The discussion of private lessons included the reasons for this phenomenon, how it affects equal opportunities and how the new petty bourgeoisie in particular invest heavily in their children's education.

ii) Purpose of private lessons

Members of the sample were asked about the purpose of private lessons, and why they give this kind of tuition to their

Table 25: Kinds of Help Parents Give to their Children

Kind of help	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Read with them	4	10	2	2	2		4	1
Help in all subjects	1	2				1		
Explain difficult points	1	2						
Arabic	1	5		1		1		
Science and mathematics	17	4	2	2	6	1	1	
Human science	2	8				1		
Foreign language	6	2				2		
Doing homework			1	1				

children. The three bourgeois classes were asked about their own experience with this kind of tuition. Since the working class who are using this kind of tuition is only a very small percentage, they were asked to explain why they thought other people give this kind of tuition. Table No.27 summarizes people's reasons for giving private lessons. The table shows the competitive nature of the education system, especially for the new petty and the big bourgeoisie who give their children private lessons to be ahead. The same competitive nature appears again when they say that it depends upon the child's standard, which means that in all cases they give private lessons to all children. If they are of a high standard they give them lessons to make them higher; if they are of a low standard they give lessons to make them equal.

A new petty bourgeoisie father who is university professor, explained how he forced his children who are excellent to take private lessons:

*"I force my children to take private lessons although they are excellent at school. I want them to get high grades especially in mathematics, science and English."*

The comment of this professor reflects the competitive nature

Table 26: Sources of Extra Tuition

	New petty bourgeoisie	Traditional petty bourgeoisie	Big bourgeoisie	Working class
Teachers	13	4	7	2
Lessons organized by the school	11			3
Teachers and organized groups	2	4		2
By the mosque or church		1		

of the system and how the new petty bourgeoisie concentrate on certain subjects like mathematics, science and English, which are important for preparing for professions, which is what the new petty bourgeoisie usually want for their children.

Table 27: Purposes of Private Lessons

Purpose	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
To remain equal with other children	11	10	4	6	2	2	3	5
To move ahead of other children	11	9	2	2	3	4	5	5
It depends upon the child's standard	8	9	3	1	4	2	3	1
Sometimes to satisfy the teacher	1	3						

Giving private lessons is not always an easy task for the new petty bourgeoisie to do, especially those who have their children in foreign language schools, and have limited income as employees. This reflects how foreign education has an important cultural meaning for this class and how it worthwhile for them to make sacrifices. An example of those

who invest heavily and sacrifice for their children is a family which pays most of its spare income for their children's education. They have two in a foreign school and one in a government language school. The parents are university graduates, work as tax collectors, with a monthly income of £200 for each. The mother said,

*"My children take private lessons in mathematics. Lessons are very expensive because all subjects are in French. We pay £10 for one hour teaching. We pay about £200 per month for lessons. I consider myself and my husband working for the account of our children's education. We cannot save anything; it all goes to the school and the lessons."*

The same point was expressed by a family where both parents are university graduates, both working in the government. The father has a monthly income of £250 and the mother £150. They have two girls in foreign language school. The father said,

*"I help my children in mathematics but one of them takes private lessons in French, science and Arabic. We pay for her £170 pounds a month; the other takes lessons in a group organized by the school and we pay for her £50 pounds a month."*

The new petty bourgeoisie mentioned a reason for giving private lessons which reflects tension with and the power of teachers, where they force students to take lessons since they have 40% of the year's work of the children. One mother said,

*"I help my children. I study with them Arabic and human science. I give them private lessons in English. It costs about £30 per month. Actually my children do not need lessons, but want to satisfy their teachers. The cause of the lessons is the low salary of the teachers. At the same time parents are forced to give lessons to the children because class teacher give 40% of the grades as year-work and parents try to satisfy teachers."*

One can recognize the great effort by the new petty bourgeoisie to keep their children ahead in the competitive education system and how far some families will go, the major part of their investment for the future going to their children's education.

The big bourgeoisie share with the new petty bourgeoisie the fact that they give private lessons for their children to be ahead, but for the big bourgeoisie there is a relationship between the economic standard of the family and the purpose of private lessons. They consider that a rich family can afford private lessons usually to keep children ahead, while, in the case of the family which has a low income, it usually pays for lessons just to keep their children equal. A father who is engineer working as entrepreneur said,

*"I help my children study mathematics, and their mother helps them to study French because of her educational background. They take private lessons in Arabic. I think that students who take private lessons, do that for different reasons. If they are from a wealthy family, it is usually in order to be ahead, if they are from an ordinary family it is just to remain equal."*

The big bourgeoisie also present the case of the family when it has the economic capital but not the cultural capital to teach children. This is represented in a case of a wealthy family where the father has a middle level of technical education and he is the owner of a factory, while the mother is illiterate. The family has five children in foreign language schools. The father said,

*"My children take private lessons in English, French and science. They cost me £500 pounds a month for the five children. The reason I give them private lessons is that we are uneducated. We share this problem with many other families who are obliged to give private lessons because the family is not educated, so we cannot give any help to our children by ourselves."*

It can be noticed that the big bourgeoisie do not complain so much about how much they pay for private lessons as the new petty bourgeoisie, who pay a higher proportion of their income for these lessons.

For the traditional petty bourgeoisie the aim of private lessons is to keep their children up to the average, which to a certain extent differs from the aim of the new petty bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie. Nearly half the fathers and

two thirds of the mothers concur in this view. The cost of private lessons for them is less than the other two bourgeois classes, since they mainly have their children in government schools and they rely on groups organized by the school more than the two other bourgeois classes.

The working class generally do not have private lessons for their own children, and they believe that private lessons are given to children to put them ahead. For themselves they expressed the difficulty they face in affording any kind of help for their children.

A father who is a cleaner in the Ministry of Transport said,

*"I cannot help my children, because I cannot read and write. The only help I can give to them and can afford is a group organized by the school. I pay £7 per month for one daughter who is in preparatory school. We could not pay for the other one who is in primary school. We could not pay for both of them to take lessons to be ahead."*

Within the working class there are differences in income which make a difference to what they can afford for their children. A welder in a foreign company with monthly income of £500, can afford private lessons for his children. He said:

*"Two of my children take private lessons, it costs me about £40 per month for both of them. They start the lessons from the summer holiday. Students take lessons to remain equal. The cause of the lessons is the low salary of teachers and private lessons is the only way to get more money."*

Another example of a privilege for a working class family is to have one of the children educated to a middle level of education so he/she can help other brothers and sisters. An example of that is the family of a waiter who has one of his daughters educated and working as a primary school teacher. The father said,

*"I cannot help my children in study because I cannot read and write. But my daughter who is a teacher helps them, so I do not need to give them private lessons. Teachers are the cause of private lessons. These lessons are unfair and they make education fee-paying in an indirect way."*

Another family, where the father is a bus conductor with an income of £80 per month, has seven children, three of whom are in primary education. The mother said that it was very difficult to find the money for private lessons, and that she doubted whether her children would be able to continue in school:

*"I cannot help my children to study because I am not educated. I give my children private lessons only in the last month before the exam because I cannot afford to pay. It costs me £27 a month which is too much for us. All my neighbours say that my children will never continue their studies because we cannot give them private lessons. The cause of the private lessons is teachers who want money."*

So, the working class are deprived of both the cultural and the economic capital to afford their children extra tuition.

### iii) Reasons for Private Lessons

After discussing with people their own purposes in paying for private lessons, they were asked to identify from their view point what they believe are the reasons why lessons exist. Their replies are summarized in Table No.28. The following reasons represent the general trends expressed by the respondents from different class positions:

#### 1. Teachers

The first reason given by all parents from different classes was that teachers want to get more money, so they give private lessons. This response received a very high level of agreement among all classes, with more than three quarters of the new petty bourgeoisie agreeing to this view, and a similar proportion of other classes.

#### 2. The school conditions

The sample gave a group of reasons concerning school facilities and conditions like the big number of students in the classroom (this was mainly identified by the new petty bourgeoisie), the short school day, accumulated difficulties with the curriculum, and not giving enough



Table 28: Reasons for Private Lessons

Reasons	New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Teachers want more money	26	23	5	5	9	7	11	10
Large classes	12	3	1	2	2	1		
Students not serious	4	8	3			1	1	2
Competition for grades	5	3		2	2	1		
Short school day	1	1						
New wealthy people encourage private lessons		2	1	1				
Overloaded curricula	1	1				1		
Parents have no time for their children				1	1			
Schools don't care enough			1					

care to students.

### 3. The competitive education system

Parents have identified the very competitive education system and hence the competition to get high grade which encourages or forces students and parents into private lessons. This was mentioned mainly by the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie.

### 4. Parents

Parents were seen as a cause of the problem in two respects; either condemning those new wealthy people who have money, but are not educated, so they can buy private lessons for a very high price (this was identified by the new petty bourgeoisie), or suggesting that parents are very busy and cannot help the children (this was mentioned by the traditional petty bourgeoisie).

#### 5. Students themselves

Parents condemned the students as not being very serious in their studies, and careless. That was seen as a reason why they need lessons (this was mentioned by the new petty bourgeoisie). It can be noticed that mothers are more likely to blame children themselves of negligence than are fathers, which may be because mothers are doing most work and study with children.

It can be noticed that the working class concentrated their reasons on the personal aspects of the problem, like teachers and students, while other classes gave a wide range, including objective reasons concerning school conditions and the education system.

#### iv) Parents' Opinion about Private Lessons

When parents were asked about how they saw private lessons in terms of educational equality and inequality, the majority from all classes have the consensus that private lessons affect equal opportunities and that they are unfair. The two exceptions to that consensus came from the new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie, with between ten and twenty percent of the parents arguing that the system of private lessons was fair. The new petty bourgeoisie who took this position argued that private lessons did not affect educational opportunities, while the traditional petty bourgeoisie said that private lessons are fair because it is the ambition of parents that their children should get high grades, so it is fair to pay for that ambition.

#### (D) Other Types of Non-formal Education:

The discussion of extra tuition has illustrated class differences in appropriating more education for their children. However, education and extra tuition are only part of a wide range of other cultural and social privileges which can be provided for the children, in particular by the new petty and

big bourgeoisie, who try to provide more non-formal types of education, which appear in buying books for children in different subjects such as story books, religious books and stories in English and French to improve their children's language. Table No.29 shows the variety of choices that the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie afford for their children and the limited choice for the traditional petty bourgeoisie, and the extraordinarily high percentage of the working class families who cannot afford any books for their children at all.

**Table 29: Kinds of Children's Books in the Family**

	New petty bourgeoisie	Traditional petty bourgeoisie	Big bourgeoisie	Working class
Children's stories and magazines	31	6	8	3
Religious books	4		1	
English or French stories	6	1	2	
We don't buy books we borrow them	1		1	1
No children's books		3		7

Children from the new petty bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie background also have more opportunities and different ways to spend leisure time which includes travel, sport in the clubs, reading and watching T.V., while, as Table No.30 indicates, the working class children have one way of spending their leisure time which is exclusive to them, i.e. children go to work with the father during the summer holiday. The working class share with the petty bourgeoisie and the new petty bourgeoisie the category of "street play", but while this is important for the children of half the working class families, it is only practised by the children of one in thirty of the families of the new petty bourgeoisie.

These two examples of books and leisure time show the class differences in getting access to the cultural wealth of

Table 30: Ways in which Children Spend their Leisure Time

	New petty bourgeoisie	Traditional petty bourgeoisie	Big bourgeoisie	Working class
Watching T.V.	16	6	5	8
Go to a club	19	4	5	
Cinema / children's theatre				
Street play	1	2		5
We encourage them to read	3			
Travelling in the summer holiday	13		4	
Studying the Quran at the mosque	1			
Activities with the church	1	1		
Boys work with me during the summer holiday				2

society. It is not completely free and open for all people.

### III. Children's future

Parents were not only asked about their children's opportunities at the present, but also in the future, and the image they have for their children's future. Predicting their children's future members of different social classes gave a number of responses. The general trend of class responses reflect three ways of looking at the future.

First, a group of the respondents said that they were not worried about their children's future because they have faith and they know that the future is in God's hand.

Second, another group believed that their children can have a future secured by their education and qualifications, where they see education as offering their children the opportunity to find a job and to work either in Egypt or abroad.

Table 31: Parents' who Believe the Future is in God's Hands

New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
4	1	2	3	2	1	1	4

Table 32: Parents' who Believe Education is a Way of Securing their Children's Future

New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
17	19	3	2	5	4	3	1

Third, another group could not give a clear vision of the future because, as they said, the increasing economic and social problems make the future more uncertain for their children, so they could not predict what the future was going to be like.

Table 33: Parents' who Believe it is Difficult to Predict their Children's Future

New petty bourgeoisie		Traditional petty bourgeoisie		Big bourgeoisie		Working class	
Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
7	11	4	4	4		2	3

If we look at the specific replies given by members of different social classes, it can be seen that respondents from all classes divided between the three responses set out in the tables. However, some points of emphasis can be found. For the new petty bourgeoisie the stress is upon the role of education in securing a good future for their children. They share this view with the big bourgeoisie, while the traditional petty bourgeoisie stressed the difficulty of predicting the future

because of the economic crisis. The working class emphasized different points, with the fathers paying attention to the role of education in securing a good future, and the mothers stressing that the future is in God's hands. Fewer of them believe in the positive role in securing the future of their children than are to be found in any other class.

Yet another class specific response can be identified, mainly in the responses of big and new petty bourgeoisie, which is their vision of their children's future, in terms of emigrating abroad and making their future outside Egypt. This was expressed by one in ten of the new petty bourgeoisie fathers and nearly a quarter of big bourgeoisie fathers. These two classes could see their children's future in a wider perspective which extends beyond the Egyptian society to abroad. This emphasizes the power of the cultural capital of these two classes which appears as a strong asset which can secure them and their children a future at the local and international level. This picture can be further illustrated when we look at the working class, who expressed their views of their own, that their children 'have no future', and that what they can predict is derived from the very harsh conditions they live in today. This was the opinion of nearly half the fathers and over a quarter of the mothers. This kind of harsh response reflects both economic and cultural deprivation.

The responses of members from different class positions reflect one of the characters of the cultural aspects of the class formation, which is the duality between the secular and the religious thought in perceiving the present and the future. This duality can be identified in the respondents' perceptions of the future as influenced by secular factors, such as education and economics, as well as by religious factors, which is God's will.

#### IV. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter is to study the actual provision of education, not only how it is distributed quantitatively, but also in qualitative terms, i.e. the dynamics of ideological and cultural aspects which have an influence on the cultural level of class formation. From the discussions in this chapter, some concluding remarks can be drawn.

##### (A) Social Advance and the Power of Cultural Capital

From the analysis of people's perspectives of opportunities for social advancement, and the factors which are responsible for advancement, some class cultural differences can be identified.

- The working class is conscious of the lack of opportunities which are available to their children, and they have a clear vision as to whether those opportunities exist or not. The bourgeois classes perceive they have good opportunities at the local level, in the school and local residential area. However, they recognise that they have less opportunities at the broader, societal level, because they know that others have higher incomes, social relations and contacts, and more power than themselves.
- When members of the sample were asked to arrange the factors affecting social advance in order of importance, the bourgeois classes put social and cultural factors such as religious belief and education above economic factors. Both the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie expressed the view that having money alone is not enough to secure social advancement. Indeed, on this point they criticized developments in the seventies, which enabled uneducated people to make a lot of money. They believe that money without cultural awareness cannot secure social advance. These two classes, which the

profile of the sample shows are those which have both high incomes and a high level of education, would appear to wish to maintain a distance between themselves and those who have only economic, but not cultural, capital.

- It has been argued that the seventies, with the open door policy, capitalist market and consumer boom, led to an increased emphasis on money as the only important thing. The responses of the bourgeois classes in the sample, however, indicate the exact opposite, and show the importance which these classes attach to education and being cultured.
- The working class attach more importance to economic factors in social advancement than any other class. This does not mean that they do not attach any importance to cultural aspects.

