

**Adult Education as a  
Stabilizing Response to Conflict**

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**Thesis submitted for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy at the  
Institute of Education, University of London**

## **ABSTRACT**

The aim of the study was to examine how adult education can be part of an international response in societies recovering from conflict, which can stabilize rather than de-stabilize, thus enhancing security. The guiding hypothesis was that there has been a failure to recognize the contribution adult education can make in building a secure society, resulting in policy vacuums and under-funding of the sector. The three countries studied were Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq.

The study relied primarily on documentary research, but also on opportunistic data collection during periods of work in each of the three countries. By identifying common themes and practices in each specific scenario, it has been possible to determine the links between adult education and security.

The findings supported the guiding hypothesis and affirmed that adult education can play a key role in stabilizing a post-conflict society. The resultant understanding of the links between adult education and societal development underpin a new framework for adult education in such societies, which balances short-term security issues with community values and the longer term requirements of society, reducing the potential for future conflict. An analytical tool and a checklist for adult education practitioners were developed as part of that framework. These could potentially inform decision making within the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom government and the British military.

I hereby declare that, except where explicit attribution is made, the work presented in this thesis is entirely my own.

Word count (exclusive of annexes, list of references and bibliography): 79, 784 words

Carolyn Johnstone

“Every hour Jonathan was there at the side of each of his students, demonstrating, suggesting, pressuring, guiding. He flew with them through the night and cloud and storm, for the sport of it, while the Flock huddled miserably on the ground.” From *Jonathan Livingston Seagull* by Richard Bach, the book about a seagull which encapsulates everything important in adult education.

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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This study has been characterized by difficulties with boundaries and with time. Because boundaries have been blurred, efforts on this thesis have permeated across the work-life-study divide and many people have been affected by the process. I must thank everyone who has been such a patient supporter over the years, including family who have listened, friends who have postponed things and work colleagues who have accepted delays.

This work would have been impossible if I had not worked in support of interventions in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq and I acknowledge that – compared to the efforts made by the citizens of those countries – this study makes a very small contribution. My particular thanks go to the local staff with whom I worked most closely.

Dr Chris Williams supervised me throughout and deserves thanks for tolerating my unconventional approach. Perhaps now we can both retire!

## ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFELPS	Australian Defence Force English Language Profiling System
ADO	Australian Defence Organisation
AELC	Australian English Language Course
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ARBiH	Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
BERA	British Educational Research Association
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence
CAAI	Creative Associates International Inc
CAP <sup>2</sup> DEV	Capacity / Capability Development
CCC	Co-operation Committee for Cambodia
CIPD	Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CONDO	CONtractors Deployed on Operations
CoT	College of Teachers
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
CRE-ATF	European Reactors' Conference – Academic Task Force
D3	Deter-Dissuade-Deny
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFI	Development Fund for Iraq
DFID	Department for International Development
DITC	Defence International Training Centre
EFL	English as a Foreign Language
EID	Education and Information Division
ESC	Employment Service Center
ESL	English as a Second Language
ESOL	English for Speaker of Other Languages
ETDC	English Teaching Development Course
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FIA	Former Iraqi Army
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace

HACCP	Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HVO	Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane)
IBE	International Bureau of Education
ICAP	Iraq Community Action Program
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
IDB	Interamerican Development Bank
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFOR	Implementation FORce
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
ISO	International Standards Organization
ITI	Iraq Transition Initiatives
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
LMAP	Land Mine Awareness Programme
MAS	Moqtada al Sadr
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MNF-I	Multi-National Forces – Iraq
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MoE	Ministry of Education
MOLSA	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
MPRI	Military Professional Resources Inc
N.D.	Not dated
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NADK	National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA	Principal Component Analysis

PDK	Party of the Democratic Kampuchea
PMC	Private Military Company
PMO	Program Management Office
PSD	Private Sector Development
PSDI	Private Sector Development Initiative
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RCAF	Royal Cambodian Armed Force
RISE	Revitalization of Iraqi Schools and Stabilization of Education
RS	Republika Srpska
RTI	Research Triangle Institute
SFOR	Stabilization FORce
SLB	State Literacy Board
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SOC	State of Cambodia
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAF	UNified TAsk Force (Somalia)
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMiBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSMIS	United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VEGA	Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance
VIP	Very Important Person
VRS	Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike Srpske)
VSO	Voluntary Service Overseas
VTTC	Vocational and Technical Training Center
WCEFA	World Conference on Education for All

# CHAPTER 1

## THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT AND RATIONALE

### 1.1 AN INSECURE WORLD

There has been considerable debate in recent years about the changing nature of the global security environment. After the Cold War ended, there was a perception that the international system had changed and that relations between states would in future be governed by what the United States (US) President George H W Bush called “a New World Order.” People envisaged a global community in which interdependent states resolved differences through dialogue and where the United Nations (UN) would be allowed to play the role of international governance and mediation that was envisaged at its founding in the aftermath of World War Two. However, there was an increase in the number and nature of disputes in the 1990s: ethnic and nationalist tensions caused intra-state conflicts and demands for interventions surged. The traditional approach to UN peacekeeping, with agreed cease-fires monitored by UN military forces, was no longer an adequate template for dealing with the complexities of peacebuilding and post-conflict rehabilitation. In 1992, the Secretary General of the United Nations explained the increase in activity levels:

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes - 279 of them - cast in the Security Council... With the end of the cold war there have been no such vetoes since 31 May 1990, and demands on the United Nations have surged. Its security arm, once disabled by circumstances it was not created or equipped to control, has emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:7)

In the new millennium, nations have sought to resolve security problems without the direct involvement of the UN. Thus, while 36 new UN missions were initiated in the period from 1990 to 1999, there were only ten in the following decade (United Nations, 2013a). Fewer missions does not necessarily correlate with increased security, however, as there has been an increase in state-led interventions and counter terrorism activity. Interestingly, the General Assembly rather than the Security Council has the lead for counter terrorism and it adopted a global strategy in 2006, in which member states resolve:

1. To consistently, unequivocally and strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever

purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.

2. To take urgent action to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations ...
3. To recognize that international cooperation and any measures that we undertake to prevent and combat terrorism must comply with our obligations under international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. (United Nations, 2006)

However, security forces have not been faced simply by an increased number of deployments and missions. They have had to deal with complex security environments where the boundaries between peace, conflict and terrorism have become blurred, where the distinction between inter- and intra-state conflict is less clear and where a multitude of organizations operate alongside them. Boutros-Ghali noted that the task of peacekeeping was no longer a uniquely military task and acknowledged the contribution made by “civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:30).

By 1995, he was more explicit about the many tasks the United Nations undertook:

...an unprecedented variety of functions: the supervision of cease-fires, the regroupment and demobilization of forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mining programmes; the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment of new police forces; the verification of respect for human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; the observation, supervision and even conduct of elections; and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. (Boutros-Ghali, 1995:11)

Thus, international agencies, regional bodies, military forces, civilian contractors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may all be contributors to the international community's response to a crisis.

My research has been designed in the context of a number of diverse but related fields of academic interest. In international relations, the role of the state is being questioned in the light of global economic inter-dependence and recent challenges to state sovereignty with regards to human rights abuses as well as the assertion by some states of their right to take pre-emptive action in self-defence. International and regional organizations have been asked to intervene to rehabilitate post-conflict societies such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia while a US-led coalition took over the governance in Iraq. These issues are relevant to this research because the state has traditionally been responsible for educational provision and shaping the national

interest. When external agencies intervene, the values that they import into a culture and the impact this might have on the programmes available to learners must be questioned. In post-conflict societies, especially where there has been intra-state conflict, there will often be a lack of consensus with regard to the values and norms that should be accepted within the society; the purposes of adult education may be questioned; programmes may be conducted against a backdrop of competing ideologies. This study will draw on the philosophy of education to address some of these difficult areas. During the Cold War, security policy was based on a balance of military power between the Western and Soviet blocs. Recently, the focus of security policy has shifted from a limited military calculation to a wider and more complex consideration of the economic, political and social components of security. Adults play a key role in the reconstruction of a society, both as participants and as teachers of the next generation. Thus, education programmes for them play a role in the rehabilitation of post-conflict societies and the study of such programmes is therefore essential in developing new security policies.

The field of adult education is very wide and there is no clearly agreed definition of the provision that falls into this category. In societies where there has been conflict, it is especially difficult to define “adult” and formal compulsory education may have been disrupted. Therefore, this study examines all education offered to people in the area who regard themselves as independent adults. This could include teenagers who work to support themselves yet find the time to attend secondary education classes, women who re-enter education, refugees and returning combatants who retrain in order to find work or come to terms with their war experience. Formal higher education and vocational training provision will be included, along with democratisation and citizenship programmes, which are often delivered through distance learning.

However, this study will not consider all adult education in all situations. Rather, I will focus on education that is provided during an intervention by the international community in the post-conflict context, where there has also been a military intervention. It will not address the education of children, defined in the UN Convention as a person below the age of 18, unless the laws of a particular country set the legal age for adulthood younger (UNICEF, 1989).

## 1.2 MODELS OF CONFLICT, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS AND SECURITY

Each complex emergency is unique and the international community is forced to consider a multitude of factors in determining the most appropriate response. However, while each scenario is different, politicians, the military and humanitarian organizations all use theoretical models to provide a framework for consideration of the specific conditions to which they must respond. Such models are, by necessity, simplistic but they can be useful in placing a situation in context and in offering a foundation on which to develop a unique response. Traditionally, the models used have been linear and have represented a continuum with extremes. For example, the British Army used a Spectrum of Conflict with “full scale warfighting at one end to the use of armed force in extremely constrained circumstances at the other” (Chief of the General Staff, 1996:3-2). Similarly, humanitarian organizations have been working with an “emergency-recovery-development continuum” (Tanil, 1997:11), and the 1997 Human Development Report talks of poverty relief being “directed to the whole continuum of peace-building, prevention of further conflict and reconstruction” (UN Development Programme, 1997:11).

Taking these linear representations together, we can see that there are times when military forces would have a pivotal role and others during which humanitarian actors should take the lead. Thus, during an intervention we might expect to see a heavy military presence during the warfighting / emergency / peacebuilding stage, increased humanitarian intervention during the recovery / conflict prevention phase, followed by a low-profile and constrained military element during the final development / reconstruction activities. In such a scenario, there would be little interface between the military, international organizations, commercial entities and NGOs.

However, the reality of complex emergencies does not fit these tidy, linear models and academics and policy makers now use circular, multidimensional representations of modern interventions. In a circular model, the term ‘post-conflict’ is problematic with episodes of violent conflict recurring after a peace settlement and the possibility that a society might resume its conflict. However, the term is used in this study because it describes a time when there has been international involvement and levels of violence have been reduced; there is no assumption that post-conflict societies are synonymous with permanently peaceful ones. In the area of humanitarian assistance, Tanil highlights this point:



It is acknowledged that there is a general 'theoretical deficit' regarding the integration of components of sustainable development within relief and rehabilitation efforts in war-torn societies. This is further complicated by the fact that post-conflict phases cannot always be clearly identified, and situations may all too often be considered to be 'permanent emergencies'. In such cases, emergency intervention (preparedness) may have to be viewed as an integral part of development operations. The recent unfortunate re-emergence of violence in Sierra Leone is but one example of how the vision of a linear emergency-recovery-development continuum may seriously be questioned. More generally, given that chronic economic stress is continuing in nations currently in crisis, the notion of a linear development is further invalidated. Researchers and policy-makers consequently need to think of non-linear patterns of conflict development and bear in mind the potential re-emergence of conflict when planning intervention strategies. (Tanil, 1997:11)

In such unstable and dynamic circumstances, the many different organizations involved in an intervention, both military and civilian, will not only be present at the same time but are likely to be required to work together.

### **1.3 CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COLLABORATION**

The people who make up the military, international organizations, commercial entities and NGOs during an intervention may need to develop working relationships and this will be framed by the ethos and the organizational cultures of the groups involved. Each group has distinct tasks and it is probable that its ethos reflects the nature of the work normally undertaken. At the level of the organizational culture, there may be valid reasons for maintaining distance. Prins (1998:37-8) points out that government bodies, including the military, may deny privileged information to NGOs as the latter do not have a public mandate. From the civilians' perspective, there may be different reasons for retaining distance: "Some civilians, wary of compromising both their independence and impartiality, and apprehensive about working with an organization which is perceived to be aggressive, may be reluctant to co-operate with the military" (UNHCR, 1995b:para 5.1).

Contractors working for the military, perhaps in a logistic support role, may be granted partial access to the privileged information but other private companies will often be excluded. Individual companies are likely to judge how closely they can involve themselves with the military based on risk to their operations and the possible financial consequences of taking a particular line.

Where organizations have valid reasons for operating independently, this must be respected. However, circumstances might dictate that organizations should work together. If an efficient operating group is to form, common goals and objectives must

be set. In the case of a private company, there may even be a formal contractual arrangement with other agencies or organizations. A shared effort leading to mutual achievement of goals can cause diverse individuals or subgroups to bond into an effective organization. Even where common goals are agreed, though, negative stereotypes can act as barriers to inter-agency co-operation and such stereotyping is not uncommon. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) training materials characterize the military and draw conclusions about resultant behaviours:

Uniformity is the foundation upon which the operational and social structures of military units are built. ... Initiative within these limits is rewarded, but normally takes place within agreed parameters. The military ethos encourages patterns of thinking and behaviour which may differ from those of civilians. Military training and discipline create the basic difference of approach to problem-solving from that of civilians. It is also an end in itself, ensuring that decision makers analyze information and make decisions in a manner which is consistent with that of all other decision makers... (UNHCR, 1995b:para 2.1)

The military's integral logistic support and communications infrastructure, however, make it a useful asset, as Weiss points out:

Armed forces often possess an abundance of precisely those resources that are in shortest supply when disaster strikes: transport; fuel; communications; commodities; building equipment; medicines; and large stockpiles of off-the-shelf provisions. In addition, the military's vaunted 'can-do' mentality and rapid response capabilities, as well as its hierarchical discipline, are useful within the chaos of acute tragedies. (Weiss, 1998:31-2)

Weiss was writing at the end of the millennium and recent experiences in Iraq show that the situation is now more complex, with NGOs and the military each relying to some extent on private contractors for transport and communications support.

From a military perspective, United Nations agencies are felt by some to be "corrupt" (Thomson, 1994:5) while contractors are perceived as being driven solely by monetary gain. Brown reports a conflict in agendas arising out of different roles in Cambodia, and the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign Affairs committee highlighted the potential economic interests of Private Military Companies (PMCs):

[T]he UN High Commissioners for Refugees had a very distinct agenda in that they wanted to get rid of all the displaced people on the Thai borders as quickly as possible. Whether this meant sending them into areas that were still mined or not being able to provide support for them over the rainy season, they weren't particularly interested in that. (Brown, N.D.:18)

Nonetheless, we have little doubt that some commercial military and security activity has been paid for through the granting of mineral concessions or other

non-monetary methods. ... The granting of mineral concessions to PMCs is unlikely to result in the equitable distribution of the proceeds of such concessions to local communities, and in most cases should be deprecated. (Her Majesty's Government, 2002:para 52)

Stereotypes of humanitarian organizations are equally prevalent and there are many negative perceptions. Duffield notes the lack of regulation and describes the situation amongst NGOs as “anything goes” (Duffield, 1998b:94). Others have been less kind:

The culture of relief is described as a world of 'missionaries, mercenaries, misfits', 'the last bastion of the amateur', a world of incompetence and creeping bureaucratization, and a culture of paternalism with little accountability to people on the ground. (Pieterse, 1998a:16)

If good working relationships are to be established during complex interventions, all those involved need to take steps to dismantle the barriers caused by such stereotyping and this is not an easy task, as the UNHCR notes:

Overcoming differences in organizational cultures and working methods requires an investment of time and understanding, sometimes considered a luxury in emergency operations. Each United Nations agency or NGO will to a large extent pursue its own priorities. Some actors may take the view that co-ordination and independence are mutually exclusive. (UNHCR, 1995a:para 4.1)

The preferred mode of communication in organizations may be determined by the group's traditions or working practices. At the most pragmatic level, steps need to be taken to ensure military and civilian organizations can physically communicate: radios, telephones or interpreters may be required. UNHCR training materials highlight this point: “Compatible communications equipment with shared frequencies [is required and] it may be necessary for one of UNHCR or the military to provide the appropriate equipment to the other” (UNHCR, 1995b:para 5.2).

However, there can be more fundamental communication problems. In hierarchical organizations, it is common to use a formal style and to process and structure information before it is communicated. On the other hand, more egalitarian institutions will probably use informal channels and share information openly. During interventions involving military and civilian personnel, individuals may be obliged to share information with people accustomed to a different pattern of communication and this can cause problems, especially if the information is devalued because of the manner in which it was communicated. Reflecting on the United Nations in Somalia, Walsh said, “Without a very proactive approach to internal communications, any relief group or organization faces a host of competing priorities and high prospects for misunderstanding, missed opportunities, and possibly failure” (Walsh, 1996:41).

Decision making during field operations can be made more difficult by the different structures used by participating groups. This results in a discrepancy in “decision-making maps” which can cause tension between groups.

[In the military] all channels of communication and reporting are therefore directed toward the policy decision-maker at the top of the pyramid. This gives the military an important C4I capability, and a robust management structure. By contrast, UNHCR devolves decision-making authority to the site of the most information. ... In the military command chain, command and control always emanate from a central point. UNHCR does not follow the same decision-making map. ... this perceived lack of structure could be a source of misunderstanding and even frustration. (UNHCR, 1995b:para 2.3)

UNHCR training materials also highlight that this frustration for military personnel can be made worse by the lack of a single focus in many of the agencies and by having to work as equals with personnel who are much younger (UNHCR, 1995a:paras 2.3 and 7.1). However, the devolved decision making and empowerment of subordinates may improve effectiveness, as Walsh points out:

Once the civilian agencies acquire confidence in each other and agree to the strategy behind their parts in the intervention, these agencies can demonstrate remarkable initiative and resourcefulness. Paradoxically, the uniformed services, which have so much to offer the collective enterprise, may require more time and outreach than the civilians to develop an informal approach to meeting day-to-day requirements. (Walsh, 1996:44)

Research with military commanders, on the other hand, suggests that the opposite is the case and that coping with deficiencies in the civilian decision-making process can be a source of stress:

Officers, at virtually all levels, are expected to deal with the complexities of a multinational political organisation which intervene in the process of decision-making and resourcing an operation but which lacks an adequate command structure. The slow speed of decision-making and vacillation which sometimes results can be a significant pressure for officers in the field who need definitive answers to questions and expect adequate resources. (Breakwell and Spacie, 1997:11)

It therefore appears that separate decision-making structures during interventions weaken the working relations of all personnel, military and civilian. At the lowest level of day-to-day administration, differences in procedures and working practices can also cause difficulties. One United States Army officer complained that the military and civilian elements of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

could not agree on allocated office space and, consequently, the headquarters moved three times in 12 days (Brown, N.D.:16). The same officer was further irritated:

The civilian UN personnel that were supporting the force only worked five days a week, whereas the military force was deployed working seven days a week. The civilian administrative personnel had never had any sort of interaction with a military force before, had no idea what military terms meant. (Ibid:5)

It has been suggested that military and civilian personnel have distinct psychological profiles that may prevent harmonious working relationships:

Military operations may require considerable experience and a certain state of mind, but the same applies to humanitarian assistance. It demands a thorough understanding of the needs of the people, good access to and relationship with local authorities and with other governmental and non-governmental organizations, patience and a self-sacrificing attitude. These things do not always sit easily in a military mind. (Brinkman, 1998:176-7)

However, many practitioners feel that these differences can be accommodated and, indeed, that we must do so if success is to be achieved. Thomson comments:

Despite the differences it is incumbent on the military to learn to work with the aid agencies, partly because in a humanitarian operation the delivery of aid is usually the main aim, but also because, despite their occasional oddness, they are often staffed by extremely experienced people who know how to deal with unusual third world situations. (Thomson, 1994:17)

Similarly, Walsh regards “stable working relationships” as “so important to the mission's broader objectives” (p 48) and includes such efforts amongst the “key issues”: “Key issues here are intramission cooperation and independence, prioritizing efforts and resources, building teamwork, and reducing the inevitable organizational friction inherent in such operations (Walsh, 1996:33)”.

Collaboration between the military, international organizations, commercial entities and NGOs who are involved in interventions is a key issue in delivering effective security policies. Differing goals and perceptions of the characteristics of people in other groups can lead to communication problems, while reluctance to share information broadly and different approaches to hierarchy could result in poor, ill-informed decisions being made.

#### **1.4 RATIONALE AND STRUCTURE FOR THE THESIS**

The insecurity that is common in the world and the way in which we now conceptualize any international responses through dynamic and circular models of

multi-faceted intervention suggest that there is a need for military and civilian actors to collaborate. These three issues set the context for the problem that will be considered in this study, which is presented in four main sections of the thesis. First, in the two chapters that follow, the research questions and the design are outlined. I have considered the work of other people who have reflected the complex context of adult education in societies recovering from conflict and their work is presented in a review of relevant literature and theory. Subsequently, data are presented in the form of three chapters that each addresses a documentary case study, with a chapter for Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq. Themes which were found to be common to all three cases are highlighted in Chapter 8. Having set out my data, it is analysed against five dimensions which are newly selected as the basis of an analytical framework. Finally, the report revisits the research questions and presents my findings and conclusions. This structure goes from expansive through focused selection onto specific features of single cases which are then re-integrated to wider concepts and tools that can be applied by policymakers and practitioners. The next chapter starts this journey, considering the background against which my research has been set.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

#### **2.1 BACKGROUND**

I am a British Army education officer with an interest in both security policy and adult education. In three posts that I have held, there has been an educational component to the military plan and operations. During deployment with the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1997, for example, I discovered that many of the groups involved in the international effort included adult education as part of their programmes. Generally, this was not made explicit, but there were many examples in which non-formal community education was provided for adults, either directly or through the media. Practitioners in the field did not appear to regard adult education elements of their programmes as a priority and military planners, attuned in part to the impact adversary groups might have on individuals, nevertheless ignored the potential for adult education to further their own aims. However, the importance of adult education in post-conflict societies cannot be under-estimated and this was recognized by both the UN (as long ago as 1992) and by an individual who had survived a recent war:

Reducing hostile perceptions through educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities. (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:32)

A postwar era in any country is a time when lessons – potentially deadly lessons – are crafted and distributed for instructing the next generation of women and men about what to fear, what to cherish, who to blame and who to count on for protection. (Enloe, 1994:228)

#### **2.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES**

The specific aim of the study is to propose how adult education can be part of an international response to conflict that can stabilize rather than de-stabilize societies recovering from conflict, thus enhancing security. The guiding hypothesis was that there has been a failure to recognize the contribution adult education can make in building a secure society resulting in policy vacuums and under-funding of the sector. From this hypothesis, five research questions were identified:

1. What were the links between adult education and security in societies following recent conflicts?
2. Where do policy makers and funding organizations focus their attention?
3. Has the new security context changed our understanding of the role of adult education?
4. On a more philosophical level, whose values are embedded in policy decisions regarding adult education provision?
5. What is the potential for adult education to stabilize the situation in societies recovering from conflict?

Answering these questions should lead to a clearer picture of the role of adult education provision in international interventions and responses to conflict and will help to frame the key levels of security on which adult education impacts.

The three operations in which I have been personally involved have occurred at different times, in different parts of the world under different legal regimes and my own role in each has varied. This study shall review the circumstances in each of these post-conflict societies. The individual situations were different but between them they covered most of the possible scenarios under which there could be an international intervention in the adult education of a society recovering from conflict. By identifying common themes and practices in each specific scenario, it will be possible to determine the links between adult education and security.

The three countries under examination are Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq. The United Nations mission in Cambodia was one of the first major commitments by the UN after the Cold War. At the time, it was seen as the possible model for future operations. The mission began in 1992 and my personal involvement was later (1994). I was working with the Australian Defence Force and was involved in a programme to develop the English language skills of the Cambodian military. At the time, I did not even visit the country; my work took place in Melbourne, Australia. However, I visited the country briefly in 2001 so I had the opportunity to see at first hand some of the outcomes of international efforts over almost a decade.

My second experience of a society recovering from conflict was through a deployment with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The operation started in 1995 and I spent six months of 1997 working in the sector supervised by British troops. My duties involved working with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to develop voter education materials



and other tasks that had an element of public education. This operation was mandated by the UN but conducted by NATO as a regional organization. This gave a different dynamic and offers a second model of how international agencies might get involved with education in a society recovering from conflict.

My most recent involvement in a post-conflict society was in 2004 when I was assigned to work with the military coalition that deployed to Iraq. The warfighting phase of the operation had been in 2003 and by the time I became involved, an American / British entity called the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had been given the responsibility of governing the occupied Iraq. I was amongst the military staff attached to the CPA to work on Civil Military Operations. As part of my role, I became involved in developing plans for vocational education systems. There was also a small role for me in wider plans for the de-militarization of Iraq's militia which had an education and employment component. A key feature of the operation in Iraq in 2004 was the involvement of contractors in the occupied country and their status as the CPA withdrew and Iraqi sovereignty was re-established.

My personal involvement in these three countries was very minor and I do not claim that I had a perceptible impact on adult education for these people. Nor do I claim that a study of the specific circumstances in these three countries will give a comprehensive picture of adult education in societies recovering from conflict. Taken together, however, they should provide a useful framework for examining the links between adult education and security at various stages in a country's development after a conflict, and for identifying common lessons learned and good practice for future operations.

In order to determine the focus of policy makers and funding organizations, there were two main sources of information. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government departments and international organizations each publicize their efforts in post-conflict societies. I propose that analysis of these records, sometimes taken from the Internet and sometimes from primary source published reports, should show the amount of funding and the priority given to adult education. This can be compared with efforts made in respect of other interventions, such as health, governance or school education.

Documentary evidence has been supplemented by approaching officials in some of these organizations and departments and seeking their views on where the focus lies in their dealings with societies recovering from conflict. These policy makers and funders are often highly mobile (dealing, as they often do, with crises and development across

the globe) and personal contact difficult. Therefore, data collection was by means of a questionnaire that could be emailed to them. An earlier trial of a web-based questionnaire proved ineffective except when direct contact had already been made so the questionnaires were closely controlled, kept brief and easy to complete, and targeted individuals within the organization who were likely to be responsive to part-time, PhD research of this kind.

In considering the three countries where I had been involved, it was clear that the model for international involvement was different in each. Further, the intervention in Iraq came after a series of bombings (including those on 9/11 in the US, attacks on tourists in Bali, and against transport infrastructure in Madrid and London) which gained worldwide media coverage and were considered by some to have shifted irreversibly the international security situation. A review of the literature will consider whether the security situation has changed and whether the view and role of adult education in shaping that security has shifted. Literature under consideration will include commentaries on international security, curricula for adults and a survey of ongoing research interests that might indicate a change of view. Radicalization of young men is regarded in some literature as a threat but more detailed study should show whether this is a recent change, linked to the possibly-new security situation, or a continuation of a longer term trend. There may also be lessons to be learned regarding the progression of an adult who participates in an educational programme and the study will attempt to examine connections between the content and structure of the programme and the outcomes.

A small part of the study will consider, drawing on the philosophy of education, the values that might be embedded in adult education programmes. Particularly in societies recovering from conflict, where commonly adopted and universally accepted values may not be present and channels to express individual or community views are often limited, it can be difficult to determine the values that should be promoted and accepted. If adult education is regarded as being a mechanism for influencing an individual, then any programme could be seen as part of a competition with others who seek to influence the adult in different directions. This potentially fraught area of a competition – perhaps between utilitarian or ideological drivers – will be examined through the questionnaires sent to organizations, through personal experience and in the review of documentary sources.

### **2.3 OUTCOMES AND UTILITY**

It is anticipated that the study will confirm that there has been a failure to recognize the contribution adult education can make in building a secure society, resulting in policy vacuums and under-funding of the sector. Further, the study is expected to confirm that adult education can play a key role in stabilizing a post-conflict society, thus enhancing security. A better understanding of the links between adult education and societal development will underpin a framework for adult education in such societies which balances short-term security issues with community values and the longer term requirements of society, reducing the potential for future conflict. This framework can partly fill the policy vacuum and, as it will link security outcomes to education, it may assist in establishing funding mechanisms for this often neglected sector. I hope that this work will inform decision making in the UN, the European Union (EU), the UK government and in the British military. As a professional educator and military practitioner, I believe I can offer a unique perspective and make a key contribution to this vital area of research.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the factors which shaped the design of the research study are described. Ethical considerations and the theoretical perspectives from which I drew are outlined; these underpinned the entire study and are considered first because there is potential for ethical concerns to affect the available methods and methodologies. A justification is also made for the research methods and methodologies selected.

#### 3.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Based on personal experience of working on post-conflict operations, I am acutely aware of the fragility of individual security for some in a society that is recovering from conflict. In such societies, local people have – almost by definition – been subjected to difficult and trying circumstances. If they engage with the international community in a fragile, recovering society (where there are guarantees neither of the eventual outcome nor of the duration of the international community's involvement), short-term advantages and benefits must be balanced against longer term concerns for individual safety. Those engaging most closely and most publicly may derive increased immediate benefits but they are also at greatest risk once the international community's involvement diminishes. Even during an international intervention, they may be at personal risk: a female I knew who was learning English and providing administrative services to the military was permanently disfigured by those who wished to discourage engagement with the international effort; another friend had to decide (on assuming the appointment as my interpreter) to relocate their family to protect them from reprisals. Ethical considerations in this study, therefore, had personal as well as academic importance. In seeking to discover how improvements can be made in adult education in societies recovering from conflict, it was essential to minimize any risks to anyone involved in the research and be aware of the possible consequences of the research findings. Therefore, everyone whose contribution to my research was not already in the public domain was guaranteed anonymity and I respected any confidences; material shared with me for this study was not used for any other purpose.

A significant ethical issue was my dual status as an officer in the British Army and an educator/researcher. As an officer, my conduct was governed by domestic statute and international law (such as the Geneva conventions); I was thus obligated, *inter alia*, to

carry out any legal order and to avoid endangering civilians. There were certain aspects of military duties which could require me to act in ways that are legal – indeed obligatory – for military personnel but could be considered unethical for an educator. I was also required to adhere to the values and standards of the British Army, codified in March 2000, which state:

All officers and soldiers in the British Army are required to commit themselves to achieving and maintaining values and standards which are in some respects different from, and more demanding than, those which apply in society at large. (Ministry of Defence, 2000:2)

The overriding operational imperative to sustain team cohesion and to maintain trust and loyalty between commanders and those they command imposes a need for values and standards which are more demanding than those required by society at large. (Ministry of Defence, 2000:1)

The core values are selfless commitment ... courage ('All soldiers must be prepared for tasks that involve the use of controlled lethal force: to fight. They may be required to take the lives of others, and knowingly to risk their own; to show restraint, even when doing so involves personal danger; and to witness injury or death to their comrades but still continue with the task in hand. '), ... discipline, ... integrity, ... loyalty, ... and respect for others. (Ministry of Defence, 2000:6-11)

As a professional educator, and a member of the College of Teachers (CoT), I was also obliged to consider the expected standards within the profession. The CoT code of practice obliges members to, “ensure equal opportunities for all” and “refrain from any acts that cause teachers or pupils harm”, as well as “ensure positive collaboration with those in educational and other institutions, authorities, examination boards and other specialist bodies” (College of Teachers). Similarly, the Professional Standards for Teachers, Tutors and Trainers in the Lifelong Learning Sector has overarching professional standards for all those who teach in the sector:

Teachers in the lifelong learning sector value all learners individually and equally. They are committed to lifelong learning and professional development and strive for continuous improvement through reflective practice. The key purpose of the teacher is to create effective and stimulating opportunities for learning through high quality teaching that enables the development and progression of all learners. (Lifelong Learning UK, 2007:2)

When these various professional standards are compared, some common features exist in all of them: the primacy of law over each code is a key feature and respect for the rights of others is also prominent. In most daily circumstances, I found no conflict in conducting myself in accordance with the requirements of each of the separate standards. At its most stark, however, there was potential for tension between the

Army's emphasis on the group and the controlled use of lethal force and the educationalist's professional obligation to enable the development of each individual learner. In my work (even during complex military deployments), I was usually able to separate the two roles and – if a choice had to be made – there would be a simple mechanism to determine which role took primacy in determining my actions at a given time. In this research study, however, I was deliberately combining the separate roles and my research forced me to consider both perspectives simultaneously. In the event that a conflict arose between the various professional standards expected, I needed to have a clear identity for myself which could take precedence when I was acting in my capacity as a researcher.

When I started my research, therefore, I decided to join the British Educational Research Association (BERA). I regarded BERA's ethical guidelines as an established and proven means of operating in this potentially fraught area. During my research, these guidelines were revised and a new ethical code was imposed on me. I think that the key revisions are an interesting reflection of how commercial and political dimensions have grown in importance since the late 1990s, and these are summarized below.

The original ethical guidelines, adopted in 1992, established the context for research and set out responsibilities to the research profession, participants and the public. They also set the basis for any relationship with funding agencies and the host institution, and offered guidance on publication and intellectual ownership (BERA, 1992). In the revised guidelines, the responsibility was extended to the “community of educational researchers” rather than the profession, and the relationship with funders became a more constraining “responsibility to sponsors of research”. A respect for academic freedom was added to the list of things which were to be respected within the ethical framework – the others (persons, knowledge, democratic values, quality of educational research) being unchanged. Within this amended context, the format for the revised guidelines, formally adopted by the BERA Council in 2004, was changed and the new guidelines referred to specific legislation (such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Data Protection Act (1998)). However, there were only limited changes that were relevant to my study: “Researchers must therefore avoid deception or subterfuge unless their research design specifically requires it to ensure that the appropriate data is collected or that the welfare of the researchers is not put in jeopardy” (BERA, 2004:6).

This was a new area but did not require any change to my research as I was not using deception or subterfuge.

The Association considers it good practice for researchers to debrief participants at the conclusion of the research and to provide them with copies of any reports or other publications arising from their participation. Where the scale of the research makes such a consideration impractical, alternative means such as a website should be used to ensure participants are informed of the outcomes. (BERA, 2004:10)

The 1992 guidelines simply required a more general “duty to report”. In either case, provided the findings were published, my obligations would be met.

There were three new clauses regarding treatment of participants and their data:

Researchers must make known to the participants (or their guardians or responsible others) any predictable detriment arising from the process or findings of the research. Any unexpected detriment to participants, which arises during the research, must be brought immediately to their attention or to the attention of their guardians or responsible others as appropriate. (BERA, 2004:8)

The confidential and anonymous treatment of participants' data is considered the norm for the conduct of research. Researchers must recognize the participants' entitlement to privacy and must accord them their rights to confidentiality and anonymity, unless they or their guardians or responsible others, specifically and willingly waive that right. (BERA, 2004:8)

Researchers must have participants' permission to disclose personal information to third parties and are required to ensure that such parties are permitted to have access to the information. (BERA, 2004:9)

These clauses forced me to consider who my “participants” might be. With a documentary study, focusing on documents that have been produced for other purposes, there would be no direct participant / researcher relationship with the authors of the documents. The proposed research design did not have an empirical component that would generate participants so I would only have to adhere to the BERA ethical guidelines on participants if I were to conduct any interviews. I decided that any participant interviewees would be offered the outline of my research and I would explain that I had determined to operate within BERA's ethical guidelines. Even with the changes in its guidelines, I believe that BERA's ethical guidelines gave me an appropriate framework to guide my research.

Others may question my ethics, though, simply because I was researching in the social sciences while operating as part of a military force overseas. In an article on the expansion of American Human Terrain Teams (groups of anthropologists and other

social scientists attached to each deployed US combat brigade), academics – including Hugh Gusterson – criticize the involvement of social scientists because their work, "contributes to a war of occupation which has entailed massive civilian casualties" (Rohde, 2007). My military values can, in certain circumstances, require me to use lethal force but, of itself, the force is rarely a solution to the underlying conflict. In seeking longer term solutions for societies recovering from conflict, where the human and social dynamic is so important, I think it was appropriate to shift my frame of reference from the military role to a more educationally-focused code; timing the shift in emphasis, however, could be a challenge.

### **3.3 UNDERPINNING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES**

In considering how to approach my research, it struck me that my topic rested in a lacuna between international relations / security studies and the educational field. In addressing each individual research question, I would be required to consider two disciplines, and this could affect not only the literature I should review before embarking on my study but also the appropriate theoretical framework for my work.

It was important that my work was bounded: there were such wide ranging theoretical perspectives that could offer relevant insights that multiple theses could have been produced. Rather than choosing one area to underpin my work (particularly during data collection and analysis), or attempting to draw on all the possible theoretical models which could be applied, it was decided that theoretical perspectives would be taken into account only where they affected the choices of policy makers or practitioners. Hence, there was no need to choose between a realist or idealist approach to international relations unless the role of the state was important to the decisions being made. Similarly, the debate about adult education as a community or individual good could be left aside.

Table 1 summarizes where disciplines were mapped to each of my research questions, and the notes which follow indicate the relationship which needed to be explored.



**Table 1 Relevance of disciplines to research questions**

<b>Research Question</b>	<b>Educational Field</b>	<b>International Relations / Security Studies</b>
1. What were the links between adult education and security in societies following recent conflicts?	Yes – A	Yes – E
2. Where do policy makers and funding organizations focus their attention?	Yes – B	Yes – B
3. Has the new security context changed our understanding of the role of adult education?	No	Yes – F
4. Whose values are embedded in policy decisions regarding adult education provision?	Yes – C	No
5. What is the potential for adult education to stabilize the situation in societies recovering from conflict?	Yes – D	Yes – E

Key:

- A. Identify adult education programmes.
- B. NGOs, governments and international organizations are all included; some have an educational and others a security focus.
- C. Philosophy of education informs this discussion.
- D. Outcomes, or potential outcomes, of adult education programmes.
- E. Security policy using 'soft' power: employment; disarmament and demobilization.
- F. Threats to security and radicalization.

### **3.4 METHODOLOGY**

In developing my research design, I felt it was important to recognize from the outset the link between my research and policy:

Some research is designed for those in education who have no role in policy-making; some research is, in effect, the academic community talking to itself, developing new concepts or critiques of existing ones. Educational research also legitimately explores issues of education in its wider social context, often to the dislike or discomfort of policy-makers. Educational research nevertheless can, and should, contribute to policy in several different ways. It can serve instrumental ends, such as improvement of decision-making in the classroom or school, and actual educational practice. More generally, through its ability to problematize and inform issues faced by policy-makers and practitioners. In a democratic society, it has a vital function in offering a critical challenge to conventional beliefs and practices. (Pratt, 1999:39-40)

A key outcome is to “problematize and inform” the military and others in an international intervention of adult educational issues in societies recovering from conflict. Although

my work would be informed by separate disciplines, I found that case study research was common in both of these two social sciences, so this could be the basis of a methodology which would be recognized in each sphere. Bill Gillham identifies a case study as a “main method”, with “document and record analysis” as a sub-method. He also highlights the role of theorizing in case study research:

In naturalistic case study research, theorizing emerges. That is because you cannot usefully theorize in the absence of evidence, or on very little. The evidence you look at is initially dictated by your broad aims. But increasingly it is directed by your successively revised theories or explanations. And it is negative or complicating evidence that precipitates these revisions. (Gillham, 2000:35)

This was slightly at odds with the view of Robert K. Yin who makes a distinction between ethnography or grounded theory and case studies, because the latter are preceded by theory development (Yin, 2003:28). Yin also defines the case study methodology as an “empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Ibid:13). This seemed to encompass the three situations I wished to study and I regarded my research design as a multiple-case study, which would be analogous to replication logic in experimentation:

The logic underlying the use of multiple-case studies is the same. Each case must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication). (Ibid:47)

In selecting multiple cases, I had to complete what Ragin refers to as “casing.” He suggests that using casing in “case-oriented inquiry ... provide[s] ways of viewing cases as coherent bundles of aspects and attributes” (Ragin, 2009:523). These attributes were associated with the security and educational aspects of the three countries studied. All three had experienced conflict, which had been followed by an international intervention that used military force. However, different mandates underpinned each of the interventions and the disruption to the education systems also varied. The UN mounted a traditional peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, which had very low levels of adult literacy as a result of the intellectual infrastructure having been systematically destroyed during a protracted conflict. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a mature and well-respected education system had been – to some extent – protected during a relatively brief but brutal war; the UN endorsed a peace enforcement operation under the auspices of a regional organization. Similarly to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq had had reasonable literacy levels when a coalition of states intervened in 2003 but the education system had suffered many years of underfunding and neglect during the

periods of conflict and sanctions. Thus, the three cases reflected common inputs to their situations but with differing features and attributes that should explain the different outcomes. I expected the three countries studied to show contrasting results and to identify the possible reasons for these differences so my case study would be both descriptive and explanatory.

Military colleagues with whom I discussed my research often assumed I was comparing adult education in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq but this is not a comparative study. There were common concerns in each country, but it was never my intent to examine identical aspects of the international provision as it was applied in each of the three countries. Neither did I have a unified theory or model against which I would compare the different sets of individual data. Thus, while I hoped to draw conclusions from studying three interventions in adult education in societies recovering from conflict, my approach was to be one of documentary case study highlighting points of contrast rather than comparative educational research.

### **3.5 RESEARCH METHODS**

#### **3.5.1 Establishing Access to Data**

Before I designed this study, I had the advantage of working in some of the countries whose adult education provision I wished to explore in my research; this gave me a degree of familiarity with the places and working practices. I believed that people who could inform my research would be reassured that any information they shared would be used ethically, carefully and with due consideration of any sensitivities surrounding it. However, the people who had direct – and contemporary – experience of working in societies recovering from conflict were usually extremely busy and (from my own personal experience) I knew that the majority would be neither able nor willing to spare time to assist in my research. I decided, therefore, to make maximum use of documents and other material which these busy people had produced for other purposes, even if it was not comprehensive, and extract the data I required. Denscombe identified three advantages of documentary research, all of which were relevant in my choice of method: “access to data ... cost-effective ... permanence of data” (Denscombe, 1998:169). I knew at first hand, however, how partial many records would be and how difficult it would be to contact those with direct knowledge and relevant information.

The problem of access was made more complicated by the locations of experienced practitioners. Many international staff who work in societies recovering from conflict

spend short periods of time in the country then return to their home base or the headquarters of the international organization they represent. Those with the information and expertise I wanted to access were just as likely to be in New York or London as Sarajevo or Baghdad.

### 3.5.2 Potential Bias in the Data

Having decided to focus mostly on documentary research, I considered the greatest risk in the method was the potential for selective use of the material so a thematic approach was adopted. In this approach, I would extract from published or otherwise available documents all the data (comments, facts, supposition) on a given theme before I used the information in my analysis. In this way, I would emulate an interview with a subject, where all the responses to a given prompt are captured and then analysed by the researcher. It was also important that the documents consulted were not taken at face value, particularly as there could be bias built in by the original authors and publishers of source material:

Document search and analysis (a main method if you are an historian) epitomizes the case study research strategy. These documents were not drawn up to answer your research questions: but they're part of the evidence base. They are not of course to be taken as representative of what actually happens – the informal reality. But they bear some relation to it: exactly what, you have to discover. What weight you attach to them in your research depends on their relevance to your questions. But that they exist at all is of some significance. (Gillham, 2000:43)

Nevertheless, there are some basic well established rules that apply in appraising and analysing documents, and these are generally discussed in terms of authenticity, reliability, meaning and theorisation. (McCulloch, 2004:42)

Corbetta regards it as positive that documents are “non-reactive” sources for research “which exist independently of the researcher's actions” (Corbetta, 2003:287), while others (for example, (Denscombe, 1998:170)) view negatively the fact that the data have been generated for other purposes.

It could be claimed that a great many people have knowledge of the various adult education programmes in societies recovering from conflict, although only a privileged minority will usually formalize their account and have access to a means of publication. A further bias could be introduced by focusing on those sharing their opinions in the English language. In my initial study design, therefore, I planned to use a questionnaire in the local languages of the countries I was studying. During a small-scale pilot of these questionnaires, they were shown to be of limited utility and, further, served to indicate that (in some cases) the choice of local language was in itself an indication of

the degree to which a group had succeeded in gaining recognition from the international community. Therefore, by selecting only English as the language for this study, while a bias inevitably exists, it is at least a standard bias. Thus, the data can be used, albeit with the proviso that the groups that are most remote from the international community's involvement in their country will be unlikely to be represented. The involvement of the international community in the local adult education is a standard feature of the societies under consideration, so valid comparisons can still be made using this partial, potentially biased, data.

### 3.5.3 Types of Data

For this study, the majority of my data has been drawn from published and documentary sources. While this approach did not offer comprehensive coverage of the situations, it was more likely to generate a consistent amount of access to information for the separate countries studied, thereby increasing the validity of the comparisons of the cases. Access to documents was considered more practical than attempting to establish direct contact with people in the field, partly as I lacked up-to-date background knowledge of the organizational structures in place, and had few local contacts. Using published material had drawbacks, however. As McCulloch highlights, where government departments or others establish their own website for public access, "It gives the official government perspective on the issues of the day, and the orthodox line to undermine criticisms and alternatives" (McCulloch, 2004:39). Further,

From the standpoint of the researcher, a particularly important question concerns the kind of access which may be had to official documents. For if the production of the documents is a politically and bureaucratically structured process, so too is access to the documents produced. Not all official documents are published, and those unpublished documents that become available to researchers in open archives are but a selection of all the documents produced. (Scott, 1990:62)

Nevertheless, I decided to use published official reports to establish facts about adult education programmes, bearing in mind that the publisher may have been selective in the facts published in order to present the publishing organization in a positive light. Aside from issues of access, there were practical constraints on my ability to gather primary data by visiting the countries I wished to research.

