AN INVESTIGATION OF KANT'S AND WITTGENSTEIN'S IDEAS AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR ART AND DESIGN EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

The philosophical approach that I have taken in my thesis, is an attempt to evaluate the importance of Kant's and Wittgenstein's thinking for art and design practice in education. In order to substantiate my central claim that art and design experience needs to be taken seriously in education, I begin by discussing through Kant's and Wittgenstein's work some of the major theoretical concerns that appear to underpin aesthetic activity, its experience and thus creative involvement. From this analysis and by developing some of these arguments further, in relation to practical problems, I explore and demonstrate in the final part of my thesis some of the factors which determine and account for art and design learning in education. The arguments that I produce, are an attempt to redefine expression and meaning in art and design education in a more precise and accurate way. In this respect, the essential distinctions that I aim to clarify concern some of the issues that affect and establish art and design understanding. In general, my arguments are a defence against considering art and design experience as indeterminate, subjective and simplistic. It is with this in mind, that I challenge the way art and design experience is often interpreted in education. The point that I stress, is that art and design practice is a complex and sophisticated learning activity. It is my contention that the complexity of understanding which art and design can entail and which I describe in this work,

has seldom been explicitly articulated within an art and design educational context. The suggestions that I make in my work, outline certain ideas which have implications for art and design curriculum issues and teaching practice.

CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations

BB Wittgenstein, L. *Blue and Brown Books*

CJ Kant, I. *Critique of Judgement*

CPR Kant, I. *Critique of Pure Reason*

CTJ Kant, I. *Critique of Teleological Judgement*

LC Wittgenstein, L. *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetic, Psychology and Religious Belief*

OC Wittgenstein, L. *On Certainty*

PI Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations*

PPI Wittgenstein, L. *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. I*

PPII Wittgenstein, L. *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. II*

RC Wittgenstein, L. *Remarks on Colour*

Z Wittgenstein, L. *Zettle*

Preface

This investigation is essentially about the notion that the aesthetic is a creative experience and its importance for art and design education. Taking what appears to be a Kantian position of the aesthetic, it was Louis Arnaud Reid who wrote: "A work of art, then, is (at least) something made, or created with aesthetically imaginative intention. It is often said to be an "expression" of the artist's mind or personality, or his feelings and emotions" (1986, p.14). My two main educational aims, therefore, are: (1) to explain this experience and to suggest that what constitutes and conditions the aesthetic must partly underpin the educational curriculum of art and design at all levels, and (2) to demonstrate how learning and understanding takes place in art and design education, and in this respect, to determine how aesthetic experience can manifest itself in the educational curriculum as an important contribution to self-knowledge and understanding.

The aesthetic, being synonymous with creativity preoccupies most people's lives in one form or another, yet few understand how it operates. A common assumption here seems to be that, aesthetic learning is often seen as very peculiar, unsatisfactory and obscure. One often thinks of art and design education as purely a matter of "feeling", an experience obsessed with emotions, idle fancy, dreams and passions. But nothing could be further from the truth, for as Ernst Cassirer writes: "For artistic inspiration is not intoxication, artistic

imagination is not dream or hallucination. Every great work of art is characterised by a deep structural unity" (1945, p.163). It is my intention to debate this deep structural "unity" that Cassirer mentions, for art and design teachers, lecturers, examiners, assessors, and generalists, lack in my view a theoretical and objective understanding of the importance of this aesthetic approach, its relevance and learning potential. Consequently, in what follows, I will explore the philosophical and practical implications of aesthetic experience for education. At the end of this preface I outline specifically the issues that I will address.

The aesthetic plays many roles in human existence, yet to understand the objective sense of this phenomenon, our judgement needs to be informed by a detailed knowledge of its historical, developing and changing structure. This work attempts to explain something of the nature of this aesthetic and how one can account for it in a determinate manner. Yet, some might argue that the mere name "aesthetic" is a matter of indifference, that it presupposes certain conditions on art and design that do not reflect the diverse ways in which the creative mind flows between subject and object, material and idea, that art and design can refuse to relate, to order, to set boundaries, limits and purposes. All this is true, but none of it negates the fact that art and design is primarily an aesthetic experience that has a critical and determined structure to it. The challenge here, in one sense, is to enquire into Louis Arnaud Reid's comment as to what it means to say that a work of art and design as an aesthetic concern, is

imaginative, is a matter of feeling and is a personal response of the artist or designer. This kind of aesthetic experience is further described by Reid as embodying, the whole person (1986, p.19). It is my contention, that such aesthetic experience is embedded in social historical practice, personal vision and relates to a public conception of understanding that personifies learning in its most inspiring form.

My research, above all, examines the aesthetic as an experience and as a practice that has implications for the way art and design is taught in education. I take the view, that art and design education must be a creative experience, but that this creative experience is accountable and can be significantly relevant in the development of our understanding, as to what constitutes learning. It is my contention that this creative experience and its learning extends and develops new relationships and realities of experience. It is to be noted, that to achieve this, the aesthetic must be a highly sensuous and cognitive experience, one that seems to draw the subjective and objective together, and as will be explained, this is exactly what I aim to demonstrate. For the art and design teacher, it would seem important that the teacher knows something about how this experience operates, so that he or she can make effective use of this experience in the course of teaching.

In order to substantiate my position on this, I have felt it necessary to show firstly what I see is the theoretical structure of this aesthetic concern from a Kantian and Wittgensteinian critique. Before I begin to assemble some of the

multifaceted arguments and counter-arguments that permeate through both Kant's and Wittgenstein's understanding of the aesthetic, one may well ask why Kant and Wittgenstein? To begin with, there has been recently a resurgence in Wittgenstein's work in its relevance for education, as Smeyers and Marshall argue, Wittgenstein's philosophy: "has challenged and changed the understanding of some of our basic concepts including those of "experience", "learning" and "teaching" (1995, p.221). These are certainly some of the issues that I wish to discuss, but it seems a shame, however, that the same cannot be said for Kant, for while his work is often mooted, it is seldom openly and persuasively argued in art and design education. Here in this thesis I will argue that Kant too, has some insightful thoughts in terms of "experience", "learning" and "teaching". While these philosophers have, in one sense, enormously different views of the aesthetic, both of these philosophers offer something in aesthetic terms that the other does not. I have further felt it necessary, given the complexity of Kant's and Wittgenstein's work in relation to learning issues, not to combine the arguments of these philosophers but to examine their work and its educational significance separately. This thesis is broken down into three sections: in the first section I discuss Kant's aesthetic ideas, in the second section I discuss Wittgenstein's aesthetic ideas and in the section three, my purpose will be to show how in practice aesthetic learning manifests itself and develops in art and design education in terms of the discussion of Kant and Wittgenstein. Let me start by stating the complexity of the problem before us regarding aesthetic

experience, as this will provide an overview of some of the issues that appear throughout this work.

In many ways, what both Kant and Wittgenstein tentatively agree on is that in the aesthetic, first and third person involvement appears to be going on, but the status of this involvement from a Kantian position, is primarily first-person "subjectivism", while for Wittgenstein the status centres on a "public" conception of understanding. Kant's strength seizes on the sensuous and cognitive nature of aesthetic experience (though not as a purely physiological experience), its individuality and its "unconditional" and intuitive arrangement. Thus, both Kant and Wittgenstein formulate aesthetic understanding on different grounds. Kant's emphasis on "disinterest" being contingent on what gives rise in "free-play", through the "harmony" of imagination and understanding to the state of pleasure, might be contrasted with Wittgenstein's conception that the aesthetic is dependent on "practice and description". In this respect, Wittgenstein's emphasis on "description" and Kant's emphasis on "disinterest" is a further point of contrast and incompatibility between these two philosophers. These notions give us a clue for understanding the difference between, on the one hand, "disinterest" and on the other "practice". Despite these differences, I will attempt to show that "disinterest" and "practice" are not that far apart as one might initially think in art and design education.

It seems, then, that Kant and Wittgenstein identify different things; for Kant the aesthetic on *prima facie* evidence is a private world, but for Wittgenstein this world is far from "private". The difficulty for Kant here seems to be how can the aesthetic be "private" and yet rely on intersubjective agreement. Does the "private", in fact, negate intersubjectivity? For Wittgenstein, his problem is not so much the wholesale denial of "private" occurrence, but rather his aesthetic appears ignorant of some of the deep epistemological and cognitive arguments that Kant produces in relation to aesthetic experience itself. Now, the central tenet of my thesis is concerned with "how one learns in reference to art and design practice". That is to say, how is art and design experience expressed and how is such expression given "meaning". Both of the philosophers that I have chosen have stated a different view on what constitutes learning in the aesthetic, but it seems to me that neither Wittgenstein or Kant are entirely correct in their views about the aesthetic. The stand that I take is not so much that "subjectivity" is irrelevant but rather that the aesthetic can be interpreted as objective. On the face of it, there seems to be something misleading about claiming that the aesthetic is objective, but Kant's notion of aesthetic "subjectivity" might be interpreted as a means of distancing the aesthetic from his "theoretical" and "practical" notions, so as to not confuse what differentiates the aesthetic from these concerns. There is a world of difference, Kant would argue, between strict "analytic" and "synthetic" judgements and those aesthetic judgements which are "purposive" in kind. In

the former, Kant is attempting to determine the conditions for *a priori* propositions, and in the latter, merely the conditions and suitability that one can attribute in the general sense to aesthetic experience.

In some ways then, aesthetic "subjectivity" is a red herring, for Kant seems paradoxically to be using it in an objective fashion, albeit one that is different to his "theoretical" and "practical" doctrine. Similarly, aesthetic "subjectivity" appears to be used by Kant to represent a different kind of experience and reality which is not found in the "theoretical" or the "practical". One is, of course, obliged to admit that Kant does not go far enough in explaining aesthetic experience and it is at this point that Wittgenstein's contribution to the notion of aesthetic objectivity is certainly important, for he deals with an aspect of aesthetic understanding that Kant does not touch, notably a "public" sense of what constitutes recognition. What I wish to show is that art and design education combines both Kant's notion that learning in the aesthetic involves "purposiveness", and Wittgenstein's argument that such experience also connects through "noticing an aspect", a description that can be objective in kind.

Kant's aesthetic arguments correctly prohibit anything purely determinate about aesthetic experience other than it is sensuous, an imaginary perception that he believes (correctly in my view) through "disinterest" and "purposiveness" is "beautiful". Paradoxically, Kant has a powerful argument here, for in itself "disinterest" may well be distinctively "beautiful", but not

necessarily in the wider object context and employment of this term. However, to further complicate the issue, it is without question that the aesthetic is largely self-determining, but for Kant this was an experience that involved "free-play" and "purposiveness" as a precondition for aesthetic experience, while for Wittgenstein there are no preconditions, for everything is dependent on "usage". The fruitful argument that Kant turns to here, is that the imagination transcends reason as it connects with the sensuous side of experience.

In conclusion, my investigation nevertheless construes, by contrasting and comparing Wittgenstein's ideas against Kant's, that Wittgenstein's contribution to the aesthetic is not only a valid one, but one that confronts in one respect the Kantian position on aesthetics head-on. The argument that Wittgenstein makes, in contrast to Kant's position, is that understanding is essentially an activity and that this activity being descriptive determines its objectivity. However, the fact that there are clear differences between Kant and Wittgenstein seems unquestionable, but in my opinion since this work is about how aesthetic learning can be seen as objective, an objective view of the aesthetic must recognise that there is a private side of this experience, but one I hasten to add, which can be objectifiable. Let me further state, that, for Kant, the cohesiveness of the aesthetic through purposiveness, and the belief that the individual brings something unique of itself to the work, are rich, unshakeable and enduring arguments. This is something of course, that needs to be proved. So, while the theses of these two philosophers may appear to confront one

another, it is my understanding that in some respects these ideas can be reconciled. The point being, that educationally, the aesthetic connects to the private as well as to the public and it is a fact that art and design experience can and does draw from these different experiences, that demonstrate in one respect, just how imaginative and creative art and design experience can be. Moreover, I will argue how aesthetic experience in educational terms, presupposes in an important sense, self-realisation and understanding.

In the final part of this thesis I draw together what I see are the educational implications of this work and outline its importance for art and design teaching practice. I will attempt to show from a teaching perspective, some of the critical factors that can affect the development of art and design learning. In this final part of my manuscript, in relation to Kant's and Wittgenstein's ideas, I will explore the role of the teacher and student in art and design education. The focus, as stated, is undoubtedly how self-realisation and understanding manifests itself in art and design education and how this experience is conceived and developed. How one elicits and confers art and design expression and its understanding needs vindicating. In connection to this, the critical attitude that one might be looking for, from a teaching point of view, is whether alterations, adjustments, developments and different experiences are being integrated into the learning situation in various ways. This needs to be borne in mind, but the issue of learning, will only be settled at the end of our enquiry, for clearly one needs to debate first some of the arguments and

counter-arguments that affect education in art and design. It is my intention to show how the theoretical can throw light on and perhaps enlarge a better understanding of some the concerns in art and design education. In learning terms, aesthetic interpretations can be unquestionably varied, and this, as may be argued, poses problems for the teacher. But as a preliminary to the conclusion of my thesis, let me state the possible changes that I feel art and design education has to adopt given the theoretical implications of this work. These are: (1) that aesthetic subjectivity in itself is dangerous for it misconstrues how its experience and its intellectual stance can be seen on a par with other educational subjects such as science and technology. In order to change this way of thinking about the aesthetic, I aim to demonstrate clearly from a Kantian and Wittgensteinian position, that the aesthetic is objective in its experience and "usage" and constitutes levels of understanding that can be formidable, (2) that there is a need to understand that what constitutes aesthetic experience in itself offers a unique, rewarding and accountable experience, (3) that the concept of creativity presupposes a complex understanding which is far from arbitrary and (4) that learning in art and design education must embrace fundamentally a creative approach so as to establish aesthetic validity and expression.

Chapter One

Kant's Aesthetic

Introduction

By investigating the Kantian position on aesthetics as laid out in the *Critique of Judgement*, the special problem that I explore is Kant's assertion that the aesthetic *per se* is profound. It is a special problem not only because of the difficulty of explaining the aesthetic in terms of its importance, but also because the aesthetic is deemed by Kant as constituting a "necessity". In this part of my thesis, the areas that I will cover, concern Kant's notion that on the one hand the aesthetic is subjective, and that the main characteristics of aesthetic subjectivity can be found in his concept of "free-play", "disinterest" and "purposiveness". In the first part of this work, in relation to aesthetic subjectivity, I draw out some of Kant's major arguments that attempt to clarify why he maintains that the aesthetic is subjective in kind. In relation to this I have felt it necessary to state further why he thinks the aesthetic on a certain level is *a priori* and universal. Kant has to demonstrate that the aesthetic is subjective *a priori* in order to claim that the aesthetic has a unique character to it. In this respect, he argues that the aesthetic is not purely conceptually based, but rather, presupposed by an imaginative feeling response. In this section, then, my chief aim has been to state a few of the fundamental conditions that Kant feels ground all aesthetic experiences. Following on from Kant's

conception that the aesthetic is subjective in kind, my approach in "Pleasure, Beauty and a Judgement of Taste", interconnects with the first part of this work through Kant's notion that the aesthetic is the play of the cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding). Both pleasure and beauty can be regarded as aesthetic subjective experiences, but Kant holds that only beauty is universal (*CJ*, §6). In general, the *a priori* judgement of aesthetic experiences rests on the condition of pleasure as a reflection of "purposiveness" (*CJ*, intro. VII). Here, Kant appears to be aware (*CJ*, §12) that one cannot connect one's aesthetic feelings *a priori* to the given object as its cause. This, then, may seem to add to our difficulty as to what constitutes *a priori* grounds for aesthetic experience. Kant, as will be seen, differentiates, in one respect, between disinterested pleasure (beauty) and pleasure originating from an interest or purpose. In the light of these conditions Kant determines through intersubjective agreement that the aesthetic is primarily a singular, autonomous and "disinterested" (*CJ*, §5, 210) experience. What determines the form of the singular, autonomous and "disinterested" experience stems, according to Kant, from the "harmony" that is "purposive" and in "free-play" (*CJ*, §9, 217). This distinction that the aesthetic is "purposive", indicates that such experience is not simply a judgement of perception. It is largely as a result of this that Kant holds that beauty personifies all that is best in aesthetic experience. Yet it is Kant's intention to distinguish and categorise two different kinds of beauty; "pure beauty" and "impure beauty". The former Kant refers to as free beauty

and the latter he refers to as dependent beauty. Whether such categorisation is possible when it comes to determining aesthetic experience in this way, is something which I will consider.

In my conclusion to this Kantian section of my thesis, I not only reiterate in brief terms, what the aesthetic consists of, and how this experience estimates and affects certain kinds of judgement, but I will also attempt to emphasise the importance of this work. For it seems to me that Kant holds the key whereby one can begin to demonstrate the significance of the aesthetic for art and design education, because he lays down some of its fundamental principles that clearly demonstrate just how creative and important this experience can be. Finally, while it may be argued that there are many possible confusions and problems with Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, I have attempted, from a theoretical position, to explain, some of the factors that may be useful to an art and design teacher's understanding of the aesthetic.

1. 1

For Kant, the aesthetic, as an experience, involves elements which defy measurement and it is on this basis that he attempts to construe the aesthetic as essentially subjective. Firstly, it is important to bear in mind, before one goes any further with this, that the reason why Kant thinks the aesthetic defies measurement is because the aesthetic experience is very different to his notion of "objectivity". There are deep reasons why Kant thinks the aesthetic defies measurement, and I will begin to explain this in a moment, but just because the aesthetic defies measure, it must be noted, that this does not exclude the aesthetic from being objective. For the notion of objectivity is not tied exclusively to measurement, but as Wittgenstein points out, to "practice" (a term that will be described in chapter two of this manuscript). While Kant's concept of subjectivity is explained in aesthetic terms in this piece of work, his notion of objectivity itself, is not adequately discussed (although references are made throughout this work which explain, in a limited sense, what objectivity in the Kantian sense involves). It is, however, necessary to distinguish the subjective from the objective, for it is a key issue in discerning Kant's understanding of aesthetics. As will be shown, Kant's philosophy of aesthetic subjectivity is indeed a complex affair that involves amongst other things, a certain understanding of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.* Yet, for Paul Guyer, aesthetic subjectivity (1979, p.85), is conditioned and unified by an imaginative

experience, but as I will argue, there is much more involved in this notion of aesthetic subjectivity than one might presuppose. For imaginative experience seems to be present in almost everything that one does, aesthetic or otherwise. A modest conclusion to this would be that Kant, in part, clearly demonstrates some of the judgement features (as will be explained) that affect imaginative understanding in aesthetic terms. On the one hand, Kant is attempting to put constraints on what establishes aesthetic experience in order to claim how one apprehends and represents this experience, but he does not, however, specify the properties that determine particular aesthetic experiences. Kant himself, hints at this point when he mentions in his preface to this work, that his task is to categorise only the principles of aesthetic judgement.

In considering the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant formulates a totally different hypothesis and set of principles from those found in either the *Critique of Pure Reason* or the *Critique of Practical Reason.* But this is not to say, that there are not deliberate connections that Kant attempts to fuse together from these two other important Critiques in order to characterise the aesthetic. He begins, for example, in the *Critique of Judgement* by naming the Four Moments as: quality, quantity, relation and modality and this, no doubt, is a clear move by him, to get us to recognise certain similarities with his Table of Judgement and thus its concept of understanding in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* It is quite possible that the point that Kant is making here, is that because the Four Moments constitute elements which go to form Kant's understanding of beauty,

these Four Moments being aesthetic categories, relate to Kant's overall thesis that aesthetic judgement possesses certain conditional elements, not unlike the Table of Judgements. The view is, in an analogous sense, that like the Table of Judgements, Kant wants to establish "laws" and principles which conform to aesthetic experience, which one might regard as constituting a form of objectivity.

While each of these Moments deal with an aspect of the aesthetic itself (being in some respects self-contained), they are nevertheless interdependent. This interdependency can be likened to Kant's Table of Judgements in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in that he makes it clear that any kind of judgement has certain properties relating to quality, quantity, relation and modality. Kant determines the aesthetic as having four essential characteristics which are: (1) that the aesthetic can be beautiful, (2) that the aesthetic can be characterised as universal, (3) that the aesthetic is purposive and (4) that the aesthetic is autonomous and relates to particular and singular feelings of experience. In conjunction and springing from the above four categories, the aesthetic as a judgement of taste has two other important characteristics which must be borne in mind. These are: firstly, that in one sense the aesthetic is contingent, and secondly, the aesthetic as a judgement of taste is devoid of "interest" and any definite sense of Kant's notion of objectivity. Paradoxically, while in one respect the aesthetic is devoid of "interest", in another, it positively embraces this concern through its individuality (a point that many Kantian philosophers

have failed to notice: Paul Guyer, Donald Crawford, Paul Crowther, Dieter Henrich, Anthony Savile, Eva Schaper and Salim Kemal).

In examining Kant's aesthetic hypothesis, one needs to take account of the Four Moments since they form the means by which he considers that aesthetic validity can be judged as a judgement of taste. In turn, what grounds these Four Moments is predetermined, to a large degree, by the Critique *of Judgement's* introduction. However, as a preliminary, what has to be borne in mind, is that the aesthetic constitutes for Kant three things: (1) it is a personal individual decision based on one's experience, (2) its pleasure is derivative of imagination and understanding and (3) that because it relates to cognition in general, purposiveness, and the subject's feeling response and analytical understanding, this experience must also be regarded as having epistemological properties. It is for these reasons that Kant regards the aesthetic as subjective *a priori.* Kant's investigation centres on the fact that the aesthetic is a matter of experience that presupposes, above all else, creativity. What confronts us, is an enquiry into what constitutes the notion that the aesthetic is a creative concern of considerable constitution and judgement.

1. 2

Plainly, if no definite concept from a Kantian position can adequately define, conceive, measure or represent an aesthetic experience what kind of experience is the aesthetic, what does it consist of and how does it operate? To answer this, one of the first things that Kant wants to get across is that aesthetic judgement represents a possible "middle term" (*CJ*, intro. III); a cross between theoretical (conceptual *a priori*) involvement and practical (the will, freedom and moral) involvement. Accordingly, what the aesthetic consists of and how it operates is determined through this "middle term". Yet, to what extent one can say there is this middle ground which the aesthetic occupies, may be difficult to substantiate, so much so that perhaps it is misleading to describe the aesthetic as a possible "middle term", even though, aesthetic experience may involve theoretical and practical considerations. All kinds of problems arise as to how one can define and experience the aesthetic as a "middle term", if the aesthetic manifests in its own way as a particular and singular experience not bounded by any specific rules or relations. But as philosophers have mentioned (Ernst Cassirer, Paul Crowther, Paul Guyer, Stuart Hampshire and Eva Schaper), the aesthetic as a "middle term" construes interdependently theoretical and practical reasoning. Without, however, wanting to dwell on this notion of a "middle term", the aesthetic as an experience for Kant combines the cognitive processes of imagination and understanding in such a way, that the aesthetic principle of

"unity" is one of pleasure corresponding to the "harmony" between imagination and understanding. As Kant mentions (*CJ*, §9), the "harmony" is what brings about objectivity, for representation, he argues, must harmonise. The "harmony" is what makes cognition possible, as it combines imagination and understanding in "spontaneity". It may be argued from this, that it is only when imagination and understanding coexist that there is spontaneity of aesthetic thought. In which case, Kant seems to be arguing that aesthetic thought combines reason and sense experience in an imaginative way.

Pleasure being attached to and determined by the coexistence between understanding and imagination, is the means by which the aesthetic, according to Kant, is felt through one's consciousness. Kant feels that this experience is subjective *a priori*, a condition that Kant uses, to my mind, to claim that the aesthetic is partly objective. One of the conditions of this subjective *a priori* is that it presupposes a necessity. I concur with many philosophers (Louis Arnaud Reid, Anthony Savile, Paul Crowther, and Richard Wollheim) that there are problems with this concept of necessity in art and design, but it seems to me that Kant is well aware of the difficulty of this term when he comes to consider aesthetic experience. In my opinion, Kant constructs through "subjectivity" a different notion of this term necessity (than the one he uses in the *Critique of Pure Reason*) that will mirror in part the aesthetic, and thereby establish along with other claims, that the aesthetic has possible universal grounds. Here, Kant gets rid of the precise sense in which the *a priori* is meant to determine the

object in "objective" terms, constructing instead, an element of necessity which, "prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary" (*CPR*, A.104). Because Kant recognised that the aesthetic through "purposiveness" was a unified experience (to be explained shortly), the "subjective" *a priori* gives him a basis to argue that the aesthetic is not as haphazard as some might like to think. The possible reason why Kant thought the aesthetic was not haphazard or arbitrary needs explaining.

What Kant attempts to do through a certain kind of coexistence (imagination and understanding), is to demonstrate that while the aesthetic shares conceptual and moral principles, its representation and experiences are nevertheless unlike the conceptual and the moral in that the aesthetic has no "ulterior aim", is "spontaneous", a matter of "feeling" and in "free-play". What immediately occurs to us, is that if the aesthetic has no "ulterior aim" how can one argue that the work of art has, as Richard Wollheim argues (1993, pp.132-43), an intentional side to it? Likewise, Guyer makes the point about whether it is possible for the imagination in free-play to be independent of the constraints of concepts (1979, p.251). While not wishing to disagree with Wollheim or Guyer in the above remarks, one will find that Kant's interest in the aesthetic has a more primary goal, which is to assert firstly the nature of this concern. It is important to recognise the claim that Kant makes, when he states that: "Aesthetic finality is the conformity to law of judgement in its freedom. The delight in the object depends upon the reference which we seek to give to

the imagination, subject to the proviso that it is to entertain the mind in a free activity" (*CJ*, §29, 270). Thus, Kant is asserting that one of the conditions of aesthetic purposiveness is that being in free-play, it is creative autonomous experience. The case being, that the capacity to make something one's own, to come into contact with one's own frame of mind is a necessary element of aesthetic understanding. Furthermore, as Guyer points out: "finality leads to the criticism of one form of intentionalist fallacy, namely, the assumption that a work's success in fulfilling its maker's intentions for it is itself a ground for aesthetic appreciation" (1979, p.215). Put differently, an object which may fulfil a certain intention does not in itself presuppose an aesthetic experience. One deduces that what Kant is prescribing is that the aesthetic is first and foremost a product of one's imaginative freedom, a sensuous encounter. But it may be disputable how far one can claim that aesthetic experience is in free-play, for as I will argue in chapters two and three, the aesthetic is neither indifferent nor oblivious to distinctions between what counts as real and unreal.

What reasons are there for saying that purposiveness is an essential factor in aesthetic experience? An initial answer would be that because the aesthetic is coupled to the feeling of pleasure, what gives rise to these feelings of pleasure is constituted by purposiveness. Without this feeling of pleasure, which Kant sees as purposive and "final", there can be no aesthetic engagement or judgement. Kant defines "final" in the aesthetic sense, when the feeling of pleasure involves a concept. Here the end or finality (purpose) is the means by

which a concept determines exclusively the kind of object that one wants to produce according to a set of necessary conditions which will produce this object. Essentially, the purpose (end) is defined by the concept and is caused by it (*CJ*, §10, 220). However, in aesthetic terms, this concept which in part is produced by either the mutual harmony between imagination and understanding or by the coexistence of these elements is not an experience which can be caused by some predetermined definite end. In this way, Kant does not consider aesthetic experience as *a priori* to any concept (*CJ*, intro. VII, 191). His reason for this seems to be that the aesthetic is "reflective" and based only on the consciousness of the subject's subjective feelings and his or her perceptions of these feelings. These perceptions, conditioned by the harmony between imagination and understanding, determine the form of the object. Kant thinks that aesthetically one can consider the form of the object prior to any concept of it (*CJ*, intro. VIII, 192). He argues that this can operate through the subjective harmony of cognition in general as an intuition of the form of the object, or alternatively, by the purposive feeling of pleasure itself. The difference between these two experiences seems to be that in the first example there is a perception of the object involved, but in the latter, the feeling of pleasure may be spontaneous and may not necessarily involve a perception of the object as it exists. Furthermore, there is the suggestion that the feeling of pleasure itself is tied to cognition in the general sense. As Guyer goes on to say: "Specifically, what Kant is suggesting is that in the case of aesthetic judgement,

the recognition of the finality of an object does not require a causal judgement about the relation between pleasure and an end, but is given by the feeling of pleasure itself" (1979, p.217). Kant sees that because the aesthetic is an experience in free-play, it cannot have a determinate end in respect of the cause of the object and its concept. In the aesthetic, nothing must be allowed to hinder the free-play of the cognitive powers. However, one must be careful, as Guyer argues, not to insist that causal judgements are not involved in aesthetic experience, for as Guyer puts it: "a feeling of pleasure is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition of such judgement" (1979, p.217). I should explain, before I go any further, that perception broadly involves "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" characteristic features, that connect to sensory, emotional, optical, tactile, auditory, imaginative and thought aspects of our understanding. While Kant sees perception as being possibly linked to our cognitive operations, Wittgenstein, as I will discuss later, sees perception in terms of sensation—language use. In contrast, Kant argues that our perception is determined by the harmony between imagination and understanding.

Let us discuss further why Kant thinks the aesthetic has a "necessity" of its own making. At the beginning of section twelve of the *Critique of Judgement* Kant states: "The judgement of taste rests upon *a priori* grounds" (*CJ*, §12, 221). The effect of this move is indeed crucial, for the essential deduction that Kant makes is not only that the aesthetic is subjective, but that by necessity it is subjective. To do this, Kant has to claim that the *a priori*

connection in the aesthetic is a subjective one, because he sees the subjective in the aesthetic as a representation of the subject's own feelings. In order to understand this, it is necessary to look briefly at the objective sense upon which Kant formulates his *a priori* claim in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* If one is to attach any real importance to subjectivity, one must know what, for Kant, constitutes objectivity, in order to see why he might be justified in arguing that the aesthetic could not conform to this condition. It is only by making some comparisons between subjectivity and objectivity that one can discern possible distinctions between these two notions. One has to see that, for Kant, objectivity: (1) concerns deductions which are solely conceptual, (2) refers to a single principle, (3) means that the character and logical necessity of the concept does not change from one moment to the next, but rather has a definite form to it, and (4) represents clear systematic connections relating to the Categories (*CPR*, B.92). According to Kant, these conceptions as objects of experience, must be truth-functions which one is told must be object rather than subject based. However, against this, aesthetic subjectivity is a self-determining experience that operates from the premise of felt experience. Here the aesthetic is self-grounding as the experience does not look for someone else to act as its arbiter about what he or she is feeling. In this respect, the individual responds "intuitively".

Consequently, in this first critique, Kant's general premise, in relation to our debate, seems to be that when I make a judgement about a particular

object I imply by my own judgement a necessity, but such necessity may not be *a priori*, for the *a priori* also carries with it universality (*CPR*, B.4). Now, in the deduction of the first critique the *a priori* basis is: *"The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of the Apperception of the Concepts which they contain"* (*CPR*, B.140-B.141). Put differently, the object I am holding in my hand is a pen, and what makes this object a pen will be the concept I hold of it. But to know it "is" a pen (*CPR*, B.142), requires that I can connect a number of particular concepts and relations to this object. What conceptual features, in the general sense, make this object a pen as a necessary condition of experience (*CPR*, A.119)? The situation is that the pen is not simply a matter of perceptive experience alone, but what also holds as a conceptual synthesis of connected properties relating to a general consciousness of this object. It must also have its logical possibility, connected to Apperception and synthetic *a priori* judgements. On this basis, the Kantian argument is that I would need to know firstly what the concept of the understanding was supposed to be about, if I was going to demonstrate empirically how something works. In contrast, when it comes to the aesthetic, Kant argues that one does not need to understand the object in this way to engage in aesthetic experience and understanding. Kant's point here, is that aesthetic experiences being "spontaneous" and imaginative will not operate in this fashion, and given his description of "objectivity", one would be inclined to agree with him. Indeed, if one takes the above example as a concept of

objectivity, then, at first glance, it is no wonder that Kant asserts that aesthetic understanding cannot be contrived in this manner. For the "objective" appears only concerned with defining the constant or its logical possibility judged by a systematic determinate approach. Assuming my description is accurate, one gets the impression that there is only a specific notion of conceptual synthesis that Kant considers appropriate in relation to "objectivity". In chapter two and three of my thesis, however, I will explore a different kind of objectivity, one which is not as strict, regimented or severe as Kant's interpretation would have us believe.

Furthermore, as if to stress this "objective" point, Kant asserts in the Analytic of Concepts *(CPR)*, that concepts fundamentally relate to conditions of understanding, the manifold of which is one of "unity". In this, he argues that concepts and their understanding are not factors which can be immediately known, as it takes a number of representations to relate to an object and its "unity". Such representations that go towards such conceptual understanding are not simply sense-impressions. Indeed, if this understanding is to be known, then Kant argues that it must correspond to a synthesis (*CPR*, A.77). However, the relevant point that he makes in relation to subjective and objective understanding, concerns empirical and transcendental deductions. For he argues that in the former: "which shows the manner in which a concept is acquired through experience and through reflection upon experience, and which therefore concerns, not its legitimacy, but only its *de facto* mode of origination" (*CPR*,

A.85). Accordingly, the subjective form of empirical and conceptual understanding corresponds to a certain sort of universal, but one which is different in a number of ways from an objective concept. The main difference being, that objectivity for Kant is a regular and determinate experience, as opposed to subjectivity which is neither regular nor determinate in the Kantian conceptual sense. It is to be noted that Kant is not suggesting that the aesthetic is not regular or determinate, it is just not regular and determinate in relation to pure concepts.

There is a vital difference about "objectivity" which the subjective understanding does not have, and this centres on: "For this concept makes strict demand that something, A should be such that something else, B, follows from it necessarily and in accordance with an absolute universal rule" (*CPR*, B.124). "Objectivity" on these grounds rules out anything aesthetic, and whatever further problems one might have with this statement, it is self-evident that pure concepts of understanding and thus objectivity, do not correspond strictly to empirical understanding, in that an empirical experience on its own, does not require that an experience be gone through in the above prescribed manner. Aesthetically, however, Kant conceives that it might be possible for subjective conditions of thought to have objective validity (*CPR*, A.89, B.122-B.123, A.121-A.123) in the *a priori* sense, in order to establish a particular meaning that relates to aesthetic consciousness. From this, Kant establishes a number of things which aesthetically seem important. Firstly, Kant points out that sensibility

(perception) and understanding need a necessary connection if they are to "harmonise", and the only way this can occur is through the imagination (*CPR*, A.124). Secondly, he further insists that the imagination alone makes the unitary experience, whether that experience is objective or subjective (*CPR*, A.,133), and thirdly, he writes of this condition: "A pure imagination, which conditions all *a priori* knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul" (*CPR*, A. 124).

Before I go any further with this, it would be a mistake not to recognise that the *a priori* is only one property of Kant's notion of aesthetic universality. Any notion of aesthetic universality would have to take in a range of factors which affect a judgement of taste. However, the problem for Kant is that he sees any *a priori* ground as conceptual (*CPR*, B.129-A.96), but since Kant insists that there is no definite conceptual notion which can be strictly applied to aesthetic experience, what kind of *a priori* condition is he then envisaging? I have previously indicated one sense of this term, but the way that Kant appears to get around this problem is to argue that the aesthetic is supposedly synthetic. As a number of Kantian philosophers have noted (A.C. Ewing, H.J. Paton, S. Korner, Jonathan Bennett), the synthetic is a matter of a logical inference, such that while A is different to B, A and B can be brought together to form a further logical concept. It is possible from this basis, to state why the synthetic judgement might be relevant to Kant's understanding of the aesthetic as it: (1) relates to intuition, (2) is reflective in the sense that no concept is given, (3)

involves empirical operations, (4) has a synthesis which relates to imagination and (5) carries with it either *a priori* or *a posteriori* distinctions. But as Guyer (1992, p.28) and Bennett (1990, pp.9-12) imply, A and B may be connected in various ways, not all of which can be accounted for by synthetic *a priori* judgements.

Kant, however, is drawn to the view that it is upon the immediate basis of intuition connected with pleasure that the synthetic condition (*CJ*, §36, 288) as an aesthetic experience is *a priori.* He believes, for instance, that this experience is: "present in every man, and further that we have rightly subsumed the given object under these conditions" (*CJ*, §38, 290). For this to happen, let us first investigate how it is possible for pleasure and intuition to "harmonise". Kant sums up this process as follows: "The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties whose harmonious accord contains the ground of this pleasure, makes the concept in question, in its consequences, a suitable mediating link connecting the realm of the concept of nature with that of the concept of freedom" (*CJ*, intro. IX, 197). In other words, pleasure is the "harmony" necessitated through the spontaneity of the practical and the theoretical. The feeling of pleasure is final because of the way these cognitive elements in free-play harmonise. In free-play, the aesthetic is being itself, "spontaneous", autonomous and creative. It seizes on its own voice, its nature, which in turn presupposes pleasure. This one might say, is the *a priori* condition of aesthetic experience. It would seem, that the aesthetic is essentially

the result of purposiveness deriving from a general cognition of an object determined by its perception and pleasure, that is solely of the individual's making. If these conditions are met, this leads Kant in aesthetic terms to state that: "The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such a pleasure (and so also with universal validity) is called taste" (*CJ*, intro. VII, 190).

The necessity and universality of the aesthetic rests on the power to comprehend the "feeling of life" (*CJ*, §1, 204). The *a priori* must connect to this "feeling of life". For Rudolf A. Makkreel this "feeling of life" for Kant: "must involve not only the capacity to act, but also the consciousness of being acted upon. The latter engenders a capacity to respond, which is crucial to the feeling of life in the *Critique of Judgement*" (1994, p.91). Moreover, it seems to me that this "feeling of life" is one of self-activity and "spontaneity". This is why Kant thinks the aesthetic has no ulterior aim, as "free-play" in imagination has, as Michael Oakeshott remarks, no ulterior ends (1959, p.40), other than its own voice. The situation in "free-play" is delightful because "spontaneity" is being created out of this experience and the free-play is "harmonious" with itself. When a person responds in this manner as Oakeshott states: " Each voice is the reflection of a human activity, begun without premonition of where it would lead, but acquiring for itself in the course of the engagement a specific character and a manner of speaking of its own: and within each mode of utterance modulation is discernible" (1959, p.12). For this to happen, free-play,

being a combination of understanding and imagination, produces a "mutual harmonising" effect which determines the aesthetic representation. Whatever the quality of the experience our creative thinking is nothing other than the freedom to experience in a particular way. This engagement excites the individual character of the person as a singular experience which strives towards a consciousness which is indifferent to the "objective" sense of the object. Thus, this experience is what Kant describes as subjective finality or "purposiveness". Needless to say, the aesthetic *a priori* is a judgement derived from inner sense and its synthesis. It is for reasons of "purposiveness" that the aesthetic cannot be considered arbitrary or haphazard, for as Kant argues, the aesthetic through purposiveness always has an aim.

Let us further discuss "purposiveness", for it is an important element of the *a priori* aesthetic condition. According to Ernst Cassirer, the notion of purposiveness relates to a: "harmonious unification of the parts of a manifold, regardless of the grounds on which this agreement may rest and the sources from which it may stem" (1981, p.287). "Purposiveness" in the aesthetic sense does not presuppose a definite concept or purpose (end) for Kant, because the aesthetic is a cause of feeling that happens when, through spontaneity, a harmony is felt through sensation. The individual responds to this aesthetic purposiveness as an "internal" sense of his or her awareness. The significance of this, is that individuals will construct for themselves, their own experiences. One is able to construct for oneself because purposiveness is the expression of

"harmony" connected to pleasure by the powers of representation (by the imagination and understanding cooperating and interacting). The underlying central thought here of aesthetic *a priori* experience, is that it is a special kind of autonomy which is not found in either the *Critique of Pure Reason* or in the *Critique of Practical Reason.* Such is the nature of the aesthetic, that purposiveness is, as Ernst Cassirer mentions: "without purpose" (1981, p.312). This is because aesthetic purposiveness being an individual autonomous experience is: "the bare contemplation of the object irrespective of its use or of any end" (*CJ*, §22, 242).

Crucially, Kant regards the aesthetic as being contingent on this "purposiveness"; a purposiveness that is spontaneous, that happens by chance, an accident, an irregular or reflective experience. One deduces, that Kant's notion of the aesthetic as "disinterest" is a pleasure which is unfashioned, surprising, thoughtful and impulsive; it is as he thought a "phenomenon" (*CJ*, intro. VII, 189). In this way, the aesthetic experience is constructed by individuality and: "displays an independent and fundamental lawfulness of its own" (Ernst Cassirer, 1981, p.306), for it represents an intuitive sense of itself which is *a priori* unconditional and in free-play, that is justified from the point of view of the autonomy of the individual. Without wishing to discuss in any detail the notion of autonomy (a thesis in itself), this concern embodies, from the point of view of this work, the aesthetic itself as a self-activity, which is independent of the desire for moral laws and "theoretical" concepts. Put

differently, aesthetic self-activity, because it "calls out" an activity of the mind, is concomitantly cognitive activity. Autonomy refers only to the particular and singular immersed spontaneity of self-expression which the subject connects in free-play as a cognitive and creative understanding of its experience. In this case, aesthetic autonomy is incapable of measured formulation simply because the aesthetic is not derived from definite concepts.

To repeat, in aesthetic experience new relationships are formed which outgrow the confines of a strict logical necessity, and moreover, oppose such constraints by virtue of the fact that the aesthetic positively develops a different way of looking and experiencing out of its own intuitive responses. This experience is meaningful because, as Kant argues, such experiences are part of reflective judgement. Moreover, Kant implies that such experience through reflection forms the possibility of concepts themselves (*CJ*, intro. VII). The point being, as Ernst Cassirer writes, such spontaneity: "insofar as it possesses true *a priori* validity it does not present a mere relation to given objects, but it is the positing of objects themselves" (1991, p.308). So far as Kant was concerned, the aesthetic emerges as a new experience, an experience in free-play not as an arbitrary attribute, or something which is tagged on the end of concepts, but something final, primary, representative and rewarding. Whatever complaints one may have in relation to pleasure, (which is merely the outcome and not the ground) it is clear to me, that Kant's argument centres on aesthetic creativity being a matter of autonomy, of self-expression and its

fulfilment in intuitive and imaginative involvement. These are the conditions that connect creativity as an aesthetic concern. Here creativity is synonymous with the aesthetic and may be taken as unified cumulative experience. This aesthetic cumulative experience is "always in itself sensible" (*CPR*, A.124), because the imagination connecting the perception and the understanding unifies the experience.

Because the aesthetic is grounded in intuition (and thus empirical conditions), let me attempt to give a brief account of how intuition in Kantian terms, is imbued in this condition. At the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant immediately opens a debate about intuition. He insists that intuition is the mode by which I receive representations of objects in sensibility (*CPR*, A.20). However, for Kant, whatever I intuit in a manifold of experience I must do so in relation to either space or time (*CPR*, A.22). Although space and time, when corresponding to intuition, are considered subjective, they are nevertheless *a priori* representations. This has to do with the fact that nothing concerned with appearance (the form of the object) can be represented as having determined shape, size, relation and so on, without engaging the conditions of space and time. In the current sense, the reason why such experience is deemed to be subjective is because the intuitive experience which determines shape, size and so on is a relation to inner determinates; a sensible rather than a logical condition.