In general terms, the cultural power of the family background, religion and education are very clear and important factors for the new petty and big bourgeoisie and to a certain extent to the traditional petty bourgeoisie, who probably still emphasize the economic factor with the working class, but their views are held back by religious views.

#### (B) The Unequal Division of Educational Opportunities and Class Reproduction

The discussion has shown the unequal division of education between different class positions. The inequality appears in the kind of education that children from different class positions can enter, and the level of education they can reach. If one looks at that distribution on a class basis, one finds that all kinds of fee-paying education are effectively dominated by the new petty and big bourgeoisie, with a limited share from the traditional petty bourgeoisie, and the complete exclusion of the working class.



If one looks in particular at the working class education, some important characteristics which reflect the limited and low standard of the education they receive can be noticed.

- the highest level their children reached is technical secondary education, for only 6.3 per cent of their children, without any representation at university level.
- The working class have children in some categories which are exclusive to them like children who dropped out of the school after four years (12.5 per cent) and uneducated girls who are married (8.3 per cent), while the working class share with the traditional petty bourgeoisie the category of children who go to work after primary level (10.4 per cent for the working class, 5 per cent for the traditional petty bourgeoisie).

At university level, quite a large proportion of the new petty bourgeoisie and traditional petty bourgeoisie reach university, while the working class children are completely absent, and the maximum they reach is technical secondary education. Beside the high representation of the new petty bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie children in all kinds of fee paying education, these children enjoy more opportunities through the cultural capital of the family which represents itself in affording more types of non-formal education like reading books, travel and sports, while part of the working class children spend their leisure time of the summer holiday in working to increase family income.

The differences in the division of education opportunities has its qualitative implications which go beyond the quantitative one, whereby this mechanism of division of the education system works to reproduce the unequal class structure of society. The dynamics of reproduction was explained by Althusser, that students leave education at different levels and after spending different lengths of time at school. They leave school 'provided' with the ideology which suits the role they have to play in class society. So, according to the

explicit, unequal division of education, the children of the working class either drop out of school and join the world of work and become unskilled workers, or at best they reach technical education and become semi-skilled workers. The children of the three bourgeois classes usually carry on to the university level and then occupy the middle class positions of employees and professionals.

### (C) Class Membership and Demand for Type and Level of Education

The type of demand for education of the three bourgeois classes lies in different types of fee-paying education. In reality the big bourgeoisie could achieve their demands and send their children to fee-paying education, while the new petty bourgeoisie to a large extent could achieve that, and the traditional petty bourgeoisie could to a limited extent to send their children to fee-paying education. Other kinds of education, such as technical education, were rejected by the new petty and big bourgeoisie as a type of education for their children, since they consider it as a second chance: the working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie did not show any prejudice against this type of education.

In terms of continuation of education, respondents from different class positions wanted their children to go to the university. University education is over loaded with moral, cultural and economic values.

Respondents demands and choice of certain types of education and their rejection of others, reflect two important points:

- The present researcher would suggest that there will be a high level of frustration among the working class, who want university education for their children, while in reality the best their children achieve is technical secondary education.

- Class awareness of its identity at the cultural and ideological level tends to get clearer when approached via educational issues, where the choice and demand for education shows a clear distinction between academic and university education as 'middle class education' and technical 'working class education'.

(D) The duality of the Education System and Class Cultural Integration:

Discussions with the respondents around the value of different types of education and why people would choose certain types and reject others reflected class cultural tension created by the existing duality between Arabic/foreign, technical/academic and secular/religious education.

The cultural tension and conflict appears in the choice between foreign education and government language education and between secular and religious education. This tension mainly exists among the new petty bourgeoisie who find themselves in contradiction between what they should do as a Muslim in terms of educating their children in religion and what they actually do and educate their children according to the modern needs of society. This conflict does not exist among all class positions where, for example, the big bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie are clear about their choice of foreign education and have no cultural conflict about it. These differences among social classes in that matter reflect one of the contradictions of the class formation at the cultural level. That is, members from different class positions were clear about what constitutes middle class education and what they consider to be working class education which reflects a more defined class identity. However, this integration and identity seemed divided when respondents discussed and made decisions which involved their religious belief where the conflict between secular/religious and modern/traditional appears, and where different classes are divided between those who suffer the conflict and those

who do not.

#### (E) Educational Practices and the Power of Cultural Capital

The study of educational practices has involved the following points:

- parents' evaluation of positive and negative aspects of their children's school,
- parents' relation with the school and the role of parents' committee,
- parents' evaluation of school knowledge, and
- parents' views about extra tuition given to their children.

#### Parents' Evaluation of the Positive and Negative Aspects of School

In terms of the evaluation of the positive and negative aspects of their children's school, some class differences can be identified. For the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie who have their children in foreign language schools, they believe that their children are getting a high standard of education in terms of the content of the subjects they study, especially in foreign languages. However, they complain that their children are not getting enough religious studies and school activities are neglected. Those who have their children in government language schools believe that their children are getting a balanced education in Arabic, religion and a foreign language. However, they are not satisfied with the standard of teaching foreign languages in these schools and believe that the standards are better in foreign language schools. This reflects the frustration of those elements of the new petty bourgeoisie who wish to educate their children in what they consider a 'proper'

foreign language in a foreign school.

When the new petty and big bourgeoisie speak about the standard of education they mean general things including, discipline, quality of teachers, the social background of the children and the content of the subjects they study. It is worth noting that parents who consider that the content of the subjects in foreign language schools is higher than that in Arabic schools mainly attribute this to the language of instruction, where the content of subjects in the two types of schools is the same. This positive attitude towards instruction in foreign language is reinforced in their belief that mastering a foreign language is the mark of being well educated and cultured.

For the traditional petty bourgeoisie, their views about their children's school depend upon the type of school they have for their children. Those who have their children in foreign language or government language school reflect the same attitude as the new petty and big bourgeoisie, while those who have their children in free Arabic Schools share the same views with the working class who complain that their children are getting a low standard of teaching, bad school results, and teachers who are not giving children enough academic and social care.

#### Parents Relations with the School and the Relative Power of both Economic and Cultural Capital

Discussions with respondents from different class positions showed some class differences in relations with the school at the personal level represented in direct parent/teacher relations and at the collective level represented in the parents' committee influence.

At the personal level of the relation, it seems that the new petty bourgeoisie are able to follow up their children's performance at school but with a considerable level of tension

and challenge to teachers. In the case of the big bourgeoisie the problem in relation with the school appears when the family has the economic capital but not the cultural capital to deal with teachers and in this case teachers feel more dominant.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class may avoid contacting teachers and send their educated children to deal with them, which reinforces the point of having the cultural capital to deal with teachers.

At the level of collective relations with the school as it appears in the role of the parents' committee, it seems that the cultural capital retreats and gives way to the economic capital to operate, since schools are mainly suffering from shortage of resources. Consequently, the big bourgeoisie are more confident about their power and their relation with the school. While the new petty bourgeoisie are more powerful in their individual position to argue with teacher, they are not at the same level of power as the big bourgeoisie in their collective power, which is to a large extent influenced by their economic power.

For the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class, their collective action at school is very limited especially for the working class who believe that the committee is not their business since they cannot afford what the school asks for.

#### **Parents' Critique of the School Knowledge and the Influence of Cultural Capital**

Parents' critique of the school knowledge is represented in their views about the curriculum that their children study at school.

The views of respondents from different class positions show that they believe that all kinds of knowledge that children

get at school are very important in forming the child's mentality and knowledge. However, the content of most of the subjects was criticized by the new petty and big bourgeoisie. They mainly criticized subjects which, according to Althusser, have an explicit ideological message. According to Althusser, these are language and religion - Arabic and religion in the case of Egypt. They criticized the moral and ideological messages coming from these subjects which they evaluate as intimidating children and not helping to emancipate them from superstition. The critique of other subjects which have less explicit ideological messages, such as science and mathematics, concentrates on the organisation of the curriculum in terms of the size of the curriculum and its distribution through different education levels.

Basic education subjects were seen as irrelevant and they considered this kind of education as more suitable for children in rural environments. The views of the new petty and big bourgeoisie on different subjects reflect how the practical ideology representing itself in the explicit transmission of knowledge at school produces ideological effect in the form of parental attitudes and beliefs towards school knowledge. That is, in spite of the fact of the movement of basic education which aims at introducing integrated studies of academic and practical studies, members of the new petty and big bourgeoisie in particular still recognise school knowledge as divided between abstract academic subjects for the able talented students, and practical, technical subjects for less able students, mainly in rural areas. The traditional petty bourgeoisie did not introduce as wide a range of criticism as the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie. The parents have limited access to school knowledge which is influenced by their own level of education. The point which can be noticed about the traditional petty bourgeoisie is their division about basic education. It was seen by those who have their children in fee-paying schools from the same perspective as the new petty and big bourgeoisie, as irrelevant. But those who have their

children in free government school tend to see it in a positive way, that is, they see practical studies in basic education as important in absorbing children's energy and directing their activities to such productive practice.

The working class are almost excluded from the issue of evaluating school knowledge. However those who are more literate have different views about the complicated and difficult science and mathematics curricula. They consider the difficulty as a way to eliminate their children from education. The same point was seen by the new petty and big bourgeoisie in the context of developing and modernizing the curriculum. That is, it was thought that difficult curricula are a mistake in educational design. So, these views are reinforcing the importance of the cultural capital and how it works as a cultural power which may influence what is to be considered as 'relevant' or 'irrelevant' school knowledge and what is to be considered as a 'high' or 'low' standard of knowledge.

#### Extra Tuition

Extra tuition given to children reflects some of the economic and cultural aspects of the class formation in economic terms. When extra tuition is given in private lessons, this reflects the economic power of those who can afford it for their children, in particular the big and the new petty bourgeoisie. It reflects as well the heavy investment and sacrifice by the new petty bourgeoisie to educate their children, where they expect both cultural and economic return for this spending - cultural return in the form of being well educated and mastering a foreign language and economic return in terms of being able to work in the foreign sector.

Extra tuition also reflects the family cultural capital, where the new petty and big bourgeoisie in particular are able to use their own education background to afford more help for their children and to provide them with a wide range of help



in different subjects. The children of the working class are deprived of both parental help and private tuition, while the traditional petty bourgeoisie could secure for their children a standard of help which is better than that of the working class.

Extra tuition and the help that children get from their parents reinforces the issue of how the education system is an important force in the process of class reproduction, through family cultural capital, where children from new petty and big bourgeoisie background are inheriting from their families more cultural competences and skills which are important for school achievement and of which working class children are deprived.

#### (F) Children's Future

Members from different class positions have an image of their children's future influenced by religious, economic and educational factors. The religious belief appears when people answer that future is in God's hand, so one cannot give predictions about it. The economic crisis of the society appeared as an obstacle for perceiving the future and giving any expectations about how children's futures are going to be, since the economic crisis allows for no job opportunities.

Education appeared as a factor which is going to influence children's futures, especially in the view of the bourgeois classes who have strong belief that education will qualify their children and allow them to secure their future by finding a job, while the working class are not that sure about how education can help their children because of the difficulties that their children have at school.

Another view of the future was that emigration was a possibility for the future of their children. This was mainly introduced by the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie, while the working class was the only group which

had a very pessimistic vision of the future, since they could not see anybody taking responsibility for the future of their children. The serious pressure of the economic problem, the difficulties in educating their children and unemployment had led them to this expectation.

If one looks at the factors which influence people's vision of the present opportunities for social advance and their image of their children's future, it seems that the main factors which influence people's perceptions in the present and the future are the same. These are the religious, cultural and economic factors. One difference which can be identified is the influence of the religious factors in perceiving the present, where it works as an incentive for achievement and for good behaviour while in perceiving the future, the religious factor seemed to prevent people from thinking about the future, and they tend to be fatalistic.

The responses of the new petty bourgeoisie, in particular at the level of education practices, proved what was suggested in Chapter Seven, that their class identity becomes clearer when they discuss educational issues where they clearly identify what is middle class education and what is working class education. This picture gets arises from the results of this chapter, where it was shown that the new petty bourgeoisie invest heavily in their children's education in foreign language and government language school, and they sacrifice to provide them with extra help for private tuition which is a big burden for some fractions of this class, especially the government employees. This gives an indication of the importance of education for this class.

However, the picture of clear class identity around education is not that simple, where contradictions among the new petty bourgeoisie can be identified. That is, the choice between religious and secular education, where this class is divided in their feeling between those who find no problem in the choice of foreign education while for others it provokes a

personal cultural conflict between what they think they should do as Muslims and what the necessities of modern life force them to do. However, the choice at the end goes to secular education in foreign language or government language schools.

At the level of education practices, it seems that the cultural capital of the new petty bourgeoisie is their main asset where it allows them to follow up their children at school, give them extra help in study, and provide them with different kinds of non-formal education such as books and sports.

## CHAPTER NINE

## CONCLUSION

The conclusion of this thesis will illustrate some important theoretical issues and will present further discussion of the findings of the research. This will include the following points:

- I. An overview of theoretical and conceptual issues,
- II. The changing Egyptian political and ideological scene and its effect on economic, political and educational systems,
- III. The cultural dynamics of Egypt's complex class formation, and
- IV. Class based perspectives of education present and future. The latter includes the following points:
  - A. The importance of education for society.
  - B. The unequal provision of education and its implications for class reproduction.
  - C. Education practices and their implications for political power and class cultural capital.
  - D. The duality of the education system and its influence on cultural integration.
  - E. A class based critique of education policies and their role in underlying class conflict.
  - F. Images of the future.
  - G. Class alliances and possibilities of social action and their implication for the class formation.
- V. Suggestions for further future studies.

I. An Overview of Some Theoretical and Conceptual Issues

The main aim of this research has been to study the influence of the class formation of urban Egypt on the level of policy of education and on the popular level of access, control and educational practices. The study of this subject is attempting to break new ground by looking at social class and education

in urban Egypt. Because of the small sample size, it is not possible to draw quantitative conclusions concerning the distribution of educational opportunities, nor to generalize any of the findings of the present research. This study does, however, offer a new qualitative insight into the influence of social class and ideology on ordinary people's perspectives on economic, social and educational matters. Social class in this research is conceptualized as more than a matter of economic relations. It is also a matter of culture, ideology and common sense. The field of this research is needed to provide an account of these elements in Egypt, since the literature of sociological and educational studies neglects these aspects. In sociological research, and in social class studies, there is more concern with the study of class at the economic level. When the superstructure is addressed, the main point is usually the political power of classes, while class cultures, ideologies and common sense receive little attention.

In educational research, there is little class based analysis of educational policies and when class is addressed it is studied in a way which neglects important cultural and ideological issues. In the educational literature, human capital theory is more likely to be employed. Its stress is upon the importance of educational expansion as a means to attack poverty, achieve full employment and contribute to economic and social development. However this approach neglects important aspects such as the study of the unequal provision of education, the role of education in reproducing the class society and the role of class cultural capital in influencing education opportunities. This thesis is concerned with these gaps. It attempts to contribute to some areas, such as the class formation of Egypt, and to emphasize the cultural and ideological level, by introducing a field study of popular perspectives and analyzing education policy in relation to the state and its class nature. All this is done against the background of Egypt as a peripheral society.

The design of the research to cover all these areas has encountered two main analytical difficulties. The first one is the difficulty of applying concepts which are problematic in nature, and the debate around them has not yet been resolved. These include the relationship between base and superstructure and the relationship between class culture and consciousness and class objective position at the economic base. Other concepts are difficult to apply to the specific case of Egypt as a peripheral society. An example is the concept of state relative autonomy, where views are divided between those who consider state in third world countries as autonomous and those who speak about the relative autonomy of these state. This was discussed in Chapter Three.

