@article{discovery4097, publisher = {RAND}, pages = {670 -- 693}, number = {4}, journal = {RAND J ECON}, title = {Structural estimation of a principal-agent model: moral hazard in medical insurance}, year = {2003}, volume = {34}, author = {Vera-Hernandez, M}, url = {https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje\%5fonline.cgi?action=view&year=2003&issue=win&page=670&&tid=115586&sc=WtYV8yx9}, abstract = {Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and obtain an approximation to the optimal contract. The results show that out-of-pocket payments follow a concave profile with respect to costs of treatment. I estimate the welfare loss due to moral hazard, taking into account income effects. I also propose a new measure of moral hazard based on the conditional correlation between contractible and noncontractible variables.}, issn = {0741-6261}, keywords = {EXCESS HEALTH-INSURANCE, PAYROLL RECORDS, WELFARE LOSS, ACCESS VALUE, CARE, DEMAND, UNCERTAINTY, RISK, ECONOMICS, DEDUCTIBLES} }