Without wanting to discuss space and time specifically (important though this issue is), the explanation that Kant gives of space and time as intuition in itself for an aesthetic experience: "is valid not in relation to sensibility in general but only in relation to a particular standpoint or to a particularity of structure in this or that sense" (*CPR*, A.45). While intuition in relation to objects is regarded by Kant as determined by appearances (*CPR*, A.45), this intuition if so determined by perception and thus understood to be "posited and ordered" in a certain way, is no longer an intuition, (*CPR*, A.20) because now this intuition through appearance has form. If intuition, as remarked, is through appearance a perception, then according to Kant such a perception belongs to the faculty of imagination (*CJ*, intro. VI, 190). He writes: "Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not in itself present" (*CPR*, B.151). As inner sense, imagination combines through a threefold synthesis (that involves reproduction, recognition and apprehension) to become what Kant claims is an act of spontaneity (*CPR*, B.130-2). One must therefore see that spontaneity has a special meaning for Kant that cannot be found in a dictionary.

In conclusion to this section, the aesthetic is subjective precisely because its experience is determined by first-person sense. Not surprisingly, Kant claims that the character of this experience comes about because the aesthetic manifests itself through intuition in the free-play of imagination and understanding. Whatever the faults proposed by private experience, Kant is

absolutely justified in my view to claim that aesthetic experience must involve a singular and autonomous experience that connects with the imagination and understanding. In the Kantian sense, as Ernst Cassirer mentions, the aesthetic has a "goal purely within itself, a new image of reality" (1981, p.307), which serves its own needs not out of some twisted or vain insistence on comprehending what is being conceived, but because the aesthetic reaches a part of life that is necessary to experience; an experience that is boundless and dependent only on the possibility derived from the harmony of the sensuous feeling in imagination and understanding. Out of this comes the perception that every aesthetic judgement must unite these conditions of experience. If one is to speak of aesthetic creativity, Kant foresaw, what Wittgenstein was unable to realise, that the aesthetic was not just dependent on "usage" but experience; an experience that presupposes certain conditions of engagement. Likewise in this survey, Kant's view, as explained, is that in one sense, the aesthetic is purposiveless, for the aesthetic is not calculated systematically by units measured line by line, sensation by sensation, fact by fact, texture by texture. My feelings are that, given certain conditions, Kant has a point here. This point does indeed do damage to Wittgenstein's argument of usage, for while the concept of usage could be invoked here, Kant's argument centres on the fact that an experience of this kind is valid not from the premise of usage, but from the premise that the aesthetic is the result of "disinterest" (this will be explained later).

1. 3

Some might suppose, that it is one thing to claim what constitutes an aesthetic experience and quite another to judge whether a particular aesthetic experience is correct (this is an issue that is also debated in chapter two of this thesis). Difficulties arise when one often cites in aesthetic terms, particular experiences that confound convention. Whatever the problem between these two questions, the distinction that Kant draws is that what constitutes an aesthetic experience must always be present in any particular aesthetic experience. One might be tempted to think from this that there is a certain deterministic quality to Kant's understanding of the aesthetic, but adopting such a position would be to misconstrue Kant's argument entirely. Kant's doctrine is quite clear, that no understanding of the aesthetic is fulfilled without one focusing on the particular aesthetic intuition itself. The paramount condition that Kant is claiming, is that the aesthetic in free-play (which sustains the imagination) is autonomous and involves in a purposive manner, imagination and understanding, that must be felt as a present experience of the intuition itself. This argument reveals and affirms that creativity must not be stifled or tied down to certain antecedent concepts or perceptions. The aesthetic is a relevant *a priori* experience in itself that is perfectly capable of unifying an experience out of its own devices, in such a way that its results can, according to Kant, be beautiful. This originality, Kant feels,

is not matched in the "theoretical" or the "practical". It seems that the first step towards aesthetic judgement is that it must not predetermine the experience.

However, for Kant, judgement was either: "the faculty of thinking as contained under the universal" (*CJ*, intro. IV) or either: "the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is simply reflective" (*CJ*, intro. IV). The first proposition applies to the *Critique of Pure Reason* and relates to purely conceptual and cognitive conditions. Whereas, as will be explained in a moment, it is this second proposition in particular, that Kant proposes corresponds to aesthetic judgement. In this respect, aesthetic judgements turn on the fact that (1) they are not predetermined and (2) they are particular judgements which are not determinate. Therefore, the aesthetic does not fall under definite concepts. If one takes Kant's distinction of judgement in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as: "If understanding in general is to be viewed as the faculty of rules, judgement will be the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule (*casus datae legis*)" (*CPR*, A.132), then this concept of judgement as it stands, would raise a number of problems, as clearly this kind of judgement would run contrary to a Kantian understanding of aesthetic judgement. His hypothesis in the *Critique of Judgement* recognises this problem and claims instead, that the aesthetic cannot conform to rules of this kind, since its inherent diverse nature is subordinate to the particular. His solution to this problem is to argue that: "The Principle of Taste is the Subjective Principle of the General

Power of Judgement" (*CJ*, §35), and it is this condition above all else, that lays a partial claim to his notion of aesthetic "necessity". I agree with Makkreel here, that what Kant is claiming is that the aesthetic is by nature "content to be formed instead of as a form that is fixed" (1994, p.58). Therefore, the second condition is that aesthetic judgements rest on particular situations which have no precedents in terms of what one may encounter in experience.

Now, what Kant struggles to do in the Four Moments, is to determine the principles that condition a judgement of taste and thus the validity, as he sees it, of the aesthetic in general. This is not, however, as straightforward as it might sound and as Kant acknowledges, the difficulty is how can judgements of taste be made sufficiently determinate to embrace aesthetic experience. What mode of experience corresponds to an aesthetic judgement? A vague answer would be a subjective one. But the notion of subjectivity alone is not representative in itself of any aesthetic experience. The reason for saying that subjectivity alone is not an aesthetic condition, is because for Kant, the element of intuition and its perception ,being perceived alone as subjective (*CPR*, A.42), are not sufficient grounds to demonstrate an aesthetic experience. Even if one could bring this intuition and perception under the condition of understanding, this would still not constitute an aesthetic experience. In view of this, Kant recommends, at one level, that an aesthetic experience is determined by a personal response. That response does not take account of its object (CJ, intro. VII & § 1, 203) in any objective manner, but is determined instead by creative

interactions as a reference to the experiencing subject. Such a response must, Kant argues, engage and be a symptom of pleasure as a primary experience of the consequence of the "harmony" between imagination and understanding. Kant does not confine himself to connecting the aesthetic simply to intuition; he also makes the connection that the aesthetic is an imaginative experience. Our third condition which is the key to Kant's whole aesthetic argument, is that an aesthetic judgement must be imaginative.

In order to understand this further, what needs to be noted, as an element of interdependency, is that the aesthetic for Kant, is a "reflective judgement". In effect, he regards all aesthetic experiences as containing some reflective judgement. His analysis seems to be that reflective (sense experience) judgements neither predetermine objects, nor make them determinate. As asserted already: "only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is simply reflective" (*CJ*, intro. IV). In which case, the reflective differs from the "determinate" in that the determinate is not only conditioned by a clear and necessary concept, but that, in essence, the determinate in this situation, is an operation that knows its end and how to obtain it (this kind of determination should not be confused with the productive imagination kind). The reflective judgement is neither prescriptive nor theoretically necessary and its nature is broader and more variable than determinate universal judgements. The important thing to remember about this condition is that it is through perception that the aesthetic experience connects

with cognition (*CJ*, intro. VII, 190-1). Thus, the perception, as an empirical aesthetic condition, holds the manifold of experience together, without, as Kant puts it, regard for any concept being present or estimated as part of this representation. Kant is claiming that the aesthetic is contingent on feeling being a ground for its pleasure and not its concepts. Controversially perhaps, if no concept connects to the aesthetic, how can one claim a public sense to this experience? For Kant, however, the public sense of such experience is not derived from a definite concept as such, but from the imaginative feeling response as "disinterest". A point perhaps, that one may consider contentious. The fourth condition, is that an aesthetic judgement cannot predetermine its purpose, for this would be contrary to the fact that the aesthetic is in free-play.

Kant argues: "For while in respect of the rational employment of our cognitive faculties bounds may be definitely determined, in the empirical field no such determinations of bounds is possible" (*CJ*, intro. VI). As will be further elaborated, he takes this as a condition which lays claims to contingent "necessity". Fundamental to Kant's aesthetic position, is that an aesthetic judgement, as an act of subjectivity, does not consider an object purely on its own account, since, as a reflective judgement, the aesthetic does not subsume any strict *a priori* necessity. The aesthetic, seen in this light, is not part of a purely observed experience. It relies instead, on its own reflection estimated on grounds relating to "disinterest", a way of experiencing without constraints. What is more, while the determinate is considered by Kant as universal in kind,

the reflective mode of the aesthetic, being intrinsically multifarious, can only have a contingent universal judgement, because it is constituted by its own feeling of pleasure being subjective *a priori.* Such a contingent universal judgement, relies fundamentally, according to Kant, on the particular correspondence between imagination and understanding. The fifth condition is that aesthetic judgements are boundless and multifarious.

The form of this contingency is taken as being singular and particular. This singular and particular judgement is in one sense determinate. I will further show that it is the mode of this arrangement that is partly responsible for how the *a priori* occurs. Here, to reinforce the *a priori* position, Kant goes on to explain that: "particular empirical laws must be regarded, in respect of that which is left undetermined in them by these universal laws, according to a unity such as they would have if the understanding (though it be not ours) has supplied them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system of experience according to particular laws" (*CJ*, intro. IV, 180). In other words, aesthetic judgements presuppose unity in the representation prior, so one is told, to experience, because the synthesis involves the empirical and such empirical laws, as H.W. Cassirer argues (1938, p.114), must be intelligible to humans irrespective of whether they are objective or not. It is this synthesis of experience through reflection of the formal qualities (space and time), that presupposes the contingent cognitive accord necessary to conceive the aesthetic.

The final condition is that an aesthetic judgement must be purposive, uniting the experience through agreement and coexistence.

In the next section of the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant makes it clear that the empirical, as a reflective judgement, relates to how I "ought" to judge rather than how I must judge. But I must be careful here, because Dieter Henrich asserts that one must not confuse empirical concepts with the aesthetic (1992, pp.42-50), as an aesthetic judgement may well be spontaneous, singular and irregular in ways which do not conform purely to empirical concepts. Indeed, one might well argue that the aesthetic does not fit easily into any philosophical category; be it empirical, transcendental, physiological, psychological or language. However, being perhaps singular, spontaneous and irregular, the aesthetic character makes it difficult for us to formulate, along empirical lines alone, a universal agreement. A judgement of taste may well be based on empirical intuitive perceptions but such perceptions being aesthetic (rather than merely empirical), as Henrich rightly claims (1992, p.47), connect to imagination and understanding. Briefly, two further points here need to be mentioned. Firstly, it need not follow that just because one has a perception of an object that one necessarily understands this object and secondly, the harmonious play between imagination and understanding involves cognitive operations. None the less, it is the harmony which stems from the free-play of the imagination in conjunction with understanding that prevents a further determinate judgement. This is because the aesthetic judgement presupposes, in

spontaneity, a heightened awareness as a condition of a singular pleasure (*CJ*, §8, 215). It may be inaccurate, however, to argue that such heightened awareness is singular as the play and feeling response may be changing, be accompanied by several feelings about the object not all of which may be "harmonising" or alternatively, be conditioned by a "public" rather than a "private" acquisition. However, this might be a premature line to take at this stage, for in contrast to what has just been said, such arguments need to be seen against Kant's premise that the making of aesthetic representation is always accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, to the extent that: "All it does is to compare the given representation in the subject with the entire faculty of representations of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of its state" (*CJ*, §1, 204). It is the intelligible nature of this experience that conditions the kind of empirical and transcendental "laws" that Kant describes as conforming to the aesthetic. The capacity for considering the aesthetic intelligible must, argues Kant, stem from those "laws" derivative of aesthetic experience. Such "laws" (if one can indeed call them laws), are, for Kant, derivative of the personal harmony between imagination and understanding in free-play.

It seems that Kant's thinking suggests that any sensible representation would require that "I" condition the representation, according to only "my" reflective judgement. It may seem contentious to claim that an aesthetic experience is purely "my" experience, as such experience (to be discussed in chapters two and three) is often acquired and in part attributed to, community

values. However, taking Kant's aesthetic viewpoint, the best that can be said of this is that I do not take account of what constitutes universality in itself, but rather I apprehend and respond dynamically to the phenomena of experience as it happens without regard to causes or presupposed considerations. Indeed, he regards such experience as a possible aesthetic experience, and refers to it as "unconditioned". The question of how "disinterest" and the "unconditioned" connects to the aesthetic appears, on a certain level to deny the *a priori* necessity itself. The contradiction seems to be how does one align an unconditioned experience with necessity. If there is a necessity which embraces aesthetic experience, would such a necessity not affect the "seen", so thus effectively ruling out autonomy. Similarly, if necessity happens to affect the "seen", what kind of seen experience is one having? But one has shown that the way Kant uses necessity is to refer to the "unity" of the experience. By Kant insisting that the aesthetic is a matter of "disinterest" he is denying that I can knowingly as a predetermined response, involve any background understanding or knowledge to this situation in a determinate way. He has to maintain this, for the background understanding may express a certain kind of interest, which is what he wants to avoid. But, as Wollheim argues, if one cannot connect one's perception with one's "cognitive stock" (1993, pp.134-6), what kind of perception is one having. Yet, this "cognitive stock" is exactly what Kant insists establishes the aesthetic, when he argues that the aesthetic is a cognition in general. On the other hand, since the aesthetic must involve personal experience, how can one proceed to

argue as Kant does, that such an experience relates to "disinterest" (*CJ*, §5)? It may be further argued, that bringing one's interest to bear upon the aesthetic may presuppose a more natural state of individuality than "disinterest". If this is so, then free-play may be just as much an inclination of interest as "disinterest". The term "interest", for Kant, suggests background knowledge and understanding, a sense of what the object is itself conceptually, which in turn involves satisfaction and fulfilment, though of a different kind than that of the aesthetic. Consequently, what Kant is objecting to is that this notion robs the aesthetic of its independence, its unconditioned representation, its intuitive and reflective sense, and the concept of autonomy, for in Kant's eyes aesthetic autonomy is limited to the notion of "disinterest".

According to Guyer, Kant's concept of "disinterest" must be seen as connecting to Kant's other notion concerning purposiveness (1979, p.169). The idea would seem to be that disinterest justifies in part why the aesthetic requires free-play and the feeling of pleasure. One interpretation of disinterest is stated when Kant mentions that: "All one wants to know is whether the mere representation of the object is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I may be to the real existence of the object of this representation" (*CJ*, §2, 205). Alternatively, Kant considers that interest, more often than not, relates to the real existence of objects (*CJ*, §2 & 5). In addition, Kant asserts that: "Every interest vitiates the judgement of taste and robs it of its impartiality" (*CJ*, §13, 223). It may be counter-argued, that Kant's concept of disinterest is somewhat

a confusing one, when one attempts to compare it with the concept of interest. But this may prove an inadequate explanation of disinterest, as this term appears in Kant's work as a whole, to be a reference to the aesthetic experience being a genuine "inner" response of itself. Here, Kant's motive for this condition seems to be, at one level, that because aesthetic experiences are conditioned by disinterest, they are not judgements depending on the proof of objects by means of concepts. While one has to admit that there are difficulties if one strictly follows the early claims that Kant makes about the aesthetic being independent of interest. It is, nevertheless, also clear that one will be misled if one argues that Kant's understanding is defined in this way.

The task that Kant sets himself is obviously to limit the notion of autonomy in the aesthetic sense to "disinterest", but there is a real danger that one might be distorting Kant's position if one insists that the correspondence between autonomy and "disinterest" trivialises the aesthetic. What I feel that Kant pursues, from one reading of this argument, is that in the general sense, the aesthetic fundamentally involves "disinterest". This term is not only a detachment from what the object might be "theoretically" or "practically", but it is a totally different kind of experience that reveals and expresses itself only in the aesthetic. The situation is that autonomy being singular and particular must involve "disinterest" (free-play and spontaneity), because "disinterest" allows the individual to have its own voice. Thus, Kant recognises the importance of individuality against suppressing or dictating what one can and cannot feel,

suppose or imagine. This spontaneity, this imagery, this imaginative experience that one uses aesthetically as an expression of oneself, is as Oakeshott points out, an experience which cannot be learnt by imitation (1959, p.51). One is reminded here of Oakeshott's remark that: "If it imitates the voice of practice its utterance is counterfeit. To listen to the voice of poetry is to enjoy, not a victory, but a momentary release, a brief enchantment" (1959, p.62). In this connection, "disinterest" and interest may not be worlds apart, as they are expressions which appear to overlap. "Disinterest" epitomises, for Kant, the aesthetic in its most exalted form, a way of experiencing without constraints. The argument that I feel Kant is further making, is that disinterest is an unrestricted experience that allows us to "turn anything into an object of pleasure" (*CJ*, §5, 210). Similarly, it seems that it may also be found that disinterest lays claim to aesthetic autonomy itself, which weakens the argument that one can purely interpret disinterest in respect of what constitutes interest.

While Kant claims that there are different modes of pleasure affecting the good, the agreeable and the beautiful, the pleasure that matters for him, as a judgement of taste, concerns the beautiful (to be discussed shortly). In seeking to bring out those conditions which actually presuppose aesthetic experience, perhaps it is in the notion of the beautiful, that one gets an understanding of the specifics that establish the purity of the aesthetic. It is possible to interpret this aesthetic purity as Kant's attempt to show that, like pure concepts of reason, the aesthetic too has a purity which one finds in "disinterest". Indeed, what

fundamentally differentiates the beautiful from the good and the agreeable is that: "the beautiful may be said to be the one and only disinterest and free delight; for, with it, no interest, whether of sense or reason extorts approval" (*CJ*, §5, 210). Given that beauty, for Kant, personifies the best the aesthetic can offer, it is no wonder that the notion of beauty is the rule that he uses as a judgement of taste. The principal point is that the condition of beauty appears to be the yardstick against which Kant determines aesthetic experience.

Indisputably, it cannot go unnoticed that Kant construes the aesthetic as an interaction between personal self-experience and object awareness (the "form" of the object through the subject's own experience). Aesthetic experience can be seen as both unconditioned and dependent. It is unconditioned because nothing is predetermined and dependent because the individual is obliged to realise oneself through this experience. So, while Kant acknowledges the difficulty that the aesthetic poses in appearing to be concerned with free-play, cognition and purposiveness, he also recognises that the aesthetic, because of this, deals with a certain kind of experience which is independent of objectivity, but is not inferior to it. It is not inferior to it, simply because, for Kant, it is a different kind of experience which does not attempt to be objective. In dealing with this experience, Kant has to account for the inherent diversity in which the aesthetic manifests itself, as he attempts to establish certain arguments that constitute and take on board free-play. At one

level free-play is an attempt to justify aesthetic diversity, but at another level it can stimulate a deeper understanding of object experience.

But from Kant's point of view: "The obligation to furnish a Deduction, i.e. a guarantee of legitimacy of judgements of a particular kind, only arises where the judgement lays claim to necessity" (*CJ*, §31, 280). It is crucial to see that, from Kant's position, it must be necessary to both evoke the aesthetic experience as unconditioned necessity, yet still maintain some sort of conceptual stance which is reflective, if the experience is to be seen as aesthetic. For the point is, that Kant wants to show that the aesthetic is an experience of self-activity, but a self-activity by its very nature which is enlightened through its cognitive powers. However, while a judgement of taste can be described as multifarious in kind, it is clear that what he has in mind, is that the aesthetic must rest on a notion of beauty, if one wishes to establish the conditions that correspond to subjective universality. Kant also makes the claim, that such subjective universality connects to the "universal validity of a singular judgement" (*CJ*, §31, 281). As Kant puts it: "This flower is beautiful, is tantamount to repeating its own proper claim to the delight of everyone" (*CJ*, §32, 282). Kant is insistent on this and writes more about this condition when he states that: " 'All tulips are beautiful'. But that judgement is not one of taste, but is a logical judgement which converts the reference of an object to our taste into a predicate belonging to things of a certain kind" (*CJ*, §33, 285). As I understand it, what he appears to be claiming amounts to two different things.

In the first instance, the aesthetic is founded on a particular and singular actual response which results in a certain kind of experience corresponding and conditioned by imaginative free-play, which Kant regards in principle as universally acceptable. In the second example, there is no direct reference to a particular and singular actual experience taking place which results in aesthetic experience. The second example cannot, therefore, be regarded as particularly aesthetic in the sense that it presupposes a determined concept of what all tulips as beautiful objects are to be set against. This implies a situation that attempts to deny one's own personal response to objects. It is only if the experience represented an individual tulip from the position of aesthetic intuition and free-play, that Kant would consider such an experience as beautiful. What is echoed in the above remarks is not that I cannot consider a bunch of tulips, this building complex, this row of houses, this triptych, this designed object, a flock of geese, a collection of short stories or paintings, a museum or gallery exhibition as singular; for Kant's comment would be that all these situations can constitute particular experiences. Consequently, what Kant is objecting to, is the ambiguous sense implied in "all" tulips are beautiful or for that matter "all" paintings or objects are beautiful. For example, one does not say, in the ordinary sense, that a wilted tulip is beautiful. One might of course argue that a wilted tulip is beautiful, but in the Kantian sense, one's argument would then be moving in the direction of the particular and singular experience. Taken in this

sense, aesthetic experiences cannot be generalised, as they require particular perceptions of experience that relate to specific situations and circumstances.

Without wishing to discuss Kant's notion of beauty at this stage, the subjective universality of aesthetic experience rests on individual judgements about an object. That is, in Kant's terms: "Taste lays claim simply to autonomy" (*CJ*, §32, 282). But if an aesthetic judgement lays claim to independent responses, then once again how can there be any *a priori* universal validity in the aesthetic? Since I agree with Kant that autonomy is a necessary characteristic of aesthetic experience, then how can such an experience as autonomy represent any agreed understanding in relation to object experience, without involving some public conception? Kant's solution to this problem is to assert that since the aesthetic is partly a claim connected to autonomy, it is a particular experience that one has through this autonomy, that decides its universality. Furthermore, I have mentioned the six criteria that must be taken into consideration for the universality to have merit in Kantian terms. For underpinning this universality must be the condition that the aesthetic is imaginative and hence the reason why Kant adopts the stance that he does. To preserve the aesthetic, universality must fit this concern and not the other way round. From this aspect, one can see why Kant could not determine aesthetic universality in connection with "objectivity". Kant, however, argues that the one experience that establishes universality in the aesthetic is personified by "beauty". Let us then turn to discuss this issue.

1. 4

As indicated, beauty is the one judgement that Kant thinks has universal validity. Kant writes: "The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object of a necessary delight" (*CJ*, §22, 240). Such a necessary delight, Kant insists, is logical in that it conforms to subjective *a priori* conditions. As necessity, beauty is regarded by Kant as singular, in the sense that the subject must make his or her own aesthetic judgement independent of both "interest" and determined conceptual considerations. The concern being, that: "no perfection of any kind - no internal finality, as something to which the arrangement of the manifold is related - underlies this judgement" (*CJ*, §16, 229). It follows, that, in Kantian terms, the aesthetic cannot be predetermined. It also follows that no permanent relation can be found which determines aesthetic experience. On the other hand, this new revelation that the aesthetic is now universal, is no longer an assertion that the aesthetic is a private feeling. It follows, from a Kantian point of view, that what differentiates aesthetic beauty from mere pleasure alone ("charms" and "agreeableness" as empirical judgements, see §§13-14 of the *Critique of Judgement*), is that beauty is purposive; it is not physiological. In other words, it is not simply a sensation-experience, for beauty is not passive as it requires free-play and purposiveness to characterise the experience. What is more, as Guyer points out: "In defining the "quality" of aesthetic judgement Kant is not making a

phenomenological distinction between different kinds of feelings of pleasure, but a distinction between the ways in which different instances of pleasure may be occasioned" (1979, p.171).

Kant further argues, that if the aesthetic is completely free (pure) so that the subject makes his or her decision according to imaginative experience, then there are possible grounds for asserting that such experience may be universal. For a judgement of taste to be universal the individual who is having this experience must demand: "a similar delight from every one" (*CJ*, §6, 211). It remains to be seen how exactly Kant determines this state of affairs, for if the experience is supposedly singular and particular, how can such an experience, being singularly and particularly determined, be at the same time shareable? However, Kant holds that beauty is essentially an accord of imagination and understanding in free-play. Yet, there appears to be two sides to beauty; one categorised as pure beauty and the other categorised as impure beauty. So, while beauty captures the aesthetic mode and its feeling, this feeling may be regarded as a pure judgement or an impure judgement. Let us then investigate how beauty is seen by Kant as the universal condition presupposing aesthetic judgement. It is necessary for us to explore the concept of beauty as it represents Kant's attempt to demonstrate that the aesthetic is *a priori* universal. It follows, that if one is not convinced of this claim, then Kant's understanding of aesthetic experience must be seriously questionable, albeit only on universal lines. It is tempting to say, that the phenomenon of beauty is an aesthetic

experience, but to what extent this condition can be considered as the epitome of what constitutes aesthetic experience, some might regard as misleading.

1. 5

To start our discussion, one must remind ourselves that Kant's notion of "feeling" is the "unity" of imagination and understanding in the reflective sense, that subsequently gives rise to a judgement of taste as an aesthetic experience. This can be described as Kant's first assertion that the aesthetic is partly an individual representation corresponding to an imaginative experience, but which, as previously stated, correlates in some sense with understanding. This is important, for what Kant is suggesting is that aesthetic representation connects with the "inner feelings" of the subject. He refers to these "feelings" as either pleasure or displeasure and the pleasure or displeasure as he points out, is not directly the sensory material itself (the perception). Thus here too, what corresponds in free-play is amenable and founded on the dynamical formal properties of space and time (magnitude, relation, shape, succession and simultaneity), which the individual arranges according to his or her own experiences affected by this free-play.

He refers to pleasure in itself, as something which is "enjoyable" for its own sake, in that it appeals to our sensibilities as a private affair of feeling. Now, I have already suggested that such pleasure in itself is a matter of sensation (perception). He describes this kind of pleasure as deriving from the sensation alone. In the bare sense, such sensation as pleasure involves no "harmony with concepts" (*CJ*, intro. VIII, 194), but only the personal sense

through imagination of the subject in intuition. In this instance, the mere sensation of such an experience is incapable of forming representations of objects, because Kant presupposes that such sensations, in terms of feeling, are not cognitive in themselves (*CJ*, §3, 206). It is only when the subject in the act of reflection, apprehends this feeling, without regard to definite concepts, that one can necessarily refer to this, as an aesthetic experience. Consequently, while feelings give rise to one's personal consciousness and individual judgement, Kant argues that what forms the basis of the aesthetic is whether the subject in the act of feeling this reflection does so as a purposive experience in free-play. For beauty to mean anything its disposition must be one of "disinterest".

It is worthwhile exploring further this notion of sensation, for in Kant's mind, sensation can be the condition of the "delight in the agreeable" and the "delight in the good" (*CJ*, §§3 & 4). Indeed, these two different but related kinds of delight, are a prefatory remark for a judgement of taste, but are not aesthetic experiences in themselves. In fact, to be more precise, Kant contrasts the notion of delight in these two terms as dependent upon an interest. He alludes to these conditions as being that which pleases as a means to some kind of purpose, or as a desire for a certain kind of sensation itself (*CJ*, §§3 & 4). These conditions presuppose a number of things in connection with interest. But in order to show that the agreeable or the good, are not aesthetic judgements, he refers to the agreeable and the good as elements determined by interest. For

Kant, having an "interest" presupposes both a desire and as a reference to the real existence of the object (*CJ*, §3, 207). The problem with this is, if I have an interest in the aesthetic does this mean that my interest must also be connected in some way to real existence. If it does, how can Kant still claim that aesthetic understanding is not a cognitive judgement of its object? However, Kant sustains the argument that pleasure in itself is not aesthetic, because for pleasure to be aesthetic it must correspond to disinterest, and this is the reason why Kant maintains that the good and the agreeable do not by themselves constitute aesthetic experience.

This leaves us to consider that the good and the agreeable cannot be a matter of "disinterest", as they imply an involvement which presupposes a certain kind of deliberate intention. In other words, one's interest and its pleasure, as opposed to the aesthetic and its pleasure, presuppose a purpose that partly conditions and provokes the feeling response. The premise being, that an intention or purpose as interest would exert influence on the aesthetic, which is something Kant wants to avoid as it conflicts with his idea of free-play. He is, therefore, reluctant to reconcile any notion of interest when it comes to matters relating to the aesthetic. Now, in the first instance, Kant uses the word delight in two different senses: (1) without cognition of the object and (2) that which is agreeable with delight has an interest. On first view, this might seem a contradiction in terms, but Kant makes it clear his intention when he argues that:

"All delight (as is said or thought) is itself sensation (of a pleasure)" (*CJ*, §3, 206).

What is agreeable as delight amounts on the one hand, to what is produced in sensation from the reasoning and or cognitive knowledge of an object. Such an experience amounts to an interest, but such an interest one might still find pleasing in the mere subjective sensations I have towards a personal representation of this kind. In this second example, is there the possibility that the agreeable could also be a basis for an aesthetic experience? The simple answer to this would be no. The reason being, as Kant postulates, is that the agreeable presupposes certain preconditioned criteria relating to sensation. Under these circumstances, what amounts to an agreeable delight in an object, is in effect, an interest, since such interest predetermines the nature of the delight as sensation. Likewise, but in a different sense, Kant states that the good also has two properties to it: (1) as a means to an attainment which pleases because it is cognitive and (2) because such a concept in itself also implies an interest. As Kant proposes: "To deem something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is intended to be, i.e. I must have a concept of it" (*CJ*, §4, 207). Unlike the agreeable which does not have a determined concept, since it springs out of the sensation itself, the good presupposes a desire that determines its delight, in accordance with the concept of a given object. But since any good, in the Kantian sense, appears to be rationally determined, this, like the agreeable, has an interest. Given this account of delight, it is clear that

interest is that which can appear related to what can be determined rationally in part by a concept, or by a predetermined desire which determines the feeling response to an object.

One might find objectionable, the distinction that Kant makes concerning interest. For in claiming that interest in general, is that which predetermines an object (by sensation or by concept), is to define narrowly the notion interest and mislead us into thinking that interest cannot be a fact in aesthetic judgement. In Latin the word interest means "it matters to me", and in one acceptable sense Kant makes this point, but because something matters to me, it does not necessarily follow that I have to precondition the experience. For example, I love my family, but this does not mean that I have to precondition the way they should behave. So while Kant accepts the view that it must matter to me as to how I feel the pleasure in an object, the pleasure that I obtain in this object, in aesthetic terms, happens as a consequence of free-play, reflection and spontaneity. The claim that he asserts against interest is that: "All interest presupposes a want, or calls one forth; and, being a ground determining approval, deprives the judgement on the object of its freedom" (*CJ*, §5, 210). It is in this respect that one can sympathise with Kant that the aesthetic just might be a matter of disinterest, but disinterest poses some enormous problems, for if the aesthetic can only be glimpsed from the viewpoint of disinterest, such experience strains the very notion of the aesthetic itself. But if this is so, what does this say about aesthetic judgement, which is supposedly grounded in

disinterest and free-play? The problem for Kant is, how can I have an aesthetic experience which is not related to: (1) a world of ideas and (2) which does not display or provoke a certain familiarity with the object in some sense? Similarly, a possible response to the issue of interest depriving the judgement in relation to the object and its freedom, is the sense in which Kant seems to be taking a purist stance on this issue. The difficulty is, that there are grounds to be suspicious of an aesthetic which does not notice these difficulties. Before I pass on to develop Kant's notion of beauty further, let me restate the fact that I feel the aesthetic does involve "disinterest", which as an experience may be enhanced when it connects with interest.

From the beginning of the Second Moment, Kant insists that any individual who is conscious in a disinterested manner of his or her own delight, grounds this object as a possible universal mode. Such "disinterest" is regarded by Kant as being: "completely free in respect of the liking which he accords to the object, he can find as reason for his delight no personal conditions to which his own subjective self alone be party" (*CJ*, §6, 211). It is on this basis that he constructs subjective universality. For in Kant's mind the universality, as a judgement of taste, is in the claim that the individual perceives an object in such a way that his or her own personal prejudices, interest or inclinations do not predetermine what constitutes the feeling of pleasure in this object; the aesthetic in a sense is pure. Even so, at one level, the sort of difficulty facing disinterest, is for example, the kind of pleasure that a child finds enjoyable. For children

often appear to enjoy that which they find most interesting and which stimulates their cognitive and sensory modes. The concern here, is that my interest may itself have been predetermined by an explorative experience which at some stage or other involved free-play, a point, however, that Kant appears to have overlooked. Since Kant appears also to claim that the aesthetic in fine art is not an organic sensation (*CJ*, §44, 306) and has what Kant calls: "a definite intention of producing something" (*CJ*, §45, 306), it remains perhaps an open question as to the extent to which the aesthetic is ever free of certain interests.

1. 6

By far the most important issue which determines the aesthetic for Kant, is beauty. Firstly, it may be questioned, that since the aesthetic is largely based on a notion of beauty, what kind of aesthetic deduction does Kant make, that explains why the aesthetic is beautiful? For Kant, to assert a notion of beauty is to apprehend particular qualities that indicate a particular kind of pleasure altogether different from that which merely pleases. As I have indicated, from a Kantian point of view, beauty differs considerably from that which pleases by its universality and form. The form that beauty takes is not based on: "neither charm nor emotion, in a word, no sensation as matter of aesthetic judgement" (*CJ*, §14, 226). It is in this section that I will explain the characteristics of beauty which Kant describes as essentially created out of the individual imagination and understanding in free-play. One hastens to add that this appears to endorse Kant's view that: "Beauty (whether it be of nature or of art) may in general be termed the expression of aesthetic ideas" (*CJ*, §51). What is contained in beauty, according to Kant, is characteristic of aesthetic experience. Clearly though, the kind of beauty that Kant relates to fine art, is presupposed by design and composition (*CJ*, §14, 225). However, beauty, while being universal, owes nothing to an external standard. It is a reflection only of the autonomous sensuous nature of the human subject and is therefore

not purely physiological. Moreover, Kant regards beauty as the most heightened, spontaneous and completely free subjective self-experience (*CJ*, §6).

Perhaps more debatable, is that when Kant examines beauty itself, he clearly categorises the aesthetic (in relation to beauty) as pure and impure judgements of taste and in doing so, he attempts to explain the aesthetic as an experience of these conditions. Such relations obviously determine what I can judge as necessary or unnecessary, for pure and impure aesthetic judgements. Furthermore, to insist, as Kant does, on a notion of pure beauty being pure, one might conceive as objectionable, depending on how one views whether anything can really be pure. The salient point here is that Kant by taking a purist position, is distancing himself from the notion of interest. However, if interest is deemed by Kant as anti-aesthetic, what kind of experience does beauty represent? A possible answer to this question is that beauty can be seen as an opposite to interest, in that he argues, that interest relates to the real existence of objects (*CJ*, §2, 204). In contrast, he maintains that the aesthetic as a subjective experience does not concern itself with the real existence of things, as it discriminates and estimates only in relation to the representation in free-play. This means, as Kant concludes: "everything turns on the meaning which I can give to this representation, and not on any factor which makes me dependent on the real existence of the object" (*CJ*, §2, 205). The trouble with this argument is, that what Kant conceives as the "real" existence of the object bears no resemblance to what he feels constitutes aesthetic experience. In this connection

there is something quite curious about why Kant feels that the aesthetic response is not at all about real existences. Admittedly, Kant feels that "real" existence corresponds to objectivity, but does it follow that because the aesthetic engages in the activity of imagining, that imagining itself is not "real existence"? My deduction is, as I will go on to explain in chapters two and three, that it is a fundamental flaw in anyone's argument to suggest that the aesthetic does not involve "real existence". Paradoxically, Kant admits this himself, for he sees the aesthetic as having its own reality, but is this not a contradiction in terms?

Kant argues that there are two kinds of beauty: free beauty and dependent beauty (*CJ*, §16). Free beauty rests on no defined concept of what the object is supposed to be, and as early as section two (First Moment), Kant suggests that the delight which determines a judgement of taste is indifferent to the real existence of the object of representation. It is this notion of disinterest that Kant relates to free beauty. Denis Dutton also underlines that the distinction that Kant makes in section sixteen of the *Critique of Judgement* between pure and impure (dependent) beauty, which attempts not only to categories the aesthetic between notions of pure and impure beauty, but implies that dependent beauty is: "a check-list of features against which to measure 'aesthetic' quality" (Dutton, 1994, vol.XXXIV, p.229). While I agree with Dutton that a notion of a check-list, as Kant describes it, negates against aesthetic diversity and creativity, it is also misleading for him to suggest that the aesthetic can be divided in this way. However, it seems to me undeniable, as H.W. Cassirer

considers (1938, p.271), that the whole notion of free beauty has to be interpreted as free from the constraints of rules. In other words, I cannot just observe free beauty as implying an archetypal status, as Kant wants to emphasise the felt pleasure in an object of experience for its own sake. Nevertheless, the categorisation of pure and impure judgement may possibly be seen as a serious weakness in Kant's argument and one that needs to be addressed if only because a number of philosophers have different views on the subject (consider for example the views of H.W. & E. Cassirer, Crawford, Crowther, Dutton, Guyer, Savile and Schaper).

The argument that I want to construct here, concerns only whether the grounds of the deduction, that Kant deduces for the distinction of pure and impure, can be made at all. This seems to me an important issue, for Kant often talks about pure judgements of taste being a necessary condition for aesthetic experience. It needs to be noted, and before I proceed any further, it is also necessary to recognise that Kant does not consider dependent beauty as entirely inferior to pure beauty. He argues that pure and dependent beauty operate in different ways: "one according to what he had present to his senses, the other according to what was present in his thoughts" (*CJ*, §16, 231). But, be this as it may, the concept that Kant talks about as a pure judgement of taste is not to be interpreted as a pure judgement of perfection (*CJ*, §15), but rather a pure judgement of universal delight (*CJ*, §§2-5-6-8), which presupposes no determining concept. Indeed, Kant criticises the concept of perfection on the

grounds that perfection implies aesthetically a sense of utility; an estimation of its parts in relation to a given purpose or standard. Furthermore, he argues, as a rebuff against a concept of perfection, that: "The judgement is called aesthetic for the very reason that its determining ground cannot be a concept, but is rather the feeling (of the internal sense) of the concept in the play of the mental powers as a thing only capable of being felt" (*CJ*, §15, 228). What he is getting at, in contrast to a notion of perfection, is that the pure aesthetic judgement is a spontaneous experience that can only judge the concept of beauty as a perception of inner sense. Perfection, as Kant puts it, "supplies the rule of its synthesis" (*CJ*, §15, 227), pure beauty does not. It is the grasping of this intuitive inner sense individually through purposiveness, that is at the heart of a pure aesthetic judgement. It remains to be seen just how plausible an explanation this can be.

A possible dent, however, in Kant's reasoning, seems to be that there is something not quite right about a pure judgement of taste being pure. For even if one accepts that there is such a thing as a pure judgement of taste, one might still insist that a pure aesthetic judgement is a matter of degree. The danger for us, is deciding where exactly to draw the boundary line as to what constitutes purity. But asking a question of this kind, would be to miss Kant's point that pureness is a matter of disinterest. In short, one misconstrues the dynamics of the aesthetic, because such an experience wholly abandons a determinate approach. There remains, however, other problems concerning the way that Kant sees pure beauty in terms of parrots, hummingbirds, foliage on wallpaper

and flowers. As if this was not enough, in contrast to pure beauty there is dependent beauty which seems just as implausible as the categories of pure with its emphasis on men, women, children, horses and buildings (*CJ*, §16). The premise of pure beauty being that I judge foliage on wallpaper or humming birds without any preconceived ideas as to their purpose. This may or may not be the case, but this might equally apply to dependent beauty. However, Kant proceeds to argue that such things as pure beauty are also judged "on their own account" (*CJ*, §16, 229), without, that is, a defined concept. Once again, this may be true, but it is questionable how one can judge on his or her own account, not least because there must be some "public sense" which one associates with this experience, as how else does one "judge"? As I will discuss, it is Wittgenstein, rather than Kant, who gives us more of an objective understanding as to what constitutes a "public sense". None the less, one might think that this is a dubious question, for I can judge an object on its own account which may indeed qualify as public. Still, it seems that Kant also makes the mistake that dependent beauty has a "concept of its own perfection" (*CJ*, §16, 230) but this too has many anomalies which are certainly questionable given his categorisation of pure and impure. For example, in producing a painting that I am working on, one would naturally draw upon past experiences and one would probably reflect on the form and content of the work to the degree that what one notices in the work affects the direction of the work, and yet through all this experience one still has no idea of its perfection. The

essential meaning that I am getting at, is that the work of art or design is more often than not, a mixture of "disinterest" and interest that operates through an intuitive response (although not always). Hence one arrives at the view that the individual, in his or her autonomy, contemplates the object of experience perhaps from an intuitive response that is all the time reworking itself as it identifies, recognises, rejects and transforms itself through what is being confirmed and imagined. In general, however, the adoption of pure and impure conditions are certainly confusing, for why does Kant consider a horse as being aesthetically the same as a building, or for that matter different to a parrot? In these examples, what exactly is Kant designating as pure and impure? What is it about these examples that explains clearly their differences in relation to pure and impure beauty?

Entangled in this, as suggested, is that the feeling of sensation as a singular judgement presupposes a relation to the object through intuition. In Kantian terms, there is no connection with a judgement of taste, which has to assume a conceptual understanding of the object concerned, since an aesthetic judgement is quite independent of it; for the "unity" of an aesthetic judgement as Kant argues, does not conform to strict laws of understanding. This is because singular and particular judgements of aesthetic experience are primarily imaginative representations which are contingent on the subject's felt experience in free-play. Thus, the felt experience is deemed as indeterminate, but nevertheless singular and particular because it involves a subjective necessary

"unity" which is purposive. Kant is convinced that aesthetic meaning and understanding is intuitive. The stand that he takes is: "Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not in itself present" (*CPR*, B.151). A problem arises here concerning whether one can say necessarily that an imaginative experience in free-play does not conform to strict laws of understanding, for much may depend on how one's creative sensibility is being used. If understanding is dependent on "use" (a point that I will argue in chapter two of this manuscript) then nothing is ruled out as to what constitutes understanding, other than what establishes and accounts as "usage". Kant's aesthetic critique, however, as I have implied, has the advantage of claiming firmly that what pre-empts usage (as comprehended by Wittgenstein) is aesthetic purposiveness and its independent judgement. For Kant will properly insist that "mental" occurrence, as a matter of experience, cannot be superseded by a public concept of the aesthetic, so that the aesthetic because it rests on intuition, is in one respect a private rather than a "public" operation. Conceding Wittgenstein's point (yet to be discussed) that the aesthetic does involve important behavioural, description and language conditions, does not rule out necessarily that the aesthetic, as Kant thought, is an imaginative experience.