The second analytical difficulty comes from the dependent development of sociological and educational research on western literature. This means that the research has to be careful in applying some concepts developed in different societies and cultures, since the Arab literature did not develop its own theories and concepts. It has been impossible to neglect the development of concepts in a literature which is essentially international. However, throughout the sociological analysis in this research, an attempt has been made to relate the concepts of state, culture, ideology and class to the specific nature of society in Egypt. This research has applied a neo-Marxist approach to the study of education and society.

## II. The Changing Egyptian Political and Ideological Scene, and its Effect on Economic, Political and Educational Systems

The analysis of the influence of class formation on education in urban Egypt was performed against the background of the changing politics and ideologies which influenced the economic system and policies of education.

After the 1952 Revolution, under Nasser, Egypt witnessed changes in its political and economic system. Political

parties were abolished and replaced by a one party system. Economic measures taken included agrarian reform. However, the serious economic change came in 1961 with the nationalization programme, and the first development plan. All this was done against the background of new ideologies of socialism and equality. The state as a leading figure for such changes and enjoyed a considerable amount of power and autonomy.

Education came as an important part of the development plan and the wide movement of social change. Under Nasser's socialist policies, education was expanded in a mass education movement, the duality of primary education was abolished, university education became free and foreign education was taken under the state control. These changes in the education policies meant increasing state involvement in education and they reflect the kind of class alliance that the state worked for, where under Nasser these policies benefited the workers, farmers and the middle classes. In spite of these achievements, education under Nasser still suffered from drop out, low enrolment levels, differences between rural and urban areas and shortage of resources.

In the seventies, under Sadat, new policies and ideologies were introduced in the form of the open door policy which opened the Egyptian economy to private and foreign investment. The political system was changed to a multi-party system. The new policies and ideologies of the open door policy had their social consequences where they widened the gap between classes, worked for the benefit of the middle and upper classes and could not attack poverty. At the political level, in spite of the multi-party system, there was no widening of the base for more popular participation and democracy. The policies increased Egypt's debts and dependency on the West.

Education policies were changed under these new ideologies and policies, where private fee paying schools increased, the government established its own fee paying schools, the government languages schools, to satisfy the demands of the

middle class, basic education was introduced as working class education, academic secondary education was controlled and technical secondary education increased, and university education was controlled with the continuation of problems of drop out, low enrolment and the gap between rural and urban Egypt.

These educational characteristics demonstrate that education in Egypt reflects the same education crisis as in other developing countries, where the expansion of formal education did not solve problems of unemployment, attack poverty or bring more equal opportunities. The education system in Egypt is marked by class features reflected in the drop out, differences between rural and urban areas, the duality between foreign and Arabic education and the different social value for technical and academic education.

These class features of the education system have their historical roots dating back to Muhammad Aly (1805-1848) who introduced modern education to Egypt as part of his modernization plan. However his education policy was not a mass education movement, rather it was an elitist system to produce the professionals and bureaucrats needed to run his modern projects in industry, the army, and agriculture. Education created a wide cultural gap in society between who are educated and the illiterate majority and between those who were educated in traditional religious schools and those who educated in the modern secular system.

Under the British occupation (1882-1920) education opportunities were limited, free education abolished and the education budget was severely cut, which increased the elitist nature of the system where the middle and upper classes were the only people who could pay for their children's education. Taking this history in account, Egypt since the early nineteenth century has had a continuous struggle for developing and modernizing society. Education comes as central to these efforts which were made in a context of persisting economic and political crisis mediated by a complex class



formation and a central role for the state.

### III. The Cultural Dynamics of Egypt's Complex Class Formation

Egypt is conceptualized as a peripheral society structured by social classes whose formation is complex and in a state of flux. The features of the complexity of the class formation can be identified from the findings of the empirical study and can be analyzed and understood in the light of the dynamics of Egyptian culture. The complex features of Egypt's class formation can be partly identified from the clear class differences in the outside appearance in the way that people from different class positions dress and speak, in their ways of life, and in their level of education and income. Other features of the class formation can be identified by looking at the following aspects:

(i) How people identify their own class position, (ii) the images they have of society, (iii) their understanding and explanation of class differences, and (iv) their economic and political interests.

(i) In terms of identifying their own class position the results of the empirical study show that the three bourgeois classes have mainly concentrated themselves at the level of middle-middle class. This means that members of the big bourgeoisie may not identify themselves at a different level from members of the traditional petty bourgeoisie in spite of the differences in the economic level in terms of the size of ownership and employing other people. This result has led the research to the conclusion of the weak development of class identity among the bourgeoisie classes. In addition the three bourgeoisie classes find it difficult to identify who constitute the middle class and who are the poor of society, while the working class are clear about their own class position as the poor of society. However, their class consciousness comes from a limited view of their everyday economic suffering. Other aspects of class identity seem more clearly formulated when the three bourgeois classes discuss

educational issues, where they are clear about what constitutes middle class education and what constitutes working class education.

(ii) In identifying the class formation of Egypt there is a consensus among members from different class positions that people in society are unequal and that differences between them are very large. However, when it comes with models of society they have in mind, they introduce a diversity of images of society which range from models of two classes to models of five classes, with everything in between.

(iii) Members from different class positions understand class differences in income, standard of living, being poor or rich, in two different ways. Firstly they may understand differences as created by God. Secondly they may understand them as created by social tensions and conflicts in society. This division between secular and religious explanation can be found across the social formation.

(iv) In terms of the economic and political interests there is a division between and inside the same social class, in particular the three bourgeois classes, about the benefits they gained in the sixties and seventies. The working class are almost united in their view that they were better off in the sixties.

These aspects of the cultural and ideological level of class formation reflect different perceptions and ideologies. This is expected according to the theoretical discussion, which highlighted the fact that people may have diverse ideologies and interests because of the complexity of their culture, where political, social and economic factors are working together. The following is an analysis of the cultural dynamics which stand behind these different perspectives and ideologies.

The aspects of cultural dynamics which will be analyzed are built on the theoretical framework of this research and include:

- a) State power and social class formation
- b) Economic and ideological changes in the seventies
- c) The dichotomy of the Egyptian culture between religious and secular thought.

a) State power and social class formation:

The weak class identity and the difficulty of the bourgeois classes in identifying who are the middle class and who are the poor, beside the division in their economic and political interests, can all be understood from two perspectives. The first one is a historical perspective of Egypt's integration in the world capitalist economy, which influenced the class formation of Egypt. The second is the state power and class relations.

- In historical perspective, Egypt as a peripheral society was integrated in the world capitalist system. The Egyptian bourgeoisie, in the first phase of the system, was allowed, according to the international division of labour, to invest mainly in agriculture not in industry. In the second phase of the system the bourgeoisie was allowed to invest in industry in the mode of import substitution. This situation created a weak bourgeoisie and divided the working class. So, the Egyptian class formation since the second world war is marked by a fragmentation and weakness in the formation of the two fundamental classes in society, which did not allow for the development of a clear identity for the bourgeoisie, nor for the working class who did not have the opportunity to work in large organised industry.

In the recent history of Egypt, in particular since the 1952 Revolution, the development of class power and consciousness can be understood in relation to state power. That is, from the theoretical analysis, it was seen that the state in the sixties enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy and the political society which include the state, the army and the

government has developed more than the civil society which includes political parties, schools and mass media. Under these circumstances the political power of social classes, in terms of developing political parties and corporate organisation, did not develop to a clear class identity for the bourgeoisie, nor for the working class who have no strong unions to defend their interests.

b) Economic and ideological changes in the seventies: with the introduction of a multi-party system the power is still concentrated in the hands of the government party and gives very little room for the opposition parties to express different ideologies from those of the government. The policies of the seventies created fragmented class interests inside the same social class and did not allow for the development of coherent class interests. Besides that, the policies in the seventies created new social strata which gained economic power, such as, craftsmen and those who work in the parasitic activities, which changed the class formation of Egypt and made it difficult to identify in such a formation who became middle and who went down to the poor position. However some class alliances may occur in the future between these segments, as will be explained later.

The diversity in the development of class consciousness which was referred to earlier, in the form of people being more conscious and having a class identity developed around educational issues more than political and economic one, can be explained in the context of the development of civil society. In the analysis it was mentioned that the civil society, which includes education institutions, did not develop at the same rate as the political society. However, education institutions in this system developed in a way which made their class nature and identity very clear, where modern education in Egypt started as an elite system which emphasized the class and cultural differences between the educated minority and the illiterate majority. In addition to that, the system has developed in part away from state control, in the

form of foreign and missionary schools which form upper class education institutions, added to the class nature of the system. So, an early middle and upper class identity clustered around education. At the same time working class and farmers' education was mainly confined to apprenticeship and Kuttab education. At the present time, the same class nature of education has continued, in spite of the mass education movement which started under Nasser.

c) The dichotomy of the Egyptian culture between religious and secular thought is another factor which adds to the complexity of the cultural dynamics of Egypt. This appears in respondents' understandings of class differences and the images of the future which they have, which are strongly divided between secular and religious visions. The dichotomy between the two streams of thought exists inside any one social class, and between social classes. This may indicate tensions, conflicts and disagreements about the way to develop and modernize society, but it may also indicate novel ways in which alliances could form between segments of different social classes. There is a division in Egypt between the traditionalists who want to revive the old traditions of Islam and the modernists who believe that Egypt must not be isolated from the developments in the Western World.

#### IV. Class Based Perspectives of Education Present and Future

The class based perspectives of education cover general and specific educational issues. The general issues are concerned with education and society, which includes the importance of education for society, policies of the sixties and seventies and the debate around free and fee paying education.

The specific issues are concerned with people's own relation with the education system, i.e. education practices, which includes parents' relations with the school, their critique of school knowledge, provision of education, control and power over education.

The analysis of these issues raises some important theoretical points about the class formation, political power, cultures and ideologies in Egypt.

**(A) The Importance of Education for Society**

There is a consensus among members from different class positions that education is very important and essential for any society which seeks to develop and modernize itself. This is an important finding about the value of education because there have been speculations that, in the seventies and because of the new ideologies of the open door policy, education lost its value, where people could earn money from activities which needed no qualifications (black market). The result suggests the opposite, where there is a strong demand for education from different class positions, and those who are outside education are not there by choice. They are the children of the working class who are excluded from education because of the bias of the system against them. The seventies increased the marginalisation of the working class in education. Parents have to carry more financial burden to educate their children, and since they cannot afford it, they are more likely to withdraw their children. In fact the seventies increased demand for certain types of education, in particular foreign and private schools, which widened the education gap between classes.

Another indication about the importance of education and other cultural factors, compared with the economic aspect, comes when people speak about social advance. Members from different class positions have indicated that economic factors are important in social advance. However, for the new petty and big bourgeoisie, economic factors did not exceed the cultural factors such as family background and education, where they considered that, economic capital alone is not enough for social advance, unless one also has cultural capital. The traditional petty bourgeoisie emphasized cultural aspects but

less than the new petty and big bourgeoisie while the working class stressed the economic factor, where they were influenced by their severe economic problems and deprivation.

**(B) The Unequal Provision of Education and its Implications for Class Reproduction**

The distribution of education opportunities according to levels and kinds of education is reflecting social and cultural indications which go behind the simple quantitative distribution.

The study of kinds and levels of education afforded to children from different class positions gives a clear indication of the unequal division of education opportunities, where the children of the new petty and big bourgeoisie are highly represented in all kinds of fee paying and foreign education and a substantial percentage of the new petty bourgeoisie children can reach the university. Working class children of the sample are excluded from university education; at maximum they reach technical secondary school and the rate of drop out, and joining the world of work after primary level is very high among them. The traditional petty bourgeoisie are in a middle position between the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class. That is, when they have the economic capital, they can afford fee paying education for their children. A substantial number of their children reach the university. At the same time they share with the working class, but to a smaller degree, sending their children to technical secondary school or they may join the world of work after primary level.

The distribution of education opportunities among the sample provides an explicit example of the role of education in class reproduction. The children of the new petty and big bourgeoisie carry on to reach the highest level of education, and to graduate as professionals and reproduce the middle class position. The working class children who drop out or

leave school after primary level and participate in the world of work, fill the position of the working class. The traditional petty bourgeoisie in their middle position have better opportunities than the working class, where they can afford fee paying education and send their children to higher education, so they can move to the position of the middle class.

(C) Educational Practices and their Implications for Political Power and Class Cultural Capital

"Educational practices" mean three things. First: parents' immediate relations with the school. Second: parents' critique of school knowledge and different strategies they follow to allow more education opportunities for their children. Third: the level of system and policy of education where one can study which social groups have influence and control over education.

Parents' immediate relations with the school highlight the importance of cultural capital in education practices. For example, parents' cultural capital is very important in appropriating more education opportunities for their children through the help they can give to them in different subjects. The big bourgeoisie share with the new petty bourgeoisie the ability to teach their children by using their own cultural capital, and if they do not have it, they can buy private lessons using their economic power. The working class children are deprived of both opportunities of help through parents and private lessons.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie are in a middle position between the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class. Since they are not educated to the level of the new petty bourgeoisie, the help they can afford for their children is limited. At the same time they are not as deprived as the working class, so they can afford extra tuition organized by the school or private lessons.



The other aspect of education practice where the cultural capital shows up is the critique of the school knowledge. It is a direct and clear example of the importance of cultural capital where the working class are almost excluded from the issue. The critique of school knowledge goes behind the explicit cultural differences to the dynamics of practical ideology which are represented in the explicit transmission of knowledge at school, where it produces its ideological effect in parents' attitudes and beliefs about school knowledge. Parents still recognise school knowledge as being divided into two cultures: the culture which is presented in technical education for the less able students and the high culture of abstract knowledge for talented students.

Education practices at the level of control and power over education are concerned with who should have authority and power to solve and deal with education problems and who can actually influence the policy of education. The discussion reveals two important points, one concerning the approach to reform in education and the other concerning class alliances over educational issues.

In terms of the approach to reform in education the new petty and big bourgeoisie mainly stress that the government has responsibility, as the only competent authority which can solve and deal with education problems. The traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class stressed co-operation between people and the government. These views can be analyzed on the light of how political power is distributed and how political organizations function in Egypt. The views of the new petty and big bourgeoisie reflect the nature of political practice in Egypt, where the state and the government have considerable control over decision making. At the same time, the role of political parties and other civil society organizations such as unions and syndicates is weak, and people may have little faith in their power and ability to achieve anything.

The view of the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class, that there is a need for co-operation between people and government, may reflect the nature of life in alley (Hara) community where help and co-operation is part of their daily relations.

The other important point which power and authority over education reflect concerns class alliance. People from different class positions have identified politicians, ministers of education and senior officials as having the real power and authority over the policy of education more than any other group. Only a minority has identified other groups, like businessmen and craftsmen, as having influence through their money.

These views indicate that the identification of social groups which have the economic power and capital were not typically seen as having control over education. It is worth noting that control over education as seen by members of different class positions goes mainly to those elements of the new petty bourgeoisie represented in the state officials i.e. those who are related to the superstructure of the society. In this case the question of class alliance, and whether the new petty bourgeoisie would ally with the working class or with the big bourgeoisie, seems crucial in identifying policies of education and in deciding how educational opportunities will be divided, and in determining the openness of the system.

#### (D) The Duality of the Education System and its Influence on Cultural Integration

The division of the education system between free and fee paying schools, Arabic/foreign language schools and between technical/academic has its implications for cultural integration. The effect of these dichotomies goes beyond the economic differences between classes to afford fee paying education for their children to deeper cultural conflict.

The discussion of the choice of certain types of education and the rejection of other types reflects a cultural tension and conflict in particular among members of the new petty bourgeoisie who want foreign education for their children. At the same time they think about religious education and find themselves in conflict between what they think they should do as Muslims and what modern life demands in the way of secular education.

