@article{discovery4097,
       publisher = {RAND},
           pages = {670 -- 693},
          number = {4},
         journal = {RAND J ECON},
           title = {Structural estimation of a principal-agent model: moral hazard in medical insurance},
            year = {2003},
          volume = {34},
          author = {Vera-Hernandez, M},
             url = {https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje\%5fonline.cgi?action=view&year=2003&issue=win&page=670&&tid=115586&sc=WtYV8yx9},
        abstract = {Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and obtain an approximation to the optimal contract. The results show that out-of-pocket payments follow a concave profile with respect to costs of treatment. I estimate the welfare loss due to moral hazard, taking into account income effects. I also propose a new measure of moral hazard based on the conditional correlation between contractible and noncontractible variables.},
            issn = {0741-6261},
        keywords = {EXCESS HEALTH-INSURANCE, PAYROLL RECORDS, WELFARE LOSS, ACCESS VALUE, CARE, DEMAND, UNCERTAINTY, RISK, ECONOMICS, DEDUCTIBLES}
}