Beauty is seen by Kant as a personal experience having its own means of representation and estimation, one involving both cognitive and sensory responses as a feeling of self. Quite clearly, therefore, if I take into account that the aesthetic is both singular, original and in free-play, one begins to understand

further why Kant considers beauty in the aesthetic sense as an "indeterminate idea" (*CJ*, §17, 232). Such indeterminacy in Kant's mind, is a product of the sensuous and imaginative experiences and therefore depends on individual representation. The distinction that he proposes about indeterminacy, and this should be noted, is that he sees any "ideal" of beauty, as that which is unthinkable. The account that he gives is that: "An ideal of a beautiful flower, of a beautiful suite of furniture, or of a beautiful view, is unthinkable" (*CJ*, §17, 233). This is undoubtedly significant, because he is arguing that such experiences are formed by imaginative means, not conceptual means. One has to visualise these objects in order to represent them to oneself. Creativity, therefore, is not a product of strict logical necessity of the "objective" kind. In which case, the imagination can extend one's understanding through free-play, but the conceptual understanding that one has, may itself be affecting the imaginative experience, but not as Kant points out through some definite end. Hypothetically, if the aesthetic has an end then: "we must first have a concept of what sort of thing it is to be" (*CJ*, §15, 227). Consequently, this would negate the very idea of aesthetic experience. The power of the imagination is what transforms the notion of what is beautiful, a power which concepts alone do not have (*CJ*, §17, 231). Yet, Kant clearly thought that even concepts must involve imaginative experience, a point that he discusses in his Aesthetic and Analytic sections in the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

I will now proceed to a closer examination of how Kant establishes that the imagination transforms the beautiful. As mentioned, he construes in sections ten to twelve of the *Critique of Judgement* his principle of formal purposiveness. In this sense, he argues that the perception of an object relating to the purposiveness, causally gives us a concept of the finality which relates to one's felt engagement. Kant's argument seems to be that an impure judgement involves formal purposiveness as a concept in general; as opposed to pure beauty whose purposiveness is a matter of purely intuitive sense. In general, this formal purposiveness involved in impure beauty relates to causal relations of purpose that are meant to establish what the object represents conceptually. In one sense, purposiveness presupposes theoretically what I am able, by causal aesthetic means, to perceive and thus determine the conceptions of what represents a certain object (*CTJ*, §3, 64). In other words, if an aesthetic experience is presupposed by what happens conceptually, then Kant describes this as dependent beauty, because the purposiveness is contingent upon independent reason in relation to what an object is supposed to be (a flower, a house, a dress, a painting). This needs to be recognised, for what Kant is implying here, is that in order to appreciate dependent beauty it must be possible that: "the contingency is itself a ground for making us look upon the origin of the thing as if, just because of that contingency, it could be possible through reason" (*CTJ*, §3, 64). In contrast, if I have free beauty (as previously indicated) no determinate concept can be found. Pure beauty is not connected

to any purpose at all (in relation to an object), and it is in this respect that pure beauty fundamentally differs from dependent beauty. Now clearly the kind of purposiveness that Kant is mentioning here as free beauty, is not necessarily a concept of an object, as the point that Kant is making is that the aesthetic in an undetermined manner, conceptualises purposively. In pure beauty, knowing what the object is (a flower, a house, a dress, a painting) is not part of what characterises the free beauty itself, for it would presuppose an interest in the object's end. One is completely indifferent to the nature of the object, for free beauty is self-activity which is spontaneous as an experience, in free accord totally with one's own intuitive feelings.

An issue that deserves attention is, that while a person may know what the object is, it is not the concept of knowing what this object is that determines pure beauty. While this is a noteworthy critical view of Kant's, one might still wonder how it is possible to say in the Kantian sense, that wallpaper designs are objects of pure beauty, when they are designed to serve a purpose? To this extent, pure beauty fails to take account of some of the factors that can condition aesthetic intention. As Schaper claims, there is a case to suppose that pure beauty must be "representing nothing" since its particular effect does not conform to object representation (1979, p.86). Schaper's point is, that pleasure in the representation is insufficient as a device to produce the necessary object of experience. This expresses, that if I do not know what the object is as a concept when considering free beauty, how is it possible to deduce experience from it

that conforms to the conditions of experience? Representations must stand compared and connected, according to Kant (*CPR*, A.97), but under pure beauty this is not possible. If pure beauty cannot (1) be compared, (2) be connected and (3) be aroused by the formal purposiveness of objects then what exactly is there left capable of being considered aesthetic? The brief Kantian answer is that feelings express my consciousness, but how do I know this consciousness, if I cannot compare, connect nor conceptualise? How do I decide that this is the correct feeling or response for myself and for others? In reply, Kant might rightly suppose that this misses his point entirely, which is that individuals, in immersing themselves in imaginative thought, are reaching a state of consciousness and originality, that cannot be grasped in any other method, that bring a different kind of reality into play. Similarly, he would argue that pure beauty can be conceptualising, can be comparing and can be connected, only it does so through its own excitement, in a felt indeterminate (without regard to ends) fashion which is spontaneous. It is not judging itself against other concepts, ideas or theories, but merely reflecting its own consciousness of being.

From Dutton's point of view, if Kant presupposes that pure beauty has "no perfection of any kind" (*CJ*, §16) then this undermines judgement. The distinction that Dutton makes in response to this, is that: "What of a flower that is wilted or whose white petals show grown spots?" (Dutton, 1994, vol.XXXIV, p.231). The assumption being that these kinds of qualities may be relevant to an aesthetic experience irrespective of whether it is pure or dependent beauty. It

is quite possible for qualities of this kind to represent our understanding of objects and to presuppose what one finds interesting. That is to say, that object representation can be dependent on qualities or properties of things, so that the necessary concepts can be contingent on particular qualities of experience. For example, judgements are made that lend themselves initially to how I feel intuitively about perceived paint handling, colour mixing, tactile qualities and so on. Yet Kant would still insist that these kinds of qualities are under a concept of a purpose about possible perfection, and are thus impure judgements (*CJ*, §16, 230). This explanation of an impure judgement would seem to be dependent partly on how I conceive the concept as being important to the judgement of beauty.

As previously claimed, Kant sees purposiveness as derivative of the person's subjective experience. This is the case even if my delight is taken from the object according to its end (concept), but not all objects which depend upon purposiveness can be described as delightful (*CJ*,§33). The goal of this subjective aim of purposiveness through synthesis, has two sides to it: on the one hand, the aim through understanding is to make sense of the purposiveness process itself. That is to say, because purposiveness is coupled to understanding, such experience can be of the subjective *a priori* kind, since it relates to the faculty of concepts in general. Similarly, purposiveness involves imagination so that pleasure can be felt. It is an intuition of the cognitive power (imagination and understanding). To reiterate, because this experience is

coupled to a feeling of pleasure, the aesthetic domain is not a domain in reference to the object itself, but as Kant puts it, is a reference to the subject. The imagination which engages this experience, does so spontaneously, but in so doing it combines with the intuition to form a necessary concept in the general sense. Clearly then, aesthetic purposiveness always has, as Kant puts it, an "aim", to combine a manifold in such a way that it has a certain unique and relevant "unity" about it, that can be awe inspiring in what one experiences and creates. So, aesthetic purposiveness pursues intersubjective agreement through: (1) a theoretical aim, (2) the combined "unity" of imagination and understanding, (3) purposiveness which is devoid of interest and (4) conscious experience of these factors as a subjective but reflective feeling; such purposiveness is nothing other than the consciousness of the aesthetic itself.

Alternatively, one might ask, how does the free-play of imagination and understanding operate in dependent beauty, if the dependent beauty is predetermined partly by a concept? In this respect, Kant himself goes on to argue: "Now the delight in the manifold of a thing, in reference to an internal end that determines its possibility, is a delight based on a concept" (*CJ*, §16, 230). There appears, then, to be at least some confusion as to the extent to which the concept of end predetermines the notion of impure beauty. One might have to recognise the fact that perhaps there is a certain impasse in the argument. If one's imagination and understanding in free-play is always having to proceed or be judged according to a concept of end, then the imagination and

understanding is not in free-play at all. In other words, if the imagination and understanding is serving a purpose, does it not follow that the imagination and understanding becomes an instrument of this purpose? For Kant, the answer would be no, because the imagination although actively cognitive can never be a defined concept, because the imaginative experience itself being intuitive, is an object of sense, not pure understanding. Purposively, the aesthetic is without a final cause (a concept), that explains its representation, because it has no definite end (a purpose) that it strives towards and is only recognised as having a "finality of form" (*CJ*, §13, 223), when it is singularly and particularly dependent and determined by sensations.

However, it would be a mistake to presuppose that formal purposiveness in object experience automatically determines the conditions by which aesthetic judgements are made. It must be remembered that Kant repeatedly argues, that what I envisage must be my own awareness of the object concerned. Kant's point and one that must be stressed, is that purposiveness must correspond to a delight, if the aesthetic is to be accompanied by a judgement of taste. In addition, it may be true that any possible notion of representation as finality has a concept of its perfection (*CJ*, §16, 230), but it is unclear how in practice this works in the aesthetic sense. For artists and designers do not know in advance how to perceive representation as a formal purposive condition of perfection. This brings us back to an earlier point that the aesthetic, as a creative concern, has no definite end that can be envisaged,

for to do so would negate aesthetic experience. However, as Ernst Cassirer implies, there is: "a special kind of causality for Kant—so as to place it purely under the rule of inner creation" (1981, p.312). This obviously suggests that the aesthetic is not as unstructured or as unconstrained as one might be tempted to think. This is an issue that I explore further in chapter two of this work.

The fact that Kant peculiarly discriminates between pure and impure judgements is secondary to the fact that aesthetic judgements are constituted by the representation of what "I" experience as delight through intuition, imagination and understanding. Thus, even the cognitive, universal and *a priori* elements must combine with this purpose, to estimate the beauty of an object. The aesthetic experience as described, is imaginative, and because it is imaginative: "It must therefore rest upon a feeling that allows the object to be estimated by the finality of the representation (by which an object is given) for the furtherance of the cognitive faculties in their free-play" (*CJ*, §35, 278). In this sense, whatever the experience reveals, it must be aesthetic as its relations evolve in a determinate manner, through imagination. None the less, one should resist the temptation of thinking of the aesthetic as purely and necessarily a cognitive occurrence, for as I will explore in chapter two and three of this work much of aesthetic activity can be grasped in public terms. Finally, the special case that Kant makes relating to the aesthetic is in principle sound, and if objectivity in art and design is to mean anything, it must not overturn these fundamental arguments that he appears to be asserting. The real basis of the

aesthetic, as Kant considered, is that it involves, in the midst of everything, an encounter with a creative experience.

Conclusion

The problems that I have discussed relate to whether the aesthetic is a creative experience and whether such a creative experience is worth anything of consequence. I have attempted to explain in this work the way that Kant handles the unique and characteristic elements that show that the aesthetic is primarily a creative concern of considerable value. He regards, the aesthetic as being particularly important to human beings in their " life", as it intensifies both the cognitive and sensuous side of human existence, the completion of a mind, which the "theoretical" and the "practical" does not touch upon. In this respect the aesthetic extends one's knowledge and understanding of things in a way that the "theoretical" and the "practical" cannot comprehend or dismiss, as it represents, through feelings, a different kind of life experience.

The *Critique of Judgement* attempts to explain above all else, how the imagination and the understanding as self-activity, feature as elements in aesthetic experience. In this respect, Kant investigates how one judges and estimates the aesthetic in relation to how he sees the aesthetic revealing itself through autonomy as a felt particular experience which is creative and independent of determinate objective concepts. When one enquires what Kant means by the aesthetic being independent of determinate concepts, the connection that he establishes is that the aesthetic in free-play is imaginative. Here the logic of Kant's argument arises from the fact that the aesthetic as a

feeling of pleasure, is an individual experience without ulterior aim, but one that is valid *a priori* universally "for all men" (*CJ*, intro. VI, 187).

In exploring the multiple nature of the aesthetic, Kant argues that this experience can only be accounted for and determined according to its pleasure. What gives rise to this satisfaction, according to Kant, is the harmony between imagination and understanding in free-play. Consequently, he arrives at the view that because the aesthetic is spontaneous and connects to a conscious feeling of pleasure, a feeling of this kind must in some sense be indeterminate. This argument appears to be strengthened by the fact that, for Kant, and I concur partly with him on this point, the aesthetic is singular, particular and autonomous. Certainly it is the case that autonomy is of paramount importance in creativity because it allows the individual to experience the object as a matter of disinterest, spontaneously and without any preconceived or presupposed considerations about how such an object should be experienced. In this respect, individuals are obliged to state their own feelings, to express themselves and to feel this experience unfolding. One is drawn to the conclusion that what governs the aesthetic and its *a priori* conditions are: (1) free-play, (2) autonomy, (3) particularisation, and (4) aesthetic purposiveness. In short, the aesthetic is, as Kant thought, an unconditioned experience that is a reflective rather than a purely conceptual determinate judgement. This, however, should not lead us into thinking, as I have intimated, that aesthetic experience is discordant.

One soon realises that the new cutting edge that Kant bestows upon the aesthetic surpasses both theoretical and moral concepts, in that the aesthetic is the only creative experience that one has; it is the only experience where the individual as an autonomous being is at the centre of things. In other words, the aesthetic does not push aside the individual, but positively embraces them. Kant is confirming the importance of intuitive experience, for in his mind nowhere is the individual more respected, than in aesthetic experience. Through free-play the individual is obliged only to feel their sensuous selves, to grasp their own feelings and thus give life to such self-activity; the individual is not subordinated, but elevated as it dwells in its own experience. It is essential to realise, as Ernst Cassirer states, that in this fashion the aesthetic designates and enlarges the concept of validity (1981, pp.318-9). Consequently, in the aesthetic, the individual is neither swallowed nor tied-down to existing concepts, because through free-play the artist or designer creates new concepts of experience. Here, Kant develops the argument that despite creativity being an irregular experience, it still has a unified structure which although subjective, represents one's imaginative impulses in their originality. In supporting Kant's argument that the aesthetic can be a unified experience (though not, I hasten to add, necessarily a subjective one), one may be puzzled as to why Kant feels that the aesthetic is an irregular experience. The important thing is that Kant is not implying that the aesthetic nature is a rare, unreliable and haphazard experience, but rather, that because the aesthetic is unconditional this governs

the irregular nature of the aesthetic. That is to say, that the only thing that is irregular about the aesthetic is that each experience is unique. The point being, that the specific aesthetic experience itself is not disorderly, as the experience is a unified one which can make perfect sense even though it may not have a purpose or defined concept. Here, the involved "harmony" and agreement between imagination and understanding brings about the necessary spontaneity and synthesis of experience. The imagination and the understanding may be disproportionate to each other, but what matters is not their ratio, but their "harmony". Kant argues that the creative sense strives for a: "mutual relation of the powers of representation so far as they refer a given representation to cognition in general" (*CJ*, §9, 217). Such a harmony only occurs, argues Kant, when the imagination and understanding are in free-play.

One is left feeling that perhaps one has to concede the point that in Kantian terms the aesthetic experience is unconditional, is autonomous, is a disinterested experience, is personal, is particular and is in imaginative free-play. But, if one did agree with this impression would one also have to agree that the aesthetic is non-conceptual, has no criteria, is indeterminate and thus has no objectivity? Does it follow, in other words, that because something aesthetically is autonomous and in free-play, it cannot be conceptual and determinate? In one sense, Kant is arguing that the aesthetic is objective, for his notion of autonomy, free-play, disinterest and purposiveness represent objective understanding. These are the rules which one is obliged to accept when it comes

to aesthetic matters. But Kant only deals with one side of this notion of objectivity from the viewpoint of experience. In chapter two of my thesis I will discuss another side to this argument, one which draws on a different kind of aesthetic understanding that is conditioned by Wittgenstein's notion of behaviour, language-games and usage. This leads me later in this work to comment on the fact that these different views can be reconciled and can be accommodated under an objective notion.

The difficulty that one has to face, if one presupposes that Kant's understanding is correct, is how exactly from an art and design perspective, does one know that a mutual harmony between imagination and understanding exists? Kant's response to this, would probably be that one's conscious awareness and the conditions which bring about pleasure, would tell us when such harmony existed. Yet, how does one confirm, amass and make clear a conception based solely on a conscious feeling of pleasure which can only be interpreted as a felt experience? The fact that I am conscious of a feeling does not tell us what this feeling is about, or indeed how it came about. One observes, that in Kantian terms there is no public criteria that will enable us to understand the aesthetic through art and design experience. Yet, Kant's thesis is immersed in something quite different than this, for his doctrine requires us to put aside our tendency to want to judge things in purely deterministic and conceptual terms. This thinking argues that the aesthetic is receptive only to creativity. Here, then, what justifies creativity is not a thoroughly systematic approach, but when the subject

through imagination responds to his or her own sense of being in spontaneity. In this experience, the aesthetic has no need to follow a procedure or define and fix a course of understanding since everything is dependent on what is seen and experienced. It makes no sense, therefore, to confine the aesthetic to something which it is not. Aesthetically, the individual's only obligation is to feel itself and to come to terms with this experience from an intuitive and imaginative position. The individual concerned, embraces the totality of his or her powers of experience in an autonomous free-play rather than a mechanistic manner. In other words, the aesthetic relies on the subject's natural inclinations of imagination and understanding to explore and to absorb self-experience. Accordingly, the aesthetic reaches a level of creative output that surpasses anything else, as it connects its whole self-experience in a unified manner. Indeed, it enriches the lives of those who can perceive this experience, because it expands one's sensuous being. In essence, aesthetic reality, because it is concerned with creativity, challenges the orthodoxy of what constitutes experience and understanding.

What strongly accompanies the Kantian argument is the concern that what aesthetic experience connects and exposes is a world where feelings and pleasure are given a logical outlet, a defined role and an understanding of one's self in intuition. Kant is committed to the view that this world is incapable of determinate concepts in that feelings and pleasure need to escape precise conceptual meaning in order not to subsume any account that would directly

affect the natural states of these expressions. My opposition to this view is not to deny these states of affairs, (as I happen to support this view entirely), but rather to suggest that there is also an intentional and conceptual side that affects aesthetic experience and meaning in a way that Kant appears not to have realised. By moving this thesis in a more practical direction in my next chapter, it becomes necessary to explain in this part of my manuscript, in contrast to the Kantian thesis, how a "public" understanding of art and design aesthetic practice is manifested. One shall see that the "public" does not negate Kant's position, but instead complements it.

Chapter Two

Wittgenstein's Concept of Noticing an Aspect: A Public Conception

Introduction

The main arguments in this chapter relate to noticing an aspect as a public conception of understanding. Aesthetically, Wittgenstein believes that a public conception of understanding can be shown to connect to the notion of objectivity itself. I begin by discussing why Wittgenstein objects to the idea that the aesthetic is a "private mental experience" and why he argues that it is only through one's actions and "practice", that meaning and objectivity can embrace the aesthetic. It is on these lines that "noticing an aspect" takes shape. Yet, in noticing an aspect what Wittgenstein is concerned with is the particular visual experience, and its perception as a public rather than as a "private experience". Wittgenstein's argument is that a painting only makes sense when it can be described in a specific kind of way through its "usage" and conceptual understanding. The claim being, that it is only by what I do in terms of observed actions, behaviour and sensation—language, that determines objectivity. Aesthetically, what Wittgenstein pursues, is that the aesthetic gets expressed only when I know how to use and make sense of particular lines, colours, shapes, tones, materials and so on. What he is asserting, is that it is by behavioural, visual, sensation—language and conceptual means alone, that any criteria or notion of aesthetic understanding manifests itself. There are

therefore, many aspects of Wittgenstein's work, but pertinent to his argument and to this discussion about aesthetic understanding, are his claims concerning "seeing" and "interpreting".

One of the principal arguments that Wittgenstein sustains in relation to noticing an aspect is that observing does not produce what is observed, as visual experience is a conceptual matter (*PI*, p.187, §IX). However, part of his understanding of aesthetic perception relates to "organisation", a Gestalt approach. Wittgenstein, in relation to "organisation", talks about the "dawning of an aspect" (*PI*, pp.193-6, §XII), an issue that I will shortly discuss. Now, it is particular important to realise that noticing an aspect primarily involves "seeing" and "interpreting". Here, he argues, that seeing is a "state", a felt experience, or optical effect, and interpreting that which is taken from the seen, verifies what is seen, a criterion of understanding of this experience. On this basis, Wittgenstein describes some of the ways in which seeing affects the interpreting and mentions that everything is dependent on the seen. While Wittgenstein's concern is to describe the perception of what is "seen", he is adamant that how one applies this expression of the "seen" describes its meaning. In other words, and this is a fundamental point, a public conception of understanding relates to a description of what is "seen". I will discuss the issue that what is "seen" aesthetically can be "real", but problems arise here relating to the picture-space as one's responses are never clear cut, given the various light, tone, colour, lines, texture, shape and character differences alone in any one painting.

Perception, Wittgenstein argues, has unintentional and intentional aspects that affect the "organisation" of noticing an aspect, but one may not be aware, how these sensory modes are being organised. In seeking to explain the conditions of perception, he argues that in perception, one can make connections between elements which cannot actually be seen in a painting. In other words, that one will readily form a picture of an image or event when in fact much of our identity of this picture or image may be obscured from view (consider William Turner's seascape paintings or Rembrandt Hermensz Van Rijn's interior/figure paintings). The kind of connections that Wittgenstein has in mind here relate to an arrow piercing an apple, in that one sees the two ends of the arrow, but assume through experience that the two ends are connected in the apple even though one cannot see this effect. This leaves open the question as to other kinds of perception connections that can be made in this fashion. Another significant feature of this perception that Wittgenstein draws out, is that visual experience is essentially an activity of a particular kind, involving perhaps sound, touch, sight and body movement all at the same time. One's attention is drawn to the fact that if I use my paintbrush in a particular way, creating marks of a certain kind that represent spatial elements through dry brushwork and the use of solid and transparent colour techniques, then the figure in this painting through the rhythms that I have created in my mark-making, says something about the character of this expression and its description. If a certain expression is therefore captured as so described, Wittgenstein maintains that I may be right to assert how this happened and thus determine its objective

validity. The claim is, that by describing something I am illustrating a concept of the object. Thus, according to Wittgenstein the criterion of understanding is being deduced in relation to what can be "seen" in the perceptual situation. Consciousness alone is not enough, he insists, because one needs to make conceptual connections that describe what I am designing or making. The creative process is in one sense not implied by my feelings, but how I use tone, colour, line, scale, atmosphere, expression and materials.

At the very core of Wittgenstein's understanding of the aesthetic, is that it converges on a public concept of understanding. As will be explored, he sees the aesthetic as a matter of considering, differentiating and comparing that presupposes "public" accountability. He proceeds to show how method, example and order are involved and connected to aesthetic experience and that what ultimately matters is the visual expression, since this explains usage.

2. 1

Having explained the Kantian aesthetic argument, in one regard, as an imaginative "private" experience, it is time now to turn to Wittgenstein's aesthetic argument which centres on a concept of "usage". In other words, for Wittgenstein, how the aesthetic is being employed and how it is being used determines what kind of aesthetic representation one is dealing with and its objectivity. This further determines, for Wittgenstein, the way in which one can take stock of the aesthetic as a public conception. For the concept of use, in Wittgensteinian terms, constitutes meaning. The premise being, that usage presupposes a social practice (how individuals communicate and behave) that demonstrates and describes the meaning of what one is doing. In which case, usage is a criterion and a development of identity which is meant to show how the aesthetic activity is being expressed. As Oswald Hanfling remarks, usage is connected with the description that one gives of an object (1989, p.42). From an educational point of view, these Wittgensteinian arguments further substantiate our pursuit, at one level, in establishing relevance and credibility to aesthetic experience. Underlining Wittgenstein's argument is, that our sensation—language must be grounded by some physical object.

For Wittgenstein: "The mental picture is the picture which is described when someone describes his images" (*PI*, §367). He can only describe what he imagines, argues Wittgenstein (*PI*, §344), when what he says rests on his behaviour (usage). It is in relation to behaviour—description that I now want to strengthen the case that art and design is objective and

accountable. In pursuing this issue, Wittgenstein's point is that through our actions the imaginative experience is described. Indeed, he states that: "How does one teach anyone to read to himself? How does one know if he can do so? How does he himself know that he is doing what is required of him?" (*PI*, §375). Moreover, he insists that: "One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when one imagines anything, but how the word 'Imagination' is used" (*PI*, §370). Consequently, Wittgenstein's method is an attempt to observe behaviour and its actions and to conceptualise this experience through social practice. He argues quite clearly that: "The concept of the 'inner picture' is misleading, for this concept uses the 'outer picture' as a model" (*PI*, p.196, §XI). His analysis is, not to deny the "inner picture", but that the "inner picture" only makes sense when one describes the perception of this thought and its action. By examining the aesthetic in this way, he aims to show that a fundamental feature of this experience, is a public conception of understanding. Here, it is only by exhibiting one's behaviour that it is possible to determine the kind of imagining or making that is taking place. For he insists, that "doing" sums in one's head (*PI*, §369), could invariably mean anything. It should be remembered, before I go any further with this, that one should not lose sight of Kant's argument that the aesthetic is "purposive", an experience through which the aesthetic sense is developed and directed. In other words, as I have explained, the aesthetic through spontaneity and "free-play" is an imaginative experience capable of exhibiting its own perception. My feelings are that Kant has a point when he claims that art and design experience defies measurement. It is evident from this that one

must treat with caution Wittgenstein's notion of usage, for while the concept of usage can be invoked here, Kant's doctrine centres on the fact that an experience of this kind is valid from the premise that art and design is the result of imaginative "free-play" and "disinterest". However, despite these differences, I am using Wittgenstein's arguments along with Kant's, to demonstrate the importance of the aesthetic for education, and not as a battle for supremacy between two different theories.

In private language, one of Wittgenstein's arguments is that there is no independent criteria and the relationship between a mental image and what it is an image of, may of course be correctly connected, but the fact is, that there is no independent way of comparing his or her image. The issue facing private language is knowing not only how to identify, but also how to reidentify. The Wittgensteinian argument, claims that knowing how to identify and reidentify requires a public conception. What is being suggested is that one's method of comparing, differentiating and so forth corresponds in some sense to a public recognition of what constitutes construction, comparing, differentiating and so on. Yet the notion of reidentifying an aesthetic object, from a Wittgensteinian point of view, implies a criteria of identify. This is certainly a contentious issue given Kant's notion of aesthetic free-play. Accordingly, one of the problems seems to be the extent to which the form of the object (its shape, colour and pattern) determines what I feel for the object. On the other hand, one must be careful here, for the public conception that Wittgenstein has in mind has to be rooted in art and design itself if it is to mean anything. Put differently, a scientific method, according

to Stephen Hawking: "must make definite predictions about the result of future observations" (p.9). Since this is hardly an aesthetic experience, one must be cautious about how one goes about comparing and differentiating in aesthetic terms. Similarly, it might seem as though Kant's notion of the aesthetic is far from a Wittgensteinian conception of art, but as I have suggested, there is a lot of overlap and criss-crossing going on here between cognitive occurrence, conceptual understanding and behaviour, that neither Kant nor Wittgenstein is prepared aesthetically to fully admit. To my mind, neither philosopher goes far enough in explaining aesthetic experience and its understanding. It would be naive not to admit that the act of coming to know, is an act that involves both impressions, feelings and ideas reciprocally. What is more, as Stuart Hampshire argues, a living human being cannot be seen: "primarily as a tool for effective action, as a mechanism. It is also a complex living organism that has its own preconceptual tendencies and goals" (1989, p.156), but this is an issue that I will examine further in chapter three. However, art and design experience does involve a personal response which is intuitive and imaginative, but as Wittgenstein thought, the judgement—features of such experience is realised only when one is able to ascribe meaning to these character experiences. The visual impression must have certain features which can be described in perception, action or language. How one associates a certain kind of meaning with its visual effect is the subject of this chapter.

2. 2

In Wittgenstein's discussion of the philosophy of psychology he mentions "noticing an aspect" (*PI*, p.193, §XI), in relation to "seeing" and "interpreting". As Wittgenstein explains, one has to look at why it is that one can imagine and "see" some things and not others. To understand this in Wittgensteinian terms, is to determine what the image or picture appears to be dependent on. In this context, it is not the image or "seeing" that matters, which Wittgenstein describes as lifeless (*Z*, §§236-8), but rather its role, what explains it, how am I comparing this image to something else, what it is doing and what it is for. This is what for Wittgenstein, determines the expression and "forms of life" in the aesthetic.

To begin with, what Wittgenstein finds interesting in noticing an aspect is how: "I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently" (*PI*, p.193, §XI). In this respect, noticing an aspect of an object, is akin to having a particular image of it and seeing it "as this" object, because of the sensory change. The difficulty here, of course, is the degree to which the sensory change as "organisation" (to be explained) is dependent on concepts. However, "seeing" the object as a particular kind of object is to have a concept of it, but a concept that involves an understanding of perception. The sensory perception that Wittgenstein has in mind appears to be of the observed rather than of the imaginary or feeling aspect that Kant emphasises. In the

final part of my thesis, I attempt to draw some conclusions about these different approaches in relation to art and design understanding and education.

Now, as Malcolm Budd points out: "But the image of a single point at which the sensory meets the intellect is not entirely accurate. For there are significantly different kinds of aspect, in which the sensory is joined with the intellect in different ways and in different proportions" (1993, p.79). In which case, the visual description is not to be solely understood in the sense that one cannot necessarily segregate the intellect and the sensory nature of this experience. They interconnect in ways which cannot easily be prised apart. In Kant, the aesthetic is a dynamic experience which in part is spontaneous. It has no need for a single point to be considered in this way, since the experience is a unified one. Our search to get close to such an experience is hampered partly by the fact that there are different ways one can perceive noticing an aspect, and also by the fact that one wants to "unify" this experience as a whole. If Wittgenstein's notion of aesthetic objectivity is to be acceptable, then clearly it must embrace this concern. As Kant thought, there is a general cognition in aesthetic experience through "purposiveness" that serves to make sense of one's experience. Of course, Wittgenstein is adamant that there is no strict manner in which aesthetic objectivity operates, because everything is dependent on what is "seen". The "seen" is the basis, according to Wittgenstein, of what constitutes objectivity, its recognition.

Let us then cite some of Wittgenstein's examples (*PI*, §XI) that emphasise some of the possible objective differences that can affect noticing an aspect or the "seen": (1) "I can draw this object but I cannot describe it in

words", (2) "I can see a likeness between this object here and that object opposite", (3) "these two objects look the same to me", (4) "the duck and rabbit syndrome" (5) "my understanding of this person's face changes as his or her face changes and at the same time when no change appears in the face", (6) "I can imagine this object two-dimensionally but not three-dimensionally", (7) "but I can imagine the object two-dimensionally and three-dimensionally", (8) "this object could be a plane", (9) "I can visualise only a part of this object", (10) "if you can imagine this you should also be able to imagine this other object", (11) "I can compare this object with this object, but not this with that object", (12) "I do not see any blue in this painting", (13) "to understand this experience, you have to be able to do this first", (14) "I am unable to visualise how this works", (15) "the way that you are imagining the object is wrong, what you need to do is..." and finally (16) "I can imagine that what needs to be added to this object is..." Quite clearly, one could continue with this process, but this list should be sufficient to show what noticing an aspect can encompass, and the many important ways it is possible to experience an object. If objectivity is to mean anything then Wittgenstein might be correct to state that one must first ask what is being seen. If noticing an aspect involves perception, then Wittgenstein asks us to consider how I am able to understand this experience. For example: "what makes my image of him into an image of him" (*PI*, p.177, §III). It is not so much that I have an expression of this face, but what is it about this expression that justifies the appropriateness of this visual experience. The case being, what tells me that this face is sad, happy or angry? For the artist and the designer

are searching, through experimentation, for a particular expression, and it is this feeling for this particular expression that will constrain how their creativity will develop.

The issue seems to be in the kinds of connections that I am making in "rule" terms. That is, in order for me to see this face like "this", I must experience the characteristics of "this" as they are meant to be "seen". However, it may be difficult to maintain the characteristics of what is seen, in aesthetic terms, since the strength or significance of "this" must involve an imaginative experience and an understanding perhaps of the artist's or designer's work, that extends beyond description. None the less, Wittgenstein argues, one can only notice an object if one understands the kinds of relationships that this object may have, if one is familiar with its experience. To become familiar, one has to describe something, he argues, by the way that one is using it, by what the individual goes on to do (*PI*, §180). This entails, how is the "seen" being used, because it is how the object is being used that determines the expression and its familiarity. How one chooses to describe an art or designed object whether by referring to the making of it or otherwise, is not the issue here, but merely the fact that one's description determines how one acquired an understanding of the object. One central notion that Wittgenstein is making here, concerns the thought that the use accounts for the argument that one is determining. What is at stake, is the competency of the description either as a performance, a visual experience or by discussion. Connected to this is that one's description is dependent on noticing an aspect. Yet, it may have to be admitted that the connections that

an artist or designer make involve imaginative consequences that make it difficult for the seen to be a simple straightforward matter. Wittgenstein partly realises this himself when he mentions: "There is gold paint, but Rembrandt didn't use it to paint a golden helmet" (*RC*, p.27, §79). Now this is a very interesting remark, which is not really explained by Wittgenstein, other than the fact that he is referring to the issue that one must look at the use of things. Our response to such a gold helmet, painted by Rembrandt Hermensz Van Rijn, gives one the feeling that yes "this" is a gold helmet. It is not a representation of a gold helmet, it is the real thing, which the painter gets us to experience in a particular way. Likewise, it would be wrong to construe that Rembrandt was merely in the business of copying a gold helmet for the sake of it. In other words, this gold helmet would have been painted in a particular kind of way, positioned spatially and scaled compositionally in relation to other objects and the atmosphere of the painting and its mood. What is more, it would be symbolising perhaps other connotations to do with the description of the painting as a whole, that would in turn be expressing several things about this helmet. One might consider how the gold helmet has a certain weight to it, but how is this achieved? Similarly, one might consider what is the object's social status, or alternatively, does the gold helmet look as though it is battle worn (how did Rembrandt achieve this effect), which might suggest something further about the painting and the helmet. To engage such an object is not just a matter of visual perception as it also involves an imaginative experience to appreciate the sensuousness of this artefact.

One must tread carefully about the concept of use, for in this instance the gold helmet is an imaginative experience, not necessarily a concept of what one observes, for the play of light and shadow in Rembrandt's paintings, though difficult to pin down, are certainly not arbitrarily constructed, nor arbitrarily conceptualised in an imaginative sense. Cubism, Fauvism, Abstract Expressionism, the work of Joseph Beuys, Georg Baselitz and so on, are testimony to the fact that usage in art and design terms is anything but obvious. Still, Wittgenstein would insist that one should *make* use of the "identity" (*PI*, §565), but what is the "identity" when it comes to aesthetic issues? The assertion is, that this aspect of colour, line, mark-making, texture, volume and space presupposes "identity", that comes about through its intention, thought and purpose. The aspect of "identity", in this instance, is not the colour or material itself, but, once again, what seems to matter is that the colour or material application presupposes a certain expression on the painting or designed object. A painting, he would argue is designed to give a specific kind of visual impression. If one changes this visual impression, then the painting changes, and the painting only makes sense when its perception can be described in a specific kind of way. In this case, the expression must be one of thought as opposed to merely a "cry of recognition" (*PI*, p.198, §XI). I feel that the point that Wittgenstein is getting at (amongst other things) here, is that a work of art is conceived and constructed with thought (*PI*, p.197, §XI) which makes it possible for the work to be realised. To be able to construct or respond to an aesthetic experience requires that one understands how one is able to perceive connections, images and differences in the work.

However, if one thinks back to "making use of the identity" (*PI*, §565), the identity that one comes to understand about a work of art or design may well come about because of the purposive nature of aesthetic experience. While identity is certainly problematic, the mistake that I feel that Wittgenstein makes here, is that his notion of identity seems to give us only one slice of the experience, it does not account fully for the way in which our cognitive—feeling understanding might otherwise develop.

Wittgenstein realises that: "Displace a piece and it is no longer what it was" (*PP I*, §339). In his view, the particular visual perception changes both the object and its surroundings. That is to say, that my awareness is no longer the same if for any reason I add, take away or change direction in what I am doing to this object. As he puts it: "'A quite particular expression' - it is part of this that if one makes the slightest alteration in the face, the expression changes at once" (*PP I*, §340). The difficulty here, as indicated earlier, is whether such alterations in themselves have meaning? Wittgenstein's solution to this problem is that one does not work with "definite" meanings, (whether these meanings are there or not, is not the issue) as the point is that: "I am developing what there is of it" (*PP I*, §363). Thus, something has caught my attention; I am not clear about it, but it interests me, I recognise that this aspect has possibilities and I keep working with these ideas until what Wittgenstein calls the "dawning of an aspect" (*PI*, p. 194, §XI). Before I discuss "the dawning of an aspect", Wittgenstein surmises again, how is it that I know that these possibilities are taken in conjunction with the work itself? He deals with this when he explains that: "So we interpret it, and see it as we

interpret it" (*PI*, p.193, §XI). The argument that Wittgenstein develops here, is that as I interpret the object, I have a particular visual experience that forms what I notice about the object. In response to this, I can see the same object, at one time like this and at another time like that. If I harbour a different view of this object each time I look at it, then surely this experience corresponds to a different picture or image, which in turn changes my understanding of the object. In a moment, I will discuss how Wittgenstein sees this in terms of "organisation".

From Wittgenstein's point of view: "'Observing' does not produce what is observed" (*PI*, p.187, §IX). In other words, he does not feel that a visual experience is purely a perceptual matter as: "Our problem is not a causal but a conceptual one" (*PI*, p.203, §XI). His argument is that a visual experience that involves noticing an aspect must also presuppose that a certain kind of thinking connects to the "seeing", to determine the visual sense. Clearly, being aroused by stimuli is dependent on how one is "seeing" the experience and the attention that one pays to it. Now because a visual experience for Wittgenstein corresponds to a perceptual and conceptual experience, the visual experience is essentially a description of an image. This description must provide: "a representation of a distribution in a space (that of time, for instance)" (*PI*, p.187, §IX), to claim that something has observable qualities. On this basis, Wittgenstein insists that noticing an aspect is an active rather than a passive (non-reflective) experience; an experience, that must involve an "interpretation". To understand further what noticing an aspect stipulates, one needs to explore the crucial elements of "seeing" and

"interpreting", for, without doubt, these are the factors that determine Wittgenstein's understanding of the aesthetic.

2.3

One of the most important statements that Wittgenstein makes about "seeing" and "interpreting" is found in *Zettle*, §208, and in *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I*, section 1. Here, to begin with, Wittgenstein remarks that seeing is not an action but a "state" (*Z*, §208); whereas interpreting is a procedure, an action, a hypothesis. In seeing as a state: "'Seeing this' doesn't mean: reacting in this way, - for I can see without reacting" (*PP* I, §83). Seeing seems to imply that the experience is an "Inner" occurrence. Aesthetically, this phenomenon, from Wittgenstein's point of view, involves a sensation—optical experience which art cannot do without, as the sensation—optical experience leads to "particular actions" (*Z*, §208). It is to be noted, that Wittgenstein is not claiming necessarily that there is a causal connection between the optical effect of an object and its interpretation. That implies that there is some "common property", as Godfrey Vesey puts it (1992, pp.6-12), in what I see and in what I reason. The difficulty here is, to quote Vesey: "O looks like an X to S without S,s taking O to be an X" (1992, p.10). Although Wittgenstein never elaborates on this notion of "felt", he nevertheless feels that this experience affects the seeing. It is important to notice this feeling, because in the aesthetic sense one arrives at seeing partly through this state. What I see, simply as seeing, is a behavioural response involving what I am observing, but it is not as Wittgenstein argues, an expression of an experience, as this would constitute interpretation (*PP I*, §20). For example, a car races towards me as I am

walking down the street and my immediate reaction is to jump to one side. My reason for jumping to one side was because I interpreted the car as a threat (see also, *Z*, §218). It is not simply that an object is red in colour that matters, but rather how I react to this colour red and what it expresses. The premise being, that the fact that I may be conscious of an object, as Wittgenstein thought, does not presuppose necessarily anything poignant about this object. Thus, I may be conscious of the wall in front of me, but an object needs interpretation, if it is to mean anything.

Yet, a different kind of seeing and interpreting is required, for instance, if in seeing Pablo Picasso's *Guernica* I notice that there is a human face and a horse in this painting. Here in order to see the human face and the horse in this painting I have to interpret according to what I see, but the difficulty is how did I come to recognise a human face and a horse in such a painting? If I rely purely on the optical effect would I see a horse or a human face? For not only does the Cubist "style" of this painting affect my interpretation, there is the added difficulty about how one compares and thus understands a painting of this kind. To make matters more complex, in order to understand a painting like this, is it necessary that I should see a human face or a horse? The manner in which Picasso has painted the human face or the horse in this work represents more of a likeness rather than a direct copy of a human or animal expression. That makes the comparing and understanding less than obvious. But, as noted earlier, one's imaginative experience of this painting is a real one, not an illusion, the human face and the horse appear as

living objects in our consciousness. In which case, our imaginative ability is not constrained simply by the formal qualities in the work.

To reiterate, the picture-space of these objects is less than straightforward, involving as it does a combination of forms and indeed ideas. So, while it is true to say that I am seeing this aspect "as" a particular expression of a horse, this implies noticing an aspect and hence an interpretation of this painting by Picasso. The painting surface in this painting alone combines a complex mixture of light, tone, colour, shape, texture and expression that makes our specific responses to such stimuli far from clear cut. As Kant thought, the aesthetic mind, through purposiveness, tends to unify these experiences. This is because when one looks at a painting, it is not just the picture-space that is affecting our understanding of the work, there is also the time factor and one's personal history that affects our understanding. However, the interpretation gives the seeing, the expression of experience, although perhaps the optical picture appears to be changing (as in the rabbit and the duck experience). Does it not follow, then, that my interpretation, because of this optical picture, must also change? So, while the whole point of interpreting is to state how one is seeing an object, how can one rely on this experience, if the problem is, as Wittgenstein remarked: "Do I really see something different each time, or do I merely interpret what I see in a different way? I am inclined to think the former. But why?" (*PI*, p.212, §XI, see also *Z*, §208 and *PP I*, §1). It is debatable how far one can go along with this Wittgensteinian claim here, as there are limits and constraints relevant to what one is recognising. It is by no means clear that in seeing a walking-stick

appearing to bend in a pool of water, that I am experiencing such an object as formulated in this way.

What Wittgenstein appears to be getting at, is that one's interpretation in noticing an aspect is based on what one is seeing, as the sensory perception of what one is seeing affects one's interpretation. This is the reason why Wittgenstein comments on: "seeing the figure F sometimes as an F, sometimes as the mirror-image of an F" (*PP I*, §1). Put differently, my interpretation is taken from what I see, even though what I see now may be different to what I see in five minutes and may vary from one object to another object. Yet, as I have suggested, this is not always the case. The consequence of my interpretation if properly used, verifies my visual sense and gives the situation a particular kind of expression that belongs to the seeing "as". But, as Wittgenstein mentions (*PP I*, §21), not all interpretations are voluntary; some are involuntary. The assumption being, that a piece of art or design work may leave a strong visual impression which affects one's experience of this object. There is also the possibility that my visual experience of an object as a perception succeeds only because there was an intentional side that identified what I needed to see. In other words, as John Searle mentions, there are conditions of satisfaction that direct the visual experience (1993, ch.2).