The conflict does not appear in the case of the big bourgeoisie and traditional petty bourgeoisie who have their children in foreign education. However, when big and traditional petty bourgeoisie evaluate foreign language schools they agree with the new petty bourgeoisie that these schools neglect religious studies. They evaluate government language schools as positive in giving more care to Arabic and religion, but they evaluate them negatively in the standard of teaching foreign language. This situation leads this researcher to argue that the establishment of the model of government language school is not just to solve the economic problem of the new petty bourgeoisie, who cannot join foreign language schools, but also it is the model in which the new petty bourgeoisie try to solve the contradictions between their religious beliefs and their demand for foreign, secular education.

Because government reforms have focused on the development of government language schools, the opportunities for other reforms have been minimized. This has harmed the interests of the majority of the working class and the traditional petty bourgeoisie, who cannot enter the government language schools. The divisive effect of foreign language and government language schools must, therefore, not be primarily assessed in terms of the ability of different groups to pay; rather it should be assessed in terms of the overall impact on cultural integration.

(E) Class Based Critique of Education Policies and its Underlying Class Conflict

The critique of education policies addresses two kinds of points; general point about policies of education in the sixties and seventies and specific points of educational policy concerning the debate around spending on education and the free/fee paying debate. The analysis of these points illustrates the underlying class conflict and the class of class interests between and inside various social classes.

When the subject of policies of education in the sixties and seventies was opened to discussion and critique, the idea was that the two policies had different views and ideologies for education. As the theoretical discussion illustrated, in the early revolutionary period of the fifties and sixties, socialist policies were applied in the economic and social domains. Education was opened for more lower class positions and the policies tended to give more equal opportunities in many ways including the big increase of students numbers, the unification of primary education and the control of private and foreign education. In the seventies policy worked to control educational opportunities and to enhance class differences in education opportunities by, for example, increasing private education and reducing the period of basic education.

With these differences in mind, respondents' evaluation of the policies indicate divisions between and inside classes. The big and new petty bourgeoisie mainly attacked the sixties as having a negative effect on the quality of education because of the increasing numbers of students which resulted in the unemployment of graduates. Ideas of equal opportunity were criticized because they opened education to certain social groups who they felt should not be educated, such as workers and farmers. However this is not the dominant view among the new petty bourgeoisie, where the lower fractions of this class who benefited from free education in the sixties and could

send their children to the university, support the policies of the sixties.

The view of the traditional petty bourgeoisie mainly supports the expansion of education in the sixties, but when they can afford fee paying education for their children they tend to criticize the sixties in the same manner as the new petty and big bourgeoisie.

The working class mainly support the policies of the sixties, where in the seventies they had to bear a higher financial burden for the education of their children.

The attack by the three bourgeois classes on the sixties policies concentrated on the ideologies of equal opportunities and mass education. This critique is crucial in determining how education opportunities are divided in society and which educational policies these social classes are going to adopt and support.

**Free and fee paying education: the arena of class conflict over education:**

This research argues that the most pronounced class differences and conflict in education in Egypt today centre around the issue of spending on education, and in particular the aspect of free and fee paying education. Spending on education is provoking a clash of class interests particularly on the aspect of free and fee paying education.

The responses on the issues of fee paying and free education has shown different interests between and inside the same social class. The new petty bourgeoisie mainly supported fee paying education and introduced different models of education which divided the system into two parallel system of fee paying and free education, or restricted free education to certain levels such as primary or secondary level. The lower fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie supported free education at all levels since free education allowed them to

educate their children up to the university level. The big bourgeoisie has supported policies and models similar to those of the new petty bourgeoisie. The traditional petty bourgeoisie like the working class need and support free education, but when they can afford fee paying education, they support the division of the system between free and fee paying.

At the level of financing education, the educational budget and whether the government should spend more or less on education, a diversity of views between classes can be identified. The new petty and big bourgeoisie supported more spending on education. Aspects of spending which they supported are different, however. The new petty bourgeoisie supported more spending on the primary level, while the big bourgeoisie supported more spending on university level and technical secondary education. The traditional petty bourgeoisie supported more spending in particular at the university level.

The working class supported free education at all levels, but did not support more spending by the government. When they were asked on which level the government should concentrate its spending, they supported a wide range of spending, in particular at the university level.

Preferred sources of revenue indicate the possibility of class alliance between the big and traditional petty bourgeoisie, who wish to defend their interests and prevent taxes from being the source of educational finance. The big bourgeoisie suggested that increasing production should be the source for finance, so that the burden of taxation is transferred to the workers who have to increase production, and hence increase surplus value. The traditional petty bourgeoisie suggested some restrictions on taxation, like following Islamic law in deciding the amount of tax which should be paid.

The new petty bourgeoisie and the working class, as wage earners, supported more taxes on the rich, in particular businessmen and merchants.

In general, class ideologies on this issue of free and fee paying education, and which aspects of education should receive more funding, reflect part of the cultural crisis of society and presents an indicator of the revival of the old forces of thought in society and in education. First, it shows how education is used by the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie to divide society into two groups, the elite who should be highly educated and the public who should get only basic education to create for the big bourgeoisie skilled workers and at the same time to perpetuate the cultural superiority of the new petty bourgeoisie which they have clearly pronounced against other classes in society, such as farmers and workers. So, education is used as a means of cultural division and different types of education, in particular fee paying or free education, are indicators and signals of class distance.

Second, the views of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie reflect the old forces in Egyptian society and in education. That is, in the theoretical analysis it was shown how education under colonial rule worked to divide society between the educated elite and the illiterate masses, and it was further explained how policies of Lord Cromer mainly abolished free education and encouraged crafts education for the masses in the nineteenth century. These old forces are coming back in the form of the pressure of the new petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie to abolish free education. This position represents the persistent dilemma of the Egyptian intellectuals who were divided at the beginning of this century over the same points of free and fee paying education, and who should be educated.

The views of the traditional petty bourgeoisie reflect their contradictory class position where in many respects they are

similar to the working class positions and views, but when they have the economic capital they tend to take the ideologies of the petty and big bourgeoisie.

The working class views on spending on education and their support for government restrictions on the education budget reflect the contradictions in their common sense, where they support policies which are expected to harm their interests and this shows how they submit to the dominant ideology disseminated by the state about Egypt's economic crisis. The working class seem to accept that the activities of the state are the only practicable solution to the economic crisis. They know that the policies harm their interests but acquiesce to the view that economic disorder and loss of a sense of community will harm them more.

#### (F) Images of the Future

Respondents were asked to look at three issues in futuristic terms. These are, the future of the whole society, their children's future and their expectations for educational future change.

Two main important characteristics can be discerned. The first one is the common ground between people's image of their children's future and the whole future of society. This common ground appears in the influence of religious and economic factors in shaping people's images and visions of the future. The religious factor tends to stop people from giving predictions about the shape and possibilities of the future since it is in God's hands. The economic factor is represented in people's awareness of the economic crisis as a major factor which may influence society's future. From this vision it seems that the fractionalization in class economic interests and the incoherence of class interests caused by the open door policy, has not prevented people from being aware of the economic crisis and its impact on individual and society's future.



The second character is the tendency of the three bourgeois classes, in particular the new petty bourgeoisie, to think of the future in positive terms in thinking of solutions for society's problem, which gives a sense of concern as to what is going on around. This sense did not exist among the working class who seem very pessimistic about the future for the whole society and for their children.

Educational future change divided respondents between those who believe there will be change and those who do not. The view of no change is expressed mainly by the new petty and big bourgeoisie. Their views connect education with other problems in society, i.e. education is seen as integrated and influenced by other problems such as the economic crisis, shortage of resources and the conflict to decide government priorities which may push education behind other issues.

The view which anticipates changes in the future covered different areas of curriculum, teacher training, expansion of certain kinds of education and changes in the policy of education towards more fee paying schools. In this general picture certain points were emphasized by members from different class positions, which reflect class interests. The new petty bourgeoisie think of changes towards more science and technology which are important in forming the middle class. They also think of restricting education opportunities through increasing fee paying schools in the future.

The big and traditional petty bourgeoisie expect the expansion of technical secondary schools to satisfy the needs of the market for trained labour power. The working class have different expectations coming from their problems with the system, where they expect private lessons to be suspended and that student numbers will increase.

**(G) Class Alliances and Possibilities for Social Action and their Implications for the Class Formation**

In this final point of the conclusion, possible social actions and kinds of class alliances in the future will be suggested. In order to study that two points will have to be discussed:

- i) to explain how class alliances occur and their implications for the study of class formation, and
- ii) to give chosen examples from the field study in the areas of economics and educational ideologies in which class alliance may occur and
- iii) their implications for the class formation, in particular for the new petty bourgeoisie.

**i) Theoretical background for understanding how class alliances occur**

The study of class alliances as a move towards the transformation of society can be understood in relation to the subjects of class cultures and ideologies. That is, in the theoretical analysis of the study of social class, Poulantzas was aware of the problem of the place of social classes in the process of class transformation. From his analysis he tended to emphasize with others, such as Hindess, that social transformation does not only occur at the level of the mode of production, but also class consciousness, the education of the masses and organizing them for political action is part of the process of transformation. Transforming society is not absolutely influenced by powers outside people's control but also influenced by people's own ideologies and consciousness. So, the study of people's consciousness and ideologies on economic, political and educational issues might be helpful in giving some indications for class based action.

However, it is not an easy task to discuss exactly what kind of social action different social classes may take in the future on social, economic, political and educational issues. This difficulty is analyzed by Erik Olin Wright, who explained

that class struggle does not occur between perfectly homogeneously organized classes. Rather in a typical situation in a specific class formation, class alliances are possible between classes, segments of classes or between contradictory class locations. This explains the difficulty of identifying precisely which class alliance will occur, where individuals, in particular those in contradictory position such as the new petty bourgeoisie, have to face the choice between different alternative alliances. They may try as individuals to move to the position of the exploiters by being owners. They may form an alliance with the exploiters in return for some privileges such as high salaries. Or they may ally with the popular exploited classes, although this is very difficult to achieve where the oppressed masses have very little to offer to them.

In the following point, these possibilities will be discussed to show how they may occur in future class alliances in Egypt and their implications for class formation.

#### ii) Areas of class alliance

Some key issues in the economic, educational and ideological fields might be a subject for class alliance in the future. In the economic field, the main issue where class alliance may occur is around the open door policy and the market economy, where the big bourgeoisie are clear in their positive attitude towards these policies. The new petty bourgeoisie are divided where some segments of this class benefited and others were harmed. The traditional petty bourgeoisie are divided as well, where those who work in the service activities have benefited more than those who run small businesses, as the discussion of class power in Chapter Three has shown. The working class were clear in their attitude that they were harmed by the open door policies.

Such a situation shows a division in class interest between and inside the same social class. However, class alliances as explained earlier may occur between segments from different

classes. In this case the secular big bourgeoisie may go into alliance with elements from the new petty and traditional petty bourgeoisie who benefited from the open door policy. In such an alliance the big bourgeoisie will be more united in their interests than other classes. The working class might be exploited by this coalition or they may unite with other oppressed elements.

In the educational field one can see the main issues where class conflict or alliance may occur. If one speculates on what kind of educational policies will get the support of different classes, one may expect the new petty bourgeoisie to support more conservative policies of education working to control education opportunities in order not to threaten their privileged position and in order not to face the competition from the working class in urban and rural Egypt. The lower strata of this class are expected to support more opportunities and free education.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie from their contradictory position might be sceptical about the spread of education, but they still find in expanding education good opportunities for their children. So, they are the only class which needs to make their own calculations since their immediate interests conflict with their children's future interest, because education is threatening their crafts, but they know that education is important for the future generation. So, their position will be mainly decided in terms of the way they are going to solve that contradiction. In terms of free and fee paying education they are divided between those who support free education and those who can afford to pay and support fee paying education.

The big bourgeoisie may support policies which open education to more people in order to satisfy their needs for qualified workers, but still in the form of a dual system of free and fee paying, private education. The working class are more inclined to support policies which allow for a general

increase in opportunities for their children, since education is seen by them as element of security.

These different policies show that the big bourgeoisie are united in their support for fee paying education and private schools, while both the new petty and traditional petty bourgeoisie are divided in their support of fee paying and free education. The working class are united in their support of free education. In such a situation an alliance may occur between the big bourgeoisie and elements of new petty and traditional petty bourgeoisie to force the continuation of the policy of increasing fee paying schools. In such alliance, the big bourgeoisie would seem to be more united as a class than the two other parties to the alliance. The working class may either submit to that alliance and accept what is offered to them of free education or they may ally with the lower strata of the new petty bourgeoisie who want free education.

In ideological and political terms, religion belief comes as a key issue for a possible political and ideological alliance or confrontation. The importance of religious belief comes from its influence upon respondents' perspectives of the future and of the solution for present problems. This influence can be found across the social formation with some differences, where the secular big bourgeoisie are the least likely to reply in religious terms. Even so, some religious responses are recorded.

From the previous theoretical analysis it was expected that elements of working class and traditional petty bourgeoisie would be more likely to express themselves and their perspectives in religious terms, since they are less educated and more exposed to traditional ways of thinking. The big and the new petty bourgeoisie were expected to have more secular perspectives due to their exposure to more secular education. However, it seems that one must expect religious influence across the class formation. In such a situation ideological and political alliances may occur between the big bourgeoisie,

in particular the Islamic fraction, and segments from new petty traditional petty bourgeoisie and the working class.

iii) Implications of class alliances for the class formation:

These possible class alliances and conflicts have their implications for the class formation of Egypt. If one looks at the big bourgeoisie who are in the sample of this research, and who represent the secular bourgeoisie, one may find a beginning of united class interest around economic and educational issues. This may be supported by indications from the theoretical analysis, that the secular bourgeoisie are moving towards more coherence through establishing their own organizations. However, the big bourgeoisie has recently become divided between secular and religious elements. Those religious elements may go into alliance with the religious fractions from other classes, and this development has taken place in practice in the 1984 and 1987 parliamentary elections.

The traditional petty bourgeoisie represent, in some aspects, a typical contradictory class position, especially around education where, in some cases, they are in contradiction between the benefit of expanding modern education and protecting their traditional crafts. They are also divided in supporting free education, like the working class, and fee paying education, like the big and new petty bourgeoisie. So this class has the two possibilities, and might go either way. The winning of the support of this class is important for social transformation since they constitute a considerable number and play an important role in production.

For the working class the theoretical analysis shows that the working class is divided between a group who work in the industry and organized sector and another group in the service sector. There is also a lumpen proletariat who are not organised under any unions, which means that more attention has to be given to these sections if the working class is to

be integrated in any national action.

As a social class, this class consciousness is not well developed, where in some cases they may support policies which may harm their interests. That can be understood from the nature of their common sense, where from their life experience they know about class inequalities. But at another level their consciousness, due to the influence of the dominant culture, inclines them to accept it as normal, or to acquiesce by perceiving that there are no real alternatives.

In terms of class alliance, they are a social power which is in a way united in their interests by the simple fact of their every day suffering not as a result of being politically organised. The crucial point in their class alliance and their role in social transformation is how they react to the hegemony of the dominant classes or the fractions of these classes. As Gramsci explained, hegemony is never complete. The working class do not give their complete support to the capitalists, since they have two consciousnesses; one determined by their life experience which may unite workers for social class transformation, and another formed in a traditional way of thinking, informed by the dominant culture which is uncritically absorbed.

This contradiction in working class common sense gives two possibilities for their future social action. They may either accept and co-exist with the dominant classes, or they may reject and try to overthrow their hegemony. In Gramsci's terms poor are not yet well organized enough to directly counter the hegemony of the dominant classes.

