TY  - JOUR
VL  - 34
TI  - Structural estimation of a principal-agent model: moral hazard in medical insurance
Y1  - 2003///
IS  - 4
EP  -  693
KW  - EXCESS HEALTH-INSURANCE
KW  -  PAYROLL RECORDS
KW  -  WELFARE LOSS
KW  -  ACCESS VALUE
KW  -  CARE
KW  -  DEMAND
KW  -  UNCERTAINTY
KW  -  RISK
KW  -  ECONOMICS
KW  -  DEDUCTIBLES
A1  - Vera-Hernandez, M
PB  - RAND
JF  - RAND J ECON
UR  - https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=view&year=2003&issue=win&page=670&&tid=115586&sc=WtYV8yx9
ID  - discovery4097
AV  - public
SP  - 670 
N2  - Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and obtain an approximation to the optimal contract. The results show that out-of-pocket payments follow a concave profile with respect to costs of treatment. I estimate the welfare loss due to moral hazard, taking into account income effects. I also propose a new measure of moral hazard based on the conditional correlation between contractible and noncontractible variables.
SN  - 0741-6261
ER  -