However, for some areas, I was able to draw on personal experience, due to my own deployments there as part of the international community efforts. My personal connection with Cambodia, however, was through my involvement in the Australian government Defence Engagement programme and I had been based in Melbourne, Australia. Ideally, I would have arranged some work in Cambodia for six months; this

would have allowed more direct comparisons with Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Practical considerations precluded an extended period in the country, primarily because research was being conducted on a part-time basis and I remained committed to full-time employment with the British Army throughout. However, I was able to arrange a brief visit to Phnom Penh and I met some people who were involved in adult education there. Personal notes and records from the visit and my deployments have been used to supplement the other documentary sources available for this research and the former might be viewed as the notes from condensed fieldwork (which was useful in compiling factual data but inappropriate as a basis for value judgements):

Condensed fieldwork is heavily reliant on interviews and the collection of documents, often incorporating only day-long visits to a variety of research sites. ...such approaches have been dismissed as 'blitzkrieg ethnography'. However, the value and validity of the data generated by such fieldwork are dependent upon the scope and purpose of the research. Condensed fieldwork is an inappropriate basis for a portrayal of the values, beliefs and rituals of a particular culture – the traditional focus of ethnography. However, it can provide in-depth information and understanding of more limited themes. ... It also has the benefit of broadening a sample to enhance population validity as a supplement to the high ecological validity which ethnographers argue typically characterises the in-depth study of a particular institution. This can be especially important in policy-oriented research where single in-depth studies may be dismissed as being atypical. (Crossley and Vulliamy, 1996:445)

I did not consider my time in the three countries which formed the core of my research as fieldwork in any formal sense. There was no structured approach to data gathering from in-country sources and my role in each case was distinctly different. Indeed, it was during my deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina that I first started to critically reflect on how the international community delivered adult education there compared to Cambodia; these initial reflections developed into this research project, which would use documents as a research resource.

Systematic documentary research may involve one of two interdependent focuses of interest: documents can be used as resources or topics. ...the use of documents as resources might involve the use of biographical reference books to compile a comprehensive set of data on a particular sample of individuals regarded as members of an elite. ... In such research the quality of the documents is appraised in terms of their value in constructing valid descriptive statements about the things to which they refer: the researcher is interested in what they denote about the world. When documents are used as topics, on the other hand, the researcher's main concern is to explain the nature of the documents themselves. (Scott, 1990:36)

### 3.5.4 The Internet and E-Research

In many respects, the development of the Internet has allowed me to avoid the complexities of conducting fieldwork in societies recovering from conflict. Travel into the countries under consideration was likely to be difficult until the situation had stabilized; by definition, this would be once some steps towards the recovery from conflict had been completed. However, the Internet – which is increasingly available in many areas, despite degradation of the communications infrastructure – allowed me relatively easy access to publications that would previously be filed in remote offices, as well as the opportunity (sometimes) to email individuals to obtain clarification of data in their publications. There had been a tendency, too, for non-governmental organizations and public bodies to publish extensive records on the Internet in order to increase their transparency and accountability; this has generated a great amount of information on international projects overseas, although it may not be presented in a neutral and objective manner.

It cannot be assumed that the information provided in such [published official] reports is always accurate, and it should be checked against other sources. The way in which such information is selected should also be carefully assessed, for it is usually designed to support a particular argument, or the government's general credibility. (McCulloch, 2004:80)

Denscombe supports McCulloch's stance on this potential bias which runs counter to the improved access to data. "Publicly available records reflect upon matters in a way that is publicly acceptable at a given time and in a given social sphere. They tend to offer a version of reality massaged to meet public expectations" (Denscombe, 1998:162).

In the initial design of this research project, I envisaged using the Internet for more direct contact with people in societies recovering from conflict. I expected to be able to circulate a large number of questionnaires via email, and I wanted to use a website to offer participants information on my research project. I also believed that interviews could be conducted either via an email dialogue, or using web-based conference facilities. In theory, these aspirations were all possible but piloting of a website and email questionnaires generated feeble hit and response rates. So few participants were using these media that I concluded I was not achieving enough penetration and access via the Internet; analysis of data gathered in this way was unrepresentative and lacked validity. For completeness, the pilot questionnaires are reproduced in Annex 1.

### 3.6 SUMMARY

In considering how best the research questions could be addressed, the practical challenges and difficulties took precedence in my initial thinking. I imagined a study where I would have unlimited time and the material resources I needed to explore my topic would be freely available. Of course, I knew that in reality I would be constrained in many ways: the issue was whether it would be possible to design the research in a way that would allow me to address my research questions in a valid way, to allow me to develop defensible positions and be achievable within the practical constraints I faced.

There were some unexpected outcomes from developing my research design. The choice of an ethical frame of reference initially appeared to be arbitrary, a simple selection of a code from the many available. However, because I was forced to critique my choice due to the duality of my roles, the similarities and differences in the codes were highlighted; the importance of an individual's identity (rather than the research questions or the context of the study) in determining the appropriate ethics need to be explored further.

Collating data from an organization's records (published on the Internet or elsewhere), internal working documents and personal notes retained for purposes other than research potentially introduced bias into the study. However, it was unlikely that individuals with relevant expertise in the three countries under consideration and over the extended timeframe of the conflicts from which the societies were recovering would be available for interview; a research design that depended on gaining data gathered as responses to standard questions would be impractical. One of the unexpected outcomes of this project, therefore, is the collation of disparate information on adult education in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq into a single, easily accessible source for other researchers to use in future.

Thus, the research design, as well as informing the study has potentially opened up areas of further study in both ethics and adult education.



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **LITERATURE AND THEORY REVIEW**

In this chapter, I review the literature and theory relevant to the study of adult education as a stabilizing response to conflict. Literature that might be considered could be drawn from a very expansive field of adult education and the addition of literature from an equally wide field of stabilization, conflict and security studies would result in an unmanageable and unbounded number of items to review. By considering the research design before turning to the literature, it is possible to focus on literature and theories that are important and relevant to my specific study. Also, selecting a methodology of documentary case studies means that some literature might stand as data so it is more appropriate to establish the research design before turning – in this chapter – to review literature and theory.

#### **4.1 PRACTICALITIES**

No academic research can be conducted in a vacuum and, thus, critical engagement with the existing literature has been a central part of my study; literature searching and reviewing was one of my main concerns when I first began this study and I considered both practical and theoretical critiques of the process.

In completing this review of the literature relevant to my study, I identified two challenges: boundaries and time. As my research is at the nexus of security and educational policy, perhaps it was to be expected that there would be no clear boundaries delineating my area of study. However, the lack of clear boundaries has made it difficult to decide when an item that is interesting (but only indirectly connected to the research questions) should be included. To give an example, as the study has developed, structural issues regarding international organizations have taken less prominence. By contrast, meantime, the links between an individual's personal security and the stability of the state have grown in importance. My boundary thus shifted from the United Nations towards the individual.

Other boundaries were those between reading for pleasure, for this research and for professional purposes (made more complicated by my dual professional role as an education officer in the British Army). Mostly, my reading for relaxation is characterized and separated by the casual engagement with the text – but I am aware that some such reading has influenced my thought process, or initiated new lines of enquiry within my research. For example, a work of fiction for teenagers set in Bosnia (Groen, 1996) sparked the development of my thinking on defining adulthood; the same text also

contained an evaluation of the comparative values of school, training or work to the participant. When I have been reading policy documents, however, it has been difficult at times to engage with them for research or professional purposes. When I was in Iraq, for example, I used documents such as Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias within Iraq (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004) to frame decisions taken on whether my team could deal with particular individuals or groups. Later, the same order became a key source for the analysis of the impact of vocational education programmes for the militias – covered in my research study.

Turning to time, my part-time programme of study – and the fact that other commitments have taken priority on occasion – has unduly extended the duration of my research. Since I formally began work on this project in 1998, there have been some prominent and significant shifts in the field. The prominence of the United Nations in interventions has dwindled, in conjunction with alterations in the interpretation of sovereignty. Similarly, the importance of adult education for general development has reduced in favour of education and training that underpins future earning potential.

The study is based on an examination of three interventions, with the first starting in 1992 and the final one in 2003. This extended timeframe was not helpful in identifying when relevant literature may have been published. However, it was helpful to categorize the literature in relation to significant shifts in debate on international security: the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the al-Qaeda attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001. Earlier and later literature was not ignored but it was considered only if it shaped or influenced these key security shifts, or was directly relevant to the interventions under examination.

It could be expected that, as time passed, the situation in societies recovering from conflict would change. Similarly, the literature relevant to each intervention might be expected to follow a pattern. Intuitively, I thought that there would be a peak of reports and journal articles (based on individual experience) very soon after an international intervention focused attention on a particular country, and that this would be followed by the publication of books, academic theses and conferences once there had been time for reflection. Reviews – perhaps as much as a decade after the society began recovering from conflict – might produce a second cluster of literature. With this in mind, I analysed the types of literature on each country in my study by its date of publication. I used the Institute of Education library catalogue to identify the number of items in each category which had the country name as a keyword (excluding curriculum resources). A similar exercise was conducted on the bibliographic database used for all

the references in my research. Neither catalogue produced enough literature items for reliable statistical analysis and, to my surprise, there were no emerging patterns or trends, although there were indications perhaps of a 'rush to publish' following the intervention in Iraq. For completeness, however, the results of this exercise are shown in Annex 2.

Managing the references over an extended period of time, and being able to retrieve and recall relevant material over years, proved to be a challenge. From the outset, I established a framework of categories which were used for filing (in old-fashioned ring binder folders, and in a bespoke commercial bibliographic database). These are outlined in the table below:

**Table 2 Categories for filing framework**

Conflict (security)	Distance (education)	Bosnia
Humanitarian	Adult	Cambodia
Intervention	Higher	Iraq
NGO	Organizations	Country (other nations)
Multilateral	Politics	Contacts
Interagency	Research	

It was important to keep EndNote software up to date, and compatible with the word processing packages I was using; the accuracy of the database after each update had to be confirmed. The paper copies of references which were not transferred onto the database (mainly those that were pictorial, or which needed retrieval of substantial sections of the text) had to be protected. I was acutely aware that there was no physical backup of these files, a particular worry when I moved house (I have been relocated seven times during the project).

It has been important to address these basic, practical matters because, had they failed, there would have been no auditable basis for reviewing the literature that has informed my research.

## **4.2 RESEARCH PROCESS**

There are a number of publications which offer guidance to the beginning-researcher on how to approach the literature in their field and Chris Hart's text, *Doing a Literature Review: Releasing the Social Science Research Imagination* (Hart, 1998), was particularly useful. However, the intention in this section is not to list the many handbooks and manuals which provide guidance on how to complete various types of research project. Rather, I have highlighted a few authors whose comments on the

research process had particular relevance for this study. A prime concern was the availability of data: Carron and Carr-Hill list a number of sources, including sector assessments and statistical reports (Carron and Carr-Hill, 1991:47), while Little reminds us that data may be in existence before our own project begins:

A great deal of useful information for planning purposes can be gleaned from existing sources – if people know where to look and if the obstacles to looking are not too great. Government records on recruitment, selection and promotion, newspaper cuttings of job advertisements, personnel files from parastatal and private organisations, employment exchange data, Examination Board records of school examination performance all currently exist and all provide valuable information for education / employment planning. (Little, 1984:16)

The interventions in this study have all resulted from complex environments, with political, economic and social erosion in the area. A number of authors are aware that data collection in such circumstances may be a low priority, including (Weiss, 1998:52) and (Huon, 1974:25). It is also difficult to measure the impact of any intervention, as it cannot be isolated from the wider social and political context. Billis and MacKeith note that, "... it was almost impossible to establish whether local changes had resulted from NGO interventions or not" (Billis and MacKeith, 1992:121). Uphoff believes that isolation is impossible so researchers should adopt an "open system" (Uphoff, 1995:26) in their approach to studies and Duffield summarizes the situation well:

In complex political emergencies the standards of need assessment and end-use monitoring are generally low. If one adds to this inter-agency competition, the relativization of success, the limited accountability and the absence of professional standards, one can make several comments about the aid market. ... it is extremely difficult to find out exactly what humanitarian aid has achieved. (Duffield, 1998b:94)

Finally, I was mindful of the impact the research would have on me as an individual. Neither McLaren nor Tanil underestimate this issue:

Living as a critical social agent means knowing how to live contingently and provisionally without the certainty of knowing the truth, yet at the same time with the courage to take a stand on issues of human suffering, domination and oppression. This is the 'postmodern' task of the critical educator – to live with courage and conviction with the understanding that knowledge is always partial and incomplete... (McLaren, 1995:15)

Examining violence in society is a deep soul-searching exercise that raises fundamental ethical and philosophical questions relative to human civilization. (Tanil, 1997:8)

Both the title of my thesis (*Adult Education as a Stabilizing Response to Conflict*) and the research questions that I have set, highlight that my study was situated between

two main fields. My study, therefore, had to draw on diverse fields of literature, taking account of developments in both the International Relations and Educational disciplines. Information sources for both disciplines were available in traditional academic journals, in electronic journal form and on the Internet. Within these broad categories, it was possible to identify specialist fields that were likely to have particular relevance to my research. These included Development Studies, Security Strategy and literature on the United Nations in the International Relations field, with adult, non-formal and refugee education being significant areas of the Educational literature. Because of the difficulties the passage of time presented to me as a researcher, and as the literature was so diverse, a chronological review would be disjointed. Instead, my review of the literature has been presented using the strategy paradigm of Ways, Means and Ends as a framework. Attributed to Sophocles and explicitly used by Clausewitz (1989), this paradigm holds that a strategy is the sum of the ways and means used to achieve (political or military) ends: they must be compatible and balanced for the strategy to be successful. The paradigm is in common use by military practitioners and those developing a critical or doctrinal approach to military thinking (Riper, 2006); (Lykke, 1998) and it is adopted below.

I selected three **ways** of approaching the analysis of how societies recovering from conflict have been influenced through adult education, international intervention and 'soft' security models. The **means** for this study are the available data and documents which are considered in two main categories: financial matters and country-specific material. Finally, the **end** is being able to link theory to practice and the final section of the literature review will examine some of the key theories others have used and which occur elsewhere in the thesis.

### **4.3 WAYS: THE CONCEPT OF ADULT EDUCATION**

It was interesting to note that there was no universally-agreed definition of 'adult'. In presenting a conceptual model of adulthood, Squires reminds us that biological factors are less important than socio-cultural ones in determining an individual's adult status: "It is also fairly widely recognized that the age of transition from one phase to another may vary considerably from one individual to another and also between groups: women and men, different social classes, different cultures" (Squires, 1987:96).

With my interest in adult education, I have excluded literature dealing with the education of children in conflict or post-conflict situations while remaining aware of advances in thinking in this field – summarized well in a Department for International Development (DFID) publication in 2003 (Smith and Vaux, 2003). The complexities of

competing views of adult education are not as prevalent for young people and that sector has more recourse to internationally agreed standards; thus, children's education sources have been placed out of scope for the literature review.

Table 3 shows the main definitions of various terms used in the literature of adult education. However, it was significant that many of the definitions were based on comparisons with children's schools rather than a positive statement that could stand alone. From the table, it can be seen that Evans and Jeffs and Smith both point to a category of education that is "throughout the lives of learners" (Evans, 1981:19), or "learning in life as it is lived" (Jeffs and Smith, 1996:4).

**Table 3 Comparison of terms used by various authors to describe types of adult education**

	ISCED	Evans	Coombs	Michigan State University	Jeffs
	(Carron and Carr-Hill, 1991:7)	(Evans, 1981:19)	(Evans, 1981:27)	(Evans, 1981:28)	(Jeffs and Smith, 1996:4)
Formal adult education	organized programmes of education provided for the benefit, and adapted to the needs, of persons not in the regular school and university systems and generally 15 years of age and older. Students are enrolled or registered.			incidental; in school.	
Non-formal adult education	No enrolment or registration		any organized educational activity outside the established formal system – whether operating separately or as an important feature of some broader activity – that is intended to serve identifiable clienteles and learning objectives	out of school	
Complementary education		rounds out the school curriculum			
Supplementary education		adds on to schooling at a later time and place			

Replacement education		<i>replaces</i> schooling			
Incidental education				No conscious intent to foster learning	
Informal education				either the learner or source of information has conscious intent to foster learning	It is the process of fostering learning in life as it is lived. The concerns with community and conversation; the focus on people as persons rather than objects: the range of settings in which it can happen
REMARKS	"para-formal education" , popular education, education for personal development and professional training' (Ibid:21)	"A fourth category may be emerging in the future in which formal and non-formal education merge into a unified process of education which is available throughout the lives of learners."	"very considerable overlap between Coomb's 'functional knowledge and skills' and the WCEFA notions of knowledge and skills for critical thinking and problem-solving" (King, 1991:178)		P 13 Discusses a formal -informal continuum with the separation depending on the amount of control over the environment



The concept of lifelong learning has indeed entered common parlance and adult education is certainly part of the category. However, definitions and categorizations of lifelong learning vary enormously. Originally defined in the 1960s, lifelong learning, particularly when it was understood to be a policy context, attracted renewed attention at the turn of the century, concurrent with globalization and a critique of power relationships in education. Definitions are difficult in this area, as Koski (2006:193) stresses: "The links between formal adult education, lifelong learning, individual experience, actual educational deeds, participation and margins seem controversial." Some consider the social and societal context to be the key defining element in lifelong learning but many regard the outcomes that are related to economic success and vocational skills as taking priority (Hager and Halliday, 2006:236); (Usher and Edwards, 2007:38). Again, however, it was common for lifelong learning to be defined and described by a series of absences:

What we see in this discussion therefore is an implied set of opposites or binaries through which the meaning of lifelong learning is articulated and inscribed: people rather than structures; promotion rather than provision; transformation rather than more of the same; breaking down rather than erecting barriers; variety rather than narrowness; managing learning rather than teaching; flexibility rather than rigidity. Here the formal education system, and in particular schooling, functions as an absence which nonetheless is also a presence and against which lifelong learning is semiotically fashioned. (Usher and Edwards, 2007:42)

Also of interest is Little's observation that the informal sector has less status than the formal – a phenomenon repeated in the economic sector. Carron and Carr-Hill note that the non-formal sector (believed by Evans to be capable of replacing schooling) cannot correct "the main gender disparities which are being reproduced by the formal school system" (Carron and Carr-Hill, 1991:41). "Similarly, much of the discussion about the role of women's work in the informal sector emphasizes its dependence on and exploitation by the larger enterprises in the formal sector" (Little, 1984:23).

#### 4.3.1 Links to the Community

Given the difficulties of definition highlighted above, authors often choose to describe the characteristics of the provision under examination. A common feature of adult education is its foundations on groups or loose community structures and the following works all highlight this feature: (Carron and Carr-Hill, 1991), (Bock and Papagiannis, 1983) and (Squires, 1987). However, close links between adult education and the community can make comparison between programmes difficult. The difficulties of comparison and evaluation in my study cannot be forgotten.

The flexibility of non-formal education, which is its strength, also makes it relatively intractable to measurement. ... Attempts to measure learning achievements with easily collected statistical indicators which will be comparable across countries are on-going but far from completion: while reading comprehension and mathematical and scientific ability may be relatively tractable to evaluation, it will remain difficult to assess students' command of essential life skills, as these will vary from region to region. (Eastern and Southern Regional Office, 1991:49)

#### 4.3.2 Purposes

Adult education programmes can be regarded as having either a public good or a vocational purpose and provision can usually be placed on a continuum between these extremes. Bock and Papagiannis (1983:4) and Tanil (1997:12) each describe a dilemma for developing countries, where education from both ends of the spectrum may be demanded.

Other writers appear to believe that vocational training and teaching skills that will increase earning potential are most important in developing countries. King (1991) notes that this sector includes training for entrepreneurial small businesses and is becoming more co-ordinated but also cautions that manpower assumptions can be flawed (Ibid:128), while Styler concludes that the people in developing countries prefer to undertake training which they perceive has direct utility (Styler, 1984).

Those practitioners who choose more general adult education programmes tend to stress the values that can be promoted and they often use words such as "empowerment" and "democracy" (Eastern and Southern Regional Office, 1991). The focus of such programmes is likely to be on an individual's attitudes, beliefs and feelings, so it can be more useful where the programme seeks to question, challenge or strengthen the dialogue about such matters in a society. Recent thinking about this, for example by Gallagher and contributors to a volume on peace education (Gallagher, 2009), acknowledge that "globalizing pressures" (Ibid:7) can run against this focus. The balance can be particularly important in post-conflict societies.

From the academic perspective, the role of adult education in promoting social dialogue is even more paramount, with McLaren calling it a pre-requisite to any vocational provision (McLaren, 1995:30) and Jeffs and Smith placing "values" in their definition of adult education (Jeffs and Smith, 1996:10).

### 4.3.3 Structural Aspects within States

In adult education, it is often the state that decides on access, curricular choices or funding. In these ways, states can exert influence over adult education programmes. Styler believed that non-state actors' roles were limited but since the work was published (Styler, 1984:19), the freedom available to these non-state actors has grown. However, the point is still valid and the following quote from Bock and Papagiannis reinforces the point that control of education can be a route to control of whole groups in society.

Education extends the claims of the state's authority over and above that of previous primordial subgroup allegiances and establishes the essential exchange relationship of citizenships rights and obligations to those newly incorporated elements. ...However, this process of educational institutionalization operates in both directions. As these newly incorporated groups come to perceive the allocation and legitimating power of schools, they begin to organize their political and economic resources in an attempt to capture control of education as the chief means of gaining access to power in the new state. Since many such subgroups are similarly motivated, the result is often intense competition between rival groups for control of education. (Bock and Papagiannis, 1983:176)

Recognising this power, Sophoan believes politics should be kept out of education and decisions on educational matters should be made without interference (Sophoan, 1997:45-6). On the other hand, others including Filson and Green (1980) have suggested that power granted through education is not useful and groups must claim power for themselves.

## 4.4 WAYS: THE IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS

As with the term 'adult', the definition of 'intervention' proved to be problematic. There were a number of definitions in the literature and Parekh makes a specific distinction between interventions and war or conquest (Parekh, 1998:144), and he applies particular conditions to humanitarian interventions.

Humanitarian intervention, as the term is used today, then, is an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another country with a view to ending the physical suffering caused by the disintegration or the gross misuse of the authority of the state, and helping create conditions in which a viable structure of civil authority can emerge. (Ibid:147-8)

Parekh tends to agree with Freedman that interventions are processes:

Thus, intervention has to be recognized not as being directed at a specific end but as being part of a process, though undoubtedly a process with defined stages. Military action can never be sufficient: at best, it can create conditions for a more favourable political outcome. By definition, a country which can only be stabilized by outside intervention is no longer fully self-governing. (Freedman, 1995:22)

Having defined intervention, those who use the term usually take a position with regards to the value or otherwise of such a process. Pieterse (1998b:232) is amongst those who see those intervening as authoritarian or neo-colonialist and in another work, he continues to reflect this view:

[These operations are] authoritarian damage control operations, under a humanitarian flag because humanitarianism happens to be the international flavour of the year. This matches the account of humanitarian action as 'functional imperialism' (Griffiths et al. 1995: 113) and the image of relief-as-recolonization. (Pieterse, 1998a:8)


In fact, many writers in this field have struggled with the problems of legitimacy, rights and values in international interventions. Parekh (1998:167) connects interventions to a "just world order", while Woodhouse and Ramsbotham – drawing on M Trachtenberg's 1993 work – note, "For an interventionist system to be viable, it needs in particular to have a general aura of legitimacy" (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 1998:71). Their views are also reflected by Thomas and Reader, who comment:

[Raymond Plant, the political philosopher] ...argues forcibly that there must be a transnational moral basis for human rights. Without this, the definition of such rights amounts to nothing more than the expression of a preference, and the implications of this for humanitarian intervention are worrying: imperialism will raise its head again. ... Without such a rule governed basis, Plant argues that intervention will depend on the discretion of the rich and powerful. (Thomas and Reader, 1998:127)

Other articles and books highlight the changing nature of interventions, the increasing presence of military forces, and the more integrated approach of NGOs and government bodies. Thus, we find discussion of circular rather than linear models of conflict, relief and development (UN Development Programme, 1997:11); (Bellamy, 1998:13); (Tanil, 1997:11).

Prins notes the limitations of measuring intensity simply as a feature of frequency and degree of violence and suggests that, "High intensity operations are those in which there is the lowest degree of control over the risk variables to which the force is subjected" (Prins, 1998:11). He goes on to develop a lever / fulcrum analogy to show

the degree of control given the many risk factors that must be assessed. This fulcrum analogy is also quoted in Bellamy's *Spiral Through Time* paper, but he develops a circular model of conflict which reflects the wider security picture and this is shown in Figure 1.



**Figure 1 A Circular Model of Conflict (Bellamy, 1998:33)**

He judges, “The smart place to be ... is not outside the circle, but inside it, able to move out to undertake pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict operations with equal facility” (Bellamy, 1998:34) and he notes:

Ideally, forces working for global security will expand the conflict prevention zone and do more in that area (top right), and try to minimise time spent in the conflict zone (bottom) when it becomes unavoidable. The circular model immediately suggests the need for a more holistic security model, which ... embraces foreign aid, diplomacy and other activities, very much like the D3 concept mentioned above. Ideas which are receiving increased attention, such as preventive deployment, preventive and 'Defence Diplomacy' all find a natural place on the circle, as does post conflict peace-building and conflict resolution. These may all involve military forces, though they are far from an exclusively military preserve. (Bellamy, 1998:32)

This shift means that military and civilian agencies cannot draw clear demarcation lines between phases of an intervention or UN mission with an appropriate "lead agency" at each stage. Instead, all the contributors are likely to be involved throughout an

intervention and may be asked to switch back and forth between confidence building, emergency relief work, peacebuilding and stabilization roles with little notice. A number of practitioners consequently conducted research in this area (Hemmings, 1999).

These new models do not mirror exactly any specific international intervention but they highlight that the challenges facing the international community are increasingly complex. The models show that, in current and future operations, the military will have to interact with civilian agencies more frequently and that there is no clear boundary or demarcation between each group's respective area of interest or authority. Single dimensional responses are unlikely to succeed and participant agencies' efforts must be co-ordinated.

While completing the literature review for this study, I have noticed an increase in the frequency of published articles on interventions; this culminated in the publication in 1998 of *Education as a Humanitarian Response* (Retamal and Aedo-Richmond, 1998). This publication represents one of the first attempts to collect together some of the disparate strands of work in this field but it does not cover the whole of the area. One element not covered in the book, for example, and a key measure of the effectiveness of any educational programme, is the cost.

The legitimacy of a given intervention is problematic. Realist international relations experts would regard any interference in a sovereign country as unacceptable but this extreme position has been modified, particularly since the end of the Cold War. 'Humanitarian' interventions have entered the vocabulary and some governments consider it an obligation to intervene where a state is labelled as failed or failing, particularly when there are accusations of genocide, where the human rights of the state's citizens are threatened, or governance is weakened to the point where there is no rule of law (or to the extent that the state is regarded as having no legitimacy). John Mackinlay, who was one of the first to conceptualize the shift from peacekeeping to an intervention that was a peace-support operation, has now identified four interventions: peacekeeping, containment, intervention and a new category of 'humanitarian force' (Mackinlay, 2007:194-7). A breach of sovereignty through an intervention is sometimes justified on the grounds that the state has failed in its obligations of statehood, particularly if it is no longer able to protect its citizens. Increasingly, this argument has been used in establishing the legitimacy of an intervention but state failure is not an absolute matter:

State fragility is a continuum. ... From a human security perspective, state fragility matters whether or not it affects international security. The key

characteristics of fragile countries (variously described as weak, frail, failing, failed or as difficult partners and poor performers) is their instability and lack of responsiveness to human needs. From this perspective, fragility has to do with the capacity of the state to adapt to changed circumstances, protect citizens, absorb shocks and manage conflict without resort to violence. ... In this paper, we define state fragility as a combination of capacity and resilience. (Ikpe, 2007:86)

More recently, international consensus on this matter has been sought and, at the United Nations World Summit in September 2005, the General Assembly enshrined the “responsibility to protect” citizens and obligated member states to intervene where another state had failed to fulfil this responsibility for its citizens (United Nations, 2005).

#### **4.5 WAYS: THE NOTION OF 'SOFT' SECURITY**

For some time, and at the highest political level, there has been a belief that educational programmes can play a critical role in determining the outcome of an intervention: “Reducing hostile perceptions through educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:32). More recently, using education as a way of changing society (*inter alia*, through employment, nation building and transmission of values) has been specifically linked to security; as 'hard' security models have seemed inadequate, using the force of the mind through education has become more relevant in the policy debate.

Boutros-Ghali was concerned with the activities that might be involved but others saw the process as more significant than the outcomes, especially where there was a lack of community identity (Carron and Carr-Hill, 1991:31). At a conference in 1991, participants regarded education as the vital first step in any intervention:

As an instrument for inspiring reforms, adult education has to be the precursor of policy – and not the afterthought. This claim has very often been validated in projects of foreign aid in developing countries. The introduction of new techniques and machines can only be helpful if people in these countries have first been trained to use the techniques and to handle the machines. In other words, there can be no economic and social reform in developing countries without an educational reform as a first step. (Poggeler, 1991:23)

Even though education and teaching have made significant progress in explaining learning processes from the cognitive perspective, the reconstruction of many societies today requires an educational theory and practice designed to overcome prejudices and stereotypes, and to cope with violence and aggression. (Tedesco, 1996:1)

This seems to be common sense but many interventions suffer from an ad hoc approach to adult education provision, which can result in an inappropriate sequence for adult education provisions. Mohle notes that this was true in East Germany immediately after the Cold War (Mohle, 1991:111). By 2011, Brookfield and Holst had recognized “adult education as a force for political detoxification” (Brookfield and Holst, 2011:5) and – when the intervention follows a period of violent conflict – the sequencing may be subject to more conflicting priorities.

Since the mid-1990s, practitioners have acknowledged the need to co-ordinate their efforts. At an international conference in 1994, participants concluded that, "The conferences emphasize the importance of inter-sectoral linkages" (International Working Group on Education, 1994:51). However, the diverse nature of the field of adult education and its links to local communities lead other commentators to conclude that there must be local involvement and recognition of local structures for non-formal education. This factor pulls against the previous need for co-ordination (Carron and Carr-Hill, 1991:62); (Tanil, 1997:13).

Where diverse groups must co-operate, a mechanism must be put in place which harmonizes the communication, planning, decision making and administrative procedures of each group. At the highest international level, the United Nations and NGOs have developed a consultative mechanism and adopted procedures:

To date, 1,003 non-governmental organizations **have been granted consultative status within the United Nations** ... The changed nature of United Nations operations in the field has brought non-governmental organizations into a closer relationship with the United Nations, especially in the provision of humanitarian relief in conflict situations and in post-conflict peace-building. **It has been necessary to devise procedures** that do not compromise their non-governmental status but do ensure that their efforts are properly coordinated with those of the United Nations and its programmes, funds, offices and agencies [emphasis added]. (Boutros-Ghali, 1995:33)

There is evidence, however, that this process has not cascaded to field level. Reports from Cambodia and Rwanda and general research into multi-national interventions all show weaknesses in the co-ordination of efforts, inter-agency communication, the decision-making process and day-to-day administration.

With regard to co-ordination, Weiss describes the importance of this function:

The task of co-ordination, sizeable in most natural disasters and even normal development activities, is still more challenging in war zones where duplication and turf-battles are more than simply wasteful – they cost lives. Aid practitioners



favour co-ordination and donors insist upon it. But few agencies – and here the fierce drive for autonomy of virtually all NGOs especially should be noted – wish to be co-ordinated when this requires more than merely sharing information, namely abandoning institutional autonomy in favour of a centralized and coherent strategy. (Weiss, 1998:43)

In extending the concept of security to include 'softer' aspects, the number of agencies who should co-ordinate their efforts is multiplied and there may be particular difficulties when the military and civilian sectors come together.

The focus for the 2011 *Education for All Global Monitoring Report* (UNESCO, 2011) was armed conflict and education and a particular concern was the "securitization" of aid (Ibid:132) when the military and civilian sectors come together, using a 3D (Development, Diplomacy, Defence) approach:

Integrated approaches to security, foreign policy and development make sense. ... Yet the dangers inherent in the 3D approach have to be recognized. One obvious concern is that national security considerations will override other priorities. If development is subordinated to military and foreign policy goals, poverty reduction will inevitably slip down the agenda. Moreover, the use of aid to pursue what are perceived by actors in conflict-affected countries, rightly or wrongly, as strategic objectives for donor countries can fuel violence. (Ibid:177)

However, in societies recovering from conflict there are likely to be multi-dimensional problems and the responses that have most chance of being effective will be similarly complex. In extending into 'soft' power, military planners acknowledge that isolated application of force and violence ('hard' power) will be successful in creating stability only in the short term and any progress will be easily reversed. It is, therefore, likely that interventions will involve many agencies and the separate initiatives need to be co-ordinated.

Even with co-ordinated interventions, it would be unfair to suggest that adult education can be a panacea: not all interventions involving adult education have been successful. Wright, reviewing Sierra Leone, suggests that programmes do no more than foster dependency (Wright, 1997:28) while Jones relates that programmes in Ethiopia created unrealistic expectations and a sense of guilt amongst the students (Jones, 1992a:85). While this is a cause for regret, it reinforced the need to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of provision during my study.

The purpose of education in development and in peace support has been said to be subject to the standards and values of the donor or supporting agency in any intervention. Maliyamkono et al list three principal benefits:

- Lever for the acquisition of needs in e.g. housing and health.
- Prerequisite for an awareness of the environment and adapting to social change.
- Frees individuals from dependence on others by giving earning power. (Maliyamkono *et al.*, 1982:5)

Tanil notes that the issue is sometimes avoided by focusing on material reconstruction: “When donors do become involved with education in post-conflict situations, they tend to focus on the more visible rebuilding of physical infrastructure” (Tanil, 1997:10).

In any specific intervention, it will be necessary to describe the anticipated outcomes of educational programmes to uncover the purposes and intentions involved, noting that there may be a tendency for some false legitimation, for example by labelling a project as 'rehabilitation' which implies a universal good. Some commonly specified objectives from the literature are listed in the next section.

#### 4.5.1 Vocational Training, Employment and Capital Labour

Under the third Maliyamkono function, there is a perceived link between earning power and the new nation's industrial requirements: “Educational planners in most developing countries have chosen to control and relate educational planning to their manpower demands” (Maliyamkono *et al.*, 1982:3).

Tanil makes a distinction between long- and short-term employment opportunities, particularly in the case of demobilizing soldiers (Tanil, 1997:12), who are seen as a source of available labour and a key feature in restabilizing a country. It should be noted, however, that the creation of a viable market is also a benefit to contributing countries, as the Australian motives below show:

...alleviating poverty; helping in humanitarian crises; creating a geopolitical presence for Australia; contributing to security of the region by encouraging development; and **promoting our trading interests**. These views of the Parliamentary Secretary for Overseas Aid reflect the tension within the government on the motives and purposes of Australia's aid programme [emphasis added]. (Randel and German, 1997:26)

#### 4.5.2 Nation Building: Democracy and Stabilization

The nation building function of education can be particularly important where there has been intra-state conflict. It is necessary to reach a wide range of the population if these programmes are to be successful so they have often employed the mass media and other distance learning techniques. The first stage is to determine and promote a national identity. Huon's quote is from a much earlier period in the national history of Cambodia, but his words are still relevant: "The national culture is the cement of the country's unity" (Huon, 1974:26).

Edwards notes – somewhat cynically – that "shared grievances" often form the basis of a national identity (Edwards, 1996:53). Jeffs and Smith use the psychology of groups in constructing the basis of a national identity (Jeffs and Smith, 1996:31-2) and they see this type of work as having a moral dimension: "The cultivation of the knowledge, skills and virtues necessary for political participation is more important morally than any other purpose of public education in a democracy" (Ibid:33).

However, some doubts have arisen over the UN strategy of linking education programmes and elections supervision, which became a common feature of peace support missions in the period from 1992 to 1997 (White, 1997:273). Nevertheless, theorists such as Torres (2009) emphasize the importance of linking education and democracy despite the challenges and, in this context, Brookfield uses the term 'learning tasks':

Critical theory is normatively grounded in a vision of a society in which people live collectively in ways that encourage the free exercise of their creativity without foreclosing that of others. ... Creating such a society can be understood as entailing a series of learning tasks: learning to recognize and challenge ideology that attempts to portray the exploitation of the many by the few as the natural state of affairs, learning to uncover and counter hegemony, learning to unmask power, learning to overcome alienation and thereby accept freedom, learning to pursue liberation, learning to reclaim reason, and learning to practice democracy. These learning tasks are, of course, interrelated and any separation of them is mostly for analytical purposes. (Brookfield, 2005:39)

#### 4.5.3 Rights and Morals

A survey of available literature showed a large number of references to rights and values in relation to education programmes as part of intervention strategies. Mendus sees a dilemma in the attempt to teach "moral values" (1998:44-58) and makes the comment:

If we take seriously the claim that reason cannot deliver moral agreement, and if there really are diverse and conflicting, yet reasonable moral beliefs, how are we to avoid a sense that it does not matter which we choose. ... Conversely, how are we to justify any sense that some things do matter and that, for example, the violation of human rights or the wilful destruction of human life are morally wrong? (Mendus, 1998:50-1)

Sanderson mentions human rights in Cambodia (Sanderson, 1995:6-7) while Jordens comments specifically on racial equality, particularly for Vietnamese Cambodians (Jordens, 1996:146). Prins argues for another value, that of public health, and highlights the need to take an active position with regard to values (Prins, 1994:15).

In these cases, the values selected are made explicit. Other groups seem to make judgements implicitly:

Where we cannot work with governments because they have such a bad approach to human rights, we will show our solidarity with poor and disadvantaged peoples by supporting local government and civil institutions. Our aim will be to continue to deliver support direct to the poor while we are working for change within government. (Wilson, 1998:23)

However, the greatest impediment to basing educational programmes on morals or values, whether explicit or unstated, is that there is seldom universal agreement on what those values should be.

#### 4.5.4 Challenging Views and Extremism

In the aftermath of the attacks on the New York World Trade Center in 2001 and bombings of public transport in London in 2005, international organizations, governments and academics increased the attention paid to how citizens may be attracted to extremist ideas through a process of radicalization, and how this process may be challenged. Note that the emphasis has been added below to show the link with education.

Survival – meaning continuance – concerns present and future generations, and the relevance of **educational influence is apparent at three levels**. (Williams, 2000:194) N.B. The 3 levels are individual, community and species level.

Stressing the importance of the role of the media, civil and religious society, the business community and **educational institutions** in those efforts to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding, and in promoting tolerance and coexistence, and in fostering an environment which is not conducive to incitement of terrorism, ... (UN Security Council, 2005)

We are working to **assess the contribution of education to human security in four interlinked areas**: economic security (employment destinations, skills base for social and cultural capital, inclusion and exclusion, and measures of corruption); national security (degree of segregation or integration, policies on racism, stereotypes in curriculum materials, how conflict is taught); political security (active citizenship education, critical thinking, practice in democracy, building civil society); personal security (protection of rights, policy on non-violence, health / sex / relationships / HIV / AIDS education, secure buildings). (Davies, 2006:13)

In another work, Davies makes reference to a New York Police Department study, which also identified a need for education in addressing radicalization:

Three important educational implications then arise: the need for an emphasis on complexity and on alternative world views; the need for political education, so that young people are not 'politically naive': and the need to surface and counter conspiracy theories. (Davies, 2008:21)

#### 4.5.5 General Problems and Dilemmas

Having listed some of the more common values and objectives of adult education in interventions, some general dilemmas emerge that must be addressed. I would agree strongly with Thomas and Reader (1998:129) that visibility and transparency in these decisions is important. On a practical level, any educational intervention must avoid creating a dependency amongst the recipient culture and avoid the situation Blom and Nooijer describe in Cambodia, where staff depend on foreign "experts" for direction on teaching methodologies and curricula (Blom and Nooijer, 1992:88).

The central dilemma, however, is that of creating programmes which meet the interventionist's objectives, are simultaneously acceptable to the local cultures and do not undermine the local system inadvertently. While some authors acknowledge the dilemma, there are few solutions offered in the literature:

Global security studies register an informed awareness of the tenacity and the legitimacy of local culture. The challenge created by the study of the first two dimensions of global security is therefore to define doubly acceptable solutions: solutions which are both just and efficient in removing global insecurity but which are also acceptable across many cultures without confrontation or compulsion. (Prins, 1994:12-3)

Furthermore, the cases of Mozambique and Algeria clearly illustrate how the process of educational modernization creates new national identities by rejecting local traditional identities. ... Becoming aware of the violent and often brutal nature of change and modernization would therefore help us understand and anticipate what is happening. (Tanil, 1997:9)

#### 4.6 MEANS: DOCUMENTS AND DATA ON FINANCIAL MATTERS

Financial support and adequate resources seem to benefit any educational programme and many providers highlight the need to have enough funding. For example, Bock and Papagiannis note that sponsorship – regardless of the source – can have a substantial impact on programme outcomes (Bock and Papagiannis, 1983:13). Two separate reports published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) continue the theme:

Budgetary stringency was also a subject which was referred to by many speakers. Education had to compete for scarce resources not only with other sectors of development assistance, but also with other types of international action which are taking an increasing share both of attention and of funds: humanitarian action, peace-keeping operations, refugees, asylum seekers. (International Working Group on Education, 1994:13)

Higher education in public universities should be strongly supported by the government secured budget. At least 70 percent of the funds needed would have to come from the central budget. ... The autonomy of the university would have to be reinforced; however, the influence of both government and particular interest groups could not be neglected. (Dizdar and Kemal, 1996:49-50)

There is a belief in some quarters that adult education conducted in non-formal ways is a cheap way for states to improve educational standards. King (1991) supports this view but also mentions the difficulty of validating programmes, while Carron and Carr-Hill (1991:59) remind us that non-formal provision can take many forms and may not necessarily be cheap.

Some literature attempts to identify trends in funding patterns (Weiss, 1998:46) and then relate this to organizational behaviour. For example, the financial climate and the priorities for funding can shift. Tanil mentions "competition among NGOs for funding" (Tanil, 1997:15) while Uphoff (1995:17) notes the increasing involvement of the private sector and that educational programmes must "compete" with other forms of intervention. Other sources provide a narrative on the funding provided by various First World donors ((Daudet, 1998:79); (Randel and German, 1997:47)). However, when researchers try to calculate the precise amounts of money spent, there are difficulties in deciding what funds and programmes should be included and of tracking money as it flows between agencies and budgets.

...the above financial information only reflects the budgets as allocated from Government sources; data on the financial inputs [for expatriate staff, equipment, etc.] from external sources, in particular NGOs and bilateral donors, have not been incorporated into these budgets. Hence, it is not entirely clear to what extent these low budgets have been augmented by foreign funding nor

what the ratio is between domestic and foreign financing. (Blom and Nooijer, 1992:68)

The literature does contain some figures, however, and for my study it was necessary to examine some of the costs involved. Mostly, relative rather than absolute costs were used as these allowed for more valid comparison between programmes. The following quotation from *Agenda for Peace* shows that data are often included in official reports, analytical work and commentaries.

Peace-keeping operations approved at present are estimated to cost close to \$3 billion in the current 12-month period, while patterns of payment are unacceptably slow. Against this, global defence expenditures at the end of the last decade had approached \$1 trillion a year, or \$2 million per minute. (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:28)

However, use of such data is not restricted to official international bodies. Duffield's analytical work also used figures. "From the mid-1980s, relief and humanitarian expenditure grew rapidly to peak at about \$9 billion in 1994; however, spending on humanitarian assistance has declined to an estimated \$3.75 billion in 1997" (Duffield, 1998a:1-2). A third example of the use of financial data was found in a commentary on developments in international relations.

The military is the most costly option, but in certain situations and for limited periods of time it may be the only one. Moreover, defence departments sometimes foot the bill, and then the high costs are not directly deducted from civilian efforts but are genuine add-ons. (Weiss, 1998:32)

One of the major sources of funds for the developing world is the World Bank. In addition to their fiscal role, the Bank has sponsored and conducted a great deal of research in the field of development and assistance- for example (World Bank, 2005). The amount of data generated has informed many studies and Maliyamkono et al point out that World Bank assumptions are often carried into other studies (Maliyamkono et al., 1982:4). Others also note the World Bank's influence on researchers and aid-recipients:

It is too early to be sure whether [the World Bank's studies] will have much impact upon other types of informal sector research. But it will almost certainly put the education and training dimensions more firmly into the mix of factors to be considered in supporting the informal sector. (King, 1991:111)

Therefore, the dangers are considerable for borrowers who look to the Bank for a comprehensive and balanced view of educational development. For institutional reasons, the Bank has had to be selective in its views, a factor perhaps least understood within the Bank itself. (Jones, 1992b:220)

During my work, it has been necessary to be wary of over-reliance on single sources of data.

Commercial involvement in international security has come to prominence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Some businesses have always had a financial interest in conflict and war but the use of contractors by governmental bodies during interventions has increased. UK military doctrine first recognized this development in 2000 and there have been four iterations of the policy documents in this field, with the current UK Joint Service Publication 567 being published in January 2008. The term CONDO (CONtractors Deployed on Operations) is defined as “a generic term relating to all civilian contracted personnel deployed in support of military operations” (2008) and not all roles are suited to CONDO:

Contractor support to operations is not appropriate for all roles and operational situations, and contractor's personnel cannot be used for delivery of armed offensive capabilities. Mission critical, decisive operations are less likely to be suited to [Contractor Support to Operations] than support functions. (2008:2)

Apart from “the delivery of armed offensive capabilities”, which are considered inappropriate, commercial organizations may provide logistics support, act as interpreters, and their roles may extend to carrying out elements of the civilian intervention strategy. For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)'s intervention in Iraq was executed in many cases by contractors such as Creative Associates International Inc, which won a \$1million contract to deliver an assistance programme, Revitalization of Iraqi Schools and Stabilization of Education (USAID, 2003). Further, the use of contractors has gradually extended into the military sphere. One contractor, Military Professional Resources Inc (MPRI), was engaged to train and equip the forces of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996 and it is now common to find private military security companies operating in Iraq and using force – previously the sole authority of state military and security forces – to conduct what would previously have been perceived as military tasks (guarding static points and VIPs, advising on security, mentoring – which may include operating in the field during military engagements and issuing orders – training and equipping new military and police forces). The profit such activities generate for shareholders is controversial and some of the expenditure breakdown on an intervention (previously available from governmental accounts) has become commercially confidential. However, some figures have been published and are available as a data source, albeit not a comprehensive one (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2006).



#### **4.7 MEANS: DOCUMENTS AND DATA ON COUNTRIES BEING STUDIED**

For this study, three post-conflict interventions which happened under different circumstances and over a period of more than a decade were considered. In all cases, however, international bodies or external organizations, including the British Army, became involved in aspects of the state's adult education provision. In particular, adult education in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq were considered. In collecting information about these countries, one must be aware that documents may not be translated into English and non-Latinic scripts are used in parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as throughout Cambodia and Iraq. It is likely that relevant documents in English will be produced by, or written for, a Western audience and this potentially added bias to the study.