The new petty bourgeoisie has a special position in this analysis, since this class has grown in size and it has an important role in development and modernisation. In terms of the formation of this class, it is not homogeneous. It consists of groups who have different interests and ambitions, and these range from action, seeking authority and power, or

just seeking safe careers. Its formation gives some indications for internal divisions and conflicts. In Egypt this class was in a continuous struggle for power and authority from the time of Muhammad Aly (1805-1849) until 1952 when the lower strata of this class gained power and control over the state apparatus and state power. In the view of some authors, like Manfred Halpern, this class seems to be the principal revolutionary and potentially stabilizing force which is more able to act as a separate and independent force for the following reasons:

Culturally, it is free from traditional bonds and preconditions, well prepared and equipped for administration. It is numerically one of the largest groups within the modern sector of society. It is more obviously cohesive, more self-conscious and better trained than other classes. Their political, economic and social action in social change are decisive in determining the role of other classes in the future and it has shown itself as capable of marshalling the masses' support. These features of the new class must be evaluated in two ways. On the one hand some of these characters are true for Egypt, such as the high standard of education of the new class, their better level of training, their large numbers in the modern sector and their power which they gain from controlling the state power. On the other hand, other characteristics which deal with cultural and ideological aspects must be taken more carefully, in particular the point of being free from traditional ideas and more self-conscious. That is, the analysis of the culture and ideologies of this class has shown that its class consciousness has developed clearly in areas of education, while at the economic and political level they are divided and less coherent. In terms of their ideologies it is difficult to argue that all members of this class are only influenced by and bearers of new, modern and secular ideas, where traditional religious thought exists as well.

From this ideological and cultural background, some main questions about this class can be addressed, concerning their



ability to lead modernisation and the kind of class alliance they may go for.

In terms of leading modernisation, this class is essential. Throughout the modern history of Egypt, it took the responsibility of leading social transformation. It is equipped with modern knowledge, obtained modern technical and administration skills.

In order to fulfil its role in society, this class has to consider the challenges it may face from the growing power of other social classes, in particular the tendency of the big bourgeoisie to organise itself in coalitions and the growing militant activities which recruit the traditional petty bourgeoisie and lower strata of the new class itself. This will require this class to decide its alliance. It has two ways either to go; either with the growing power of the big bourgeoisie, as they did in the seventies, or with the oppressed working class and traditional petty bourgeoisie.

All this imposes more challenges on this class. First, it must solve its internal conflicts and second it must determine its social allies. At this point, the role of the intellectuals of this class is essential and Gramsci's identification of the role of the organic intellectuals is relevant. They may ally themselves with the working class and the oppressed elements of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, where they may work, engage themselves and direct the ideas and ideologies of the dominated classes and help them to build counter hegemony.

#### V. Suggestions for Further Future Studies

This research tried to cover three areas: class formation, culture and education. Further studies can be suggested to cover some important areas which this research could not develop.

In the area of class formation, more detailed studies of popular images of society are needed in comparative terms, between rural and urban Egypt, to see differences,

similarities and the degree of the development of class consciousness and class identity in the two areas.

In the study of education and class formation certain groups in urban Egypt need more investigation of their class consciousness and perception of education, such as the Islamic bourgeoisie and the working class who are engaged in modern industries such as the steel industry.

Certain aspects of class ideologies and consciousness need more investigation. These include the influence of religious belief in shaping people's perception of society, class relations and education, in particular a comparative study for Muslim/Christian differences.

This has been an essentially exploratory study, and it requires extensive theoretical and empirical consolidation in both quantitative and qualitative terms. However, in terms of indicating the potential for class analysis on culture, education and class formation, it has been completely successful, and fulfilled that initial task.

Appendix 1: Comparison between the 48 developing countries with annual per capita income below 500 dollars, and the 18 western countries listed as industrialized

---

Aspects of Comparison	Industrialized Countries	Developing Countries
Calories per day	3377	2118
Literacy	98%	41%
Secondary school enrolment	87%	22%
Primary school enrolment	98%	75%
Life expectancy at birth	74	48

Source: Margaret Hardiman and James Midgley, (1962) The Social Dimensions of Development (John Wiley and Sons, Chichester) pp.12-13

---

#### Appendix 2: Population Growth

---

Year	Total population in millions	Birth rate per thousand people	Death rate per thousand people	Rate of population growth (%)
1955	22.99	40.3	17.6	2.27
1965	29.40	41.5	14.6	2.75
1975	36.95	36.1	12.1	2.40
1985	48.59	37.4	9.1	2.97

Source: Ali Abdallah and Michael Brown, "Economy", in Lillian Craig, Harris (ed.) Egypt: International Challenges and Regional Stability, (Routledge and Kegan Paul) p.45. The figures are gathered by the authors from different official sources and from their own estimates.

---

---

**Appendix 3: Components of GDP (as a percentage of the total)**


---

	1985/6	1981/2
Commodity-producing sectors	51.8	51.7
of which		
Agriculture	16.3	19.1
Industry and Mining	14.9	13.6
Petroleum	15.1	13.6
Production services	28.5	28.6
of which		
Trade	12.2	12.4
Finance and Insurance	7.1	7.1
Suez Canal	2.3	3.3
Services (Housing, Tourism, etc.)	19.7	19.7
Total	100	100

Source: Ali Abdallah and Michael Brown, "Economy", in Lillian Craig, Harris (ed.) Egypt: International Challenges and Regional Stability, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) p.48.

---



---

**Appendix 4: Election to the People's Assembly 1984**


---

Party	Votes (%)	Seats
NDP	72.9	389
NWP (including Muslim Brothers)	15.1	59
SLP	7.1	--
NDURP	4.2	--
Sub-total		448
Nominated by President		10
Total		458

Source: Nazih N. Ayubi, Domestic Politics, in Lillian Craig Harris (ed.) Egypt: International Challenges and Regional Stability, (Routledge and Kegan Paul) p.77

---

---

**Appendix 5: Elections to the People's Assembly 1987**


---

Party	Votes (%)	Seats on party slates	"Independent" seats
NDP	69.6	309	40
SLP (Alliance) (including Muslim Brothers)	17.0	56 (36)	4
NWP	10.9	35	
NDURP	2.21	--	--
Umma	0.91	--	--
Independents*			4
Sub-total		400	48
Nominated by President		10	
Total		458	

\* Independents who were successful were those who were sponsored by existing parties.

Source: Nazih N. Ayubi, "Domestic Politics", in Lillian Craig Harris (ed.) Egypt: International Challenges and Regional Stability, (routledge and Kegan Paul) p.77

---

Appendix 6: Size distribution of establishments and employees according to the number of persons employed.<sup>a</sup> 1960-72

Size Class	1960			1964			1972 <sup>b</sup>		
	Number of establishments	Number of employees (000's)	%	Number of establishments	Number of employees (000's)	%	Number of establishments	Number of employees (000's)	%
1 employee	262,000	262	20.0	293,000	2,911	18.5	62,407	62	10.0
2 - 4	158,700	400	31.0	155,000	387	24.4	62,639	160	25.0
5 - 9	22,800	140	11.0	21,500	132	8.3	10,000	64	10.0
10 - 14	4,200	48	3.7	4,000	47	3.0	2,000 <sup>c</sup>	25	4.0
15 - 19	1,800	29	2.2	1,700	28	1.8	962	16	2.5
20 - 29	1,600	37	2.8	1,600	38	2.4	857	20	3.1
30 - 39	800	25	2.5	2,100	66	4.2	391	13	2.1
40 - 49	400	19	1.5	500	21	1.3	227	10	1.6
50 - 99	700	50	3.8	900	58	3.7	345	23	3.6
100 - 499	500	113	8.7	800	171	10.8	324	671	0.5
500 - 999	100	54	4.1	100	71	4.5	46	32	5.0
1,000 or more	100	128	10.0	100	273	17.2	55	147	23.0
Not stated	14,900	-	-	11,800	-	-	1,155	-	-
Total	468,600	1,305	100	493,800	1,588	100	141,967	641	100

<sup>a</sup> Excluding Frontier Governorates

<sup>b</sup> Refers to the Cairo Governorate only, as the aggregate results of the 1972 Census of Establishments are yet to be released.

<sup>c</sup> Figures excluding governmental establishments

Sources: CAPMS, 1964 Census of Establishments, Ref. No. 1/726, p.11 Table B, and CAPMS, 1972 Census of Establishments

- Cairo Governorate, Ref. No. 6613/AMT/77 (June 1977)  
Table 5

Appendix 7: Size composition of industrial establishments in the organised sector according to number of employed persons, 1952-68

Size class (Workers per establishment)	1962		1967/8		1967/8		1967/8	
	Number of establish- ments	%	Number of employees (000's)	%	Number of establish- ments	%	Number of employees (000's)	%
10 - 49	2,734	79	53	20	4,130	80	771	3.5
50 - 499	633	19	90	33	796	16	106	18.5
500 or more	78	2	130	47	202	4	387	68.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,445</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>5,128</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>570</b>	<b>100</b>

<sup>a</sup> Which employ ten workers or more  
 Sources: For 1952: Central Statistics Committee,  
Collection of Basic Statistics (Cairo, 1962),  
 p.92. For 1967/68: Industrial Census 1967/68

---

**Appendix 8: Membership of Professional Syndicates 1962 - 1972**


---

Syndicate	Year of foundation	Membership	
		June 1962	June 1972
Physicians	1942	11,419	15,198
Dentists	1942	923	2,373
Veterinarians	1942	1,006	2,634
Pharmacists	1942	2,815	5,520
Teachers	1951	110,387	190,740
Agronomists	1949	11,332	39,910
Engineers	1946	16,770	44,771
Accountants	1955	1,378	1,655
Lawyers	1912	9,149	8,420
Scientists	1955	1,086	6,156
Journalists	1940	1,159	1,863
Actors	1958	948	886
Cinema	1958	466	612
Musicians	1958	935	913
<b>Total</b>		<b>169,774</b>	<b>321,651</b>

Source: Central Statistical Committee, Collection of Basic Statistics (Cairo, May 1963) pp.228-9; CAPMS, Statistical Indicators for the Arab Republic of Egypt (Cairo, July 1974) p.189, quoted in Mahmoud Abdel Fadel, The Political Economy of Nasserism (Cambridge University Press) p.99

---



## Appendix 9: The Education Ladder 1953

## Appendix 1: The Educational Ladder 1953

6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18			
Primary Stage					Preparatory Stage										
1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3							
						Vocational training centres									
Eight year school						1									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	General and specialized secondary school		1	2	3	4	University faculties	
										1	2	3	4	Higher institutes	
										1	2	Technicians training institutes			
										Technical secondary (skilled work)					
										1	2	3	1	2	Further studies for workshop teachers
										Five year technical schools (technicians)					
										1	2	3	4	5	
										Teacher training schools					
										1	2	3	4	5	
										Vocational training centres		1	Teacher training schools (special education)		
										1	2	3			
Primary stage					Preparatory Stage			Secondary stage		al-Azhar University					
1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	1	2	3	4			

Source: Ministry of Education, Cairo, quoted in Georgie Hyde, (1976) Education in Modern Egypt: Ideas and Realities, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London).

Appendix 10: The Growth in the Numbers of Pupils and Students per Thousand of Egypt's Population at all Educational Levels (1952 - 1972)

---

Educational Level	No. of Students per thousand of population in 1952	No. of Students per thousand of population in 1972	Percentage Increase
Primary Education	47.0	110.0	234
General Preparatory Education	16.0	31.0	194
General Secondary Education	4.3	9.6	223
Vocational Secondary Education	0.8	9.0	1,125
Higher Education	2.4	7.8	325

Source: Yosef Khalil Yosef (1975) The Main Events in the Educational System of Egypt: 1952 - 1975 (National Council for Education, Science and Technology, Cairo) (Arabic)

---

Appendix 11: Unified Educational Ladder 1979

	Grade	Higher Education Institutes and Colleges	Higher Education Institutes and Colleges
Higher Education Institutes and Colleges	18		
Fine Arts	17		
Physical Education	16		
Dar al-Ulum	15		
Law			
Education			
Social Service			
Medicine			
Agriculture			
SECONDARY	14	TOTAL ENROLMENT MALE	TOTAL ENROLMENT FEMALE
Technical	13	424,000	199,100
Industrial	12	439,000	180,387
Commercial	11	451,000	218,446
Agricultural	10	459,000	375,260
Teacher Training Institutes	9		
General	8	465,000	293,478
Science	7	471,000	310,888
Literary	6	477,000	328,770
PREPARATORY	5	484,000	387,911
Industrial	4	493,000	469,192
Commercial	3	503,000	431,890
Agricultural	2	512,000	507,673
General	1	524,000	464,572
PRIMARY			
General			
Science			
Literary			
PREPARATORY			
Post primary terminal			
Oriental Music			
Technical-Girls			
Commerce			
Engineering			
Veterinary			
Dentistry			
Applied Arts			
Higher Institutes for Teacher Training			
Higher Industrial Institutes			
SECONDARY			
Technical			
Teacher Training Institute			
Commercial			
Agricultural			
Industrial			
General			
Science			
Literary			
PREPARATORY			
Post primary terminal			
Oriental Music			
Technical-Girls			
PRIMARY			
General			
Science			
Literary			
PREPARATORY			
Post primary terminal			
Oriental Music			
Technical-Girls			

Adapted from World Bank report 21139, Amir Boktor, University of Cairo Press, 1963, DAR, quoted in Judith Cochran, (1986) Education in Egypt, (Croom Helm, London) p.48

Appendix 12: The condition of the Educational Buildings, both Official and Subsidized

Educational Level	Number of schools	The suitability of the buildings			Number of schools without		
		Com-pletely Suit-able	Comp-letely Unsuit-able	Needs Repair	electricity	potable water	sanitary utilities
Primary	9,170	5,422	959	2,789	3,633	721	335
Preparatory	2,254	1,538	72	644	324	83	60
General Secondary	467	366	7	94	24	7	4
Technical Secondary (3 year)	148	106	8	34	1	-	-
Technical Secondary (5 year)	14	13	1	-	-	-	1
Agricultural Secondary (3 year)	62	49	1	12	2	-	-
Agricultural Secondary (5 year)	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
Commercial Secondary (3 year)	303	228	7	69	15	3	2
Commercial Secondary (5 year)	4	4	-	-	-	-	-
Teachers' Schools	91	59	8	24	1	-	-
TOTAL	12,515	7,786	1,063	3,666	4,000	814	402

Source: Strategy of Developing Education in Egypt, Ministry of Education, July 1987

**Appendix 13: The Development of the Number of Students Registered in Higher and University Education and their Percentage of the Population: Years 1975/76 - 1985/86**

Year	Registered in Higher University Education	Registered in Commercial Industrial Higher Institutes	Registered in Private Higher Institutes	Total No. of Registered	% annual growth rate	Population	% Total to Population
75/76	419,183	28,829	29,405	477,417	0	36,997,000	1.29
76/77	453,696	31,541	32,951	518,180	8.5	38,198,000	1.36
77/78	476,777	36,475	37,610	550,862	6.3	38,794,000	1.42
78/79	488,569	39,802	40,686	596,057	3.3	39,767,000	1.43
79/80	507,314	44,722	44,573	596,609	4.8	40,983,000	1.46
80/81	544,153	52,283	49,445	645,881	8.2	42,289,000	1.53
81/82	589,562	55,782	53,348	698,692	8.2	43,465,000	1.61
82/83	632,360	59,423	55,113	746,896	6.9	44,673,000	1.67
83/84	667,987	65,206	57,652	790,895	5.9	45,913,000	1.72
84/85	670,726	85,630	58,264	814,620	3.0	46,958,000	1.73
85/86	668,849	101,394	58,857	829,100	1.8	48,189,000	1.72

Source: Strategy of Developing Education in Egypt (Ministry of Education, July, 1987)

**Appendix 14: Total Education Budget for 1981/82, 1982/83 and 1983/84, expressed as percentage of the national budget**

---

	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84
Ministry of Education	562.2	726.4	816.7
Universities	242.1	307.1	369.8
Total	804.3	1033.5	1186.5
Total Current State Expenditure	9794.8	12081.2	13372.4
Percentage	8.21%	8.55%	8.87%

The budget of Al-Azhar Education is excluded.