As Wittgenstein explains, I may not see the object as a rabbit, if I am not aware of the existence of this creature (*PP I*, §74). Even so, it is quite clear that my perception is not dependent necessarily on my knowing the existence of certain objects, since it is possible to describe an object without

necessarily knowing what kind of object it is. Similarly, as Wittgenstein states, seeing means seeing "as" which is not something that can be known before that particular state of seeing (*PI*, p.212, §XI). It also seems to me, that what I see may be dependent on the sort of questions that I have been asked to answer, for the question itself may involve a visual experience that affects what I see; for example, if I am asked the question can I see the texture in this painting, the lines in this painting, the colours in this painting and so on. My seeing is employed differently each time to distinguish not just the question, but its visual sense. In these sorts of situations my perception becomes part of my conceptual understanding. Indeed, in relation to arrows, triangles, double crosses, hexagons, duck and rabbit and other picture puzzles, Wittgenstein makes it clear that perception makes the difference in the way that one interprets.

Let us now address some of the issues that correspond to the "dawning of an aspect". The difficulty, as Wittgenstein argues, is how can I see a rabbit or a duck and know that I can "take" this image as an image of a duck or a rabbit (*PI*, p.195, §XI). A possible reason why one might see a rabbit rather than a duck or vice versa, has to do with one's possible mode of comparing (*PI*, p.195, §XI); a difference between one conception and another. Yet, it is also clear that I cannot see the duck and the rabbit at the same time, but this argument leads us a bit astray from Wittgenstein's main argument. The main argument being the change of aspect, which in the case of the duck or rabbit is a change in perception. As previously suggested, how one sees a duck or a rabbit is dependent on one's visual experience, but how is it possible

to justify that both the duck and the rabbit are seen experiences? In other words, can one claim that the optical effect and its perception is not just a "mental occurrence" or something that I happen to have imagined. In view of this, Wittgenstein's reply to this problem appears to involve the fact that: "I suddenly see the solution of a puzzle-picture. Before, there were branches there, now there is a human shape. My visual impression has changed and now I recognise that it has not only shape and colour but also a quite particular "organization" (*PI*, p.196, §XI). The example shows, right or wrongly, that the "organisation" determines, from a Wittgenstein angle, how one is interpreting the object, but he also remarks in relation to visual experience: "I shall mostly have no recollection of the way my glance shifted in looking at it" (*PI*, p.199, §XI). The argument is, how is the "organisation" arranged and made responsible for the visual experience, if I have no recollection of how I visually formed an image of this human shape by this notion? An aspect of this change from branches to human shape seems for Wittgenstein to involve: "half visual experience, half thought" (*PI*, p.197, §XI). How Wittgenstein arrives at this proportion "half" visual and "half" thought is not clear. However, he further sees this experience, the visual and the thought, as interconnected, to the degree that the language-game may help to describe and form the picture with the perception. In this respect, the thought is part of the experience of seeing and part of the linguistic intercourse that may have more of an explorative and imaginative content than simply a grammatical one.

Wittgenstein's notion of "organisation" is derived partly from Gestalt theory (often referred to as optical illusions concerning figure and ground or

positive and negative spaces). While more needs to be said about "organisation", in the context of visual experience, Wittgenstein also argues that whatever I see this object or event "as", this object or event only has "life" (meaning) if I have an interest in it. One of the contingent factors that gives life to visual experience is time and space (*PI*, p.187, §IX), in that time and space allow one to explore and develop an interest that can be talked about, extended, modified and used (*PI*, p.209, §XI). This brings us to the point, where Wittgenstein writes: "How is it, though, that when pointing to a particular figure I tell myself that I should like to call this such-and-such ('X')? I may even say the ostensive definition 'X' means this out loud to myself. But I must surely also understand it myself! So I must know, according to what technique, I think of using the sign 'X' "(*PP* I, §264). One visualises, in this instance, according to how one constructs "X". But the fact that I have constructed "X" does not make it a portrait of "X". For to repeat, the expression to be a portrait of "X" requires that I know something about the various factors which go to make the portrait of "X". Here, to master a technique means that I know how to handle certain materials and how to create a certain expression through these materials that describe what "X" represents. In itself, mastering a technique may be very skilful, but it does not necessarily presuppose a depth of feeling or ideas. In reply, though, one's technique can be very experimental to the extent that the technique itself can evoke a strong feeling (see the work of Jasper Johns or Vincent Van Gogh). Furthermore, it seems that there may be no connection between the development or mastering

of a technique in a painting and the ideas or feelings behind it. Thus, one may be very good technically in making an object, but weak in generating ideas.

Returning to the issue of "organisation", Wittgenstein claims that the change in aspect, is not something produced by the recognition of the object, for example, a duck or a rabbit, but by the "organisation" of the sensory experience. The reason being, that "organisation" produces a new experience, but a new experience which as a change in aspect is also unchanged. What is being presented here is that the picture elements remain the same, but because of the "aspect of organisation", I now experience the picture differently. Hence, what is being claimed is that the lines, colours or texture in the duck or rabbit syndrome (other examples of this kind can be found in M.C. Escher, Bridget Riley, Paul Klee, Greek, Gothic, Islamic, Chinese, Renaissance and Impressionist painters or craftsmen) remain the same, even though my experience of these perceptions is now changed because of the "organisation" stimuli. The dawning of an aspect then is the "organisation" of a person's visual impression. This only comes about not because I can give a description of it (though this is important for other reasons), but because: "the concept of "seeing" makes a tangled impression" (*PI*, p.200, §XI). Such "organisation" as a change in aspect, can be drawn and described to show my concept of this object has not changed. So, therefore, it is not an "inner process", "for this concept uses the "outer picture" as a model" (*PI*, p.196, §XI). In other words, to experience or draw any figure in my painting requires the perception of certain visual characteristics (line, texture, tone, colour) that determine my understanding of

this activity. However, this does not explain necessarily how the visual effect was constructed. The visual effect is not constructed by the line, texture, tone or colour, alone, but rather by what these qualities represent in the object itself.

It seems, according to Wittgenstein, that one cannot explain how the visual effect was constructed, because during "seeing", one is not made aware of how the sensory modes are being "organised"; how one's glance shifts. What Wittgenstein means by this is, that I cannot say what the picture of the rabbit or duck must have been like to produce this effect. In the same way that I can suddenly picture blue in this painting, where before I could only see red, or "Before, there were branches there; now there is a human shape" (*PI*, p.196, §XI). The interpretation that Wittgenstein is asserting is that while the expression of the experience may change from a pyramid to a square by the optical effect of the diagonals crossed in these pictures (*PP I*, §31), or from a duck to a rabbit, my interpretation remains the same (*PP I*, §33). It remains the same because the same components are in it (colour, texture, shape, space), and can be shown to be located in the same place. To reiterate, Wittgenstein argues that the "how" of experience depends on what I am able to make of it, what this experience tells me and thus the visual sense that it gives me. The suggestion is, that only by conceiving in a particular kind of mode (for example, I am now seeing a rabbit), is it possible to experience the content of an experience (*PI*, §177). It is one thing to claim that I need to conceive in a particular fashion, but what one finds in "the dawning of an aspect" (I now see it as a rabbit), is that I will see this experience in the same

way. Without wishing to debate this point any further, Kant could justifiably challenge Wittgenstein's attack on cognitive experience, on the grounds that the aesthetic is not purely a reality determined by physical and observable predictions.

The idiom that Wittgenstein also considers in seeing and interpreting, is that there are unintentional and intentional features of visual experience that have to do with repeated and chance images coming before one's mind. The kind of intentional feature (wanting to make connections) that Wittgenstein draws our attention towards is as follows: "I see that an animal in a picture is transformed by an arrow. It has struck it in the throat and sticks out the back of the neck. Let the picture be a silhouette. - Do you see the arrow - or do you merely know that these two bits are supposed to represent part of an arrow" (*PI*, p.203, §XI). Many examples of art and design work are dependent on making visual connections between missing, hidden, obscured or only hinted at objects. The painting by Giovanni Bazzi, *St. Sebastian,*is an obvious Renaissance example of the kind of visual connection that Wittgenstein is commenting on. Yet there are more complex forms that demonstrate further the extent and application of this approach. Suppose for instance, that one can make connections in an object or event, where no actual visual and optical forms exist in the work itself to support these connections (as in the above arrow example). Does it necessarily follow that because optical and visual evidence is missing from the work, that I cannot presuppose another form of logic between these objects and events which will allow me to make the kind of connection that is needed? After all, not all art and design experience and

judgements are based solely on visual effects. For example, in painting to music or exploring touch painting, the kind of connections that one would be making would not be based essentially on optical effects, but rather, may be, on tactile and auditory experiences. Similarly, if one is capable of making relevant connections of the kind, as Wittgenstein is claiming, then what is to stop me from making other kinds of connections that draw upon this experience or other sensory phenomena? How is it possible, for instance, to imagine that an arrow can enter the body at one point and come out at another specified point, when the point of entry is different to the exit point? As E.M. Gombrich writes: "It is the unpractical man, the dreamer, whose response may be less rigid and less sure than that of his more efficient fellow, who taught us the possibility of seeing a rock as a bull and perhaps a bull as a rock" (1977, p.264). Here, one has the sense of what Kant talks about in free-play; the ability to make connections that previously seemed impossible (Gothic, Abstraction, Impression, Cubism, Deconstruction and Post Modernism are examples of this effect). Of course, it could be argued whether it follows from this that all connections of this kind carry equal validity? Simply put, Wittgenstein's reply to this would be that if I see the object according to a particular interpretation, then this can be accounted for and verified because it reflects a certain visual experience. Tied to this argument is the notion that the value of the work is determined by my interest in it, an interest that involves and springs partly from the interpretation itself.

So far, it has to be stated that Wittgenstein's central argument has been that the activity of visualising itself is responsible for the interpretation.

He makes a further case for this when he mentions that: "Make a movement with your finger (such as you make in piano playing, say); repeat it, but with a lighter touch. Do you remember which of the two feelings you had yesterday in connexion with the first movement?" (*PP I*, §387). Wittgenstein replies, yes I would remember especially if I have repeated it several times over. Is it simply that I repeated this feat several times over, that characterises what I can remember? The proviso being, that the reason I can remember it now, might be that I realise that "this" feeling of touch "now" has certain possibilities that are worth exploring further and that this feeling of touch is connected importantly with the music itself? One localises, implies Wittgenstein, the possible coordination of hand movement, eye, sound and touch. By coordinating this action (voluntarily or involuntarily), certain kinds of movements with the fingers are registered, as one presses the fingers on the piano in a certain kind of way so that a certain kind of sensation accompanies the touch and produces a particular sound and time sequence. This experience, however, of eye, sound and touch, though particular, is particular perhaps only in connection to how these elements interact and come across in a unified manner.

It is tempting to think that if one can grasp an aspect of an object then what one grasps is a "necessary" aspect of this object. However, in Wittgenstein's words, there is no definite "how" of what is necessary, because how one should experience is not the issue. For what Wittgenstein is suggesting, is that it is the expression that matters. One might be inclined to think that the lines that I draw, the marks that I make, the joints that I cut, the

spaces that I create are in fact descriptions of my visual awareness, but is this really the case? One has to accept the fact that a visual experience can be interpreted in a number of ways. Yet, it must be remembered, that it would be ludicrous not to accept Wittgenstein's argument that despite these differences I may still be perfectly correct to say "how" (*PP I*, §428) I noticed this aspect, as in the movements that I make with my fingers on the piano, or the marks that I make with my paintbrush on the canvas. What this presupposes is, that if I do "this", "this" is what happens to the painting, the sculpture or the textile print. Of course, noticing one aspect of a painting or an object is hardly a sufficient explanation, as Wittgenstein concedes, for most paintings or objects. But it has to be conceded, that to recognise an aspect is to recognise something in particular about this observation. What one wants to do, is provide an account of an experience such that: "If a ghost appeared to me during the night, it could glow with a weak whitish light; but if it looked grey, then the light would have to appear as though it came from somewhere else" (*RC*, p.47, §231). One sees that it is the connection between the image and what it is an image of, that may give the experience something of its credibility.

2.4

Wittgenstein's concern with grammar may seem to cause us problems aesthetically. However, the tendency here may be to misconstrue the role of grammar, and it is to be noted that one can only teach someone how to use words, but not how to describe the use for them (*RC*, p.32, §122). Without submerging or dismissing experience, Wittgenstein is asserting here that this phenomenon is something which only the individual can do for themselves. The use of grammar, as Wittgenstein surmises, may not be central to the activity, but is involved in the activity through thought. It should be stressed that in claiming that art and design experience demonstrates conceptual understanding, I am not claiming necessarily that such conceptual understanding should be along purely linguistic lines. For it is perfectly possible that my conceptual understanding is in what I do in practical terms, as opposed to what I am able to put into words. As Andrew Harrison puts it: "His action of using the right thing in the right way at the right time is what constitutes his thoughts in what he does" (1978, p.45, see also Wittgenstein's *Zettle*, §100). It would be circumspect not to realise the effect that material conditions can have and how these materials, as Harrison goes on to say, play an important part in our conceptual understanding. Knowing how materials behave and how they can be handled can be as difficult an exercise as writing a philosophical paper. What matters is what is being attended to and as Harrison writes: "How he makes is inevitably how he visually attends" (p.170). There is a close relationship between perception and practical activity

in the arts, and what both Harrison and Wittgenstein seem to agree on is that aesthetically it is the activity of action itself that often supplies the interest.

One of the further difficulties about a painting or an object is that it has a visual spatial sense to it that is not simply an element of grammar, but also of perception and imaginative experience. Yet, Wittgenstein's point is that one cannot know automatically what a painting is about, because while something may or may not be consciously before the mind, this does not make it so. The reason being, that for a thing to be such-and-such, a series of experiences and conceptual referencing is needed to describe, in the Wittgensteinian sense, what I am picturing. The difficulty is: "'Does A have the aspect A continuously before his eyes - when, that is, no change of aspect has taken place?'" (*PP I*, §506). If one is unable to visualise this experience continuously can one know what established this particular experience? For going in or out of a visual experience for whatever reason, must in some sense change the course of this experience. But why should this be the case, if the work itself can be identified and reidentified in the same way? An experience is rarely continuous in any precise sense. Wittgenstein does not deny this, but I agree with Budd (pp.104-7), that what Wittgenstein is concerned with here is not just the vivacity of the picturing, but also, the voluntary and involuntary sense in which visualising impresses itself or not, on understanding. Against this, whether something is intentional or otherwise, is not ultimately the crucial factor for Wittgenstein, as what finally matters is the visual meaning that one gives to this understanding. That the visual

experience is not continuous is hardly the deciding factor, as what appears to matter is the identification of this experience and what this expresses.

As I have mentioned, Wittgenstein's interest and indeed fundamental premise, is not a commitment to experience as such, but rather the meaning of our understanding. For the moment, consider the question that what needs expressing is the character of the communication (*PP I*, §514). Simply put, one uses signs; the sign looks like "this". In other words, the sign (an arrow, a letter, a face, an object , a pattern and so on) points in this direction (left, right, portrait, landscape, top, bottom, diagonally, convex, concave and so forth) to indicate some spatial position. The immediate question that comes to mind, is how do I know that the sign is pointing to the left or right direction? Wittgenstein's slender argument here seems to be that I can say that this colour has blue in it. One knows that this colour has blue in it, because I can compare my reaction with yours; by comparing my reaction with yours there is the possibility of agreement about this sign. The criteria of understanding are what are being deduced. This point leads us back perhaps to Kant's argument that the aesthetic cannot be hemmed in by criteria. On the other hand, the way that Wittgenstein describes this concern is not to force criteria onto aesthetic experience, but to suggest instead that the concept of usage is the only means by which the usefulness of criteria can be applied (if they can be applied at all). It makes no sense to suggest that criteria need apply to the actual experience itself, since there is no way of knowing what the criteria are before the aesthetic experience, and access to such an experience, is certainly not via any criteria.

The meaning of an object, one could say, is what art and design is all about, but the problem is, what kind of meaning can be attached to an aesthetic object? Wittgenstein writes: "Let us suppose that our picture of thinking was a human being, leaning his head on his hand while he talks to himself; Our question is not 'Is that a correct picture?' but 'How is this picture employed as a picture of thinking?'" (PP I, §549). The difficulty appears to be, as Wittgenstein asserts, how do I know what is representative of "thinking"? There are two possible issues here, one is what constitutes the phenomenon of thinking, and secondly, how in a visual sense is it possible to represent this experience? A possible answer to this problem seems to be that : "'One can't describe the aroma of coffee'. But couldn't one imagine being able to do so? And what does one have to imagine for this? If someone says: 'One can't describe the aroma', one may ask him: 'What means of description do you want to use? What elements?'" (*PP I*, §553). The distinction that Wittgenstein asserts is that if one can imagine it then in some sense one must be able to describe it, since imagining connects to seeing and interpreting. This involves the idea that in thinking, searching, considering, trying and exploring the artist or designer distinguishes the possible differences that relate to a particular experience. From the standpoint of the *Rodin Thinker*, the picture here evoked by the artist is contingent on the fact that one understands the classical behaviour of a thinker. In this respect, one need only to imagine whether an actor on a stage could entice their audience through his or her acting behaviour to imagine the aroma of coffee. Quite clearly, what these

examples show are that behaviour and imagination often appear to be closely connected.

No matter what the description, it is the activity of method, example and or order itself that partly decides one way or another, what can possibly be ignored or not in the process of aesthetic making. For example, in planing a piece of timber that one has never used before (whether one is a novice or an expert) one cannot help noticing through touch, observation and thought how the jack-plane cuts and shaves this timber differently to other timbers. Noticing how timber cuts, indicates to the craftsperson something about the properties of this material, and how to achieve certain effects with this material given these properties. Likewise, one could say, that each bench plane needs to be held differently, has perhaps a different cutting edge and only produces a scraping action or a cutting action depending on the pitch of the cutting angle, the material itself and its sharpness. Within this, one teaches a person to plane, to paint and to see by teaching them the kind of use that verifies particular experiences of this kind. For instance: " if you hold the plane like that you are not going to get a clean finish", and one can verify this experience by example.

Wittgenstein acknowledges in one sense, that my thoughts are my own, but in what sense can I say that these thoughts are my own, if I wish others to be acquainted with them, to share and to understand my experience? What this means is, if I want to judge and describe experience, the experience needs to be seen against a public conception of experience. This experience, however, is manifested and constituted by my actions. For example, what

would be the effect if I decide that the pigment cobalt blue was better than the pigment ultramarine for this painting, or why did I choose sandstone instead of limestone for this stone relief, or decide that the adjacent tones in this painting needed more work doing to them. Equally, why did I feel that I needed to look at how Rembrandt Hermensz Van Rijn used oil-paint, or why did I judge that Joseph Beuys was a much better artist than any of his contemporaries. Similarly, why did I judge that these visual drawings and paintings in my sketchbook display a different kind of creativity that I cannot match in my finished paintings, or why did I choose ash instead of oak for this cabinet or why did I decide to use this composition and so on. Here the suggestion is that if one wanted to know how a particular artist achieved a certain kind of effect, I would have to know something about the visual properties of this effect; I would have to be able to imagine such visual properties and interpret them accordingly. Wittgenstein often seems to imply, that what I am able to conceptualise in an experience helps one to characterise and decide what I am able to do in this situation.

This provides Wittgenstein with the argument that objects can be an important point of contact and represent a certain place in the scheme of things, as they must do to be of any value. Consider for example, the action that a painter may produce for touching-up certain spatial areas of his or her work. Such touching-up is often a different kind of experience and action done only at a certain stage of the work. This touching-up presupposes not only an intention to over-paint a certain area, but why this area and not others? Does touching-up impose limitations? That is, what is it about this particular

area of the painting that needs further work doing to it such that it only needs touching-up? By working on such a space, one might realise that this space is positioned in a certain kind of way with certain kind of qualities. The colours, tones, spatial areas and mark-making contained in these features of the work are worked differently to other areas of this painting. Still, one might work on such an area and not be sure where one was going with the colour, tone or spatial sense. Indeed, what a person does to such a specific area of his or her painting is limited by what is happening around it and by the kind of visual changes that one keeps making to this surface area. But such visual changes that one makes may have nothing to do with the actual paint surface itself and more to do with one's own imagination. That is, my response may not be a response to the lines and the colours in the painting, but to images and thoughts that I have in my mind. When Wittgenstein asserts: "But a painter can paint an eye so that it stares; so its staring must be described by the distribution of colour on the surface. But the one who paints it need not be able to describe this distribution" (*PP I*, §1077). Apart from the over-simplistic way that Wittgenstein thinks a painter goes about creating a certain stare of this kind, his explanation in essence may be correct, in that words may fail an artist or designer not because they are inarticulate people, but simply because such words may seem inappropriate or do not do justice to an experience that depends substantially on the activity of imagination, conceptual understanding and visual perception.

This brings me to the point that perhaps in a weak sense there are rules in art and design that presuppose a complex set of relations which as

particulars, operate by a certain kind of activity that is not predetermined. As Wittgenstein mentions: "The statement: "I see a red circle" and the statement "I see (am not blind)" are not logically of the same sort" (*RC*, p.13, §84). This recognises that our descriptions have certain consequences. To repeat, for Wittgenstein, the conditions of satisfaction are taken from the concept of use (the action itself), since the concept is expressive of the meaning with which the use can be applied, but the problem with this is that it denies purely "intrinsic" occurrence. Does this then negate imaginative thought; not necessarily, for what Wittgenstein seems to be arguing is that imaginative thought is meaningful if it has application. What is important here is not how the experience itself connects with the concept since each individual will experience differently. What Wittgenstein emphasises instead, is how the practice (the painting itself) forms part of the condition presupposing the satisfaction in the concept and its rule. The result being, that the use of planing a piece of timber or the colour blending or mixing of a certain tone has its rule, but its rule is determined by its particular perception, grammar and its "forms of life" (the expression itself). It is not a rule, however, that one can apply universally. Once one has learnt to plane a piece of timber, one can employ and extend this technique appropriately, but does one do the same with colour? Wittgenstein argued that the rule of how one learns to tone, plane, sow, mould, print, use perspective, photographs and so forth, allows one to investigate further what techniques accord with this rule. From a different point of view, how can rules be applied to aesthetic objects, if the concept and application of toning in relation to objects are variable and

varied. One is tempted to say, that the concept of toning and its application is dependent on different uses of regular and irregular paint work, mark-making and light effects in which toning can be employed.

On the other hand, does a furniture maker not follow rules in dovetail making? Does a ceramicist not follow rules in slab building? Did Peter Paul Rubens and John Constable not follow rules when highlighting and intensifying certain areas of their painting? Jackson Pollock's action paintings are painted in a certain manner conforming to the notion of Abstract Expressionism; does this not constitute a rule? What defines a collage, a frottage or photomontage? How does one practice or define the Dutch De Stijl Movement, Impressionism, German Expressionist, DADA Movement or Deconstruction? What tonal scales and colour mixing did Vincent Van Gogh like to use? What rules did Andrea Palladio use for the plans and elevations of his buildings and finally what rules did a Medieval craftperson adhere to when carving out a tympanum? It may well be then, that rules throw light "on the concept of meaning something" (*PI*, §130), if the rule can be shown to be important to the work itself. But it is certainly questionable about what sort of rules do in fact play a major role in aesthetic experience and judgements. What needs confronting, is whether one can determine aesthetic experience and judgement by rules? One might reasonably say, in agreement with Kant, that no such rules are possible, since such experience would undermine imaginative free-play. Rules themselves do not engender imaginative thought and understanding.

Finally, to show how difficult it is to define precisely certain aspects of perception, Wittgenstein remarks whether it is possible to talk about "pure colour". For example, does this red have white in it, or is there a hint of black in it too; is there yellow in this red or is there blue in it also; is it a dull red, or is it a bright red; does it have a matt finish or is it metallic; is it an embossed red; does the red here appear to enhance the shape of the form, but here it merely appears to camouflage the form; is this red tonally different when placed next to a green or a black? Likewise, what impression does one have of this red when used in a triangle shape, a square shape, a series of striped lines or a set of red dots? Indeed, how is it possible to make the same colour red seem as if the object that one is looking at is a velvet red gown rather than a cotton red gown? If red was the only colour that one could recognise how would one describe it? Somewhat differently, however, is the fact that red has a relationship with other colours, that determines the position of red (*RC*, p.25, §§60-3)? Here the red is the red it is, because I am comparing it to something or because the red, through sense-perception, has an intensity that other colours do not have. As Wittgenstein implies, one may use the same shade of green to paint an object transparent and opaque. For the shade of green that one is using may not be the important element in the transparency or opaqueness of an object, as the technique of painting may be dependent on how one applies the colour in a particular fashion to this object (*RC*, p.26, §76). What one has to agree on to a limited extent is, that there are various relationships that make it possible to notice an aspect. To justify

usage, it is more than likely that these aesthetic relationships will have to be worked on, altered and shaped to manifest this experience.

Conclusion

For Wittgenstein the aesthetic exhibits public forms of accountability and understanding when its expressions describe the significance of its use. His notion of objectivity, therefore, centres not on "intrinsic" experience, but on whether such experience can be considered as part of one's ordinary usage. The way he describes this ordinary usage in aesthetic terms is firstly to demonstrate that aesthetic experience goes about its task in ways that can be observed and described. Thus, because such experience can be observed and described, what is observed and described becomes the means by which it is possible to argue aesthetic expression in objective terms. In other words, one looks for the example, the order, the method, the interpretation and the seeing to ascertain what describes the aesthetic experience. The case that he is arguing is that the sensation-perception is attached to some object which is publicly recognisable. To do this, one conceptualises the experience, invoking comparison, differentiation and consideration. In this respect, he argues that the aesthetic is an active rather than a passive experience, that bestow forms of life, through its interest. The position is, that it is how one handles texture, line, colour, space, scale, materials and so on that constitutes an element of aesthetic understanding, forms of life and its interest. The aesthetic means of representation, for Wittgenstein, are how one establishes connections with the object, since the method of comparison that one uses, presupposes a public sense of what constitutes tonal values, atmosphere, character, colour, pattern, space and so forth, as concepts of experience.

One sees that an individual's ability to recognise and to determine aesthetic experience was, for Wittgenstein, dependent on how one connects meaning to a piece of work, which as an activity is judged by how this meaning is being applied. For Wittgenstein, it is one thing to give an account of a painting and quite another to say how it is being employed. Here one could give an account about anything, but to understand the meaning of a piece of work requires that I know something particular about how this work is being expressed, its identity, purpose and character. To describe the content of an aesthetic experience, however, is to recognise in Wittgensteinian terms, that there are various ways that one can link and represent such experiences. Furthermore, the aesthetic sense only happens when the experience demonstrates the possibility of it being shared, and unless there is this possibility there can be no objectivity. The reason being, that the possibility of the work being shared constitutes and shapes our public understanding. A further point here, however, is that it may be the argument that one produces rather than any agreement about what is being shared, that has more relevance for art and design education.

One has seen that the aesthetic is an imaginative experience, that interconnects the properties of thought, behaviour and conceptualisation, but for Wittgenstein the issue is not whether such experience is interconnected in itself, but rather, as previously explained, how does the aesthetic experience get expressed and fulfilled, how does one recognise the experience. He determines that the aesthetic gets its meaning when one can compare, observe, differentiate, contrast and question. It is only when one can apply and confer different uses in the expression of these terms, that meaning for Wittgenstein

manifests itself. The thought is that through this approach the learning can become more accountable and possibly more creative in the sense that it opens up opportunities to explore and test ideas. These points will be explored further in my final chapter.

Chapter Three

The Influence Of Kant's And Wittgenstein's Work On Teaching Practice In Art And Design Education

Introduction

A crucial issue for education has always been to embrace "quality". In the debate about quality, standards and performance are often mentioned (see Christopher Winch's work in the *Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol.XXX*, March 1996). In educational terms, what seems to connect to "quality", some would argue, relates to aims, objectives, the curriculum, learning outcomes, a common core, vocational skills and so on. All these things have relevance, but it is quite possible to extend the idea of "quality", at least in art and design, to the creative content itself, its perceptions and experiences. Kant refers to the aesthetic as a "moment of quality" (*CJ*, §1, 203) which in itself denotes in the *Critique of Judgement* what in aesthetic terms the individual is feeling, his or her imaginative thoughts relating to one's heightened awareness of oneself in this world. This moment of quality which Kant discusses is "productive" rather than just reproductive or mimetic. To some extent, unless the teacher has a working knowledge of how creativity in this area is acquired and applied, his or her understanding of art and design practice must be questionable. It may be argued that since art and design experience in education is essentially concerned with creativity, the teacher needs to be aware of the fact that this experience transcends conventional ideas of reason and thought, "seeing" and "interpreting". Likewise, it seems that a

teacher will not understand how to execute art and design activities unless he or her knows something about the various kinds of conditions that can affect art and design expression, and how one can make such experience accountable and worthwhile. I will endeavour in this work to construct how the "quality" of one's teaching practice may be improved through an understanding of what determines in some fundamental ways the learning experience in art and design education.

In this final chapter I discuss the aesthetic implications of Kant's and Wittgenstein's work for education. What I want to consider and bring out are some of the educational lessons that one can learn from Kant and Wittgenstein. To deal with this issue, what needs clarifying is just how pertinent certain concepts of understanding, taken from these philosophers, may be, and how these concepts can have implications for art and design teaching-practice. What I propose to do first is to present the way Wittgenstein's concepts of understanding corresponding to sensation—language arguments can affect art and design education and to draw some conclusions from this. Secondly, I shall in contrast, present Kant's arguments and attempt to assess how some of his notions cannot easily be pushed aside by Wittgensteinian thinking. I intend to establish, despite differences in Kant's and Wittgenstein's arguments, just how accountable and educationally sound aesthetic learning appears and how one can employ this understanding in a teaching situation, drawing from the work of both of these philosophers. On this basis, my aim is to explore and construct, in practical terms, ways in which certain concepts of understanding affect learning in art

and design education. To vindicate this position, I will have to work out in detail in connection with this text, just how understanding in art and design can be pinned down. In part, what obscures our understanding of art and design, must be the inherent diversity of this experience. This in itself poses many problems for the teacher, not least because such diversity must be maintained.

What Kant and Wittgenstein explore, which appears to be missing in art and design teaching practice at all levels of education, is how aesthetic experience is peculiar, complex and sophisticated. A popular myth is that art and design is seen as inferior to such subjects as science or language education, but such a myth stems perhaps from the belief that art is a "leisure activity", a "playful experience". Such assumptions can be seen to be rather negative to the development of art and design education as it is not uncommon in schools to put those who appear less academic, into art and design classes. Thus, giving the view, apart from other things, that art and design is a soft option. Similarly, because of the peculiar nature of art and design experience, it is common practice, in my view, for educational documents to dismiss rather than tackle some of the hard facts concerning what establishes effective art and design learning. I feel that I have, in the previous chapters, demonstrated some of the complex problems and issues that do affect art and design practice from a theoretical position. But it is my opinion that education in general appears either ignorant or unwilling to investigate in an informed way, the difficulty that learning presupposes in art and design given its diversity of experience. Any proper educational understanding of art and

design must take in the fact that aesthetic experience is conceivable in all kinds of ways. Yet, many art and design educational documents, either deceive or mislead what constitutes art and design meaning and its practice. In this respect, one is led to deduce that education has not analysed imaginative and creative experiences in relation to the depth of perception that this subject area can reveal. The facts are, that many reports and documents concerned with art and design experience have simplified art and design understanding to the point that this simplification dilutes the content and complexity of what determines art and design education. To my mind, this simplification misconstrues and trivialises learning in art and design.

I am sure that many in art and design would agree with me that aesthetic experience is a complex matter that requires, because of this complexity, considerable understanding. What makes art and design learning formidable is partly because such learning has considerable depth to it. There are indeed, then, special problems in relation to art and design, but the difficulties that I wish to avoid are the superficialities that seem to plague a proper discussion of what is far from a simple subject experience. By skimming the surface of aesthetic education such views can give a distorted account of art and design learning. The professionalism of art and design teaching must avoid this kind of approach, because it can reduce the quality and delivery of art and design education. It does seem that the problem that art and design education faces, is that it has this rich seam of diversity, but that this diversity can cause enormous problems in the teaching of art and design. The contention is, that the teacher will be better placed to assist the

development of learning in art and design if he or she understands some of the intricate issues faced by this experience. This is not to deny that art and design has not benefited from the educational treatment of procedures and methods, but it has largely ignored other central concerns that to some extent combat and defy mainstream arguments about how to record and understand learning in this field. Even if one accepts the need for methods and procedures how secure such arguments are must be questionable in art and design education, not least because there is a real danger that such claims can overshadow and threaten to curb the creative dynamics of human involvement in teaching and learning. I will attempt to give a more insightful explanation and description of some of the arguments that art and design understanding must consider so as to enrich and nourish a wider debate about learning in this curriculum area. My argument is, that there is nothing straightforward about art and design experience and it is an implausible diagnosis to conceive that it could ever be so defined.

In this chapter, I will discuss in various ways how Kant and Wittgenstein seem to cultivate the expressive life of art and design relating to experiences and understanding. To some extent, I have covered some of the arguments concerning the visual sense of such experience, but I have yet to state how such arguments can affect art and design learning in education. One might reasonably argue, that art and design understanding is characterised by certain conditions constituted by visual impressions and their effects. To investigate these issues in educational terms one needs to describe how learning in art and design is manifested, but given that such experience is

multifarious in kind, there appears to be numerous pedagogical problems. I attempt, therefore, to give a thorough understanding of some of the issues which affect the competence, appreciation and application of art and design education. For in order not to fudge or gloss over some of the conditions which affect art and design understanding in education, a more substantive analytical view of what determines understanding in this subject area is required.

The kind of standard platitudinous remark that one finds being used in education is that: "Teachers will have to deal with a wide range of knowledge and understanding and be able to encourage pupils to show a wide variety of skills and abilities" (1988. *National Curriculum, Task Group on Assessment and Testing Report*). On *prima facie*, there seems to be nothing mistaken about this remark, but it is not at all obvious how one is to digest this, how one is to decide what this means, how one is to make these distinctions, and how one is to give an answer, as to what determines and demonstrates knowledge and understanding, skill and ability. Similarly, while Peter Abbs thinks that art teachers should be made aware of Kantian thinking (1989, p.32), he, in numerous places in his work, fails in a sufficient sense to advise teachers more precisely of the kind of convincing arguments that will help us better understand art and design experience. The crux of the matter is, that it is simply not good enough to claim that teachers should become more aware of Kantian thinking without describing and explaining why the substance of Kant's ideas seem important. My argument is, that to say that a teacher needs to demonstrate knowledge and understanding, skill and

ability, requires substantiation. The kind of issues and problems that art and design raises are not easy to place. It may seem, contradictory, then, to examine in this chapter, how one can claim that art and design learning can be profound. But one should not be fooled by this argument, for it misconstrues the fact that art and design practice can be enormously enriching and true to life. The fact that art and design experience cannot be easily placed has more to do with the fact that such experience transcends boundaries. Art and design educational experience extends one's understanding, but not I hasten to add, by conventional means. With a bit of foresight, it follows perhaps that much can be learnt from art and design that is important for education.

As suggested, my concern here is to answer the question, what is art and design understanding? This needs to be done in a way that lends itself to practical methods and experiences that any art and design teacher can learn to recognise and employ in a studio or classroom teaching situation. The problems that one is concerned with are: (1) the need to recognise and decide what establishes effective art and design understanding in learning situations and (2) how to stimulate such understanding in teaching and learning so that students can appropriately use such methods and experiences for themselves. Consequently, a central tenet of this chapter is to show that art and design education is empowering, acquirable and communicable.

3. 1

Of importance to education and to this work, is how a teacher can help a student to understand and learn about art and design experience. It is striking that when one hears a teacher saying "he understands this project" one would want to ask, how the teacher knows that the student understands this project. The relationship between how students know about object X, and how teachers know that their students know about object X should, of course, to some extent, correspond. One may protest, however, that one cannot just claim that there has to be an understanding of what constitutes X between the student and the teacher, but that there also has to be an agreement between the student and the teacher about X. The problem being, that a student may have a particular understanding of X which does not correspond to how the teacher particularly understands X. Furthermore, from a teaching point of view, a feature of this constraint is that there is a difference between knowing that the student knows that X equals Y, and how one comes to know and understand that X equals Y. In other words, how does one confirm that X equals Y, in a way that this expression confers aesthetic understanding? This invites one to consider what kind of "evidence" would a student need to demonstrate that they understand the word Bauhaus, or how to use a jack-plane? Moreover, I suspect, that one might surmise in art and design, when it comes to the employment of certain colours, the spatial qualities in the work, or one's ideas to do with "contradiction", "abstract expressionism", "multiple-imagery", "a sense of place" or "personal identity", that our understanding of such

phenomena are perceptibly difficult to grasp. While there are different ways by which one could "test" someone's knowledge and understanding on certain issues, my concern here is, to get a better focus of what determines art and design experience, centering specifically on understanding itself, rather than on the notion of "testing". What a student understands about his or her work and the teacher's subsequent appraisal of this experience, will inevitably only constitute a small part of the student's total understanding of such experience. Several things seem to follow from this. It is first necessary to note, that the main difference perhaps between "testing" and understanding in general, is that if one wants to test whether someone knows X properly, then one would expect the student to react to X in a certain kind of way. Hence, there are only a limited range of conditions under which X could be described properly by the learner. Now, not wishing to denounce the value of testing, the problem that such testing might pose for art and design education would be considerable, since so much of art and design understanding does not stipulate how X can be preconceived, let alone what X properly means. This is a fact of great interest in art and design teaching as it indicates the difficulty, in one sense, in justifying the relevance and meaning of art and design learning. The danger for us is that education always looks for a working concept, but art and design seen as a creative experience in some ways defies such categorisation, if that is, one sees a working concept in rule terms.

One aspect of what has been stated so far, is that without knowing what constitutes the kind of differences and similarities that presuppose learning and understanding in art and design education, how does the teacher

know whether a student needs help with his or her work and how will the teacher know whether the student's work is producing the kind of results that one might expect? To answer this, it may seem that one has to ask what can one expect from aesthetic experience and its understanding. Some philosophers like David Pears (1988, p.422), argue that there must be criteria involved in learning. But it is not obvious how one could answer this question, because, art and design learning does not educate students to differentiate and respond to things in precise and restrictive rule-following ways. There are, then, some highly difficult problems which art and design experience poses for education. One aspect which confronts art and design understanding is that it may be interpreted as being inconsistent with mainstream educational thinking, but as the foregoing discussion would imply, from an art and design position, how would one establish a criterion for "harmony" in aesthetic terms, when such experience is often of a particular kind? The way that Piet Mondrian would consider harmony and the way that Anthony Caro would consider harmony are fundamentally different. Other differences can be found in the way that artists and designers use space, mark-making, colour, form, expression and meaning. Of course, Wittgenstein might simply argue that the notion of aesthetic harmony rests on how it is being used (*PI*, §43). Accordingly, to know how a student is using a sense of harmony, infers that one has to know in part how the student is comparing and differentiating. But, would knowing the mere employment of a particular harmony itself be sufficiently revealing aesthetically?

A sharp distinction remains about aesthetic understanding, in that there is no one common thought, practice or idea that one can turn to that will explain the multifarious way that art and design is experienced. Indeed, in individual and team teaching, it is not unusual to find that teachers themselves will offer different advice to students that at times may seem from the students point of view, contradictory. One reason why a student might see such advice as contradictory, has something to do with the way education in general views learning. However, a moments reflection reveals that art and design is concerned with aesthetic judgements and that the teacher's competence relies, in part, on this awareness. It is often the case, that because the teacher's and the student's judgement involves his or her perception of an object, problems arise here as objects have different relations to different things. As David Armstrong mentions: "Objects have an indefinite number of characteristics, and perception is a selective affair" (1961, p.25). Moreover, such judgements emerge in art and design when the character of this experience is imaginatively constructed. There is considerable scope then in art and design education for disagreement and ambiguity. But one can further say, that it is not always recognised in education that the complexity of imaginative involvement is not something which the teacher can either deny nor be dismissive of. Imaginative engagement constructs the sense of an object in art and design terms. Here as Kant claimed, an imaginative experience can develop spontaneously (*CJ*, intro. 197), but it can also be reflective. One might think that it is the aesthetic complexity and its notion of "free-play", that makes such experience so distinctive and difficult to

comprehend. While these are not simple matters that can easily be resolved in the teaching of art and design, it is clear that both Kant and Wittgenstein offer ways which can better equip teachers to understand some of the problems to do with object perception and experience. In order to grasp the sense of the many different approaches in which objects can manifest, it will be necessary for the teacher to develop strategies that help to stimulate students appreciation and identification of objects and their experiences. As I aim to demonstrate, to comprehend educationally art and design practice, calls for considerable understanding on the part of the teacher since such appreciation can be textured and coloured in many subtle variations. A teacher needs to be aware of these factors since they form an important part of the relation of art and design understanding. The temptation that one must resist, in relation to this concern, is that art and design work must not be over-simplified. The reason for this is that art and design experience involves a deep level of understanding of ourselves and our environment, which can be made virtually meaningless if one is unaware of this involvement and how it operates.

It has to be admitted, that there are philosophical and educational difficulties with Kant's and Wittgenstein's notion of understanding (with Kant's emphasis on the logical functions of judgement and Wittgenstein's emphasis on language), but these are not issues that need concern us here, because this problem would involve primarily theoretical concerns that would side-track our main purpose concerning aesthetic practical understanding in education. However, in one loose sense, Kant classifies understanding as a conscious judgement of experience, while for Wittgenstein understanding is

presupposed by the conditions of use. As indicated for both philosophers, understanding involves reason, perceptions and concepts that connect to a range of conditions which can either presuppose the possibility of experience or reflect through experience the conditions which contain its understanding. In either case, understanding as a "unity" of thought (and this implies that it may also be a drawing or a made object), asserts a particular identity of an object, but this identity may be connected in various ways. The identity of an object may be applied differently as each student has his or her own imagination. But one must resist the thought, from an art and design point of view, that identity is conformity to a rule. As Kant realised, in any art and design practice there are unconditioned and indeterminate elements in the experience of an object. One ground for refusing to accept the rule argument, is that aesthetically, one's understanding in art and design education is not determined purely by sense-perception or reason experience, but rather by an insistence on creativity. I will explore further why this seems to be the case. The implications for the teacher, are that if the identity of an object in art and design terms can be made in various ways, he or she must be skilled in teaching this learning. It would be ludicrous for education not to recognise this concern.

3. 2

Before I discuss the relevance of Kant's aesthetic for art and design education, I will debate firstly Wittgenstein's concept of understanding and its relevance for art and design teaching practice. In order to dispel the claim that art and design work is accidental or arbitrary, one has to investigate as Wittgenstein attempts to persuade us, how art and design practice is being applied through the use and description of particular expressions. While I feel that to some extent these points have been covered in chapter two, educationally, the problem for the teacher is to demonstrate just how these experiences manifest themselves in art and design learning and teaching practice. It may be problematic, however, as I will later indicate, as to how an understanding of use, can specify fundamentally what counts as learning in art and design education. Standing perhaps in the way of use, is that art and design teaching relies on the authenticity of feeling, an insistence on knowing one's own mind and the complexity and cultivation of creativity. In this respect, as will be explored, self-understanding as an expression of feeling is vital to art and design practice.