For each country, a distinction can be made between experiential reports and analytical literature. Both needed to be accessed for my research to reflect as much of the data on the country as possible. In general, practitioners produce experiential reports (and these are often on the Internet) while academics tend to prefer the analytical approach, often publishing in established, First World journals. A third source of material on the countries under investigation is the documentation produced by international agencies, such as the UN and its specialist agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) etc. This is often factual in nature and policy-oriented. Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 below, show examples of each type of literature for the three countries under investigation.

**Table 4 Examples of types of literature from Bosnia-Herzegovina**

<p>Experiential Reports</p>	<p>Report on Higher Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dizdar and Kemal, 1996)</p> <p>Humanitarian Intervention: A Military View (Brinkman, 1998)</p>
<p>Analytical Literature</p>	<p>Have the Bosnian Rapes Opened a New Era of Feminist Consciousness? (Enloe, 1994)</p> <p>Bosnia: does peace support make any sense? (Freedman, 1995)</p> <p>Bosnia 5 Years After Dayton (Schindler, 2000)</p>
<p>Policy-oriented Documentation</p>	<p>Bosnia and Herzegovina: Priorities for Recovery and Growth (Central European Department of the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1995)</p> <p>Report on the current state and priority needs of war-damaged universities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (CRE, 1996)</p> <p>Planning and Development for National Renewal in Bosnia-Herzegovina – Conceptual Framework for 1996 (Educational Policy, 1995)</p> <p>The Education Sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Spaulding, 1994)</p> <p>Education in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Priorities for Recovery (The Education Program Support Unit, 1995)</p>

**Table 5 Examples of types of literature from Cambodia**

<p>Experiential Reports</p>	<p>The Nature and Causes of Human Rights Violations in Battambang Province (Ashley, 1996)</p> <p>UN Peacekeeper in Cambodia, 1991 – 1992 (Brown)</p> <p>UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, A Success (Farris, 1994)</p> <p>The Resumption of Armed Struggle by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Heder, 1996)</p> <p>Patterns of CPP Political Repression and Violence During the UNTAC Period (Ledgerwood, 1996)</p> <p>UNTAC Lessons Learnt: The Military Component View (Sanderson, 1995)</p>
<p>Analytical Literature</p>	<p>Imaging the Other in Cambodian Nationalist Discourse Before and During the UNTAC Period (Edwards, 1996)</p> <p>Educational Destruction and Reconstruction in Cambodia (Sophoan, 1997)</p> <p>Aftermath: Women and Women's Organizations in Postconflict Cambodia (Kumar, Baldwin and Benjamin, 2000)</p>
<p>Policy-oriented Documentation</p>	<p>Focus on Higher Education and Vocational Training in Cambodia (Blom and Nooijer, 1992)</p> <p>The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: The Restoration of Sovereignty (Thayer, 1998)</p> <p>Cambodia: the situation of women and children (UNICEF, 1990)</p>

**Table 6 Examples of types of literature from Iraq**

<p>Experiential Reports</p>	<p>Community center receives grant for training Iraqis in computer skills, English language (Portal Iraq, 2005)</p> <p>Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (Phillips, 2005)</p> <p>Iraq Private Sector Development Initiative (PSDI) Final Report (Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance, 2004)</p>
<p>Analytical Literature</p>	<p>America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq (Dobbins <i>et al.</i>, 2003)</p>
<p>Policy-oriented Documentation</p>	<p>Report by the Director General on the Cultural and Educational Institutions in Iraq (Director General, 2004)</p>

In addition to the country-specific literature above, I have taken account of literature with a wider scope that mentions, as illustrations or evidence, the countries of interest to my study. A good example of this is Randel and German's Earthscan publication, *The Reality of Aid* (Randel and German, 1997). It is more difficult to classify such literature as it is often a mixture of experiential narrative and analysis, leading to policy-oriented conclusions. The following publications fall into this category: (UNESCO, 1993), (Duffield, 1998a), (Duffield, 1998b), (Smouts, 1998), (Beigbeder, 1999), (Mackinlay, 1996), (Clapham, 1998) and (Rathmell, 2005).

## **4.8 MEANS: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES**

### **4.8.1 Adult Education and Lifelong Learning**

Many of the writers on the theory of adult education and lifelong learning have focused on how adult learning differs from that of children, with an exploration of teaching and learning methods that are appropriate for this setting. There are variations of interpretation but the self-directed nature of adult learning and the way the learner uses personal experience are seen as typically characteristic. Throughout the 20th Century, Knowles (1950), Skinner (2002), Kolb (1976) and Gardner (1993) have each written on how we should approach adult learning and adapt our teaching methodologies to benefit the adult learner. However, this study is more oriented to the policy context for adult learning than the methods used at programme level so these theories are less relevant than others: the theorists who situate adult learning in the community context and those who link learning to political activism.

### **4.8.2 Community Learning**

If adults use their experiences as the basis for their learning, the distinction between living and learning becomes blurred. One of the early writers on this subject was Eduard C Lindeman, whose 1926 text was reproduced in many editions until the 1960s (Lindeman, 1961). Lindeman stressed that the voluntary nature of adult education and the formation of study groups strengthened the democratic process and adult education was regarded as a main route to increased social participation. He was writing at a time of social transformation in the UK and many suffered extreme hardship in their living conditions (in some analyses, this could be seen as a period when the UK was recovering from conflict), when learning strengthened the sense of community and community participation provided access to education for adults. In more recent times, theories of organizational learning and social capital have emerged. A learning organization is one that is structured to encourage the collective and individual "detection and correction of errors" (Argyris, 1999). Chris Argyris takes a managerial

and psychological approach to this issue, while Peter Senge (2006) has built on the theory to provide guidelines and tips for those who wish to strengthen a culture of learning and build learning organizations. In the edited book, *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society* (Putnam, 2002), civic engagement is seen as key to developing an individual's capabilities with the links between people in groups being as important as the learning of each person.

The format of community learning has diversified from a group of people meeting on a voluntary basis (but for the specific purpose of 'learning' probably under the guidance of a tutor) to being situated in the workplace (where participation is probably still voluntary but not open to all). Some community learning remains informal and is defined by how the people who come together to learn are linked, and how they build their social capital by and through that learning. However, the community context of adult learning will be a useful perspective in the analysis of adult education in societies recovering from conflict.

#### 4.8.3 Political Activism

Putnam's collection of studies on social capital (Putnam, 2002) considers eight advanced democracies (although Victor Perez-Diaz's study reaches back to the 1930s when Spain did not always enjoy democracy) and demonstrates the link between social capital, participation in educational activity and representative government. Putnam suggests, however, that we must not focus on the amount of social capital that is available; rather, there is a qualitative aspect and we must look at the type of social capital. He identifies four axes on which we can place and assess social capital: "formal versus informal; ... thick versus thin; ... inward-looking versus outward-looking; ... bridging versus bonding" (Putnam, 2002:9-12). These categories will be used to describe learning groups which build social capital in societies recovering from conflict and assess the impact they have on the political landscape of the country.

Theorists who regard adult learning as an essential part of political activism are commonly associated with Latin America; Paulo Freire is one of the best known. Once again, in blurring the distinction between an adult's lived experience and learning, critical pedagogy and the dialogue of learning is linked to political activity. In Freire's native Brazil, literacy was a pre-requisite for eligibility to vote, so adult literacy classes had immense political impact. Further, the engagement of adults and the self-directed nature of their learning (rather than a passive receipt of prescribed external facts as knowledge) enhanced the empowerment of individuals. In books such as *Pedagogy of Hope* (Freire, 2004) and *The Politics of Education* (Freire, 1985), we find critiques of

political systems and the role of learners in their communities as political actors. While the liberationist backdrop familiar to Freire may not be present in the post-conflict societies studied here, adult education programmes have the potential for political impact and Torres (2009) and Brookfield and Holst (2011) both show how this remains important in a modern, globalized world.

#### 4.8.4 Realism and Idealism

In international relations theory, those who regard states as the actors who wield power are known as realists. Adherents (such as Jack Donnelly (2000)) suggest that international relations and events are driven by the decisions sovereign states take to further their own interests and, thus, any study of international relations must use the state as the building block of any analysis. A contrary view is taken by the idealists, or universalists, whose assumption is that certain ideas or world views are greater than the interests of an individual nation state and the pursuit of such ideas through supra-national bodies drives international relations. US President Woodrow Wilson is regarded as a leading proponent of idealism, while Cynthia Weber characterizes it by comparison to the fictional events in the film *Independence Day*, when nations across the world unite against a common external threat (Weber, 2005).

#### 4.8.5 Critical Social Theories

While realist and idealist theorists have based thinking on events, a number of international relations theories have emerged in recent times from the application of critical social thinking to the field. Ideas of identity and gender have been brought to bear on how international relations are viewed, for example by Keyman (1997). Similarly, constructivist thinking has been applied to international relations to view events as socially constructed, the consequence of ongoing processes of social practice and interaction. From this perspective, we need to study the goals, threats, fears and identities of the actors – rather than the power relationships between nation states – if we are to understand international relations (Wendt, 1992). Other theorists have borrowed from globalization in economics to analyse international relations and adult education. This approach assumes that the key actors on the international stage are economic entities who operate in private markets across a global territory. Commentators such as Stephen Gill suggest that global governance is, therefore, based on the discipline processes of the global marketplace (Gill, 2000).

#### 4.8.6 Visualizing data

A final area of theory that was considered centred on analytical methods to consider data and present findings visually. The study is not quantitative but techniques of multivariate analysis were used to understand the many dimensions of adult education

and security that were being considered. The statistical techniques that were used are long-established and widely applied without recourse to specialist software tools but, for ease of reference, an overview of the results of multivariate analysis is presented in Annex 4. Principal component analysis (PCA) was used and the main area of note in this is the selection of the same scale for each variable or component of quality; principal component analysis is used to show the importance of each component, which is shown by the variance of its projections (Abdi, 2003). These analytical tools will be revisited in section 10.4.

#### **4.9 ENDS: LINKING THEORY TO PRACTICE**

I have not reviewed all the theoretical schools of thought in the Education or International Relations fields. Rather, following the overview of the key theories above, this section considers the perspectives which often inform or underpin the choices of policy makers and practitioners in deciding a course of action to achieve their ends in a society recovering from conflict. Nationalism and national identity have been regarded as both a unifying and divisive force in delivering security: “If the French understanding of nationhood has been state-centred and assimilationist, the German understanding has been Volk-centred and differentialist” (Green, 1997:137).

The realist paradigm in International Relations traces its origins to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and places states at the centre of all analysis. A parallel from education would be to view the state government as the driving force in all educational decisions (for example, through setting a curriculum, controlling funding, etc.). Thakur summarizes this view:

As a general rule, strategic studies is infused with realist assumptions. International politics is a struggle for power. The primary actors in world affairs are autonomous states engaged in power-maximizing behaviour. National security is the ultimate and overriding goal, and force is the principal instrument. (Thakur, 1999:2)

Prins, on the other hand, challenges its continuing relevance:

In a transforming world, an obsolescent language of truculently amoral realism is ill suited to the task of capturing a much-changed reality. One can no longer assume that the security of citizens is automatically – or even broadly – coterminous with agreements between states. (Prins, 1998:20)

Gellner claims that the reaction against such paradigms, in part, generated post-modernism:

In the face of this international scientific hegemony social theorists have experienced intellectual marginalization: rather than pursue the more rigorous path of a critical rationalism many have lapsed into an easy oppositionalism which they justify through a confused moral and cultural relativism. Secondly, the commercialization of academia in many western countries has put unprecedented pressure on academics to be intellectually productive and this, particularly in the American context, means producing novel ideas. (Green, 1997:17)

In contrast to the realist approach, an idealist or universalist paradigm lends weight to groups outside the state, such as the United Nations or alliances. This is quite common in international relations theory but it is also reflected in educational analysis, for example by individuals or states seeking external endorsement of education programmes:

In a climate of increasingly intense global economic competition and a growing belief in the key role of education as the source of marginal advantage, governments have become increasingly obsessed with the international rankings of measured educational outcomes. (Broadfoot, 1999:20)

The tension between 'idealism' or 'institutionalism' (i.e., those who view international organizations as having an independent role or function) and 'realism' or 'reductionism' (i.e., those who view international organizations as extensions of state power) presents a methodological challenge that cuts across various disciplines. (Heiskanen, 1999:5)

In international interventions, an idealist approach has the benefit of allowing bodies outside the state – such as UNESCO – to set standards for programmes delivered inside a country. In his book *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, quoted below, Eric Hobsbawm recognizes that this could act against nationalism:

The postwar world brought a new international order. While the Cold War was soon to divide the world into conflicting power blocs, internationalism, initially at least, was the official or ideal currency of inter-state relations. .... The growth of regional defence (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and regional and world commercial and financial organizations (the World Bank and IMF) encouraged supra-national affiliation and interdependence, weakening the hold of nationalist ideas. (Green, 1997:141)

However, others have questioned the rights of international bodies to make such decisions on behalf of a population.

Proper debate about the appropriateness and international legitimacy of the liberal universalist assumptions which lie behind the UN's peacebuilding SOP has hardly begun, with full and equal participation by a representative cross-section of commentators from developing countries an essential precondition. (Ramsbotham, 2000:184-5)



More recently, the trend of globalization has impacted on both security studies and education, counter-intuitively leading to a growing emphasis on individualism and economic forces. In International Relations, this has manifested itself through economic levers supplementing military force in seeking resolution of disputes and to the developing human rights agenda. In education, the impact can be seen in the tailoring of education programmes, often funded by the individual learner, and relevance of learning being judged according to the economic gains that are likely to be derived from learning.

Further, the very topics and themes of educational research [in the 1980s] reflected a Bank-wide agenda, for example the studies of educational financing and privatisation designed in the context of wider Bank policies to promote user charges for public services. (Jones, 1992b:224)

The history of the vocational/liberal studies debate is tightly woven into the history of a struggle between conflicting and contradictory traditions and values in American society and culture. Wirth (1983) describes this history in terms of a value conflict between an economic or technocratic orientation towards society and its problems, and a critical, or democratic, orientation based on the values of a populist, grassroots participation of people in social, political, and economic institutions. Although closely related, the concepts of 'liberal' and 'vocational' cannot be assigned unequivocally to either one of these value orientations, but the shifting and changing interpretations of these concepts bear out the same tension. It is the tension between the critical potential of the concept of liberal education and its inherent elitism which reserved this tradition for the few; between an elitist anti-vocationalism which refused to tether the cultivation of the mind to any utilitarian requirements, and a class-biased vocationalism which explicitly excluded aspects of a liberal education because 'it would ruin a good field hand' (Myrdal, quoted in Shor 1986: 50). Neither 'vocationalism' nor 'liberalism' therefore signify monolithic educational programmes, nor irreconcilable dichotomies. (Hart, 1992:60)

Fundamental to the principles that inform critical pedagogy is the conviction that schooling for self- and social empowerment is ethically prior to questions of epistemology or to a mastery of technical or social skills that are primarily tied to the logic of the marketplace. (McLaren, 1995:30)

An increased focus on individuals, suitably empowered, has been seen by some as a positive development for education (with the availability of lifelong learning opportunities) and security (through democratization) although Broadfoot notes that centralizing tendencies also remain present:

It is an odd irony that it is only now, nearly thirty years after the radical ferment of the 1970s, that the advent of notions of lifelong learning and the technologies that will make it possible, mean that the radical democratization of education in the way Lawrence Stonehouse [BERA President 1979/80] envisaged is both possible and pressing. Yet the scope for its realization is also deeply constrained by **an anachronistic** discourse of universalistic assessment. (Broadfoot, 1999:30)

This review of literature available from the International Relations and Educational disciplines has demonstrated that many different scholars and organizations have studied interventions by the international community in the three countries of interest. In addition, there is a large body of literature that looks at education policy, with some of it focusing on adult education provision. However, in studying relevant literature, I was unable to find material that developed theories in this field, examined the use of adult education in achieving international policy objectives in post-conflict societies, or linked educational provision to security outcomes. As this is the focus of my research, my study will add new material to enhance our collective knowledge of this very important area.

In the next three chapters, I move from theoretical considerations to explore the documents and data relevant to the practice of adult education in – respectively – Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq.

## CHAPTER 5

### DOCUMENTARY CASE STUDY – CAMBODIA

In this chapter, I consider the situation in Cambodia where a United Nations (UN) mission operated in the early 1990s, soon after the end of the Cold War. The education system in Cambodia had been systematically attacked and dismantled during the conflict and the international intervention was under a formally authorized UN peacekeeping mandate, possible because Russia and the United States desisted from mutual blocking tactics within the Security Council.

#### 5.1 COUNTRY PROFILE

The main population group in Cambodia is Khmer, with substantial Vietnamese, Chinese and Lao minorities. The state has been renamed at various stages to reflect the political perspectives of the regimes in power but I will refer simply to Cambodia. The country has a rich culture and a long history, but the period of study for this work begins in 1992. Prior to that, there had been a turbulent history for the South East Asian country. “The country had been isolated from most of the world for two decades and had been the scene of continuous fighting for almost three decades. Cambodian society had been shattered and was almost powerless to plan for its future” (Farris, 1994:38). In selecting Cambodia as a case for inquiry, the conflict is an important feature indicating inclusion in this study and the prolonged isolation is a contextualizing characteristic. A Cambodian adult, aged 30 in 1992 would have grown up in a society shaped by conflict. The country had witnessed:

- Bombing by United States and South Vietnamese troops from 1969 to 1973, to deter unacknowledged North Vietnamese operations in the countryside.
- A coup in 1970 which brought the rightist Lon Nol to power.
- A communist insurgency<sup>1</sup> by the Khmer Rouge, which succeeded in 1975 and empowered Pol Pot, who carried out systematic ethnic killing systematic ethnic killing, particularly targeting people of Vietnamese and Thai ethnicities. An invasion by Vietnam on 7 January

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<sup>1</sup> Insurgency is used in this thesis for organized violence within a country to replace or displace the extant government. An invasion describes military operations in a country by an external state. Guerrilla operations are characterized by the use of irregular forces and unconventional types of warfare. A civil war results when two or more forces within a state engage in conflict. Militants are any fighters not authorized by the relevant state who engage in violent acts.

1979, followed by ongoing guerrilla operations and a civil war that lasted until 1988, when there were peace talks in Bogor, Indonesia and leaders of the factions and the government set up a Commission to Pursue Peace.

- United Nations Peace Accords signed in Paris in October 1991, which led to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC began work in March 1992 and elections were held in May 1993.

This snapshot from history shows that the country has been influenced by a variety of external states. Four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council had been involved, including France, the former colonial power until independence in 1954, and China, which supported the Maoist Khmer Rouge. The two Cold War superpowers were also involved, with the United States and its South Vietnamese ally supporting Lon Nol while the USSR backed Vietnam heavily during the latter's occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s. Thailand, a strong state within the region, saw its neighbour as both a buffer with Vietnam and also regarded the large number of refugees arriving in Thailand as a potentially de-stabilizing influence.

During the colonial period, there were few schools in Cambodia but elite groups had access to an education system that followed the French model. On independence, some Cambodians were still sent to France to complete higher education but King Norodom Sihanouk expanded educational opportunities and initiated mass literacy programmes at home (Kumar, Baldwin and Benjamin, 2000:3). A National Literacy Campaign from 1964 to 1966 helped 1,257,694 Cambodians become literate, with 35% gaining the First Certificate level <sup>2</sup> (Ministry of Education Youth and Sports, 2000:v). Mass primary schooling was put in place from 1950 to 1960 and the country developed secondary education throughout the 1960s. However, curriculum relevance was questionable, with an imbalance in the number of technicians and generalists (Blom and Nooijer, 1992:i). Concerns about details of curricula were soon to be irrelevant, however, as the Khmer Rouge closed all schools and universities in 1975. Teaching materials and books were destroyed and professionals, including teachers and students, were forced to flee the country or be killed (Ibid; (Kumar, Baldwin and Benjamin, 2000:3). Sophoan notes that only some 87 of the 1009 teachers in higher

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<sup>2</sup> A UNESCO award of US\$ 5000 and a gold medal from the King of Iran were granted to the Cambodian government in recognition of this success.

education prior to the Khmer Rouge period had survived. A number of these had also fled to a third country for re-settlement from the refugee camps in Thailand (Sophoan, 1997:44). When the Khmer Rouge regime was replaced in 1979 by a Vietnamese-backed communist government, a priority was to rebuild the education system. A National Committee for Literacy and Complementary Education was set up and it sponsored two adult / youth literacy programmes from 1980 to 1983 and from 1983 to 1986. It is estimated that these initiatives helped 1.2 million people to become literate (Ministry of Education Youth and Sports, 2000:v). The legacy of such a disrupted education system and its negative effect on the majority of the adult population are notable attributes in selecting Cambodia for this case study.

## **5.2 DOCUMENT GATHERING AND DATA COLLECTION**

Documents about adult education in Cambodia during the UNTAC period and beyond (UNTAC was active in the country from March 1992 until it was formally wound up in September 1993) were available in some published reports and in the literature. I was never directly involved in the UN intervention in Cambodia but I had some contact with educators in the country while I was based in Melbourne, Australia, in 1993 and 1994, when I worked as part of the Australian Government's Defence Co-operation Programme. The Defence International Training Centre (DITC), where I worked, assisted and supported military personnel from South East Asia and the Pacific region who had been selected for training or education in Australia.

In discussions with Australian colleagues based in Cambodia, it became apparent that a wide range of international groups – many funded by foreign governments – provided a great deal of the adult education provision during Cambodia's fragile recovery from conflict. In an attempt to discover more about these programmes, I visited Cambodia for a brief period in 2001.

A key source for gathering documents was the Co-operation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) an NGO membership organization promoting information exchange and NGO co-ordination in Cambodia. The CCC Resource Centre was set up in 1992 to meet the information needs of NGOs and records were held for many of the projects that were operating during the UNTAC era and afterwards. The NGO directories listed 22 organizations that were involved in adult education and either listed this as one of their roles or mentioned a project that involved developing adults' skills or knowledge in its aims, even if this was not recognized by the NGO as adult education. This study has drawn on documents held in the CCC Resource Centre and the Cambodia Development Resource Institute library. However, I made direct contact with some

providers to supplement the partial documentation available. Emails were successfully delivered to nine of the NGOs and two responses were forthcoming. Phone or personal contact was arranged with a further five providers. Interviews with ministry officials were also arranged. In the short time available, the picture of the provision that formed was neither comprehensive nor scientifically sampled. Nevertheless, from 13 projects studied (summarized in Table 7 below), it became clear that non-statutory adult education provision was essentially ad hoc in nature.

**Table 7 Cambodia Provision**

Type of activity	Linkages	Funding	Outcomes
English language teacher training	To university administrative systems.	Charitable, plus governmental aid \$150K.	Design course materials. Bilingual syllabus. Database of resources.
English language teacher training	Cambodia Ministry of Education. UN agencies. Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO). Council for British Teachers. Textbook development project.	Governmental aid. Multilateral funds.	Supply teachers and teacher trainers.
English language training	Civil Aviation Authority. English for medical students. Sending agencies for Quality Assurance. Orphanage & working children's drop-in centre	Charitable.	Specialist experts employed (e.g. as an engineer) conduct English classes on a voluntary basis. All projects include skills training for local people.
University administrative systems: on-the-job training	English language teacher training.	In-country institution.	Student records database. Staff training.
Training of trainers for public officials	Capacity-building projects.	Previously governmental aid, now Cambodian government and charitable.	2-week and 10-week courses for trainers. Advice to graduates on their own session plans once they return to parent organizations (Cambodian government departments, International Organizations or NGOs).
Community development and capacity building	Orphanage provision. Vocational Training Centre. Previously English for medical students.		Paid local staff train volunteers in health messages, farming and forgiveness. All local staff receive on-the-job training.

Community development	Working Group for Weapons Reduction. Alliance for Conflict Transformation.	Charitable.	2-day courses on power balances in communities. Evidence to suggest results: decreased violence and reduction in alcohol use.
Community development		Cambodian government. Governmental aid. Charitable.	Training Support Units attached to all partnership departments.
Vocational Training Centre	Orphanage provision		Apprenticeships for those too old to remain in orphanages.
Vocational Training Centre		Charitable. \$0.54mi pa.	Courses in building, construction, carpentry, masonry, vehicle electronics, TV and radio maintenance, agricultural tool production.
Vocational Training Centre	Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training and Youth. Schools for 'slum kids'. World Food Programme.	Charitable	12-month courses in welding, electricians' skills, auto mechanics and dressmaking. 10,000 graduates over 7 years but no follow up to determine whether graduates use skills after the course.
Vocational Training Centre and non-formal literacy project	Supply of wheelchairs. Community advocacy. Mines awareness. Cambodian ministries.	Multilateral bodies. Charitable.	Disabled and mine victims trained to make wheelchairs. Adult literacy (2-year programme)
Non-formal education	Rural development and water supply. De-mining / Resettlement.	Charitable. \$1.7mi pa. Charitable. \$1.2mi pa.	Adult literacy, human rights and HIV/AIDs awareness.



### **5.3 ADULT EDUCATION FOR COMMUNITY SAFETY AND THE REINTEGRATION OF RETURNING REFUGEES**

At the beginning of the UNTAC mission, the education policy in Cambodia was to provide free, basic education for all and a universal primary education of six years. In 1991/2, it was estimated that 1.3 million pupils were enrolled at primary schools and that there were 40,000 teachers (Blom and Nooijer, 1992:i). Focusing on adult education, a Socio-Economic Survey of 1993/4 put the adult literacy rate at 65.3% (Ministry of Education Youth and Sports, 2000:v). Twenty one teacher training colleges for primary level were opened in the provinces, with lower secondary teachers trained at seven regional centres and the University of Phnom Penh training all upper secondary teachers (Blom and Nooijer, 1992:ii). In 1991, there were nine institutes of higher education or vocational training centres receiving external support, including the Central Nurse Training School, the Russey Keo Technical Training Centre and the Ecole Superieure des Cadres de Gestion de l'Education. A study into adult literacy in Cambodia (Ministry of Education Youth and Sports, 2000:7) highlighted problems of insufficient teaching materials for adults and a lack of qualified teachers; these difficulties extended beyond literacy to other adult education provision, including courses on health, automotive repairs, welding and training for mechanics and hairdressers.

As can be seen from Table 7, vocational training and adult literacy classes were provided by some of the NGOs that operated in Cambodia as part of wider programmes to assist in the recovery from conflict. Few of these organizations specialized in education but offered classes as an adjunct to an economic or capacity-building programme. Thus, a vocational training school grew from a perceived need to supply older residents of an orphanage with means to earn their own livings and adult literacy classes were delivered by a charity that supplied water to rural communities.

For Cambodians who had become refugees, educational opportunities were generally limited, although they may have been better than those available to people who had remained in Cambodia (Chopra, Mackinlay and Minear, 1993:3G). In Thailand, for example, the government prohibited anything other than basic education until 1986 and the focus was on primary and pre-vocational education (Blom and Nooijer, 1992:ix). It must be remembered, however, that UNHCR and other bodies provided education for refugees, and this can often be a key feature in preparing individuals for a return to their country of origin. Ongoing support for such people once they have returned home

may focus on developing the former refugees' economic self-sufficiency but other courses that assist in their reintegration into the community may – to a degree – avoid feelings of resentment, competition or divisiveness.

One example of an educational programme that can be given to returning refugees and the in-place population to enhance community safety is landmines awareness. Those who have remained in an area throughout the period of conflict often have the required knowledge of types of mines, detonation systems and minefield marking protocols; they may, however, require assistance in learning how to deal with mines when they return to peacetime activities (such as agriculture). The returning refugees may have a greater need of factual information about the risks of mines.

During the UNTAC mission, a number of the components were involved in de-mining and mines awareness education; their efforts lacked somewhat in co-ordination. The Military Component had expertise in de-mining, although there were reservations about the extent to which the mines were cleared and the resultant remaining risk to civilians. Both the Education and Information Division (EID) and the Repatriation Component had a stake in the issue but those involved in adult education apparently remained disengaged from de-mining, and did not build mine awareness into their programmes (or run distinct courses in this area). Indeed, reports from UNTAC participants showed that there was no single focus for de-mining in Cambodia. Military units started work with mines awareness, although they were not the information experts, and latterly extended the role to include mine clearing and capacity building by training local de-mining teams (Brown, N.D.:2). With 300 mines-related casualties each month, this should have been considered vital. However, internal tensions and arguments over finance caused divisions and tension. Eventually, according to military sources, the New Zealand Armed Forces took on the role: New Zealanders came in as a country contingent with personnel trained in mine training teams and also conducted the initial public information campaign about the mines (Ibid:3).

Civilian sources reported the matter in a different light, though. Grant claims that the Rehabilitation Component took the lead and claims the credit for this ground-breaking initiative of mines awareness:

LMAP (Land Mine Awareness Programme) was run by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and funded through the Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General for the Co-ordination of Cambodian Humanitarian Assistance Programmes. It was the first mine awareness programme to commence in the south east Asian region. (Grant, 1998:153)

There were tensions, though, and a stand-off between the Cambodian military and the United States military de-mining / mines awareness programme regarding payment for clearance operations resulted in the local soldiers seeking paid employment elsewhere. More complexity was added when the Australian military began a funded anti-insurgency programme against some of the Cambodians in the same complex, which caused a loss of face for the local military (Grant, 1998:157).

In the refugee camps, many low-technology educational solutions were used to convey messages about mines to local people.

As part of the informal media campaign in the camps, a raffle event was implemented featuring the traditional dancing clowns, 'Ting Mong', to attract attention, entertain and educate. Numbered mine awareness brochures were distributed, with instructions for people to learn the mine awareness messages before we returned. We then set up mobile information offices where the winning numbers were displayed. The mobile information office consisted of mine awareness poster displays, mine model cases, other attractive traditional images, music, radio plays, etc. Raffle winners were asked mine awareness questions publicly (loudly) and received mine awareness T-shirts, bags, games, etc., as prizes. The events were very well received, brightening up the refugee camp life and adding to the meagre resources available. Other informal media presentations included regular radio plays broadcast over the camp speakers, and weekend theatre productions, using local actors and scriptwriters. (Grant, 1998:154)

One NGO project took a holistic approach to the support it provided for Cambodians who had been injured by mines. In addition to developing de-mining programmes and offering adult literacy classes, the charity trained the injured to manufacture and repair wheelchairs – as a means of providing employment and increasing the mobility and self-sufficiency of amputees.

#### **5.4 ADULT EDUCATION FOR MILITIAS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL INCLUDING ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING**

Soldiers and combatants are a particular group that need attention in societies recovering from conflict. Many risk losing their employment; they must be demobilized and re-integrated into society. However, the ex-soldiers may remain subject to the influence of the chain of command from the conflict and involvement in education programmes can be overshadowed by politics. Heder quotes evidence from self-demobilizers which shows willingness to participate in the demobilization process but, in the case of the PDK (Party of the Democratic Kampuchea), compliance ended because of a political perception that other groups were not participating fully or “properly” (Heder, 1996:109). Adult education courses for demobilizers should consider

the impact of their learners' loyalties, which may or may not be challenged as part of the syllabus. The UNTAC EID programme did not address such issues with sufficient sensitivity and, consequently, the ex-soldiers frequently returned to the influence of their previous commanders.

Course content which questions loyalties and values was regarded by some commentators as of limited usefulness and Tanil (1997:12) indicated that accelerated training for employment was the priority for demobilizing soldiers. Not all the fighters in a conflict will be demobilized, however, and arrangements may be made for combatants from one or more of the parties to the conflict to be integrated into the security forces of the post-conflict nation state. In some cases, such employment will be conditional on the fighter undertaking a period of education or retraining. This may be completed in the soldier's home country or by travelling abroad to train with soldiers from other countries. The Australian government had an extensive programme of regional training and education, mostly co-ordinated by DITC.

In 1994, the Australian Defence Instruction (General) Joint Directive 4/94, PERS 05-13 was produced, assigning DITC the following role:

...to enhance the training provided in Australia to South East Asian and South Pacific defence force and other selected overseas personnel. This is achieved by facilitating the integration of those personnel into Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) training systems and fostering and promoting cross-cultural awareness between members of the ADO and foreign military personnel.  
(DITC, 2006)

There were three principal facets to this work: Australian familiarization, cross-cultural awareness and Australian English language teaching. DITC also supported English language teaching in the countries of the region, by professional development of teaching staff and development and production of a curriculum for military personnel which those local teaching staff could use.

For a Cambodian soldier, the first level of engagement with this Australian intervention was usually a language proficiency assessment conducted in their home military unit. The level of language proficiency would be assessed using the Australian Defence Force English Language Profiling System (ADFELPS) and a profile for all four skills would be produced. DITC regularly updated the test material and authorized 'raters' to administer the tests. The second step for students was to attend the regional language school. The Australian Defence Force funded the Royal Cambodian English Language Department at the Cambodian Military Institute, Russey Keo, Phnom Penh. The

Australian Government paid for the ongoing maintenance of three language laboratories (two of which it provided, too). In 1994, when the Defence Co-operation Programme with Cambodia began, Australian military instructors taught in the department but – as capacity grew – all the instructors were Cambodian. In the 1990s, salaries were paid to Cambodian military instructors and students by the Australian government. Regulations required the Cambodian officer or soldier to attend in person and pay was handed over by a commissioned Australian officer, as a means of avoiding corruption.

At the language school, the student would study Australian English using the Australian English Language Course. These materials were developed by civilian and military professional staff in DITC and included video-, audio- and text-based learning resources. There were separate Intermediate and Specialist phases, with the Intermediate course taking a student from ADFELPS level five to level six / seven and the Specialist course covering specific vocabulary and language relating to military flying or tactics and weapons. Materials were produced in Australia and provided to Defence Co-operation Partners, including Cambodia, free of charge. The materials were not a form of distributed training, though: students had to attend classes and were taught face to face, usually by instructors from the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, some of whom had attended the English Teaching Development Course (ETDC) at DITC. The ten week ETDC was designed for experienced, non-native-speaking English language teachers and focused on teaching English as a second language/English as a foreign language (ESL/EFL) to upper intermediate and advanced learners. During the UNTAC period, there were no Cambodian participants in the ETDC as the ADF were still providing officers to teach and mentor Cambodian staff in Phnom Penh.

Many students completed all their language training in Cambodia but some were selected for a military course in Australia. This might be initial officer training (an undergraduate course at the Australian Defence Force Academy or a shorter 12-month military course at the Army officer training college), an academic course for senior officers or specialist military training. If sponsored as part of the Defence Co-operation Programme, for a student the early stage of training in Australia would usually be attendance at the Administration and Reception Period of Familiarization at DITC. Not specifically a language course, it exposed students to the general and military environment in Australia, including orientation exercises and administrative processes such as issuing clothing and payment of allowances. The course was run throughout the year and lasted five working days. It was taught in English and many military personnel from the region found it a challenge to 'tune in' to the Australian English they

heard during their training. As an alternative, a three-week programme that included the necessary administration but also offered more cultural familiarization and a greater opportunity to improve speaking and listening skills (the Australian Military Familiarization Course) was available.

If a student had been selected for one of the more advanced or academic courses, s/he might attend the Advanced Australian English Language Course. This 12-week course built on the Australian English Language Course (AELC) Intermediate and Specialist courses the students would have completed in their home countries, taking students from ADFELPS level six to level seven. On completion, the student would then be able to join Australians and study alongside them, participating in a cultural exchange while studying technical, vocational or academic subjects that the Australian Government believed would be of use in the student's home country. Thus, by expanding the use of the English language amongst Cambodian military personnel, the Australian government contributed to regional engagement without being required to train its own staff in other languages or employ interpreters.

This investment in English language teaching for over 15 years shows the importance placed by Australia in allowing access to its Defence educational facilities for selected military personnel from Cambodia and other countries. The structure of the programme, with in-country support and finance operating in parallel to what were, effectively, scholarships for study in Australia, was key to enabling adult education to be linked to building regional stability and security.

One clear outcome of this programme was that personnel from the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces now participate in United Nations operations: in less than 15 years the country went from being an ungoverned state in crisis to being a contributor to international security, with military observers as part of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from January 2006 and a deployment in company strength since April 2006. Some of those selected for UN deployments attended a Peace Operations Military Observers' course – run in English, in Australia – before taking up their international appointments. In 2005, Australian Senator The Honourable Robert Hill stated, “Australia welcomes Cambodia's interest in contributing to regional and global stability. Cambodia's involvement in peace operations will also help broaden the capability of its defence forces” (Government of Australia, 2005).

The course participants included ten Royal Cambodian Armed Force (RCAF) and four Australian Defence Force personnel, alongside colleagues from Vietnam, Fiji, Tonga,

Thailand, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Clearly, second language acquisition was necessary to allow such a linguistically diverse group to learn together.

Another part of Australia's Defence Co-operation Programme worked in partnership with the United Nations Institute of Training and Research to educate Cambodian Army peacekeepers in Phnom Penh the following year.

In September 2006, two identical three-day training courses in English language on the special needs of women and children in conflict and post-conflict situations were organized by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) for a group of Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) soldiers due to become UN peacekeepers. The seminars were held in Phnom Penh from 6 to 8 and 13 to 15 September 2006. Additional train-the-trainer activities enabled RCAF instructors to conduct a third seminar in Khmer on 19 and 20 September, which was observed by UNITAR. (United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2006:2)

Fifty four people participated in the course using English as the language of instruction and a further 33 followed the course in Khmer.

The training familiarizes the participants with the specific needs, human rights, potentials and situations of women and children during armed conflict, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building. It also provides guidance on how peacekeepers should conduct themselves in a mission area in order to respect women's and children's rights. (United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2006:2)

The fact that Cambodian soldiers had English language skills that allowed them to explore such sensitive issues is direct evidence of the prolonged intervention by the Australian government and others to support RCAF language teaching. The course also demonstrates how an adult education programme (in this case, on a specialized topic and for a professional group) can be used to directly enhance security. I would also regard this course as a good example of how values are promulgated and promoted to key personalities within a post-conflict community. UNITAR staff published an evaluation of the course (Ibid). While the report is essentially narrative, describing the sessions and the training staff, the opinions of 43 participants who completed evaluations are summarized. It is clear from these comments that using English as the teaching language caused some difficulties: "Due to my limited command of English I had a few difficulties; a slower pace would have been beneficial. .... I noted that some participants had language problems but their colleagues and neighbours always helped them" (United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2006:15). From the same evaluation, one participant suggested that the training should be available to all military

personnel: this is only practical in the longer term if it is conducted in students' first language.

The English language training for soldiers, described above, is one of the most extensive and integrated programmes I discovered in Cambodia. However, language teaching featured in the adult education provision offered by a number of organizations that were operating in Cambodia. In most cases (see Table 7 above), the language training was delivered in conjunction with professional development (for lecturers at Phnom Penh University, in the aviation industry and as part of medical or teacher training) in an effort to facilitate access to professional literature and debate. It was often unstructured and not assessed; this is unsurprising as many courses were taught by native English speakers (perhaps working in the country as part of another project) who were not necessarily qualified in EFL/ESL and lacked the specialist knowledge required.

It may be that integrating language learning into a wider syllabus assists with motivation of the learner and it can be useful in practical terms to address numerous educational outcomes through a single learning event. The Australian government scheme described above showed how language learning was coupled to military education and such integrated programmes can be successful. However, there can be problems:

The training programs for mid- and junior-level staff, sponsored by the international community, are generally inadequate, as they do not zero in on the specific needs of the trainees. Moreover, because of the poor knowledge of the language – English – in which these courses are conducted, many participants fail to get the full benefit of the training. (Kumar, Baldwin and Benjamin, 2000:18)

In addition, the international community supports training programmes for the staff of women's organizations. Increasingly, many organizations are questioning the utility and relevance of training programmes funded and managed by international NGOs. The training does not necessarily build on the knowledge or needs of trainees or their sponsoring organizations. Sponsors make little attempt to conduct a regular, systematic assessment of organizational capacity for training and for developing training plans for individual staffers and the organization as a whole. Training is also conducted haphazardly and often in English, making it difficult for many trainees to comprehend the content. Therefore, many training programmes have not been useful to women's organizations (Kumar, Baldwin and Benjamin, 2000:20).



The decision to support language training in a society recovering from conflict is an intensely political one. When an international intervention occurs, the components often require interpreters and this can distort the available labour pool, particularly amongst professional and technical staff. It can be more attractive to a government or international agency to develop the language skills of locally contracted personnel rather than continually find translators. This challenge was particularly severe in Cambodia as educated people had been targets of the Khmer Rouge, as Brown notes, “The school system had been virtually destroyed, and there are very few interpreters that can work adequately in translating English to Khmer or French to Khmer” (Brown, N.D.:6).

In the case of English language, which is regarded by many as the first foreign language an individual should learn, there is a perception that English speakers will have access to the globalized world ahead of their peer group. In 2006, the US ambassador to Phnom Penh addressed a conference on English language teaching and learning, indicating that English was a useful tool for Cambodians due to the growing number of English speakers and its global application:

...today, over one billion people speak English. Within ten years, that number will be more than two billion, more than Chinese or any other language. If you want to succeed in the world, English will be an important tool. It is the language of commerce, of technology and of the internet. For Cambodia, a country which has suffered isolation, English language is a tool that will help open doors for this nation and its people. (Storella, 2006:2)

Mark Storella also drew – selectively – stark comparisons with two of Cambodia's regional competitors:

In the past, most Filipinos spoke English well and the country had a strong English education program. The economy flourished and international trade grew. Over the past few decades, however, the Philippines has not placed a high priority on English training, and now the Philippine economy is in (sic) the doing poorly. You can contrast this to Singapore, which devotes large resources to English education and where nearly every citizen speaks excellent English. Consequently, Singapore has been able to develop a very robust economy with one of the highest living standards in the world. (Storella, 2006:1)

Of course, to an audience of English language specialists (who have already invested in learning the language), this is an overly simplistic and unnecessary message; it is almost propagandistic for the general public. Perhaps recognizing this, the ambassador attempted to redress the cultural imbalance a little, stating:

The point is that there is nothing unpatriotic about Cambodians learning English. ... English will make Cambodia stronger so that it can defend its own cultural heritage and so that Cambodians can go around the world to teach others about Cambodian culture history and art. (Storella, 2006:2)

Prins agrees that English is the pre-eminent second language of the world (Prins, 1998) and he lists this, in his Chapter 9, as one of seven comparative advantages the UK has as a state. He describes the international standing of English language as a force multiplier. Thus, if we accept Prins' position, there is a direct link between English language learning and security; this will be examined further in the analytical section of this thesis in Chapter 9.

English language teaching was a major facet of structured adult education intervention in Cambodia, and English may be the language of choice for the learners in the fragile society. It can also reflect a route into a globalized world and can be linked, directly and indirectly, to security. We cannot ignore the possibility, though, that the dominance of the use of English is at the behest of the country (or coalition of countries) which is supporting the intervention and funding the education programme. This may be for practical convenience or as a result of a belief that the language learning will facilitate the transfer of values commonly associated with the countries where the language is used.

## **5.5 ADULT EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRATIZATION AND ELECTIONS**

At the highest political and strategic level, stability and security in Cambodia was linked to an election, which would offer all the factions a stake in the political process. The Security Council charged UNTAC with running the election, but acknowledged that the parties had a role to play and that preparations would be necessary:

.... confirms that the election for a constituent assembly in Cambodia will be held not later than May 1993; ... Calls upon all Cambodian parties to cooperate fully with UNTAC to create a neutral political environment for the conduct of free and fair elections and prevent acts of harassment, intimidation and political violence; ...Determines that UNTAC shall proceed with preparations for free and fair elections to be held in April / May 1993 in all areas of Cambodia to which UNTAC has full and free access.... (United Nations, 1992:3)

The EID was engaged in voter education and Farris comments that the election and voter education programmes were successful:

In retrospect, UNTAC's Information and Education Division did an excellent job convincing Cambodians that the elections would be fair and that individual votes could be kept secret, precluding fear of retribution. ... The failure of the Khmer Rouge to disrupt the elections must be credited, in large part, to the security plan developed by the Military Component. (Farris, 1994:46)

In this report, Farris demonstrates how education – by contributing to successful elections – seemingly supported security outcomes. However, the integration of efforts across parts of the UNTAC mission, in this case the military component and EID, might be considered key to the success. Frieson gives an example of the types of activity used by EID to achieve positive outcomes, showing how voters who were forced to register as members of one particular party were informed about the choices they had.

The problem was eventually addressed in an UNTAC information video in which Cambodian actors performed a skit about local villagers who were recruited by an anonymous political party representative against their will. The upset villagers were advised by a respected elder not to worry since party membership was not a requisite for voting, and assured that a voter could be a member of one party and vote for a different one. (Frieson, 1996:190)

Various EID projects went beyond direct voter education, as it was understood that the elections could only be free and fair if there was independent media scrutiny of the parties. Some work to establish an independent media system might be judged a failure as a "media charter ended up becoming a watered-down set of 'media guidelines,' which did not claim to have the force of law" (Marston, 1996:213). Nevertheless, the negotiations to establish these guidelines allowed EID to engage Cambodian media people over what was appropriate and this learning may have contributed in part to the formation of the Khmer Association of Free Journalists in 1993 (Marston, 1996:235). The activities with indigenous journalists were not part of a formal education programme; they could be described as supporting activities or capacity building, but structured activity to assist the adult journalists was undertaken and it could be designated as informal adult education.

The United Nations operation in Cambodia was the first major intervention in the post-Cold War period and, working without precedence, procedures and approaches were developed as the mission progressed. Some examples of good practice evolved during this new type of post-conflict operation. For example, Radio UNTAC was set up in October 1992 so the international organizations had control of an information outlet (which was used, in part, for public information broadcasts and distance learning). At the time, this initiative was controversial and questions as to the legitimacy of the enterprise within the mandate were raised. Indeed, the station took seven months to

set up, largely due to UN bureaucracy, the need for Security Council authorization and some technical difficulties with the broadcasting infrastructure (Marston, 1996:217).