Source: National Centre for Educational Research, The Development of Education in the Arab Republic of Egypt from 1981/82 to 1983/84

---

**Appendix 15: Spending on the Biggest and Smallest Five Sectors in Egypt in 1980/81**

---

The Biggest Five Sectors			The Smallest Five Sectors		
Rank of Sector	Name of Sector	Average development	Rank of Sector	Name of Sector	Average of development
1	Defence and security	212.6	1	Electricity	63.4
2	Insurance	162.1	2	Culture and mass media	67.8
3	Industry	145.2	3	Tourism	113.1
4	Food Supply and Commerce	142.1	4	Agriculture	116.0
5	Presidential Service	140.3	5	Education, research and youth	120.8

Source: Adel Ghoneim, (1986) The Egyptian Model of Dependent State Capitalism (Dar Al Mostakbal Al Araby, Cairo) p.239

---

**Appendix 16: The Number of Workers in the Age Range 6 to 12 as a Percentage of the Labour Force: 1974 to 1984**

Year	Workers Aged 6 to 12 Years (hundreds)	Total Labour over 6 Years (hundreds)	Percentage	Percentage Rate of Increase	(1974 = 100%)
1974	2,654	96,779	2.7	100.00	
1975	4,447	100,802	4.4	176.55	
1977	4,919	104,157	4.7	185.34	
1978	4,640	107,433	3.3	174.83	
1979	3,790	109,711	3.5	142.80	
1980	6,024	114,424	5.3	226.97	
1981	5,213	115,072	4.5	196.42	
1982	4,422	116,377	3.8	166.61	
1983	7,758	138,122	5.6	292.31	
1984	10,143	143,613	7.0	383.17	

Source: CAPMS: Sample Labour Research 1974 - 1984, in The National Centre for Social and Criminological Research, Seminar on Child Labour in Egypt in 1988

**Appendix 17: The Results of Primary School Certificate 1977/78 - 1978/79: Percentage of Students Who Pass The Examination from the Total Enroled in Each Kind of School**

Competent Authority	1977/78		1978/79	
	Boys %	Girls %	Boys %	Girls %
Foreign language schools	99.5	99.7	98.1	99.2
Private (not subsidized)	84.9	87.7	87.8	89.3
Official and subsidized	75.9	74.6	76.4	76.4
Part-time schools	69.0	71.0	71.4	75.9
Service schools	51.0	60.2	54.3	59.1

Source: The National Council for Education, Scientific Research and Technology (1983) Private and Official Language Schools (Department of General Education and Training, Cairo) November, p.39



**Appendix 18: The Results of Preparatory School Certificate  
1977/78 - 1978/79: Percentage of Students Who Pass The  
Examination from the Total Enroled in Each Kind of School**

Competent Authority	1977/78		1978/79	
	Boys %	Girls %	Boys %	Girls %
Foreign language schools	97.6	97.8	97.7	99.1
Official	72.4	77.2	75.6	77.5
Private (subsidized)	70.2	72.7	71.1	78.4
Private (not subsidized)	52.4	49.5	54.6	52.2
Service schools	40.7	43.5	43.4	47.0

Source: The National Council for Education, Scientific Research and Technology (1983) Private and Official Language Schools (Department of General Education and Training, Cairo) November, p.39

**Appendix 19: The Results of Secondary School Certificate  
1977/78 - 1978/79: Percentage of Students Who Pass The  
Examination from the Total Enroled in Each Kind of School**

Competent Authority	1977/78		1978/79	
	Boys %	Girls %	Boys %	Girls %
Foreign language schools	91.2	95.2	95.5	96.8
Private (subsidized)	59.7	63.9	63.3	65.1
Service	37.3	26.5	40.2	38.4
Private (not subsidized)	33.5	35.2	41.9	42.6

Source: The National Council for Education, Scientific Research and Technology (1983) Private and Official Language Schools (Department of General Education and Training, Cairo) November, p.40

**Appendix 20: Table Showing the Distribution of Respondents into the Registrar General's Class Categories**

Class	N	%
1 Professional etc., occupations	48	3.7
2 Intermediate occupations	327	24.9
3N Skilled occupations, nonmanual	294	22.4
3M Skilled occupations, manual	358	27.2
4 Partly skilled occupations	212	16.1
5 Unskilled occupations	67	5.1
6 Armed forces	9	0.7
	1,315	100

Source: Gordon Marshall et al. (eds.) (1988) Social Class in Modern Britain (Hutchinson: London)

**Appendix 21: Showing the Distribution of Respondents into Goldthorpe Class Categories**

Class			N	%
Service	I	Higher grade professional, administrators, and officials, managers in large establishments, large proprietors	123	9.4
	II	Lower grade professionals, administrators, and officials, higher grade technicians, managers in small business and industrial establishments; supervisors of nonmanual employees	235	17.9
Inter- mediate	IIIa	Routine nonmanual employees in administration and commerce	198	15.1
	IIIb	Personal service workers	58	4.4
	IVa	Small proprietors, artisans etc., with employees	45	3.4
	IVb	Small proprietors, artisans etc., without employees	59	4.5
	IVc	Farmers and smallholders; self-employed fishermen	11	0.8
	V	Lower grade technicians, supervisors of manual workers	107	8.1
Working	VI	Skilled manual workers	165	12.5
	VIIa	Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture)	307	23.4
	VIIb	Agricultural workers	7	0.5
			1,315	100

Source: Gordon Marshall et al. (eds.) (1988) Social Class in Modern Britain (Hutchinson: London)

**Appendix 22: Detailed Discussion of the Methods and Procedures for the Field Study**

The Selection of the Samples for the Pilot Study and Main Study

The Pilot Study

The pilot study was designed to study people's perspectives and ideologies as based upon their class position. The people who were chosen for the sample were the parents of children in primary schools. The first step in creating the sample was to select three schools of different kinds, that is, one government free school, one government language school, and one foreign language school. Within the three schools, ten pupils were chosen at random from the list of children enrolled in the sixth grade of the schools.

The researcher talked to the children and explained that the research would involve the researcher going to their homes and discussing some issues with their parents. The children were given a letter to their parents, asking them to agree to the interview, and asking them to make an appointment for the interview. Ten children were selected, so that by the time any parents who did not wish to be involved had been excluded, the desired sample of at least six would remain. The letter to parents is included in Appendix 23.

The schools were selected in the area of north Cairo from among the 89 schools which are in that part of the city. Table 1 shows the types of schools which are to be found in north Cairo.

The pilot study was conducted in Egypt from January to April 1986. The researcher chose the north Cairo area to work in and sampled from different types of schools in the area.

In order to gain access to schools for research purposes it is necessary to get permission from the Security. Once this

**Table 1: Numbers of Primary Schools of Different Types in North Cairo**

---

Type of school	Number
Government Free Schools	75
Government Language Schools	2
Foreign Language Schools	4
Private Schools Teaching Foreign Languages and Owned by Individuals	8
Total	89

Source: Ministry of Education, North Cairo Department, The Statistical Guide 1986-1987

---

was achieved, the researcher was allowed to contact the schools.

The first step in the work inside the school was to make a survey of the parent's occupation, in order to know about the social background of the schools. Only the parents of children in the sixth grade of the schools were taken into account. In order to classify the occupations, the researcher grouped them as follows:

- employees of the government or in the public sector,
- military personnel,
- professionals, such as doctors, lawyers and engineers,
- bourgeois, including merchants and businessmen, and
- workers.

From the survey, as Table No.2 indicates, it is clear that the foreign language school and the government language school have high levels of profession groups, while there is no working class in the foreign language school and only one per cent in the government language school. In contrast, in the

Table 2: Occupations of the Parents of Sixth Grade Pupils in the Pilot Study Schools

The Foreign Language School (St.Mary)

Occupation	Number	%
Professionals	42	43.4
Employees	26	26.9 (Mostly managers)
Military	8	8.3 (All officers)
Bourgeois	12	12.4 (11 merchants, 1 craftsman)
Workers	-	-
Undefined	9	9.3
Total	97	

The Government Language School (Hafiz Ibrahim)

Occupation	Number	%
Professionals	45	45.5
Employees	25	25.5 (6 managers)
Military	16	16.0 (9 officers)
Bourgeois	10	10.0 (7 merchants, 3 craftsmen)
Workers	1	1.0
Undefined	2	2.0
Total	98	

The Government Free School (Fatima Al Nabawiyah)

Occupation	Number	%
Professionals	-	-
Employees	12	26.0 (All small employees)
Military	3	6.5 (No officers)
Bourgeois	8	17.4 (Small merchants/craftsman)
Workers	20	43.6
Undefined	3	6.5
Total	46	

government free school 43.6 per cent are workers, and there are no professionals. It is also noticeable that the bourgeois, i.e. those who own the means of production, are more likely to be large merchants and businessmen in the foreign and government language schools, while in the government free school they are usually small merchants and craftsmen.

The first result from the pilot study is that, as had been anticipated, the three kinds of schools represent different social backgrounds, and that a selection from these three types of schools in the main sample would ensure a broad representation of people from different social classes. These people are the parents of the children.

The value of the pilot study was, as mentioned above, to examine the social background of the parents in the schools, and to explore the possibility of representing different social classes. In this sense it also cast some interesting light on the earlier, theoretical discussion of the class nature of different types of schools in Egypt. The pilot study was also a good opportunity for the researcher to develop her skills in the conduct of interviews.

At a more specific level, the pilot study helped in readjusting the initial plan for the conducting of interviews. The first plan was to interview the two parents together, and to make a three way discussion between the parents and the interviewer. The first interview revealed that this was not going to be a successful way of conducting the interviews, as one parent talked most of the time, and the interviewer could only note the views of one parent. The plan was subsequently modified to allow for a separate interview for each parent.

The pilot study also confirmed that the area of north Cairo has three different types of schools. The area includes houses many middle class families, who usually live in the area near the Nile, while the working class families usually live in the

inner city streets or alleyways (Hara).

### The Main Field Study

The main field study was carried out in north Cairo from January to April 1987. Security permission was needed from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, which allows the researcher to carry out the research in the primary schools of north Cairo. The permission was published in the Egyptian Official Gazette, Vol.84, 8th April 1987, and a copy is included in Appendix 24.

The selection of the sample for the main study was similar to that for the pilot study. It involved sixty families from six schools. Fifteen pupils were selected from each of six schools, two government free schools, two government language schools and two foreign language schools.

### Description of the Schools

The two government language schools in north Cairo were previously government free schools. The comparison between the buildings of the four government schools of the sample shows that, although the four schools are run by the government, the fee paying schools are getting more care in terms of maintenance and decoration. However, the government free schools have some facilities, including a library and a music room.

The foreign language schools are in the buildings surrounding the old establishment of the Maison du Bon Pasteur, which was established in north Cairo in 1845. The buildings are in good condition, and the schools have facilities which include a library, music room, theatre and gymnasium.



### The Social Background of the Pupils in the Schools

The occupations of the fathers of the children selected in the sample are shown in detail in the tables which follow.

The sample for the main study consists of sixty fathers and sixty mothers. In order to carry out the analysis, the sample was classified according to the class variable, and not according to the type of school. Using the criteria which were explained in detail in Chapter Five, the sample was classified mainly according to position in relation to the means of production, owner/non-owner, and the occupational state, and mental/manual work. The sample was classified into four classes, which were the new petty bourgeoisie, traditional petty bourgeoisie, big bourgeoisie and working class.

Table 6 shows the occupational state of the sample.

**Table 3: Father's Occupation in the Two Government Schools**

---

School No.1 (Shoubra Al-Khadima)

In school No.1 there are three six grade classrooms, with about 38 pupils in each divided as follows:

Boys	42	Muslim	100
Girls	74	Christian	16

Occupation	Number	%
Professionals	3	2.5
Employees	29	25.0
Military	2	1.7 (Soldiers)
Bourgeois	16	13.8 (Small merchants, craftsmen)
Workers	38	32.8
Undefined	28	24.1
Total	116	100

School No.2 (Gawad Husny)

In school No.2 there is one six grade classrooms with 46 pupils divided as follows:

Boys	23	Muslim	42
Girls	23	Christian	4

Occupation	Number	%
Professionals	-	-
Employees	13	28.3
Military	2	4.4 (Soldiers)
Bourgeois	10	21.7 (Small merchants, craftsmen)
Workers	15	32.6
Undefined	6	13.0
Total	46	100

---

**Table 4: Father's Occupation in the Two Government Language Schools**

---

**School No.1 (Tariq Ben Zyad)**

In school No.1 there are two six grade classrooms, with about 30 pupils in each divided as follows:

Boys	34	Muslim	46
Girls	25	Christian	13

Occupation	Number	%
Professionals	32	54.2
Employees	15	25.4
Military	7	11.9 (Officers)
Bourgeois	3	5.1 (Merchants, and businessmen)
Craftsmen	1	1.7
Undefined	1	1.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>100</b>

**School No.2 (Hafiz Ibrahim)**

In school No.2 there are three six grade classrooms with about 27 pupils in each, divided as follows:

Boys	48	Muslim	66
Girls	32	Christian	14

Occupation	Number	%
Professionals	35	43.8
Employees	29	36.3
Military	10	12.5 (Officers)
Bourgeois	3	3.7 (Merchants, and businessmen)
Craftsmen	2	1.3
Undefined	1	1.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>100</b>

---

Table 5: Father's Occupation in the Two Foreign Language Schools

School No.1 (Bonpasteur)

In school No.1 there are two six grade classrooms, with about 38 pupils in each divided as follows:

Boys	0	Muslim	22
Girls	77	Christian	45

Occupation	Number	%
Professionals	35	45.5
Employees	22	28.6
Military	2	2.6 (Officers)
Bourgeois	15	19.5 (Merchants, and businessmen)
Craftsmen	3	3.8
Undefined	-	-
Total	77	100

School No.2 (St.Mary School)

In school No.2 there are two six grade classrooms with about 42 pupils in each, divided as follows:

Boys	0	Muslim	40
Girls	85	Christian	45

Occupation	Number	%
Professionals	38	44.7
Employees	21	24.7
Military	10	11.8 (Officers)
Bourgeois	10	11.8 (Merchants, and businessmen)
Craftsmen	-	-
Undefined	6	7.0
Total	85	100

Table 6: The Occupational Distribution of the Sample

Occupational State	New petty Bourgeoisie		Traditional Bourgeoisie		Big Bourgeoisie		Working Class	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Self-employed (alone)			3					
Self-employed employing others:								
Less than 5			6	1				
10 people					7			
40 people					1			
50 people					1			
Wage earner	31	20		1*			1*	10
Unemployed (was previously employed)							1	1

\* These two wage earners are classified according to two different measures: the first one is to classify them as big or traditional petty bourgeoisie according to the husband's position, and the second is to classify them as wage earners, since they are both working women.

In terms of the size of the sample, it can be noticed that the sample of sixty families is not in proportion to the general pattern of the population of Cairo. However, there are representatives from different class positions, with a clear majority among the new petty bourgeoisie, which was the intention in selecting the sample this way, in order to give the opportunity to focus on the ideologies of this class. This was referred to earlier in the Introduction, Chapter Three and Chapter Five, on account of the importance of this group, both in terms of numbers, and in terms of the leading position they occupy in modernization. According to this view, the new petty bourgeoisie is the main class in the analysis and is represented by 31 families. Members of the sample work as

managers, directors, engineers, teachers, university teachers, employees, and all of them work either in the government, public sector or in foreign companies.

The sample of the traditional petty bourgeoisie consists of 9 families, who work as small shop keepers who employ less than five workers.

The 9 members of the big bourgeoisie consists of owners of factories, entrepreneurs, businessmen, and wholesale merchants. All of them employ more than ten workers.

There are 11 members of the working class in the sample. They work in the marginal sector of services, and not in industry, since the sample includes a driver, a barber, a cleaner, a waiter and an upholsterer.