Taking Wittgenstein's argument of use, it is not at all obvious, that I could come to understand aesthetically Marc Chagall's painting *The Green Donkey* by how I described this work, for it could be argued rather, that it is how I imagined this painting that gives the work its understanding. The important argument being, that the image-making process may not think nor reason in the same way as language construction, for what is involved in

aesthetic experience is more than mere intellect. If this is the case, then this comment must get us to at least question the Wittgensteinian argument concerning description and language. The point is, that if one sees art and design experience simply in terms of sensation—language situations, one may be displacing how cognitive and feeling experiences are also part of this picture. One must ask how visual perception concerning the physical qualities of the work, gives us access to the visual experience, for what is "seen" may not be identified in the ordinary sense, with the physical perceptual properties of the work. How revealing is Marc Chagall's painting *The Green Donkey,* by analysing simply the optical perception or physical sense of this work? An interlocking argument here, from an educational position, is that aesthetically one's understanding does not just relate to the form of the object and its construction, but also its content. Without doubt, the difficult task for the teacher is being able to suggest ways that enable the student to correct and enlarge his or her understanding of this experience in an insightful manner. This, poses many problems for the art and design teacher concerning how to design situations that will encourage students to learn how to account for their different experiences in different ways. Attached to this problem is that the teacher must develop strategies that enable students to "see" and "interpret". For this to happen, the teacher needs to be aware of the factors which lead a student to develop his or her arguments in a particular way. Let us then examine more closely in learning terms, the possibilities of what might confirm our art and design educational understanding.

The idea that understanding is constructed in various ways may leave us thinking that understanding is subjective, but as Wittgenstein writes: " 'Thinking', a widely ramified concept. A concept that comprises many manifestations of life. The phenomena of thinking are widely scattered" (*Z*, §110). This suggests, amongst other things, that our concept of understanding has more of a plastic or flexible notion than any strict meaning might imply of this term. Failure not to realise that "thinking is a ramified concept" will prejudice any understanding of art and design education. Yet, while Kant appears to suggest that aesthetic understanding is an "inner process", Wittgenstein argues that understanding is an outward expression. In support of Wittgenstein, Hanfling remarks that when one describes something, one is supporting some claim about the meaning of the object (1989, p.47). The connection that Hanfling appears to be implying here, is that meaning is not just an experience persistent in language. One has to construct thought, but to understand whether this thought construction amounts to a concept of understanding, one must in Wittgensteinian terms, describe its character and examine its use. As Hanfling puts it: "The meaning will consist in the work that the word is doing in a given context, and not in a corresponding entity" (p.49). Thus, in an analogous sense, the art and design teacher needs to consider how things are being employed in the work by their students. For Wittgenstein thinks, as Hanfling mentions (p.42), that if one wants to identify understanding one must connect it with the operations of its particular use. In general, one does not, for instance, mix the colour red with blue to get the colour green. What this entails for Wittgenstein, is that use has certain

characteristics that describe understanding, as one uses blue and yellow to make the colour green. This is obviously a straightforward case, but it remains to be seen just how far one can properly determine or rationalise art and design understanding in this way. In provisionally accepting Wittgenstein's argument concerning the need for description, from an art and design teaching point of view, one does not judge the work in relation to the language itself, but whether the language is appropriate to the object's circumstances. In which case, one aspect of Wittgenstein's understanding of language corresponds to what one is making, which in turn, defines the meaning of the language, in that the language has to correspond to how our actions and behaviour are being employed in art and design. For one's actions to make sense, Wittgenstein argues that student understanding has to be conditioned by the situation that entails the expression of the object itself.

To repeat, Wittgenstein insists that understanding is not a "mental" process, for the criteria of understanding are represented by how the student, in sensation and language terms, is able to mould clay, use a saw and cut joints, stitch a garment, use tone, use colour and scale, the manipulation of architectural space and so on. The argument being that: "One has to look at its use and learn from that" (*PI*, §340). A number of things can be implied from this, one of which seems to be that understanding is an activity, the act of doing something that others can observe and copy. Here, as claimed, Wittgenstein is concerned with "ordinary usage", for his aim is to demonstrate that a fundamental feature of aesthetic experience is a public concept of understanding, not whether such experience relates to an esoteric

understanding of the physical world. As many philosophers have asserted (David Pears, Colin McGinn, P.M.S. Hacker, Oswald Hanfling, G.E.M. Anscombe and Godfrey Vesey) Wittgenstein's later work is concerned with how one manages to construct a building, make a piece of furniture, produce a textile print and so on. So, while a philosopher, as Hanfling indicates (P.48-9), could spend a whole lifetime exploring metaphysically the phenomena of space and time, this does not prevent us from using space and time correctly as an ordinary description of the objective sense in which art and design is practised. Yet, it may seem contentious to claim that art and design conforms to ordinary usage when so much of its experience is imaginatively and originally constructed. If art and design education is a particular and singular experience having an imaginative content, then, this could easily commit us to the view that art and design practice clashes with the concept of ordinary usage.

On face value, the distinction that Wittgenstein appears at one level to be making is that if the response is taken immediately from the actual object, then what the student is reporting on has to do with the perceptions of that immediate object, as an observed event. But this seems questionable, since what kind of discrimination is the student making, if any, how does the student draw from past experiences, and how does the student determine that the character of what is being experienced actually identifies the perception. If one is to attach any credibility to art and design experience, the student has to unravel and establish his or her interpretation of the object, but how is this achieved? Of course, one might suggest, as Wittgenstein does, by giving a

description, but as I have intimated, there are more factors involved than mere description that heighten one's awareness of art and design experience. Similarly, it is not clear, from a teaching perspective, that the familiarity that the student has of a given object is derived purely by his or her actions, since the student's actions are not always revealing in themselves. One must consider in any art and design work that such experience presupposes preconceptual, non-verbal, spontaneous and reflective feelings of expression. However, one should not fail to notice, that the Wittgensteinian concern seems to be how does the teacher teach the student to be able to know what constitutes meaning other than by a public sense? For the teacher does not have clear access to the privileged pictures, feelings, notions or images which the student may be experiencing.

Let us begin, for example, by exploring the kind of aesthetic response and analysis that a designer might make. Here, one wants to ask, what latitude can one give to Wittgenstein's argument concerning how one distinguishes understanding? In the spatial complexity of Gerrit Rietveld's *Red and Blue Chair* of 1918, such an object can be described by how Reitveld used colour and three-dimensional form to enhance a certain particular spatial context to this object. The use of vertical and flat planes and the horizontality of some of these planes are counterbalanced by the vertical ribbing whose task appears to be to keep suspended the central body which serves the container. These features, at the same time give emphasis to the spatial dynamics of the object. Here, the spatial relationships have a certain harmony, which among other things, take account of De Stijl thinking. This movement held that

equilibrium depends on the distribution of the opposing forces (horizontal and vertical) which balance each other out (De Stijl was influenced by Gestalt psychology). The structural geometric form of this armchair with its simple but complicated proportions, the scale of the sections themselves, together with the total lack of decoration in this armchair, add to the precision and order of the spatial effect of this object. Now, it could be argued, that the spatial sense of this armchair by Rietveld, is dependent on the viewer being acquainted with De Stijl theory. However, whether one is aware of De Stijl theory or not, the way that I have described this object may lead one to think that a great deal of imaginative thought has gone into this object. One might further argue, that since such an object appears to have a definite arrangement through its proportions, harmony of form, spatial qualities and its sense of order underlining these relations, that this creative expression undermines the view that art and design is a chance or irregular experience. The mere fact that there appears to be an "arrangement" that is perceptual, describes in one sense, as Wittgenstein thought, the conditions under which meaning manifests. But is this description of Rietveld's 1918 chair correct? For this description seems to take for granted that I know what horizontal, vertical, harmony and so forth mean and that I know how (without misinterpretation) to perceive and represent these qualities as perceptual experiences. In the Wittgensteinian sense, the teacher could claim that one knows that the student understands what vertical means by the way he is employing these sections in the work. It surely remains a problem about how the student knows that he or she is employing such sections vertically and not horizontally, how does he or she

come to understand that certain planes in this work are vertical and not horizontal? One should expect, in agreeing with Wittgenstein, a degree of conformity in what constitutes a vertical or a horizontal plane in "common language" (*PI*, §261). Wittgenstein's argument here is: "Once you know what the word stands for, you understand it, you know its whole use" (*PI*, §264). While Wittgenstein is careful to single out the "what" here in the above quotation. In art and design learning is it also the case that what is vertical or horizontal needs to be manipulated creatively? This yields the suggestion that art and design understanding involves preconceptual and conceptual thoughts that make it implausible to state what the what is in purely language terms? The reason being, that in viewing the object the expressive nature of this work serves not just the intellect, but engages also the student's sensations, emotions and thoughts as an imaginative experience to the extent that these sensations, emotions and thoughts are what determines perhaps his or her understanding of the object. It seems that there is a sense in which one can describe these characteristics by how one conceptually accounts for them. So much so, that our conceptual understanding seems to feed-off, and in part operate or extend at times, these very sensations, emotions and thoughts that one claims to possess.

What appears educationally to give us a possible solution to the problem before us, is Wittgenstein's notion of noticing an aspect. In this respect, understanding needs "tie-ups" (*Z*, §170), that demonstrate that I can talk about the object in a way that makes sense, that I can draw the object, differentiate and compare this object with other objects (*Z*, §162). It also

means, according to Wittgenstein, that understanding always presupposes an order (*Z*, §297). Apart from Wittgenstein's understanding of Gestalt theory (which I have already explained), order also relates to Wittgenstein's notion of methods and rules. It would be unusual to find a product designer, a furniture maker, an architect, an artist and a potter not constructing their work with some loose kind of order involved in the construction of the work. However, to assert that there are rules may be controversial since any art and design teacher would be suspicious of any claim that suggests that a student's work is constructed by orders. This is not to deny that the work itself has a certain perceptual order (refer to the Reitveld's *Red and Blue Chair*), but for Wittgenstein, orders exist to be obeyed. Obviously, the art and design teacher in a classroom will give various kinds of orders to his or her students, some more definite than others. One might say that there is a difference between an order which expects us to fetch an item from the next table in the classroom, and one that says that the way that you have ordered this sequence of events needs changing. However, as Vesey points out in relation to Wittgenstein: "His order has been obeyed if the person to whom he gave it did something correctly described by the words of the order" (1994, p.97). On the face of it, this seems simple enough, for if I ask a group of students to examine and describe in sculptural form the concept of a chair, one would expect them to make an object that shows that they have obeyed the order. If they have obeyed the order, then in one sense, the work must be successful since the order describes what is expected. Unfortunately this is too simplistic, for it takes for granted if this assignment is to be successful, that the students

already know how to describe, in sculptural form, the concept of a chair. What is expected in art and design terms does not conform strictly to what is being described by the project or assignment information. It seems fair to say, that one must be familiar with the order if one is to carry it out correctly, but it could be construed that I do not understand the order unless I am able to execute the command. Of course, one may well put the burden of responsibility on the teacher to make sure that their students are familiar with what the requirements are in the project. It remains a problem however, that even if a teacher is convinced that a student does understand the requirements of a brief, this student may still have no idea about how to experience such requirements imaginatively. It is a recurring feature of art and design work, that students will not grasp what is required, unless they at some stage know how to implement their creative powers. One's awareness of this experience in imaginative terms is presupposed by a feeling sense, which is neither constrained nor determined necessarily, if at all, by language.

Wittgenstein explains that embroiled in noticing an aspect, is that there may be several ways in which one can identify an object (*PI*, §XI). In each case, one should not assume that while one aspect will be different to another aspect of the same object, that one aspect is necessarily inferior to the next. For the art and design teacher two issues seem to be related here. For instance, if I was asked how would I identify Le Corbusier's *Villa Savoye* at Poissy, it may be having visited this building, that I was particularly taken by the roof garden, or I may have a strong spatial sense of the building as a whole, the sense of its whiteness, the scale and proportion of the building, the

furniture and fittings in the house, the design period itself, the way the windows envelop the whole structure and let so much light into the building, the spiral staircase, the sliding walls and ramps in the building, Le Corbusier's writings on architecture, the position of the building when viewed from the north, or how this building relates to Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, Mart Stam or J.J.P. Oud's buildings at the time *Villa Savoye* was built. The contention being, that if students are asked to make an object or a painting based, for example, on their experiences in a museum, one might expect many different aspects to be comprehended. In which case, would it be possible to argue, taking our *Villa Savoye* example, that any one aspect of this building is superior to any of the other mentioned elements? The problem that one would have in answering this question is that there is a pictorial sense in any art and design object. Thus, if this pictorial sense presupposes a "unity" which is dependent on various aspects of the work, the elements or expressions that go to make-up this whole picture are presupposed by this arrangement. Similarly, how one works out and develops this "unity" and its arrangement may not always be perceived through the formal properties of the work.

In looking at young children's (between the ages of 3 and 5 years) art and design work it is doubtful to what extent the formal properties in the work itself are revealing unless one already knows what these formal properties represent. Wollheim argues, that children's art becomes much more perceptible when one knows the intention (1993, p.140). The visual experience, therefore, is no longer accessible by what one perceives simply in the object alone. The point that needs stressing here, is that the kind of

judgement that one needs to explain the object, can make a difference to our visual perception. For example, if one is told something about a particular artist's or designer's life and their concerns, then this experience can make a difference about how one understands his or her work by what the example guides us to imagine. While there is no mistake that Wittgenstein's contribution of sensation—language meaning can and does make a difference to our understanding of our world, this experience, however, only represents part of the picture that makes up our understanding of art and design work. One might construe that it is one's imagination itself that in part guides one's awareness of public understanding, but this is something which Wittgenstein denies (*PI*, §370).

For Wittgenstein, intention connects to thought and action because it suggests that to intend is to do something, and perhaps to have a reason for doing something. For example, I intend to write my next essay on Hieronymous Bosch, I intend next to reduce the height of this table by ten millimetres, I intend to make a kite, or the teacher may ask the students whether their design solution matches their intentions. As Wittgenstein writes: "what makes my image of him into an image of him? - What makes this portrait into this portrait? The intention of the painter?" (*PP I*, §262). Intention, therefore, is a description of doing something which may or may not get fulfilled. Of course, what the student intends may turn out, as Wittgenstein remarks, to be a bad picture. But one could say that the reason why this painting turned out to be a bad picture, is because of what the student intended (I will further explore the notion of intention in a moment).

It should be kept in mind, as Hanfling surmises (1989, p.63), that Wittgenstein's various arguments about understanding amass reasons for doing things that justify the action. In the case of Wittgenstein's notion of perception, however, one saw that sensory experience has both intentional and unintentional aspects that affect the "organisation" of noticing an aspect. Even so, as I have stated, Wittgenstein claims that by describing something, I am illustrating a concept of it, whereby the criterion of understanding is presupposed by what is being deduced. Since art and design practice is to do with particular experiences, an important aspect of this is how one is comparing a specific experience. It might seem from one point of view that one can compare the form and content of a piece of art and design work, but difficulties arise about this that relate to how one can compare a blue area in a painting with the red area in the same painting or a horizontal line with a vertical line in the same object? It may turn out that the way that one compares involves making several observations about the work, of which no single observation in itself would be revealing. But as Wittgenstein argues, there is not: "one particular mental experience characteristic of comparing" (*BB*, p.86, §17).

At this point, let me repeat, that for Wittgenstein it is only through observing our actions and circumstances by description that one comprehends understanding. Hence for Wittgenstein, comparing is not a "mental" act. As Elizabeth Anscombe argues: "Perhaps I can show you the way to saw a plank; I cannot show you the way to have a thought like that—so how do you learn? (1992, p.10). Now not wishing to dismiss the merits of this argument, there is

nevertheless another side to this, for Kant foresaw what Wittgenstein was unable to grasp about art and design learning. Namely, that art and design learning does not necessarily presuppose a causal, descriptive or conceptual relation between a student's aesthetic interest in an object and the object's purpose. Thus, art and design experience is not just part of an observed physical activity, it is also part of a much deeper perceptual process. For the best art and design practice is where there is freedom to form in a purposive manner. It might also be argued, that in sawing a piece of timber there is a level of subtlety in play that defies explanation, and which thus undermines in one sense, Anscombe's argument. For subtlety is often of crucial importance to the sawing of timber and any artwork. Another dilemma facing Wittgenstein's argument is that two people may make the same object in exactly the same way, but have a different understanding and appreciation about their respective work. It is not clear how Wittgenstein handles this problem.

3. 3

The position that Wittgenstein takes, emerges not as a strict definition of what would constitute understanding, but rather as a general claim that "one pattern in the weave is interwoven with many others" (*Z*, §569). In order to appreciate this remark let us delve further into why Wittgenstein rejects the idea that understanding can be defined in a precise and exact manner. In a simple sense, a teacher knows that a cup can be made to almost any shape and size with many different kinds of material. Given the number of variables upon which such an object can depend, one may find it difficult to define a cup other than the fact that such an object is used for drinking. However, one may argue that there are other objects which one can also use besides a cup for drinking, thus confusing or extending perhaps the boundaries between a cup and its use and other objects which may function in a similar way. Still, the teacher might find it further objectionable if any student simply saw a cup as purely a drinking object. Understanding such an object presupposes from a teaching point of view being able to make many connections. Wittgenstein was undoubtedly aware of such problems, but an art and design teacher might assert that there are special problems in making such an object of this kind that thwarts the sense of knowing that a student's understanding could be dependent on a given range of factors. Art and design does not handle its problems purely in a scientific or engineering kind of way. Nor does it take the view that form follows function. Certainly a student needs to be aware of certain requirements in making a cup, but it would be

dubious for anyone to claim that in teaching, those factors relating to size, material, purpose, construction and so forth are used in any kind of straightforward manner in art and design education. What is definable may relate more to an intuitive rather than descriptive account.

Pedagogically there are other difficulties with this straightforward manner as mentioned by Hanfling, when he states that: "It is , for example, essential to an understanding of 'yellow' and 'pencil' that one should be able to say what is not yellow and not a pencil; and essential to understand that 'pencil' means an enduring entity, one that has a past and future" (1989, p.59). Here, in relation to Wittgenstein's work, Hanfling asks how do we learn the word "yellow" and "pencil". As Wittgenstein argues (*BB*, p.2), as an instance of "yellow" and "pencil", one can learn by ostensive means by pointing to the object, and speaking what Wittgenstein calls its "proper name" (*BB*, pp.81-2, §6). Yet, could one learn what "yellow" and "pencil" represent by ostensive connections alone? Indeed, as Hanfling suggests, it is not just language that one is dealing with here, but also perception; a perception, that is, involving an image or a feeling for what a yellow pencil would look like. Plainly, to complicate the situation, the perception that a student has of a yellow colour and of a pencil, presupposes different conceptions and impressions as to what is a yellow colour and what is a pencil and how pencil and yellow can come together. Now, in this instance, it is conceivable that language and perception could interconnect through ostensive means. Not wishing to dispute this, the problem as Hanfling describes, is how is one to know when "the learner is assumed to be already in possession

of temporal notions such as 'before', 'duration', 'event'" (p.59). The flaw in the argument seems to be that to understand that one is perceiving a pencil, is to recognise that the pencil has a "before", "duration" and "event" attached to the experience. The assumption being, that what Wittgenstein failed to notice, is that one is not dealing with an object as though it exists without a learning history. To understand an object requires other forms of understanding interconnecting and extending from, past experiences that anchor current understanding.

While Wittgenstein goes to some length in explaining ostensive definitions and their connections to early or "basic" learning, it is not clear as Hanfling argues, how one learns simply by pointing (p.58). The implausibility of this, as Hanfling sees it, is that the "before", "duration" and "event" are notions which "are all interwoven, and the idea of learning them one at a time is an illusion" (p.59). One might think that this brings us full circle to Wittgenstein's earlier remark that one pattern is interwoven with many others, but Wittgenstein's comments here, relate to usage only. In our example of "yellow" and "pencil" it may well be possible by ostensive means to identify "yellow" and "pencil", but in itself, one may be suspicious as to the usefulness of this approach. To identify "yellow" and "pencil" also presupposes that I can reidentify "yellow" and "pencil", but to reidentify this object involves more than a simple ostensive definition. Likewise, as explained, Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of objects can change from one situation to another which of course would undermine further the notion of ostensive definitions. This argument relies on the fact that meaning can

change depending on how the object is being used. Hence, pointing to an object where the meaning has changed because of its use, is liable to confuse rather than enlighten what is being determined. Furthermore, Hanfling's argument shatters the view that understanding could be numerical, that understanding could be taught simply as an instance of some ostensive experience of an object (as in "yellow" and "pencil"). Wittgenstein, of course, never described understanding in this way, for he insisted that there were many tie-ups and criss-crossing between different concepts (*PI*, §§66 & 203). It would also be unfair not to recognise the case that Wittgenstein brought against ostensive definitions, when he asserts: "But suppose I point with my hand to a blue jersey. How does pointing to its colour differ from pointing to its shape?" (*BB*, p.80, §3). In addition, I have shown elsewhere (Le Corbusier's *Villa Savoye*) that individuals often identify and reidentify objects in different ways, which further suggests the difficulty that understanding can be variously interpreted. In showing slides to students one often finds that students are able to pick out things that one has not noticed before. There is a sense then that understanding is a cumulative and developing experience which undergoes perhaps many changes. However, one should not dismiss ostensive definitions as they can be a useful device in teaching situations.

To know whether a figure in a drawing is flat or three-dimensional, or whether an object is in relief or is a maquette, requires not only that I understand what "flat", "three-dimensional", "relief" or "maquette" supposes, but that I know in Wittgensteinian terms something of the use of these words.

The learner must learn to establish connections and this Wittgenstein argues, can only be achieved when the student knows how to relate and apply a colour in a certain fashion, knows how to scale a drawing in a certain fashion and knows how to explain his or her work in a certain fashion. To begin with, the connection that the student must establish in these examples, is how to produce a certain object that is conditioned by the desired effect that the student wished to be expressed of this object. But before one can get to this stage, one has to know how students could identify, for instance, a three-dimensional drawing, as this presupposes that they know the difference between a two-dimensional drawing and a three-dimensional drawing. Yet, this kind of thinking only works when there is no misunderstanding between certain sorts of drawings. A drawing may have a number of features that incorporate both two and three-dimensional space, some of these spaces could, for example, be overlapping, blocked out, receding or dispersed throughout the work in different ways.

To discuss the above problem, Wittgenstein further maintains that meaning can be applied in more than one way (*PI*, §183). For instance, the word "flat" would be notoriously difficult to precisely define in art and design terms not because it might have a qualitative aspect to it such as the way that the material might reflect its colour, but also because one's perception and concept of flatness is dependent, to some extent, on its use. A print of a painting is often described as a flat piece of work, but to the printmaker who has lifted the surface of the print so that the oil-paint rests embossed on the paper rather than being embedded into the print, would not describe such work

as purely flat. Without this visual and touch sense to determine the work, it is doubtful the extent to which one could explore certain experiences of this kind. This reveals that there are many different ways in which a student can experiment and identify what entails flatness. For there is a difference between a musical flat note, this colour looks flat, the car has a flat tyre, this flat pencil, the building looks flat when you look at it straight on, but curved when you look at it side on, this shadow is flat but it bends, and because of the weight of this colour on this flat object the shape of this object looks flatter than I had intended it to look, and there is nothing flat about this painting as its surface is thickly textured. One might begin to surmise from this, that in art and design learning the anchorage by which understanding manifests itself is characterised by the argument that one produces. In truth, the student must learn to construct his or her arguments corresponding to the pictorial sense in the work. What is easily overlooked, however, in learning terms, is that the student may make a lot of corrections and editing to his or her work which in itself manifests what learning is about.

What is involved in the above examples, is that the student may creatively play with visual differences in his or her work by exploring how different spatial compositions can suggest a particular tension, weight, shape or form to the object. In one sense, perceptual properties change the dynamics of perspective, colour, texture, line, density and spatial relationships to the degree that these perceptual changes shift our understanding of the art and design work. It is for this reason, that just because at one level a Piet Mondrian painting can be seen as a flat painting,

this does not mean that one will interpret or experience this painting and its perceptual properties, as a flat piece of work. As Wittgenstein states: "What does it mean to understand a picture, a drawing? Here too there is understanding and failure to understand. And here too these expressions may mean various kinds of thing" (*PI*, §526). It is not at all obvious, as some might suppose in education, to identify the characteristics which will enable the student to understand an object, as his or her lines of thought may have to point in all kinds of directions in order to understand what the work is expressing. An obvious major concern of this work, is that the teacher's responsibility must be to help students realise and understand how perceptual qualities in the work can function. So much of this thesis is devoted to explaining the subtlety of these concerns.

Since to some extent I have explained what constitutes description and expression in Wittgenstein's thinking, it remains for me to say something more about the role that intention plays in his notion of understanding. Now, the question that currently needs to be asked is how does intention give meaning to understanding? At this stage, what needs to be taken into account, in relation to aesthetic intention and understanding, is visual experience. One cannot attribute connecting one's intention to understanding in art and design terms, without considering the range of factors that can affect the perception of what is seen. Since I have previously explained, in relation to Kant's and Wittgenstein's work, some of the aspects that can affect visual experience, let me go on to discuss briefly how intention can affect understanding. If Wittgenstein is correct then: "For, however, like I make the picture to what it

is supposed to represent, it can always be the picture of something else as well. But it is essential to the image that it is the image of this and of nothing else" (*PI*, §389). Once again, there seems to be several arguments that one could construct out of this quote, but the argument that I have in mind is that in much of art and design work (Cubism, Dada, Abstract Expressionism, Renaissance, Expressionism, Islamic, Gothic and so on), the formal aspect alone may not be enough to understand the work itself. One must conclude, that in certain situations the student needs to know the intention of the work, in order not to misconstrue its understanding. However, as Anscombe points out: "that in general we are interested, not just in a man's intentions of doing what he does, but in his intention in doing it, and this can very often not be seen from seeing what he does" (1985, p.9, §4). In which case, simply observing what the student is doing may not be enough to determine why he or she is working in a particular manner. The formal aspects of an object do indeed describe something about the object, but as Wittgenstein states, there are various ways in which an object can be interpreted. The danger seems to be that unless one is familiar with the object, there is always the possibility that one's interpretation could be mistaken. For example, one might think that a student is making a table when in fact he or she is making a cabinet. Similarly, what looks like a well crafted wedge shaped piece of timber suitable for a doorstop, may turn out to be a device for a new piece of furniture. Further difficulties seem to be that in making a clock is the intention simply to make a clock or is there something more to it than this? In observing a furniture maker making a table, I notice that his or her actions are not

arbitrary, but intentional. Yet, does this mean that by selecting certain tools and by performing certain actions the intention can be found? In reply, Anscombe argues (p.28, §19) that the intentional character of selecting or performing presupposes that the student should give the description under which the selection and performance was intentional. Immersed in this argument is whether the character of the experience, as an intention, justifies the action.

It is certainly a condition, as Wollheim asserts (1993, p.139), that an artist's intentions are of critical relevance to the work. To countenance this argument further, knowing what a student's intentions are might decide for us just how critical his or her work appears to be, as the significance of the student's work may lie, as suggested by Anscombe, in his or her intentions. For our purposes, for the intention to mean anything, the intention must constitute part of the work itself. In this way, Wittgenstein would argue that the intention becomes part of the use and its understanding. In examining this further, one might suspect that it is unclear just how intention can work for all kinds of art and design experiences and meaning. While knowing the student's intention can make a difference to understanding the work, it is also the case that the intention may not be something which can be clearly identified. For even if the student is able to identify the intention (which in any case may change from one moment to the next) how much difference does this make to the work itself? If one knows the student's intention prior to the work itself to what degree does the intention affect the work, and if one sees the work prior to knowing the intention how much should knowing the intention change one's

view of this piece of work? On another level, intention can be regarded as a singular identity—statement, but this identity—statement (which may itself be variously interpreted), may not describe in an important sense what is actually being perceived in the work itself. It is not always clear from the way that Wittgenstein and Anscombe think, how one can always give a true description in art and design of the artist's or designer's intentions in acting as they do. The assertion being, that an art and design experience may be more of a felt response which does not lend itself necessarily to say what is true or false about the work. It may also be argued, in art and design educational terms, that intention can get in the way of creativity. The art and design teacher knows that free association and automatic drawing and making can break the ice or stubbornness of thought that can prevent a student from visualising other aspects of reality. For art and design students to work without any intention can be an important aspect of their learning. The discovery that one can work by free association can be seen to undermine both the concept of use and intention.

Knowing that a student has intentionally designed a folding chair as mass-produced domestic object, in one sense tells us something about this chair, but on closer inspection a "folding chair" and a "domestic object" can be designed and constructed in various ways. There are, as I have suggested, difficulties standing in the way of constructing a clear and precise description of intention in art and design terms, since the student's intentions, one suspects, must change as a consequence of what is being perceived and developed in imaginative terms. It is difficult to imagine, for instance, even if

one knew precisely what Reitveld's intentions were when he constructed his *Red and Blue Chair*, what this object would eventually turn out to look like. Clearly, how an object gets expressed relies on many aspects of which intention is only one possible indicator relating to the objects development and its understanding in art and design education. From what I have explained so far, it should be obvious that art and design experience is physically and "mentally" demanding, for any object which is made by a student requires acts of judgement based on knowledge and experience; a point perhaps that needs further substantiation.

I want to emphasise that how the student secures the sense of the art and design work is dependent to some degree on what the object is expressing. Rietveld's *Red and Blue Chair* showed in part, how one could demonstrate the sense of the work being perceptibly accountable. Within this, one deduces that Wittgenstein's concept of usage can have practical application for teaching practice, since such a policy provides a means whereby one can show in an ordinary way what is noticeable about a particular visual effect and its understanding. Teachers, therefore, must help the students to clarify their understanding by showing to the students how they appear to be using certain expressions. During the course of this interchange between teacher and student, the student must learn to apply and develop a personal strategy based partly on the concept of what determines aesthetic meaning in the formal sense. Wittgenstein's point is that self-realisation requires that the students must be able to construct for themselves concepts of understanding by adopting public conceptions of meaning, such as "vertical" and "horizontal". Although

one cannot simply understand aesthetic experience by an understanding of what constitutes such notions in "vertical" and "horizontal", the concession is, that it is the deployment of such notions in one's work that can affect art and design understanding. On the other hand, can the mere concept of what constitutes a "vertical" or "horizontal" element, establish aesthetic experience? It would be rash to claim, that the execution of one's behaviour in the use of vertical and horizontal planes in a painting or object, distinguishes all there is to know about art and design experience. As Nick McAdoo writes: "Anyone with normal intelligence and eyesight can see that Monet's painting depicts poplar trees, but to see the flowing dance of their slender trunks requires something more" (1995, p.165).

3. 4

What Wittgenstein infers about learning, is that the perception clarifies how I am now seeing the object of my experience. For example, in claiming that this object or drawing describes a house, a bird, a monster, a lion, a tree in a meadow or a fairground, I am indicating my sense of understanding. The way that the student draws these objects tells us something about these objects (*Z* §255). The implications of this passage for Wittgenstein is that the drawing incorporates itself into the "seen", the drawing becomes part of the performance of learning and understanding. Accordingly, aesthetic learning happens when one is able to devise ways in which by rubbing out different areas of the drawing and adding newsprint to it, overpainting certain areas while discarding others, changing both the height of this chair and the position of its joints, suggests that the student partly learns to judge correctly or incorrectly by the kinds of actions that he or she performs. That there is a personal handling of these factors that seems important to the search and authority of the work, is again crucial to learning. Equally what is at stake perhaps, from the teacher's point of view, is the expressive significance by which such practice (painting, drawing and making) enables students to develop and realise themselves. What determines this experience must be how the students are able to say something about themselves in the work that shows, through an explorative approach, creativity. But one factor standing in our way of accepting further Wittgenstein's premise concerning understanding, might be the argument Pears

considers, that each one of us, has a different centre of consciousness (1988, p.300). For if each one of us has a different centre of consciousness, and this seems to be a fact, it remains a problem about the extent to which the teacher can report on another student's experience. Despite this, the reality is that one learns about another person's understanding by the kind of argument he or she puts forward in the work.

In one respect, Wittgenstein proposes that the student learns by being given certain examples to work from. It is not, however, at all obvious that the teacher's example to their students, for instance, by pointing out how Gerrit Rietveld used colour, will throw light on Eugene Delacroix's or Henri Matisse's application of colour. The difficulty here is, that the teacher might want his or her students to use their creative imagination when interpreting certain artist's or designer's work. To a large extent, using one's creative imagination does not evolve simply around any determinate or conceptual understanding of an object. The fact that an object is a chair, an apple or an elephant, says nothing about the singular judgement of an aesthetic experience. The art and design work is stimulated by feeling. However, the way that one compares and differentiates Reitveld's work, suggests that the perception of this work by the way it is constructed and relates to certain ideas about space, harmony and colour, represents a different kind of understanding of these notions than one will find in Eugene Delacroix's or Henri Matisse's work. Crucially, learning takes place when one can show how to extend and develop a certain argument, a drawing, a painting or making of an object. In agreeing that there is no commonly accepted way in which a person will experience,

one distinguishes, nevertheless, that this experience, if it is to be communicated, must do so in a manner that makes it possible to argue this experience. From one perspective, the art and design argument involves as E.F. Carritt writes: "a becoming aware, not indeed of the nature of things, but of our own inner nature and processes" (1923, p.111), but from another perspective, it also involves being able to conceptualise, as Wittgenstein thought, a description which defines its sense. In art and design education, the student needs to learn how to handle both arguments, even if, there are problems with how one defines the work or understands one's own "inner" nature. One is prone to argue, that it is the way that one imagines things that is aesthetically important. The criticism is, that in art and design education, it is not enough to say that one can recognise an object and its content by sensation—language means, for such experience at best will only clarify one aspect of art and design learning which in itself may not be very revealing at all. In general, it is reasonable to suggest that the art and design teacher must make sure that he or she neither reduces nor narrowly defines the terms under which an aesthetic experience can be pursued. Indeed, because art and design understanding relies on imaginative creation, and the fact that the art or design work may be discernible in various ways, it would be controversial not to allow the student the opportunity to explore and develop this awareness.

Education argues, that there must be some corroborative way in which the work shows its understanding. It is further held by Wittgenstein that, for the teacher and the student, the issue must be: "'How must one react to this description in order to understand it?'" (*RC*, §55). Perhaps one should

not be surprised that there is a danger here, that our reasons for understanding might threaten to overpower our imaginative impulses, if one sees the description in purely rationalist terms. To overcome this problem, Wittgenstein argues, that it is the expression and not the reason that articulates the work. Thus, one might have a reason for putting a green colour next to a red colour, but it is what the expression of this green next to the red means that shapes its aesthetic sense. The requirement being, that the teacher must be careful to stress and create situations that provide visual stimulation that allow the felt intensity and drama of the work to come through and manifest itself. It may be said, that because the aesthetic pursues self-expression, in part as a felt intensity, that to understand this is a question not only of description, but also of "spontaneity", successive judgements, and imaginative involvement. Art and design involves a series of absorbing events expressing the involvement of emotions, ideas and mood, an experience perhaps that one must be capable of not just noticing, but also having. I reject, then, Wittgenstein's argument that one merely needs to consider meaning in terms of usage, for in learning terms, much more is involved in education.

Of course the teacher must encourage students to work in a creative fashion, but Wittgenstein makes no mechanistic or categorical claim for what constitutes the significance of such experience, as everything is dependent on the particular circumstances that manifest imaginative understanding. It is without question, that by considering, comparing and differentiating, concepts of understanding become noticeable, because this experience brings into prominence the student's methods, examples, values and understanding. This

is not to say that such concepts remain the same, do not get modified, or abandoned altogether, for such experience would be contrary to the aesthetic and to learning in general. But aesthetically, what one considers may be a question of feeling, of mood. The difficulty is, that in learning one may not always be aware aesthetically how one is employing one's values, understanding or perceptions, because such experience in art and design education may be too subtle or overpowering. This concedes a lot about "states of mind" and challenges the denial that Wittgenstein makes about cognitive experiences. The argument being, that it is quite possible that one could have contradictory perceptions coexisting in a piece of art and design work, to the extent that the work itself is not operating as a determinate conception of human knowledge, but rather, operating to intensify the vivid realisation of one's own experience as "mental life". Art and design activity gives life to the fact that individuals do dissolve, diffuse and reorganise their thoughts and feelings in creative ways.

It might be thought, as Frank Jackson points out that: "Our statements about visual images are not just to the effect that an image is red, or square, or whatever; they are also to the effect that an image is red and square and..." (1988, pp.119-20). In other words, a red image would involve many other properties or sensations which one may sense, but that these sensations are not necessarily equivalent in any manner to what can be described as properties of a particular sensation, yet for all that, these are real experiences which do affect one's understanding. These are not, however, undifferentiated experiences, for how I feel about this colour, its charm and excitement, is not

something that I can relinquish. It may turn out to be that these feelings are part of the idea of the colour itself, and to attempt to relinquish these feelings would probably change my understanding of this colour. If one relinquishes "my" feelings altogether as being connected and operated by cognitive and emotional experience, which is what Wittgenstein implies, in favour of a description presupposed by sensation—language, one ought to ask, how far can this sense be used to describe aesthetic experiences accurately?

As a counter-reaction to the Wittgensteinian position, what seems right about our thoughts, in the Strawson sense (1990, pp.87-100), must in part be determined by the experience that one ascribes to oneself. Being able to ascribe experiences to oneself represents a sense of awareness of oneself that can further serve how one can come to some agreement concerning the work. Strawson's argument, at this point, is that the learner must realise that it is his or her experiences and one's subsequent awareness of the experience, that forms an idea of the world around them. He mentions the fact that the learner: "to have the idea of himself, must he not have the idea of the subject of the experiences, of that which has them?" (p.88). Strawson's explanation here is that it is one's "orientation" and where one sees this from, that is initially crucial to a person's understanding. Facts about ourselves or about other bodies are still facts about ourselves, though not necessarily as the same person in each case. Strawson argues (pp.90-1) that one can have different perspectives about our world, as the student who is having these experiences may be having various kinds of perceptions taken from different positions, body involvement and sensory experiences. The student in a proper way,

could well be moving around and integrating various aspects of these encounters into the work. My experiences, therefore, as Strawson claims (p.97), may not be dependent on either a single point nor necessarily upon the same type of experience. This accordingly makes "my" claim that these experiences are "of" this object, complicated, if there is no single point and type involved. In art and design learning this seems more the norm rather than the exception. But to clear up any ambiguity in a student's experience, the teacher's role is to develop ways that assist the student to determine his or her positions and what such positions seem dependent on. The essential issue here for the art and design teacher, is that one needs particular states of "my" experiences in order to make particular states of these experiences transferable at all. Strawson's reason seems to be that students need to experience themselves, in order to have an idea of their experiences. In learning terms, a point of view determined by self-ascription would seem a prerequisite for art and design experience. The student needs to learn how to experience and be aroused by objects, but he or she can only do this by becoming aware of what one is doing or feeling. The art and design teacher must set up situations that allow students to become aware of their perceptions by designing projects that enable students to question and analyse object understanding. The learner gets the meaning of things only if he or she can feel the sense of the teaching or learning, by feeling perhaps the presence of his or her own mind and body.

In relation to the above argument by Strawson, Pears rightly argues in the Wittgensteinian sense (p.266), that it would be wrong to think that all our sensation experiences are obtained in this fashion, for I can and do learn

about my sensations through discussing my feelings with others, by listening to others, and by observing how others express their "ideas". It follows that an art and design teacher would want to see the students explore and respond to these different claims about how one learns from "ideas" and thoughts. In contrast, the assault that Wittgenstein makes against one's "own" thoughts and ideas, and one that to a large extent may be justified, as Pears goes on to say, is an attempt to demonstrate that our experiences are seldom purely of one's own making. However, it is contentious for Pears to claim that self-ascription, in the Strawson sense, could be considered merely the "first step" (p.266). For while not all experiences are a product of an individual "mind", without this ability to create imaginatively, one will not get very far in stimulating different interactions and thoughts about objects. My stand on this view, is that the distinctions between self-ascription and "non-ownership" experience are difficult ones to sort out when considering the art and design work, and may be closer together than one might surmise. Strawson makes a similar point to this, when he argues that a person must be both a "self-ascriber and an other-ascriber" (p.108). This idea gives us grounds to argue that the student's art and design work is dynamically constructed, an achievement expressive of imaginative thought, which from an experience point is expressive of the student's self in the making. In learning terms the student may be so intensely involved in the work that he or she is unaware of any practical or theoretical differences, preferring instead to be led by this intensity of experience.

Clearly, art and design learning cannot be reduced to following a sequence of steps to identify certain facts, as this would misrepresent aesthetic understanding. But it remains true to say, that the teacher must look to see that aspects of both self-ascription and non-ownership experiences are being considered and developed in the work. The students must show that they are capable of responding to criticism of their work, but nevertheless must feel free to express themselves, to be inspired. However, one of the difficulties here for the art and design teacher, is as Strawson argues: "Limits may be different for the speaker and hearer" (p.19). This suggests, then, that there could be differences in the kind of judgements which the speaker identifies and the hearer distinguishes. In considering this, what the student makes in art and design happens because he or she has made numerous changes in the content or form of the work. It is far from evident, therefore, that this learning process is present in the work itself. For the teacher, their judgements may at times only be a response to what is purely given in the work itself, for he or she may ignore certain features of the student's learning experiences altogether. Unlike the student, teachers may not be inspired by what they can see, for their emotional or conceptual responses to the work might be coming from a different angle to the student's. One might object to this in educational terms, but one should be careful here, for the student and the teacher may have to make various kinds of judgements at different times as an ongoing concern. For the teacher, it is essential that a student must be able to notice and form for him or her self the various conditions upon which different judgements help to identify, arrange and situate the work. A

student develops an attitude towards reality only when he or she engages issues that are brought up in discussion and through the work. It may be said, that the student must learn to compose different arguments relating to his or her work. It is not unusual that the student's judgements in relation to object experience, should be modified and developed as the work progresses. This should be positively encouraged. A piece of art and design work will involve developmentally many different observations which as a process can be interpreted in different ways. But to repeat, it does not follow necessarily that what the student hears reidentifies what the teacher requires. Whatever the kind of reference one makes, both the student and the teacher, as Strawson writes (p.32), must identify common factors that both parties can agree on.

In art and design terms, Wittgenstein does not deny that one has feelings, nor their possible significance in a given situation. But it may seem, that his analysis of these experiences has severe weaknesses. It is arguable that the quality and subtlety of feeling experiences requires a deep level of sensitivity which language use and its understanding often fail sufficiently to comprehend. What I am suggesting, and this is a point that I will discuss later, are that feelings can represent a character of experience that defies exact copying by sensation—language. It would be wrong to think that such feelings are not steeped in thought and reason as aesthetically there is often an interplay of feeling between imagination and understanding, "promoting the sensibility of the mind" (CJ, intro. IX, 197). Our conceptual devices, as Pears suggests (p.217), may not always be what starts our interest, but it may also be the case, that conceptual understanding may not be what sustains our

interest either, for there are emotional and imaginative connections that students in art and design would wish to evoke and sustain in their work. The student may be stimulated by different sensations that arouse a heightened awareness about the work. The expressive sense of such work may not be held conceptually but rather as a feeling quality. This is a point that needs further discussion.

If one sticks adamantly to Wittgenstein's concept of description, such ideas will not explain one's cognitive—feeling involvement and so lack a clear understanding of the conditions which affect creative intelligence. The reader will note, that the aesthetic proves its worth not only in the Wittgensteinian sense through description, but educationally by being aroused by genuine insights of human life. The discovery of these insights come about in art and design by means of the imagination. One tends to forget, that the experiencing creating person is testimony itself of learning. A young child can show relations of experience that can be quite intimate and revealing long before they have learnt verbal communication. Significantly, one conclusion that can be drawn from this, is that an aesthetic experience whose very existence depends on the life of the individual, cannot be anything but useful.