Radio UNTAC was one outlet for developing media skills and illustrating journalistic standards. Within the context of democratization, however, human rights were as important as an independent media. The soldier who led the Military Component felt that EID, and the rest of UNTAC, should concentrate on human rights and values:

It makes sense for peacebuilding missions such as UNTAC to focus on the longer term objective of establishing within that society a respect for human rights. The critical element is to understand that it is only through influencing the values of the society that a human rights culture of any substance will be inculcated. Along with the issues of peace, reconciliation and sovereignty, those of human rights and justice form an important element in conflict resolution. (Sanderson, 1995:6-7)

EID recognized this need and the Production Unit "... produced general public-education materials in Khmer on the Paris Agreements and their implementation and detailed materials in Khmer emphasizing human rights and voter education" (Heder and Ledgerwood, 1996:27).

Penny Edwards (1996:57) points out that the UN allowed China to remove references to 'genocide' from the peace agreements, and this omission allowed many local Cambodian media to use the term indiscriminately and unhelpfully. She also notes that there may be cultural differences in understanding the meaning of a particular term, for example, Cambodian people may tend to regard 'genocide' exclusively as a term describing the destruction of the Khmer people.

Jordens claims that the Human Rights Component promoted values of racial equality (Jordens, 1996:146) but he also describes how the organization dealt pragmatically with attacks on the Vietnamese people, thus undermining the human rights message:

UNTAC was thus faced with having to decide whether it would come to the rescue of the threatened Vietnamese communities, give in to demands that it assist in pushing them out of Cambodia, or stand idly by while events took their course. In practice, UNTAC chose the third path and the result was that in effect, UNTAC acquiesced to a considerable degree in a substantial reduction in the Vietnamese presence. In part, this reflected UNTAC's determination to proceed with elections in May 1993, despite the PDK's attempts to prevent voter registration, voter education, and voting itself. This determination meant that UNTAC's military and other assets were concentrated on protecting these various aspects of the electoral process, not on defending Vietnamese. (Jordens, 1996:145)

Running slightly counter to the values of equality and human rights, a single, Khmer nationalist identity was used as a unifying feature of Cambodia during the UNTAC period. It can be very tempting to use such ploys in post-conflict societies, which may have suffered internal divisions, but there are also unexpected consequences. In the case of Cambodia, exertion of a national identity emphasizing the Khmer culture resulted in women adopting more traditional roles, which reduced their participation in matters outside the family, including politics (Kumar, Baldwin and Benjamin, 2000:9).

There was some criticism of EID's action in challenging breaches of the human rights of Vietnamese people in the country, particularly as integration of EID's efforts with those of other components was lacking.

However, investigation and education were without immediate import in the absence of further remedial action. In this regards, the Human Rights Component received little or no backing from other components and sometimes found itself blocked by their disinterest or opposition. For example, the UNTAC Civilian Police (CIVPOL), which should have functioned as the partner of the Human Rights Component in the investigation of killings, was a generally ineffective force.... Another UNTAC component that could have attempted to do considerably more to stem racism aimed at Vietnamese was the Information/Education Division. Its mandate was to control dissemination of information in Cambodia, but it was impotent vis-a-vis PDK Radio and did little more than moderate the tone of racist propaganda being disseminated by other factions. (Jordens, 1996:146)

## **5.6 CO-ORDINATION AND THE ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDING ADULT EDUCATION IN CAMBODIA**

In this section, the co-ordination mechanisms that were established to allow the many and varied organizations to work for common effect in adult education are considered. Of note, local organizations who had to deal with UNTAC understood the importance of defining structures and roles to facilitate working together, as demobilizers from Division 607 of the NADK reported: "arms were taken from troops and given to ordinary people who were recruited into the police.' He added that these 'police were given uniforms and ranks so that there would be a formal structure for the internationalists to control'" (Heder, 1996:92).

Structurally, the original UN documents from the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991 referred to an Information Service and this was refined to produce the Education and Information Division (EID) of the UNTAC mission that supported seven components. The components were: **Human Rights**, which ran education programmes as well as

investigations into alleged human rights abuses; a **Civil Administration** component that consisted of fewer than 300 people to directly control Cambodian foreign affairs, defence, finance and internal security; the **Electoral Component** had responsibility for the registration of 4.76 million voters; **Civil Police**, which supervised the police of the four factions; **Repatriation** which dealt with refugee issues and resettlement; a **Rehabilitation** component to restore infrastructure including mine clearing; and a **Military** component, whose tasks included training programmes and mine awareness programmes, as well as providing assistance in the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and internally displaced persons (Farris, 1994:42-3).

The EID comprised 45 international staff and it established a number of UNTAC education programmes: voter education, military demobilization and reintegration, a human rights awareness education programme, and training and education for refugees provided through UNHCR (Thayer, 1998:153-5). A key factor in its success, according to Heder, was that 14 of the international staff spoke and read Khmer and had at least some experience of the country (Heder and Ledgerwood, 1996:27). Nevertheless, Jordens is dismissive of the success of UNTAC's outcomes these educational activities supported:

UNTAC's efforts fell far short of ensuring a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodia conflict and thus left unfulfilled many of the perhaps unachievable promises contained in the Paris Agreements. A year after the May 1993 elections, Cambodia's population continued to suffer from the torments of war and social dislocation, continuing political instability, endemic infrastructure deficiencies, and the prevailing corruption and cynicism of political leaders. (Jordens, 1996:151)

By this yardstick, it could be concluded that EID and the early attempts at broad, free access adult education failed to support the development and recovery of Cambodia.

For the international community, the 1993 elections were UNTAC's most obvious sign of progress and, in this area, a number of the separate components worked together. Interestingly, General Sanderson, who led the Military Component, believes that it was the delicate security situation that forced internal collaboration within UNTAC:

The security situation had imposed the requirement for close collaboration between the civilian components and the Military Component. The Military Component had to provide not only security for civilians and military alike, but a logistic support structure which penetrated to district level. An integrated approach was adopted which established a planning and control alliance for the electoral process between the Electoral and Military Components, and Information and Education Division. Centred around Military Plans in Phnom Penh, and Sector Headquarters in the field, this also drew in the Civil Police

Component. These arrangements were instrumental in the effective conduct of the election. Without them, United Nations civilian casualties would have resulted and there could not have been an election. (Sanderson, 1995:15)

We see that it was not an active UN policy to encourage the components to work together to achieve positive goals and there was no formal mechanism to manage the integrated effort. Rather, sensing a need to work together, an ad hoc arrangement was built around the military planning cell. General Sanderson's personality and the perception of a security threat were fundamental to the success of this arrangement and it is interesting to note that there was no authority granted in Security Council Resolution 792, which established the mission, to allow the military commander to adopt a co-ordination role. Despite the ad hoc nature of the integration, it contributed to successful elections and it is, therefore, surprising that this successful model was not adopted for other things UNTAC wished to achieve.

There is no evidence that EID separated the educational and information parts of its function or made any distinction between the terms. Elements of the information programme could be regarded as public education, though, and the Military Component Commander, General Sanderson, saw an information programme undistorted by the factions as essential to the success of the entire mission and the security of the new nation state (Sanderson, 1995:13) and Thayer also notes the importance of "independent" media:

The Cambodia case indicates a need for the UN to seriously consider establishing its own independent media network in countries where it intends to operate. The success of Radio UNTAC, initially opposed by UN bureaucrats, merits careful study, along with the other information and public awareness programmes conducted in Cambodia. Finally, the UN needs to consider what sort of post-electoral responsibilities should be written into its initial mandate. According to UNTAC's Force Commander, the UN lost the political initiative in Cambodia in the immediate post-election period when its mandate was unclear. (Thayer, 1998:162)

To have successful elections and to move towards a free media, the state-controlled media would have needed to lose some of its influence to a more diverse and independent media culture. Once again, a number of components can be seen to have been involved in this: Civil Administration, the Electoral Component, EID and Rehabilitation could all claim a legitimate interest in influencing the development of media structures and relations in post-conflict Cambodia. I showed above that there was a mix of successes and failures with regards to the media – in the short term, successes were few although UNTAC helped set up some groups which helped the independent media to gain a foothold. However, the CPP managed to retain control:

[The Commission for Propaganda and Education] was never dissolved during the UNTAC period, and it continued to exert its authority over the [State of Cambodia] media, even though the terms of the agreements were that the state and the party be separate. SOC media maintained a clear editorial slant in favor of the CPP and its leaders throughout the period leading up to the elections. (Marston, 1996:211)

It appears that individual components can claim most success in isolated areas where only a single component was engaged. In more vital matters, however, which tended to cross over the boundaries between components, there needed to be clear and agreed linkages between the components to ensure unity of effort and efficient implementation of the programmes. In the case of UNTAC, where this was achieved (in the elections), there was a successful outcome and where it was not (landmines and the media), there were less positive outcomes. This suggests that adult educational projects, which will often cross boundaries, should be structured in a way that makes explicit the educational contribution to those other sectors and objectives.

Reviewing the case study of UNTAC in Cambodia, a key feature is the lack of such structures and the absence of co-ordination and links between interested groups operating in the country. Karl Farris, in an article highlighting the positive outcomes from UNTAC, notes this issue:

There was no formal mechanism for integrating the efforts of the seven UNTAC components at any level of the operation. At each level – from military sector, to province, to district level – there should have been an established integrating mechanism to focus the efforts of all UN components. The individual charged with such coordination would also be tasked to coordinate UN activities with the numerous nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer organizations working in Cambodia. The military component of UNTAC, outcome-oriented and accustomed to working systematically, became the de facto integrator. (Farris, 1994:48)

General Sanderson offers similar conclusions in his report (Sanderson, 1995:19) but he suggests components other than the military were hampered by a lack of training and a limited awareness of how elements of the peace accord supported each other:

Regrettably, for almost everyone in UNTAC except the Military Component, the process was one of on-the-job training, while implementing plans prepared by someone else! ... In my view, such plans need to be prepared by the people who will be responsible for their execution, people who are aware of the subtleties within the peace agreement, and the interrelation of its provisions. (Sanderson, 1995:9)



This view of the unifying effect of the Paris Agreements is benign and reassuring to internationalists who would not wish to attribute cultural bias to their actions with regard to societies recovering from conflict. In reality, though, UNTAC – and all other interventions – have embedded values and they have made choices about whose values within society they will promote.

So, the overall impression is of a situation in Cambodia of chaos and a bureaucracy that prevented the international support agencies from assisting local people in the post-conflict reconstruction. However, the individuals involved did not usually accept this situation; rather, the human desire to succeed in difficult circumstances, the need to achieve personal goals and fortuitous coincidence came in to play with, according to Heder and Ledgerwood, positive results:

What existed were ad hoc and ramshackle interpersonal networks to which privileged (or relatively easy) access was gained on the basis of some shared trait, national culture being the most obvious and probably the most common, but still only one of many. It was probably easier to send a message if you were Australian, because the UNTAC communications system was run by Australian army personnel. It was probably easier to get a flight on an UNTAC aircraft if you were Dutch, because a Dutch military detachment controlled passenger lists. It was probably easier to see a doctor if you were German, because UNTAC's main field hospital was from the German army. These networks, however, could not and did not function as coherent factions within UNTAC on any issue. Thus the competing agendas of individual UNTAC personnel tended to cancel each other out and left as a common binding factor the formal stated goals of the organization laid down in the Paris Agreements. (Heder and Ledgerwood, 1996:29-30)

The case of UNTAC in Cambodia was not unique in that those operating in a society recovering from conflict must decide which values are important and there must also be agreement on who chooses which values are to be given most support in the emerging social and political structures.

Although economic and social rights were an integral part of its human rights education program, UNTAC made little systematic attempt to monitor or deal with problems of health, education, nutrition, gender discrimination, land titles and housing, except in some cases where disputes concerning such matters had obvious political overtones. (Ashley, 1996:179)

EID, by educating adults in Cambodia through a variety of media and information programmes, was successful in supporting UNTAC's goals; it was effective in explaining the detail of the Paris Agreements to the people in Cambodia and in describing UNTAC's role, making its main priority the support to the elections. Within

these limited parameters, EID can claim to have been a success. However, it did little to feed in to wider educational activities and longer term development goals.

The wider international community (associated with UNTAC or fiercely independent of it) was also involved in running courses and training, but these were often secondary to project aims of a wider social nature and syllabi were not formally monitored or controlled. In most cases, there was only anecdotal evidence on which to base any project evaluations, with limited access to ex-students who had completed the education programmes. It was clear that many local and international staff involved in adult education knew each other and there was evidence of co-ordination (mostly through the Cambodian Co-operation Committee), although the Non-Formal Education Department of the Cambodian Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports was only beginning to regulate the sector six years after the initial UN intervention. By contrast, there were shocking indications of NGOs competing for funding and responsibility for particular provision being passed from one to another (sometimes using the same international and local staff).

Perhaps this is a symptom of a wider weakness in adult education provided as part of an international intervention in societies recovering from conflict, where limited funds and competing agendas combine in an environment where there may be time pressures that preclude developing course materials in the students' first language. The provider must decide which objectives take priority and should avoid compromising the educational quality available to the adult population.

In developing a programme to assist in rebuilding the adult education facilities in a country which is recovering from conflict, the international community must take into account both the start point, outlined above, and the destination, i.e. the final, self-supporting system that will be in place at the end of the intervention. Blom and Nooijer (1992:i) note that efforts to "normalize" the education process, while great, have been directed at restoring the system that existed before 1975. However, the situation in modern Cambodia is very different and something more refined is required if the needs of the people and the country are to be met.

With the exception of one community development project, there was no acknowledgement of a link between adult education and security. A number of projects (particularly in the vocational training and capacity-building programmes) were, however, directly linked to the students' future employment.

## **5.7 SUMMARY**

In this chapter, I have described three distinct purposes for the adult education available to Cambodians during the time the country was recovering from conflict; the co-ordination between the organizations involved has also been considered. Using education to support community safety, develop the skills of military and militia personnel and as part of a wider process of democratization will be analysed further.

## CHAPTER 6

### DOCUMENTARY CASE STUDY – BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

The case study in this chapter focuses on Bosnia-Herzegovina in the late 1990s, a newly formed European state which had benefited from a mature and well-funded education system that was disrupted by the civil war. Unlike Cambodia, the international intervention was sanctioned by the UN but undertaken by a regional organization.

#### 6.1 COUNTRY PROFILE

The country of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the south east of Europe was admitted to the United Nations on 22 May 1992 under General Assembly resolution 46/237. This small country of some 51,000 km<sup>2</sup> and four million people was admitted on the same day as its neighbours, Croatia and Slovenia, which had also formed part of the former Yugoslavia. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a founder member of the UN and it had had the same leader, Marshal Tito, from foundation until 1980. The normal perception is that Yugoslavia was stable and unified under Tito whose Communist government was – unusually during the Cold War – part of the Non-Aligned Movement. This unification was particularly notable because of the different characteristics of the three main ethnic groups, humorously and stereotypically described in a travel guide:

When the Austrians occupied Bosnia in 1878, the new governor visited a Muslim imam and asked him how to rule. The imam said, 'You will only be able to rule Bosnia if you understand these three words: akmaluk, jogunluk and fitniluk.' ... Akmaluk describes the Muslims. ... 'It means slow. Submissive. ... Waiting for the blow. Careful.' ... Jogunluk describes the Serbs. ... 'Jogunluk is a big, stupid man, always bulling forward, waving his arms. He gets everything wrong, but refuses to listen. He drowns everyone else out. You always know what he thinks.' ... [Croats] 'Mm, yes, of course.' He jerked the knife upward into that someone's guts, as his saccharine smile curdled into a grimace of hatred. That's fitniluk. (Hall, 1996:174-5)

The period of Bosnian history that will be considered in this study starts in 1995 and is marked by the signature of the General Framework Agreement on Peace in Paris on 14 December of that year. This agreement, known as the Dayton Accords, brought to an end five years of independence struggles and civil war in which three main ethnic groups and the six republics of the former Yugoslavia fought for territory, influence and recognition. "Casing" for this study (Ragin, 2009) resulted in the clear inclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina which shared with Iraq an element of internal ethnicity-based strife

and had, like Cambodia, a formal peace accord to mark the start of the post-conflict period.

An adult aged 30 in 1995 who had lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina would not have experienced a difficult childhood. The type of communism Tito applied was politically inflexible but relatively liberal in economic terms and the country had strong manufacturing and export capability, although there was a strong state security apparatus and psychological pressure was applied, as an extract from a 1974 military manual shows:

...psychological war involves preconceived, organized and planned employment of all propaganda and other activities, including interference in the internal affairs of the other countries, to undermine the morale of the enemy and paralyze its will to fight. (Quoted in (Samolovcev, 1991:139)

From 1971, the republics that made up Yugoslavia demanded more powers; the Croatian republic in particular saw some violent acts against the state but these were limited in nature. The ethnic nationalism that characterized the wars of the 1990s was observable in the country and a new federal constitution, which strengthened each of the constituent republics, was adopted in 1974. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was a stable destination for tourists and Sarajevo hosted the Winter Olympics in 1984. During elections in 1990, Croatia and Slovenia stated their desire to secede from the federal state and they did so on 25 June 1991. From that point, when the adult was aged 26, conflict became the norm:

- The Ten Day War. In 1991, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) forcibly tried to re-take control of the external borders in Slovenia. This short-lived conflict resulted in success for the Slovenian militia forces.
- Croatia: 1991–1995. The federal JNA was dominated by Serbs and the Serb minority within Croatia supported the federal troops when they deployed to the break-away Croatia. The Independence War in Croatia included a drawn out fight for the Serb enclave of Vukovar and destruction of parts of the World Heritage site at Dubrovnik. There was a cease-fire after the recognition of the state by the UN, although the war is not regarded as having ended until 1995 when the Croatian Army conducted two major operations (Flash and Storm) which resulted in Croatia securing all the territory of the former republic except for Eastern Slavonia.

- Siege of Sarajevo. When Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence, Bosnian Serbs laid siege to the capital, Sarajevo, on 5 April 1992. The siege lasted until the peace agreements were signed in December 1995 and it is estimated that some 10,000 people were killed.
- Civil war. Within the new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, three groups fought for control of territory. These were the army of the Bosnian Serbs (VRS) who wished to form Republika Srpska (RS); the mainly Catholic Croats' military force Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane (HVO); and the Bosniak Army of the Republic (ARBiH). "Relations broke down entirely in 1993, engendering a 'war within a war' between the Muslim and Croat forces at which time the war spread throughout the country" (Walsh, 2000:1). The inter-ethnic fighting was brutal and characterized by ethnic cleansing where minority populations were forced out of an area or killed. The massacre of around 8,000 men and boys in Srebrenica was one of the most notable episodes of the war and it led to international intervention.
- NATO air strikes. Parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina were under UN protection and Security Council Resolution 836 explicitly authorized the use of force to protect 'safe areas' such as Gorazde, Srebrenica and Sarajevo. A deliberate bombing campaign against targets in RS during September 1995 brought the Bosnian Serbs to peace negotiations that eventually ended the war.

During the conflict, around half the population, over two million people, were displaced and infrastructure damage and disruption to industrial activity meant output fell to less than 30% of the pre-war levels (Hukic, 2000). These wars in the western Balkans were hugely destructive:

As a result of the widespread destruction and dislocation between 1992 and 1995, Bosnia's economic recovery began from a very low level. Per capita GDP in 1995 was estimated at only \$628 on a purchasing power parity exchange rate basis, one-third of prewar levels. ... The vast majority of the country's 1.3 million workers had lost their jobs; many had lost savings with the freezing of bank assets; and the houses of more than half had been damaged. ... Nearly two-thirds of the homes, one-half of the schools, and one-third of the hospitals were damaged or destroyed, along with power plants, water systems, agricultural land, and roads. (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:92)

Statistical data on the number of casualties has been disputed but Zwierchowski and Tabeau use a methodology that has informed the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and calculate that 104,732 people died (Zwierchowski and Tabeau, 2010). Efforts to refine and verify these numbers have continued since the conflict ended, and a project based in Sarajevo sought to record those who had died as

names rather than statistics. The *Bosnian Book of the Dead* (Tokaca, 2007) lists 97,207 names of which 8% were Croat, 25% Serbs and 65% Bosniaks. As censuses for Bosnia-Herzegovina from the time show the population split as 43.5% Bosniak, 31.2% Serb, 17.4% Croat and 7.9% from other ethnicities, it appears that the Bosnian Muslims were hardest hit in the conflict.

Throughout Tito's period in Yugoslav, there was public investment in education. In the late 1970s, the secondary system (from aged 15 plus) was changed. Rather than opting for three years of schooling for skilled workers or four years of high school, which was either technical or academic, everyone followed a common curriculum for two years before choosing a further two years at a specific centre for the type of work they wanted to complete in future, which included work placements (Obradovic, 1986:389) and was vocational in nature. Notably, the drop-out rate for secondary schooling was high with only an estimated 66% passing school leaving exams immediately prior to the war (Almeida *et al.*, 1996:24). The illiteracy rate in 1991 was only 9% – a considerable improvement since the 1953 census result (27.2%) – although this included wide disparity between the republics: Slovenia had only 2.4% of adults who were illiterate and Bosnia-Herzegovina had almost 45% in this category (UNESCO, 1957:112-4). It is likely that this improvement was a result of widespread reform of the Yugoslav adult education system from the 1950s:

Training for work and the mobilization of the masses in the reconstruction of the country, under conditions of blockade and strong psychological warfare, was a new form of adult education. Traditional education within the education system was not only inadequate, but totally inefficient as well. So, new solutions were sought in the founding of new adult education institutions, especially workers' universities and factory educational centers which brought education closer to workers. In addition to special curricula and adequate methodology, great attention was paid to stimulating work morale by means of public recognition, so that competition at work was one of the essential ways to achieve individual and collective recognition. (Samolovcev, 1991:138)

By the 1980s, education at all levels including higher education was available, although the number of students was low: "There were four universities in Bosnia (Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla and Banja Luka) which included 46 institutes and faculties. About 30,000 students were enrolled in higher education" (Arnhold *et al.*, 1998:38). The conflict saw many educational institutions close down and, although war schools had been operated by dedicated teachers on an informal basis, 50% of the schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina needed to be rebuilt (World Bank, 2005:17).

Against this backdrop of a developed country which had been severely damaged by ethnic and nationalist struggles over a five-year period, an international intervention was undertaken to oversee the Dayton Accords and enforce the peace. I will consider how the intervention became involved in adult education, specifically looking at the interface with public information and voter education. The model of civilian and military co-operation to deliver adult education will be examined and I will look in particular at how the international actors became involved in higher education – including teacher development – and curriculum change.

## **6.2 DOCUMENT GATHERING AND DATA COLLECTION**

The international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was formally authorized by the three parties to the conflict who agreed to regional bodies deploying into the country, and the UN empowered two principal organizations – NATO for military aspects and the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) leading on civilian issues – to implement the Dayton Peace Accords. Some documents on the intervention were available through electronic records in archives of these two organizations. The OSCE mentions Bosnia-Herzegovina in 86 records of annual meetings or conference declarations, and some budgetary reports are available. However, there are no published records at the granularity of projects. Similarly, the NATO archive contains 23 statements by officials and representatives and five official texts but the Alliance's policy is not to disclose records until 30 years after the events.

During 1997, I worked for six months within the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and was based in Banja Luka. By the time I began this research, I no longer had access to any classified material regarding the NATO intervention. I did, however, have access to personal notes I kept of my meetings and activities throughout the deployment and I retained samples of some of the public education materials my team developed at that time. Because I was not yet engaged in this research, the documents I kept were not a complete set of records and neither are they a systematically gathered sample of what NATO and other organizations produced during the international intervention, which lasted for many years after my involvement over only six months. They are illustrative, though, of some of the types of activities that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The limited documents accessible through the main international archives and my personal notes have been supplemented by published information provided in selected reports on the sector, academic publications and commentaries.



There are limitations to these sets of documents. In Nelles' work, OSCE-compiled lists of local and international organizations involved in education in Bosnia-Herzegovina are known to be incomplete and still indicate over 100 groups working in the educational sphere, including peace education, conflict resolution, refugee and minority support, and related activities. The records are also known to be of questionable quality:

Scores of NGOs with private and government support, and various international agencies, have fostered peace education, civics, multicultural awareness, religious sensitivity and reconciliation projects since 1995, with precise types, budgets and project numbers difficult to calculate. (Nelles, 2006:235)

As a result, it is unsurprising that there is a lack of a coherent and proactive data capture on which researchers can build analytic evaluations. Nelles is very aware of this:

First, the past work by NGOs and the research by scholars has yet to be adequately surveyed or widely reported. There are, moreover, still no good syntheses of this work ... Second, there are no easily shared criteria to measure education's contribution to local or school-based violence prevention specifically, or to national and regional peacebuilding more broadly. ... A third and related challenge is the lack of a coherent international community approach supporting a well-funded collaborative research and evaluation agenda linking curriculum, textbook and educational policy studies with security analysis. ... But collaborative, interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral and policy-relevant approaches are wanting. Meanwhile international agencies do not share internal evaluations easily, and these are mostly inaccessible to education researchers. (Nelles, 2006:236)

Data gathering in this study has addressed this problem in part by also using facts in secondary reports, for example using United Nations Development Programme figures in consolidated reports even when the detailed project-level data is hidden, such as that below:

In the two years after the 1995 Dayton Accord aid per capita reached \$245, and today it is \$138, still among the highest in the world. The huge surge in aid has generated growth, but private sector investment has not taken off. This matters not just because of the high levels of unemployment, but also because of the critical role of the private sector in taking over functions financed by aid. ... For example, fears of future insecurity can generate a preference for short-term investments with high returns rather than for the longer term investments on which sustained recovery and employment generation depend. (UN Development Programme, 2005:178)

Finally, the data collected should only be used with proper consideration of the context in which it was obtained and the purposes the analysis will serve. "Much of the

research has been done without any effort to assess the data in the Yugoslav context, or to assure that these projects are used to improve the situation for those who have gone through the traumatic experience of intergroup war” (Robinson, Schnabel and Smyth, 1999:26). In the following section, I will describe the data available on how adult education and public information were used in concert in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### **6.3 PUBLIC INFORMATION AND ADULT EDUCATION**

In the mid-1990s, there was an attempt to reach a wide range of people with educational messages which would affect the security and stability of the individual and the state. While some educators make a distinction between awareness / information campaigns and education programmes, the characteristics of each in Bosnia-Herzegovina were similar. Both relied on broadcast and print media to convey the material being taught and there was a deliberate policy of including content that would engage and stimulate the learner rather than merely reproduce facts. A priority for public safety in the country was to design education programmes that addressed concerns about landmines.

#### **6.3.1 Mines Awareness**

The US provided educational material in which the Superman character, very popular with children, arrived to rescue young people from a landmine they were about to handle. Used as public information, this content was ineffective and somewhat counter-productive: there were reports that young children sought out landmines in the hope that the cartoon character would appear. By contrast, providing the material to school teachers allowed an education programme to be built around the story and the specialist de-miners worked with teaching staff who had the final say in how their students would be taught. This approach overcame the problem identified by Baxter and Hoffman:

Very few land mine awareness campaigns have been designed for children or for education. Hence their very specific name – awareness campaigns. While one cannot criticize the well-intentioned nature of these programmes, one must realize that one problem of their effectiveness lies in that they have often been used as if they were education programmes. Sometimes awareness campaigns provide the only available materials regarding land mines, and some knowledge is better than none, at other times they are implemented on the misguided assumption that they will work as an education programme. (Baxter and Hoffman, 1998:251)

Mining had been conducted across Bosnia-Herzegovina and it was commonplace for communities who were forced to leave their homes to lay mines in gardens and outbuildings in an attempt to prevent other ethnic groups occupying their property while

they were absent. Because mining was not a military activity during the war, neither was it seen as exclusively a military problem in the post-conflict period. Thus, the international groups deployed on the peace support operation and the entity governments all appreciated that a long-term adjustment of the community's approach to mining and de-mining was needed.

Factual awareness about mines (e.g. protocols and customs around indications of mined areas) and teaching local security personnel how to disarm less complex landmines were linked into a comprehensive education programme that was embedded into adult and school curricula for the medium term, so Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the first to address the problem in a sustainable, educative manner:

Thus mine awareness was integrated with demining operations and not integrated into the school system – still the case for most mine awareness programmes around the world. This is partly attributed to the fact that mine awareness campaigns are usually conceived and developed by those who know most about mines – deminers and those who deal with the tragedy of mine victims, such as medical personnel. Only recently have home governments accepted that mines will not be cleared quickly and that there is a long-term problem to be addressed. (Baxter and Hoffman, 1998:257)

Public information campaigns are usually non-specific about the target audience and the message is transmitted to many different groups without differentiation. In the British area of operations, different programmes were developed for each group of learners. For example, internally displaced adults returning to their former homes were probably expert in the hardware used as mines but they would need to be trained to spot locally adopted signs and signals of mined areas. Those returnees who had been refugees, by contrast, would be expected to have less knowledge and experience on which to rely so would require a different programme. In some cases, discussion of landmine use by different groups was used to develop understanding of the mines but also educate each group about the fears, responses and actions of their neighbours. Effective delivery of such a course requires a sensitive understanding of military matters as well as community building and conflict resolution:

Circumstances frequently require that landmine awareness and health and safety messages related to postconflict conditions are incorporated into education programs in ways that produce additional demands for more effective intersectoral collaboration and call for skills and training that are not conventionally available to education authorities. (World Bank, 2005:61)

I found that adult educators needed to extend their skills and be supported by different subject matter experts before they could deliver such nuanced learning effectively.

Community education on mines illustrates, however, another challenge for adult education in societies recovering from conflict where there will be pressure to include many different educational goals in a given course or learning event, as the World Bank acknowledges:

Additional pressures are exerted on the curriculum to simultaneously modernize, streamline, and include additional conflict-related content, such as landmine awareness, health and safety messages, psychosocial support, conflict management skills, and tolerance and respect for diversity. (World Bank, 2005:26)

Mines awareness and safety represented only a small piece of the new content that competing parties within the post-conflict society wished to prioritize and promote in a resource-constrained adult education system. A second curricular area that has overlap with public information campaigns is identity and nation building.

### 6.3.2 Identity and Nation Building

The stability of a society is invariably at risk where competing groups within the state develop distinct identities that exclude co-operation with others. The role of education in developing a shared identity or understanding how rival identities can co-exist within a nation was not fully appreciated in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time SFOR began its work in 1996.

Until as recently as 2002 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) education was not viewed as essential for conflict prevention, security or peacebuilding. But perspectives and practices are changing. Indeed, the international community, acting as de facto governor in BiH, saw a role for education in state development and peacebuilding. In BiH the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) took the lead in education reforms and began evaluating its own broader institutional efforts at using education as a conflict prevention tool. (Nelles, 2006:230)

When education programmes are to reach large numbers of learners, distributed learning models are usually the most cost effective means of delivery and, thus, educators will be using similar bearers for their content as public information campaigns and entertainment media. Using broadcast media for distributed learning models created some practical problems because each of the entities was beginning the process of diverging from the previously standardized Serbo-Croat to create new languages to strengthen their sense of identity. Materials were translated into Cyrillic for the Republika Srpska and dialect distinctions were made for Croat and Bosniak learners – although most adults could understand all three versions. Reflecting on the Bosnian situation, Adam identifies that learning involves knowledge and action rather

than only informative content: "The role of the communicator is to create optimal conditions for consumers of information to become knowledgeable and to put their newly found knowledge into action" (Adam, 1999:4) and this active engagement with facts around identity can assist with nation building.

It fell to the OSCE to implement a sustainable democracy in which identities were not built primarily on ethno-nationalist feelings. Programmes of adult education that facilitated critiques of self-identity, provided factual information about other ethnic groups or included shared learning opportunities contributed to nation building. This set the desired outcomes for a number of adult education programmes:

Given the nature of the civil conflict, constructing a new multiethnic and democratic Bosnia from the ashes of three-and-a-half years of war was a daunting challenge. ... The long-term goal of the international community was to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina as a fully functioning and sustainable democracy that could integrate itself as a member of democratic Europe. This was not expected to be easy, however, because elections in the early 1990s had in part spawned the ultranationalist parties that started the civil war in the first place. (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:92)

With the tension between the various ethnic groups in the country so high, a number of adult education programmes were structured around a mixed delivery team of international staff plus trainers from at least two of the groups with whom many residents identified. In RS, 20 local people from the three major groups were trained in skills used for conflict resolution and they worked alongside five international facilitators who had also received special training. The Neighbourhood Facilitators Project formed mixed local/international teams which then learned together about the particular problems in Banja Luka and then worked in the area to bring about solutions to perceived problems (Last, 2000:92).

A mixed delivery team was also a feature of a United Methodist Committee on Relief initiative in Sarajevo, which had conflict resolution at its core and used adult education as a lever for change. One part of this programme established a conflict resolution centre in the university, while training and workshops were offered to local groups, including police officers (Aall, 2000:131). Although this NGO was involved primarily in delivering aid and relief, it became involved in adult education when it felt that its activities might potentially create conflict amongst groups in the city that should be addressed.

The formation of mixed international / local staff teams was also important at the national level when the OSCE established an education department in 2002:

Its intention was to help mitigate education's potential for creating political and ethnic violence while facilitating policy and administrative reforms. ... The OSCE's restructuring and aid to local initiatives and bureaucratic capacity has been dramatic. New international experts in the Sarajevo office were assigned to the education portfolio with local BiH employees to supervise activities in cantons, key cities and villages in cooperation with OHR and local authorities. (Nelles, 2006:233)

In this case, the international staff presence helped Bosnian staff from the different ethnic groups to begin working together. Mixing international with local staff is not universally welcomed, however. Tanil highlights that there is potential for this approach to be problematic when the external intervention is unaware of the strengths and successes of local provision: "Marshall Plan-type school reconstruction programmes in post-conflict Bosnia were imposed in a context in which MoE-supported co-operative war-school efforts blending formal and non formal initiatives had proven successful" (Tanil, 1997:13).

Partially to avoid these risks, the World Bank takes the view that a community should be at the heart of planning reconstruction if any intervention is to be sustainable and it has made grants to schools that involve the community (World Bank, 2005:45). It also believes that reconstruction of schools can be used as an early vehicle for community engagement in post-conflict situations:

Social funds in many postconflict countries (such as Bosnia, Cambodia and Kosovo) provide an important mechanism for targeting resources at **community-focused** reconstruction programs [emphasis added]. (Ibid:57) (World Bank, 2005:57)

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where diverse broadcast media networks remained active throughout the conflicts, distributed learning was carried on many channels. SFOR preferred to offer educative content to locally owned and operated media outlets rather than establish its own stations and channels. A series of programmes for radio broadcast used the UK *Desert Island Discs* format where a guest plays their favourite music and talks about their life stories. Guests from different ethnic groups sometimes chose similar musical selections or had common experiences and I believe that this allowed learners to reflect on touchpoints with alienated groups. To reach the full range of learners, however, it was important to use the broadcasters who had been most divisive in their war-time broadcasts:

There is little doubt that the media can have a profound impact on complex emergencies. The best known example is the notorious use of hate radio in Rwanda and Bosnia to encourage ethnic cleansing. Less well known is the potential for the media to do the opposite – that is, to support the efforts of humanitarian aid agencies in complex emergencies even to the extent of helping with peace-building efforts. (Adam, 1999:1)

Broadcasts were also made on a series of agricultural matters as many local people kept livestock despite having no farming experience. The information that was broadcast was supplemented by discussion groups hosted by veterinary staff both on the air and in local communities. SFOR also provided written 'how to' checklists and self-test questions where the answers could be found on future broadcasts or in local newspapers. Such programmes went beyond straightforward information broadcasts to promote communication and learning as described in Manoff's model:

[Robert Manoff's] model emphasises the media's role in enabling communication as opposed to simply providing information. Information does not necessarily lead to improved knowledge and can be partial, irrelevant or just plain wrong. But in sensitive hands the media can be used to promote genuine communication which can help facilitate social change. (Adam, 1999:2)

Adam notes that the international intervention focused on factual programming at the expense of entertainment:

Third is the preoccupation of the international community with news programming. Objective reporting will take many years to achieve in Bosnia. An alternative approach – to use drama and other entertainment programming to convey pro-social messages – has not been part of the media strategy. (Adam, 1999:4)

However, while this may have been true of the media strategy, the OSCE's education programme was using multi-channel communication and entertainment to promote learning. The effectiveness of public information and education campaigns around identity was not formally measured and some, including Schindler, (2000:18) suggest that the military and security situation at least had stabilized, although other reforms had not occurred.

To some extent, this could be partly attributed to the softening of divisions along ethnic identity lines which SFOR education programmes attempted. Ethnicity was also a factor in the early electoral processes that the OSCE supervised and I will consider these in the next section.

## 6.4 ADULT EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIZATION AND VOTER EDUCATION

During the international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was a push to encourage representative politics across the country. OSCE supported local elections as early as 1996. These were followed the next year by 'national' elections in Republika Srpska as well as municipal elections. In 1998, the first post-conflict general election was held. In its efforts to ensure these elections were fair and that individuals participated, voter education programmes were conducted, supervised by OSCE.

Lessons from other peace support operations had highlighted that holding elections could be counter-productive to generating stability. The World Bank acknowledged the influence of ethnicity on local politics and a UNDP report judged that early efforts in interventions should focus on political reconciliation rather than elections:

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where decentralization was driven by central ethnically-based political interests, problems were encountered when the pace of decentralization exceeded the capacity of the local management to implement it. (World Bank, 2005:44)

Cambodia in the early 1990s suggests that holding national and local elections in an atmosphere of widespread violence and mistrust can unravel the peace process or legitimize the warring parties, as they did in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Accords. But experiences in ... other post-conflict settings suggest that marked progress is possible in three key areas:

- Reforming or creating a professional military and police.
- Managing the demobilization and reintegration of combatants.
- Creating political space for broadly based reconciliation. (UN Development Programme, 2002:95)

UNDP concludes, however, that an immature democracy will still be better than systems of authoritarian rule and is thus worth introducing early as a means of reducing violence in a fragile state:

With 53 major armed internal conflicts in the 1990s resulting in an estimated 3.6 million deaths (mostly civilians), it is easy to understand why some people may favour a despotic peace over no peace at all. ... In other countries the risk of a 'failed state' – where security is fragmented, even privatized – is at least as great as the risk of returning to brutal authoritarian rule. Does this mean that civil order is incompatible with genuine democracy? Many would say yes, arguing that people need governments to focus on peace and state building first, and democracy building after. ... less rooted democracies are still better able than authoritarian regimes to cope with political unrest. Why? Probably because democracies, unlike dictatorships, offer non-violent ways of resolving political conflicts, and opposition groups have reason to hope that their turn will come. (UN Development Programme, 2002:85)



Therefore, SFOR resources were used to extend the OSCE's public education programme around elections. Military personnel distributed election pamphlets with factual information on the registration and voting process. Voter education publications were designed, printed and distributed by the military. In some areas of the country where the OSCE presence was limited, some soldiers who went out on patrols amongst the local people were trained to engage potential voters and – through interpreters – discuss the voter education material with them. An 'elections special' edition of the colour magazine that SFOR produced contained cartoons suggesting all three of the ethnic groups should vote together. It also explained the roles of the various Bosnian and international bodies involved in running the elections and the structure of the various levels of government for which candidates were standing. The special edition was illustrated with sample ballot papers, photographs of polling stations that were being fairly operated and pictorial representations of the security measures SFOR would be putting in place in order that these were less intimidating on polling day. OSCE staff used this magazine extensively in voter education classes it ran, particularly in RS and where minority returnees were a significant proportion of the voters.

Specific education programmes were tailored for female voters in the 1998 general election under the banner *There Are More of Us, Let's Vote*:

At the same time, they worked to encourage participation of women at the grassroots level in the election and approached OSCE for support of a women's voter education project. With assistance from USAID, the organization sent field representatives to villages and towns throughout the country, reaching 14,000 women in roundtables and discussions. In addition, posters and leaflets were (sic) distributed and displayed countrywide. (Walsh, 2000:11)

The education programmes were only partially successful, with assessments of the electoral process concluding that the elections had legitimized ethno-nationalist divisions within society rather than facilitating participatory dialogue. One Canadian who worked on voter education in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996 and 1997 said, "If they don't vote for the right people this time, I'm going home!" reflecting frustrations at the limited sway the interventions held. The fragility of local capacity to run elections was a key problem and it was not until 2001 that responsibility for all aspects of elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina was transferred from OSCE to indigenous bodies. After this transfer, two separate commentators concluded that democracy had not been established:

Bosnia is a revealing case. Seven years after the conclusion of the Dayton Accord that brought the Bosnian war to an end, the country continued to be governed by the United Nations Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR). There was no meaningful democracy in Bosnia, despite the holding of elections; the OHR used its powers to dismiss presidents, prime ministers, judges, mayors, and other elected officials. It could pass legislation and create new institutions without reference to the Bosnian people. Much of the administrative capacity of the Bosnian government lay in the hands of international experts rather than indigenous civil servants. (Fukuyama, 2004:140)

In sum, elections empowered nationalist parties, made the reversal of ethnic cleansing more difficult and complicated plans for the departure of international peacebuilders from the country. (Belloni, 2004:338)

The adult education in support of democracy that had only limited success in Bosnia-Herzegovina was an area in which OSCE and SFOR worked together. In the next section, such military-civilian co-operation will be examined further.

## **6.5 CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION DURING THE INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

When the parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in December 1995, they agreed that an individual would be appointed to “mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement”. They also agreed that NATO “may establish such a force, which will operate under the authority and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command” to implement the military components of the GFAP (1995). From the outset, therefore, military and civilian contributors to the intervention were operating under distinct and separate authorities, neither of whom was accountable to the United Nations Secretary General who generally receives executive powers only in peacekeeping operations:

In the enforcement operations in Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia (UNITAF) and IFOR in Bosnia, the Secretary General does not have any political control over the forces. In general, they are commanded, both politically and militarily, by a State or group of States, operating under a loose Security Council mandate, although generally, as with consensual peacekeeping forces, the Secretary General is required by the Council to provide regular reports on the progress of the force. (White, 1997:230)

International staff working in the country drew from the GFAP when they required the parties to comply with a particular directive but the document rarely gave specific guidance and it was of no use when weighing a decision or setting priorities amongst

mandated actions. Therefore, activities were usually negotiated to secure the consent of all three parties. When negotiations stalled, decision making was theoretically referred to the Office of the High Representative and the NAC but Aall notes that these bodies are not vested with any real political power:

In complex emergencies and other peacekeeping situations, it is not the military or NGOs that are ultimately in charge of the decision-making process. While these communities can make efforts to collaborate on a local basis, they have neither the authority nor resources to mandate closer coordination. This authority rests in country capitals of the state powers behind the response to conflict and in their willingness to support, politically and financially over a long period, a peacekeeping/peacebuilding effort coordinated by the UN or other selected multilateral mechanism. (Aall, 2000:139)

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the relevant state capitals were those of the countries of the Contact Group (Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome and Washington) although military decisions were taken also within the NAC, which excluded Russia. During the IFOR peace enforcement operation, it was understood that the priority was for the military to ensure none of the parties' military forces resorted to violence. During the first year of the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, therefore, it was unusual for military and civilian components to work together on shared activities because, as Freedman and Brinkman both highlight, the primary military role is to create the environment where civilian peace building efforts can begin:

Thus, intervention has to be recognized not as being directed at a specific end but as being part of a process, though undoubtedly a process with defined stages. Military action can never be sufficient: at best, it can create conditions for a more favourable political outcome. (Freedman, 1995:22)

Military resources can provide most of the requirements for rapid reaction in the case of an imminent need. They can deal with security problems as well as humanitarian assistance, are rapidly deployable and self-sustainable. ... There was no choice but to accept these refusals and to negotiate further. The use of military force – other than for self-defence – would have been counterproductive for the mission as a whole. ... It was obvious that the war in Bosnia had to be stopped in order to be able to restore respect for human rights and to improve the general humanitarian situation. Therefore, a stronger force was required with a wider mandate. ... Many lessons learned by the UN were taken into account and put into effect. One of them was a distinction between what the new force would do and what other – civil and humanitarian – organizations were supposed to do. (Brinkman, 1998:172-3)

As the intervention matured and it became usual for the parties to observe the military annex to the GFAP, the NATO force was given a new mandate and a new stabilization task:

SFOR assistance in the implementation of the civil annexes to Dayton increased significantly after 1996. NATO troops, for example, seized their first indicted war criminals in July 1997. Expanded SFOR activities included increased civil-military cooperation to restore essential public services and economic reconstruction and the use of military force to enforce aspects of the Dayton Accord (e.g., seizing extreme nationalist radio stations to dampen interethnic vitriol). (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:97)

At this stage, I and other military officers became involved with adult education programmes and with political and governance development. In these roles, we worked closely with the OHR, OSCE and NGOs although we still made formal reports to the NATO command chain that lead ultimately to the NAC. In fact, I was obliged to submit all my voter education materials to the NAC for approval on a weekly basis. Below, Abdela would prefer it if a civilian capability for reconstruction were available to operate alongside the military. However, in the absence of such organized expertise, Brinkman observed “At the moment, however, there is no multinational humanitarian body that can be deployed shoulder-to-shoulder with the military to deal with humanitarian aid and civil administration” (Brinkman, 1998:178) so military staff filled the gaps.

If they are to succeed, post-conflict peace missions in other Bosnias and Kosovos require high quality civil capabilities to administer municipalities and government; a sufficient number of trained police capable of law enforcement; civil capabilities to work in partnership with the local population to deliver rule of law, justice, and the short and long-term reconstruction process of the infrastructure. This includes developing democratic political parties, NGOs, free media and human rights over a long enough time frame to induce stability, economic growth and democracy. (Abdela, 2000)

Because there was no single, structured civilian capability, many separate organizations had to work together to cover all the areas of expertise, which resulted in complexity according to a seasoned observer: “Balkan policy is made and executed by a bewildering number of overlapping and competing organisations and this clearly leads to a degree of confusion” (Glenny, 2000:2). Similarly, Dobbins *et al* list the separate areas of responsibility:

Another illustration of the fragmented nature of civil implementation was the number of different organizations that had responsibility for various aspects of the Dayton Accord. The OSCE was given responsibility for organizing and monitoring elections. It was also in charge of negotiating arms control agreements between the former warring parties. ... The UNHCR, meanwhile, was designated as the lead agency for the explosive issue of refugee and IDP returns, as well as for providing humanitarian assistance. The World Bank and IMF assumed responsibility for most of the efforts to create effective economic

and financial policy institutions and for economic reconstruction in Bosnia. These disparate organizations each had distinct agendas. OHR had limited authority to oversee and direct the overall effort. (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:94)

In the provision of adult education, the fragmentation was particularly noticeable. A single course of education for a community of returnees might involve UNHCR on conflict resolution, input from the OSCE on the returnees' voting rights as well as a World Bank requirement to teach skills to boost economic growth. Local staff became familiar with the priorities of all these organizations so that they could co-operate as efficiently as possible.