**Appendix 23: Letter to Parents**

## Letter to Parents

Dear Parents,

I would like to introduce myself. I am Mahra Dyab, assistant lecturer in the Faculty of Education, Zagazig University. I am doing some research into parents' views on the educational system. It is part of my study for a Ph.D. degree.

Most research is concerned with the views of those in authority (government, teachers, etc.) but in this research I am concerned with your views, because your children are the customers of the system. So your views are important in order to understand and to solve the problems of this essential system.

If you do not mind, I would like to meet both of you at home to discuss different points about educational, social and economic systems in Egypt.

I will use one tool in my interview, which is a list of questions, and I will write down the answers myself.

I would like to assure you that all information will be used for the purpose of the study, and will be kept secret and anonymous.

The interview may extend for two hours. If you have no objection, would you please inform the school about a suitable date and time.

Yours sincerely,

Mahra Dyab

**Appendix 24: Permission from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics**

الوقائع المصرية - العدد ٨٤ في ٨ أبريل سنة ١٩٨٧

الجهاز المركزي للتعبئة العامة والإحصاء

قرار رقم ١٨٥ لسنة ١٩٨٧ (بالشؤون)

بشأن قيام السيدة / مهورى أمين دياب - عضو الهيئة الحكومية بالتنسيق  
المتحدة بإجراء بحث ميداني في موضوع "تغيير الاجتهاد في مصر وأثره  
على التعليم في مصر في الفترة من ١٩٧٠ حتى الآن وذلك للحصول على  
درجة الدكتوراه"

رئيس قطاع الإحصاء

بعد الاطلاع على القرار الجمهوري رقم ٢٩١٥ لسنة ١٩٦٤ الخاص بإنشاء وتنظيم الجهاز؛  
وعنى قرار رئيس الجهاز رقم ٢٣١ لسنة ١٩٦٨ بشأن إجراء الإحصاءات والتمديدات  
الاستثنائية والاستقصاءات .

وعنى قرار رئيس الجهاز رقم ٢٣٥ لسنة ١٩٨٤ .

وعنى قرار رئيس الجهاز رقم ٨٤ لسنة ١٩٨٤ .

وعنى قرار رئيس الجهاز رقم ١٥٠ لسنة ١٩٨٥ .

وعلى كتاب الإدارة العامة للبيانات رقم ٢٥٦٣ المؤرخ ١٩٨٦/٧/٢١ .

ق-رر :

مادة ١ - تقوم السيدة / مهورى أمين دياب - عضو الهيئة الحكومية بالتنسيق المتحددة  
بإجراء أبحاث ميداني الموضوع بمآله .

مادة ٢ - يجري هذا البحث على عينة حجمها ١٠٠ مفردة من أولياء أمور الطلاب  
في المدارس الابتدائية بمناطق شرق وشمال وجنوب غرب القاهرة التعليمية مع استبعاد البيانات  
الخاصة بالمتاحي منهم وشرط موافقتهم وكذا موافقة المناطق التعليمية على البحث وتحت  
إشراف مكتب الأمن بكل منهما .

مادة ٣ - تجميع البيانات اللازمة لهذا البحث طبقاً للإستمارات الممدة لهذا الغرض  
والمقدمة من الجهاز المركزي للتعبئة العامة والإحصاء وعدد صفحاتها ( ١٥ صفحة ) وذلك  
خلال خمسة شهور وتبلي أن يوافق الجهاز بتدويره من النتائج النهائية لهذا البحث فور  
الإتمام .

مادة ٤ - تقدم الباحثة بإبلاغ السيد / مدير مديرية الأمن التابعة لوزارة الداخلية  
بمحافظة القاهرة بصورة من هذا القرار صرفاً لاسمها الفاتحين بالبحث الميداني وتاريخ البدء  
والإتمام الفعليين لهذا البحث .

مادة ٥ - لا يتم البدء في تنفيذ إجراءات هذا البحث ميدانياً إلا بعد صدور  
هذا القرار .

مادة ٦ - ينتهي هذا القرار في الوقائع المصرية ما

صدر في ١٩٨٥/١٢/١٥

عبد السلام سلطان







### III Education

17. Which kind of school would you prefer for your children in their first level?
- Government school
  - Government language school
  - Foreign language school
  - Al-Azhar
  - Private school

Follow up: I get the respondent talk about:

- The main characteristic of each kind of school
- To identify the main differences and similarities
- Important aspects of each kind.

18. What kind of school they are actually in?
- Government
  - Government language school
  - Foreign language school
  - Al-Azhar
  - Private school
19. Why did you not send them to the kind which you would prefer?
- Very expensive
  - Far from our place
  - Any other.
20. To which level do you want them to reach?
- Basic education
  - General secondary
  - Technical secondary
  - University level.
21. Why do you want this level?
- To find a good job ... like
- To give them good status.
- I can't finance them for a higher level.
22. Why did you send your children to a government language, foreign language or private school?
- It is important to learn a foreign language
  - To find a good job in the future
  - They are better organised than government schools.
23. Are there any differences between the government and the language schools in developing children's abilities?
- There is no difference
  - The language schools develop their abilities more
  - The government schools develop their abilities more.

Note: I mean by abilities

- Intelligence in general
- School achievement
- Talents, like music and drawing.



VI Evaluation of the Education System

32. Are there any problems in education system?  
yes                      no
33. What are these problems?  
a. The big number of students  
b. Shortage in school buildings  
c. Shortage of teachers  
d. Weak curriculum  
e. Shortage of equipment.
34. Who can solve these problems?  
a. The government  
b. The political parties  
c. People.
35. Do you think the government should spend more money upon education?  
yes                      no
36. On what aspects and parts of education should we spend more?  
a. Basic education  
b. General secondary education  
c. Technical education  
d. University.
37. Where should the money come from?  
a. Shifting from military expenditure to education  
b. Increase taxes and changing tax system. If the latter, how?  
c. From foreign aid.
38. Do you think that our education system has been changed after 1952 revolution?  
yes                      no
39. If yes, in which aspects?  
a. Financial  
b. Increasing student numbers  
c. Free education at all levels  
d. Increasing University numbers  
e. New specialisations  
f. More equal opportunities  
g. New curricula.
40. If no, why?  
Education is still for the upper class  
Still fee-paying in an indirect way.
41. Do you expect any changes in the future?  
yes                      no

42. If yes, in which aspects?  
 a. Curriculum  
 b. More spending on education  
 c. Solve the private lessons problem  
 d. New examination system.
43. If no, why?  
 a. Changes in education are very slow  
 b. The government gives more care to other problems.

#### VII Evaluation of the School

You have your children in schools. I expect you to have some views about your children's school, for example:

44. What do you like in your children's school?  
 They have good teachers  
 The discipline  
 The school always contact home.
45. What don't you like in your children's school?  
 Not strict with the children  
 Teachers are not well qualified  
 The results are not good  
 They don't contact home  
 The buildings are in a bad condition.

#### VIII Parents' relations with school

46. What are you doing to solve your children's problems at school?  
 Discuss with their teachers  
 Discuss with headmaster/mistress  
 I let the child face the situation  
 I have nothing to do with it.
47. How do you find the discussion with teachers?  
 It's very easy  
 I can't understand them  
 Not all teachers are the same.
48. Are you a member in the parents' committee?  
 a. I am not a member but I can attend the meetings  
 b. Yes, I am a member  
 c. I am not a member and I do not go.
49. If you don't go, why not?  
 I don't believe in this system  
 I have no time  
 I have not been elected.
50. If you go, why?  
 It is our responsibility  
 It is our children's future  
 Any other



X Evaluation of Private Lessons

57. Do you help your children in their study?  
yes                      no
58. If yes, what kind of help you give them?  
a. Read with them  
b. Help them in doing homework.
59. If no, why not?  
I don't read and write  
I have no time  
I am not interested in doing that.
60. Do your children have any extra tuition?  
yes                      no
61. If yes, from whom?  
Teachers  
Organised lessons by the school  
At the mosque or church.
62. Are the private lessons to help children?  
a. To remain equal with other children  
b. To move ahead of other children  
c. It depends upon the child's standard.
63. What are the reasons for the private lessons problems?  
a. Teacher are not well qualified  
b. The big number of students in one classroom  
c. Students are not serious  
d. The competition.
64. What is your opinion about the private lessons?  
a. It affects the equal opportunities to education  
b. It is fair  
c. It is unfair

XI Family Cultural Capital

65. Do you have any books at home  
yes                      no
66. If yes, what kind of books?  
Religious books  
Political books  
Novels  
Children's books  
School books only
67. Who chose the children's books?  
a. The father  
b. The mother  
c. The children  
d. We only help them.



68. How do your children spend their leisure time?
- At home, watching T.V.
  - Go to the club
  - Go to the cinema and children's theatre
  - Play in the street.

### XII Political Consciousness and interests

69. If we compare the political system during the sixties and the political system during the seventies, which one of these systems helped in:
- Developing our society?
  - Developing your position in society?
  - Developing the education system?

Note: Give examples of these developments and differences.

### XIII Class Position and Image of Society

70. Do you think that all people in society are
- Equal?
  - Unequal?
71. If they are unequal, in which aspects?
- Power
  - Wealth
  - Social position
  - Social opportunities
  - Education
  - Poor and Rich.
72. What do you think about these differences?
- Very large differences
  - Very small differences.
73. You agree that there are differences and inequalities between people. Can you identify how many classes or different groups of people exist in Egypt now? Describe each class or group.
74. What is the size of each class or group?

Different groups	Large: more	Medium: 50%	Small:
	than 50%		less
			than
			50%

Group No.1  
 Group No.2  
 Group No.3  
 Group No.4



83. Teachers are one of many groups of professions in society. If you compare teachers with other professions in society in terms of status and social position, which position you give them compared with:

Other Professions	Status		
	Higher	The same	Lower
Doctors			
Engineers			
Officers			
Clerks			
Imams			
Factory workers			
Craftsmen			

84. What is your view of  
 a. Society's future  
 b. Children's future.
85. Would you like to add any more questions or suggestions?

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdalla, Ahmed (1985) The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973 (Al Saqi Books, London)
- Abdalla, Ismail Sabry (1977) Towards a New International Economic System (Al Hayah Al Misriyah Lil Kitab, Cairo) (Arabic)
- Abdel Fadil, Mahmoud (1980) The Political Economy of Nasserism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)
- Abdel Fadil, Mahmoud (1982) "Educational Expansion and Income Distribution in Egypt, 1952 - 1977", in Gouda Abdel-Khalek and Robert Tignor (eds.) The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt (Holmes and Meier, London)
- Abdel Fadil, Mahmoud (1983) Reflections upon the Egyptian Economic Issue (Dar El-Mostaqbal El Araby, Cairo) (Arabic)
- Abdel Khalek, Gouda (1981) "Looking Outside or Turning Northwest? On the meaning and external dimension of Egypt's Infatah 1971-1980", Social Problems, Vol.28, No.4, April, p.395
- Abdel Khalek, Gouda, and Tignor, Robert (eds.) (1982) The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt (Holmes and Meier, London)
- Abdel Malek, Anwar (1968) Egypt: Military Society (Random House, New York)
- Abdel Moatty, Abdel Basett (1981) "The Social Formation and the Future of the Societal Issue in Egypt", The Conference on the Framework for Social Work in the Arab World, Kuwait, Arab Institute for Planning
- Abdel Moatty, Abdel Basett (1968) Studies of Social Class Formation and Class Structure in Egypt: The national studies (The National Center for Sociological and Criminological Research) (Arabic)
- Abdel Moatty, Abdel Basett (1981) Theoretical Trends in Sociology (Alam Al-Maarefa, Kuwait) (Arabic)
- Abercrombie, Nicholas (1980) Class, Structure and Knowledge (Basil Blackwell, Oxford)
- Abercrombie, Nicholas (1984) (et al.) Dictionary of Sociology, (Penguin, Harmondsworth)
- Al Greitly, Aly (1977) Twenty five years: Analytical study for the economic policies in Egypt 1952-1977 (Al Hayah Al Misriyah lil Kitab, Cairo) (Arabic)
- Al Nory, Abdel Ghany and Aboud, Abdel Ghany (1979) Towards an Arab Philosophy of Education (Dar Al Fikr, Cairo)

Altbach, Philip G. and Kelly, Gail P. (1985) Education and Colonialism (Longman, New York)

Althusser, Louis, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", in Cosin, B.R. (ed.) (1972) Education and Society (Penguin Books in association with the Open University: Middlesex)

Al-Ahaly, Vol 375, 14 December 1988.

Al-Ahaly, Vol.341, 20 April 1988

Al-Ahaly, Vol.349, 15 June 1988

Al-Ahaly, Vol.350, 22 June 1988

Al-Ahaly, Vol.370, 9 November 1988

Al-Ahaly, Vol.384, 8 June 1988

Al-Ahram Iktisadi, Vol. 919, August 1986

Al-Ahram Iktisadi, Vol.684, 22 February, 1982 (Arabic)

Al-Ahram Newspaper, 15 November 1968

Amin, Galal (1982) The Crisis of the Economy and Culture in Egypt (Al Markas Al Araby lil Bahth wa Al Nashr, Cairo) (Arabic)

Amin, Samir (1976) Some Thoughts on Self-Reliant Development, Collective Self-Reliance and the New International Economic Order (United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, Dakar)

Amin, Samir (1977) Imperialism and Unequal Development (The Harvester Press, Sussex)

Amin, Samir (1985) "The Historical Foundations of Arab Nationalism", in Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Nicholas S. Hopkins Arab Society: Social Science Perspective (American University in Cairo, Cairo) p.33

Amin, Samir (1985) Class and Nation (Heineman, London),

Amin, Samir (1985) The Crisis of the Arab Society (Dar Al Mostaqbal Al Araby, Cairo) (Arabic)

Ammar, Hamid, "Dismantling the Relationship between State and Education", Al Ahaly, Vol.375, December 1988

Ammar, Hamid, "The Relapse of Mass Education at the Primary Level", Al Ahaly, Vol.351, 29 June 1988

Apple, Michael (1985) Education and Power (ARK, Boston)

Arab Republic of Egypt, Shura Council, Minutes of 28 December, 1982

Arab Republic of Egypt, Shura Council, Minutes of 4 March, 1984

Aronowitz, S. (1981) The Crisis in Historical Materialism: Class, politics and culture in Marxist theory (Bergin, New York)

Ayubi, Nazih N. (1978) Policy of Education in Egypt: Political and managerial study (Centre of Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo)

Ayubi, Nazih N. (1981) "The Development of the Political and Administrative System in Egypt 1952-1977" in Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (Ed.) Egypt in a Quarter of a Century 1952-1977 (Al Maahad Al Araby Lil Inmaa, Beirut) pp.107-108 (Arabic)

Badram, Shibl (1982) "The Economic, Social and Political Dimensions of the Egyptian Education in the Period from 1952 to 1967 (Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Education, Tanta University) (Arabic)

Badran, Shibl (1985) "Education and Dependency in Egypt: A study in the Foreign Education", in Contemporary Education, Vol.3, p.50 (Arabic)

Ball, Stephen, "The Sociology of Education in Developing Countries", The British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol.2, No.3, 1981, p.302

Baran, Paul (1967) The Political Economy of Growth (Monthly Review Press, New York) (First published in 1957)

Bell, Daniel (1962) The End of Ideology (The Free Press, New York)

Bennholdt-Thomsen, Veronika (1979) "Investment in the Poor: a critical analysis of the new World Bank policy", Bickerveld, Department of Sociology, Unpublished manuscript

Bhagwati, Jgdish, "Education, Class Structure and Income Inequality", World Development, Vol.1, No.5, May 1973

Bowles, Samuel (1980) "Education, Class Conflict, and Uneven Development", in Simmons, John, (ed.) The Education Dilemma: Policy issues for developing countries in the 1980s (Pergamon Press, Oxford) p219