It is worth reminding ourselves, from the point of view of those who teach art and design, that the aesthetic in kind is not indiscriminate, and this is the argument that Wittgenstein is partly making when he asks us to consider how one's perception of the object gets formed. The image or picture is lifeless, argues Wittgenstein, unless the student knows what he or she is thinking and how to explain it (*PI*, §XI). How then does the student bring

into existence this experience? Obviously, by students exploring the object concerned, they can begin to determine a particular expression of this object. But what is the condition of "exploring" in the aesthetic sense? The problem here is, that the student certainly does not explore aesthetically in terms strictly supposed by language—description, but as Kant thought, by means of the imagination (*CJ*, §1). The point that Kant is making, is that an aesthetic experience being imaginatively created is not realised by concepts alone. On first view, one might think that this cannot have anything to do with learning, since it is clear, in this instance, that students who are absorbed by their imaginative processes have no clear reasons to support their own actions other than the possible fact that they may be responding to the "inner" play of thought. Can this action then be justified in teaching and learning terms? Collingwood writes: "What we hear, for example is, merely sound. What we attend to is two things at once: a sound and our act of hearing it. The act of sensation is not present to itself, but it is present, together with its own sensum, to the act of attention" (1958, p.206). Without the act of attention, one can safely say that an art and design student will not produce anything of quality in his or her work. Here, Collingwood goes on to say (p.215) that the imagination is the conscious idea of this experience as thought. It would be nonsense then to think that imagination is not important to learning and education, for not only does one have here the notion that the imagination is thought, but also the suggestion that the imagination relates to ideas. The notion of an idea being for Collingwood, how a student would perpetuate and stabilise an experience (p.218). Hence, it is not just the fact that a student be

may aware of touching an object in a particular kind of way, but rather that he or she must has an idea of this experience. Such arguments seem to presuppose, furthermore, the educational value of art and design, in that to perpetuate and stabilise an experience are particular learning accomplishments. It also seems, as mentioned by Armstrong, that: "If we think of the wealth and subtlety of the information that we gain by our eyes, to take one example only, we see that much of it eludes the relatively coarse mesh of the net of language" (1988, p.127). In which case, the student's understanding may be in the perception itself rather than the reason, an experience which defies, in part, linguistic categorisation. The impact of Collingwood's and Armstrong's above remarks, are that the student must be careful about how he or she judges a piece of art and design work as his or her sensitivity to understanding may be searching a deeper level of awareness that may not in any sense be implied in our language use.

Expression in Wittgensteinian terms, connects through usage alone, but this is not to say that reason is not part of the usage. In other words, there may be all kinds of important reasons which the student develops and acts upon in his or her work, but there may not be a reason involved at every moment in the action or play of the work. Further support for this argument comes from the fact that one's possible reason for doing a painting, may be something separate from the actual painting itself, from the activity of painting and its creativeness. For it is quite possible that I might be less interested in the effect of the painting as a skill or aesthetic exercise and more interested in its political message. A student may make an object not because he or she is

interested in the object itself, but because this object allows the student to get something else that they want to have, as a means to an end. Moreover, a painter or a craftperson will respond to things that are being explored and coming out of the work itself. The creative activity may not always have a reason, in the sense that one's response may be intuitive. Let us also consider Wittgenstein's point, concerning whether it follows that just because I do not have a reason for my action, then this action cannot be meaningful (*BB*, pp.85-9, §14-7). The argument seems to be, as an alternative to the intuitive response, that if I reacted to the object automatically whether in using a paintbrush (in the way that Jackson Pollock might use it) or in using a jack-plane to plane a surface of timber, then by acting spontaneously what was I able to recognise in order to perform this task? How did I know what paint marks or planing needed to be created? Accepting in part this point, Wittgenstein's conception here is, that while the action itself does not appear to correspond to a reason for the action, the step prior to the action may have been the reason for the action. The condition is that to recognise what the art and design student achieved by a spontaneous way of working, one may have to recognise the prior reason which explains this action. In the case of Jackson Pollock's work, one would have to consider the notion of free association. It may also be replied that a craftperson who makes one hundred bowls to be sold in his shop, need not be fully conscious of each bowl he or she is making. In which case, the student may not be fully aware of his or her actions at the time those actions were carried out. What is more, making and painting may simply be an explorative exercise, which the teacher and the

student may use as a way to generate ideas, it is only later perhaps that the student's reasons begin to condition the work, if at all. One might surely suggest that by just picking up a pencil to scribble something down is a reason in itself, but to what degree is this reason on its own revealing? A student may have a good reason to make a certain object, but the reason here is not a description of the object. Just because a student has a solid reason for doing a certain piece of work does not in itself make this piece of work meaningful. At the same time, it may be further argued, in the Wittgensteinian sense (*PI*, §XI), that a drawing itself gives a reason that justifies the object expression. It would be wrong not to conclude that for the teacher, the work itself is evidence of reasoning. But just what kind of reasoning it is relates to different kinds of creative experience and understanding.

One deduces that while the student may not have been fully aware of what he or she was creating at the time this action was being produced, this action does not negate meaning, because it was found that his or her actions were being determined by some prior reason, the prior reason as a cause, justifying the action. Wittgenstein might reply that until one knows what these actions are for, one cannot be sure what explains the work. This is one reason why one must be careful in explaining Wittgenstein's notion of understanding, for it is not just a simple matter of observed behaviour that he uses to support his arguments. Still, it might be argued that consciousness is important to the work in the sense that the student's work is conditioned by creating visual experiences and ideas which must involve a level of consciousness essential to this creation. However, the teacher may want judgements about the art and

design work be put to one side in order to encourage spontaneous ways of working, that awaken new relations of experience. But now let us suppose that a student uses a tenon saw without realising the kind of cuts being made because he or she has made similar cuts with the tenon saw many times in the past. The student may certainly have a reason to make these saw cuts, but it is not this reason itself that is determining the saw action, as this action is more closely attached to his or her cognitive—bodily experiences peculiar to the student's centre of consciousness. In this instance, it is how I experience this saw action that will determine whether or not I take my saw actions for granted. This begs the question, to what extent can one construe that meaning is purely in the reason and description, for are there not other important learning ties that one must consider to substantiate meaning? It is to be noted, however, that Wittgenstein would argue with this by stating that the student's actions are determined by what he or she noticed in the work. Thus, the case seems to be, that the student's experience only changes by what he or she is able to notice in the work. Yet, what he or she notices in the work, may be a response to feeling rather than an observation.

What Kant realised, and this is something the teacher needs to be aware of, is that an imaginative experience does not always bend over easily to reason, in that this experience may have a life of its own, contingent only on what gives meaning to the life of the individual in conjunction with his or her understanding. What I am suggesting is that one does not analyse strictly an art or design object in terms of reason, for on the contrary, one makes as Lars Hertzberg argues "responsible appeals to the imagination" (1991, p.144).

The imagination may be a response to intuition rather than knowledge, an image rather than a teacher's explanation. Kant's central doctrine being that the aesthetic represents the mutual harmony between imagination and understanding and the capacity to produce instances where meaning is not tied to concepts alone. The only appeal that Kant insists is indispensable for the aesthetic, a fact that must not be overlooked by the teacher, is that art and design work must connect to actual perceptions. If the concept of aesthetic experience must involve perceptions of an object, this notion changes the way art and design work can be viewed in imaginative terms, but this is an issue that will be pursued subsequently. The point to notice is that having perceptions of an object presupposes that one knows what these perceptions are, which of course, may not be the case at all.

From the beginning, learning for Wittgenstein is a matter of being able to do certain things, but the student in an art and design situation, does not generally say I am going to put in a reason here, or at this point, that I am going to make a judgement (for it happens to be the case that one is constantly making judgements in the work). It appears that learning in art and design is much more dependent on what is being experienced, what comes out of the self-expression and activity itself, and what is being evoked. Objects in art and design also get modified because of the cognitive—intuitive response that one experiences imaginatively, and the mistake that Wittgenstein made was to try to intellectualise what is not always intellectual. What Wittgenstein gives us, which is in one sense useful in education, as Pears remarks (p.325), is an "extrinsic" notion of understanding, but he seems to miss out on the fact that

understanding also has an "intrinsic character". However, this is not entirely correct, as the contribution that Wittgenstein makes, is an attempt to explain the "intrinsic" by "extrinsic" means. One must credit Wittgenstein's understanding in attempting to demonstrate that one often learns to understand the "inner" by what confirms this experience through practice. Where he fails, is the extent to which one can see understanding in relation to external characteristics. If the teacher only judges by the external characteristics of the work, his or her understanding of art and design education will be severally restricted. For one will not properly understand art and design experience and its learning unless the teacher is aware of how the students involve themselves in creative play. Moreover, it is quite possible that the play activity that a student experiences and reveals in the art and design work, is adequate fulfilment in itself.

The argument about learning manifests itself when satisfaction, interest and understanding interconnect, not as separate concerns, but when they criss-cross and overlap. It is here that one gets a sense of aesthetic learning emerging from the Wittgensteinian argument. What does the explaining, therefore, is connected to the making itself. For the student to be able to mix colours, to make dovetail joints, to make a drawing of his or her holiday, and to distinguish in the process the experience itself, denotes an attitude, an imaginative content, and a desire which takes account of the student's fulfilment of this experience. Even so, as Harrison asserts: "The difference has to do with the maker's actions, not with what he makes" (1978, p.65). In the making the teacher can perhaps to a degree, see what the student

is concentrating on, what kind of judgements he or she is making, where the student's attention is drawn and thus offer appropriately advice as needed. The argument that Wittgenstein insists on, is that thinking and learning are not an accompaniment of the work, it is part of the activity itself, the colour mixing, the making of joints, the holiday painting and so on. This brings me to the point, that learning involves, through the making procedure, testing, confirming and recognising student's ability to do these things in a certain way, in order to justify the experience and what it teaches.

If things go wrong in art and design one refers to the making procedure and its realisation. The conditions that influence what seem to be accountable in art and design are the connections between imaginative impulses and usage, and it is through these experiences that one realises how sophisticated the aesthetic can be. To some extent, the traditional view of the aesthetic in education has always stressed the "inner" importance of experience and rightly so, but it has failed to recognise the possibility that what makes the "inner" secure, is that it also connects to a public conception of understanding. One may surmise, that learning is severely hampered aesthetically when the student is unable to spot how he or she is using something or when he or she is unable to make a gesture, utterance or action in connection with what stimulates individuality and interest. For unless one knows something about these gestures, images, utterances or actions, art and design experience becomes difficult to sustain. In this respect, knowing something about these concerns, amounts to knowing how to express interest in a creative fashion. It would be wrong to think, however, in art and design education that

familiarity is a matter relating only to usage. For there is in educational terms the challenge of the work itself and the evocativeness that this can bring in the imaginative play of the object. Putting this aside, though, one of the teacher's main tasks must be to enable students to become familiar and critical of their own self-expressions and what they form. One of the arguments here is that the stand that a student takes in his or her work by the visual connections that he or she makes, presupposes that the student should recognise that what he or she is constructing occupies a certain position, a certain visual experience which represents a particular point of view that transforms and identifies the work.

There is, of course, the argument that if some of the factors which go to determine the character of the art and design work cannot, as suggested, be seen in the object itself, then how does one know whether the student's intentions have been fulfilled in the painting or object? This brings us to the point that has been already echoed in this thesis, that the teacher must enter into a dialogue and discuss with students, their interest, background understanding and knowledge of art and design. In this way, an interaction is set up between students and teacher, that further enables the teacher to assess whether certain intentions are being fulfilled. What must interconnect with any discussion of this kind, is that the work closely resembles certain thoughts and ideas. So, in this respect, the visual sense of the work becomes important. Immersed in this, one could argue, is that the student must learn to scrutinise his or her perception, when as Wollheim argues (1993, pp.133-42), this experience modifies and demonstrates reinterpretation. By

this I take it that Wollheim means that there is a certain regularity of adjustments and readjusting that one expects students to do in their work, as this is how one becomes acquainted with the kind of evidence and experience that also connects to fulfilment and intention. I concur with Wollheim, that understanding, in art and design terms, must involve through actual acquaintance not just a perception of the work, but recurring perceptions of the work, as he writes: "Reinterpretation of Cézanne's early work requires that we go back and look at it again" (p.142). This serves to illustrate the problem and in part a possible solution, that the aesthetic requires successive experiences in order to realise certain aspects of the work. These successive experiences, as Strawson suggests (1990, p.36-7), must not only be taken from the object itself, its colours, patterns and so on, but furthermore, how is one locating and arranging these characteristics? When a student observes an object, such an object exists from one point of view in relation to certain positions and relations in three- dimensional space. In the course of the student making adjustments in his or her work, such perceptions can be sharpened up or expressed in another way, so that these adjustments become through his or her perceptions, a critical factor in what constitutes the work. The feeling is that educationally, aesthetic learning cannot be something taken for granted, as it involves interpretation and reinterpretation as an ongoing multidimensional concern. This kind of involvement, however, in art and design education experience is not simply secured by formalistic means. The concept of imaginative play, in the aesthetic sense, has a lot to do with how the student takes upon themselves the task of learning about art and

design experience. For the decisive argument in art and design education is the personal sense of the experience that gives the work its character.

3. 5

I have shown in Wittgensteinian learning terms, just how significant and justifiable art and design practice can be for education. This experience is further enhanced, but made difficult, by Kant's assertion, that art and design involves an act of imagination. This is a topic that deserves scrutiny because this experience grounds all aesthetic awareness and understanding in art and design education. It is my contention that Wittgenstein distorts our concept of art and design education when he asserts that: " One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when one imagines anything, but how the word 'imagination' is used. But this does not mean that I want to talk only about words. For the question as to the nature of the imagination is as much about the word 'imagination' as my question is" (PI, §370). Wittgenstein's thoughts here are undoubtedly pointing in several directions in an attempt to link a number of ideas together. But his main arguments in this passage centre on sensation—language experience, and on the fact that the imagination is to be seen in terms of description and so accordingly, as an observed sensation—language encounter. Not wanting to deny the important points that Wittgenstein makes in this quote, the sketch that he draws, however, gives us an inaccurate representation of imaginative experience. His fault lies in the fact that there are other aspects to consider that in one respect, challenge and undermine his understanding of this crucial experience. Let us investigate what these concerns might be as they have consequences for furthering our understanding of art and design education.

Any art and design teacher knows that imagination and "seeing" are crucial aspects that can reveal and stimulate a wealth of detail and understanding about objects and one's experience. Of course, this is not something that Wittgenstein would deny, however, his concept which connects recognition and description to usage, comes under fire from one quarter of art and design thinking. The criticism is that one cannot understand art and design work solely from this Wittgenstein synopsis. It is important for the art and design teacher to realise this challenge because of its possible consequences for "seeing" and imagining in art and design teaching. The argument is, as previously remarked, that it is not possible to appreciate Marc Chagall's *The Green Donkey* through description. To emphasise this point, one wonders how a student through description could come to understand and thus appreciate Kasimir Malevich's *Black Suprematist Square* of 1914-15? Similarly, as I will discuss later, how could a student come to understand Mark Rotho's work when this painter is not interested in "seeing"? Furthermore, to pick up Arthur Danto's point (1994, p.61), no perceptual criterion can be found to be given to Marcel Duchamp's *Fountain* (urinal). The reason being, that such an object cannot be picked out from thousands of other objects of the same kind making the perceptual criterion redundant in the case of this art work. As Danto declares: "no formula, which will enable us to pick out artwork in the way we can pick out the bagels out in the bakeshop: for if 'bagel' had the logic of 'artwork', a pumpkin pie could be a bagel" (p.61). What is more, if Wittgenstein is correct, then the art work, as Danto suggests in relation to the above, is just the material from which it is made.

One has difficulty understanding this, for the child who uses a tennis-racket as a guitar, a chair as a castle and a plank of wood as a stage is experiencing an object and its events in ways in which the plank of wood does not reveal.

From the above remarks, one could also construe, as Carritt states, that: "asking what the picture is 'of', what the poem is 'about', and, getting in reply words which express concepts" (p.114), may be distorting what constitutes creative imaginative experience. For as Carritt also implies (p.108), it is the way things are imagined, the aesthetic activity itself, as opposed to a picture or image of an object, that creates the art and design work. Aesthetically, imaginative activity itself can perceive objects without having to contemplate their conceptual sense or purpose. In point of fact, the student's art and design work, is not striving purely for conceptual ends, but a way of feeling and expressing "inner" form as a particular experience. It is not a process about images themselves, but a process concerned with the free creative power to actualise and form objects which appeals to our sensible understanding. This is not to deny that the student's imagination may be constrained by what he or she is able to conceptualise (*PI*, §370), but creative experience does not relate purely to establishing images and their recognition by concepts alone, if at all. If perceptive, an art and design student will experience many changes in his or her work relating as much to how he or she feels as to how he or she conceptualises. The constant struggle that goes on in art and design work relates to the perception that creative imaginative experiences extend and play with thoughts and ideas in an unbounded fashion. A free aesthetic activity cannot be embraced firmly in language, because it

exceeds the limits as to what can be conceived by precise conceptual means (*CJ*, §47). The teacher must be alert to this fact, for the freedom to create compounds the difficulty of teaching in art and design. Knowing that the art and design work cannot be classified in any defined and rigid manner, must open up the teacher as well as the student, to the sensitivity of experience, its absorption and justification.

Through creative imaginative experience, students are not bound by their conceptual understanding of an object, but rather, are invited to explore their own awareness of such matters. Equally, in the Kantian sense, Ernst Cassirer wrote: "Each individual, by virtue of his inclination, has a right to principles which do not destroy his individuality" (1981, p.5). For Cassirer, this means that the individual must be allowed to feel and harmonise his or her own experiences, free of any manipulative, or deterministic intent. To feel one's own experience, as Kant claimed, involves aesthetically, the subject's subjective feeling and his or her perceptions of these feelings in a purposive manner. The argument being, that these feelings themselves are a ground for art and design understanding. One is not dealing then, with a definite conceptual phenomena, but as Collingwood surmised: "imagination seems to occupy a place intermediate between the less free activity of mere feeling and the more free activity of what is generally called thought" (1958, p.197-8). In which case, the teacher needs to realise that to encourage imaginative thought and individuality, is to accept that each individual has a voice of its own. In relation to this matter, F.M. Berenson writes: "My level of understanding of a person's situation is dependent on the particular relationship in which I stand

to him" (1991, p.81). This cannot be described as a conceptual matter, since my feelings for another person strike a chord at a deeper level of experience. This requires that on the part of the teacher that he or her knows something of what it is to be a person, and to experience the aesthetic. But it also requires, that the teacher knows how to establish a personal relationship with a student and how in a particular situation the aesthetic experience is being explored by the student in relation to his or her experiences. If one takes this point of view, a teacher must recognise that in art and design, a student will bring and develop a different perceptual understanding about object creation, one that is peculiar to his or her imaginative ability.

Strawson implies (1990, p.31), that a student may identify an object in one sense, but fail to identify the same object in another sense. This might happen for instance when the student is unable to see that the colour red has a different relationship to a yellow colour than it does to a black colour, or when one is able to see how a motor works in a water pump but unable to see how a motor works in a lawn mower. The teacher needs to be aware of these kinds of problems, for it is not just what makes a successful piece of work that the teacher should be concerned with, but also why a student's work might have failed. But even if a student was able to identify where he or she went wrong there is still no guarantee that knowing where one went wrong is sufficient in itself to correct one's mistakes. Nevertheless, one might expect art and design students to make a number of identifying references or particulars about their work in various ways. One of the great successes of this approach is that it helps the student and the teacher to locate and place the designed object within

a structured framework. The student by exploring his or her objects in various ways is helping to establish the focus and sense of the work.

Since art and design work is partly conditioned through imaginative free-play, the teacher needs to find ways which encourage and channel this experience as a fundamental originating concern. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, one might object to this, by claiming that the free-play of the imagination is educationally an unsound practice, that perceptually, it is an "intrinsic" experience which cannot be observed. But this would be to misconstrue the meaning of free-play, in that free-play is a spontaneous and interactive activity which can intensify the aesthetic experience and its development. Thus it can enrich our cognitive and emotional learning about objects and experiences. Essentially, one cannot determine such experience as being intellectually conditioned in the way that Wittgenstein thinks such experiences can be. It seems to me, that since this experience heightens one's awareness of art and design, then in part, this experience helps to account for certain features of the experience that allow the student to envisage and conceive of certain aesthetic relations. The first claim that one should make from this, is that art and design is vindicated by this act of imagination. It is a misunderstanding not to realise that it is the imaginative activity itself, and not its use or sensation—language situation, that grounds the experience. The aesthetic achievement and its individuality require a personal commitment of this kind in order to create, extend and sense new possibilities of experience. This leads me to concur with Collingwood, when he states in relation to imaginative experience that: "to appreciate its value is not the delightfulness of

the sensuous elements in which as a work of art it actually consists, but the delightfulness of the imaginative experience which those sensuous elements awake in him" (p.148).

Faced with the claim that an imaginative experience has a particular character of its own that happens to be a matter of feeling, why might one consider such experience as being important for education? Firstly, aesthetic learning can be considered as offering more scope in which to explore new experiences than any other subject. Secondly, imaginative involvement can help to broaden and deepen one's understanding of objects, since this activity does not attempt to put up barriers, because as Kant claimed, it is an unconditioned experience. One might object to this, by claiming that what is conceived in art and design may still be false, for there is no guarantee that what the imagination reveals is actually the case. But from an educational point of view, it is not the issue of what is false that matters as this would imply that one also knows what is true, but whether such experience can demonstrate that learning has taken place. Truth, in part, must satisfy the demand of learning in education. To demonstrate learning, art and design experience must show that it is accountable and perhaps meaningful. Among the problems that a student may have here, is convincing the teacher and fellow students, as Wittgenstein implies, that the relation between what is seen by the student is a necessary condition which explains the seen experience and its object. Put differently, how does it follow that what is produced in the work, is a sufficient explanation of the object's expression? Colours, lines, shapes and so on can have all kinds of interpretations. What is seen, then,

appears to be important, but such understanding manifests itself in Wittgensteinian terms through "seeing" and "interpreting". A difficulty here is, that any "seeing" and "interpreting" in art and design education involves diversity. The teacher knows that there are various ways in which such diverse understanding and its accountability can be scrutinised. The art and design teacher must consider that there are many different ways in which one's understanding is realised and expressed. To reiterate, it needs to be acknowledged, that this accountability involves not just what is seen in terms of the sensation—perception, and what this explains, but it would also involve our cognitive—feeling powers of experience. One should not commit ourselves in art and design education purely to the view that aesthetic activity is a matter of sensation—perception, as this would jeopardise the fact that such experience is fundamentally imaginative.

Since the aesthetic, as Kant thought, is undetermined, it can assume a much more adventurist, creative and experimental approach to learning. A possible implication of this is that one can avoid labelling what learning should and should not contain, for as Kant and Wittgenstein realised, everything is dependent on how the object is perceived. Aesthetic learning, in a particular way, avoids ruling out anything that might enrich art and design experience. So, while art and design experience may appear as though it is "shifting" from one moment to the next (which one must do in order to explore other perceptions), the reason why it may be "shifting", is to comprehend what is being experienced in a particular way. By moving around an object and searching through it, the student begins to understand the object and set limits

to what he or she is doing. This "shifting" is crucial to the learning process. For the fact is, that the student's perceptions will almost invariably have to be multidimensional in order to determine and extend the content of such experience. He or she is involved in a world of ideas which as Oakeshott mentions, can never be reduced to a mere relation (1991, p.60). However, if everything as Kant and Wittgenstein thought is dependent on the "seen" then this experience throws into difficulty any prescriptive ideas, tests or predetermined objectives that the teacher or examiner might possibly have about what constitutes learning and understanding in art and design. The student's individual aesthetic experience will use all means available (perception, intellect, knowledge, feeling and skill) to recognise and express certain observations and expressions of thought. In a critical way, this kind of experience is not discursive, as some have supposed (an attempt no doubt to partly discredit this experience). For what the student's aesthetic experience is attempting to achieve is to discover and reveal, through successive judgements and gradual transcendence, what is contained in an experience and how best to represent this encounter. It seems that there is a special sense in which understanding in art and design education operates.

Now pleasure as I have discussed in Kantian terms, is due to the harmony between imagination and understanding. From an educational point of view, the question might be, should one concentrate on this pleasure in order to determine the aesthetic understanding? Certainly, putting the question this way does indeed cause us problems. To concentrate on the pleasure will not explain the student's meaning in his or her work, because

pleasure, as explained, is merely contingent and determined by the mutual harmony of imagination and understanding. The teacher's role, however, is not to determine what constitutes pleasure for their students (which would be an impossible task) but to engage students interest and understanding in an assignment. One of Kant's main arguments is that the aesthetic is an independent experience resting on personal conditions that are determined by oneself. The thing that needs to be said about this, is that education is somewhat turned upside-down in the aesthetic, for aesthetic experience in general seems to go against the grain of educational practice. That is to say, that in the aesthetic such experience establishes what the individual is interested in and his or her involvement in this interest. Art and design experience does not attempt to condition as a prerequisite, what needs describing. By drawing on this experience, learning becomes something which is handled by the students and not something which is dictated to them.

This brings me to three interrelated issues that I now want to discuss. Firstly, that one must avoid having too much teacher control going on in the art and design classes, secondly that one must encourage more self-criticism of the student's work and that of others, and thirdly the art and design curriculum must be centred on the student's own interest. How is it then possible to encourage this approach? It seems to me that these issues cannot be separated since they overlap extensively with one another. In short, I will attempt to grasp these issues collectively. One of the problems of the teacher taking charge of situations, is that it can have the affect of both predictability, curbing creativity and making the work appear visually uniform. This as I

have claimed, cannot constitute aesthetic experience, since individuality in the Kantian sense, is missing from this experience. In this respect, one often finds that when the teacher takes control of the art or design work, the work reflects the teacher's interest and not that of the student. Similarly, one could argue, that the student's imagination is being curtailed, since it is the teacher dictating the terms of the work and its subsequent understanding. If the teacher has too much of a say in the direction and development of the work, students lose not only interest in the work, but become unable to articulate what they are producing in a genuine sense. This happens because the ownership of such experience is not the student's, but is felt to be that of the teacher's. The student comes to articulate someone else's thoughts and ideas. This then leads to all kinds of difficulties, for one soon comes to realise that because the aesthetic experience is not the student's own experience, his or her recognition, understanding and perception does not stand up to scrutiny, when being questioned about his or her work.

Let us now consider whether there is a need in art and design education for the teacher to insist upon a systematic approach, in order to demonstrate the consistency and realism of the work. The kind of student aesthetic activity and its learning that Kant emphasises, is from the side of self-expression, from the execution of an intuitive experience without ulterior aim, an experience preoccupied with its own distinctions and images within a social context. The argument being that aesthetic experiences presuppose creativity, because such imaginative experiences do not imitate but are created from self-ascription and discovery. If art and design experience is essentially

an imaginative experience then how can one insist that student experiences be acquired through a systematic study? How can one insist further still, that design objects or works of art are created in this fashion? Certainly, the teacher must insist on accountability, but accountability, as suggested, comes in many forms. I have discussed previously Wittgenstein's view on this, but it is worth reminding ourselves that accountability in his terms, comes about when there is a correspondence between what is seen, its application and expression. To appreciate this, it could be that the art and design teacher needs only to develop ways whereby learning situations and teaching are designed to take account of these factors but not perhaps through some kind of predetermined and systematic study, as this would negate how one experiences aesthetically. A systematic study implies that once I have exhausted "A's" experience I can then move onto "B's" experience and so on, but this would be a rather artificial and misleading way of understanding creativity.

In rejecting outright any systematic view, what can one put in its place that will allow us in educational terms to determine and understand properly art and design work? Certainly one may agree with Wittgenstein's argument concerning sensation—language use, but as I have indicated, in the Kantian sense, this is not enough. In the intuitive—cognitive sense, art and design experiences happen to involve spontaneous and reflective responses. Yet, quite clearly, such a response, may be objected to on the grounds that it involves a content of thought which would not be systematic, that one could not follow logically the art and design argument construction. An adequate

response to this line of confused logic, is that a systematic approach would not reveal, in art and design terms, what one should consider necessarily as consistent and justifiable. It is not a systematic approach that matters, but whether the art and design experience in question creatively reflects the way that people connect visual space and its understanding. I have already indicated how different perceptions can affect art and design experience, but this point needs further discussion later in this work, in order to explain how Kant sees that perception includes an imaginative content.

In dealing further with this problem of educational accountability, the root of the aesthetic for Kant, requires an obligation on the part of the person doing the experiencing, an obligation that is, to seek and establish one's own voice. As indicated, this could only be achieved by imaginative means. Kant's position seems to be that when the imagination is in free-play it is "productive", an "originator" of experience itself. The recognition that the imagination is a "productive" and "original" experience seems in a certain light to touch the nerve of what art and design education involves. The concern is, that the aesthetic does not constrain the individual, but confirms the imaginative *mind* of the subject's aestheticism. For this to happen, the aesthetic, as Ernst Cassirer mentions, is intuitive, it has no need necessarily to link propositions, knowledge, concepts and reasons according to strict rules of deduction, for: "All living things owe the individuality of their particular being to the specific form actual in them..." (1981, p.282), that is to say, to realise the character of one's experiences and their independence. The point being, that one cannot realise the character of one's experience without

independence of mind. Kant argues first of all, that this specific character is none other than intuition, a capacity which all human beings have, a capacity which Kant thinks is central to independent thinking, knowledge and a determining ground for sense experience. Now, for the art and design teacher this has important consequences. If one agrees with Kant and Cassirer on this, then the role of the teacher here is to devote his or attention to helping the students realise and express themselves, in part, intuitively. One of the distinctions here is, for example, that a historical or a contemporary exhibition of objects and paintings requires that the students on the one hand, should be able to distance themselves from the work, while on the other, display a sense of human affinity and common capacities with certain objects or paintings in the museum or gallery. But is this enough? In art and design one should be careful from a teaching point of view, of this notion of "distancing" oneself from the art and design work, in some detached way. A similar argument is often made, in certain art and design curricula, that students should demonstrate a "balanced" view.

The argument in support of an intuitive response comes in one sense from the way some artists and designers use notebooks, models and preliminary drawings to record their perceptions. As Richard Serra wrote of Le Corbusier's sketchbook drawings: "They represent such a simple way of noting a very complex involvement with space. A few lines will summarise a building on a mountain top, the road leading to, the horizon, the sea. He made drawings of everything that interested him in a given day, in a given place; entire towns, ports, Egyptian tombs, ships, aeroplanes, cows, giraffes,

monkeys, anything, everything. One might want to dismiss his notations as cursory doodles, until one sees that a drawing of the most trivial subject will end up becoming a source for his architecture. Whether he draws his hand or a hydraulic dam, it all becomes reference material. If you look at the notebook you realise that Ronchamp is a combination of the most diverse source material, a mosque, a periscope, a dam, a crabshell, the prow of a ship" (1992, pp.19-21). At first glance at least, these intuitive drawings were not drawn with a reference to some determined and definite purpose in mind, but rather are imaginative responses to visual stimulus. The drawings themselves, have a felt quality which cannot be grasped conceptually, for the life of the drawings are presupposed by a feeling response that lies upon the very texture of what is being experienced. Such drawings do indeed reveal something about Le Corbusier's thinking, but one would be hard pushed to realise this, if the felt quality of the work was removed. Indeed, an aesthetic experience can move us, without knowing the set of features which brings this about. One might regard intuition as a crucial principle of not just art and design practice, but of education in general. Kant's contribution in relation to the aesthetic argument is that the individual brings something unique of itself to the work, something which is rewarding and precious that can weaken or extend all manner of supposed knowledge and understanding. Education must learn to cultivate and appreciate "private" experience which appears contrary to Wittgenstein's thoughts. The whole point of this experience is that it awakens a more sustained sense of self-experience in action, for the aesthetic experience allows us to touch the depths of our centre of consciousness. This

happens because self-expression is in contact with the totality of one's experience which has the capacity through creative experimentation to exploit and recognise relations in a responsible and relevant manner. The object's sense aesthetically, has many relations. To exploit ways of "seeing", presupposes an imaginative content which cannot by definition, be derived by standards of measurement. This is an issue that deserves to be taken further because if there is no standard test of success which determines imaginative experience, how does the art and design teacher maintain and develop standards of learning?

3. 6

The fact that a drawing may be a thumbnail sketch, a doodle, a polished drawing, drawn by rote, or by formula, is not the issue here, for all these drawings may have their place in the art and design learning process. For Kant, a drawing by formula may be as intense and moving as a drawing by observation. The reason being, that creatively what seems to matter is whether a drawing captures in spontaneity or reflection an aesthetic experience. Put another way, the imagination as a sense of feeling, is the ground for an aesthetic judgement. By conceptualising creatively, the student must learn to condition his or her responses to an object. However, the teacher should be aware of the fact that in any kind of drawing or model-making, the naiveté of its conception or the clumsiness of its execution are further factors that can influence the sense of learning and understanding that has taken place. What the student is considering in his or her art and design work, must as Pears argues in learning terms (p.333), involve discovery. For unless the students are aware of what they are doing they will never be able to maintain any proficiency in their work. Two points seem to follow that affect a notion of proficiency in art and design. Firstly, as mentioned, a student's centre of consciousness differs from one student to the next. This in turn has the aesthetic effect that our perceptions are constructed to various degrees on different spatial frameworks. Secondly, if one considers Wittgenstein's notion that everything is dependent on the

perception, then our ability to see and interpret will also affect one's proficiency.

The importance of an intuitive and creative experience must not be underestimated in education. There are several reasons which seem to support my argument on this point. It might seem, that there are certain difficulties about how much, for instance, it is possible for a three-year-old's drawing to have a spontaneity and creativeness that confirms not only an imaginative mind, but confirms a deliberate attempt to construct meaningful expression and understanding. Drawings of this kind are indeed sophisticated as any three-year-old will show you. As an intuitive and cognitive—feeling experience, a three-year-old's drawing is operating at one level by what is seen, although it is worth pointing out that what is seen here may be a spontaneous and imaginative response. Yet, such drawings represent through the freedom of imaginative experience almost a disregard for what constitutes certain established conditions of understanding, if one sees understanding, that is, in strict terms. Drawings of this kind seem to conflict and challenge in the process, institutionalised ways of working, as they do not obey predetermined thought out plans. Furthermore, one must dismiss, any thoughts that spontaneity and intuitive understanding are inconsequential, for, as Edith Cobb argues, spontaneity and creativity are essential elements in the health and growth of the child (1993, pp.15-6). Connected to this, is that Cobb sees spontaneity and creativity as attempts to extend one's fulfilment through an exploration of one's environment (p.30). Thus to explore one's environment in any meaningful way, requires, Cobb argues, that every child:

"must integrate a world image with body image in order to know where and who he is" (p.16). Here, the argument that Cobb is further constructing, is that infants can only learn to create a sense of themselves and their environment through the making of their own cultural history in creative terms. To deny the individual the space to be creative, may result, according to Cobb, in severe depression, loss of identity and schizophrenia (p.75). Her argument centres on the fact that: "I would say that the child is deeply aware of himself as an unfolding growth phenomenon, a living bit of spatiotemporal extension. His entire body is a figure of 'the principle of expectancy', temporal sequence and spatially changing form. The small child is, in fact, consistently, even when nonverbally, concerned about when and where events will happen, even before he is able to think in terms of how or why" (p.37). Indeed, babies will cry if they feel too hot, cold, or uncomfortable, or perhaps when they become awakened from a deep sleep when a sudden strong light is cast in their eyes. They smile at us and touch our face and one, too, feels a sense of their wonder and being in the world. Such experiences stimulate the senses and the perceptual discovery that these human beings and their environment can play a vital role in the creative process. Educationally, to mould clay, to ride a bicycle, to blow out candles, to paint, to build straw structures, to grasp a string of rope and feel its texture, to cut out shapes and so on for oneself, represents a sense of achievement and an awareness of oneself in the world. Touching and feeling a piece of string can be thought provoking and may indeed be for the learner a formidable experience. By making and exploring objects and events, children learn to transform their

environment and with it an understanding of themselves fashioning and perceiving these changes. The student gets to understand him or herself when he or she discovers and creates in time and space. As the individual moves from infancy, "latency" and adolescence to adulthood, much of our non-verbal understanding of things gets pushed to one side, to make room, it seems, for more intellectual and semantic experiences. Yet, it is doubtful whether our intellectual and semantic experiences could exist without the child's creative responses being present in such development. In art and design, one learns to make one's own world through one's creative powers that sense and evoke the consciousness of being.

To recall, one might think that there is a certain indeterminacy in art and design, in that such work is not designed as predetermined instances that follow rules. Kant never thought, however, that the aesthetic was haphazard, but rather represented a unity of experience. Apart from Kant's important argument concerning how purposiveness would condition this experience, it is clear that in order to avoid any indeterminacy and to demonstrate a "unity of experience" in art and design education, the student ultimately needs to show how he or she is able to observe, imagine, analyse and create in various ways. In the Wittgensteinian sense, as I have claimed, the student needs to identify and construct by seeing and interpreting what corresponds in some sense to a public recognition of aesthetic understanding. To understand an expression created by aesthetic means can only be answered, as Kant surmised, by an explanation of the specific aesthetic response. In analysing the aesthetic, one must judge according to the response, for as Kant mentions, one cannot

determine the aesthetic prior to finding out what our responses are to the object (*CJ*, intro. VIII, 191). The teacher then should not restrict what a student's response should be to a given object, as the point is to allow the student to explore the depths of his or her own mind.

The above points perhaps can be put another way. What happens, for instance, when students are only given a pair of scissors, some glue and some colour paper to work from. The task the teacher gives to the class in this situation, is to cut out paper animals, flowers, or groups of figures, that one saw from yesterday's school trip to the zoo. In this situation the class is asked to join these objects together so that they form a collage of their experience from the zoo. What might one expect from this experience to avoid the label that such work is indeterminate? In this example, the visual experience is not predetermined, nor is the teacher dictating the expression and its use. Each drawing would, no doubt, be individually executed and through discussion, action and exchange of views, the form and content of these drawings would begin to take shape. Working in this way, owes nothing, as Oakeshott (1959, pp.12-4) claims (and this is no different from Wittgenstein's or Kant's position), to an externally imposed standard; the participation and expression is dependent on how students exercise their imaginative powers. Similar stories may be told here relating to going to the fair, a trip to the beach, a puppet or clown show, a novel that one has recently read, an artist's work in a gallery and so forth. The teacher is not determining the experience, as he or she is leaving this up to the students to decide. At one level, the significance

of this is that students through imaginative free-play strive towards an honest showing of their own thoughts and feelings.

What students must decide in such a situation as this, is how to establish and construct their particular experiences so that they communicate in a visual and aesthetic sense. The problem is, of course, that one cannot predetermine such experience, and indeed, it may take some time to put this experience together. It would be unsatisfactory for the teacher not to realise this, for the student may have to explore many impressions, conversations and feelings that he or she had at the zoo, much of this experience being fragmented or layered with several images. To get at this experience and to understand its meaning the students may have to play first of all with this content and manipulate the imagery so that it reflects their own engagement. The students use the drawings, notes and leaflets that they have made and collected at the zoo to help construct their work, as such material can act as "memories" of their experiences. The teacher may decide to help this process along, by asking the students to recall what the weather was like, what kind of sounds did particular animals make, what kind of skin or fur did certain animals appear to have, what kind of facial expressions did they express, and whether these animals were small or large, and whether they all had tails, what animal rides did they go on and so on. Perhaps as it stands, one might question what this has got to do with creative experience. Let us then develop this argument further.

To begin with, the teacher is attempting to stimulate in an imaginative way, thoughts and feelings about what the student might have

experienced at the zoo. The difficulty here is that there is no standard of success that the student can turn to for guidance in determining the work, because each piece of work must be judged on its own merits and the student must learn to respond to the work as it is developing. One problem here relates to the material itself, which is by no means an easy medium to work with in order to get across one's personal experiences. Working within these limitations, in one respect, would have to involve an imaginative experience, since one could not cut up any shape to represent successfully one's experience. For example, the skin of an alligator would be different to the skin of a spider or monkey, and the student who was interested in getting this experience across in his or her work, would have to explore various ways whereby this impression could be expressed as one intended in collage form. What is more, the way that one would handle the skin of a alligator to the skin of a spider or monkey, suggests further differences in the handling alone that the student should learn to notice. Among the difficult problems that a student will have is how to build and communicate the structure and form of the object. The power to make, one might well argue, is essential to understanding and hence to education, at it involves the ability to know. One comprehends oneself in the making process as one learns to construct one's thoughts and what they express. Yet, the teacher knows that there are limits to what can be expressed given the level of understanding and experience that students may have and will therefore design their lessons with this in mind. If the argument under discussion is dependent on student interpretation, then it would seem that this kind of interpretation is dependent on the seen. One

cannot suppose that the seen is referring purely to observation, as it seems that the seen is not restricted to just this experience. The teacher understands that such objects need to be imaginatively constructed if one is to capture something of the quality of the experience. None the less, not wishing to discuss interpretation, since this issue has been previously debated, one is led to consider what the teacher's role should be in student interpretation.

From a creative and imaginative point of view, the teacher realises that his or her students will not make a success of this experience unless their attention and experiences are selective and they can delve into the character of this experience. In this instance, it would not be possible to include everything that a student saw, experienced and recorded, as this would include a lot of material that (1) may not be relevant to the exercise, (2) the time scale involved would itself impose limitations on selection, (3) it is not possible to capture everything that one has experienced and (4) it is in the nature of art and design that one wants students to be selective. It remains, for example, that one of the possible things that a teacher might be looking to see from a student is how he or she is using materials. A student using cotton wool to represent the particular quality of a sheep's coat, would have found a way of communicating perhaps the warm sensuous side that one often associates with this animal. However, one must be careful here, for all kinds of materials could be used and the problem is also one of handling the material and the relation that this has to the pose or gesture that one is attempting to capture.

The teacher's role in this kind of exercise is partly to encourage selectivity as an ongoing successive concern in respect of materials, spatial

considerations, tonal values, textures and so forth. According to Kant, when the student response is singular they bring to bear his or her own individuality into the work, and can focus more thoroughly on certain aspects, which would otherwise be ignored. For example, a student is interested in exploring an elephant he or she saw at the zoo. Now to begin with this is not an unusual experience, for it follows a tradition in art and design experience, that starts with Stone Age cave drawings and includes Rembrandt Harmensz Van Rijn, Jean Millet, George Stubbs, Vincent van Gogh, Pablo Picasso, Ettore Sottsass, and more recently the German painter Georg Baselitz all of who, in one form or another, draw upon this kind of perceptive experience. One might, as a response to this, ask what grounds are there for saying that such a drawing has the potential to be an important element in learning? The teacher knowing this, might ask his or her students to consider how the elephant was walking and how one might capture this experience. Alternatively he or she might ask the students to consider how they would get across the scale and weight of this elephant into their collage, if they felt it was necessary. There is without doubt, many ways this can be achieved, but it seems important that one should, through individuality, know how one selects, perceives and makes connections of these kinds. It is one thing, however, to note that the elephant was limping and quite another to know how to capture this experience in sculptural, collage or pencil form. What needs pointing out here, is that the building of structure and form is a complex business in art and design practice that requires in part, an ability to handle materials in respect of understanding not only how the material responds but how the material can be manipulated.