## **6.6 HIGHER EDUCATION INCLUDING TEACHER DEVELOPMENT**

Of these organizations, it was not UNESCO or UNICEF which dominated on educational matters; rather, OSCE had the mandate and the World Bank was a major player. The World Bank supported economic initiatives and, in this section, I will consider how higher education programmes and the higher-level development of teachers were delivered.

In 1995, the higher education sector needed physical reconstruction, with parts of it having been directly targeted during the conflict:

The Dzemal Bidedic University of Mostar was the target of aggression in the early stages of the war ... All the attempts to reunite the two parts of Mostar as well as to restore the single University of Mostar failed to produce results even with the creation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the Washington Agreements in March 1994. (Dizdar and Kemal, 1996:41-2)

Shortage of buildings, laboratory equipment and other facilities has become a very serious constraint for their activities. In addition, university as well as public libraries have been devastated. ... In September 1995 Germany and Italy together donated US\$330,000 to help repair university buildings in Bosnia. (Arnhold *et al.*, 1998:40)

However, fragmentation of the system along ethnic lines was a less obviously visible result of the damage done during the war:

Three separate higher education systems in two entities had emerged at the end of the war – all technically within the same country and its internationally recognized borders. Two of these systems define their current and possible future activities as higher education institutions serving the national interests of the nations they claim to represent, i.e. Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat, respectively. The third institution is attempting to maintain the multinational, multicultural, and multireligious aspects of life and higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina even though it is functioning in the territories having a

Bosniak-Muslim majority within the overall structure of its population. (Dizdar and Kemal, 1996:112-3)

The University of Banja Luka cut its former ties with the Association of Universities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and tried to link itself entirely with the Universities in Serbia and in Montenegro. (Dizdar and Kemal, 1996:41)

Internationally, there have been deliberate attempts to support the institutional development of universities and act as a counter to the narrow focus on ethnicity-driven identities and priorities and to reflect the way Bosnian students relate abroad in the home country:

It was also stressed that the CRE-ATF would not concentrate on humanitarian aid or on the reconstruction of war-damaged university buildings. Rather, it would focus on academic support to enable the rehabilitation and proper re-functioning of these institutions. The ultimate aim in assisting institutional development was to contribute to creating conditions which would re-attract those students and staff who had fled during the war. A priority goal in this collaborative effort was to help improve the institution's ability to adapt to future needs, and not simply to restore it to its pre-war state. (CRE, 1996:2)

In different European cities, refugee students from Bosnia have founded clubs to look world-wide for available places to study and for possible funding and scholarships. In these clubs, Muslims, Croats and Serbs work together in spite of their ethnic and religious differences. (Arnhold *et al.*, 1998:18)

Universities in Bosnia-Herzegovina were the focus for training teachers, some of whom had begun their careers during the war and were unqualified and others who needed to develop their skills. Higher education organizations delivering teacher training in 1996 included the Pedagogical Faculty in the University of Mostar West (which had opened during the conflict) and university institutes in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica and Bihac. However, the staff in these faculties believed that external support was required and the University of Pittsburgh established regional partnerships.

Could a country as economically weak as ours afford such a fragmented and diversified network of teacher training establishments? ... and what are we going to do with a number of graduates and / or students who want to enter the teaching profession? It is our task to try to find answers to such issues within this group **and with the assistance of our colleagues from the University of Pittsburgh**. We need to address the wider context of education in order to understand the more focused set of issues related to the teacher training reconstruction and reform. As a matter of fact, what we ought to attain is both the revival and re-shaping of our teacher training system. We should not aim at cosmetic modifications, or even to some minor plastic surgeries, but to comprehensive and far ranging changes [emphasis added]. (Dizdar, 1996:7)

Teaching staff needed the skills to involve themselves directly in designing the school system: it was no longer enough to deliver the centrally produced lessons that were common in the 1980s and education management differed between cantons because “Education, culture, the media, science, and research were no longer to be considered vital concerns of central government. Rather, they were to be transferred to the regions (or cantons as per the current political terminology)” (Dizdar and Kemal, 1996:50).

Teachers could no longer rely on a pre-war educational structure that mandated what, where and how to teach. Traditional sources of authority could no longer provide the level of financial, material and intellectual support and, therefore, the level of guidance that existed before the war. In some cases, even those who were mobilized to teach had no formal teacher education training. They had to depend on their teaching instincts. To maintain educational provision, they had to improvise and innovate out of necessity. Therefore, in many ways, decisions about what to do in a school, including what should be the structure of a school under conflict, fell on these teachers. Teachers became *school makers* in ways that before April 1992 seemed unimaginable. (Cohen, 1998:149)

As part of this ‘school maker’ role, teachers were responsible for short-term curriculum amendments: “In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the three constituent groups reached agreement in 1989 (sic) following an elaborate review process on elimination of inappropriate passages from textbooks. However, implementation at the school level has been uneven” (World Bank, 2005:53).

Aside from such superficial activity, international interest in the work of teachers was focused on how they improved the quality of their teaching and how they worked to measure learning outcomes.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, school improvement grants to schools are awarded on the basis of school improvement plans that address issues of quality improvement. ... initial work on establishing bodies for determining standards and assessment have helped focus attention of officials on the need for improved measurement of learning outcomes. (World Bank, 2005:48-9)

Even amongst qualified teachers, new demands such as these added to the pressure of working in poorly equipped schools with pupils whose learning had been interrupted by the conflict. International staff supported teachers in the early days of SFOR and latterly, formal bilateral arrangements were put in place with seven countries – Turkey, Luxembourg, Austria, Norway, Slovenia, Finland and Japan – to deliver teacher development packages. One example of this is the Finnish *Co-operation in the Education Sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina* programme, phase 1 of which engaged in the education and professional development of teachers from 2002 to 2004 (Pasalic-Kreso *et al.*, N.D.:203).

The importance of higher education in rebuilding the Bosnian economy and in leveraging improvements in education through teacher education cannot be underestimated. Given the personal links that exist amongst academics across national borders, it is not surprising that this sector of adult education attracts international support and is the subject of published research. Cohen wanted in particular to give a voice to the participants in research studies and she concludes that the role of teachers in societies recovering from conflict and other emergencies is an expansive one.

Activities designed to give a voice to teachers as they cope and respond to complex emergencies raise questions for future discussion and research. ... Participant Bosnian teachers, including those who became teachers during the war, identified assistance in education as a critical priority. They exhibited a profound commitment by continuing to teach, often under extremely chaotic conditions. ... However, Bosnian teachers, even in the middle of an intense war, retained a vision of the future. ... This dialogue among local practitioners helped to make clear that, during a complex emergency, the role and function of schooling expands as well as the role of teachers. (Cohen, 1998:150)

## **6.7 SUMMARY**

In this chapter, I have shown how public education programmes used distance learning to support democratization, mines awareness and community identity building. I also focused on the international dimension of adult education in Bosnia-Herzegovina, looking at how external military and civilian bodies co-ordinated their efforts and how international networks supported higher and teacher education. Curricular issues around identity and the co-ordination of international agencies will be analysed further.



## CHAPTER 7

### DOCUMENTARY CASE STUDY – IRAQ

In this chapter, I consider the case of Iraq where a US-led intervention began in 2003. Prior to and during the conflict period, Iraq's education system had had periods of both expansion and contraction but the sector was damaged when the international community arrived. Notably, Iraq was not a United Nations operation and a number of private enterprises participated in the international intervention.

#### 7.1 COUNTRY PROFILE

Iraq covers a geographical area of around 440,000 km<sup>2</sup> and is situated in the oil-rich Arabian Gulf. The main population group in Iraq consists of Shia Muslims, with Sunni Muslims, Kurds and Turkomans forming significant minority groups. In recent times, Iraq's foreign policy has been set against a context of post-colonial relations, US super power dominance and complex relations with neighbouring countries. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett highlight these issues:

By the autumn of 1971, the regime found itself threatened simultaneously from a number of different quarters. In the first place, there was the long-standing dispute with Iran over the Shatt al-Arab and other parts of the frontier, which had taken on a new and potentially ominous dimension with Britain's departure from the Gulf, the simultaneous creation of the United Arab Emirates and the well-publicised increase in American military supplies to Iran. Iraq's relations with most Arab countries were scarcely more cordial; the Sa'udis and most of the new rulers of the Gulf were both suspicious and fearful of what the Ba'th might do; the Syrians regarded the regime as heretical in Ba'thist terms (and apart from a brief and rather half-hearted attempt at reconciliation in 1978-79 have generally maintained this attitude); the Jordanians were not a major force in the Middle East in the early 1970s, and in any case regarded Iraq's radical posturing over Palestine with understandable, if in fact unwarranted, alarm; and relations with Egypt, already sour under Nasser, had deteriorated further under his successor. Further afield, although trade continued to be fairly buoyant, Iraq's formal relations with the West were in some disarray. (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987:144)

The study focuses on the period immediately following the US-led invasion and occupation of the country in March 2003. Because the intervention did not have explicit UN-endorsement, Iraq is not a typical case for inquiry into post-conflict adult education. However, the international involvement and the experience of conflict suggest it can be put in a "coherent bundle" (Ragin, 2009:522) with Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. An Iraqi aged 30 that year would have spent 24 years of their life as a citizen of a country whose president was Saddam Hussein, and 21 years in a country in conflict. Five major violent episodes had occurred:

- Iran-Iraq War. The Iran-Iraq War, a territorial dispute with neighbouring Iran, severely weakened Iraq's economy. It ran from 1980 and lasted eight years, during which time Iraq's oil production dropped, and the country became increasingly militarized. (Tripp, 2002)
- Kurdish Challenge. An internal rebellion (or insurgency) by Kurds in northern Iraq ran concurrently with the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War. Kurds were fighting to establish their rights as a minority within Iraq and against suppression of their culture in the Arab state. The military regime and internal security structures of Saddam's regime were brutal in suppressing the insurgency, using chemical weapons against civilians, for example at Halabja in March 1998.
- Iraq-Kuwait. Iraq invaded Kuwait in on 2 August 1990. Iraq had not recognized Kuwait's sovereignty from its earliest days of independence from Britain in 1963 and Iraq regarded Kuwait as its 19th governorate, historically part of Iraq and, crucially, offering improved access to sea ports and the North Arabian Gulf. The Iraqi Army rapidly took control of Kuwait's territory. The initial United Nations and Arab League responses were diplomatic and economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq. When Iraq failed to comply with international demands to withdraw from Kuwait, the Security Council adopted UN Security Council Resolution 678 which authorized members to use all necessary means to force an Iraqi withdrawal if it was not compliant by 15 January 1991. A coalition of 28 countries participated in Operation Desert Storm against Iraq's forces in Kuwait. Bombing of key infrastructure and aerial attacks on ground troops were used but the onslaught was swift as well as devastating, lasting only six weeks. Saddam Hussein agreed to terms for a permanent cease-fire in April 1991.
- US Attacks. Apparently as retaliation for an assassination attempt on former US President Bush, the US attacked the Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad with cruise missiles on 27 June 1993. (Drehle and Smith, 1993)
- Military Enforcement. Air strikes against military facilities and potential sites of weapons of mass destruction, along with action to enforce the no-fly zones (north of 36th parallel to protect the Kurds and south of the 32nd parallel to defend the Marsh Arabs from genocide), continued periodically from 1991 until 2002.

Following the 1991 invasion of Kuwait, United Nations sanctions were enforced on Saddam Hussein's regime. Initially preventing the export of Iraq's oil resources but later amended in an attempt to reduce the suffering of the general population by allowing limited – and strictly regulated – exports in exchange for Iraq's essential humanitarian needs (the 'Oil for Food' programme). For some commentators, these sanctions were as detrimental to Iraq's development as the violent conflicts and dictatorial regime that had preceded them.

From their application in 1990 until 1997, when UN-supervised oil revenues began to arrive, sanctions on Iraq effectively curbed the government's access to large-scale funding, with deleterious consequences for state and society. From 1991 to 2003 the effects of government policy and the sanctions regime led to hyperinflation, widespread poverty and malnutrition. (Dodge, 2006:212)

Education was a key priority in the early days of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq and there was an established programme of schooling consisting of six years of primary education, followed by two stages of secondary education – each of three years – as shown below.

**Table 8 Structure of Iraqi education system**

Primary	General Education				
Secondary 1	General Education				
Secondary 2	General Education	Industry	Agriculture	Commerce	Home Economics

Although the state provided free education, a UNESCO report of 1975 found weaknesses in provision for adults, with a lack of a “wider and more comprehensive concept of adult education” (UNESCO, 1975:12):

In the existing adult education provision, the emphasis is on literacy work. Adult literacy has the highest priority among all educational schemes. Both the Party and the Government are very keen to combat illiteracy by the target date of the plan – 1985 for men and 1990 for women. Adult education in the context of life-long learning has not been fully stressed in the existing provision. In fact, in most cases reference is made to adult literacy programmes as the only component of adult education provision. This paradoxical attitude could be observed in the apathy of all universities and higher education institutions towards contributing to any form of adult education, including research and experimentation in adult education. (UNESCO, 1975:5)

The same study reported illiteracy rates in the 15 to 44 age group as 40% for males and 76% for females (Ibid:7). The state accepted this weakness and set ambitious targets to address adult illiteracy, and indeed “eradicate” it, using the threat of

imprisonment if tutors and students did not engage with the programme (Braude, 2003:169):

In 1973, the enrollees in literacy centers were 43,064 males and 74,639 females, thus making a total of 117,703 enrollees. This total enrolment was expected to reach 348,528 in 1985 while the illiteracy rate for males was expected to decline to zero, and the illiteracy rates for females would reduce to 22.2%. It was projected to take another 5 years to complete the eradication of female illiteracy. ... In conclusion, the SLB expected to complete its task within 17 years starting from 1973. (The Supreme Council, 1979:15)

The educational provision offered to Iraqi citizens declined as the regime placed higher priority on defence and, later, international sanctions further eroded support. Consequently, literacy rates dropped and, while official statistics from the Ba'athist government may be biased, there is also independent evidence of a reversal of the progress made from the grandly titled, late 1970s' Comprehensive Campaign for Compulsory Literacy:

The creeping decline of education under the Ba'th took a plunge at every level in the era of international sanctions. Official statistics tell the story the Iraqi government wants to tell: from 11 percent literacy in the 1940s to 87 percent in 1985, the figure had slumped again to 45 percent by 1985 and continues to fall in 2003. (Braude, 2003:171)

UNESCO statistics reveal that by the year 2000, illiteracy rates among adults (over 15 years) in Iraq were far higher than they had been in the 1970s, before the illiteracy eradication programme. ... The rate of illiteracy among females (aged over 15 years) had jumped to 77 percent, or 5,070,000 women. These figures were shocking, not only on the level of Iraq but also because they were the highest among all MENA countries. (Husein, 2005:134)

The US and its partners therefore had to contend with significant security, economic and educational challenges. Comparing Iraq to other interventions for nation building, Dobbins et al concluded that:

Not since the occupation of Germany and Japan has the United States undertaken such an ambitious task [as the occupation of Iraq]: the military occupation of a sizable country and a stated commitment to wholesale political transformation. Bosnia and Kosovo are the most comparable in terms of ambition, but both are smaller entities and are in more conducive strategic environments ... Iraq combines many of the most troublesome features of the other cases analyzed in this report. (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:168)

In this chapter, the contribution of adult education in meeting these challenges is considered in three categories: demobilization of military and militia personnel;

economic regeneration; and, democratization and elections. The financial resources allocated to adult education provision in Iraq will also be considered.

## **7.2 GATHERING DOCUMENTS AND DATA COLLECTION**

Data collection for Iraq differed from the other two country studies because the research study had already begun at the time of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Further, I was able to gather some relevant documents when I was working in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2004. Being located in Baghdad allowed easy access to internal documents that were not necessarily published, and personal notes from meetings, etc. were also available; this extended the range of source material from which data could be drawn. However, documents have been included which were produced by organizations other than the CPA or were published before or after my personal involvement.

In contrast with earlier international interventions, many of the official and non-governmental organizations involved in Iraq had responded to the demands for accountability and transparency by publishing reports, statistics and other documents about their work on the Internet. This improved availability and access but, in fact, there were challenges in tracking down complete data sets as the material was rarely catalogued in a way that would be standard in a library or archive.

Note that all classified documents have been excluded from the data used in this research.

## **7.3 ADULT EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF DEMOBILIZATION OF MILITARY AND MILITIA PERSONNEL**

In Iraq in 2003, there were a large number of armed men who served in the government forces or one of the many militias. These individuals were regarded as having the propensity and means for violence and their demobilization was a priority for the CPA.

...the nature and extent of demobilization can reduce the likelihood of further conflict. A failure to demobilize and disarm fighters and incumbent security forces can perpetuate violence and abuses. Iraq suffers from banditry and lawlessness, which are rife among a heavily armed populace. There are also numerous rival militias in the country. (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:196)

In every post-conflict situation, the status of combatants (or ex-combatants) is seen as key to establishing the foundations for the new society. In Iraq, the CPA decision to

disband the national Armed Forces placed over 300,000 males in the precarious position of having no income and no obvious future. A RAND Corporation study by Andrew Rathmell et al concluded that:

While the coalition instituted a stipend program for former members of the armed forces and appointed 'clean' former officers to the security forces and ministries, the efforts to reintegrate former combatants was insufficient to keep some former soldiers from joining the insurgency. (National Defense Research Institute, 2005:2)

First, we must recognize that armed groups have a greater potential for violence than the general population, both through the availability of firearms (which, in the case of Iraq, were not taken from individuals when the force was disbanded); their leadership structures, command and control organization; training; and experience. In addition, soldiers are often drawn from the younger end of the male population, often a volatile and certainly influential group in most societies. The energies of such people should be channelled and directed in a way that supports the new society: this may be achieved either through containment and control (perhaps by co-opting armed forces into new security structures) or by providing alternative training and employment.

Decisions regarding the handling of armed forces will be politically sensitive. In divided societies, they may be seen by different groups as having unfairly benefited from the previous regime, as heroic defenders of the state, or as having been responsible for the repression of minorities. It is unlikely that the armed forces will be regarded as politically neutral in both the pre- and post-conflict societies, although they may represent a unifying national identity in some circumstances.

As well as the formally constituted armed forces of the state (full time, part time, professional, conscripted or reservist), militia groups may have been active in the conflict. The extent to which the various militia groups are seen as having contributed to the establishment of the new regime will determine, to some extent, how they are handled by the new administration. Some militia groups may be as well organized and as formally structured as the official armed forces of the country and they share common characteristics – younger males, trained and armed – with the official armed forces.

In Iraq in 2003, the indigenous armed groups listed in Table 9 below were present<sup>3</sup> (Ricciardoni and Kicklighter, 2004); (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003); the World Bank estimated that some 275,000 to 320,000 former fighters would need to be absorbed into private sector jobs (World Bank, 2004). Iraqi national police were also armed but CPA did not disband them.

In 2005, the United Nations published standards for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) (Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, 2005) but these did not exist when the post-conflict planning for Iraq was underway in 2003/4. There was very little consideration of the impact of disbanding the Iraqi armed forces and no arrangements were put in place to disarm those who had been members of those forces. Instead, a CPA Order was issued by L. Paul Bremer on 23 May 2003 (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003a), dissolving (amongst others) the Iraqi Army, Air Force, Navy, the Air Defence Force and other regular military services; the Republican Guard; the Special Republican Guard; the Directorate of Military Intelligence; the Al Quds Force; and Emergency Forces (Quwat al Tawari).

**Table 9 Military forces in Iraq**

Serial	Force	Numbers	Remarks
1.	Iraqi Army	250 000	Includes Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard but excludes up to 100,000 mobilized reservists.
2.	Navy	2 000	
3.	Air Force	20 000	
4.	Air Defence Command	17 000	
5.	Fedayeen Saddam	43 000	
6.	Border Guard Force		Total numbers unavailable.
7.	KDP Peshmerga	31 000	Kurdish militia groups had provided security in the semi-autonomous Kurdish province during Saddam Hussein's government, protected in part by the international no-fly zone.
8.	PUK Peshmerga	13 000	As above.
9.	Badr Corps	<10 000	Shia militia, backed by Iranian intelligence

<sup>3</sup> Other groups were not included in the statistics either because membership was assessed as being less than 1000 members or the group was labelled as an "enemy of the new Iraq" (such as the Mehdi Army, led by Moqtada al Sadr, which was thought to include around 2000 committed members).

Personnel were dismissed with effect from 16 April 2003 subject only to a termination payment, which would be paid provided individuals were below the rank of colonel and not senior Ba'ath Party members. Four paramilitary organizations were also dissolved: Saddam Fedayeen, Ba'ath Party militia, Friends of Saddam and Saddam's Lion Cubs (Ashbal Saddam). The order indicated that a New Iraqi Corps would be established, "as the first step in forming a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq" (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003a) but it gave no details. In fact, this radical and destabilizing policy was reversed in June 2003, when the CPA began paying stipends of between US\$50 and 150 per month to over 250,000 ex-soldiers (Forman, 2003:1). However, it was not until the CPA was in the final stages of handing sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government that reintegration was addressed. A further CPA Order, Number 91, envisaged a "Transition and Reintegration Implementation Committee" which was to come into being once Iraq had regained its sovereignty and would oversee the management of residual elements of armed groups, either by the members retiring, entering the Iraqi security forces or undergoing a reintegration programme "designed to help assimilate them into Iraqi civil society and economy. Elements that may be included in a reintegration program include skills screening, education benefits, job training and placement, and a limited stipend program" (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004).

Within the CPA, some civilian and military personnel were aware of the fragility in security which might result from the lack of a formal mechanism for DDR. As early as February 2004, an internal meeting was arranged to discuss how progress could be made. It was estimated that pensions for militia members who chose to retire would cost the Iraqi government around \$9 million per annum. The cost of a skills-screening programme for those who could not be absorbed into the emerging Iraqi security forces was estimated to be around \$1.5 million but the training itself and the cost of a job placement service was neither costed nor funded.

Although estimates of the level of adult illiteracy for Iraq in 2003 vary, (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:194) suggest 42% while UNESCO reports 29% for males and 55% for females (2003:48), it is clear and not surprising that many in the armed groups lacked the educational skills which would underpin any retraining and reintegration. US military officers, who were working independently and building on their own professional background rather than their assigned tasking within the nascent Iraqi ministries, completed some analysis and formulated outline plans for how militia group members might be reintegrated into the post-conflict society. They estimated that \$5 million



would be required for a literacy programme in Kurdish, Arabic and English. A Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) programme for Job Training and Placement was also under development and consideration was given to prioritizing places on this scheme for veterans and militia members. An incremental increase of \$3.75 million in the MOLSA budget was considered sufficient to expand the project to include 15,000 militia members. It was recognized that some militia members would wish to join the new Iraqi security forces but many lacked the literacy skills to complete, for example, the Facilities Protection Service application forms and entry tests. Although individual officers working with new Iraqi forces offered voluntary English lessons to trainees, there was no formal programme in place at the time of transition to Iraqi sovereignty.

#### **7.4 ADULT EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF ECONOMIC REGENERATION IN IRAQ**

The priority for education spending in post-conflict countries is usually to revitalize the education system, possibly expanding universal basic education to reflect international standards and beyond what was provided by the previous regime. In Iraq, there was evidence that basic education needed attention:

Although Iraq has a substantial number of individuals trained at universities, the decline in oil wealth has curtailed the number of Iraqis able to study abroad. Illiteracy is relatively high, at 42 percent. In contrast to other Middle Eastern countries, illiteracy rates in Iraq do not appear to have declined over the last decade, suggesting that some children in poorer or rural families are being missed by the educational system. (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:194)

On 19 March 2004, the US Office of Inspector General for USAID reported on education activities in Iraq, noting that:

USAID funding for educational activities in Iraq is approximately \$116 million. ...the 'Revitalization of Iraq Schools and Stabilization of Education' (RISE) project which focuses on the distribution of school materials, equipment and supplies; education reform and accelerated learning; and training and upgrading teachers and school leaders. ...Bechtel National, Inc. is the USAID contractor that is reconstructing and rehabilitating the infrastructure throughout Iraq including the majority of the schools being rehabilitated by USAID. ... Under the Iraq Community Action Program (ICAP), there are five non-governmental organizations which are assisting in the development of community-based activities in Iraq including the rehabilitation of schools. .... These two partners [UNESCO and UNICEF] have provided support to basic education including: providing five million revised text books; teacher and student kits; teacher training and accelerated learning. (Office of Inspector General, 2004:6)

As observed in the other case studies, priority was placed on basic education provision in Iraq while other parts of the education sector were, to some extent, overlooked by

the international community – despite the importance of education in establishing stability and in meeting economic challenges.

In Iraq, there was no clear lead for adult education: MOLSA had some responsibility for vocational and skills training but other ministries, which had ownership of State Owned Enterprises, had previously run apprenticeships for trades relevant to their sector. The government separated education, higher education and science and technology into separate ministries and generic adult education had no obvious champion, either within the ministries or the Coalition Provisional Authority. Nevertheless, there was some consideration of how adult education might support improvements in the Iraqi economic situation.

In the 1980s, Iraq's economy was relatively strong, with an average annual income in 1980 of around \$3,800 but this fell to an estimated \$550 by the end of 2003 (Parker and Moore, 2007:1). Part of the decline has been attributed to spending on the Iran-Iraq War, the effects of coalition action following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the UN sanctions which followed. Saddam Hussein privatized a number of state industries; in 12 months during 1987 and 1988, "the Iraqi government sold 70 large factories in construction materials and mineral extraction, food processing and light manufacturing to the private sector" (Ibid).

Thus, while Saddam's government remained in control of oil and other strategic industries, and remained the agency of necessity and choice with regard to large investment or trade contracts with large foreign firms, broad swathes of economic life were simply left to the vagaries of petty market action and struggle. (Parker and Moore, 2007:2)

The challenge of building a vibrant state from such a baseline was always acknowledged but commentators believed that economic progress would reduce the security risks in the country. By November 2003, Rogers indicated in his monthly article that expectations were not being met:

Finally, it was expected that some progress in economic reconstruction and development, coupled with the re-opening of schools, improvements in medical facilities and the reconstitution of a range of public services would all limit opposition to the coalition presence. None of these expectations has been realised and, instead, the guerrilla actions continue to develop, with November being the worst month for US forces since the war began last March. Indeed, as we enter the ninth month of the war, there is growing evidence of a deep-seated insurgency that may even be extending its geographical spread towards the north of Iraq. (Rogers, 2004:37)

From the beginning of the coalition's occupation of Iraq, international representatives were concerned about unemployment and a stagnating economy. In an internal CPA information memorandum of April 2004, urban male unemployment by governorate<sup>4</sup> was shown as ranging from 15.4% in Karbala to 45.8% in Dhi Qar. The number of violent incidents in a province was mapped to unemployment rates but also to the availability of essential services, measured by the average hours of electricity available per day and the percentage of the population with access to potable water. This data is reproduced in Annex 3. There was no direct statistical correlation between any of these but the most insecure military regions – Baghdad, North Central and West – tended to have higher unemployment and fewer essential services. Internal CPA discussion, however, was based on a perception of a link:

Although the limited data shows no link to violence and unemployment, there is an intuitively obvious link between un(under)employment and political instability and security. The jobs shortfall has recently been evident in activities in Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf where Motqada (sic) Al Sadr's (MAS) appeals to unemployed and underemployed youth. ... it is a safe working assumption that i) employment and economic well-being will increase support for the government and ii) given the presence of other factors, e.g. religious or ethnic disaffection and access to weapons, a pool of un- and underemployed men will pose a security risk. (Kuklok, 2004:2)

By early 2004, military commanders were already using the limited development funds available to them for short-term employment programmes but these were almost invariably low skill, labouring jobs of short duration. Priority for funding in the early stages of nation building is unlikely to fall on economic regeneration or adult education: “Initially, revenues from oil exports and foreign aid will be needed for government salaries, humanitarian aid, and such vital services as health care. Iraq will also need to devote resources to critical short-term investments, such as in the oil industry” (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:192).

There was an aspiration, however, that US Supplemental Budget 2207 spending (amounting to some \$18.4 billion) on Iraq's reconstruction should reduce unemployment. The US Treasury estimated that 1.5 million jobs would be created, with 50,000 of them beginning between January and July 2004 (Monaco and Simpson, 2004). CPA personnel were keen that the jobs would be given to Iraqis: the Director of CPA's Private Sector Development office, Tom Foley, was reported as claiming that

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<sup>4</sup> The three Kurdish governorates of Dahok, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah were excluded and data from November 2003 were used.

Iraqi companies would get a substantial proportion of the sub-contracts in the second round of supplemental reconstruction funding (Spinner, 2004). Imported labour would be discouraged and Foley was quoted as saying CPA would "make it difficult for foreign workers to get visas. [because]... I want Iraqis to get those jobs".

Internal papers show that there was a desire to prioritize employment programmes for key areas and for particular groups. Militia groups whose members fell out with formal Transition and Reintegration projects were regarded as needing special attention. A project to provide a vocational and jobs programme for 6,000 to 10,000 followers of Moqtada al Sadr was considered but it was suggested that it would only succeed if:

- The young men were isolated from militant activists and preachers, either by removing the adverse influences or physically providing the jobs and training in remote areas.
- A peer group was formed which mixed militia members with more moderate Iraqis.
- "Hard work, good food and good pay" were offered (Kuklok, 2004).
- The low-skill temporary jobs included skills and vocational training as a pathway to more permanent, skilled work.

Further consideration was given to embedding vocational training into an existing project, the Haditha and Dokan Generation Project (a \$108 million electricity generation scheme). Planners suggested that up to 500 local youths could be offered ground maintenance and construction labouring work. In parallel, the idea of establishing an on-site vocational training centre to deliver courses for the following trades was considered: concrete workers, welders, electricians, ironworkers, plumbers, sheet metal workers, pipe fitters and stationary engineers. Additional trade skill sets that could be taught included: heavy equipment operators, small machinery maintenance, and operating specialty equipment. In addition, it would be possible to study management training on site, in particular scheduling, project management, quality control and safety engineering (Kuklok, 2004).

Finally, it was envisaged that vocational training provided by MOLSA and the Ministry of Education should support private sector economic development:

Most new jobs are created in small firms where costs are extremely critical and skill sets are extremely important. As the business grows and more employees are needed, the owner typically has little time to properly train new employees. It is critical that the processes set up for the immediate, short and medium term

as outlined above have the procedures and techniques in place to assist in the transition to a free market economy. The Supplemental and the security training issues outlined above will facilitate this important requirement of the Iraqi economy. (Kuklok, 2004:3)

In general terms, the aspiration to employ Iraqis on reconstruction projects in their country was laudable and few groups were antagonistic to this aim. Even US contractors were content to use local labour as it was cheaper, although there was a tendency to avoid sourcing more skilled workers for technical or specialist jobs from the region. However, there were a number of risks which needed to be managed to ensure all the aims were met and that the outcomes from supplemental spending were positive. Two key risks, from the perspective of the Iraqi population, were:

1. Qualifications. In order to ensure that contracts were completed efficiently and they met Quality Assurance standards, prime and sub-contractors were likely to employ qualified staff who held formally-recognized skills or qualifications. The qualifications of experienced Iraqis risked being opaque to contractors. In addition, with so many large construction projects being completed in Iraq over a matter of months, there was a danger of shortages of workers with key construction skills. These risks could be mitigated by running training courses and mapping Iraqi qualifications to international frameworks.
2. Identifying Workers. Even assuming workers with appropriate skills were available in Iraq, contractors could encounter difficulties in identifying and making contact with local workers. When large groups of workers were required, there was a tendency to use local contacts – such as tribal or religious leaders – to supply labour, leading to charges of cronyism and to favoured groups of workers getting repeat contracts while others got no work at all. This risk could be reduced by establishing a register of workers that identified the level of work sought (professional, skilled, unskilled) and any qualifications held by individuals. Work could then be allocated on an equitable and transparent basis.

Two risks would be of concern to CPA and Coalition Forces.

1. Project Timelines. With the political impetus to initiate and complete many projects before sovereignty returned to Iraqis by 1 July 2004, timely completion of projects was critical. Contractors were probably going to be set challenging deadlines and the goal would be to deliver project outcomes as early as

practicable. As local recruitment in an unfamiliar environment would take time, contractors might choose to move a previously identified and screened labour force into Iraq. The goal for quick project initiation and completion potentially ran counter to the goal of employing Iraqi staff and management priorities would need to be set with these competing demands in mind.

2. Security. When it was difficult to hire local labour, contractors would be obliged to provide accommodation for their workers (Iraqi or foreign) in camps or lodgings. Groups of unaccompanied males living and working in close proximity and away from families could present attractive targets for those opposed to reconstruction efforts. In addition, extremist groups might seek to infiltrate the workers in an attempt to turn sympathies towards anti-coalition activities. This risk could be reduced if a priority was placed on setting the conditions that allowed the required numbers of workers to be recruited from near their home areas.

Foreign workers were identified as another risk. In 2004, large groups of non-Iraqis were already working for CPA and coalition forces. This was perceived as being necessary to the reconstruction effort but these workers did not contribute to the Iraqi economy; they were exempt from Iraqi income tax (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003b) and many sent a large percentage of their salaries to home countries. In addition, depending on the country of origin, pay rates were higher than those likely to be paid to local people. Consequently, profit margins were reduced or project outcomes dropped if foreign workers were used. There were also political sensitivities in employing non-Iraqis as the desire was to show Iraqi people taking the lead and responsibility in rebuilding their country. It was agreed that CPA should manage perceptions and expectations and publicize Iraqi involvement in reconstruction.

There were a number of challenges which had to be addressed if large numbers of Iraqis were to be employed on supplemental reconstruction projects. While the Program Management Office (PMO) had responsibility for the supplemental, there were additional initiatives it could take to improve Iraqi employment prospects. PMO could consider funding enabling activities that would increase the number of Iraqis employed and sequencing projects to take account of labour availability. Making Iraqi employment generation a criterion in tender evaluation also improved the likelihood of maximum Iraqi employment. PMO was not in a position to address this matter in isolation and other agencies, such as those listed below, needed to be involved.

MOLSA was a key partner in involving Iraqi workers in reconstruction projects. It had opened 13 employment centres and three technical / vocational training colleges. None of these facilities were fully equipped in 2004 but there were plans to expand the network of centres and improve the facilities. The MOLSA establishments were intended to form the backbone of a national register of available labour and they would be key to skills development amongst Iraqis.

CPA's Private Sector Development (PSD) department, which worked on business regulation and focused on small and medium enterprises, was well placed to ensure that Iraqi businesses registered interest in participating in supplemental reconstruction projects. It was thought that many of the difficulties prime contractors would have in identifying local labour would be ameliorated if Iraqi sub-contractors were used and a PSD register could reduce the risk that cronyism would develop. Responsibility for assisting Iraqi companies in preparation of tenders and meeting regulatory requirements also fell to PSD. However, some observers who drew on the US's previous experience of nation building believed that involvement of small and medium enterprises too early would be counterproductive:

It would probably not be helpful for postconflict authorities to provide traditional development assistance to Iraq. Foreign assistance programs are frequently criticized for trying to do too much with too little. ... Only **after a period of recovery and economic stabilization would it be wise to consider starting more-traditional assistance programs**, such as rural development and aid to small and medium businesses, for which the track record is mixed [emphasis added]. (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:217)

State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and Former Iraqi Army (FIA) personnel were often in receipt of salaries but not productively employed. There had been suggestions that allowing SOEs to bid for supplemental contracts would be anti-competitive but the reconstruction work could offer opportunities for workers to move out of SOE or FIA and into gainful employment. Some retraining would probably be required but these groups formed an identifiable labour pool that could be tapped.

The CPA's Strategic Communications branch could assist in generating Iraqi employment by informing Iraqi businesses and individuals of the ways they could benefit from the supplemental and providing access to information that facilitates Iraqi participation.

As early as February 2004, senior civil-military operations staff were discussing the need for Iraqis to derive employment from reconstruction projects, and a prioritized list

of 16 tasks that needed to be completed to maximize Iraqi employment from the US's supplemental spending was produced in March 2004 (reproduced in Table 10 below). Nevertheless, there was no co-ordinating process and few of the enabling actions occurred before sovereignty was re-assumed by Iraqis in June 2004.



**Table 10 Tasks to facilitate Iraqi employment**

Serial (a)	Task (b)	Department (c)	Priority * (d)	Remarks (e)
1.	Open Tech / Voc Training Colleges	MOLSA	1	Supports Sers 2 and 3
2.	Run 'Quick Start' training packages		3	Minimum level of training to allow Iraqis to access reconstruction jobs. (Linked to job guarantees?)
3.	Run trade training courses leading to certified qualifications		3	
4.	National recognition of trade qualifications, mapped to international equivalents		4	
5.	Open employment centres		1	Supports Sers 6 and 7
6.	Register people seeking work		3	Provided to contractors on request.
7.	Identify labour available by location and skills		1	Supports Ser 9
8.	Evaluate tenders for prime contracts		PMO	2
9.	Sequence projects to take account of labour availability	2		
10.	Collect employment data from contractors	4		
11.	Register of potential Iraqi sub-contractors	PSD		2
12.	Verify financial viability of Iraqi sub-contractors		2	
13.	Release SOE / FIA workers for retraining	SOE / FIA	4	Confirm whether FIA stipend would continue to be paid
14.	Inform Iraqi people of benefits of reconstruction	STRATCOM	4	
15.	Inform Iraqis of mechanism for finding work		3	
16.	Inform Iraqi businesses of PSD support		2	Supports Sers 11 and 12

\* Priority 1 – Task supports another high priority or several other tasks. Priority 2 – Task must be completed before contracts are awarded. Priority 3 – Task must be completed before reconstruction work begins. Priority 4 – Other tasks

## 7.5 ADULT EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND ELECTIONS

The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.  
*Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21(3)*

In societies recovering from conflict, there is often a governance vacuum or a lack of credible leaders with the legitimacy to run the country's affairs. As a result, many United Nations interventions have – as a matter of priority – incorporated activities that have allowed the country to hold early elections in order to establish a government. In addition, where there is a formal peace agreement, it may specify arrangements for transitional and future governments. The United Nations Electoral Assistance Division provides a focus for support to elections by advising member states and ensuring consistency in the delivery of United Nations electoral assistance, for example in post-conflict societies.

In Iraq, there was no formal peace agreement and the United States and United Kingdom (as occupying powers) had responsibility for governance of Iraq under international law. However, there was an appetite to involve Iraqis in national decision making and a working group (which involved expatriate Iraqis) met in the UK in September 2002 to discuss “ways to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of the transitional authority. Iraqis pointed out that the transitional period would ‘make or break’ democracy in Iraq. .... The Iraqis insisted that the U.S. mandate, as well as the role of the international community, be limited and clearly defined” (Phillips, 2005:51). Key dates for the return of permanent, sovereign government to Iraq are shown in Table 11 (based on Ibid and (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003)).

**Table 11 Return of Iraqi sovereignty**

Apr 03 – Jun 04	Coalition Provisional Authority	US entity, advised by Iraqi Governing Council
28 Jun 04	Iraqi Interim Government	Reassumed sovereignty
30 Jan 05	Legislative Elections	
3 May 05	Iraqi Transitional Government	Drafted new constitution
15 Oct 05	Constitutional Referendum	
15 Dec 05	Legislative Elections	
20 May 06	Council of Representatives	

Throughout the period, there were criticisms of the process used to select Iraqis for the various advisory and administrative bodies and, as large political blocs boycotted the elections in 2005, even the first iteration of the Council of Representatives is regarded by some as being non-representative and biased. The extent of the Iraqis' real power and authority has also been questioned:

...the initial US plans for a country-wide assembly in July to advise on some kind of national council has been cancelled. It is being replaced by a small advisory group appointed directly by the occupying authorities, again in the face of substantial disagreement and opposition. (Rogers, 2004:15), writing in June 2003

The council ... could name and dismiss interim ministers, propose a budget, appoint charges d'affaires to foreign capitals, and organize the drafting of Iraq's new constitution. However, foreign nationals appointed by the CPA as 'shadow' ministers really ran the show. (Phillips, 2005:172)

At local level, the military occupation forces had set up groups to allow Iraqis to express their views, participate in decision making and conduct some local administrative functions. However, these bodies were not elected through universal suffrage and some were entirely appointed.

In parallel with this [higher than expected US force levels], the development of an independent Iraqi political life has proved hugely problematic. In Basra, the British have summarily sacked the City Council that they established immediately after the war, much to the anger of local Iraqi professionals.... (Rogers, 2004:15)

Regarding local elections, Bremer advised caution: 'I'm not opposed, but I want to do it in a way that takes care of our concerns. Elections that are held too early can be destructive. It's got to be done very carefully. In a situation like this, if you start holding elections, the people who are rejectionists tend to win.' City council members were selected, not elected. Instead of 'one person, one vote,' the CPA tried to control the outcome by relying on hand-picked local leaders to participate in neighborhood councils. In turn, the neighborhood councils

selected district councils, which selected county councils, which selected a provincial council, which finally selected a governor. Many Iraqis objected to the system of indirect elections. Every decision had to be approved by U.S. military commanders, a situation that exacerbated the Iraqis' resentment. ... In instances where the Iraqis tried to organize their own elections, the U.S. intervened. (Phillips, 2005:170)

There were some justifications for not holding early elections at local and national level in Iraq, particularly around the security of any poll, the willingness of all Iraqis to participate and accept the results, and the perceived lack of a culture of political participation (for example, amongst women). While Americans wanted Iraq to be a democracy, many advisors in Baghdad were wary of the timeline to introduce a fully participative democracy to Iraq's governing structures: "Rather than moving rapidly to national, party-based parliamentary elections, the transitional authorities would be advised to focus upon developing democratic building blocks, such as a free press, the rule of law, and local elected authorities" (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:191).

In Chapters 5 and 6, the activities of the international community to support elections through adult education have been described. In Iraq, there were some community development projects which included some support to local communities who wished to participate in local decision making. Military Information Operations were used to encourage the electorate to register to vote during 2004 and to participate in the 2005 elections. In addition, US and UK civil affairs officers regularly attended neighbourhood and city council meetings to 'coach' Iraqis in running debates and reaching decisions. Although the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq supported the Independent High Electoral Commission in Iraq through capacity building and institutional development, and was invited to provide technical support to elections, there was not a focused campaign of public voter education such as that found in the United Nations intervention in Cambodia.

## **7.6 FINANCE AND COMMERCIAL CONTRACTORS EMPLOYED BY THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY IN IRAQ**

In this section, the scale of resources allocated to education projects in Iraq and the organizations entrusted with delivery of those projects are considered. As early as April 2003, USAID announced an initial 12-month contract, valued at \$1 million, to "address immediate educational needs and promote participation of the Iraqi people in a sustainable, decentralized educational system" (USAID, 2003). The programme, Revitalization of Iraqi Schools and Stabilization of Education (RISE), was run by the Washington-based Creative Associates International, Inc (CAII). The contract – agreed before the military invasion – covered the development of baseline indicators to

measure educational progress, school materials and equipment, and staff / teacher training. In addition, CAI was to pilot an accelerated learning programme which would allow Iraqi children who had missed schooling to rejoin mainstream classes at the grade appropriate to their age. It is of note that, in planning Iraq's reconstruction, education was regarded as almost synonymous with children's schooling. Further, the stated value of the contract seems minimal for a country with an estimated school population of 4.2 million young people (Center for Public Integrity,:2).

The campaigning public integrity website reported the RISE contract as an up-to-three-year, "Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee" arrangement. USAID claimed that over the three years of the contract, the grant to RISE was \$62.6 million (with \$4.25 million as the fixed fee) although the legal contract documentation shows that the contract could be worth up to \$157.1 million. The Center for Public Integrity also questioned the propriety of the process for the award of the contract, as CAI was the sole bidder and the only company represented, by their senior associate and ex-USAID employee Frank Dall, at a planning and requirements meeting on Iraq which USAID held in November 2002. The use of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts is usually regarded as inefficient in government procurement but such enticements may be necessary to encourage commercial organizations to work in the often difficult circumstances common to post-conflict societies, which may be characterized by many other risks to the contractor. USAID justified Dall's participation in its planning meeting by claiming he was the single expert on Iraq education and access to experts with relevant experience may often present challenges to those planning interventions. Many commentators were dissatisfied with the US processes regarding development contracts, going far beyond the RISE programme:

The Bush administration further undermined its efforts to broaden the coalition by announcing that regulations permitted only U.S. companies to bid on reconstruction contracts using U.S. funds. Moreover, only coalition countries were allowed to bid on contracts paid for by the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), which was capitalized with seized Iraqi assets and money left even in the UN Oil for Food escrow account. More questions about the U.S.-led reconstruction effort arose when the administration awarded Halliburton and Bechtel multibillion dollar deals without going through a competitive bidding process. (Phillips, 2005:139)

As a comparison to the high-profile RISE project, CPA also considered developing vocational education for adults. Before the conflict, MOLSA had a network of employment centres but these were not well-equipped and many had been looted in the immediate aftermath of the coalition's arrival. CPA staff envisaged a six-month project that would rapidly expand the capacity of MOLSA to support job seekers with

information, training and job placement. The proposal was for five Vocational and Technical Training Centers (VTTC) and ten Employment Service Centers (ESC) (which would focus on literacy training) to be established, initially catering for 10,000 trainees, of whom 30% would be youths and 10% female. Trainees were to be paid a stipend during their courses which might last up to two months. In a second phase, the network would be expanded to a total of 17 VTTC and 28 ESCs to support a further 30,000 trainees. The final phase envisaged facilities being developed for technical and construction training, plus education in English for Speaker of Other Languages (ESOL) and Information Technology. The proposed programme was challenging and initial estimates put the total cost at \$99, 923,000. However, following the Iraqi government's budgetary planning round in 2004, no funds were made available for this vocational education. Thus, MOLSA requested that international funds should be released for the purpose and, at a meeting of the Program Review Board held in Baghdad on 15 May 2004; \$65 million from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) was allocated for this purpose.

