TY - JOUR VL - 34 TI - Structural estimation of a principal-agent model: moral hazard in medical insurance Y1 - 2003/// IS - 4 EP - 693 KW - EXCESS HEALTH-INSURANCE KW - PAYROLL RECORDS KW - WELFARE LOSS KW - ACCESS VALUE KW - CARE KW - DEMAND KW - UNCERTAINTY KW - RISK KW - ECONOMICS KW - DEDUCTIBLES A1 - Vera-Hernandez, M PB - RAND JF - RAND J ECON UR - https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=view&year=2003&issue=win&page=670&&tid=115586&sc=WtYV8yx9 ID - discovery4097 AV - public SP - 670 N2 - Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and obtain an approximation to the optimal contract. The results show that out-of-pocket payments follow a concave profile with respect to costs of treatment. I estimate the welfare loss due to moral hazard, taking into account income effects. I also propose a new measure of moral hazard based on the conditional correlation between contractible and noncontractible variables. SN - 0741-6261 ER -