TY  - UNPB
UR  - https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/623278/
PB  - UCL (University College London)
ID  - discovery623278
N2  - The overall project of this MPhil thesis is to defend a version of the view
that is often called contextualism in philosophy of language, namely the
version of the view that I take Charles Travis to hold. His view is that the
meaning a sentence is insufficient for deciding on questions about truth and
falsity, and that in arriving at the truth-conditions of an utterance the
occasion on which the utterance is made always plays a determining role. In
order to defend this view, I focus on a particular sort of example ? which I
refer to as a ?Travis case? ? and that Travis uses to support his view. Travis
cases, as I present Travis as conceiving of them, are supposed to show that
the truth-values of utterances made by using the same sentence can differ,
although the meaning of constituent expressions is the same and the
sentence is used to speak about the same state of things in the world. I
consider two alternative ways of analysing the example, from which
Travis?s view does not receive support, and I give arguments as to why
these analyses are problematic. By doing this, I aim both to give reasons as
to why Travis cases support Travis?s view and to highlight in what respects
his view differs from the views that are assumed in the alternative analyses.
A1  - Aasen, S.
M1  - Masters
EP  - 78
AV  - public
Y1  - 2010/11/28/
TI  - Truth, context and the reference of statements
N1  - Unpublished
ER  -