Separately, USAID was tasked with arranging for a US government reconstruction assistance programme to provide international experts and a suitable contractor to undertake the work. The programme was scheduled to run from 27 September 2004 to 26 September 2006 and the USAID website reported:

The purpose of this activity is to implement a broad scale vocational and technical training initiative in Iraq in response to the challenges of unemployment, an under skilled workforce, needs of an emerging private sector, and capacity gaps at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA). The contractor also provides training and capacity building for the implementation, oversight and monitoring of a network of 17 Vocational and Technical Training Centers and 28 Employment Services Centers. (USAID)

The contract was valued at \$88 million and USAID's website claimed "knowing that a well-trained workforce is essential to the reconstruction effort as well as stability in Iraq", the centres were designed to be used by "unemployed youth (17 and older), demobilized soldiers and militia, displaced persons, women, agricultural workers and others without marketable skills" (USAID). Support courses in English, computer training and basic Arabic literacy were offered with the main curriculum offering courses which covered a choice of the following topics:

- Welding
- Lathe work
- Carpentry
- Electrical functions
- Auto mechanics
- Tailoring
- Cosmetology
- Plumbing
- Small appliance repair
- Elevator repair

By 2005, over 1,000 trainees had been enrolled while 1,500 workers had been placed in jobs and the project was due to be re-orientated:

USAID's vocational training program will focus on providing training in those vocational skills which support reconstruction efforts in essential services (i.e., power, water, and sewage). By focusing on these essential services, USAID will be able to augment the ongoing work of the Project Contracting Office directed at ongoing utilities operations and maintenance. Separately, USAID is exploring options and potential partners in vocational training such as multi-national and Iraqi companies and organizations while continuing the important work to VTTCs and ESCs. (USAID)

However, the project was suspended in September 2005

...to meet the changing needs of the Iraqi Government. As development and reconstruction progressed throughout the country, the Iraqi Government saw a renewed need for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) training for government employees in essential services sector, such as power and water. (Ibid)

It was reported that funds of \$25,802,342 were obligated to the project, of which \$20,604,074 was expended (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2006). Those sceptical about the entire Iraq project were unsurprised that development projects were stalling and increasingly large percentages of project funds were being devoted to security. In April 2004, Rogers wrote:

This [another effect of the increase in violence and insecurity] has been the near-cessation of a wide range of reconstruction projects, stemming partly from the withdrawal of contractors from the country, or at least the location of their personnel in safe areas such as the 'Green Zone' in Baghdad. Another development has been the decision of the US military to close some major highways in order to ensure the security of convoys, with this having a knock-on effect on the domestic economy. With the hot summer weather imminent, there is now concern that power supplies will be inadequate to provide basic services

at a time when the economy is already being seriously damaged. (Rogers, 2004:62)

In parallel with the support to MOLSA, but in a discrete programme, USAID also supported private sector development in Iraq through the Private Sector Development Initiative (PSDI) which sought “to provide training and technical assistance to businesses of all sizes” (USAID, 2004). The contract, which USAID awarded to the Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance (VEGA), was valued at \$12.3 million and covered the provision of:

...training courses, business kits, and technical assistance to businesses. Additionally, assistance will be provided to firms to compete for procurements under supplemental funds. Businesses who successfully complete the requisite training courses will be eligible to receive small grants to follow-through on implementing changes and pursuing opportunities suggested in training activities. (Ibid)

The initial contract was for a 15-month programme to run from 7 July 2004 to 6 October 2005 but as VEGA approached the end of that period, they requested a 3-month extension (at no extra cost) in order to complete the disbursement of grants and conduct evaluation activities. Official reports from October 2006 (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2006) indicate that \$70,606,291 of the \$95 million obligated to this project was actually expended. It is difficult to determine the proportion of the total amount which was allocated to the training – as opposed to technical assistance – components of the project but the overall scale is larger than the assistance provided to MOLSA under the vocational education programme by a factor of about three. USAID's final report on the project records that \$2,946,097 was disbursed in grants, and \$1,708,000 on security; this leaves around \$65 million for the outputs. The same report gives a breakdown of the number of students who completed one or more of the seven training modules. VEGA delivered 118 courses, as shown in Table 12 below:

**Table 12 Volunteers for Economic Growth Analysis courses**

Statistic	VEGA Module	Bespoke Course	Train-the-Trainer
Courses	68	42	8
Students	1634	661	N/A

It is of note that 124 people were estimated to have received training from those who completed the VEGA train-the-trainer project. It is also important to note that some students were to have completed more than one course and the actual number of Iraqis who attended part of the VEGA programme was 2419, of whom 14% were



women. Female participation was substantially higher in the bespoke programmes and they constituted 42% of the 124 who benefited from the training cascaded through the train-the-trainer scheme.

The seven modular courses which VEGA volunteers developed were:

1. Principles of the market economy and basic business functions.
2. Financial aspects of Small / Medium Enterprise (SME) management.
3. Key conditions for winning contracts and subcontracts.
4. Middle-market cooperation with foreign partners.
5. SME development – general business functions for entrepreneurs.
6. Auditing.
7. Middle-market lending.

Co-operation with foreign partners, SME development and financial aspects of SME management proved to be the most popular modules.

In its evaluation of the programme, VEGA identified a number of lessons, with security the most prominent as “PSDI reaffirmed the long-established reality that carrying out economic development projects in an environment of high security risk for project staff, host country nationals and project facilities presents enormous challenges to project implementation, and requires sustained attention and readiness to respond to the evolving security environment” (Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance, 2004:31). With regard to the training component of the project, using skilled local partners and evolving bespoke courses outside the modules designed by the VEGA experts were regarded as essential to the project's success. Study trips to trade fairs were considered to be an enhancement which might be included in future programmes. However, three of the six lessons learned concerned the international aspects of training:

In retrospect, courses that lead to an international certification (in computers, technology, or accounting, for example) might also have been offered, and could have created substantial new business opportunities to the beneficiary entrepreneurs. The work of volunteers working outside Iraq to develop the course materials might have been complemented by use of existing internationally-recognized materials in the public domain, such as the World Bank/IFC SME Toolkits. ... A future program for the development of the private sector in Iraq should include the implementation of international standards such as ISO and HACCP. These not only yield tangible benefits to the enterprise and thus have a significant demonstration effect, but also help to establish a core group that, with the appropriate additional TA [technical assistance], could become leading examples of SME exporters. (Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance, 2004:32)

It appears that VEGA, an established and respected organization which aims to leverage volunteer effort, developed its project in Iraq in isolation. It is not clear what enduring benefit the “beneficiary entrepreneurs” will have derived from attending the training courses and neither is it clear to what extent the three business training centres will have been sustainable after the end of the project. The failure to address certification and at least consider using existing materials tested in other post-conflict or developing countries was a key weakness; sadly, VEGA do not seem unusual in taking an insular, stand-alone approach to adult education.

The northern governorates of Iraq, semi-autonomous within Iraq since the Gulf War of 1990 / 1991, and more secure than the rest of the country, has also received international attention with regard to vocational education (MNFI, 2006). In 2004, the US invited the Republic of South Korea to contribute more troops to Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I). From the outset, the 2,500 Korean troops who formed a brigade in the North West of Iraq and were based in Irbil, concentrated on reconstruction. The troops were known as the Zaytun Division – meaning 'olive' in Arabic – and the divisional motto was, “We are friends”. In addition to medical and community projects, the Zaytun Division ran literacy programmes and operated a Vocational Training Centre.

A Vocational Training Center has offered classes to more than 1,000 residents in computers and baking, as well (sic) maintenance and repair of home appliances, generators and cars. Local input determined which classes would benefit the local economy. They also trained Iraqis to teach these classes so the training is sustainable. Multi National Force – Iraq Commanding General George W. Casey, Jr. called the training center ‘a model for other parts of Iraq in the training of militias and insurgents to become productive members of society’. (MNFI, 2006)

Also in the north, and following on from the MOLSA project which ended in September 2005, USAID supported a six-month vocational training programme for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnee populations in the area. The programme was launched in March 2006 and expanded the operations of the existing Employment and Vocational Training Center:

The first part of the vocational training program, which included courses in auto mechanics, electrical fitting and wiring, carpentry and basic computer skills, took place from March through May. The second part of the program, including courses in turnery, plumbing, blacksmithing and cooling and air conditioning, began in May. ... In total, 187 unskilled and unemployed IDPs and returnees from various ethnic groups enrolled in the program. Each course ran from 30 to 45 days and involved weekly theoretical and practical examinations.

Participants who successfully met course requirements received skill certifications from the EVTC and were registered in a database accessible by local contractors and small businesses in need of employees. (Portal Iraq, 2006)

In another project, training for adult returnees was provided through a community centre. This was one of many small projects funded through USAID's Iraq Transition Initiatives (ITI) programme (Portal Iraq, 2005). Such projects were designed to fill crucial gaps in US government assistance efforts and increase Iraqi support for the transition to democracy. ITI activities were implemented through a contract that allowed for fast and flexible disbursement of small grants to local organizations and a grant was made to equip the community centre with equipment which allowed them to train 100 returnees in computer skills and English language.

These three small projects highlight some progress from the earlier national programmes, with more local involvement, a variety of courses that appear to reflect the local demand rather than international need (basic English is often attractive to those in post-conflict societies as it is often the lingua franca of the international community organizations with which local people need to communicate), and clear awareness of the adult group which was being targeted for training and education. The need to provide certification and links to employment are also positive, although more could be done to provide portable, widely recognized qualifications. Nevertheless, six-month projects of international intervention, however they are integrated into wider MOLSA provision, are indicative of an ongoing approach that is short termist and subject to shifting priorities amongst the international donor community.

Many of the projects examined have resulted from US or CPA initiatives but the United Nations supported Iraq's reconstruction despite the coalition failing to seek specific endorsement for the invasion and the withdrawal of the UN mission to Jordan when its premises in Baghdad were attacked on 19 August 2003. UNESCO was a key partner in the RISE project, producing five million maths and science textbooks in 2004 and supported the Ministry of Education by providing communications and video-conferencing facilities. A progress report for the UNESCO Executive Board meeting of 9 August 2004 (Director General, 2004) indicated that a number of new projects were about to start, with some focusing on adult education. These projects were to be funded through the UN Development Group Trust Fund and included the adult education projects listed in

Table 13:

**Table 13 Adult education funded by the UN Development Group Trust Fund**

Serial	Project	Cost (\$US)	Remarks
1.	Revitalization of technical and vocational education and training in Iraq.	2,758,274	
2.	Literacy and life-skills development.	2,230,000	Based in Baghdad. Erbil and Samawah.
3.	Computer learning centres for students and communities in Iraq.	3,000,000	Earmarked funds, to be based in all governorates
4.	Technical and vocational education and training.	3,000,000	UNESCO was invited to draft a proposal.

## **7.7 SUMMARY**

In this chapter, I have outlined adult education provision which the international community provided for Iraqis during the time the country was recovering from conflict. Using education as part of democratization, for economic development and to assist in demobilizing and reintegrating militias will be analysed further.

## CHAPTER 8 COMMON THEMES

The three post-conflict interventions considered in this thesis occurred in different parts of the globe and at different times. The geography and the populations of each country have very little in common. However, some themes emerged when I considered aspects of adult education that are common to the countries, regardless of the differences. In this chapter, common themes around the post-conflict curriculum, organizational structures and financing for adult education are identified. In addition, common features around the evaluation and assessment of international interventions are considered.

### 8.1 CURRICULA AND SYLLABI

In post-conflict situations, there are often calls for the curriculum to be changed. This may be to update teaching materials to reflect the recent history, to amend or remove references to the country's former government (when there has been a change of regime) or to better prepare students for the new environment in which they will be operating and seeking work. At the most straightforward level, there are examples of text books being reprinted with new names and boundaries on maps to reflect territorial changes that might have arisen during the conflict. Curricular change can act as a very visible symbol of the nation's new priorities and values, so the process of change is never value-neutral and may be politically charged. In all three countries studied here, curricula have been changed, including in the adult education sector<sup>5</sup>.

In Iraq, immediate action was taken in 2003 to remove images of Saddam Hussein from school buildings, text books and teaching materials. Similarly, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a centralized decision was made regarding passages in text books that were to be removed:

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the three constituent groups reached agreement in 1989 (sic) following an elaborate review process on elimination of inappropriate passages from textbooks. However, implementation at the school level has been uneven. ... In Iraq, textbooks distributed to schools in the immediate aftermath of the conflict were reprinted without the pictures of Saddam Hussein or the most obvious symbols of the previous regime; in cases where this was not possible, children were supervised in the tearing out of offensive pictures and pages. In planning for the subsequent year, the Ministry of Education

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<sup>5</sup> Often, the school curriculum is changed as the highest priority.

constituted its own panels of teachers and educators to review the textbooks and expurgate the most offensive content. (World Bank, 2005:53)

A common theme from post-conflict countries is that it will not be obvious which individuals or organizations should be given the authority to re-write the curriculum on behalf of the nation and its people. Where there has been an international intervention to end the conflict, it may be that international expertise can be used to assist in developing new curricula along with the teaching materials to support it. International experts might have the advantage of being regarded as neutral in mediating between parties to construct a new curriculum and they can also bring experience – gained in other countries – of implementing curricular change in a condensed timeframe. Less positively, their generic experience and objectivity makes them less aware of local sensitivities that could be reflected in the new syllabus. Using international staff to do such reviews may be efficient in the aftermath of a conflict but there is a risk of over-reliance on external support. In Bosnia-Herzegovina's higher education sector, external assistance deliberately focused on knowledge and governance rather than bricks and mortar. In this case, institution development was an explicit part of the support offered. By contrast, sustainable expertise and even consistent change were not guaranteed in Cambodia.

It was also stressed that the CRE-ATF would not concentrate on humanitarian aid or on the reconstruction of war-damaged university buildings. Rather, it would focus on academic support to enable the rehabilitation and proper re-functioning of these institutions. The ultimate aim in assisting institutional development was to contribute to creating conditions which would re-attract those students and staff who had fled during the war. A priority goal in this collaborative effort was to help improve the institution's ability to adapt to future needs, and not simply to restore it to its pre-war state. (CRE, 1996:2)

...the Cambodian staff have come to rely more and more on foreign experts of all kinds of donor agencies, with different teaching methodologies and curricula. As neither a consistent approach nor a monitoring system have been developed, the mission fears that whenever new foreign donors enter, new plans will be developed and implemented, confronting students with all kinds of new courses, without questions being asked about their efficiency and effectivity. (Blom and Nooijer, 1992:88)

One of the key areas for debate in the post-conflict situation will usually be the content of new curricula. For school-age children, international standards and provision of the core skills necessary to operate as adults will dictate the vast majority of the content. In adult education, by contrast, there is usually more discretion and choice for individuals over the curriculum an individual follows. Decisions on curricular content are therefore more problematic: those writing new curricula for adult education in the post-conflict

setting must decide on the relative weighting that will be given to the various topics that might be taught to students.

In post-conflict Cambodia, the human rights of different groups within the country needed protection and the UN mission included a Human Rights Component to promote those rights. This Component would have liked to include education on human rights in a variety of educational programmes but this was not seen as a priority:

[The Human Rights Component] also endeavored, through its education work with newly emerging Cambodian human rights organizations, to promote values of racial equality. However, investigation and education were without immediate import in the absence of further remedial action. In this regards, the Human Rights Component received little or no backing from other components and sometimes found itself blocked by their disinterest or opposition. (Jordens, 1996:146)

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the previous curricula were either assimilationist or separatist; post-conflict, a move to an integrationist basis that encouraged tolerance was put in place.

The curriculum is also at the center of concern over management of diversity in education and in the wider society. Most curricula in the conflict affected countries studied here had either an assimilationist or a separatist approach to dealing with identity, and both of these strategies often become the focus of identity struggles that contribute to conflict. Many sought to move toward a more integrationist approach that would promote greater mutual understanding of cultural and identity difference within a broader framework of tolerance. (World Bank, 2005:52)

In Iraq, the process of de-Ba'athification was a priority for the CPA and it sought to remove references to the Ba'ath Party from educational materials. There was, however, an effort within ministries to remove negative stereotyping, "For example, NGOs can work with the Education Ministry to eliminate negative stereotyping in academic curricula and to develop educational materials that incorporate conflict resolution" (Phillips, 2005:235).

How to incorporate education on values – such as human rights, diversity and respect for the rule of law – into a new curriculum is a common challenge in the post-conflict setting. Decisions on how mandatory these subjects might be in a given course, the manner in which it is taught and the share of teaching time that should be allocated will be made by curriculum designers.



To some, it appears self-evident that it would be beneficial for a community if they received conflict-related content in their courses. This might include lessons on landmines awareness or safety and security in the post-conflict environment. In both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia, it was essential for public safety that the population were educated about treatment of discarded munitions and identification of mined areas. This was particularly important for returning refugees and displaced persons who had not spent the conflict period in the locality. However, educators often do not have the necessary expertise to deliver such material.

Circumstances frequently require that landmine awareness and health and safety messages related to postconflict conditions are incorporated into education programs in ways that produce additional demands for more effective intersectoral collaboration and call for skills and training that are not conventionally available to education authorities. (World Bank, 2005:61)

In each of the countries in this study, education for adults that will lead to future employment is seen as a priority. In debating the curriculum, there will usually be consideration of the types of work that are available and the skills gaps that exist in the labour market. However, often the understanding of the labour market is only partial and detailed prediction of future skills shortages (problematic in even the most mature economies) is very difficult in a post-conflict situation. The job opportunities available in a post-conflict country are often increased, for example, women may be free to participate in a wider range of occupations and international interventions may seek to diversify the economy, creating new types of employment.

Those seeking to develop vocational and technical skills for work will often be given more general education as part of their courses. Where there are deficiencies in an adult's literacy and numeracy, this can be a valuable support that will assist with subsequent employability but it also serves to dilute the vocational aspects of the curriculum. A common feature of curricula examined in this study is that they often address wider life and employability skills alongside the vocational and technical training, as the examples below – from Cambodia and for women in Iraq – show.

It is also increasingly felt that training must be linked to adult basic education and must not only focus on technical skills, but also on literacy, numeracy and other life skills. This is also clearly illustrated by the Cambodian government's decision to focus simultaneously on basic education and on vocational training. The importance of non-formal adult education and literacy programmes, and the need to integrate life skills and basic adult education with technical training, is also echoed by NGOs involved in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa. (Tanil, 1997:12)

In addition, the role of women is enhanced through vocational-skills training and support in generating income, including access to credit. (Phillips, 2005:235)

Another issue for those designing adult education courses is the best means of delivery. The infrastructure in a post-conflict country is often destroyed or damaged, sometimes with pockets of excellent infrastructure where a reconstruction project has been active and resulted in providing facilities of international quality high above the standard of what is expected locally. In the absence of such investment, resources for teaching adults are often a low priority and, for example, equipment used in vocational training workshops might have been removed to be operated in a full business setting if the industrial infrastructure is depleted. It is common for teaching facilities to be spread thinly across the country and 'shared use' models – for trainees and workers, for children and adults, for education and emergency shelter – are frequent.

In efforts to reach the widest range of learners, adult education curricula may be delivered through broadcast media. This increases accessibility for those who cannot reach a training centre but it limits the nature of lessons that can be covered, for example reducing opportunities for physical and handling skills to be practised. However, information and knowledge aspects of a curriculum may be delivered through such means, with dramatizations being used for educational messages. The examples below show how drama was used as an educational vehicle for values-based education, where the learner population is large and widespread across the country, in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia:

Third is the preoccupation of the international community with news programming. Objective reporting will take many years to achieve in Bosnia. An alternative approach – to use drama and other entertainment programming to convey pro-social messages – has not been part of the media strategy. (Adam, 1999:4)

In retrospect, UNTAC's Information and Education Division did an excellent job convincing Cambodians that the elections would be fair and that individual votes could be kept secret, precluding fear of retribution. (Farris, 1994:46)

In these types of educational course, there is no need for summative assessment of individual learners. A common feature of post-conflict adult education remains, however, that insufficient attention is paid to establishing a credible exam and qualifications system. Where the curriculum has changed, with the methods of delivery varied and often innovative, and with disruption to educational governance and management systems, determining who is responsible for qualifications and deciding what standards they should set is complex.

In both Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, initial work on establishing bodies for determining standards and assessment have helped focus attention of officials on the need for improved measurement of learning outcomes. (World Bank, 2005:49)

Setting a recognized standard which will allow an adult to demonstrate to a range of prospective employers their capacity for work is vital in promoting a transparent labour market and reduces the scope for corruption in a fragile state. Whereas national school exams are often a priority in establishing 'normality' in a post-conflict country, it is rare for there to be consideration in the adult sphere. Nevertheless, qualifications and a credible assessment system to gain them are important for individuals who need to prove themselves and for educators in measuring the effectiveness of their learning programmes, even in the non-formal sector: "Will the non-formal activities lead to something else? For example, (re)entry to the formal system? Some type of certificate? Better employment options? Better health, and peace-promoting activities?" (International Institute for Educational Planning, :12-6).

The examinations and qualifications architecture for adult education is a single example of how it is important to focus on systems and management in the adult education sector rather than make isolated interventions: building a training centre here, designing a new language course there. The World Bank has highlighted the need for attention to this matter:

System management and development usually come to a standstill during conflict, as administration and supervision of learning are disrupted and policy development is suspended, distorted by competing political agendas, or fragmented. Education systems, often highly centralized prior to conflict, frequently experience fragmentation as the management systems, communication, and control are disrupted. Management and administrative structures wither or are prevented from operating; policy and curriculum development often grind to a halt, leaving, in the case of extended conflict, outdated policies, inappropriate and inadequate curricula, and neglected and deteriorating infrastructure. (World Bank, 2005:19)

Those managing education must be accountable for their work and it is common for there to be a democratic deficit in the immediate aftermath of conflict. For this reason, embedding voter education and programmes of democratization into curricula is often a priority. Arguably, though, democratization initiatives were introduced too soon in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia, where the programmes were sometimes seen as being imposed on the population. Commonly, international bodies want to accelerate democratization but – in so doing – they impose procedures which are, of themselves, anti-democratic.

The Democratisation Branch of the OSCE seeks to encourage the voice and activity of ordinary citizens who support civil society. ... Although the Democratisation Branch sees that only the Bosnian people can create a civil society, it also believes that Bosnian people themselves are at present not confident enough, or skilled enough, to initiate their own 'grass-roots' projects. (Chandler, 2000:137)

An immediate priority in any post-conflict state is to develop institutional capacity and accountability to local populations. ... The danger is that poor judgement by donors will compound the very problem that donors want to address: the weakening of state structures and local capacity. (UN Development Programme, 2005:171)

Thus, the timing for introducing democratization education is sensitive and the educational management system will have weaknesses until this situation is rectified. In Iraq, this dilemma was tackled by giving local people a voice early through selection (rather than election) to various committees, councils and boards. However, two different perspectives below show that there was no agreement on how effective this compromise might have been:

[Formerly Research Triangle Institute] RTI's Dr. Ron Johnson further described the Iraq 'elections / selections' to Congress (*Federal News Service*, May 4, 2005): During the course of our work in Iraq, in many cases working alongside coalition forces, especially in the early first year, we supported the formation of about 700 of the over 1,000 local government councils throughout the country. More than a year before Iraq elected its first national assembly, local councils were operating all across Iraq. Though these councils were far from perfect examples, they nonetheless provide a valuable means for citizens to express grievances, set priorities, and demand accountability from local leaders. ... Conduct of open meetings and local media coverage for these councils is the norm, rather than the exception, with these councils in Iraq. The pride which Iraqis feel in serving on these councils and the dedication and courage that they exhibit in the face of threats and deaths of some local council members are an inspiration. (Sourcewatch)

City council members were selected, not elected. Instead of 'one person, one vote,' the CPA tried to control the outcome by relying on hand-picked local leaders to participate in neighbourhood councils. In turn, the neighbourhood councils selected district councils, which selected county councils, which selected a provincial council, which finally selected a governor. Many Iraqis objected to the system of indirect elections. (Phillips, 2005:170)

Despite disagreement over the method, the common principle of local accountability for the system of adult education, which will make decisions about the curricula and syllabi, is clear.

## 8.2 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

A common feature of post-conflict societies is the disruption of community and state structures and the arrival of international groups and agencies, which may interact with the local structures and may themselves have been created to deal with the specific circumstances. In the initial stages of an intervention, groups will seek formal bodies with which they can communicate. However, such formal organizations may be artificial and may be created for the sole purpose of being transparent to other formal groups. In Cambodia, Brinkman highlighted the absence of an international civilian body to mirror the UN military force: "At the moment, however, there is no multinational humanitarian body that can be deployed shoulder-to-shoulder with the military to deal with humanitarian aid and civil administration" (Brinkman, 1998:178).

Amongst local people, the international community's desire to interact with formal structures was recognized and this resulted in the creation of otherwise unnecessary bureaucracies, as shown in the following example from people demobilizing from Division 607 of the NADK: "'arms were taken from troops and given to ordinary people who were recruited into the police.' He added that these 'police were given uniforms and ranks so that there would be a formal structure for the internationalists [i.e., UNTAC] to control'" (Heder, 1996:92).

This need for groups to operate within formally structured, recognized organizations was also seen in Iraq, where a Program Management Office (PMO) was set up to bring together all the different contractors who were supporting either the Coalition Provisional Authority or the fledgling Iraqi government. While it was difficult for the authorities to deal with all the individual contractors, for example having no mandate to share threat information with commercial organizations, the PMO were invited to security briefings.

The formal organizations that are set up can reflect the preferences of national or international bodies regarding the way the post-conflict society might be structured. This may be for ideological or practical reasons. The World Bank notes that decentralization occurs because the central organizations have been disrupted by the conflict:

System management and development usually come to a standstill during conflict, as administration and supervision of learning are disrupted and policy development is suspended, distorted by competing political agendas, or fragmented. Education systems, often highly centralized prior to conflict, frequently experience fragmentation as the management systems, communication, and control are disrupted. (World Bank, 2005:19)

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the desire to strengthen the powers of each entity within the federation resulted in support for formal organizations to be decentralized: "In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where decentralization was driven by central ethnically-based political interests, problems were encountered when the pace of decentralization exceeded the capacity of the local management to implement it" (World Bank, 2005:44).

In this case, the parties were all similarly motivated to move power away from the central state so there was no dispute on whether parties were mandated to make such decisions. The mandate and authority of an international mission will be determined before the intervention. In Cambodia, UNTAC was a formal peacekeeping mission where the UN Secretary General had formal control over all the components, including the military. Bosnia-Herzegovina's intervention was under the formal authority of the Contact Group, while the coalition in Iraq had the full status of the governance of the country as an occupying power:

The Secretary General's powers in the field of peacekeeping have expanded over the years from the holder of the office simply being the administrator of forces to becoming the instigator and executive commander of the forces within the overall framework of the Security Council's mandate. It must be noted that this only applies to peacekeeping forces. In the enforcement operations in Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia (UNITAF) and IFOR in Bosnia, the Secretary General does not have any political control over the forces. In general, they are commanded, both politically and militarily, by a State or group of States, operating under a loose Security Council mandate, although generally, as with consensual peacekeeping forces, the Secretary General is required by the Council to provide regular reports on the progress of the force. (White, 1997:230)

UN Security Resolution 1511 was adopted on October 16, 2003. Drafted by British and U.S. diplomats, it identified the coalition as Iraq's 'occupying power,' with the sole responsibility for security. Whereas it invited member states to assist in Iraq's reconstruction, it did not authorize a specific role for the United Nations in Iraq's political transition. (Phillips, 2005:175)

There is a question, therefore, over the authority and mandate that international organizations will have in a post-conflict society. Aall points out that the country capitals – in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome and Washington – will be where ultimate decisions are made:

In complex emergencies and other peacekeeping situations, it is not the military or NGOs that are ultimately in charge of the decision-making process. While these communities can make efforts to collaborate on a local basis, they have neither the authority nor resources to mandate closer coordination. This authority rests in country capitals of the state powers behind the response to conflict. (Aall, 2000:139)

This could be disempowering for communities but there is evidence that, in practice, the important decisions will be taken locally and the individuals 'on the ground' will use informal structures and networks more than the formal organizational structures which are easier to see. The examples that follow show that such informal structures existed in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq, but with different degrees of success in operating within them. In Cambodia, those within the UN system depended on personal contacts to produce an inefficient system overall.

What existed were ad hoc and ramshackle interpersonal networks to which privileged (or relatively easy) access was gained on the basis of some shared trait, national culture being the most obvious and probably the most common, but still only one of many. (Heder and Ledgerwood, 1996:29)

In Iraq, where it was clearly stated that the Coalition Provisional Authority had executive authority, Iraqis were co-opted onto councils to give a voice to local people. Nevertheless, the power of council members was constrained and there was a perception that international staff (often subject matter experts who had been seconded to Baghdad for short periods) retained control and made the important decisions:

The council could name and dismiss interim ministers, propose a budget, appoint charges d'affaires to foreign capitals, and organize the drafting of Iraq's new constitution. However, foreign nationals appointed by the CPA as 'shadow' ministers really ran the show. (Phillips, 2005:172)

Similarly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, international groupings limited the autonomy of those selected as local representatives in Bosnian institutions:

At state level, Bosnian representatives have had the opportunity to discuss policy proposals, under the guidance of the Office of the High Representative and other international bodies such as the World Bank and IMF, but at the most the Bosnian institutions could only make minor alterations to OHR pre-prepared packages or delay their implementation. (Chandler, 2000:64)

The situation for schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina was mixed: local initiatives had kept some people learning and teaching through the war and the mixture of provision was supported by the community. School rebuilding was a priority for the international community, however, and a formal, external programme was 'imposed', as Tanil points out, "Marshall Plan-type school reconstruction programmes in post-conflict Bosnia were imposed in a context in which MoE-supported co-operative war-school efforts blending formal and non formal initiatives had proven successful" (Tanil, 1997:13).

In situations where the international representatives are engaged so closely in the governance and administration of a country where there has been an intervention, it is

likely that there will be a comprehensive programme. For example, the post-conflict society will often be subject to interventions on a range of areas of national importance such as economic support, security sector reform and improvements to social institutions such as health and education. There are no international organizations that have mandates and expertise in all these areas, probably reflecting the UN's structure of independent agencies dealing with separate concerns. A common theme for the three countries considered in the case studies has been how different groups of experts have come together to pursue a unified goal within a multi-faceted mission in post-conflict situations. In particular, military and civilian components must work in concert; this is sometimes problematic if the military is deployed separately under a Security Council rather than UN agency resolution. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Abdela recognized the many functions required in a post-conflict mission, while Chandler notes that no single international organization had oversight of all of the groups involved in transition:

If they are to succeed, post conflict peace missions in other Bosnias and Kosovos require high quality civil capabilities to administer municipalities and government; a sufficient number of trained police capable of law enforcement; civil capabilities to work in partnership with the local population to deliver rule of law, justice, and the short and long-term reconstruction process of the infrastructure. This includes developing democratic political parties, NGOs, free media and human rights over a long enough time frame to induce stability, economic growth and democracy. (Abdela, 2000)

The extension of the international institutional mechanisms of regulation during the process of democratisation, the transition to democracy and self-rule, has meant that the Bosnian state bodies have had little influence over either policy development or its implementation. In effect, Bosnia under Dayton, has been governed by a network of international community institutions representing the major world powers, with NATO, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMiBH) and the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina as leading implementing organs. (Chandler, 2000:64)

This multi-faceted approach is also seen in Cambodia, where there were seven components within the UNTAC mission – Human Rights; Civil Administration; Civil Police; Repatriation; Rehabilitation; Electoral; and Military (Farris, 1994:42-3) – which although under a unified UN umbrella operated separately and were under no mandated obligation to cooperate.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pamela Aall acknowledges that NGOs were also extending to cover a multitude of functions, rather than focusing on a single area of expertise: “In addition, some of the large relief and development NGOs have added a conflict resolution component to their work, recognizing that development itself can create new tensions and/or alter old relationships” (Aall, 2000:131).



In the absence of an intervention which has a single purpose, it is unlikely that there will be a suitable body with full expertise to take the lead in co-ordinating the various efforts in the post-conflict society. In Iraq, the occupying power status of the Coalition Provisional Authority gave it sole agency for all matters of government but usually a more complex structure is necessary. Lead agency arrangements may be put in place, either to co-ordinate the whole intervention or for specific outcomes. In Cambodia, there were some problems when a particular agency took the lead without considering pan-component coherence:

Even though UNTAC is supposed to be the umbrella organization through which all other UN agencies worked, the UN high commissioners for refugees had a very distinct agenda in that they wanted to get rid of all the displaced people on the Thai borders as quickly as possible. Whether this meant sending them into areas that were still mined or not being able to provide support for them over the rainy season, they weren't particularly interested in that. (Brown, N.D.:18)

Specifically turning to education, the OSCE has been an advocate of using education within a wider conflict resolution purpose and they took lead agency status on education in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Until as recently as 2002 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) education was not viewed as essential for conflict prevention, security or peacebuilding. But perspectives and practices are changing. Indeed, the international community, acting as de facto governor in BiH, saw a role for education in state development and peacebuilding. In BiH the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) took the lead in education reforms and began evaluating its own broader institutional efforts at using education as a conflict prevention tool. (Nelles, 2006:230)

The World Bank has acknowledged the benefits of the international agencies appointing a lead but, for the system to work most effectively, that lead agency's purview must extend to all the players involved in the post-conflict intervention:

The international practice of identifying 'lead agencies' for education provides a helpful means of coordinating the activities of the international agencies during the humanitarian assistance phase, but it has not yet effectively brought coherence to interventions from bilateral and multilateral agencies or international nongovernmental organizations. (World Bank, 2005:45)

### 8.3 FINANCE AND FUNDING

Regardless of the organizational structures in place at local, national and international level, a significant feature of an intervention in post-conflict societies will always be securing and disbursing funds for both routine, ongoing activities and the investment in either capital projects or change programmes in the services sector. Although investment in education is acknowledged as being important, with “Annual worldwide spending on education ... assessed today at \$1 trillion, with a ‘market’ of some one billion students worldwide” (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008:141) and the economic benefits from the investment being realized relatively rapidly (Ibid:140), funding for adult education in societies recovering from conflict is not always prioritized. Transparency and the accountability of individuals for spending such monies is sometimes difficult to establish, with funding often a complex mixture of international government pledges and individual donations, grants or investments, either direct to the receiving country, perhaps through a donor agency, or to specific projects. As adult education is rarely a priority for a fragile government with many competing demands being made in the post-conflict situation, hypothecated international funding is most often the sole source for work in this area. I found that two European countries made a specific donation to fund university buildings in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Shortage of buildings, laboratory equipment and other facilities has become a very serious constraint for their activities. In addition, university as well as public libraries have been devastated. ... In September 1995 Germany and Italy together donated US\$330,000 to help repair university buildings in Bosnia. (Arnhold *et al.*, 1998:40)

Reliance on international finance should not be a permanent state of affairs and there should be a plan to complete any interventions or move their funding to a sustainable footing, based on the income generating capacity of the post-conflict society. The amount of international aid invested in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while high, declined in the decade following the conflict and there was little sign that private funding from within the country would be available to replace it:

In the two years after the 1995 Dayton Accord aid per capita reached \$245, and today it is \$138, still among the highest in the world. The huge surge in aid has generated growth, but private sector investment has not taken off. This matters not just because of the high levels of unemployment, but also because of the critical role of the private sector in taking over functions financed by aid. (UN Development Programme, 2005:178)

In Iraq, which had abundant natural resources, there was still a dependence on international financial support. This additional money was required specifically for

reconstruction of facilities damaged during the conflict, for security costs that were added to most contracts and to ensure that new services and infrastructure met modern, international standards. The flow of funds – from donor or Iraqi owned assets – to the individual projects was problematic:

The Bush administration initially submitted to Congress an \$87 billion budget supplemental; it included \$21 billion for reconstruction that would augment the Iraqi Assistance Fund. This fund had been established with Iraqi assets and the UN Oil for Food Program escrow, as well as with \$37.5 billion in pledges made at the October donors' conference in Madrid. Six months after the supplemental was approved, less than \$1 billion had actually been spent on reconstruction. In addition to the security crisis, there were several other reasons why spending had become bogged down. Only companies from countries in the U.S.-led coalition were allowed to bid. Iraq's \$125 billion debt burden was crippling. Foreign direct investment was negligible. The Pentagon's contracting process vacillated between large sole-source contracts and dysfunctional procurement procedures. (Phillips, 2005:203)

There were also difficulties because finance was often allocated to specific initiatives which meant projects might be funded through multiple funding streams. For example, a US-funded project for private sector development included adult education to support business accounting but this had to be combined with another initiative on learning English to give the Iraqi entrepreneurs the full range of education they sought.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) announces the award of a multi-million dollar grant to the Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance (VEGA) to implement the Iraq Private Sector Development Initiative. The grant award provides funding up to \$12.3 million over the next 15 months. (USAID, 2004)

When there are such complex funding flows, those involved in providing adult education may find themselves in competition with other groups to secure finance for their projects. In a US military programme to train local soldiers in mines awareness and de-mining, a stand-off developed over funding:

The Cambodian military was waiting and hoping that the United States would relent and pay up, while the Americans stood their ground and expected the Cambodians to be motivated by humanitarian goodwill for the safety of their fellow countrypeople. In the end, the soldiers started to lose interest in the programme and had to spend more and more time doing other paying work to support their families. To make matters worse, the Cambodian soldiers lost face when the Australian military came in and started a well-funded anti-insurgency programme in the same complex. (Grant, 1998:157)

Also in Cambodia, a project to teach English to medical staff had been running for several years. Because the donor organization required that there was competitive tendering for funding, an NGO working in the area on non-educational projects set up a

section to compete for the project funds. They then hired the same staff and the project continued. The original NGO, which had run the English classes in conjunction with raising the medical skills of local staff, was closed down due to lack of funds. This does not support a culture of collaboration:

Consequently, there may be tension between information acquisition and dissemination, as well as competition among NGOs for funding. Although there is some evidence elsewhere of effective strategic linkages being made among agencies and between certain agencies and NGOs, it is acknowledged that efforts to share experiences and information must be urgently and significantly developed. (Tanil, 1997:15)

One partial solution to the problematic area of funding in post-conflict societies where the international element is so important is to pass the monies to local people and allow them to determine priorities. Creation of a locally-controlled fund which can be disbursed across various sectors to meet local priorities will tend to support longer term development and will facilitate a more coherent approach. In the early stages of funding aid and development in this way, there may be a need to support the communities and local interest groups to ensure they have mechanisms for discussing how the finance is to be managed and spent but, in the longer term, this is a sustainable model for international intervention funding and it can operate even in the absence of the often weak central governance.

Social funds in many postconflict countries (such as Bosnia, Cambodia and Kosovo) provide an important mechanism for targeting resources at community-focused reconstruction programs. (World Bank, 2005:57)

The international community can help establish women's organizations in postconflict societies. Such organizations can develop local roots and gain political legitimacy despite their dependence on international resources. (Kumar, Baldwin and Benjamin, 2000:1)

#### **8.4 ASSESSMENTS AND EVALUATIONS**

A final common theme that emerges from the three post-conflict societies studied here concerns evaluation and assessment of the interventions. There have been several evaluations in each of the three cases in this study, sometimes associated with evaluating an individual project or initiative, sometimes connected to funding, sometimes prepared as part of an international organization's obligations to be transparent and sometimes when a researcher has examined the situation to inform their own studies. Each of these circumstances would require the evaluations to be conducted with different results required, varied methodologies and ultimately different

purposes. Partly as a result of these differences, it can be challenging to develop a coherent view of the post-conflict society under consideration. From the different evaluations, a paradox emerges as policy developers often require data and information in a short timeframe while researchers are driven by the desire to produce new knowledge, which may take longer. “Avoiding this paradox is vital: research and evaluation must generate useful knowledge; policy-makers must have realistic expectations of the status of this knowledge (its true limits as well as its true power)” (Oates, 2007:155).

If we are to derive the maximum benefit from evaluations in post-conflict societies, we should clearly understand the purpose for which each evaluation has been designed and also identify the elements of the single evaluation that might be used in concert with others, and with what caveats.

Conflicting purposes of evaluations and assessments of education in post-conflict societies have been observed but a more common feature is the weaknesses of evaluations that are conducted or even the total absence any evaluation at all. When training courses were run for the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces to prepare personnel to deploy on UN missions, UNITAR reported on the conduct of the training: “In September 2006, two identical three-day training courses in English language on the special needs of women and children in conflict and post-conflict situations were organized by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research” (United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2006:2).

However, the report is very narrative and contains no evaluation or analysis. In another instance, the World Bank concludes that brief interventions in teacher training are appreciated by participants and they are supported, despite the lack of “measurable impact” on teaching:

While there is little evidence that these short courses (frequently three to five days) have any measurable impact on teaching practice, experience has shown that they are highly appreciated by the participants for a number of reasons, especially in building teacher morale. (World Bank, 2005:49)

Similarly, when no data were available to support beliefs about unemployment in Iraq, the limited amount of data was criticized and a decision was made to revert to intuition: “Although the limited data shows no link to violence and unemployment, there is an intuitively obvious link between un (under) employment and political instability and security” (Kuklok, 2004). Policy making on this case was not based on evaluations. The absence of proper evaluations and assessments results in an increase in the

probability that interventions in post-conflict societies will not work and that we will not understand why some things apparently achieve better results than others.

Another weakness in many of the evaluations that have been conducted is that they have failed to take account of the specific circumstances or societal norms in the given situation so that, for example, the dynamics of how different community groups operated before and after the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not taken into account: "Much of the research has been done without any effort to assess the data in the Yugoslav context, or to assure that these projects are used to improve the situation for those who have gone through the traumatic experience of intergroup war" (Robinson, Schnabel and Smyth, 1999:26).

Nelles has written about the shortcomings in evaluation of education in post-conflict societies, claiming that more comprehensive evaluation might demonstrate that educational interventions would be more cost effective than the more usual military/security responses.

Of particular value would be more critical pedagogy studies emphasizing non-military theoretical and applied approaches to security analysis and conflict prevention. Related new education research and reforms may be more effective, sustainable and cheaper than costly military interventions. (Nelles, 2006:238)

Further, Nelles lists the problems with the piecemeal approach to education evaluations and notes that there should be improved sharing of information and the results of evaluations across disciplines, across countries and across the intended purposes of the evaluations:

First, the past work by NGOs and the research by scholars has yet to be adequately surveyed or widely reported. There are, moreover, still no good syntheses of this work. ... Second, there are no easily shared criteria to measure education's contribution to local or school-based violence prevention specifically, or to national and regional peacebuilding more broadly. ... A third and related challenge is the lack of a coherent international community approach supporting a well-funded collaborative research and evaluation agenda linking curriculum, textbook and educational policy studies with security analysis. ... But collaborative, interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral and policy-relevant approaches are wanting. Meanwhile international agencies do not share internal evaluations easily, and these are mostly inaccessible to education researchers. (Nelles, 2006:236)

The common theme of weaknesses in evaluations has also been apparent in this research. It has not been possible to access all existing data from the many isolated evaluations of adult education in post-conflict societies. Nor has a meta-data analysis

of all the available data been attempted. Rather, available data and evidence has been synthesized and I have drawn conclusions. Of course, this is not an ideal model for a fully objective evaluation but when multiple sources have indicated a common idea, this has been taken to be corroboration.

I have illustrated from three distinct case studies that some common themes exist for adult education in complex post-conflict societies. In the next chapter, I will consider some of these themes again, when I analyse adult education's stabilization effect at different levels of society.

## **CHAPTER 9**

### **ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION**

In this chapter, five different levels of society are used to analyse adult education. Theoretical models discussed in Chapter 4 provide the basis for using the community, the state and international bodies as three dimensions while the case studies reinforced the importance both of considering regional issues and viewing international interventions from the perspective of the adult learner. Thus, the five levels are: the learner, the community, the state, the region and the international bodies.

#### **9.1 THE LEARNER**

If adult education in societies recovering from conflict is stabilizing rather than de-stabilizing, thus enhancing security, the stabilization is likely to be felt at different levels within society. Considering the individual adult learner, security may result from physical security, economic stability or from a less tangible psychological stability. Adult education programmes that teach about physical safety in a post-conflict society, for example teaching returning refugees about recognition of a mined area or safe handling of discarded munitions, have a direct impact on the security of the learners. By contrast, it is acknowledged by the World Bank that recruiting young adults for military activity can be de-stabilizing and decrease their security:

In almost every country study was the recognition that youth constitute not simply a potential threat to stability should they be recruited into military or criminal activity, but also an important potential resource for development and reconstruction. Yet there were very few examples of practical programs that address the educational needs of youth and young adults. (World Bank, 2005:68)

Similarly, adults may be recruited by criminal groups that operate where the rule of law is not fully functioning, a situation that can be common when a society is recovering from conflict. Adult education that offers individuals tools and strategies for avoiding involvement with such groups can support stabilization. In addition, an individual may be attracted to military or criminal groups that expose them to violence only because they see no viable economic alternative. In such circumstances, adult education that leads to paid work or the ability for an individual to generate income is very important. If the work is related to the reconstruction or recovery of the post-conflict society, there is a double benefit at the individual and national level. As Seitz states, unemployment and the consequent economic vulnerability can lead to future conflicts if there are particular groups who feel excluded from society and national life:



Given the consequence of the diagnosis of the FAKT study, that above all the frustration of young people in the face of a lack of employment opportunities creates the breeding ground for new conflicts, and especially in post-conflict societies, it is obvious: Greater significance has to be attached to linking education and training offerings with the labour market and above all the creation of jobs for young people. (Seitz, 2004:55)

Such frustrations are sometimes compounded if these young adults have also missed schooling during the conflict and there is a risk that they become what the World Bank describes as a 'lost generation' (2005:25) that may be drawn to crime and violence as an alternative to employment.

As shown in the three case studies, adult education programmes that are most successful in supporting individual learner's stability usually include those where successful completion leads directly to employment. In some cases, an international organization may provide a training course as a pre-requisite for an individual gaining employment on a reconstruction contract. Seeing an increase in the number of motorbikes on the roads in Cambodia, many young people were placed on courses in motorbike repair and this generated a revenue stream for the individuals. However, when so many undertook the course that everyone mended and maintained their own bikes, the course did not lead to employment and it was, thus, much less valued by individuals. Adult education providers should acknowledge that the types of employment to which their programmes lead must not be too narrowly defined by the current situation, which will usually change. In Iraq, there were courses teaching local small businesses how to bid for work as sub-contractors in multinational reconstruction projects. These were very popular and – as well as providing an economic uplift for the small companies involved when they secured new business – the courses supported the relationships and dialogue between two disparate groups (locals and internationals).

