TY  - GEN
AV  - public
ID  - discovery2573
SN  - 1350-6722
N1  - Please also see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/14567 for a related item
Y1  - 2004/04//
PB  - Department of Economics, University College London
A1  - Albano, G.L.
A1  - Leaver, C.
CY  - London, UK
T3  - Discussion Papers in Economics
N2  - This paper evaluates the impact of releasing performance measures on public sector recruitment
and retention. We analyse the role played by the informativeness of disclosure by
comparing a policy of transparency with confidentiality, and the role played by the timing of
disclosure via a comparison with delayed (e.g. end of project) reporting. We show that relative
wage compression in the public sector produces a recruitment-retention trade-off. Transparency
minimises the cost of recruitment, delayed reporting minimises the cost of short-term retention,
while confidentiality minimises the cost of long-term retention. The optimal disclosure policy
varies with the type of public organisation - that is, with the relative value of public sector
projects and the complexity of production - warning against the current ?one size fits all? policy
KW  - JEL classification: D82
KW  -  D73
KW  -  H1
KW  -  J31
KW  -  J44
KW  -  J45. Recruitment and retention
KW  -  wage compression
KW  -  optimal disclosure policies
TI  - Transparency, recruitment and retention in the public sector
UR  - http://www.ucl.ac.uk/silva/economics/research/papers/working-papers-2004
ER  -