Bray, Mark, et al. (1986) Education and Society in Africa (Edward Arnold, London)

CAPMS (1971) Statistical Indicators for UAR 1950 - 1970 (Cairo)

CAPMS (1986) Systems of Education and Employment in Egypt Vol.5

Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (1985) Press Release (mimeographed) (Cairo)

Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (1984) Statistical Year Book 1952-1983

Clarke, John, et al. "Sub-cultures, Cultures and Class" in Bennett, Tony, et al. (eds.) (1986) Culture, Ideology and Social Process (Batsford Academic and Education in association with The Open University) (First published 1981)

Cochran, Judith (1986) Education in Egypt (Croom Helm, London)

Coombs, Philip H. (1964) The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Education and cultural affairs (Harper Row, New York)

Coombs, Philip H. (1985) The World Crisis in Education (Oxford University Press: Oxford)

Craig Harris, Lillian (Ed.) (1988) Egypt: International challenge and regional stability (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)

Crececius, Daniel (1970) "Al-Azhar: A millennium of faithfulness to tradition", Mid East, April, 34-41

Dale, Roger (1981) "The State and Education: Some theoretical approaches", Unit 3, The Open University, The State, and the Politics of Education, Part 2

Davis, Howard H. (1979) Beyond Class Images: Exploration in the structure of social consciousness (Croom Helm, London)

Dekmejian, R. Hararair (1977) Egypt Under Nasser (University of London, London)

Delcroix, Jacques and Ragin, Charles "Modernizing Institutions", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 84, July 1978 / May 1979, p.125

Demaine, Jack (1983) Contemporary Theories in the Sociology of Education (London: Macmillan)

Dunne, Heyworth (n.d.) An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt (Luzac and Co., London)

Ebeid, Mona Makram (1987) "The Role of the Official Opposition": Paper presented at the Conference on Politics and the Economy in Egypt under Mubarak (SOAS, University of London, London) May 1987

Eisenstadt, S.R. (ed.) (1970) Readings in Social Evolution and Development (Pergamon Press, Oxford)

El Gohary, Muhammad (1979) Studies in Social Development (Dar El Maarif: Cairo) (Arabic)

El Tayeb, Muhammad (no date) "The Policies of Prices and Wages" in The Eighth Scientific Conference on Social Justice in the Light of Monetary and Economic Policies (The Institute of National Planning, Cairo) pp.1-3 (Arabic)

Elewah, Elewah Ibrahim (1974) "The Principle of Equal Opportunity in General Education in Egypt" (M.A., Faculty of Education, Ain Shams University, Cairo) (Arabic)

El-Edel, (1982) "Impact of Taxation on Income Distribution: An exploratory attempt to estimate tax incidence in Egypt", in Abdel-Khalek, Gouda, and Tignor, Robert (eds.) The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt (Holmes and Meier, London)

Entwistle, Harold (1979) Antonio Gramsci: Conservative schooling for radical politics (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)

Fagerlind, Ingermar and Saha, Lawrence J. (1983) Education and National Development: A comparative perspective (Pergamon Press, Oxford)

Faksh, Mahmud (1980) "The Consequences of the Introduction and Spread of Modern Education: Education and national integration in Egypt", in Kedourie, Elie and Hiam, Sylvia, Modern Egypt: Studies in politics and society (Frank Cass, London)

Fathy Suror, Ahmed (1989) Developing Education in Egypt: Its policy, strategy and implementation plan (Ministry of Education, Cairo) (Arabic)

Fitzgerald, E.V.K. (1979) The Political Economy of Peru 1956-1978 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)

Foster, Philip J. (1977) "The Vocational School Fallacy in Development Planning", in Karabel, Jerome and Halsey, A.H. (eds.) Power and Ideology in Education (Oxford University Press, New York)

Ghoneim, Adel (1968) "The Issue of the New Class in Egypt", in Al-Taleaa February

Ghoneim, Adel (1986) The Egyptian Model of Dependent State Capitalism (Dar Al Mostakbal Al Araby, Cairo)(Arabic)

Giddens, Anthony and Held, David (eds.) (1984) Classes, Power and Conflict (Macmillan, Houndmills)

Gilsenan, Michael (1982) Recognizing Islam: An anthropologist's introduction (Croom Helm, London)

Giroux, Henry (1981) Ideology, Culture and the Process of Schooling (Falmer Press, London)

Giroux, Henry (1983) Theory and Resistance in Education (Heinemann, London) pp.122-123



Goldthorpe, John H. (1980) Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain (Clarendon Press: Oxford)

Gramsci, Antonio (1982) Notebook (Lawrence and Wishart, London)

Gunder Frank, Andre (1967) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (Monthly Review Press, New York)

Gusfield, Joseph R., "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced polarities in the study of social change", The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 72, July 1966/May 1967, pp.354-355

Hall, Stuart (1982) "Culture and the State", Unit 28, The Open University, The State and Popular Culture, (1) Block 7

Halpern, Manfred (1963) The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton University Press, Princeton)

Hansen, Bent and Radwan, Samir (1982) Employment Opportunities and Equity in Egypt (ILO, Geneva)

Hardiman, Margaret and Midgley, James (1962) The Social Dimensions of Development (John Wiley and Sons, Chichester)

Harik, Iliya (1987) "The Origins of the Arab State System", in Salame, Gahassan, The Foundations of the Arab State, Vol.1, (Croom Helm, New York)

Hasanein, Gamal Magdy (1981) Class Structure in Egypt 1952-1970 (Dar Al Thakafa Lil Tibaah Wa Al-Nashr, Cairo)(Arabic)

Heindrick, B. (1982) "The Legal Left: A case study", Middle Eastern Studies, (University of Amsterdam)

Hillal, Ali E. (1981) "Policy Making in Egypt: A case study of the Open Door Economic Policy", in Social Problems, Vol.28, No.4, April, p.414

Hindess, Barry (1987) Politics and Class Analysis (Basil Blackwell, Oxford)

Hindess, Barry and Hirst, Paul Q. (1975) Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production, (London and Boston)

Hinnebusch, Raymond A. (1981) "Egypt under Sadat - Elite, Power Structure and Political Changes in a Post Populist State", Social Problems, Vol.28, No.4, p.446

Hoogvelt, Ankie M. (1982) The Third World in Global Development (Macmillan Press, London)

Hopwood, Derek, (1985) Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984 (Allen and Unwin, London)

- Hussein, Adel (1985) Towards a New Arab Thinking: Nasserism, development and democracy (Dar Al Mustaqbal Al Araby, Cairo) (Arabic)
- Hussein, Mahmoud (1977) Class Conflict in Egypt 1945-1970 (Monthly Review Press, New York)
- Hussein, Mansour and Khalil, Yosef (n.d.) Basic Education: Its concepts, principles and applications (Gharib, Cairo) (Arabic)
- Hyde, Georgie D.M. (1978) Education in Modern Egypt: Ideals and realities (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)
- Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (1982) The New Arab Social System: A study on the social impact of the oil wealth (Markas Dirasat Al Wahda Al Arabiyah, Beirut) (Arabic)
- Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (1982) The New Arab Social System: A study on the social effects of the oil wealth (Centre of Arab Unity Studies, Beirut) (Arabic)
- Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (1983) Egypt Reconsidering Herself (Dar Al-Mostaqbal Al Araby, Cairo) (Arabic)
- Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (1985) "Society Crisis or Class Crisis?: A study in the crisis of the new middle class", Al Manar, Vol.6, June, pp.18-19 (Arabic)
- Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (Ed.) (1981) Egypt in a Quarter of a Century 1952-1977 (Al Maahad Al Araby Lil Inmaa, Beirut) (Arabic)
- Ikram, Khalid (1980) Egypt: Economic management in a period of transition (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore)
- Ismail, Saeid (1974) Issues of Education under Occupation (Alam Al Kottob, Cairo) (Arabic)
- Ismail, Saeid (1984) Crisis of Education in Egypt (Al Ahaly Book, Unperiodical Book, Cairo) (Arabic)
- Karabel, Jerome and Halsey, A.H. (eds.) Power and Ideology in Education (Oxford University Press, New York)
- Larrain, Jorge (1984) Marxism and Ideology (Macmillan, Houndmills) (First published 1983)
- Larrain, Jorge (1984) The Concept of Ideology (Hutchinson, London) (First published in 1979)
- Marshall, Gordon, et al. (1988) Social Class in Modern Britain (Hutchinson, London)
- Ministry of Education (1962) Education Planning in the United Arab Republic (Documentation and Research Centre for Education)

Ministry of Education (1980) Developing and Innovating Education in Egypt: Policy Plans (National Centre for Educational Research, Cairo)

Ministry of Education (1987) Strategy of Developing Education in Egypt, (Ministry of Education, July)

Ministry of Education, Statistics of Primary Education 1986/87 (Arabic)

Ministry of Labour Power (1965) The Report of the Ministerial Committee of Labour Power on the Policy of Education (Cairo) (Arabic)

Moabeid, Fathy Hussein (1980) "The Philosophy of the 23rd July Revolution and its Effect on the Educational Thought in Egypt in the Period from 1952 to 1970" (Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Women, Ain Shams University, Cairo) (Arabic)

Muhye Al Din, Amro (1978) "The Evaluation of Industrial Strategy in Egypt and the Other Alternatives in the Future", in Development Strategy in Egypt: Papers and discussions of the second conference for Egyptian Economics, Cairo 24 - 26 March 1977 (Al Hayah Al Misriyah lil-Kitab, Cairo) (Arabic)

Mursy, Saad and Ismail, Saeid (1983) The History of Pedagogy and Education (Alam Al Kottob, Cairo) (Arabic)

National Centre for Educational Research (1984) The Development of Education in Egypt from 1981/82 to 1983/84 (Cairo)

National Centre for Educational Research (1979) (Cairo), Data About Education in Egypt, in response to questionnaires forwarded by the International Conference on Education, Geneva, 1979.

O'Brien, Patrick (1966) The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System from Private Enterprise to Socialism 1951-1962 (Oxford University Press, London)

Page, G. Terry and Thomas, J.B. (1979) International Dictionary of Education (Kogan Page: London)

Parsons, T. (1951) The Social System (The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill.)

Perlmutter, Amos, "Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle Class: A comparative analysis", Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. X, No.1, October 1967, p.55

Philip G. Altbach, "The Distribution of Knowledge in the Third World: A case study in neocolonialism", in Altbach, Philip G. and Kelly, Gail P. (1985) Education and Colonialism (Longman, New York)

Poulantzas, Nicos (1975) Class in Contemporary Capitalism (NLB, London)

Poulantzas, Nicos (1982) Political Power and Social Classes (Verso, London)

Radwan, Abu Al-Futouh (1951) Old and New Forces in Egyptian Education (Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia, New York)

Ramadan, Abdel Azeem (1978) Class Conflict in Egypt 1937-1952 (Al Moassah Al Arabiyah Lil mashr, Beirut)

Raslan, Aly Mahmoud (1974) "The Trends of the Policy of Education in Egypt from 1952 to 1970" (Ph.D. thesis, Faculty of Education, Al Azhar University, Cairo) (Arabic)

Richards, Alan (1984) "Ten Years of Infatih: Class, rents, and policy stasis in Egypt", Journal of Development Studies, 20, 4 July, pp.323-328

Rugh, Andre B. (1979) Coping with Poverty in a Cairo Community. American University in Cairo, Cairo Papers in Social Science Vol 1

Saad, Samir Lewis (1980) Drop out in Primary Education from 1956/57 to 1978/79 (The National Centre for Educational Research with the World Bank, Cairo) (Arabic)

Saad, Samir Lewis (1982) The enrolment of Children in Basic Education Schools (The National Centre for Educational Research, Cairo)

Sarup, Madan (1978) Marxism and Education (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)

Sayed Ahmed, Abdel Sameiaa (1985) "The Identity Crisis of the Egyptian Educational Thought", in Educational Studies (Irregular Book, Vol.1, November)(Arabic), p.136

Shaaban, Abdel Azeem Taha (1981) "Social Justice and Efficiency in Egyptian Education: A critical investigation of the bases of Egyptian Educational Philosophy" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A.)

Shalaby, Ahmed (1982) Islamic Education: Its systems, philosophy and history (Nahdat Misr, Cairo) (Arabic)

Sharp, Rachel (1980) Knowledge, Ideology and the Politics of Schooling (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)

Shawky Al-Bohy, Farouk, "Scale for Determining Socio-Economic Classes", Contemporary Education, Vol.5 & 6, July 1986, February 1987 (Arabic)

Shils, E. "Political Development in the New States: The will to be modern", in Eisenstadt, S.R. (ed.)(1970) Readings in Social Evolution and Development (Pergamon Press, Oxford)

Shils, E. (1960) "Political Development in the New States", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2, p.273

Shoukri, Ghali (1981) Egypt: Portrait of a President, 1971 - 1981 (Zed, London)

Simmons, John (1980) "An overview of the policy issues in the 1980s", in Simmons, John (ed.) The Education Dilemma: Policy issues for developing countries in the 1980s (Pergamon Press, Oxford)

Sinclair, M.E. and Lillis, Kevin (1980) School and Community in the Third World (Croom Helm, London)

Smith, Charles D. (1980) "The Intellectual and Modernization: Definitions and reconsiderations: The Egyptian experience", in Comparative Studies in Society and History: An International Quarterly, Vol.22, No.4, October, p.524

Springborg, Robert (1989) Mubaraks's Egypt: Fragmentation of the political order (Westview Press, Boulder)

Stepan, Alfred (1978) The State and Society: Peru in comparative perspective (Princeton University Press, Princeton)

Szeliowicz, Joseph (1973) Education and Modernization in the Middle East (Cornell University Press, London)

Szentes, Tamas (1971) The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (Akademiai Kiado, Budapest)

The Charter of National Action, Chapter 6

The National Council for Education and Scientific Research. Third Period. October - July, 1975/76 (Arabic)

Tignor, Robert (1982) "Equality in Egypt's Recent Past: 1945-1952", in Abdel-Khalek, Gouda, and Tignor, Robert (eds.) The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt (Holmes and Meier, London) p.38

Tlemcani, Rachid (1986) State and Revolution in Algeria (Zed, London)

Trimberger, Ellen Kay (1978) Revolution from Above: Military bureaucrats and development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru (Transaction, New Brunswick)

Turner, Bryan (1978) Marx and the end of Orientalism (George Allen and Unwin, London)

Turner, Bryan (1984) Capitalism and Class in the Middle East: Theories of social and economic development (Heineman, London)

Wahba, Mourad, "Social Aspects", in Craig Harris, Lillian (Ed.) (1988) Egypt: International challenge and regional stability (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)

Waterbury, John (1983) The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The political economy of two regimes (Princeton University Press, Princeton)

Weber, Max (1978) Max Weber: Economy and Society (edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich) (University of California Press, Berkeley) 2 vols.

Williams, Raymond (1984) The Long Revolution (Penguin Books, Middlesex) (First published 1961)

Williams, Raymond (1985) Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society (Flamingo, London) (First published 1976)

Williamson, Bill (1987) Education and Social Change in Egypt and Turkey: A study in historical sociology (Macmillan Press, Houndmills)

Wright, Erik Olin, "Class and Occupation", Theory and Society, 9, pp.177-214

Wright, Erik Olin (1973) Class Structure and Income Determination (Academic Press, New York)

Wright, Erik Olin (1978) Class, Crisis and the State (NLB, London)

Wright, Erik Olin (1985) Classes (Verso, London)

Yosef, Yosef Khalil (n.d.) A Report about the Experiment of Basic Education (The National Centre for Educational Research)

Zaalouk, Malak (1989) Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The rise of the new bourgeoisie (Zed Books, London)

Zartman, William, "Opposition as Support of the State", in Adeed Dawisha and William Zartman (Eds.) (1988) Beyond Coercion: The durability of the Arab state (Croom Helm, New York) Vol.3, p.75