It appears that participation in the labour market and earning a living, while providing an economic and physical security, are also important in supporting the identity and self-worth of an individual. The learner who knows they can earn money is acknowledged as being an independent member of society and they are more likely to feel part of that social group. Adult education that contributes to an individual's self-respect can have a stabilizing effect, even when there is no direct economic benefit following the course. In Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina, adult education programmes were used to give learners the skills to act as change agents within their own communities. Although these were designed to stabilize at the community level, there was the possibility that learners sometimes gained more status – as the individual who

could harness the views of many or speak as a formal representative of a group – which went beyond the personal influence they held. This is an important impact of education but external attempts to evaluate programmes often focus on achievement of stated, primary objectives and outcomes and the international observer may overlook these more subtle impacts.

Davies notes the importance of an individual's sense of self within a group and adult education can be formative in finding those identities:

Yet the question remains of how to give young people a secure sense of self without labelling or hardening this – what is sometimes called an 'essentialist' identity. ... Social identity theory suggests that how we think about ourselves tends to vary along a continuum, from the perception of self as unique to the perception of self as very similar or identical to in-group members. (Davies, 2008:30)

For the learner, economic benefits may not be possible following an educational opportunity, especially where a fragile society recovering from conflict is excluding particular groups. In Iraq, some female learners in this position nevertheless valued the adult education that was available to them as it provided a shared experience and built a group identity beyond the family setting, as Husein reports:

Many respondents cynically expressed that the 'only' benefit of education was the opportunity it offered to socialise with others outside the home. ... Paradoxically it may seem, I believe, that such a phenomenon also indicates that, in spite of the negative implications of sanctions for education, socially, female education remains 'largely' respected. (Husein, 2005:150)

Similarly, Sen proposes that an individual who has "capabilities" is able to make real choices and "lead lives they have reason to value" (Sen, 1999:293); such freedom offers a stability and psychological security to individuals. In that it provides learners with skills that permit them choices in the way they secure their livelihoods, offers them the opportunity to understand themselves better and supports them in defining a sense of identity, adult education can operate as a powerful force in developing individual stability. Therefore, adult education can be instrumental in developing what Sen calls 'capability':

A person's 'capability' refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve. Capability is thus a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to achieve various lifestyles). ... The evaluative focus of this 'capability approach' can be either on the *realized* functionings (what a person is actually able to do) or on the *capability set* of alternatives she has (her real opportunities). (Sen, 1999:75)

At the level of the learner, therefore, adult education can contribute to stabilization by drawing people to livelihoods away from crime and violence. In addition, economic and physical security are supplemented by developing a sense of self and by helping individuals develop the human capability to make proper, realistic choices about their lives.

## **9.2 THE COMMUNITY**

Increasing security at an individual level and developing self-identities for adults can be stabilizing, but each adult will be living within a community and they will, thus, be less secure if that community is de-stabilized. In section 4.8, theoretical perspectives that regarded adult education as community learning – often with local political impact – were highlighted. In this section, the practical application of such learning and its impact on communities are assessed. In considering education programmes for younger adults, the World Bank identified the lack of support to the social group as a weakness: “The concern for education as an important mechanism for building the social cohesion required to ensure lasting peace in postconflict countries rarely manifests itself in substantial programs that address the learning needs of youth” (World Bank, 2005:69).

The effect on the group of an individual undertaking learning can operate at two levels, both creating a new environment of shared benefits while more directly increasing the overall group productivity. In economic theory, this can generate endogenous growth but the process can be applied more loosely to building security too.

The contributions of education to the welfare of individual students and their families and to economic development include the direct contributions of education to productivity plus indirect contributions through community structural effects. These latter, to the extent that they are due to education, also aid productivity growth within firms and households. In this context two levels of externality benefits can be distinguished .... One level is within the firm or household. Some work environments, for example, contain many well-educated people, collegiality, and stimuli to new learning, facilitating an interchange whereby each individual's productivity benefits from knowledge gained from colleagues. ... A second level of shared externality benefits is from the environment in the community within which the firm or household lives. ... These community characteristics can include low crime rates, good public health, democratic processes, political stability and other characteristics. (McMahon, 1999:6)

Quoting a 1988 study of Hungary, Carron and Carr-Hill believe that the individual learning within a community setting can be justification enough for adult education,

regardless of any specific learning outcome or qualification; “learning in the socio-cultural life sphere” and the collective experience are the key feature of the benefits that are gained (Carron and Carr-Hill, 1991:31). Shute and Reimer also focus on a participatory process above the content of the education.

Participation is the primary principle in the radical model of social change. This radical model views conflict, defined as a manifestation of the need for change, as potentially creative. In contrast to the previous two paradigms, great effort is made by transformational approaches to involve marginalized groups. The techniques used by transformational strategies are participatory, dialogical, process-oriented, and empowering. (Shute and Reimer, 1996:116)

It appears from commentary and the case studies that adult education can support stabilization of a group particularly where the individual is drawn to a more active role within the community, with outcomes being that the adult education can “increase social cohesion, reduce crime and improve income distribution” (Seitz, 2004:48). This is usually a positive outcome but Torres reminds us that there are contradictory constructs of the individual / community relationship.

Therefore, any discussion of educational reform; the relationships between teachers, students, and administrators; curriculum policy and work; teachers' training; educational financing; multiculturalism; citizenship; democratic education; or educational policy in general involves competing and contradictory views and perceptions of the relationships between the individual and the community, a basic tension in the constitution of Western thought. (Torres, 1998:63)

Jeffs and Smith use four features to define a group: associational structure; commitment to others; mutual aid; sense of belonging and identity (Jeffs and Smith, 1996:31-2) and it is noteworthy that these can be applied to both positive and negative effect. In the societies recovering from conflict in the case studies, adult education has been used to directly support groups that seek the positive outcomes. Community-based learning organizations received assistance from international organizations in Bosnia, and in some cases the expectation was that the group would continue to represent and act for the community even once the learning activity had ended.

Community participation as part of strategies for people-centred development has been put forward as representing potential hope in addressing the global development crisis. And linked to this, voluntary and community-based organisations, non-governmental organisations and people's movements have been identified as having potentially vital and radical contributions. (Mayo, 1995:15)

In Iraq, the US invested heavily in communities and RTI ran adult education programmes whose primary outcomes were to learn the skills required for democratic community participation:

From 2003 to 2004, RTI won an up to \$167 million contract to 'foster democratic local government in Iraq'; it spent some \$156 million. ... In April 2004, RTI won a one-year extension on its USAID contract, 'worth up to \$154 million.' A North Carolina paper reported that RTI was 'helping provincial, town and neighborhood councils learn to govern democratically' and also 'helping workers learn how to provide services such as water and sewer and garbage collection.' In Iraq, RTI works with 'more than 300 local councils and all 18 provincial governments,' with its staff of 'about 2,200 Iraqis and 220 foreign workers.' (Sourcewatch)

It can be seen that there is a tightly interwoven relationship between the adult education being provided, the development of stable communities and the governance of the education process within a community. As a result, and as UNESCO notes, education is important in capacity building for communities:

Teachers, youth and adult educators should be drawn from the community, providing psycho-social benefits to the learners and to the community as a whole. Capacity-building for the community's role in school management should begin with in-service training of teachers and training of school management committees, **from the earliest stage of the emergency** [emphasis added]. (UNESCO, 2005:2)

However, in societies recovering from conflict, group identity can be problematic – as Mehreteab, referring to Eritrea but with more universal applicability, starkly stated: "The truth is that during transition periods, war-torn societies tend to remain extremely polarised. The extremist factions of warring parties constantly strive to undermine the peace accords" (Mehreteab, 2000:73).

Collective identity, which may be strengthened by an individual completing adult education, could be a source of division with difficulties resulting from defining membership of the group, and an increased chance of groups competing against each other. Cockburn, quoted by Davies, notes that ethnic movements build from such groups: "they mobilise culture, tradition, religion and notions of history and place to evoke a sense of unity" (Davies, 2008:30) – as seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular. Davies also reminds us that the term 'community' implies a distinct group, with the implication of difference at its heart:

Yet within plural societies, these imagined, almost symbolic or metaphorical unities are still constraining thinking and leading to dangerous labelling. 'Community' has a nice feel, with the image of the meeting hall, the village

shop, the neighbours, the self-help. ... This is mythological, but also has the problem of boundaries and where one 'community' begins and another ends. And, as Sen points out, the 'well-integrated' community where residents do great things for each other, can be the very same that throws bricks through the windows of immigrants. ...community, like an essentialist identity, connotes an essentialist grouping of people who somehow have common and distinct values, lifestyles and claims. (Davies, 2008:78)

If adult education is to enhance security at the community level, it must take account of its potential to simultaneously stabilize and de-stabilize. It appears from this study that the education that is most likely to be stabilizing is usually that which operates more slowly, dealing with the complex issues underpinning identity and values rather than using the positive bonding of the individual adult learners to achieve short-term effects within a narrowly defined 'in-group'. World Bank studies note this risk of simultaneously building social capital and exacerbating conflict among groups (World Bank, 2005:9) and Chandler illustrates how Gellner predicted in his book *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* that ethnicity groupings would de-stabilize Eastern Europe after the Cold War, including in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Since 1989 the future of Eastern Europe has often been posed in stark terms with the question of ethnicity as central. For example, the late Ernest Gellner, a leading authority on nationalism, saw the challenge facing Eastern Europe as that of two competing ideologies. Either 'civil society' would win out or the region would fall victim to 'the powerful ethnic passions' (1994, p 126). His prognosis for the region was a negative one; while civil society could not easily be created, ethnic nationalism could be easily ignited.... (Chandler, 2000:24)

In her work on countering extremism, which is de-stabilizing simultaneously for individuals and communities, Davies notes the features of adult education that will be successful:

The most efficient value-for-money way to protect against extremism is the combination of

- engaging in learning side by side in integrated settings
- having an emphasis on commonality, although not blunt nationalism such as Britishness, nor the pretence that all religions have truth in common
- working together for common goals, whether in school or contact programmes
- honesty and critical dialogue about belief systems as well as about social and economic inequality as between groups. (Davies, 2008:98)

The shared social setting and the exposure of underpinning values are equally important to the educative effect but this was not always a priority for international organizations in the case studies. Bourdieu categorized the assets an individual possessed into three primary groups: economic, social and cultural capital. Learning –

as an activity that takes place within a group and that strengthens the community – contributes to the acquisition of social capital, while the content of the adult education programme may contribute to the store of either economic or cultural capital.

McClenaghan claims that social capital can be used to strengthen inequality and exclusion:

... Social capital, on the other hand, he defines as the 'aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition' (Bourdieu, 1986, p 248). ... Hence, social capital endows holders with advantages and opportunities accruing through membership in certain communities and it is an important means whereby social inequality and social exclusion are reproduced. (McClenaghan, 2000:568)

She also notes that many reviews of social capital emphasize a conservative, socially cohesive model. However, adult education can be used to mobilize a community and build its assets and this can result in a different and more beneficial form of social capital being developed.

Whatever it defines, in all these analyses social capital is used in such a way as to place the main emphasis upon social cohesion; an emphasis which gives the analysis a profoundly functionalist and socially conservative bent in that it discounts community organisation and mobilisation in defence of citizenship rights and the political articulation of rights-based demands which inevitably generate conflict, in favour of activities designed to enhance social cohesiveness and, by implication, social control. ... In communities with lower volumes of total capital, educational provision which will help to make apparent these structured capital relations, which supports community mobilisation to combat processes of exclusion grounded in these relations and which enhances the economic and human capital potential of community actors, becomes vital. (McClenaghan, 2000:580)

In building social capital through adult education, Putnam (2002:9-12) suggests that there is a qualitative aspect that must be assessed as there are four different types of social capital: formal (memberships, regulations, etc.) versus informal; thick versus thin, depending on the amount and strength of ties within the group; inward-looking versus outward-looking (determined through who primarily benefits from the group's activities); and, bridging versus bonding. Some social capital is more valuable than others and thick, outward-looking, bridging forms will take the most investment to generate.

The values underpinning the adult education provided in a society recovering from conflict will be instrumental in determining whether it supports community stability or contributes to de-stabilization by further separating different groups. Sen acknowledges these social values:

Social values can play – and have played – an important part in the success of various forms of social organization, including the market mechanism, democratic politics, elementary civil and political rights, provision of basic public goods, and institutions for public action and protest. (Sen, 1999:261)

Similarly, but using the language of principles, social integration is promoted through social policy. All three case studies, but particularly from Cambodia, show that adult education that will be successful in increasing security if it adheres to these principles:

to foster societies that are safe, stable and just; promote respect for diversity; achieve equity between women and men; foster tolerance and protect human rights; and enhance the participation of all groups of people in their economies, societies and natural environments – including the poor, vulnerable and disadvantaged. (Overseas Development Institute, 2000:3)

However, it is important to apply these generic principles in a way that is specific to the context of the particular society. A social worker operating in support of the Australian military listed 11 elements that were essential to community development, highlighting the need to reflect “site specific conditions”, community ownership, involvement participation and empowerment (Baschiera, 1999:29-30). These apply equally to adult education, mirroring the social policy principles, above.

Incorporating these values and principles into adult education will tend towards more stable outcomes within and between communities in societies recovering from conflict, but there are also structural features that will support security when groups are formerly fragmented:

Arendt Lijphart, contends that in order to promote bargaining and compromise, consociational systems need to contain four institutional arrangements: 'segmental autonomy', generally involving the adoption of a federal structure when groups are geographically concentrated; minority or mutual veto powers that guarantee no group will be outvoted by the majority when its vital interests are at stake; an inclusive grand coalition government; and proportional representation in public administration and the allocation of resources. (Belloni, 2004:336)

Applied in the context of adult education, multiple programmes could be created for different social groups in a federated structure with common, overarching features and there should be proportional allocation of resources to fund the programmes. Such structures can be put into effect at all levels of an educational system, down to community level. Sen places community freedom at the heart of the development process which underpins much adult education in post-conflict societies, seeing expanding freedom as both an end and a means:



In this approach, expansion of freedom is viewed as both (1) the *primary end* and (2) the *principal means* of development. They can be called respectively the 'constitutive role' and the 'instrumental role' of freedom in development. The constitutive role of freedom relates to the substantive freedom in enriching human life. The substantive freedoms include elementary capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivations as starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as well as the freedoms that are associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and so on. In this constitutive perspective, development involves expansion of these and other basic freedoms. Development, in this view, is the process of expanding human freedoms, and the assessment of development has to be informed by this consideration. (Sen, 1999:36)

Thus, the nature of adult education and the specific context in which it is delivered are important factors in determining the extent to which it will stabilize or de-stabilize a community. These communities, however, are not the same as the public sphere or nation in which an individual lives and I will now consider whether adult education contributes to security at the level of the state.

Hence the public sphere is distinct from the state; it is, in Habermas's definition – which Fraser criticizes as not wholly satisfactory – a body of private individuals constituting a public through deliberation and discursive interaction. The concept of the public sphere, as Fraser (1997) aptly notes, cannot be equated with the concept of community. (Torres, 1998:19)

### **9.3 THE STATE**

It is commonly assumed that the over-riding role of a government is to protect the state, and physical security – being able to protect the territory and people from violent interference – is taken as the primary purpose of a national government. Provision of such physical security is regarded as an essential pre-requisite of any functioning state and is a key element of sovereign power. In a society recovering from conflict, the focus is often on recovering the capacity to provide physical security as the first step in establishing a newly functioning state (UN Development Programme, 2002:86); many international actors are likely to be involved, but state building is a limited activity:

Since internal conflict is essentially a pathology of the state, state-building should be at the heart of peace efforts in collapsed states. It is important to note that 'state-building' is not synonymous with 'nation-building', a more expansive goal which involves rehabilitating the economy and reestablishing (sic) civil society. Nation-building should be the primary responsibility of local leaders, not of foreign intermediaries. International aid and assistance may be needed, but it should be co-ordinated with, and not divert attention from, the central goal of achieving sustainable security or reconstructing the minimum elements of a state. (Baker and Weller, 1998:12)

Of note, 'state' is frequently used for a formal entity defined through specification of territory, the population that is governed, the exercise of sovereign rights and legal or political recognition while 'nation' is a less legalistic concept that covers such things as perceptions of shared culture, language and belonging.

Once physical security is in place, state building functions of a less recognizable nature may be addressed. Watson notes that teachers are usually a visible manifestation of the government's effectiveness and the mere presence of teachers can be a symbol of a state's power. "In most countries of the world, the teacher is either a civil servant or is a public servant employed by a national Teaching Commission. As such, therefore, he/she is very much an agent of the state with legal responsibilities" (Watson, 1996:168).

After defence, education is often the next function by which a new government demonstrates its influence. Education is also a tool through which the government exercises its authority over its people, described as persuading the majority and coercing others (Skey, 1998:3), and creates the new components of a viable state, which Mackinlay says will have been damaged:

After years of internal conflict, the infrastructure of the host nation will be changed and diminished in its effectiveness and facilities. In addition to the visible installations that facilitate communications, trade, and good government, there may be unseen damage that also reduces the speed of long-term rebuilding plans. National education programs probably have been suspended, reducing the pool of educated labor. (Mackinlay, 1996:18)

This damage will be addressed by an increase in educational activity, which Green caveats may also be a means of enforcing an existing hegemony:

Countries involved in domestic and international wars and conflicts generally experience a centralization of power and the efforts of reconstruction after such conflicts also, typically, necessitate enhanced activity on the part of the state. ... The importance of education in this process of state formation is evident. The major impetus for the creation of national education systems lay in the need to provide the state with trained administrators, engineers and military personnel, to spread the dominant cultures and inculcate popular ideologies of nationhood, to forge the political and cultural unity of the burgeoning nation states and to cement the ideological hegemony of their dominant classes. (Green, 1997:34-5)

Historically, there are examples of new governments controlling education and this was also seen in the more recent case studies here. In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority disagreed with local governing council members over the extent to which State Owned Enterprises (that had traditionally provided the majority of adult vocational

learning) should be replaced in the educational field by deregulated private concerns. Similarly, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, attempts to place adult education at the national level failed with each ethnic Entity eventually retaining control.

Where the process of state formation was particularly compacted and intensive, so too was the development of national education. Typically, where countries were forced into accelerated state formation, either by revolution as in France or America, or by territorial conflict and defensive nationalism as in Prussia, or simply by the desire to reverse a history of economic underdevelopment relative to some dominant power, education was pressed into service by the state as an essential vehicle of national development. (Green, 1997:135)

As in nineteenth century Europe, rapid educational growth today is often associated with countries undergoing peculiarly intensive periods of state formation. In many cases this has been induced by crises of national identity born of war, national division and social transformation. (Ibid:144)

Adult education in Cambodia was criticized by international figures for favouring Khmer culture and language to the exclusion of Vietnamese and other minority ethnic groups – demonstrating the importance of education to nation building:

The situation as regards education and citizen formation is perhaps more complex. From a global perspective, it would appear that forming citizens and shaping national identities is still one of the primary functions of education in most countries. National curricula still tend to place great emphasis on national languages and cultures. History is used to popularize national myths and to promote national identities; literature to celebrate the national language and literary achievements; and civic and moral education to instil national values and notions of good citizenship. (Green, 1997:183)

Another example from Cambodia illustrates that in periods when a society is recovering from conflict, education for returning refugees is required to enable them to settle fully into society. This was seen as a weakness in establishing the new Cambodian state: “While repatriation had been a success, the returnees had not been integrated into Cambodian society” (Farris, 1994:46).

International groups that are supporting a society recovering from conflict may wish to impose a particular model of adult education to strengthen the fragile state structures, particularly if they regard such state weakness as a threat to the wider world:

In the international system, stateness has been under attack and eroded de facto for a variety of reasons. States throughout the less-developed world are weak, and the end of the Cold War led to the emergence of a band of failed and troubled states from Europe to South Asia. These weak states have posed threats to international order because they are the source of conflict and grave abuses of human rights and because they have become potential breeding

grounds for a new kind of terrorism that can reach into the developed world. (Fukuyama, 2004:162)

However, Skey agrees with Gellner that they must operate in this respect through the state: “Gellner argues that the state has the primary role in cementing the national culture – notably through the education system, as no other body (private or public) retains the necessary human or economic resources” (Skey, 1998:4).

Once it has established physical security and set the cultural and identity boundaries for the new or recovering state, a government will seek economic stability. Adult education is, once again, a large lever for changing the economic status of a nation. The World Bank regards countries with skilled labour and a limited dependence on primary commodities as being at less risk of conflict and adult education is instrumental in helping people develop the new skills:

Where dependence on primary commodity exports is reduced to less than 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), the risk of conflict falls to 10 percent. Economic diversification requires the development of new and flexible skills and competences that require a functioning and efficient education system. (World Bank, 2005:8-9)

Rata notes that the purpose of education will be changed “As the nation-state shifts from its role as a site of politics to a site of administration on behalf of the market, the purpose of education also changes.” (Rata, 2012:109). This may be related to the manpower requirements of the labour market (Maliyamkono *et al.*, 1982:3), a trend that does not impress Kazamias, who is not considering only post-conflict states:

In order for contemporary nation-states to participate effectively and competitively in the world economic system, modern systems of education, as state-steering mechanisms, are called upon to emphasize certain types of educational knowledge and culture at the expense of conventional others. ... From socio-cultural enclaves, one of whose main functions has been the construction of persons, and citizens with cultivated 'minds and souls', they are being metamorphosed into sites for the production of instrumental knowledge and marketable skills. (Kazamias, 2001:2)

If it is successful, the adult education that is provided in post-conflict societies will lead to a diverse and developed skills base that allows people to participate in growing areas of the economy. The type and nature of the skills will differ in each situation (as illustrated in section 9.1) but the emphasis should be on future areas of interest rather than reverting to the outputs that helped survival during the conflict or to primary subsistence.

... Achieving macroeconomic stability is essential for the transition from a highly distorted; survival oriented war economy to a more household-friendly market and livelihood-oriented economy and for providing the basis for sustainable economic recovery and growth. (Mehreteab, 2000:73)

Bock and Papagiannis noted in 1983 that the population will also want opportunities to participate in national development beyond the economic imperative (Bock and Papagiannis, 1983:4). Adult education is often the most obvious and available route to achieving this and Gorard et al echo Bock's argument more recently:

As well as leading to economic competitiveness (perhaps) and social mobility (probably), education is nearly always a genuinely transformative experience for an individual (Lewis, 1993), and one that impacts on the local community. Learning should not therefore be viewed as an escape route from anything, but a normal part of an accomplished life in a democratic society. (Gorard, Selwyn and Williams, 2000:154)

In recent international interventions in societies recovering from conflict, initiatives to strengthen democracy have been used to stabilize the state. Democratic values can be demonstrated indirectly to an adult participating and sharing in education and there is less need for specific curricular content:

...the democratic strength of education is not found in the content. Fundamentally, it is not about adding a 'democracy' course to the curriculum ... nor one about human rights or anti-sexism. ... Democratization is communication between differences, recognition of the differences without transforming them into inequality: women cannot be incorporated into democracy without recognizing them as being different from men, and the indigenous peoples will not be complete citizens if the contribution of their distinct history and culture is not recognized and respected, the same with young people who are not strange but different. (Grossi, 1994:72-5)

While it is possible for women to fully participate in democratic societies both as women and as citizens (as they choose), adult education can support democracy by challenging stereotypes and by giving adults the structures and space to explore the rights of groups of citizens and their relationship to state authorities. The Cambodia case study, in particular, demonstrates this and the words of the authors in the two books below remain valid.

Suffice to say difference is at the heart of the nationalist debate, as exemplified by the requirement of each national community to possess its own demarcated territory, protected by immutable borders that may be used to classify who belongs. ... Stereotypes are a prime way of cementing one's own identity by stigmatising 'others' as having negative traits or attributes. As Eriksen writes 'stereotypes contribute to defining one's own group in relation to others by providing a tidy 'map' of the social world.' (Skey, 1998:4)

Education extends the claims of the state's authority over and above that of previous primordial subgroup allegiances and establishes the essential exchange relationship of citizenship's rights and obligations to those newly incorporated elements. ... However, this process of educational institutionalization operates in both directions. ...the result is often intense competition between rival groups for control of education. (Bock and Papagiannis, 1983:176)

As described below, Ikpe defines state fragility as a combination of capacity and resilience. Adult education has the potential to increase an individual's ability to adapt and gives groups the tools to manage conflict. It can, therefore, be a useful means of reducing fragility and it directly stabilizes at the state level.

State fragility is a continuum. ... From a human security perspective, state fragility matters whether or not it affects international security. The key characteristics of fragile countries (variously described as weak, frail, failing, failed or as difficult partners and poor performers) is their instability and lack of responsiveness to human needs. From this perspective, fragility has to do with the capacity of the state to adapt to changed circumstances, protect citizens, absorb shocks and manage conflict without resort to violence. (Ikpe, 2007:86)

The resilience of the state must be supported to improve international peace and stability and, in particular, international threats from food shortage and the development crises which can be addressed through adult education must be tackled at the state level:

A discourse then, on international peacekeeping strategies must address the role of national peacekeeping since the interdependency of states is itself contingent on the integrity of national security. ... Furthermore, since the global food shortage, climate change, and the development crisis are impending systemic crises that threaten international peace ... The three crises threatening international peace also pose a serious threat to the individual national security of any given state. (Campbell and Campbell, 2012:19)

Kostic, too, sees nation building as consisting of components in which adult education plays a role:

Statebuilding, social integration through identity creation, democratisation and reconciliatory processes are regarded as the constituent elements of contemporary nationbuilding. The term statebuilding refers to the formation of viable political, legal, economic and administrative institutions enabling the state to function efficiently and with a capacity to provide public goods for its population, assume a monopoly on violence and independently control its territory. Social integration entails the incorporation of existing loosely associated groups into a common society with an overarching identity by means of cultural unification and standardisation. Common symbols, language, education and mass media are generally seen as the key requirements for successful establishment of a national political identity. In recent times academics also include reconciliation as an aspect of nationbuilding after civil wars. (Kostic, 2008:385)

By establishing adult education provision, a government will have demonstrated its control of some aspects of state building (through administrative systems) and by providing a 'public good'. Realist theorists described in section 4.8 would expect that functioning states would exert such influence and this section of analysis would take primacy over the other four dimensions considered in this chapter. The examples above show how adult education can promote cultural unification and social identification, while its role in supporting political change and democracy has also been explained. Thus, adult education may contribute to strengthening a state and this will help support stabilization and security. Ultimately, however, a state that has a vibrant approach to adult education is likely to be stable because learning is at the heart of national life:

In the debates of the learning society, there can be seen characteristics signifying the central ideas and ideals. Although the learning society cannot be defined unambiguously, these ideas can be summed up as follows: lifelong learning and human growth penetrate the aims and activities of all social institutions .... every social activity advances lifelong learning, and each institution and group stimulates and allows its members to learn .... learning opportunities are actively offered to adults throughout their lives, and adults are encouraged to solve the problems in their personal lives and at work by active, reflexive processes of learning. (Koski, 2006:187)

This section has shown that adult education can stabilize a state by influencing economic development, demonstrating the influence of a functioning state, supporting the cultural life of the people and developing skills required for different social groups to engage constructively. In this way, education interventions are a significant lever in post-conflict societies and they merit investment alongside more traditional measures that support the physical security of a state.

#### **9.4 THE REGION**

In the three case studies, the influence of neighbouring countries has been important for the state's development: Bosnia-Herzegovina was affected by varying levels of ethnic tension in Croatia and Serbia; Iraq had to account for former regime links to Syria and its consideration of the needs of Kurds within the state reflected the Kurdish presence in bordering countries; and, in Cambodia, trade matters and the presence of refugees abroad were of national interest for years after the Paris Peace Agreement. The extent to which adult education has a regional dimension will reflect the historical and geographic ties in the specific case but it is likely that regional factors will have a part to play.

Given the importance – highlighted in the previous section – that education has as an indicator of state sovereignty and national identity it is not surprising that there are sensitivities around regional actors influencing a country's education system. Thus, the European Union's powers are limited in this area although it is able to act on adult education:

Supra-national bodies like the EU have limited power to interfere with national education systems. The Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act, for instance, gave the European Community limited competence in the field of education, restricting it from direct provision and prescriptions about the detail of school curricula. The main scope for action lay in the field of vocational education which the Commission has interpreted widely to mean all post-compulsory education. Articles 126 and 127 of the Maastricht Treaty provided the EU with a more explicit mandate for action but still largely within the post-compulsory sector and in relation to education and the economy. (Green, 1997:179)

Given that the UN now often relies on regional organizations to conduct interventions on its behalf, we must acknowledge that the regional actors are rarely neutral to the conflict and the subsequent post-conflict society.

Regional organizations reflect the interests of the region, often compounded by the predominance of one or more strong actors. ... Thus it remains important for the UN to secure a degree of authority over the actions of regional organizations, to monitor their actions and ensure that effectiveness will not come at the cost of injustice and non-compliance with UN prerogatives. (Schnabel and Carment, 1999:12)

Schnabel and Carment note that the regional organizations must be constrained to ensure justice and compliance with 'UN prerogatives' but these boundaries can be difficult to define in an environment where the values are disputed (or at least subject to negotiation in a society recovering from conflict). Adult education can have a stabilizing effect on a region where it can spread awareness of common values across that region, such as building a respect for the rights of minorities rather than regarding them as misplaced people from a neighbouring country. However, this must be contextualized and tailored for the specific situation, as shown for peace education:

Gavriel Salomon (Salomon/Nevo 2002, 5 et seq.) believes the generalisation and universalisation of peace education concepts to be confusing anyway, and expressly advocates a context-related differentiation of peace education into at least three very different categories: peace education in regions with intractable, ongoing violent conflicts; peace education in regions of interethnic tension; peace education in regions of experienced tranquillity. (Seitz, 2004:18)



There was little evidence of regional involvement in Iraq in the post-conflict period as the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority preferred to contract internationally while the regional neighbours in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been responsible in part for the break-up of that state and tended to support factional interests if they became involved. In Cambodia, neighbours' primary interests were in returning refugees to their country of origin and re-establishing the trade balance in the area. Some adult education programmes in Cambodia claimed to teach English language specifically to facilitate trade: "The claim that English is the 'commercial language' of the region also requires questioning. ... The Chinese have been trading with Cambodian (sic) since the Angkorean era without the aid of English" (Clayton, 2004:92).

Where neighbouring countries have pursued their own interests at the expense of the overall strengthening of the country recovering from conflict, as they will usually do, it can result in problems with the regional approach:

In practice, however, the experience of regional organisations in conflict prevention and settlement has not been an impressive one. This has reflected inadequate resources, inadequate mechanisms to tackle conflicts once they arise and Superpower domination within regions. (United Nations Association (UK), 1993:19)

By contrast, though, the lack of involvement of states is also problematic within a region. Arguably, had the US ignored its own issues over relations with certain of the neighbours and built into its plans for the reconstruction of Iraq a regional dimension that addressed underlying sectarian divisions, a more inter-connected region would have been more stable and Iraq could have been more secure – with less need to protect against regional threats and shared rather than competitive economic development. Dobbins et al acknowledge that the absence of regional states makes it more difficult for a society to recover from conflict and Hopkins reminds us that there is self-interest for a neighbouring state to support regional stability:

Third, political, ethnic, and sectarian fragmentation and lack of support from neighboring states are important hindrances to successful nation-building. (Dobbins *et al.*, 2003:195)

Thus among the principal benefits of humanitarian efforts for peacekeeping are enhanced stability within a region and reduced burdens on neighbouring states. (Hopkins, 1999:80)

Adult education that seeks to stabilize must be sensitive to the regional factors at play in both negative and positive ways. The impact of adult education on neighbouring

states should also be forecast and, whenever possible, these countries should be invited to become involved in a constructive manner for their own long-term security.

## 9.5 THE INTERNATIONAL BODIES

Aside from the regional dimension, we often find that international bodies become involved in adult education in societies recovering from conflict, usually as part of a wider peacekeeping or stabilization effort. These groups have been engaged in delivering various types of 'peace education', which has aimed to develop security at the international rather than regional, national, community or individual level. Straightforward forms of peace education were included in adult education programmes in Cambodia, mostly incorporated into other parts of the curriculum but usually including at least one of the goals identified as necessary by Hinde:

How then can education for peace help to achieve co-operative international relations involving trust? What subgoals should we seek? The following seem clearly crucial:... Promotion of a general appreciation that alternative styles of international relations are possible. ...Creation in individuals of an awareness that a new ethic in international relations is possible - an ethic that does not condone the flaunting or use of military or economic power to achieve national advantage. ... Increasing familiarity with other nations. ...Positive efforts to personalize those who live under other systems, to portray them as individuals. (Hinde, 1989:49-50)

The knowledge components concerning the operation of the international system must be supplemented by more attitudinal elements that assist in developing trust between different groups if the peace education programme is to increase international stability. Synthesis of these attitudinal elements is demanding of the teaching staff but the essence can be included in many distinct programmes:

This means that in teaching the approach should be a global one, irrespective of the subject of the learning, and that the contents of peace education should be included in all teaching activities. Introduction of this peace education approach in adult education on a large scale requires a new kind of training of adult educators. (Kekkonen, 1986:52)

The concept of peace education has evolved to reflect a more globalized approach and an increasingly sophisticated understanding of what might be achieved. Thus, UNESCO uses the term 'peace-building education' which is more extensive than the traditional understanding (Seitz, 2004:56) and Fujikane considers peace education to be only one part of a wider 'global education' that includes development education, multicultural education and education for international understanding:

The shift in worldviews, from the system of nation states towards more complex relations among states and other agencies, is important in renewing earlier educational aspirations. The acknowledgement of the changing nature of international system (sic) itself is generating educational imperatives to teach about the new world. Departure from the older visions about nation states is giving new hope and new tasks to education. New debates on 'global education' have thus emerged. (Fujikane, 2003:143)

In delivering more stability at an international level, rights and values have taken more prominence within this more widely scoped form of peace education and these are a priority for international bodies intervening in societies recovering from conflict: "The universal values of democracy and rights have today been asserted as the new priorities of international relations, important to defend both for self-interested reasons of global security and as good and noble causes in themselves" (Chandler, 2000:28).

These values can, of course, exist independently of the territorial boundaries of a nation state and Arjun Appadurai and others no longer view the world from a physical perspective, preferring to categorize according to ethnic groups (ethnoscapes), technological similarity (technoscapes), financial links (finascapes), shared communications (mediascapes) and – perhaps the least tangible – by 'ideascape'. If promotion of security is through these scapes, peace education must operate across similar borders:

11 September merely brought to light trends which had been apparent long before the Twin Towers attack. For in financial and social worlds security is *despatialized* too. Insecurity is grounded increasingly in the plasticity of power. The fluidity of world politics has given rise to a number of risk communities in which we all live, even those of us who still tend to think in territorial terms. Arjun Appadurai differentiates the globe into different socio-economic and cultural 'scapes' in which goods and peoples are mobile as never before. (Coker, 2003:9)

Thakur acknowledges that such an analytical framework and holistic encapsulation create complexity for those trying to reduce instability and provide more security but adult education is, in fact, a more useful tool to address these security factors than traditional economic or military levers:

The border between the domestic and the international has become increasingly irrelevant with such a holistic approach. Analysts of the security problematique are likely in the next century to be grappling simultaneously with problems of internal social cohesion, regime capacity and brittleness, failed states, economic development, structural adjustment, gender relations, ethnic identity, external threats, and transnational and global problems like AIDS, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, terrorism, child soldiers, child prostitution and so on. (Thakur, 1999:3)

In considering the international dimension to adult education for stabilization, there are myriad organizations that are likely to be involved. These organizations are supra-national and their activities fall within an idealist theoretical perspective, described in section 4.8. Some actors are formally constituted global bodies, such as the World Bank or UNESCO but multinational companies and both relief and development NGOs (of all sizes) operate in the adult education sphere, sometimes formally contracted or seconded to a global entity (UNESCO, 2005:3). Merely by their presence, these groups bring an awareness of the outside world to the post-conflict society and this contributes to the peace education goals listed above, despite the fact they may be operating without a mandate, for example when dealing with IDPs (International Institute for Educational Planning, :2-6). However, there is always a potential risk that local actors will pervert the international efforts, which may not be co-ordinated, and this can undermine the stabilization effect:

In the neoliberal model of globalization, educational policies are internationally promoted according to agendas defined by multinational and bilateral organizations like the World Bank, the IMF, or the IDB (Interamerican Development Bank), as well as some agencies of the United Nations. ... It has been some time since adult education was abandoned by the State as training for the traditional (industrial) workforce. Many programs remain in the hands of the business community. (Torres, 2006:6)

Another dimension of the new conflict zone was the hugely increased involvement of international emergency relief and long-term development programmes. The warlords had less respect for international agencies that had to operate in territory they controlled. Not only were they extremely adept at seizing the cargoes that were useful, but in many cases they did it in a way that encouraged the flow of relief to continue. (Mackinlay, 2000:56)

International staff within these organisations will also come into contact with local people and play a role in bridging the specific circumstances with the worldwide context. It is interesting that international staff working in education will usually have a lower profile than others involved in development or security interventions but they can, nevertheless, have a significant impact on local people:

Educational planners in flak jackets are increasingly present in crisis nations, reminding colleagues of their responsibilities beyond the span of an adrenaline rush. These quieter heroes, however, do not appear on the nightly news or make guest appearances on talk shows. They represent many international agencies, including UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, NORAD and USAID, as well as NGOs. These clearer but quieter voices rarely command the priority attention accorded the athletes of relief assistance. Who wants to listen to the teacher in the middle of a violent conflict? It is clear that a special courage is required on the part of the new heroes to think beyond the next crisis to establishing enduring participatory relationships as neighbours, business partners and parents. (Vargas-Baron and McClure, 1998:275)

The curriculum, individuals and agencies described above have had an internationalizing effect that can contribute towards stabilization in societies recovering from conflict but there are examples from Iraq and Cambodia where the intervention had different outcomes for women. In the case of Iraq, the international influence on local power structures tended to exclude women and their position was, in comparison with the secular former regime, less progressive and more insecure:

The experiences of Iraqi women under sanctions showed that international politics, more than has assumed (sic), are intervening directly in social processes, and that gender and gender relations are constructed as a result of the interplay between the global and the local levels. The painful case of sanctions in Iraq ended without any substantial political gain. However, they 'effectively' disrupted the social fabric of the Iraqi society, marginalized the roles of Iraqi women in the society and the family, and reversed their position into backwardness. (Husein, 2005:Abstract)

By contrast, adult education programmes for female refugees in Cambodia were instrumental in promoting the position of women in society and many achieved more stability:

Education and training of women and their participation in refugee camp activities can prepare them to assume leadership roles in postconflict societies. The international community should support education and training programs for women in refugee camps, enabling women to acquire new skills, experience, and vision to help reconstruct gender relations – and their country – upon their return to society. (Kumar, Baldwin and Benjamin, 2000:1)

Similarly, for postgraduate students, there can be a stabilizing effect from the international approach taken towards their education. In many societies recovering from conflict, particularly when the domestic capacity to provide higher education has been depleted, overseas scholarships may be linked to development aid programmes. The international donor country may support such schemes to foster a sense of international community and build diplomatic cohesion, indirectly shaping the appetite and attitude required for successful development. Meanwhile, recipient nations are likely to want access for their people to higher level learning, probably on courses that are not available locally such as in science and technical subjects (Maliyamkono *et al.*, 1982:7).

Adult education certainly has a part to play in developing security at the international level, which Williams notes must address the links between its formative disciplines (Williams, 2000:190). He uses the term “global human security” to capture the idea:

The UNDP ... ‘talks of “Global Human Security”, viewing Human Security as complementary to Human Development – the latter “a process of widening the range of people’s choices” and the security aspect ensuring “that people can exercise these choices safely and freely”. (Williams, 2000:187)

While individual adult education programmes will support human development, the international involvement augments the chances of Human Security being achieved as well. However, the tendency for international influence to be used to shape a society recovering from conflict is not by definition always going to be a stabilizing factor. Hinnebusch notes that this is a key weakness in the theoretical model underpinning the international approach: “The big weakness shared by all versions of [Hegemonic Stability Theory] is that they do not convincingly explain why the hegemon should use its preponderant power in a *stabilizing* way, whether this be interpreted as serving global, national, or ruling-class interests.” (Hinnebusch, 2006:305)

At the international level, simply engaging in adult education may promote awareness of the wider world and have a stabilizing effect. However, developing a rights- and values-based approach within a global human security perspective and ensuring that international efforts are co-ordinated will support adult education as a stabilizing force within a globalized world.

The international dimension is the final of five levels of society that should be considered, with the others being the region, the state, the community and – of course – the learner. In the next three sections, these dimensions are used as an analytical framework and applied to adult education examples from each of the three country case studies, with the first being Cambodia.

## **9.6 APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: CAMBODIA**

In the case study in Chapter 5, I gave examples of providing English language courses as part of adult education programmes in Cambodia. The effect of these programmes on security and stability can be assessed against the five dimensions above. There is no discernible effect on community security in this example where Khmer would be the universal shared language. However, at an individual level, learning English could lead to economic advantage for the learner. Members of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces were paid directly by the Australian government while they attended English language training courses and mastery of English, even at a rudimentary level, could increase the chance of securing employment with one of the international organizations or NGOs that were part of the UN-led intervention. In addition, some professionals increased their employability and ability to engage in global debate by accessing

professional literature and journals (more likely to be published or conducted in English rather than Khmer). Thus, English classes contributed to increased stability for some at the individual level although there was also some de-stabilizing effect at the state level through distortion of the labour market: professionals sometimes took lucrative jobs in unskilled roles with international organizations in favour of nationally more important work in their professional field.

At the regional level, Australia deliberately promoted use of English with a number of its partners in order to facilitate training exchanges with Australian Defence Forces but also to provide a common language that could be used in bilateral discussions between regional countries. For example, a course to prepare Australian and Cambodian military personnel for UN peacekeeping tasks was conducted in English and attended by six other nationalities. In this context, English acted as a neutral language of equal standing in all the countries involved and it allowed dialogue between Vietnamese and Cambodian nationals who would be reluctant to use each other's language (even though each probably spoke and understood some).

Through the lens of the international bodies, courses such as the UNITAR intervention that focused on the rights of children and women built on pre-existing competence in English, hence using the transmission and study of these values to build stability. Language learning almost always incorporates some cultural learning (not always by design) and having access to English vocabulary can, in some cases, permit discussion of concepts and values that may be defined differently or not at all in the first tongue. Taking a non-geographical perspective, access to and membership of the 'mediascape' grouping is predicated on a common language and it is still the case that the majority of internet websites are in English. In Chapter 5, I questioned Storella's blunt assertion that the level of English language competence had boosted Singapore's economy while reducing the fortunes of the Philippines, but having citizens who have studied other languages always creates at least the potential for trade and economic activity with a wider range of markets and, thus, international engagement is likely to be strengthened. In summary, stability and security have been enhanced by English language training at the individual, regional and international levels with a slightly negative effect at state level and neutral impact within communities.

## **9.7 APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

In Chapter 6, I illustrated how various adult education programmes had conflict resolution and nation building as their focus. It is interesting to note that OSCE rather than UNESCO was given the lead for supporting education in Bosnia-Herzegovina and this was because education was regarded as integrally linked to political decision making as the post-conflict state established itself. OSCE viewed education as a conflict prevention tool and plans explicitly recognized the potential of education to mitigate political and ethnic violence, thereby increasing stability at nation-state level.

Within the OSCE's education department, bureaucratic capacity was increased by employing and training local people to supervise education programmes at local level within communities. Adam (1999) described how media outlets could be used to "facilitate social change" and there were examples of media programming to support awareness and education on conflict resolution. Generally, such programmes were broadcast on local TV and radio stations and so operated at the community level. Another example within communities was when an international religious group partnered with Sarajevo University to offer curriculum content on multicultural conflict resolution. This was delivered to local police and there were also workshops conducted in training centres which aimed to institutionalized conflict resolution.

The examples of conflict resolution education only rarely increased the stability for individuals, although the Neighbourhood Facilitators Project improved the conflict resolution skills of five international personnel along with 20 people from three separate communities in the Banja Luka area. Even here, though, the main objective was to have an effect within the individuals' communities. I have shown that the conflict resolution programmes in Bosnia-Herzegovina were designed and impacted on stability predominantly at the community and state levels.

## **9.8 APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: IRAQ**

A number of adult education programmes that were associated with support to economic regeneration in Iraq were described in Chapter 7. In two cases, there was impact on the sense of security for individual learners. In an electricity generation project which aimed to employ 500 local youths, the project funds were expanded to allow for on-site vocational training centres. These provided training courses for trades such as electricians and pipe fitters as well as management training in project management and quality control. The additional training ensured that the locals gained skills for future employment rather than simply gaining unskilled jobs that would last



only until the electricity generation project was completed, thereby offering more long-term opportunities for income generation which improve the individual's financial security. The community also benefits from the increased productivity and knowledge base through having so many local people with enhanced skills although this was not an objective of this particular project. Those who had been included in programmes for the transition and reintegration of militias also received skills training. There was explicit acknowledgement of a risk because members of some armed groups, such as the militia of Moqtada Al Sadr, were excluded from programmes that would provide skills and vocational training as part of temporary labouring jobs. However, retraining for armed groups also impacts on the security of the state, by giving learners options for income generation and employment that do not involve the use of force.

During the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) tenure in governing Iraq, state stability was the primary driver for adult education programmes. Specifically, officials expected that visible progress in economic reconstruction would lead to Iraqis judging they would benefit from the new administration and should not, therefore, oppose the coalition's presence; this happened only in a small number of areas. In Chapter 7, I showed that CPA regarded a pool of men without enough work as a de-stabilizing threat to national security. There was particular concern about employees of the State Owned Enterprises (which were no longer operating and were being restructured) and discharged Iraqi Army personnel, who were likely to feel affiliation to the Iraqi state – rather than the CPA – and the former regime. Both groups were in receipt of stipends so had some economic stability, but retraining and work on reconstruction projects was provided in order to reduce the dependence on state payments and provide a sense of self-esteem through meaningful activity. Adult education leading to work was, therefore, a priority at state level and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs opened three technical and vocational training colleges as well as 13 employment centres. In this case, the amount of adult education provided across Iraq was not enough to meet the demands of large numbers of groups. It may have been that the insurgency that grew from the start of 2004 would have happened in any event but it is also arguable that the instability resulted – at least in part – from the lack of vocational training.

