%C London, UK
%S Discussion Papers in Economics
%N 04-05
%X This paper evaluates the impact of releasing performance measures on public sector recruitment
and retention. We analyse the role played by the informativeness of disclosure by
comparing a policy of transparency with confidentiality, and the role played by the timing of
disclosure via a comparison with delayed (e.g. end of project) reporting. We show that relative
wage compression in the public sector produces a recruitment-retention trade-off. Transparency
minimises the cost of recruitment, delayed reporting minimises the cost of short-term retention,
while confidentiality minimises the cost of long-term retention. The optimal disclosure policy
varies with the type of public organisation - that is, with the relative value of public sector
projects and the complexity of production - warning against the current ’one size fits all’ policy
%K JEL classification: D82, D73, H1, J31, J44, J45. Recruitment and retention, wage compression, optimal disclosure policies
%A G.L. Albano
%A C. Leaver
%O Please also see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/14567 for a related item
%T Transparency, recruitment and retention in the public sector
%L discovery2573
%I Department of Economics, University College London
%D 2004