It is not just the fact that one has noticed that the elephant was limping, but how does one communicate the sense of this in visual language? To further complicate the issue, there is the picture arrangement, the composition of which will also affect how the experience is communicated, not forgetting that the experience may be whimsical, a straightforward observation, a sad experience, a colourful or magical experience and so forth. Never having worked with these materials before, the student notices that the materials have limitations, but also possibilities that seem somewhat unique to the materials and the tools themselves. Some of the images that this person draws are in profile, others are in perspective and others seem flat. Suppose furthermore, that part of the background is in paper-chains, one of the figures is silhouetted against what appears to be a mountain range, another figure has one of its ears missing and standing next to this figure is a lion which has a huge head in relation to its body, offset against this is a small animal figure in the corner of the collage which appears to be shivering. One could go on with this description adding more detail and observation to the work. But if this experience presupposes imagination and description, and it seems to me that it does, one might say that these features, as aspects of the work itself, can become important in the way that one justifies the relevance and objectivity of the experience.

However, Kant's argument asserts that the student's imaginative work and his or her subsequent pleasure attached to this experience would as Makkreel points out (pp. 46-7), be tied to some definite form of an object, such as an elephant. In other words, one's imagination has to conform to the

laws of understanding. What this means is that when art and design positively embrace this concern, it does not treat such experience as anything other than primary. In making a drawing of an elephant, Makkreel goes on to say: "aesthetic judgements are comparable to perceptual judgements" (p.52) as in saying that the elephant's colour was grey or the monkey's fur was soft. Here visual and tactile qualities correspond to our perceptions. But such perceptions are not merely sensible properties of a certain object, as they may also embrace or conflict with imaginative responses. The teacher knows that one can turn such experience into something else. A student may use an elephant, for example, in a metaphorical sense to represent perhaps a symbol of strength and wisdom. The fact remains, however, as Wittgenstein recognised, that my observation of an object may not coincide with my seeing of this object, for what I see may relate to an interpretation of the object, but not from the point of view that this seeing can necessarily be observed in the object. The argument that one might deny Wittgenstein here, is that while I may abstract a felt quality from the object, this felt quality is nevertheless something which I would have observed in the object. Can one say that this felt quality is anything other than an observed experience, albeit an imaginative one? It would seem, that observation and seeing often coincide.

While in the ordinary sense one can assert that the colour of the elephant was grey, to paint this elephant would require a great deal more than just the application of the colour grey. It would seem that if one thinks of an elephant in observation terms one would invariably be thinking of its size, its mass, its scale, its movement, its three- dimensional form, its different skin

qualities and so on. But the difficulty is, that to draw, make or paint such an animal of this kind would in one sense relate to what one is observing. However, observing would also involve an intuitive and imaginative response towards this animal. It is by no means clear that the student could analyse what is being observed any better than what is being intuited. For the observation and the intuition both have their problems, which are not necessarily related, but can overlap. It is a requirement here, in this drawing, that not only should the student realise that the elephant has a certain shape, colour, texture and so on, but that he or she knows how to bring this experience to life. I see no way that one could bring to life certain experiences in art and design, without the content of such experience being dynamically related and interconnected to different perceptions that capture the character of this particular experience. In art and design education, it is difficult to know how one could capture an experience by how one simply classed or typed an object. For while the student can be claiming to be talking about a "pin", a "rod", a "cup", a "bowl", a "handle", a "wheel", a "wedge" and a "timber" surface, the maker, as David Pye asserts (1988, p.24), is concerned with what kind of individual shape and arrangement the student is talking about, what kind of intricate device or function such forms belong to? The distinction is, that while in many cases a maker will need to know what he or she is making, simply knowing how such an object is classed may not tell the maker very much about the particular object that they have to make. It seems that an object embodies many qualities which do not belong to any class of object. It follows that if a student is to make an object, the

making of this object requires an understanding of a range of particular qualities which such an object possesses in order to make it properly. Thus, the students understanding would relate to a range of particulars only. But the problem with this, is that even these particulars need interpreting, for the quality of finish in any object presupposes many sensitive judgements (refer back to Gerrit Rietveld's *Red and Blue Chair*).

If one examines the worked surface that a maker has used to cut into some material, one soon realises several things. That the depth of the cut, its width, its length, the angle of the cut and the serrated edge of the cut, have to be seen against the density, opaqueness, transparency of the material, the age of the material, the diversity of colour and texture, the effects of wear, the shadows which the cut makes, and other such qualities, when taken together in experience, are not factors that can be described as purely conceptual. To enquire further into this, one might ask why it is common practice in art and design education, for the teacher to say to students: "look and see" or "look closer at"? It is worth pausing to see how this comes about, for what the teacher is suggesting by this comment, is that one should in certain circumstances, unequivocally, "look and see" and learn from this experience. That the "looking and seeing" of these features described above can leave us with impressions too subtle and sensitive to be picked up, at times, by language use. The assumption is, that there may be qualities in seeing that cannot be grasped strictly by concepts. When it comes down to it the answer to what is educationally sound in art and design cannot be given purely in a verbal interpretation; one needs to "look and see". The misconception that

needs to be rebutted here is that "look and see" does not explain anything. In an analogous sense, could one not imagine uses for "look and see" to be sensibly employed? Certainly, the teacher would have an idea of why he or she wants the students to "look and see" but not necessarily in the form of "tell me what this object is". In looking and seeing one may be simply stressing the point that one should examine this experience more closely. Furthermore, if one takes our current example of the kind of marks that a maker can make, the different visible features that the student can pick out of from this experience often seem to depend further on "memories", intention, other formal aspects of the object, one's sense of touch, and the "mood" that he or she is in. These factors are not studied one by one, but involve in imaginative terms the participation of play and its unity. Of course, it is possible to neutralise or ignore some of the elements which seem to serve our experience, but if so, does this not change our experience and thus perhaps what is educationally important in learning? What kind of educational practice would one be construing if one attempts to dismiss what is affecting, without due consideration, our sense-perceptions in art and design experience.

The above argument, also requires us to note that it is not always the case that what one observes purely according to our sensation—language use will add anything to our conceptual understanding. Our observation and conceptual understanding may merely stand as a relation to one another, as opposed to criss-crossing each other's boundaries. In which case, there may be differences in each of these terms that cannot be reconciled or be merged together. When this happens, it is possible that our sense-impressions, as

Kant thought, are ones of feeling, a coexistence between understanding and imagination. In other words, the particular experience that the student is having cannot be clearly categorised and sensation—language typed. When one describes an experience the teacher may expect the student's reply to be in the form of sensation—language type, but can it be claimed that I am holding my understanding of this experience purely in these terms? The teacher knows that by looking at the art and design work that this is indeed not the case. Similarly, one should not assume that a sense-impression which cannot be categorised because of the nature of the experience, makes it necessarily inferior to one which can be categorised. It is arguable, that an experience which cannot be so defined in sensation—language terms, may be extending itself into a deeper level of experience, which the sensation—language type cannot comprehend because of the limitations imposed by its categorisation.

What seems to influence aesthetic understanding most, is how one sees the object now, as this experience influences the next step that one takes. How one is seeing it now, forms the significance for us, it is this understanding that brings about seeing the connections that the student needs to make in his or her work. The view, however, that the aesthetic might correspond to sensible perceptions must be treated with caution, for as Kant claimed, what is apprehended in aesthetic form, as Makkreel points out: "is not just perceptual shape, but a purposiveness" (p.61). The assertion being, that the student's response to a given object on aesthetic lines perceives the object according to a mutual relationship between imagination and understanding. That is to say, that it is this experience which is in part

responsible for the actual object in aesthetic terms. The distinction is, that it makes no sense for the teacher or for that matter anybody else, to try to judge or experience such objects capable of being guided by concepts alone. However, it should be clear enough, that the character of the aesthetic reinforces the identity of the individual and with it his or her understanding of art and design experience. It is without doubt that what the individual is identifying is of the utmost importance to educational experience.

3. 7

It seems, in the main, that although the aesthetic in art and design is a visual or other sense-experience this does not necessarily imply that the sort of ability that one should expect students to develop is only one of a direct observational kind. For instance, I can imagine objects floating around this room that for one reason or another intrigue me to the extent that I want to capture this experience in a painting. The point being, that aesthetic expression is not dependent solely on observational work, and even if it were (see Rembrandt's gold helmets), one might suspect that there is more to this kind of experience than just a simple observation. In the case of aesthetic judgement, Kant sees the representation of the work as a valid one because it conforms to cognition in general (*CJ*, §9, 217). Thus the concern is, from a teaching point of view, that this cognition in general (imagination and understanding) presupposes in part the aesthetic feeling response and its sensibility. Let us investigate this further. An art teacher may decide to use music to stimulate a different kind of painting, or blindfold their students so that they draw and paint from what they touch. Here, the concept of "seeing" is of a different kind than that of observation. It is without doubt that one of the crucial elements of drawing, painting and making is bodily/tactile contact with the work, the materials and tools. Working on a computer does not give you this kind of experience, but the sense of touch and the quality of the material can be important to any drawing, painting or making (see the work of Frank Auerbach, Ian McKeever, Joseph Beuys, William Turner, Brice Marden

and Antoni Gaudi Y Cornet). In viewing what might be called the textural qualities of such work, the tensions, softness, rhythm, roughness and dynamic form of these lines and structures, must not be regarded from the painter's or the maker's point of view, as indeterminate mark-making, blemishes or imperfections in the painting or making. For the painter's brushstrokes and the maker's handling of various kinds of cuts, are intentional and often serve an underlying purpose to transform ideas. The way the body can move, the way the painter or maker swings his or her arm in different rhythms and intensity suggest that the sense of "touch" is not arbitrary matter. The assumption being, that the sense of "touch" in the work is not driven by concepts alone, but may also involve sensations and perceptions which in turn produce concepts. One reacts with one's body whether one is aware of it or not, and for the painter or the maker this tactile contact and its experience can affect one's imaginative sensibility. Pedagogically, the teacher needs to be aware of these factors in order to direct and improve the student's understanding of art and design experience.

The first issue that I wish to raise here, which I take from Armstrong, is that the sense of "touch" can not only be defined in many different ways, but denotes more often than not a wealth of possible experiences. Secondly, this idea of "touch" is somewhat misleading, for if Armstrong is to be believed (1988, pp.127-9) there is no sense-organ that encompasses "touch". As Armstrong writes: "Perhaps this difficulty can be met by saying that touch does not involve a special organ but rather a special procedure: objects coming into contact with the flesh" (p.129). The problem

is, that there does not seem to be any kind of exact procedure which the student of art and design can follow, for the sense of touch that the student is concerned with has to do rather with the perception of touch, which Armstrong calls beliefs about tactile perceptions (p.129). To apprehend and direct one's sense of touch, must as Armstrong mentions, involve stimulation and use. But since, according to Armstrong (p.129), there is difficulty in locating the sense-organ for touch, how does one know that "this" touch is influencing the perception? For Armstrong, one possible answer to this problem could be that the perception was stimulated by the sensation of touch such that the perception acquired was due to or bound up with the intention and stimulation of the touch itself. Thus, as a teacher, if I ask the students to grip their paintbrushes or jack-planes very tightly the perception of this experience may well modify their actions or the result of the work. This happens because the sense-perception involved due to the tension in the grip of the paintbrush or jack-plane is able to stimulate images, actions or feelings of a particular kind. Accordingly, it may seem that the sense of touch alone can have an important effect in stimulating ideas useful for art an design practice. From this, one can identify that the operation and stimulation of sense-perception can cause and extend students understanding of visual experience and thus its educational value. Yet, it may be dubious to argue that there is difficulty in locating the sense-organ of touch, for the sense-organ here relates to the skin itself, to one's grip of the plane.

In dealing with touch, it can be useful for the teacher to point out that our sensory receptors in our fingertips hold a greater concentration of sensory

receptors than in any other part of the body. One can distinguish, for instance, the contact of two points being together closer in our fingertips than in any other part of the body. This is significant as it demonstrates the sensitivity of our touch. Of course, knowing this, does not tell us what is immediately "felt" by touch experience. Now, one might conclude from this, that the visual experience of touch must be vague, but this need not necessarily be the case. If one combines with touch the visual impression of the marks that one is making, then the description itself may not be as indeterminate as one might think. I concur with Armstrong that this kind of experience, through the surface area of the touch, its pressure, bodily displacement, motion, and change, informs us about what is going on in our bodies and what is being immediately perceived by the sense of touch. On these lines, the teacher might deduce and exploit exercises that involve through touch, scratching the surface, painting with a twig, dragging the pencil, smudging, smearing, dry brush work, using various parts of the hand itself, chisel-edge paintbrushes, painting with a six foot paintbrush and comparing it with a one inch paintbrush, and using rags and rollers in the work. It would seem that at one level, one cannot talk about stimulation and use as though they work independently. When the student drags the pencil he or she is being stimulated by this sense-perception experience which in turn is influenced by the use of the sense-perception experience; the stimulation and use feed off each other. There is considerable scope here for the art and design teacher to discuss and be aware of the various relations that tactile experiences, can manifest.

Our aesthetic response to touch, however, is further complicated by the fact that in painting with a twig or in holding a jack-plane, what one perceives by touch, as Armstrong asserts (1962, p.11), is via the twig or jack-plane. It is the feel of the twig or the jack-plane that my touch perceives, as my hand pushes, turns, drags, slides or scratches the surface of the work. But how far can one insist on this? If I am drawing or making an object in the snow my hands may be so cold, that physiologically this experience may be the dominant factor which influences the quality of the work, and not the instrument itself. No doubt possible concepts would interconnect with our touch perception, but this is exactly what the teacher would want his or her students to explore and recognise. Alternatively,, as Armstrong writes: "A hole in my tooth, can feel larger than it really is, when explored by the tongue" (p.12). In the same way, by keeping my eyes closed and feeling my face (eyes, nose, ears mouth, cheeks and so on in relation to the smoothness, roughness, coldness, hardness, convex and concave shapes and spatial forms) with one of my hands and recording this tactile experience on paper can change one's understanding about touch and visual experience, in a way, that is not possible by any other means. In touching one's own body, there is the fact that two sense-organ areas are touching one another, which is not the same as touching an inanimate object. Furthermore, students could also consider the kind of pressure or resistance of pressure they are applying to the skin surface, for all of this can affect the visual impression. These kinds of exercises are important since they can encourage the student to consider further the notion as to what constitutes aesthetic experience and understanding. For in "seeing"

this shape, or in making a leg for a table the visual impression of this shape or the making of this table leg undergoes a variety of phenomenological judgements that can affect and determine one's procedure, imagination and method of experience. It follows, that there are a vast array of pedagogical turns that the art and design teacher can manipulate in order to demonstrate both the significance and accountability involved in art and design learning.

Student's ability and learning may be further enhanced when one asks them to do a drawing in two minutes, then over a period of five minutes, and then over a period of twelve hours and so on. In each case, the time conditions are important aspects of aesthetic learning. As Kant identified, there are immediate and reflective experiences which are being evoked and revealed by how one perceives such experience through time and this determines (along with space) in part, the kind of marks that one lays down in the work (*CPR*, A.33-B.54). Only when one draws a line, Kant argues (*CPR*,B.154) in the physical sense does the perception of what one may be thinking get determined, but that this determination is intuited by ourselves (*CPR*, B.156). One's awareness of the time factor as a length or magnitude of experience in the work, while being something that is given, is nevertheless constructed and determined by the student. In the student's work itself, the intuition of time coexists with the spatial qualities of the object. Consequently, a student's understanding of the spatial qualities are held together by the factor of time, in that the shape, size, colour, proportions and their relationships "necessarily stand in time-relations" (*CPR*, B.51). There is then, nothing "unreal" about space and time in that all objects appear to be constructed by these conditions

of experience. But in order to identify in one loose sense what is "real" about a particular experience, A.J. Ayer argues (1976, pp.76-9), that the student must be able to discriminate and correlate under different conditions, the properties through which an object presents itself in perception or as a concept. In which case, what is "real", as Ayer goes on to say, can be seen in many different ways. Now while I do not wish to explore any further what establishes realism, as this would lead me back into theoretical arguments, the issues that concern us here are that aesthetic experience presupposes what is real by the kind of perception, imagination and conceptual understanding that is being determined by the student. The art and design teacher is aware that this is not something that one can know in advance of the aesthetic work, for what is real about art and design work has to be perceived, and one can only identify what one is perceiving by constructing and analysing the experience. Thus one may safely say, as Kant does, that time and space are "two sources of knowledge" (*CPR*, B.55-A.39) upon which the aesthetic work is derived. One objection might be that our awareness of an object could be spontaneous which therefore may not give us any outward signs about our space-time construction. What is more, if our response is intuitive one may have to consider that this intuitive feeling is responsible for the experience and the space-time construction. The student may be learning the meaning of art and design experience from his or her intuitive feelings rather than from how he or she discriminated by space-time construction. The structure of experience, however, is affected by the properties which arrange our experiences for us. Intuitive or not, one depends to some extent on the connections that one is able

to build and this can only be realised by how the student puts together his or her spatial and temporal relations. A student is unlikely to argue his or her case properly without some reference that satisfy these conditions. Even so, there are difficulties about this. In art and design experience, not only may our spatial and temporal relations face in different directions, but to what degree is such experience "ordered" or "constructed"? The flow of the spatial and temporal construction may seep out or be saturated not in any linear sense but as an outburst of feeling.

A crucial role here for the art and design teacher is that the student's work must be publicly perceptible in some manner, but one could argue that simply drawing a line on a piece of paper is a mark which can be identified publicly. The teacher wishes, of course, to infuse a better understanding of mark-making than this. Let us, therefore, explain further how the teacher might explore the connections of what is publicly perceptible in art and design learning and understanding. By getting students to rapidly produce a drawing of an object in three minutes will produce a different kind of experience than a drawing produced over three days. In each drawing, the experience is markedly different and moreover, so is the visual quality of the drawing. This happens because different tensions and perceptions are being extended over the work that lapse, relate and transcend over the different experiences that the student is encountering in the progression of the work. This can be shown by how a student dwells on an object, the different thoughts, feelings and perceptions that these situations entail. Equally, such experience also relates to the different meeting points of a drawing where the lines cross, the breaks

that one makes in a drawing between a curved shape and a straight line, by the geometry and rhythms, the changing thickness of the line, how a light touch meets a dark touch, the length of the line, the line direction, the compositional structure, the roughness of the line, the building up of different layers of line, the tonal changes in the line and the line's movement. One surmises from this, that the object details change as a consequence of what is being constituted in part by the time and spatial conditions that one constructs in the work.

A further criticism that one might throw at any idea of spatial and temporal construction is when one is faced with an object or painting that involves several different issues in the work itself. If on the one side of a painting there is an image of a dog and on the other side of this painting there is an image of an apple, does one see the apple and the dog separately? If one can see the apple and the dog at the same time what kind of spatial and temporal view of the apple and dog determines the place or image of these objects? It may seem that one does not construe such an experience as just an optical one, for a thing of beauty is dependent on how it feels not on how it looks. Similarly, what happens when an object involves multiple imagery, for how does one then envisage the spatial and temporal locations? Many objects and paintings have a variety of features to them and one may not be able to neatly separate out the images, colours, forms or spaces that seem to occupy and inform these works. It is common practice in making or painting that the teaching approach attempts to encourage the student to interchange and build different areas, reworking and reconstructing reciprocally as an ongoing

concern in the work itself. This manner of working is complex, as many elements of this experience are determined by a variety of sense—conceptual conditions that are being realised and developed in different ways. The teacher knows that one's understanding of such work and its subsequent development is not dependent on identifying and experiencing these different aspects separately, that the strength of the work lies in being able to imagine these aspects together. There are various times in the work when the student must refuse to judge the work as though certain features such as line, space, colour, scale, proportion and so on, exist independently of other compositional factors. Educationally, this is an experience where the correctness changes in part against the object. Of course, one may be able to analyse particular features in the work separately and the teacher may feel that this is necessary in order to appreciate and develop an understanding of the object or painting sense. But, one must reject any attempt that one can purely understand the art and design work through this kind of approach. The verdict is, that it may be counter-intuitive to claim that one's spatial and temporal understanding must be understood in this way. It does not follow that by analysing particular areas of the work that the "place" or "location" of these features are identified in this way. Certainly, the teacher can say to a student, that the back of the chair that he or she is making needs further development or that this house, or tree in the landscape that the student is painting needs more reworking. But the teaching practice involves much more than this, as the teacher is aware that there may be any number of impressions maintaining the image of the chair, the house or the tree. To deal with these kinds of problems it is

standard practice in education for the teacher to be on the look out for personal commitment shown by the students, and a sign of this experience is when the students show that they are making transformations in the work.

What is askew in the current argument is that one's imagination and intuition is often needed in order to feel the "presence" and the effect of these sense-impressions, ruling out any clear reference to spatial and temporal relations. The work being handled by the student often requires that what is observed connects various features of the work together. In the painting work of Signar Polke and Jasper Johns, references are made that point to past and present experiences, so much so, that the past and the present seem to overlap, coexist. In William Hogarth's *A Rake's Progress*, the portrayal is one of satire, of social commentary. The art and design teacher is aware that this work has a rich vein of humour and pathos which penetrates into almost every scene of *A Rake's Progress.* What I am attempting to say is that these qualities are not factors that can be simply isolated, placed and examined as though one is analysing the stresses in a piece of timber, for to do so would be to miss the point of the experience. The imaginative expression of such work may only happen because there are other connections involved which at times may have to be experienced simultaneously in order to feel the full force and relevance of the work. The pathos and humour in *A Rake's Progress*, can often be felt as one experience and this is how in one respect, it should be. The portrayal of satire works in *A Rake's Progress* because of the way that one is able to imagine and feel in one experience both the pathos and humour connecting and merging together. Here, because of the particular way that the pathos and

humour is handled in the painting, both of these qualities penetrate and overlap each other. Not surprisingly, the perception that one gets from this kind of experience poses problems in the way spatial and temporal notions appear to be operating, because such occasions depend on the play of a number of cognitive—feeling powers working and interacting simultaneously and cooperatively. To feel the "life" of the work means engaging in this process. The implications of the time and spatial conditions, presuppose a network of perceptions which interconnect and manifest themselves in different ways. Just how exactly time and space affect particular pieces of work is difficult to answer and deserves a more extended discussion than I am able to give. It seems unlikely, however, that one can claim that this kind of dynamical combined experience as heightened sensuous awareness, amounts to non-learning, for the acquisition of learning, as I have attempted to show, springs from many sources not all of which are disclosed in sensation—language. Learning cannot be seen as exclusive to either the Kantian or Wittgensteinian doctrines. A heightened sensuous experience presupposes learning of a certain kind that is crucial to the development of the art and design work. But it is true to say, that aesthetic judgements require that the students use their imagination in a responsible way, and this the students learn by developing arguments and correcting mistakes in the work by sharing, responding and testing their ideas with others.

In any art and design learning process, one must not assume that a three-minute drawing must by definition be inferior to the three-day drawing, for all is dependent on what is experienced, seen, intended, reacted to, and

reflected upon; the intensity of the experience. Yet, even here there is an important time sequence that affects the intuition of the experience and thus our reaction to the work. Indeed, in general, a three-minute drawing will often have a quality to it that a three-day drawing cannot match and vice versa. Once again, the whole point of such experiences is to demonstrate how the picture quality of a drawing can change depending on whether a drawing is produced rapidly or slowly. Similarly, according to Wittgenstein, a student's approach to these kinds of exercises can vary from one student to the next because of his or her working method. In this instance one student may decide to concentrate on the outline of the forms, working from the middle to the outside, another student may decide to work in this fashion, but produce a quality of line that is markedly different from the other student simply because the drawing fired his or her imagination and a third student, who feels the tension and pressure more than most, will also produce a different kind of drawing. In each case, this individuality seems crucially important to the development of the drawing and its creative effect and this is what the teacher should exploit. The teacher can do this, in one respect, by pointing out to students the kinds of "moves" that can colour one's experience and the subsequent interpretation, but much of this would relate to particular circumstances. This is not to say, that the teacher would not discuss the general learning notions and ideas that students might have to consider in a project. So much so, that what the teacher raises in such discussions will often prove invaluable for the student in a number of ways. One obstacle here is, that one should recognise the fact that in art and design education, the

particularity of the experience, as I have often pointed out, is not from the cognitive to the sensuous or vice versa, but rather dynamically reflects an interrelated and total experience. In each drawing that students produce, whether it is a three-minute drawing, a three-hour drawing, or a three-day drawing, a different kind of control with their marks, contact with the surface, consciousness, mood and perception varies in connection with how they respond, feel and interpret these experiences imaginatively. The same thing happens if students are asked to do a diagrammatic drawing, a tonal drawing in black and white, a tonal drawing in colour, positive or negative spaces, a collage, a relief and so forth.

As a counter-argument, one might suggest that the sense of touch, the consciousness that one could possess and one's mood and spontaneity in such drawings are indeterminate, but what does this mean in aesthetic terms? Whether touch, consciousness, mood or spontaneity are relevant or not is dependent not on whether such factors are indeterminate in logical—truth terms, but on the creative act—perception of these factors for artistic or design purposes. For Armstrong and Wittgenstein, one can treat act—perception as evidence or grounds upon which certain conclusions can be reached. If I say for example, that the marks in this drawing are bold and dynamic I can as a teacher point to such effects in the particular work and describe what I "see". In so doing, as Armstrong states: "I have provided my questioner with a reason" (1988, p.144) for believing that such marks are bold and dynamic. Thus, while the student's perception of what is "seen" may be questionable, he or she has provided a means by which such experience can

be argued. In other words, what I take the object as, from the point of view of "seeing" the object, says something about what I know about this object. The argument is, that certain qualities which I have apprehended, as a consequence of "seeing" the object, provide me with a reason for stating what I "see". Armstrong's and Wittgenstein's argument is that my perceptions represent part of how I apprehend reality. Of course, as I have shown, "seeing" may not quite be this straightforward. One case, against this kind of interpretation in art and design practice, is that aesthetically one can be aroused by a variety of stimuli which may very well modify the student's understanding through different encounters with the work. To amplify this, it is possible to claim that the object is bold and dynamic in various ways depending on how one is "seeing" the object. It may not be clear, therefore, that the description that I give, corresponds to how others might see the same features in the same object. They may well see the bold and dynamic features that I am describing, but see these bold and dynamic features differently, or see the same features but attach other meanings to them. It could also be that what I see as bold and dynamic is being attributed to other factors in the work that I have not noticed. It is not unusual for a teacher to suggest to students that the manner in which they have painted the objects in their paintings comes across as bold and dynamic because of the way they are drawn. Certainly, such comments must raise our concern for if the teacher is claiming that the objects in the drawing appear bold and dynamic, he or she must point out the contingent factors which make the objects bold and dynamic in this painting.

He or she might also point out some of the alternative ways in which such effects can be further achieved or extended.

One of the arguments that further connects a student's object understanding, is that he or she must consider the meaning of the object as not being something conferred on the object as he or she encounters it; what the students create connects to other previous encounters with the object. The case being, that the teacher must encourage the student to reflect and bring to bear on the work previous experiences that they have acquired. The student can show perhaps what they have learnt from previous exercises by applying what they have learnt from these occasions. Here, the sophistication of the student's understanding about an object must mean that the student has examined his or her object in a variety of ways, distinguishing the fact that learning requires the modification of meaning, as new perceptions of thought and experience are identified. It is worth bearing in mind, however, as McAdoo argues (pp. 116-4), that a student may begin a project from an unlearnt starting point, despite the fact that he or she may be tapping into previous experiences. Each new experience that a student may tackle, poses some problems that he or she has not encountered before and it is these new aspects that may need particular attention. It does not follow, of course, that because a student has tackled the same project repeatedly that he or she have not learnt something new each time. The diversity of art and design experience allows the opportunity for a student to examine a particular issue repeatedly, but in different ways. Furthermore, a teacher of art and design may wish to go over certain experiences because of issues stemming from the

project's aesthetic complexity. For example, there would be many issues arising out of how the students would demonstrate that they understood still-life painting, for as any art and design teacher knows, what is involved in still-life painting has a long history and a practice that cannot be appreciated in one lesson.

For the teacher, he or she will be looking for visual signs of alterations in students work, which may or may not be derived purely from observation experience. What the teacher needs to recognise is the manner in which visual alterations in the work are an essential process in themselves, for such experience further enhances the student's understanding of art and design practice. Alterations transform the work. It represents a mark of significance, a feature of how the work is developing and an act of consideration and thought. There is often no way in which the student will be able to observe the affect of a certain quality in his or her work and its potential, unless he or she is able make corrections and changes. Moreover, it could be argued, that since meaning in art and design cannot be a preconceived experience, that the only sufficient and justifiable way that a student can assert and extend his or her visual understanding is by demonstrating a willingness to explore and discover. By altering the work, the student is provoking new experiences and perceptions of the work itself, as he or she is remodelling its arrangement, whereby the images, experiences and ideas that the student is working with are being reinterpreted and analysed. The premise being, that the process of alteration or reworking an object is a significant element of the learning experience because it demonstrates not only

that it takes time to make and to form ideas, but unless alterations are being made to the work (which again may be over a period of time), it becomes difficult to determine the extent to which such-and-such a person has or can show development in his or her understanding. Without modifying one's learning how can the student locate and place new aspects, or reveal different layers of experience and extended relationships? One of the difficulties that I have noticed students having in relation to this experience within an art and design context, is the way that students can allow the initial marks that they make determine the development of the drawing, painting or designed object. This is a recurring problem in the development of the work and particular attention should be paid to this issue. There are times when student will lack the confidence and critical ability in making aesthetic judgements in their work and cling to what they know because it is "safe". Indeed, it is not unusual to be taken in by the sensuous nature of one's own experience, without determining how these sense—conditons are affecting the work.

It might seem that Wittgenstein's notion of "organisation", sensation—language, perceptual knowledge and concept of meaning, are perhaps reasons that can prevent the student from reworking the object in certain alternative ways. The conflict here, is that these elements are often needed to develop one's creative understanding, even when such factors seem to point to another kind of thinking about art and design education. However, to see the potential in one's work, one may have to abandon any preconceptions that one may have, remove the problems that Wittgenstein poses about meaning, and work simply with one's spontaneity, its mood, and

inner-sense experience. This experience can contribute to the student's understanding because it can open up new experiences that enlarge his or her awareness of certain aspects of visual expression and meaning. There may not be any logical sense to this approach that can be properly explained in definite conceptual terms, for to do so would be to give an artificial picture in which to judge this kind of experience. None the less, it could be argued that part of the teacher's responsibility is to set up situations whereby students have to consider, differentiate and compare objects through different approaches, so that perceptual and imaginative understanding can be acquired and developed in different ways involving different perceptions, behaviour and techniques. The temptation for the teacher and the student in learning terms, is to suppress one's feelings, momentary impulses or emotions, but from an art and design analysis these factors can strike at the very heart of creativity. As C.J.B. Macmillan writes: "Human beings may see, but we should remember that commenting on it in just this way may prevent more significant learning" (1995, p.45).

3. 8

The point has already been made, that while perception may be objective, as Kant thought (*CJ*, §2), such perceptions are not solely responsible for aesthetic representation, for aesthetic discrimination, as he argues, is apprehended by imaginative means. In other words, the form of the object aesthetically, is in free-play, an experience in character which is not necessarily contingent on knowing the object in purely conceptual terms. One's creative understanding is not attached to any clear system of thought because imaginatively I can judge the object's logical sense, as an aesthetic experience, by feeling alone. That as an experience, our imagination is attached in various ways involving sensory and conceptual understanding presupposing different relations that are sensed and thought. This requires one to see that learning in art and design involves imaginative experience not as forming a logical train of thought in a systematic fashion, but one that involves, as Kant claims, the conscious feeling of the mind and its state (*CJ*, §1). Kant's argument is, that the imagination allows us to experience objects that would otherwise not be possible to experience if one had to employ deterministic means of understanding. As remarked previously, it is tempting to think that it is purely our observations which determine and provoke aesthetic judgements, but if this were the case, all that the student or teacher need refer to and explain is the formal properties of the work. However, as I have indicated, there are cognitive—feeling states as well as sensation—language that can affect the play of our creative and conceptual

operations. Given that this may be the case, what are the practical implications of these concerns for education? Now, Kant's concept of the aesthetic in an interconnected sense, embraces perception, thought and imagination. Seen in this way, the teacher needs to be concerned with the fact that art and design experience, to various degrees, always involves a combination of these factors, but not in any definite order.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant makes the case that imagination is responsible for perception (*CPR*, A.120-1). The contention is, that the possibility of experience, as Kant argues, necessarily rests on the individual being able to imaginatively produce a synthesis of knowledge or experience. Understanding, Kant argues, must have a synthesis through imagination (*CPR*, A.119). The premise seems to be, that all objects of sense to contain understanding, are conditioned firstly by intuitive and imaginative means. As Kant writes in his footnotes: "Psychologists have hitherto failed to realise that imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself" (*CPR*, A.120). For Henrich (p. 36) the significance of this, is that imagination is always present in understanding, which as Henrich goes on to say "necessitated the move from an ultimately empirical aesthetic to an aesthetic founded upon transcendental principles" (p.37). The point of this remark, from a teaching side, is to suggest that aesthetic understanding cannot be purely understood or explained in terms of only the student's experience. The argument is, that by simply making references to one's "inner" self experience does not distinguish the particular way that all art and design objects are manifested. One can envisage, for instance, using the imagination to predict some future event as

one finds in the work of Hieronymus Bosch, or alternatively, one could hardly describe Marc Chagall's paintings as connected to what is based on experience. For such work cannot be substantiated purely from this point of view. The argument being, that one can have intuitions, thoughts and ideas independent of an actual observed physical experience. It remains, however, that more often than not, there is a mutual dependence in aesthetic experience which in the Kantian sense, combines intuitive and conceptual sense imaginatively. Thus, the imaginative experience corresponds to intuitive experience, but to present the possibility of this experience in a tangible form, it is necessary for this experience, by imaginative means to be conditioned by concepts in general.

The thesis that perception also combines imagination in Kant's thinking, needs further debate for as Strawson cites, Kant's understanding of imagination in the *Critique of Pure Reason* operates (1) to connect perceptions of different objects of the same kind in another dimension and (2) the imagination also connects different perceptions of the same object of a given kind (1970, p.33). One would also have to admit that it is possible to construct other arrangements of how such a perception and its imaginative connections could be further explored. For example, would it not be possible for a student to connect different perceptions of an object with different perceptions of several different objects. It is also possible that the students perceptions of the object before them bears no resemblance to this object and that what they experience of this object is not the object at all, but rather the effect of what surrounds the object itself, or alternatively, that the perception

of the object is an accumulation of different aspects of the same object. It should be obvious from this that one could keep adding different arrangements and combinations to our perceptions. What Strawson further explains about this is: " (1) that this sort of combination is dependent on the possession and application of this sort of concept, that is, that if we did not conceptualise our sensory intake in this sort of way, then our sensory impressions would not be combined in this sort of way; (2) that distinguishable perceptions combined in this way, whether they are temporally continuous (as when we see an object move or change colour) or temporally separate (as when we see an object again after an interval), really are distinguishable, that is different, perceptions" (p.39).

In agreeing with Strawson on these Kantian points, one would also have to concede that our perceptions may be spontaneous and that such perceptions may be caused by the optical effect of the work and by what it means to "see" and to notice, in Wittgensteinian terms, an aspect of what is being noticed. For example, one argument here would be that I may see the cup in front of me, but I do not see this object as a cup at all, but as a storage jar for my pens and pencils. The fact then that I "see" the cup, does not mean necessarily that I see it as a cup, for as I have suggested, this object to me is not a cup, but a storage jar. To find out whether I was confusing the cup with a storage jar, may, of course, depend in part on my concepts of these objects. However, what this poses for art and design, is that the artist or the designer may have special reasons for sensing and constructing particular objects that have nothing necessarily to do with the sensing and constructing of physical

objects. That the student of art and design may not be interested in the fact that this object in front of him or her is simply a cup as if what confirms this object has to do with its actual physical existence. In this instance, he or she may justifiably argue that what confirms the actual physical existence of this object, at one level, has nothing at all to do with what logically confirms the existence of this object as purely a perception of epistemic, phenomenological and conceptual analysis, but rather, how one experiences such an object imaginatively. In learning terms, what one wants to handle in art and design tends to be those factors that will enable the student to construct a presence, ambience, character or mood in relation to the object, in such a way that the object's experience sustains aesthetically, feelings of life. Actual or not, the teacher knows that it is what is imagined that turns what one sees into something worth exploring. Perhaps, the pedagogical lesson to be learnt is that in taking the object as a cup, the student who is interested in giving this experience meaning, might investigate the object's history. This might entail exploring the object's family history, where it was brought, whether it was a present that was given to the student, its physical structure, its distinguishing features, how it is used, the student's particular interest in the object, the place that this object has on the table, how one touches and feels the object, its weight, how it reflects colour and so on.

Teaching-wise, one needs a practical perspective about imaginative experience that one can actually observe and apply to learning situations. To some extent this has been covered by Wittgenstein's remarks, but questionably, one might construe that since the imagination in the Kantian

sense, is in free-play, the aesthetic must then lack some conceptual coherence. Indeed, one might think that because the student must be "free" to judge his or her own response to an object, Kant's analysis on the one hand vindicates the claim that the aesthetic is a personal response, but this might misconstrue Kant's other claim, as stated, that the aesthetic could be considered universal. Let us, therefore, discuss these two issues. Firstly, it could be argued, as one has seen throughout this work, that art and design experience is as conceptually coherent as it needs to be. That is to say, that the argument that the aesthetic makes is not purely conceptual (what is?) because what determines its value is subject to creative concerns. If one takes for granted that this is the case, one still might think that this kind of experience, because it is creative, is simply subjective. On the other hand, the difficulty that one has with this, is that it is misleading, at least in aesthetic terms. For what matters is not purely the conceptual coherence, but rather as Wittgenstein seems to argue in the general sense, whether the imagination relates to the situation of life in which it takes place.

By suggesting that the aesthetic judgement can be objective, I am claiming that art and design understanding, in Wittgensteinian terms, must be in part descriptive of its expression, but also, that the work is related to the kind of experience that one is attempting to portray. The principle that there is a lack of conceptual coherence in aesthetic experience might seem confusing or incompatible with art and design understanding. For example, in relation to Frank Kafka's novel *Metamorphosis*, Hertzberg writes: "Does the story show that one can, after all, remain the person that one is, even after ceasing to be

human (in the story, the insect clearly remains Gregor Samsa), or should it be discounted on the grounds of conceptual incoherence?" (1991, p.146). Likewise, there is indeed nonsense in a great deal of painting, but as Hacker implies (p.185, Vol.III, part 1), there is nonsense and nonsense. One can find this nonsense in Marc Chagall's paintings, in Paul Klee's work and in much of "Primitive Art", but there is a serious side to this aesthetic nonsense that cannot be dismissed out of hand. The case being, that such work is not constructed arbitrarily. This factor alone should make us question what constitutes learning and understanding. Aesthetic education argues that Marc Chagall's or Paul Klee's work brings to life experiences that reveal aspects of of some importance about our world. One can further question whether Kafka's story or Paul Klee's paintings are meaningful, by one's ability to imagine whether the characterisation of such work reflects something particular about life that seems worth expressing. The teaching in art and design, therefore, must be emphasising this kind of experience.

Kant's analysis argues that: "humanity signifies, on the one hand, the universal feeling of sympathy, and, on the other, the faculty of being able to communicate universally one's inmost self-properties constituting in conjunction the befitting social spirit of mankind" (*CJ*, §60, 355). Of course, one could insist that Picasso's Cubist work is hardly representative, in one respect, of "real" physical objects, but there is nothing "false" nor naive about Picasso's perceptions. What seems to matter here, is whether one can justify and account for the perception's correspondence and its reality. Yet, one cannot account for the perception correspondence by claiming that one is able

to locate it "here" in one's visual field, which in any case would be impossible, as this would require that I can pinpoint with accuracy, at every step of the way, how the "this" of this particular perception can be found. To grasp Picasso's understanding of art, however, is first of all to recognise that there is an imaginative content involved in establishing the meaning of the experience. In the Kantian sense, as Makkreel argues: "Here interpretation is subject to revision introduced by the imagination's efforts to link sense and intellect and becomes as much a function of judgement as of reason" (p.112). Furthermore, one has no need to "locate" the perception in order to justify the experience, because I know what Cubism and what Picasso's particular perceptions represent without having, as Jackson argues (pp.120-1), to locate in the visual sense the meaning of the work. The crucial argument being that the visual sense, which is what the teacher is concerned with in art and design teaching, may not be dependent on any particular aspect of the work, because the way the work is constructed and developed connects and corresponds to a variety of reflective and immediate judgements. As mentioned, one may not be able to specifically place an aesthetic experience, but this has to be seen against the fact that art and design experience transcends boundaries. Thus the key argument for the teacher has nothing to do with the precise location of an experience, but rather, with how the pictorial sense is being portrayed through the argument that the student is constructing in his or her work.

Similarly, the argument that Jackson makes, is that: "I can during a concerto, listen happily to the strings and unhappily to the piano. And that when I have a red and non-red after-image together, I am sensing red-ly with

respect to one thing and non-red-ly with respect to another. But what are these things with respect to which I am sensing, for there need, of course, be no appropriate physical thing in the offing? It is hard to see what they could be other than the mental objects of the act-object theory" (p.124). To establish then, the common argument that is often put forward about aesthetic experience, that, "I know what I like", may seem somewhat problematic. As the objection here, of course, is how do I "know" what I like, for clearly in art and design experience, much depends on what constitutes and determines one's response and analysis of this perception and what is being observed and noted. Following this line of reasoning one can see why Wittgenstein was not generally in favour of ostensive definitions, for to point to an object, in this instance, as an explanation of "this is what I like", would not explain what is being distinguished aesthetically. In Wittgensteinian terms, "this is what I like" would not explain anything, for when he mentions that "Red is complex", his response is: "We are not familiar with any technique, to which that sentence might be alluding" (*Z* §338). I have also shown that perception differs depending on the kind of object and intention that one has in mind, but that this aesthetic perception can be shown to be accountable by the kind of work that the student produces. One has already seen that if the student wishes to establish certain perceptual and conceptual qualities in his or her work then he or she must do so by showing an understanding in the visual sense of what constitutes size, shape, distance, smoothness, texture, colour and other spatial qualities. However, one cannot treat aesthetic experience as though it is simply an examination of physical objects and their relations. In

that, one is confronted by the fact, that in aesthetic terms, qualities such as shape, composition and size are not elements purely determined in themselves. Not only does the artist or designer compare such forms, but they select and construct these elements on the basis of the kind of relationships which these forms seem to manifest in perception. What needs affirming here, as Wittgenstein maintains, is that colour, shape, texture and so on, are also determined by the kind of light, spatial sense, tonal values, opaqueness, transparency, thickness, rhythm and direction of line, smoothness and other such qualities. Consequently, colours, shape and texture, which the student manipulates can be considered from different points of view.

Bearing the implications of what has been said, it seems in learning terms inadequate to say, "that I know what I like", because at the very least, this remark obscures the complex conditions that affect the understanding of art and design educational experience. This is not to deny, that because I cannot describe it, that it necessarily follows that I do not know what I like. For it may be argued, that the presence of certain objects themselves may be enough to say, "this is what I like". Moreover, the fact that I may not be able to explain why I feel I enjoy this particular object, may not in any particular way diminish my feelings for this object. A further ground for refusing to accept that "I know what I like" is meaningless, is to say that at times it may be appropriate to say just this. In learning terms, a searching issue for someone who might claim that they "know what they like", without explaining it, may itself prove to be invaluable in the determination of other experiences.