The analysis above is summarized in Table 14 for an adult education programme from each of the three case study countries. It has shown that adult education has the potential to stabilize a society recovering from conflict at all levels from the individual learner to the interplay of multinational bodies on a global scale. This potential is not always exploited and adult education may not be used to shape all these levels in

every case. Nevertheless, the five dimensions can be used to assess the effectiveness of an individual programme on security.

**Table 14 Stabilizing effect of sample adult education programmes**

	Individual	Community	State	Region	International
Cambodia: English language	Y	—	N	Y	Y
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Conflict resolution	—	Y	Y	N	N
Iraq: Economic regeneration	Y	—	?	N	N

## CHAPTER 10

### FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

#### 10.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED

In Chapter 2, five research questions were posed to explore the guiding hypothesis that there has been a failure to recognize the contribution adult education can make in building a secure society, and that this has resulted in policy vacuums and under-funding of the sector. The questions are revisited below and they demonstrate that the hypothesis is useful. Thereafter, this study concludes by making recommendations which will lead to adult education in future interventions and responses being framed to stabilize and thus enhance security.

##### 10.1.1 The Links Between Adult Education and Security

In the case study of Cambodia, only one community development project explicitly acknowledged a link between adult education and security. However, in the theory of international relations in section 4.4, it was noted that there is a continuum of state fragility and it is possible to have concerns about fragility at the level of human security even in situations where there is no impact on international security. There is a significant link between adult education and improved human security. One example of adult education contributing directly to physical security is through landmine awareness, which was covered in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia, although in the former case there was a failure to recognize education's link to security which meant that landmines awareness was not usually incorporated into curricula.

There are obvious links between security and adult education where the learners are armed groups within a society recovering from conflict. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the OSCE mission deliberately wanted to mitigate education's potential for creating political and ethnic violence, but this was not recognized until 2002, over six years after the international intervention began. Of course, conflict resolution skills were taught earlier than that but most of the successes this achieved were at the localized level where the small numbers of returnees resettled; inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts remained. Similarly, Chapter 7 demonstrated that armed groups in Iraq had a propensity for violence above that of the general population and it was thought that economic progress overall would reduce the security risks. Thus, adult education to support economic growth is linked to security. However, demobilization and reintegration were badly handled in Iraq, despite recognition amongst international staff within the Coalition Provisional Authority that these were a key group who could undermine

security. By contrast, there was considerable attention paid to demobilization in Cambodia. As well as the UN programmes, the Australian government invested in adult education for those militias who formed the security forces of the new Cambodian state – to the point where Royal Cambodian Armed Forces personnel participated in UN peacekeeping missions, directly supporting international security and manifesting the link between adult education and security.

The analysis of the three case studies in Chapter 9 considered links between adult education and security at five distinct levels. It showed that adult education is linked to security at the level of the learner by drawing people to livelihoods away from crime and violence. As well as this support to economic and physical security, adult education builds resilience and psychological sense of security by addressing issues of identity and by developing human capability to enable learners to make choices. Within communities, the conclusion was that adult education had links to security but also had potential to be de-stabilizing; it increased security most when education was undertaken in a social setting to build social capital and deal with the complex issues of identity and values. When a government provides adult education, it directly increases security by demonstrating that there is a functioning state. A country's economic security is enhanced by adult education, which also supports the cultural life of the people and can give them tools to engage constructively with other groups. The interaction of a state with its neighbours is vital to security but there were few examples of adult education positively contributing to regional security – although failure to reflect regional issues could undermine stability. Finally, at the international level, adult education was shown to be linked to security if it encouraged the society recovering from conflict to adopt a rights- and values-based approach within a global human security perspective.

The links between adult education and security in societies recovering from conflict are clearly present and were operating at all levels in all three case studies. However, the links are complex and sometimes indirect and it is unsurprising, therefore, that they are often unacknowledged by those planning interventions or developing policies for post-conflict states. The next section will consider what their focus should be.

#### 10.1.2 The Focus for Policy Makers and Funding Organizations

In this study, a range of groups from independent NGOs operating on small, localized projects, through multinationals and governments, to international organizations have been shown to have an interest in adult education in societies recovering from conflict. In Cambodia, a number of the NGOs who were providing adult education did not

acknowledge they were doing so and the courses offered were an adjunct to an economic or capacity-building programme. In the case of landmine awareness education, there were confused financial arrangements with UN bodies funding both the International Rescue Committee and some of the UNTAC components to run programmes. Further, governments and the international bodies prioritized funding for adult education associated with English language classes, voter education programmes and professional development of influential groups – such as teachers, journalists, demobilizing military personnel and medical staff. There was little evidence of a co-ordinated approach and I found, in particular, that small NGOs were bidding against each other in re-tendering processes which were designed to support international transparency but in fact would result in the same in-country personnel continuing to deliver the same courses.

The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed similarities with numerous organizations active in education-related activity. An incomplete OSCE listing identified over 100 groups, both local and international, and it is striking that budgets and the exact number of projects could not be determined. The first international High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Carl Bildt, noted that many parties were engaged and identified that there was not a single ‘recipe’ for success that they all followed (Glenny, 2000:2). The fragmentation of the efforts in civil reconstruction was acknowledged but no one, including the Office of the High Representative, had authority to oversee and direct the work.

Moving forward to Iraq, where there was a single authority in the form of the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003 / 4, there was evidence of confusing and competing arrangements for organizations providing adult education. Despite an understanding that demobilization and reintegration of armed groups – estimated to number over 300,000 personnel – and the increased potential for these adults to resort to violence, only small amounts of money<sup>6</sup> were allocated to education for them. A preliminary skills-screening programme was estimated to cost \$1.5 million, with a further \$5 million for essential literacy improvements but a funding for a comprehensive programme to cover the whole cohort was never prioritized. Chapter 7 showed that interventions including adult education that would have maximized the employment of Iraqis on reconstruction projects were neither co-ordinated nor implemented before sovereignty passed back from CPA to Iraqis in the summer of 2004.

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<sup>6</sup> Spending is relative: the US’ Supplemental Budget for 2007 allocated some \$18.4 billion to reconstruction in Iraq.

In post-conflict Iraq, unlike other interventions, there were significant funds available for reconstruction: both international donations such as the US government's Supplemental spending and Iraq's own funds in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) could be used. Initial scoping of projects to support vocational education suggested that over \$100 million would be required and DFI allocated \$65 million – while the USAID contract for the work was valued at \$88 million. Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, the programme was cancelled after only a year when only \$25 million had been spent. More successful in disbursing funds was a project of adult education as part of the Private Sector Development Initiative: \$65 million was spent on 118 courses although the project evaluation noted that more use could have been made of internationally available teaching resources, and that recognized qualifications should have been offered to those who completed the courses. These two large-scale initiatives were augmented by a series of small-scale grants for stand-alone projects of adult education that lasted a few months, targeting specific groups (either geographically or by type of learner, e.g. returning refugees), and the UN also funded some adult education programmes at a scale of less than \$3 million per project.

In all three case studies, the overall approach to adult education in societies recovering from conflict has been ad hoc, with fragmented funding and organizational arrangements. Too often, adult education is delivered as an afterthought and there is a failure to set anticipated outcomes and robustly evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention. Those considering funding projects in post-conflict situations do not appear to apply commercial principles where they balance the proposed investment against expected returns. To do this properly, there is a need to consider the education costs and separate them from the wider programme (which may have infrastructure investment, security overheads or capacity-building elements). The returns will also be a mixture of direct educational and other benefits and it will always be a complex calculation. It is recommended that funders and policy makers view projects through a new lens. Instead of designing an intervention and subsequently trying to isolate the educative effect and benefits, the planners should pose the question: if I put in place adult education of this type at this cost, what will be achieved? Such proactive consideration of adult education as programmes in their own right will ensure that the expected benefits will remain prioritized and also allow a golden thread of adult education provision to be woven through multi-layered and complex delivery vehicles.

### 10.1.3 The New Security Context

The period from 1993 to 2004 which bound the interventions in the case studies has included debates in the security literature over the existence or otherwise of not one but two fundamental shifts in the security context. Certainly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the Warsaw Pact military alliance that ended the bipolarity of superpowers was significant. Fukuyama's interpretation, below, was subsequently criticized:

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. (Fukuyama, 1989:3)

However, it is unlikely there would have been UN-endorsed interventions in either Cambodia or Bosnia-Herzegovina if the USSR and the US had followed the pre-1989 norms and blocked each other's initiatives using UN Security Council veto powers. Later, non-state entities following a global terror agenda emerged as the greatest perceived external threat to the US, and some commentators use the al-Qaeda attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 to mark another fundamental shift. After that date, the US invested more in military interventions and direct action against terrorist groups across the globe; the so-called Global War on Terror pursued by the Bush administration marked a shift in US practices and was used – somewhat inconsistently – as a capping action for the 2003 intervention in Iraq.

Both changes can be viewed as noteworthy points of change in how analysts categorize security studies, although neither are paradigm shifts. It is possible to point to examples from before and after 1989 that show collaboration amongst superpowers on international problems, and al-Qaeda attacked US interests prior to and following 9/11. The security context has changed, though, with a shift from formal and narrowly defined peacekeeping operations under UN mandates to a more amorphous spectrum of activity through which international groups can bring their influence to bear on a society recovering from conflict. Similarly, interventions are more likely to be an integrated effort that encompasses security, political, economic and infrastructure components – based on an acknowledgement that there will not be a simple military solution to stabilizing a state with weak institutions and poor governance. A model of 'soft' security that incorporates both the 'hard' physical security (with enforced suppression of violence where there is a military lead) and less tangible elements such as values, political discourse, economic security and a sense of nationhood is better applied in these less-black-and-white situations. Therefore, adult education which can

be used to influence and shape the non-military dimensions of an intervention has a more significant role in efforts to stabilize a situation.

Although not a factor in the case studies here, international actors also now consider engaging in countries before conflict breaks out in pre-emptive actions to stabilize and bolster security. This can include supporting particular groups within communities and providing anti-radicalization programmes for individuals. Adult education is viewed as a less controversial activity than, for example, providing military hardware, so the governments of the states concerned are more willing to use and allow this intervention tool in the early stages. Of course, when conflict is viewed through the lens of a model that is circular rather than linear, the actions taken in a society recovering from conflict can be seen as being preventive for the future. In this respect, adult education in the three case studies has been demonstrated to be relevant by extending the immediate intervention to encompass state building, providing individuals with more economic opportunities and challenging the values held in the society so that violent conflict is less likely to recur.

#### 10.1.4 Whose Values are Embedded in Policy Decisions?

Throughout this study, it has been clear that provision of adult education in societies recovering from conflict is dependent upon a number of choices made by individuals, their governments and the groups and bodies that are intervening. Therefore, the importance of the constructivist theories from chapter 4 has been affirmed. These choices are values based and an important research question was to determine whose values are embedded in policies.

In the Cambodia case study, the United Nations was formally engaged in drawing up the Paris Peace Agreement and in setting up UNTAC as a transitional authority. One might have expected, therefore, that universal values as stated in the UN charter would have had a strong bearing on the adult education provided. Indeed, voter education and human rights were prominent in the Education and Information Division materials, although locally-held understandings and interpretations allowed the rights of some groups (e.g. the Vietnamese minority) to be afforded lower priority. UNHCR provided education for refugees although the government in Thailand's values restricted it initially to primary and pre-vocational education only. The education provided for demobilizing ex-soldiers included course content which questioned the loyalties held by students – thus suggesting that previously held values were being challenged. Many different agencies offered adult education and shared or agreed values would have been useful in co-ordinating their efforts. There was disagreement over UNTAC's



prioritization of social and economic rights over others, however, and the Cambodia case study showed that negotiated common outputs and personal commitment to delivering in challenging circumstances were what held the different bodies together.

In Chapter 6, it was shown that the goal of the international community in the form of the OSCE was to make Bosnia-Herzegovina a sustainable democracy that could be integrated with a democratic Europe. NGOs took the lead in developing programmes of conflict resolution in Bosnia-Herzegovina's multi-ethnic setting, which ran in opposition to the political drive to decentralize decision making to the different ethnic-based entities within the country. Thus, the multicultural and participatory values that were being promoted by the international groups were undermined by local tensions and mistrust of other ethnic groups. Integrationist material was supposed to be incorporated into education programmes but this was implemented unevenly with separatist approaches to identity remaining in many cantons, which were also granted sway over education, culture and research by the Dayton peace accords. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the values embedded in policy decisions were those of competing ethnic groups at the entity and canton level – despite attempts by international players and others involved in the intervention to promote multicultural democratic values.

In Iraq, the US-led coalition directly governed the country and most of the funding for the intervention came from the US. Both these political and financial levers were applied to promote US values and interests, with members of the Ba'ath party excluded from Iraq's reconstruction. Adult education programmes that supported personal economic independence were favoured and private sector solutions were always considered before any state-driven initiatives, reflecting the US administration's philosophy of free market economics. On the same theme, curricula for adult education programmes were dominated by providing marketable skills that would support employment and the courses offered by VEGA (USAID, 2004) were all focused on private finance and operating in a competitive market. US values can also be seen in the education to support democratization, which also followed the US model, with local community activism being the primary focus for participative democracy. The Iraq case study in Chapter 7 showed very clearly that it was the values of the US that were embedded in adult education policies.

This study has demonstrated that the values underpinning adult education in societies recovering from conflict depend on the political structures operating during the intervention and these will prevail over other values favoured by groups providing the education. Thus, the chance to promote universal values through the UN in Cambodia

was only partially taken because the international bodies did not agree on which rights should be prioritized. Similarly, the fragmented cantons that were empowered in the Dayton process for Bosnia-Herzegovina skewed and corrupted attempts to introduce integrationist values. Finally, the US used financial and political muscle to promote its favoured free market values throughout the intervention in Iraq.

#### 10.1.5 The Potential for Adult Education to Stabilize

In Chapter 9, it was suggested that adult education should adhere to a number of principles set out by the Overseas Development Institute if it is to enhance security:

to foster societies that are safe, stable and just; promote respect for diversity; achieve equality between women and men; foster tolerance and protect human rights; and, enhance the participation of all groups of all people in their economies, societies and natural environments. (2000:3)

In each country, all of the principles were applied to some extent in some – but not all – of the adult education described in this thesis. It is not valid to aggregate this to make a binary judgement on whether each principle was applied and neither can we use weighting to show the complexity of a particular course's impact at the learner, community, state, regional and international levels, as considered in Chapter 9. However, Table 15 summarizes whether programmes in general reflected each of the principles to a greater or lesser extent.

**Table 15 Application of ODI Principles**

<b>Principle</b>	<b>Cambodia</b>	<b>Bosnia-Herzegovina</b>	<b>Iraq</b>
1. Fosters societies that are safe, stable and just	Greater	Lesser	Greater
2. Promotes respect for diversity	Lesser	Lesser	Greater
3. Achieves equality between women and men	Greater	-	Lesser
4. Fosters tolerance and protects human rights	Lesser	Lesser	-
5. Enhance the participation of all groups of all people in their economies, societies and natural environments	Greater	Greater	Greater

To illustrate Table 15 further, programmes for returning refugees addressed economic and safety objectives in Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina which would tend towards greater adherence to the first principle, although the ethnically differentiated courses in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the failure to address community integration in Cambodia ran counter to it. In all three case study countries adult education did, however, offer individuals improved capability to make real choices which will foster stable and just societies (Sen, 1999).

Turning to the second principle, the individualized values embedded by the programmes supported by the US in Iraq promoted respect for diversity. The treatment of minority ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Cambodia, by contrast, supported monocultural segmentation of the countries. In the particular case of gender diversity (Principle 3), there were isolated examples of adult education programmes in Bosnia-Herzegovina that supported female participation in the electoral process but in general the society was equal. Cambodian women returning from refugee camps had often benefited from education they would not have had in their own country and voter education encouraged women to cast their own ballot, independent of family member pressure. Given that female illiteracy rates were high in Iraq, there is no evidence that women received more education, although opportunities were provided on an equal basis. The security driver to focus on young males of fighting age for interventions also resulted in women being over-shadowed.

Throughout this study, adult education for women has been considered either as distinct provision or when it has been supplied for both genders. Difficult choices must be made in post-conflict situations about which groups have access to adult education and whether gender neutral courses can be offered. In addition to the examples above, there are indications that the value choices of those designing programmes may have different impact on females and males and of second order consequences. As examples, the focus on Khmer culture in Cambodia gave increased prominence to women's roles within the family and some reduced their participation in wider civil society. Similarly, the drive for 'equal' provision in Iraq resulted in little formal acknowledgement of the generally lower literacy levels of women when vocational education programmes were designed and this may have reduced the accessibility of the training to women. In this study, there has been no attempt to move beyond such indicators and formally analyse the adult education provided for each gender separately either in terms of provision or outcomes. Other pieces of interesting research would be to examine in detail the gender differences in adult education in

societies recovering from conflict, for example by clarifying the status of girls in relation to adult education when the age of assuming adult roles may be different for men and women, or considering whether adult education in societies recovering from conflict should be provided to traditionally segregated sexes in forward looking mixed groups.

The application of the fourth principle on human rights was at best neutral in the case of Iraq and the evidence suggests that it was not effective in the adult education in either Bosnia-Herzegovina or Cambodia. In the latter case, there was a Human Rights component of the UNTAC mission which ran education programmes but it was not supported by the Education and Information Division's outputs, and racism towards Vietnamese groups was prevalent. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the conflict had been driven by ethno-nationalistic aims so it is unsurprising that tolerance and human rights were difficult to achieve. There were some attempts to address this, including tolerance and respect discussions in community reintegration programmes where minority groups were exercising the right to return, but the returns were usually tense and media output was often nationalistic and divisive.

More positively, the adult education programmes in the case studies had a greater tendency towards enhancing the participation of all groups of all people in their economies, societies and natural environments, the final principle. Although environmental sustainability was not a high priority, community development programmes in Cambodia encouraged low-impact farming. In all three countries, adult education had stated aims to improve the economic opportunities of learners through vocational education, whether that be amputees maintaining wheelchairs in Cambodia or a large-scale programme to develop the skills of Iraqis in welding, electrical and carpentry so they could gain jobs on reconstruction projects. Similarly, education to support democratization was always underpinned by a drive to encourage participation in society through voting, whether at the community or state level. In addition, because adult education has a social dimension, an individual has more chances to participate in their societies simply through course attendance.

Thus, adult education has strong potential to stabilize a society recovering from conflict provided it is well designed for the particular context, applied at the appropriate level from individual learner to internationally, and reflects the appropriate principles and values. In all three case studies, this research has shown there is potential to stabilize but also that greater stabilization could have been achieved with better adult education. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider ways to improve adult education in societies recovering from conflict.

## 10.2 IMPROVING ADULT EDUCATION IN SOCIETIES RECOVERING FROM CONFLICT

One of the themes considered in Chapter 8 was the weakness in evaluation and assessment of adult education in societies recovering from conflict. This deficit creates challenges for those seeking to improve the provision as they are likely to be operating without an established baseline and with partial data. Efforts to capture more useable data about education programmes, their delivery and effect should be increased and data capture should be built into the design of the adult education programme from the outset.


A feature identified in the three case studies was the complexity of the organizational structures in which adult education is delivered, with groups operating at different scales of effort – from micro projects where education for a few people in a discrete local area is added at no cost to another development project, to a multi-million dollar intervention where international bodies work in partnership with national authorities and contracted NGO staff to provide new adult education across the nation. The various bodies involved will usually have different capacity to provide useful data (often seen as an administrative overhead that adds no value to a specific project) and the sheer numbers of different agencies involved suggests that agreeing common protocols to allow data to be shared will be problematic. Nevertheless, there would be utility in establishing a framework for the types of data that adult educators should collect for all their projects in post-conflict interventions and an international body such as the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) or UNESCO should provide a repository for all the data. Subsequently, academics and researchers would be in a position to collate relevant material and develop a better understanding of what works best in adult education as a step towards improving the quality of the provision.

Minimum standards for education in post-conflict societies exist in the form of INEE's *Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery* (Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, 2012) which sets 17 standards in four domains. In the Foundational Standards domain, community participation and the use of community resources to implement age-appropriate learning opportunities are encouraged. These two standards are particularly important in improving adult education, whose social aspects and importance in building secure communities was highlighted in Chapter 9. The second domain (Access and Learning Environment) is generic across all education provision, with an emphasis on secure and safe locations for learning that provide physical protection as well as psychosocial wellbeing. The appropriate atmosphere for psychosocial wellbeing can be generated at no cost but I

have shown that adult education will usually be accorded the lowest priority for reconstruction. Facilities for adults will be improved only after the primary, secondary and university sectors have been upgraded. However, siting adult education in multi-purpose venues (for example, workplaces) can provide better facilities earlier and this will generally improve the quality.

In INEE's third domain of standards (Teaching and Learning), minima are set for curricula – which must be “appropriate to the particular context and needs of learners” – and there is a requirement for “learner-centred, participatory and inclusive” learning (Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, 2012). These two are particularly important in raising the quality of adult education where learning that builds on the adult's life experiences and actively engages them in the development of knowledge is most effective. The final domain concerns Teachers and other Education Personnel; qualified teachers who are supported and supervised are seen as necessary to a working education system. For adult education, this raises two issues: teachers of adults should understand how adults learn and be qualified accordingly; and, the adult education provided in a post-conflict society must include education programmes for teaching staff.

Rigorous application of the INEE minimum standards in the adult education sector would be a useful first step to improving the quality of adult education in situations similar to those in the three case studies where the societies were recovering from conflict. By raising the quality of provision, there would be more effective adult education and better outcomes. However, the standard of adult education should be judged also according to the impact of the programme. The spectrum in Figure 2 can be used to locate a specific example of adult education depending on its impact:




**Figure 2 The impact spectrum for adult education**

To demonstrate how the spectrum can be used, examples from the case studies are placed on the spectrum. At the lowest end, poor programmes will not only fail to achieve the education outcomes intended but will actually be counterproductive. In the case of Cambodia, section 5.4 included an example of an EID programme for

demobilizing soldiers which tried to inculcate commitment to the peace process so overtly that ex-soldiers returned to their former military commanders. An example from Iraq of a 'one-off' where the impact ended when the project funding ceased was the USAID-sponsored programme to set up Vocational and Technical Training Centres. As described in section 7.6, over 1,000 trainees were enrolled in ten courses that related to employment in fields such as auto mechanics and plumbing. However, funding was stopped when only a quarter of the monies had been disbursed and the project terminated. The individuals who had been trained would have benefited from their education by gaining skills that would lead to employment but the project was entirely dependent on external support and it therefore failed.

As we move to the higher end of the spectrum, quality programmes of adult education are self-sustaining. An adult education programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina (section 6.4) was run by the OSCE to encourage women to participate in presidential and parliamentary elections. In addition to written materials, it was estimated that 14,000 women were engaged through roundtable teaching groups. Many of these learners subsequently encouraged other women to participate and provided them with voter education materials so that the OSCE representatives were no longer required. At the top of the spectrum, one locates provision which gives learners tools and motivation so that they expand the learning beyond the original course, to reach more people and to access further learning. The South Korean Zaytun Division's programme of adult education, described in section 7.6, focused on skills for the home such as baking and repair of small appliances. As well as using and training local people to teach these classes within the community, the activities had a pathway to further vocational training and, thus, facilitated an expansive approach to adult education. These four examples are therefore situated on the impact spectrum, as shown in Figure 3.



**Figure 3 The impact spectrum showing examples of adult education**

Improvements to adult education in societies recovering from conflict will raise the quality of provision and lead to better outcomes for stability. A more rigorous approach to capturing data about individual projects and programmes, which should be placed in an accessible repository by a universal body so they can be shared and used by researchers, will facilitate a greater understanding of this complex area of policy and delivery. The INEE *Minimum Standards for Education* should be applied in the adult education sector and providers should aim to increase the amount of education that is at the higher end of the impact spectrum, where learning is expanded beyond the original courses to reach more people and support new learning.



### **10.3 CAPACITY / CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT (CAP<sup>2</sup>DEV) AND ADULT EDUCATION**

In development studies, capacity building is an “ongoing process through which individuals, groups, organizations and societies enhance their ability to identify and meet development challenges” (Wignaraja, 2009:5). A capacity-building approach is accepted as an improvement on earlier development techniques of providing relief or technical assistance, neither of which is sustainable. High quality, effective adult education in societies recovering from conflict will contribute to capacity building by up-skilling local people, but it also requires the intervention to take this approach if it is to achieve all its potential at the community and state levels.

A similar term, capability building, is used in personnel and Human Resources management. In this context, capability building is used as a term for effective talent management processes. The Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development has developed a tool for capability building that has four instruments: “Balancing current and future capability issues; talent management check-up; aligning capability and talent with a future focus; leadership and management capability” (Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development, 2011:8). Adult education policy in fragile states would benefit from considering how it can support capability building for all professions and vocational groups, including teachers. In particular, the forward looking focus of capability building and the connection between the skills and talents of workers with the organization’s goals is particularly relevant in societies recovering from conflict where we can expect the needs to change over time.

‘Capability’ is also used in the defence arena: capability development has been applied in equipment acquisition to ensure that holistic capabilities are delivered rather than hardware without the associated training, infrastructure, etc. US, Australian and British defence departments now all use capability development and the European Defence Agency described its importance: “Several of the operational conclusions underline the fact that while armaments and new technology play an important role, capability development must take place in all lines of development, and few challenges can be solved by technology alone” (European Defence Agency, 2008).

For adult education, design of programmes that take into account all the contributing components – such as personnel, training and education, infrastructure, equipment, curricular content, organizational structures, and the logistics to support ongoing delivery – will usually lead to sustainable provision of sufficient quality for the society being supported.

Throughout this study, the most interesting issues have been located in the boundary space between security, development and education. In this section, it appears again that there is a need for new terminology to encompass the aspects of adult education during an intervention that ensure holistic, assured quality provision which will be sustainable and adaptable as the society stabilizes. Taking the three terms above (capacity building, capability building and capability development), I offer the new concept of capacity / capability development or Cap<sup>2</sup>Dev. This concept alludes to Amartya Sen's work in developing 'a capability approach' toward human development, which was considered in sections 9.1 and 9.2.


The UK government has adopted a strategy for engaging in countries where there are British interests and it includes the use of military power, short of combat operations. The *International Defence Engagement Strategy*, published jointly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), takes a longer term view to support international security: "It will ensure that we are shaping our defence engagement over a longer horizon of up to 20 years, and developing the relationships and influence that we will require to achieve our objectives in a period of significant uncertainty and change" (Ministry of Defence, 2013:1).

This strategy includes, *inter alia*: "overseas training teams; security sector reform; international defence training; ... overseas and UK-based training and capacity building" (Ibid:3). I recommend that the MOD uses the Cap<sup>2</sup>Dev concept to structure these inter-related activities within its engagement.

#### **10.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE INTERVENTIONS**


In Chapter 9, adult education was analysed according to its impact at five different levels. Understanding the impact of a programme on a multidimensional problem can be easier if the data are compiled on a radar chart, which shows multiple variables. This is technically known as multivariate analysis and it is particularly useful for examining relationships among multiple variables at the same time. In the cases studied here, the variables were clearly identified as: the learner; the community; the state; the region; and, international bodies. There are no numerical data sets for each of these variables but it is possible for researchers and policy makers to attribute a numerical score for the effectiveness of adult education on each of these variables in a given case. Policy makers will set the appropriate targets for a given context so, for example, small scale interventions might be expected to achieve at least 80% for the individual learner and community, with perhaps 40% being sufficient for international

stability. By contrast, a programme to be implemented across the country might be expected to reach 70% at both the state and international levels. Given my finding that the regional effect is usually only in a negative / deficit manner, 10% will usually be acceptable. Thus, a target radar chart could be as shown in Figure 4.




**Figure 4 Illustrative radar chart for a national programme of adult education**

Those designing and delivering education programmes should subsequently rate their provision, using the same scales, and their adult education provision can be plotted against the policy target, as illustrated in Figure 5. In this example, it is clear that the programme is likely to fall short in its impact on the security of individual learners although it has potential to have a particularly positive effect on international security.




**Figure 5 Illustrative radar chart showing policy target (in black) and expected impact (in yellow)**


Radar charts can be used to directly compare different adult education programmes: those which plot out the greatest areas on the chart are the most likely to be effective in stabilizing the post-conflict society. Revisiting the three examples in Chapter 9, radar charts can be generated to show the stabilizing effect of these adult education programmes. Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate the results of the analysis.



**Figure 6 Stabilizing effect of English language programmes in Cambodia**



**Figure 7 Stabilizing effect of conflict resolution education in Bosnia-Herzegovina**



**Figure 8 Stabilizing effect of adult education for economic regeneration in Iraq**

It is recommended that those planning adult education as part of interventions in societies recovering from conflict use this analytical technique to determine the probable outcomes for the provision they intend to deliver.

The findings in section 10.1.5 suggested that adult education would be a stabilizing force if it followed the Overseas Development Institute principles. Further, the INEE standards across four domains should be reached. Taking these two requirements together, this study recommends that adult education designers evaluate their proposed provision against the checklist below.

**Table 16 Checklist for designing adult education**

1	Recognize that adult education is set in the <b>context</b> of the host society	√
2	Acknowledge embedded <b>values</b> : human rights, diversity and gender equality	√
3	Exploit <b>community</b> resources and encourage participation of all groups of all people	√
4	Meet adults' <b>learning and psychosocial needs</b> : learner-centred, participatory and inclusive learning	√
5	Use decent safe <b>facilities</b> , including multi-purpose venues if necessary	√
6	Provide CPD and qualifications for <b>teachers</b> who understand how adults learn	√

The analytical tool and checklist can be used by those involved in adult education at all levels from delivery to policy and they have utility in any setting. The other

recommendations for improving adult education in future interventions should be implemented by specific actors.

First, providers should aim to increase the amount of adult education that is at the higher end of the impact spectrum. They must adopt a more rigorous approach to capturing data about individual projects and programmes.

The UK MOD should use the Cap<sup>2</sup>Dev concept to structure the inter-related activities within its *International Defence Engagement Strategy*.

Funders and policy makers are encouraged to pose the question: if I put in place adult education of this type at this cost, what will be achieved?

Finally, a universal body should create an accessible repository for practitioners' data on adult education.

## **10.5 UNKNOWN OUTCOMES: CONSIDERING THE CASE OF SYRIA**

Those who follow international affairs have learned that there are few reliable predictors of the future and all actions in an intervention risk bringing unanticipated consequences. At the time of submitting this thesis in the summer of 2013, however, news broadcasts were frequently headed with updates from the conflict in Syria. Violence had been used following a political impasse and international actors have been considering – although they have not yet determined – courses of action for possible interventions, along with options to influence the parties behind the unrest and instability, which has been labelled as a civil war. Although detailed information about the situation in the country has not been available to me and effective interventions must be designed with reference to the specific and individual context, it is possible to use this Middle East conflict to demonstrate how adult education might be used in an unknown future to stabilize the situation.

In Syria, unrest that began as part of the so called 'Arab Spring' in 2011 led to an opposition consisting of military defectors who have formed the Free Syrian Army and a political grouping under the label of the National Coalition of the Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (the National Coalition). On 20 November 2012, the British government recognized the Coalition as "the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people" and the National Coalition has also been recognized by all the members of the Arab League except Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon. In September 2013, the UN continued to recognize the government of President Bashar al-Assad although Security

Council Resolutions<sup>7</sup> called equally on both government and opposition to comply with cessations of violence and permit the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) from April to August 2012. The UN launched an appeal in March 2012 to raise \$84 million to assist Syrian refugees but the amount had not been raised after more than a year. By the summer of 2013, the UN claimed that up to 100,000 people have been killed in Syria with 2 million refugees leaving the country and a further 4 million being internally displaced. There has been alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria and the UN despatched a specialist inspection team in August 2013. The UN Secretary General has acknowledged that use of such weapons would be a “crime against humanity” (United Nations, 2013b) and there have been discussion over the extent to which the responsibility to protect should be applied in the case of Syria.

If Syria were to move to the post-conflict stage, adult education could be part of the international response. Considering the findings in this thesis, the checklist above should be used. Thus, adult education should recognize the context of a country where secular and Sunni opposition groups have united against the current government but have few common goals or shared values. During the period of recovery from conflict, society will probably continue to be very divided. The intervention must acknowledge any embedded values, noting that the capacity of adult education to challenge them will be limited compared to the influence of whichever group is dominating the post-conflict society. There will be benefits from early international support for teachers of adult education, providing them with updates on appropriate teaching techniques to use with their adult learners and introducing qualifications through Syria’s university system. Other items on the checklist should be applied at the project level, with curricula focusing on skills required to repair the war damage to the country’s infrastructure in the short term only.

Speculating on how a military force might become involved, Cap<sup>2</sup>Dev should be applied. Many young people in both the government forces and the Free Syrian Army will need assistance to move into a renewed Syrian armed force or to civilian employment: a deliberate programme of demobilization and reintegration that is properly resourced should be implemented. International military training teams are also likely to be required to support security sector reform and adult education should be provided either in Syria or in other countries. The militaries involved should be prepared for this training to continue for a number of years. However, the military education provided must be integrated with other adult education programmes as part

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
<sup>7</sup> UN Security Resolution 2043(2012) dated 21 April 2012

of Cap<sup>2</sup>Dev and organizational structures should be put in place to facilitate co-operation.

It would be appropriate for UN agencies, interested governments, NGOs and Syrians to be planning for a future intervention while conflict and political positioning take place. Planning teams should consider adult education as a specific workstream or 'line of activity' within their planning, although it will be premature to plan specific programmes, and use the key question (if I put in place adult education of this type at this cost, what will be achieved?) and impact spectrum. It would be premature to conduct the detailed design of programmes until learners in Syria can be asked about their needs and aspirations. However, rather than thinking about outcomes, it would be timely to be designing the organizational structures they will employ. It will be difficult to identify the representatives of the Syrian people who will be participating in these structures. Arguably, the conflict itself will resolve which if any of the bodies in Syria will have sway. The current government might end up with residual supporters but they are disinclined to work with external agencies during the conflict, while the opposition groups are fragmented and disagree on most things other than the removal of President al-Assad.

The unrest in Syria has seen the population split its affiliations according to religious and ethnic background. To prevent the continuing fragmentation of governance within the country, lessons should be learned from the Bosnian case in particular: formal organizational structures and delivery of services in post-conflict Syria must not be channelled through the locally dominant ethno-religious bodies and, instead, the groups should be encouraged to work collaboratively. This is particularly important because each Syrian group has strong cross-border links which could result in any ongoing tensions being played out at the regional level. Lebanese and Iranian groups such as Hezbollah would probably back Syrian Shi'ites and Alawites, while Kurds would seek support from Turkey and Iraq, and the Gulf powers seek to link with the Sunni groups that dominate the centre of the country. In fact, security in Syria is heavily dependent on regional engagement and – as an exception to the analysis in Chapter 9 – this should be a priority area for adult education. In summary, below is an illustrative radar chart for the adult education in Syria that this study suggests would be a stabilizing force.





**Figure 9 Stabilizing effect for future adult education in Syria**

Of course, at the time and place of writing, the future situation for Syria is unknown. The situational awareness and contextual understanding have been gleaned predominantly from media reports so it is unlikely that the adult education included as part of a putative intervention or response will be of the type shown in this section. However, the example illustrates how the analytical tools, checklists and findings from this thesis might be used to increase the chance that any investment in adult education in Syria as it recovers from conflict will be worthwhile and effective in enhancing security.

## 10.6 PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

Completing the research for this study and producing the final thesis has been one of my greatest challenges. From the outset, I understood that my personal experience of the three interventions and my own direct knowledge would constitute only a small part of the information necessary to understand the dynamics of stabilization. Nevertheless, using three countries which I had visited gave me an emotional investment in the research that was unexpected. Data presented in this thesis are objective but I frequently pondered facts and information I discovered, and speculated on whether individuals I knew would have recognized the situations I was writing about and what they might have thought. I have had to be very disciplined to ensure that such speculations remained isolated from the analysis and rested outwith my study.

Nevertheless, this thesis has been very personal and I have discovered things about myself during the writing process. My roles – as military officer, professional educator and, latterly researcher – lay at the heart of my self-image. In the ethical discussion in

Chapter 3, I highlighted that different ethical frameworks applied depending on my role at any given time. However, I find that I now identify primarily as a person who deliberately seeks to be situated between roles: the multi-disciplinarity is more important for me than any individual role-identity.

Deriving my self-identity from multi-disciplinarity, it was not surprising that I found the most interesting discoveries in my study were made when I was working in the uncertain space that sat at the boundaries of both international security policy and adult education. It was sometimes difficult to stretch a concept between the two spheres but I found it most rewarding to discover analytical tools and research methods that had utility in both. Further, some of the ideas that were common in security studies were novel in the education domain (and vice versa) and I believe my ability to work between the two enriched my thinking and strengthened my understanding. It also increased the chance of me reaching new insights into a problem as I was able to look at it from a fresh perspective, for example considering a security problem through an educative lens.

Another personal discovery during this study was that I like to move back and forward across different levels when I am working on a problem. Analysis ranged from the level of the individual learner, through community to international engagement. Similarly, I shifted from examination of delivery of specific projects and courses of adult education to the consideration of the policy underpinning provision across the entire adult education sector. I need to conceptualize at the strategic level and understand the broad dynamics of a situation but, simultaneously, I require concrete examples that are grounded in direct experiences of learners. Without an understanding of an issue at both levels, I feel I have an incomplete grasp of the problem being studied.

The time taken to write this thesis has been extended because of professional commitments in education and security. I believe that my personal connection to the situations in the case studies resulted in me being reluctant to put them behind me: finishing this research seemed like an admission that I was no longer involved in supporting the people in those countries. In addition, because international politics changes every day there was always the temptation to revisit a piece of analysis in light of the latest news bulletin, even when it was not directly relevant. However, the passage of time has allowed me to incorporate more into my work: earlier submission would have precluded using Iraq as a case study and the evolution of international interventions (from UN to regional organization to commercial operations) would not

have been apparent. On balance, I believe the thesis is stronger and the findings more useful overall due to the time elapsed since I embarked on this study.

Good adult education has potential to be transformative and I am continually inspired by examples of teachers and learners who achieve magnificent things. When a society is recovering from conflict and a complex multi-agency intervention is underway, there is a great deal at stake. Delivering quality adult education that acts as a stabilizing influence in such confused circumstances is hugely challenging. I hope through this work that I have made any future challenge a little less daunting.

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## ANNEX 1

### PILOT QUESTIONNAIRES USED BY CAROLYN JOHNSTONE DURING PHD STUDY

#### Initial Questions.

<http://www.ioe.ac.uk/eid/cjohnstone>

1. Describe any skills training or education activities you provide for adults as part of your programme.
2. Which organisations or individuals support your programme with significant financial or other resources?
3. Are you aware of any similar programme operating in your sector or locality? Please provide brief details, including contact details.
4. Please list any organisational partnerships that have formed as a result of your programme.

Would you be willing to help with this research further by answering a few more specific questions? If so, please provide contact details (email, telephone, fax or postal address).

#### Follow-Up Questions.

<http://www.ioe.ac.uk/eid/cjohnstone>

- A. Please give details of the skills training / learning activities you provide for adults, including time allocated to the activity, materials and resources, teachers.
- B. Please provide anticipated and actual outcomes of your education activities / skills training, as experienced by the individual learner. Please describe anticipated and actual outcomes of your education activities / skills training, as experienced by the host community or society.
- C. What is your estimate of the number of participants in the programme, and over what period of time?
- D. In designing the education activities / skills training:
  - Who was involved or consulted?
  - What factors influenced the design?

Contact: email [c.johnstone@net.ntl.com](mailto:c.johnstone@net.ntl.com) or 'phone 01344 644 491

## ANNEX 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW – ANALYSIS OF PUBLICATION DATES FROM YEAR OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

Time elapsed (Years)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Cambodia	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Iraq	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013					


#### Types of Publication

**Key:** B – book; BS – book section; C – conference paper or report; G – government publication; J – journal article; o – other source; R – report; T – thesis; W – website


Time elapsed	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Cambodia (2 undated)	1R	1J 1T	3B 1C	1B 7BS	2B 2BS	3BS	-	2J 3R	1R	1R	-	1R 1T	1G 2R	1R	1J
Bosnia-Herzegovina (2 undated)	3B 3R	3B 1BS 1T	1B 4BS 1J	1BS 1J 1W	1B 4J 2o 3R	1R	1B 1R	1B	1B 1J	1R	1J 1T	1B 1J	1B 1J	-	1C
Iraq (6 undated)	1B 2G 1J 2o 5R	2B 2J 3R 1T 1W	6BS 2J 1R 2W	3BS 1J 1o	-	-	-	1R	-	-					



### Graphical representation of total publications for each year since the international intervention (EndNote Database)



**Graphical representation of total publications for each year since the international intervention  
(Institute of Education Library Catalogue excluding Curriculum Resources Collection)**



**ANNEX 3**  
**COMPARISON OF SECURITY, UNEMPLOYMENT AND SERVICES BY IRAQI**  
**GOVERNORATE**

*Jobs and Training Assessment for Security of New Iraq: Some Options (2004) by Kevin Kuklok*

Governorate	Region	Population (1000s)	Violence	Unemployment (%)	Avg Hours Electricity	Water Potability	Per capita \$ PMO Projects
Baghdad	<b>Baghdad</b>	6,677.0	8.58	36.5	15.0	74.7	369
As Sulaymaniyah		1,677.5		NA	18.0	NA	220
Ninawa		2,514.8		26.0	11.0	78.9	411
Dihok		496.1		NA	12.0	NA	562
Irbil		1,349.2		NA	18.0	NA	528
<b>North</b>		3,438.1	3.55	26.0	11.0	78.9	396
At Tamim		927.2		18.9	13.0	91.3	315
Diyala		1,397.5		32.4	12.0	67.2	351
Salah ad Din		1,113.4		34.1	12.0	59.8	495
<b>North Central</b>		3,438.1	6.87	29.3	12.3	71.3	388
Babil		1,454.7		30.7	13.0	47.9	355
Karbala		731.5		15.4	20.0	68.3	284
Wasit		964.6		27.5	17.0	73.3	166
An Najaf		954.1		17.8	14.0	77.1	200
Al Qadisiyah		924.9		32.8	12.0	64.5	303
<b>South Central</b>		5,029.8	2.54	25.8	14.8	64.3	270
Al Muthanna		537.7		29.8	15.0	73.1	495
Dhi Qar		1,458.5		45.2	15.0	53.1	409
Maysan		784.3		35.1	16.0	71.3	249
Al Basrah		1,916.0		16.9	22.0	62.3	1,260
<b>South East</b>		4,696.5	1.42	30.2	18.0	62.2	739
Al Anbar	<b>West</b>	1,260.2	6.87	37.9	17.0	67.0	419
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>27, 139.2</b>	<b>29.83</b>	<b>31.0</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>67.3</b>	<b>426</b>

Violence measured by 30 Day avg daily Sigacts for March 11-Apr 10 2004

Unemployment rates are from Nov 2003

Electricity avg hours from Apr 2004

Water Potability is from Jan 11, 2004, but excludes water trucked in

**ANNEX 4**  
**STATISTICAL GRAPHICS FOR MULTIVARIATE DATA (EXTRACT)**

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Paper presented at the SAS<sup>®</sup> Users Group International (SAS SUGI) 16 Conference,  
Apr, 1991

(<http://www.math.yorku.ca/SCS/sugi/sugi16-paper.html>, accessed 14 September 2011)

### **Star plots**

Star plots ([Chambers, et al., 1983](#), pp. 158-162) are a useful way to display multivariate observations with an arbitrary number of variables. Each observation is represented as a star-shaped figure with one ray for each variable. For a given observation, the length of each ray is made proportional to the size of that variable. Star plots differ from glyph plots in that all variables are used to construct the plotted star figure; there is no separation into foreground and background variables. Instead, the star-shaped figures are usually arranged in a rectangular array on the page. It is somewhat easier to see patterns in the data if the observations are arranged in some non-arbitrary order, and if the variables are assigned to the rays of the star in some meaningful order. [Figure 3](#) shows a star plot of the 12 numeric variables in the automobiles data.




Figure 3: Star plot of automobile data. Each star represents one car model; each ray in the star is proportional to one variable. Only the 8 lightest (top two rows) and 8 heaviest models (bottom two rows) are shown.

These 12 variables are arranged around the perimeter as shown in the variable assignment key in [Figure 4](#).




Figure 4: Variable assignment key for star plot. The variables at the sides and bottom are related to size; the others relate to price and performance.

The star plot is constructed using the Annotate facility with PROC GSLIDE. To make this procedure general, it has been written as a SAS macro program, STARS, which takes the following parameters:

```
%macro STARS(
  data=_LAST_,      /* Data set plotted      */
  var=_NUMERIC_,    /* Variables, as ordered */
                   /* around the star      */
  id=,              /* Observation identifier */
  minray=.1,        /* Minimum ray length 0-1 */
  across=5,         /* stars across a page   */
  down=6 );         /* stars down a page     */
```

The star plot is most useful when all of the variables have their scales aligned in the same direction so that increasing values have a similar meaning for all variables. For the AUTO data, this means that large values of a variable should reflect a "better" car and appear as long rays. To do this, the sign of PRICE, TURN, and GRATIO were changed before using STARS by this DATA step:

```
proc sort;
  by weight;
data autot;
  set auto;
  price = -price; /* make large values */
  turn  = -turn;  /* represent 'good' cars*/
  gratio= -gratio;
  if _n_ <= 8 or _n_ < 66-8 ;
```

Then, STARS was invoked by the following program lines to produce [Figure 3](#) and [Figure 4](#).

```
%stars(data=autot,
  vars= gratio turn rep77 rep78 price mpg
        hroom rseat trunk weight length displa,
  id=model,minray=.1);
```

The dominant pattern in [Figure 3](#) is that the star symbols in the top rows have long rays on the top (good price and performance) and short rays on the bottom (small in size variables), but the reverse is generally true for the heaviest models in the bottom rows.

Note that in the star plot we tend to see the configural properties of the collection of variables represented for each observation, and that this perception is affected by the ordering of variables around the perimeter and by the arrangement of stars on the page. Other arrangements might lead to noticing other features of the data, so it might be useful to try several alternatives.

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