"I know what I like" may not be inconsequential because it can be used in a variety of ways, some of which may call for such a remark to be made.

The issue for the teacher of art and design, as I have indicated, is what brings the experience into prominence. What then does this require? For the teacher as well as the student, this experience requires noticing how the experience was perceived and what distinguishes the particular expression that constitutes the work. In toning a piece of work, rearranging the composition, painting over areas which appear not to be working, varying one's painting technique so that the painting has more rhythm, using different media on the paint, using different sense-organs, changing the perspective and scale of the object to create more of a dynamic feeling as opposed to a static composition and so forth, stimulates ideas. But to give an account of these judgements requires a sophisticated understanding of the way in which one can use concepts, imagination, perception and behaviour in visual experience. One might say, that the task for the teacher in such a situation, is knowing how to create an environment that will encourage students to arrive at solutions that capture their creative understanding.

A reason why one might consider what is captured in an aesthetic experience as a disputable explanation, has to do perhaps with the kind of interpretation that one is making. It is without question, as Ayer cites (p.73), that mistakes are often made because further observations do not seem to support one's perceptions. In which case, I think, it must be admitted, that the student has to demonstrate through a body of work, how different observations seem to support their perceptions. In learning, the student needs to produce an

argument supported by a body of ideas which he or she have researched and created. I have touched on the fact that a student's sketchbooks, models, diaries and so on are a vital source of information upon which to show that a student's perceptions are not randomly constructed. In sympathy with this, as Wittgenstein thought, it is the coming into existence that is part of what constitutes objectivity and learning. Here, the argument is, that when something is written, scribbled, painted or made, this experience gives us something concrete to compare, to deduce and to perceive. However, Ayer writes in the Wittgensteinian sense (pp.79-81), that one needs to formulate on what basis students can claim that their perceptions manifest or preserve the real identity of their objects? Certainly, as Wittgenstein argued, one can corroborate whether such perceptions seem to reflect the reality of the situation, but as Ayer goes on to say: "Our perceptual judgements are seldom indefinite, in the sense that we claim only to perceive a physical object of some sort or other. In the same way, we identify it as a thing of some specific kind, and this brings in further assumptions, as, for example, that the object is solid, or flexible, or that it is not hollow" (pp.80-1). Equally, in such cases, one may refer to one's intentions, conceptual understanding and other sensory modes collaborating to determine the experience that one feels is correct in some way. Of course, the object before us possesses different problems about its recognition and identity, than say, an object which does not exist at all in physical terms. Yet, in art and design whether the object exists at all as a physical object or not, our acceptance of such objects, would be scrutinised with as much rigour as one would determine physical objects, albeit from a

different perspective. In other words, how one visually experiences the colour, shape, spatial content, function, purpose and meaning determines the representation of the object for us. Still, it is not just a matter of what is being perceived and how to account for this, for art and design learning must also relate to whether one is satisfied with the results of this work, and what kind of "special" perceptual identification one is making.

In arguing that identity is important, when one comes to the issue of identity in a Mark Rothko painting, it would be false to say that one is "seeing" anything. If one is not meant to "see", what is the experience actually capturing? One is not expected when confronted by a Mark Rothko painting to "see this", for Rothko's intention is not to deal with form or content in the sense of what is being perceived as physical qualities in the work. In one respect, the visible does not exist in Rothko's paintings, as the intention of the work is an attempt to describe, through experience, his emotions. One is expected to construct our experiences along emotional lines. An object of this kind is not simply a matter of observed perception, in that there is a distinct lack of spatial and time quality mark-making that one can refer to in the work itself. The artist has deliberately reduced these factors in his painting. It is conceivable that one cannot look at a painting of this kind and ostensively point to the painting and its colour changes or mark-making for specific guidance as to what the work expresses in precise terms. The sort of experience that one is having is not to be perceived as properties of a physical object, for quite clearly there are no object elements in his work. What one would have to pursue is perhaps an emotional response and not a

purely reasoned response to the work, to the extent that, how well the painting expresses this fact, is dependent on how well one can experience the emotional content that one relates to the work. If this is correct, however vague this feeling may be on a personal level, the experience itself may be an exact one, in respect that what is being suggested is a reference to and heightened awareness of emotional feelings as an affective response.

As claimed, for the teacher or the student the description in a work of art, is not purely accountable in linguistic terms, as much of the experience may rely on sense-impressions. In relation to this discussion, it would be a mistake to attempt to justify Rothko's work as a reference to the physicality of any object, because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find similarities and resemblance of specific feelings and their expressions reduced to this kind of analysis. Evidence of identity here is in part determined and justified by whether one is able, when perceiving the work, to be consciously aroused by one's particular emotions—ideas. These emotions—ideas, must be felt as feelings and not, as stated, to provoke simply a definite physical image of an object. Such feelings must be stimulated purely by the work itself. Familiarity or access to what the work is communicating, in part, means to abandon any recognition to things in the work for Rothko is not concerned here with its visible form, even though the visual sense of the work is reliant, in part, on how the work was constructed. How the work is constructed, may provoke one's awareness of what is pertinent to the painting, which in this case, because of the way the painterly qualities are layered and arranged on the canvas, the experience of this effect, arouses perhaps different

emotions—ideas taken from the work. The poignancy of the experience is characterised by the imagining and its activity. To understand and justify what is being imagined, requires both acquaintance and considerable engagement with the work over a period of time. Without knowing the artist's intentions in such an "abstract" piece of work, the construction of meaning may be difficult to establish, to those unfamiliar with this process. How far one would need to be precise about these intentions is perhaps an open question, but it seems clear enough that one can begin to unlock such an experience by simply asking whether the artist is interested in exploring colour to evoke emotions—ideas. This kind of response, for the teacher, would give rise further to specific questions about how the artist is examining and using colour.

It might seem that in examining how the artist is using colour to evoke certain emotions, one can get a clear insight into understanding Rothko's paintings. The trouble is, that Rothko appears to be dealing in part with experiences that makes it difficult alone to understand his work on a conceptual—intellectual framework. One misses his point, if one hangs one's understanding in this fashion. It has also to be asserted, that one should not assume that what the artist describes is *ipso facto* the case. In any teaching situation, the teacher must question the student's accuracy of understanding, by examining how such an experience is being applied, what this experience designates and its relevance. In order for students to demonstrate that they are making discriminating references, they have to be able to show how they are constructing their thoughts. Students work will probably go disastrously

wrong if they are incapable of producing the kind of evidence that explains their interpretations. The artist, like anyone else, is not infallible and because the act of making may not explain itself one must guard against arguments that appear solely to defend this position. It may seem that those who appeal merely to this kind of argument, and think that their work speaks for itself, may be showing arrogance of the most exalted kind.

The question remains, that the way that colours are employed in a painting are anything but transparent, but it is through the application of colour and other materials, that issues and problems to do with conflict, contradiction and confirmation can arise. This step must be seen against the fact that an object may have, in a determinate manner, all these qualities expressed in different ways (see Vincent van Gogh's *The Night Cafe*). These differences are further explored by Wittgenstein when he argues that the student may use the same shade of green to paint an object transparent and opaque. For the shade of green that the student is using may not be the important element in the transparency or opaqueness of the object. What the student is doing is setting up new relationships of experience, whereby the shade of green and its use is being determined in another way. I have previously given other examples of how this can be achieved, but it is immediately apparent, that in the painting work of Joseph Beuys, Georg Baselitz, Franceso Clemente, William Blake and designers such as Le Corbusier, Daniel Lieberskind, Lebbeus Woods, Bernard Tschumi and Gaetano Pesce, drawing and making represent experiences which open up new relations, realities of experience and the possibility of seeing new forms. This

gives us the view that creativity is an activity that is determined by having an understanding of the judgements that one is making in the work. In the Kantian sense, however, these aesthetic judgements are seen to be actively involving free-play. The argument that I have in mind in educational terms, is that art and design learning is essentially explorative and experimental in a creative sense. Hence, it follows, as Kant thought, that the art and design teacher needs to realise that such aesthetic experience cannot be planned in advance of what is being perceived in an experience. There can be no standard of what the perception may be and that what is ultimately produced may owe less to pure conceptualisation than one might be led to believe.

From a different teaching angle, it may be absurd to insist that a certain criteria is necessary to determine an art or design object. Such a remark would appear to have repercussions for assessment and testing. Paradoxically, while it may seem as though one needs criteria in order to assess the work, the argument against this position, as Wollheim puts it: "assumes (by talking of representation) that there is an independent means of identifying what we see, independent that is of how we represent it, and then goes on to deny that this is so" (1972, pp.124-5). The issue being, that one cannot have independent means of assessing art and design work, since art and design is a visual experience whereby our actual perception of the art and design work is essential. One needs to take account of what is being perceived and its stimulation. If the drawing or object needs changing or adjusting then this is done by engaging the work itself; the work itself tells us what changes need to be made. If one assumes that one changes the object because it does

not meet the criterion involved, then this assumes that one has decided what the visual experience should be, prior to seeing the work. My account of the work, as Wollheim goes on to insist, must be in relation to the object itself, for without this perception, one's understanding may appear worthless. One can only talk about the work having experienced it, but this is not to say that my understanding is simply a matter of observation, far from it. The argument from a teaching side is, that if the perception is not a perception of the work itself, then one's understanding must be independent of the actual object concerned. This throws into question any possible deductions or inferences that one could make in support or against this work. Furthermore, the problem with criteria, is that they do not give an accurate guide about how the work was constructed, since art and design work cannot be predetermined in advance of what is being perceived in the work itself. In support of Wollheim's argument (p.128), that while the student may have intentions, it is what the student encounters with the work itself and what one observes as a consequence of one's actions conditioning this experience that prevents us from knowing in advance what the experience will be. Wollheim's argument seems to be, at the very least, that criteria should be based on the visual experience of the work, but since it is the work itself that indicates whether something needs to be changed, does one really need criteria? It may also be true, as Wollheim goes on to state, that while one needs to observe one's actions as they are being formed, it does not follow that what is being represented in the work ties to what is being observed. What I am really looking at, then, may not be categorised by what is observed, but by some

other token of experience. For example its history, its tactile qualities or other sense—imaginative involvement. Yet, significantly, the more that the student draws from different aesthetic experiences the more likely he or she will be capable of seeing and comprehending new patterns and expressions of meaning and the sense of what is being observed. The acquisition of learning requires that steps are taken that show the handling of problems or issues in different ways.

In order to bring the above argument down to earth, several things need to be taken into consideration. The educational value that I feel one has to demonstrate in art and design education, is that the student's art and design learning must be convincing. To achieve this effect, the student's degree of understanding that he or she has acquired must be accessible to others, but the means by which one achieves this goal cannot be realised unless one evokes imaginative experience. The main problem that stands in our way in educational terms, is how can one guarantee correctness in art and design practice, when such experience is multifarious in kind. There is nothing unusual in this in itself, for most people in their daily lives operate their experiences in this manner. However, the source of doubt that one may have about art and design experience seems to rest squarely upon creative imagination.

The standard argument that education in general seems to insist upon, is that learning must be conceptual. Now, not wishing to devalue this experience, as it is indeed a crucial factor in learning, one might nevertheless ask to what extent is the conceptual argument in aesthetic terms revealing?

How instructive, in other words, is conceptual experience? Wittgenstein, in much of his later work undoubtedly gives us a number of examples of this approach and its importance in relation to acquiring and determining a successful performance of skill and understanding. A colour, as Wittgenstein remarks can be described as luminous, dull, cloudy and so on. To understand colour one may have to appeal to this kind of understanding to demonstrate the type of use of this colour and its sense in the work. An argument stemming from this that Wittgenstein is answering, is: "A colour which is "dirty" if it were a colour of a wall, needn't be so in a painting" (*RC*, p.28, §89). However, if one wants to profit by art and design experience, one cannot understand this activity in conceptual terms alone. For in using colour the artist or the designer response involves a feeling state, a felt intensity that triggers and accompanies our experience of the colour. In the Kantian sense, such feelings are intuitive and involve cognition in general, but maybe there is also a case to argue that our feelings involve one's whole being. It is this phenomenon, the feeling as an imaginative experience, rather than purely a conceptual experience that beats the drum in art and design experience. For without doubt the connection between ideas and feelings are essential to art and design. As Kant writes: "aesthetic judgements decide, not by any harmony with concepts, but by feeling" (*CJ*, intro. VIII, 194). The indispensable argument is this, that in art and design experience one learns the meaning of a colour, not by simply having a concept of it, nor by simply its use, but how one imaginatively experiences the colour, for decisions are made in the work based on this encounter. There is certainly a "closeness" of

experience about feelings in the aesthetic, but it is clear that one cannot relate to these states of being simply as intellectual constructs. One should not assume, however, that this means that one cannot apprehend the experience. Of course, one is not talking here about feeling sick, or feeling tired, but rather how the artist and the designer learns to zero into his or her feelings as references to creative understanding.

In chapter one, I claimed that one may refer to these feelings, as Kant in one of his arguments seems to suggest, as intuitions which induce a feeling of our own selves in relation to purposiveness. It may seem that what gives further support to this argument in education, is that an art and design teacher, would encourage the students to reflect on their perceptions and feelings in different ways, as this would have the knock-on effect of developing and analysing further what they think and feel about their work. There would be various stages, interconnections and levels of thinking about these feelings that would further condition one's understanding. At times one might consider concentrating more on the sensation, mood or play of feeling rather than the object itself. In the aesthetic sense, such feelings are nevertheless relational, in that having a certain feeling about an object relates to aspects in the work which cause us to consider, what these feelings are dependent on. It would be nonsense for any student to argue that they could develop an understanding of an object without references to this object. Moreover, it is without doubt, that while the students, sensory and perceptual experiences may be keenly felt, what the students may be lacking is a way of communicating this experience. The teacher's role would be in this instance,

to show to students how they could possibly interpret and decode their experiences. What students need to learn is how to pick out and register both the simple and complex parts of their experiences and to understand the way such experiences are communicated in art and design terms.

The difficulty with this, is that one may not be able to say what exactly this feeling consists of because there may be too many overlapping tones of this feeling that make it impossible to account precisely for its colour effect. Visual input alone is immensely complex, for one is not just talking about the here and now, as our visual understanding is integrated and immersed with other sensory factors embraced over a period of time. Apart from the fact that our feelings change, these experiences may be attributed to and arise from a layering of sensations, images and thoughts. In the aesthetic it has to be recognised that there are a large number of factors that make the work intuitive. The making itself is an activity where its construction and assemblage involves through the sense of touch, images, ideas, mark-making and general materiality, the exploitation and characterisation of various differences in sensory and perceptual information. In education, the art and design teacher may have to repeatedly expose his or her students to certain aesthetic practices in order to bring about perceptual learning and understanding. It takes time, for instance, to learn how to paint flesh colours, how to plane a surface flat and how to understand one's feelings. There is a difference, one might argue between knowing one's feelings and when to act upon them. What the teacher needs to reflect on, is that the students' feelings which are embedded in certain sensory and cognitive perceptions, may be the

result or overlaying of both their personal responses to the work and the teacher's discussion and comments about such work. The argument being, that what the teacher discusses with the students about their work may be a significant factor that connects and determines for the students the kinds of limits or deductions that they can make about their own feelings. The intervention of the teacher can help the students to explore their feelings in different ways. On the other hand, one may have to abandon any attempt to precisely locate or determine what these feelings are other than the fact that they are cognitive—imaginative experiences involving perceptions of an object.

From a practical position, the teacher would start the process of exploring these issues about feelings by devising in different ways, tactile, auditory, written and perceptual exercises, for students to experiment with and examine. The concern would be, how does one know when to reject one's feelings, how does one know when to modify them and how does one know when our feelings are "right"? For the teacher to deal with these concerns, and for the student to learn from such experience, requires that one tackles these issues by setting up project work or exercises that are designed to test the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the feelings that one has acquired or developed in the process. This might suggest for the teacher and the student the need to explore, in relation to feelings, the physicality, materiality, locality and presence of particular art and design work. Other issues might suggest that the student considers the optical appearance of objects contrasted with the functions or status of objects, the manipulation of forms, patterns,

details, spatial factors, the history of the object, its symbolic content, and so on. In this way, the student can learn to contrast, argue and bring to light their thoughts—feelings on such matters. Like most other subjects, it might seem that the student needs to be led "systematically", but with the proviso that the teacher must allow the student to reflect upon his or her own experiences. However, it would be more accurate to claim that a developmental and open free approach, that allows the student to question, analyse and search for meaning represents the best chance of the student understanding art and design experience. This obviously means, apart from other factors, that the teacher has to design exercises which draw on students past experiences. Of course, the teacher would further have to devise strategies whereby the content, for example, of dealing with spatial considerations, is made accessible for students to examine. This might mean setting up a still life, a slide lecture and or a visit to a gallery or a museum. If, as I have asserted, a student's feelings must relate to the perception of the object, the teacher and the student can devise ways to assess and explore what these restrictions and/ or possibilities will allow us to argue and experience.

What one has to see is that there is no standard type by which he or she will use a dull, luminous or cloudy colour. Moreover, these colours have to feel right, if the object is to work at all. This argument knocks on the head any attempt to understand this experience in intellectual terms. It does of course, in educational terms, remain a fact that such art and design work must be checked to determine its credibility. I have pointed out in this thesis various ways in which this can be achieved. However, two final points are

worth mentioning further. The first concerns the fact that the teacher must possess certain feelings if he or she is to practice this understanding with anyone. If the teacher says to a student go and see Paul Cézanne's *The Basket of Apples*, 1895, and look at the way he paints his apples, the appeal that the teacher is making, is that he too possesses certain feelings about this work. He or she must know something of what can be learnt from this experience otherwise what was the point of mentioning Paul Cézanne's work? In this respect, the teacher's understanding should not be aimless, as this would confuse the student about his or her intentions. Secondly, I concur with Wittgenstein, that if art and design practice is to have its lines of reality tied, the sense experience of such work cannot be unrelated to an object and as Pears points out (p.341), unconnected to our physical world. Our sensations, as Wittgenstein seems to argue in his later work, must connect to objects of experience in such a way that the sense of these feelings are perceptible by others. In this way, one begins to make one's understanding accountable. However, one hastens to add, that sensation—language situations alone do not explain the deeper perceptual experiences that one has to feel and thus create in order to understand properly art and design work. The creative mind, as any art and design teacher will acknowledge, sets its own impulses and tuning more often than not from what is imaginatively perceived and played with, in a dynamical sense, in thought, feeling and intuition.

Conclusion

Quite clearly, this work has explained that there are many diverse ways in which the teacher can teach art and design and the student can learn about art and design. The special problems that face teaching in education must relate to the "intrinsic" diversity posed by the art and design experience. Creatively, one's imagination can be turned and viewed in many ways, the feeling of which may be expressive of a number of things. It is not an experience that can be described as deterministic in purely conceptual terms, because creatively, as I have mentioned, it is neither limited nor under the rule of any particular concept. To make matters worse, this implies that art and design experience cannot be formulated or tested. Equally, if no precise conception of art and design work can be found, it is reasonable to argue that this practice must compound further the problem of teaching in art and design. As I have argued, however, this should not mislead us into thinking that art and design education is inferior or inadequate in any way. To show how sophisticated and accountable this experience can be, the two main arguments that I have been concerned with expressing in relation to creative learning, stem from Wittgenstein's notion of sensation—language and Kant's notion of cognitive—feeling. What I have attempted to demonstrate in this thesis, is how accountable and how effective art and design experience can be, given these different philosophical viewpoints. Certainly, education-wise, there are drawbacks if one attempts to see one of these arguments and not the other. Given the debate that I have constructed in this work, how one employs these

arguments must be a matter of considerable aesthetic judgement. It has been in part my argument that in considering aesthetic judgement, there is a wealth and subtlety to this experience that is indispensable to the learning situation in art and design education.

Obviously, it becomes important in teaching terms, for the teacher to show how this understanding is acquired. Of course, it needs to be stated, that art and design understanding cannot be reduced to the mere formal qualities of its representation, for however "good" this representation may be, art and design experience extends itself beyond the formal qualities of the picture-plane. A student, then, needs to investigate more than just the perceptual features of his or her art and design work. For no matter how rational one's methods may be, the aesthetic experience intensifies the cognitive and sensuous side of the student's experience beyond merely practical considerations. Indeed, one might further suppose that as an imaginative experience art and design confounds convention and with it the belief that its sense conforms with the expectations of a regular system of making and doing.

While few in education would deny that creative experience is important, the nature of what constitutes precisely such experience is often a missing feature in art and design education. My position has been to show on the one hand the diversity and complexity of this experience, and on the other, to show how one can handle in a pedagogical fashion the sense of learning that can take place in art and design education. At the heart of this art and design learning, is the interplay that takes place between imagination

and understanding. The relationship between imagination and understanding is a dynamic one, a response conditioned by the activity of experience. Without doubt, this art and design activity is not a form of escapism, for the experience must be determined by the perception of the object and its meaning. Since art and design practice is essentially an imaginative experience, the difficult task for the teacher is being able to suggest ways that will enable the student to correct and enlarge his or her understanding of this experience in an insightful manner. Any attempt the teacher makes to improve art and design understanding, as I have indicated, must guard against any textbook or worksheet activity that is prescriptive in kind.

One normally thinks of this imaginative process in art and design as mutually embracing the compositional arrangement of the work and the creative play of thoughts and feelings that interact with this experience reciprocally. An experience that can in part spring from the form and content of the art and design work. In which case, how students show their understanding is very much dependent on their own resources, their ability to respond and express colours, shapes, ideas and so on. A student will not be able to express properly colours, shapes and ideas unless he or she is able to demonstrate reasonable connections between these kinds of factors. As a result, one cannot claim that what a student creates in his or her art and design work, is "blind". But what is enlightening about how a student expresses his or her work is indeed problematic for there are many delicate tonal changes that can have a profound affect on the employment of understanding, and what is acceptable in these circumstances.

From a Kantian and Wittgensteinian position, I have explored some of the sophisticated difficulties and possible solutions that an art and design teacher should consider and learn to acquire. It follows perhaps that the art and design teacher should concentrate on activities which are "productive" rather than simply "reproductive", as such experience would be attempting to demonstrate that art and design practice is empowering. For it seems that one consequence of this approach, would be to encourage the capacity to extend rather than constrain one's understanding. Yet because there are many perceptual differences that can affect the "productive" sense of the art and design work, the teacher needs to approach such work with caution. Educationally, I have argued that aesthetic understanding must be embraced. My argument has been that in art and design students learn about themselves and what they are expressing, as Oakeshott states (1959, pp.18-20) through creative involvement. What emerges, is that art and design education represents a special kind of perception based on the notion of creativity. Art and design education does indeed represent a personal way of expressing one's understanding, but one that is stimulated and guided by argument. The making of this argument can be quite exhaustive and extraordinary. Here, the art and design teacher at all levels of education must recognise that the aesthetic experience is a self in the making, a coexistence between past and present ideas. It should be noted that what the student encounters in the work affects the way past and present ideas are perceived and handled. Consequently, what a student meets in a work, together with the project requirements, often determines the manner in which past and present ideas

connect. Any dialogue that the teacher has with a student can affect this balance. Similarly, it is important to realise that any coexistence between past and present experiences may be absorbed and mingled by the student in different ways. In this case, the character of what is produced through the various connections between past and present experiences is determined by how the student employs his or her creative sensibilities. Thus, to repeat, the quality of the student's work in art and design is enriched by how past and present thoughts are conditioned by imaginative perceptions. It follows, as suggested, that the best art and design practice is where there is freedom to form in a purposive manner.

My attempt has been to demonstrate and justify art and design education and what one can expect to express and learn from this concern and its history. Art and design practice attempts to reveal the connections between our own inner centre of consciousness and the external world, by responding to the impulses and analysis of personal experience. In art and design students cannot distance themselves from the work, for there is nothing neutral about this experience. In other words, the student has to make a personal case, state a position and make an argument. There are, as I have claimed no immutable facts that make art and design dependent on anything, other than aesthetic sense. While there is no absolute definition of what constitutes aesthetic experience, everything, nevertheless, is dependent on the particular situation and what this embodies individually. At the same time, the learning derives its intelligence from what is created articulately in these particular art and design situations that one devises. In designing projects

whereby students can learn to experience and express the aesthetic in a creative fashion, through the difficult elements of form and content, the teacher adopts a position that shows where he or she stands on such matters. Against this, the teacher needs to combat any suggestion that art and design is merely a relative matter. What the teacher teaches, often has applications in a wider range of matters beyond any immediate setting or reference. Pertinently, a teacher would want to see that his or her particular comments about a piece of work were being used by students in other situations and in various ways. The stand being taken, is that while the teacher is concerned with the student's current work, his or her thoughts on these developments have implications beyond perhaps, the immediate work. In this sense, one might also reply that what is often discussed aesthetically has repercussions for other work of a similar nature. Lessons are learnt that can and should be transferred to other situations. In the course of the teacher—student dialogue, the student learns to pick up the language of art and design practice. On this view, the student is learning in part the kind of discourse that is involved in making aesthetic judgements.

It is conceivable, that the lesson that a student may learn from a given situation may seem appropriate to other learning environments throughout this person's life. Yet, as proposed, it is quite clear that students will not grasp and create in an imaginative fashion unless they can experience in a specific kind of way, revealing the connections they are making in a plausible manner. Educationally, the teacher would want to see some of the student's previous learning being brought to bear on current curriculum assignment work in order

to substantiate certain connections in his or her object. The student has to show at times that he or she is able to take advantage of the teacher's professional judgement. Even so, what is relevant or plausible in aesthetic terms is, however, far from straightforward, since such notions require that the student can substantiate his or her understanding by the kind of arguments that he or she is making by visual means. It is because a student's response to an object may vary that it is necessary for the teacher to know something about how the student is responding. As I have remarked, the difficulty for the student, is that there is no standard of success that he or she can turn to for guidance in determining the work, because each piece of work must be judged on its own merits, an experience that cannot be predetermined. To try to predetermine art and design practice would be to disregard the very essence of this experience in relation to imaginative free-play. I have argued in this thesis, that imaginative free-play in the Kantian sense, refers to aesthetic autonomy. According to this account, students must be allowed to experience the work in their own way. At one level, the significant point here, is that the free-play of the imagination allows the students to strive towards an honest showing of their own thoughts and feelings. That such experience may be subsequently without ulterior aim, is evidence that an object may be variously tackled by a student. The position is, that imaginative free-play is creative energy that provokes and involves the perception of thought. An experience, as I have claimed, that may be as much conceptual as it is intuitive. It is no easy matter to provoke the power to make, yet all children possess this ability. The power to make, as suggested, is essential to understanding and hence to

education, as it involves the ability to know. One comprehends oneself, in the making process as one learns to construct one's thoughts and what they express. However, in studio practice, the teacher must wait and see what the student develops in his or her work. The teacher must not in this sense impose preconceptions, but let the student's work reveal itself. How instructive a teacher's comments may be is partly dependent on what the student is constructing. But the teacher's remarks to his or her students are not destined to serve only those considerations to do with the student's visual work itself. The case being, that the teacher may also have to consider the student's intentions, attitude, constraints, background knowledge, level of ability and approach work.

Unlike science education, what imbues the sense of art and design is sympathetically connected with feeling. Feelings are part of the aesthetic qualities that accompany any understanding of art and design work. The formative process that seems to influence the student's art and design learning is couched in the freedom to experience; an experience that is not limited by concepts or rules, but strives for ideas of reason (*CJ*, §17, 232) that manifest themselves in imaginative thought. A central argument of mine has been that any imaginative play that one adopts in art and design relates to understanding and is thus "serious business" (*C J*, §53, 329), because it "penetrates much further into the region of ideas" (*CJ*, §53, 333) provoking and exciting visual sense as it develops and plays. To appreciate the sense of this the student's work must ultimately be self-confirming if the art and design learning is to have any value at all. Appreciation is that which is self-confirming.

Nevertheless, the components which allow the student to appreciate art and design work rest to a large extent on how the teacher communicates his or her awareness of what constitutes proper experience and judgements in these matters.

In an imaginative way, feelings involve certain relations between emotions, thoughts and sensations. Such experience, as explained in an art and design sense, has an intellectual and non-intellectual character to it. Thus in art and design education the relationship that a student builds up in his or her work, involves the imaginative free-play of one's felt response to the work. The student learns by what is being perceived, to comprehend and guide his or her feelings. It follows that the character of such feelings would seem to be intentional. Crucially, what the student investigates and the manner in which the teacher directs the student to consider particular kinds of perceptions to do with his or her object, must condition the student's feeling response. The students explore their feelings through rational and sensory observations involving the perception of visual, auditory and tactile experience. The students' experiences, therefore, relate to tangible sensible qualities that have educational importance. Conversely, it might also be implied from this, that art and design experience cannot be regarded at one level as free-play experience at all. Our feelings get their description from the conditions of their production, which stem from how the student notes his or her impressions and develops an attitude towards this experience. It follows, that the student's awareness of his or her feelings are dependent on how one sees and uses certain qualities of his or her experiences.

An aesthetic experience, as I have pointed out, must in some sense be descriptive of the story or thoughts it is telling if it is to be successful. To understand this properly the teacher must know how the student is addressing issues in his or her work and the kind of approach he or she is taking. From an educational point of view this means, for example, that the student, would have to use a certain kind of mark-making to represent a particular kind of feeling, image and thought. The student learns that mark-making can entail specific feelings, images and thoughts as perceptions of a possible experience. This infers that the student argues his or her case in part by making connections that gather the pictorial sense that accompanies the work. In many ways, meaning is built up when the character of the work involves those fertile and difficult moments that seem to touch the nerve of one's imagination, reflecting on what one has experienced and composed. In art and design, then, a teacher must stimulate not only a student's thoughts but their sensations as well.

It is important to remember that firstly the aesthetic experience is stimulated by events, images, feelings and thoughts, secondly it is a response to these events, images, feelings and thoughts, and thirdly it involves ideas and technique. The character of such experience in an interdependent manner, is spontaneous and reflective. The sense here, one must conclude, is that the aesthetic in art and design can be employed sensibly. For this reason, one of the lines that I have attempted to draw has been to show that a student who may opt to do art and design classes must realise that he or she will be dealing with experiences that can go well beyond the communication of language.

I have repeatedly attempted to explain that aesthetic experience is not a self-indulgent experience, a display of feeling alone, as some might suppose. Art and design education begins to take definite shape when students engage, structure and differentiate experiences in relation to a point of view, an intuition or a conceptual experience that relates to human understanding. Whatever form this takes, this perspective represents a position of reference which has to be accounted for. How a student becomes acquainted with his or her experiences are issues that must concern education. One deduces, that how ideas are derived enables the student to learn something about aesthetic content. This point of view, however, along with the work itself may be a constant developing experience. While the students must learn to objectify particular life experiences, the capacity to touch the centre of one's consciousness creatively involves the powers of perception. For students to demonstrate that they are extending their understanding, requires not only that their experiences be visibly recognisable in aesthetic terms, but that their work should show new relationships of experience that validate their perceptions. The teacher wants to see that the student is able to capture his or her imagination and one's public sense of this experience by the way that he or she is able to handle a certain subject. As explained, the student learns about art and design, by the teacher setting various assignments that allow the student to explore and develop relationships of different kinds. As a consequence of this, it may be argued that it is of fundamental importance that a student learns both about different relations that objects can have and that there are different ways to "seeing" objects, because without the development

of this sense, the student's conceptual framework will be limited. This seems to suggest that a student's creative understanding is dependent significantly on how he or she is able to view an object in different ways. Thus, students need to develop different perceptions of object experience if they wish to enhance their conceptual—creative understanding. What takes shape, then, in art and design, in the words of Ernst Cassirer, is: "not simply a momentary outburst of passionate feeling" (1945, p.146). For art and design work represents a way of viewing the world and of making sense of it. A further point about this, is that the art and design teacher must be concerned with developing and varying student's seeing and interpretation, so that as Ernst Cassirer implies, it alters and extends his or her view of reality and sense of experience (p.170). Art and design can be, then, a daunting task for any student.

To understand art and design one has to enter into the life of aesthetic experience. It is an experience that Oakeshott describes as sensuous, perceiving, feeling, desiring, thinking, approving, imagining, listening, reflecting, touching, discussing, demonstrating, intuiting, crying, laughing, desiring, loving, symbolising and so on (1959, pp.17-8). One wonders how many other subjects in our educational system can draw upon experience in such a positive way. What emerges from this, is that art and design practice attempts to foster and bring to light those things which are aspects of our life, aspects which individuals share and experience. Not I hasten to add, in some inconsiderate fashion, but in a genuine attempt to understand one's experience by imaginatively making that which seems important to oneself; an experience that is part of one's personal development. But, it remains true to say, that

such experience while often seen as a release, an "intrinsic" need to strive for personal expression, can also be a difficult "mental" experience to realise in visual terms. If the student is genuinely attempting to make sense of his or her thoughts and feelings, then, this experience justifies claims to learning. In respect of this work, one could say that the kind of learning that the aesthetic manifests, is the kind of learning that attempts to take stock of what the student is imagining, feeling, perceiving and thinking. Art and design is an embodiment of not only a coherent experience, but one that reaches out to the very essence of self-expression, knowledge and understanding. I have shown that art and design experience and its judgement is not a vacuous, passive or "organic sensation" (*CJ*, §44, 306), but rather, as Kant thought, a determined reflection of self-recognition by imaginative means. For Wittgenstein, art and design understanding is embedded in one's "practice". His view was that form and content in aesthetic terms is given meaning through one's actions, application and description. As one has seen, this aesthetic experience in art and design education is not merely a physiological or "organic response", but involves in a determinate fashion intelligible expressions of human understanding. Not surprisingly, Kant further insists in relation to this experience: "that this form is not, as it were, a matter of inspiration, or of a free swing of the mental powers, but rather a slow and even painful process of improvement, directed to making the form adequate to his thought without prejudice to the freedom in the play of those powers" (*CJ*, §48, 312-3). It is this complexity, as I have outlined, that the teacher and the student of art and

design must embrace, if one is to employ the relevance of aesthetic understanding in education.

In summary, the teacher in art and design must deliver a curriculum that constitutes aesthetic experience and its realisation. It is, therefore, a characteristic of art and design experience that it transcends boundaries. Seeing, interpreting, comparing, differentiating, adjusting, using, experimenting and examining are all elements which make up this experience and, as shown, are ingrained in art and design education. Through various realities of experience that involve different perceptions of objects, the student can learn to understand how art and design communicates its sense. Different perceptions of objects require from the teacher that he or she encourages the student to notice how different ways of seeing can affect one's interpretation of such objects. This happens because the teacher shows the students how they can interact with their environment to perceive their world, and to demonstrate this fact by comparing the effects of different mark-making, ideas and so on. One ought not to forget, though, that prolonged, spontaneous and intermittent thoughts are constant hallmarks of art and design practice. The student acquires a growing familiarity with art and design practice when the teacher can observe a student engaging in this process. Through one's actions a student will demonstrate his or her attitude towards art and design. The teacher assesses and looks to see how students are progressing by how they respond, analyse and express colours, shapes, lines, textures, rhythms and so on. In this way, art and design education is a visible creation, that to a large extent can be monitored and appraised. Here, educationally, it is important to

recognise as I have mentioned, that these rhythms, colours, textures, constructions, spatial projections and so forth, are not just part of a rational process, they are also necessary elements for the development of creativity. For it is the representation of what is perceived in such experiences through the sense-organs and the perceptual properties that one might attribute to such encounters, that can stimulate imaginative ideas. In a different vein, for a student to "see" an object and to work through his or her ideas of this object requires an intensity of thought and feeling. So much so, that an intuitive and reflective grasp of the ideas being extended in the work, evokes the selectivity of materials and techniques. From this last consideration, it might also be said, that art and design learning is not simply a matter of seeing and interpreting. In other words, one realises that art and design is a making experience, and not just a response to seeing and interpreting objects in a gallery or a museum. The making itself further involves aspects of seeing and interpreting not found purely in viewing the visual object, but rather, in creating it. One's response and analysis of objects depends, as explained, on all sorts of distinctions and connections that have to be made, but only a token of these features are present in the final object. Whatever the merits of the final work in art and design a whole range of perceptions and idea developments will have been phenomenologically encountered and explored, in order to make the visual sense distinguishable and to represent the importance of these features.

It is worth distinguishing, that because learning presupposes self-realisation, it is crucial that the art and design teacher shows by means of

models, drawings, sketchbook, paintings and so on, how this process to some degree operates. The teacher's role, in one respect, is to explore and debate with students what one can do with certain ideas and how this experience can express and confirm the degree and direction of student learning. I have given numerous examples of this approach in this work. Similarly, I have claimed that art and design experience is educationally sound. To support this, I have argued to begin with that what the student encounters in art and design education involves disinterested and unconditioned experience (see chapter one). Furthermore, I have argued that art and design education also involves a physical understanding of the experience of objects by conceptual and sensation means. The line that I have taken, is that students should be encouraged to self-express their own interest, not in any shallow sense, but by obliging the individual through autonomy to search and scrutinise particular experiences that reflect without reservation, understanding. The synopsis being, that art and design experience does not reduce the concept of understanding, but positively attempts to extend it in a comprehensive manner. This experience criss-crosses and structures successively various plays of thought, so that what is eventually established by the student may be the way a line cuts across the canvas aggressively or the way a leg of a chair can look sharp and decisive. It is clear that what holds the image of this line or leg of a chair intact, is the way the form communicates itself. In a crucial way the student must show how a line or leg of a chair holds together and enclose for the student certain thoughts, inviting us to perceive the perception of these features in a certain fashion. If Kant is correct, the rule of this

perception is dependent on the individualisation of an experience (*CJ*, §46). In short, students in art and design must define for themselves what their work is communicating, but they can only do this by arguing their case. What is produced by students, is dependent on the state of affairs that they are able to bring to bear on their work, and how they are able to attach meaning to these expressions.

One might agree with Wollheim that: "A non-arbitrary relationship does not have to be one-one relationship: it can be many-one, or even many-many" (1994, p.187). What is implied, here, is that there is more than one way in which a student can represent an image of a tree, can make a chair on the theme of Cubism or deal with the notion of homelessness. In exploring such issues, the art and design teacher knows that this experience is further complicated by the fact that what is constructed by the student involves visual experiences that have non-linguistic characteristics. I have explained that for the student to form an idea out of their experiences, requires considerable understanding of visual perception and pictorial meaning. It is important to see, however, that the intricacy and intimacy which constitutes art and design, complicates still further the teaching situation. The essential point is, that art and design education is not just an appeal to reason alone, for aesthetic understanding is an experience evoked by creative activity. The situation being, that students must to some extent carve out their own object sense, making accessible their own understanding in aesthetic terms. As argued, the pictorial demands which the student has to grapple with can reach a depth beyond intellectual interest or language use.

To reiterate, the distinction seems to be that art and design "expands the mind by giving freedom to the imagination" (*CJ*, §53, 326), thus ruling out any claim that one can conceive of such experience purely by reason or language. None the less, there is no common standard or exact reference criteria that the teacher can apply to all of the students he or she teaches, since each piece of art and design work is individually created. The teacher like the student must be persuaded by the argument. It therefore requires an experienced and knowledgeable art and design teacher to deal with these issues and to demonstrate the kinds of arguments that a student needs to produce to substantiate his or her thinking. If the student is to realise certain ideas then he or she must understand what is being evoked by the work and how to account for the perceptions that belong to this experience.

I have shown in various places how art and design practice in education can transcend, by its sensuous and imaginative nature, certain obstacles which prevent us from thinking and experiencing objects in new or in different relations. One might suppose, then, that art and design activity challenges the orthodoxy of what constitutes experience and understanding. Thus, one of the lessons here for education, is that a teacher who is able to stimulate a student's imagination more energetically will find that such a student will not be confined by reference only to the objective existence of things as one might fix it through scientific concepts and laws. In art and design education students cannot just sit there in a classroom waiting for something passively to happen, but rather they must create and intensify their experience. Such activity "induces much thought " (*CJ*, §49, 314) which

one might construe in the process as an attempt to remodel experience (*CJ*, §49, 314). One's attempt therefore to induce thought and to remodel it, must be necessary to education.

As part of the learning activity, a teacher would want to see that students were both changing and developing their ideas in a manner that attempts to show that they are opening up and deepening their understanding. In this regard, the art and design teacher's role is to provide the kind of stimulus that will arouse and stimulate the students to realise their creative potential. To nurture a student's appreciation of art and design is to provide an environment that challenges and develops visual understanding through physical and "mental" experience. Apart from the importance of "play" here, what is creatively expressed by the student tends to be a conscious effort to capture a particular experience. Such work gives feedback to the students and represents a perception of themselves and what they have achieved. Here, one must not overlook the fact that art and design education extends beyond "technical skill", which may be argued is merely a means to an end. Moreover, art and design embraces not just the product itself, but the purposive sense that the student encounters in evoking his or her feelings and ideas. Educationally, learning about one's thoughts and feelings aesthetically is characterised by how the student is absorbed by his or her impulse to create. To achieve any kind of success in art and design education involves the free-play of the imagination, in order for the student to be stimulated by the potentialities of what is being evoked. For the art and design teacher, he or she must find through the curriculum, ways that properly animate and

strengthen this involvement. Aesthetic appreciation, then, captures a more sensitive understanding of our ideas than language because such experience allows students to tap into their feelings and emotions in a way that one cannot grasp simply by linguistic means. If one is to allow the student the space to create in art and design education, the teacher must aim to clarify and strengthen the student's independent research and personal vision within a creative approach. To achieve this, the student's work must involve the capacity to be realised as intended, and the conditions which make this possible stem from the work itself and one's ability to imagine. But this, as argued, is not an experience where a basic standard of measurement can be applied.

Students often wish to share their experiences, but for students to share their experiences, requires as Wittgenstein thought, that their visual sense must presuppose a description of its understanding. The danger for us in education, is not to subordinate necessarily that which sensation—language is unable to effectively explain. Of course, in the Kantian sense, such description must have an imaginative—feeling dimension if one is to profit by this understanding in aesthetic terms. Tempered by this understanding, art and design education can be justified in so far as it attempts to capture the reality of certain experiences by how one imagines and is "moved" by ideas. However, unlike Kant, one may have to be cautious and distance oneself from Wittgenstein's position concerning understanding in general, for his arguments do not seem to penetrate deep enough into the significance of imagination. I have attempted to show, in various ways, that art and design education

embraces Kant's and Wittgenstein's philosophy in a genuine and profound sense and the heightened awareness of what is explored, is infused with the joy of learning and understanding, transcending and comprehending one's own perceptions of the world. This discussion ends with the belief that art and design education must reassert and familiarise itself with the complexity, richness and sophistication of the learning experience in art and design. My critique has been to show to the teacher these very points that transform art and design experience.

In general, it seems that there has been a tacit suppression in art and design education to limit its thought to what can simply and directly be applied to teaching situations under the model which Smeyers and Marshall emphasise as: "measurable learning outcomes" (1995, p.28). Such an insular view of learning can be detrimental to the quality of teaching in this area and paralyses in the process the vibrant and enlightening sensibility of art and design understanding. If education wishes to benefit and confront art and design work, it must acknowledge that this activity has a overwhelmingly rich seam of personally created detail crucial to its life.

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