TY  - GEN
TI  - Access pricing, bypass and universal service in
post
A1  - Armstrong, M.
ID  - discovery2549
PB  - Department of Economics, University College London
N2  - An incumbent postal service provider faces two issues which make the design of efficient access pricing especially difficult. First, universal service obligations, together with the presence of significant fixed costs, require retail prices to be out of line with underlying marginal costs. Second, competing firms may be able to bypass the incumbent's delivery network. Within a simple framework, this note analyses how access charges should best be set in the light of these twin constraints.
T3  - Discussion Papers in Economics
UR  - http://www.ucl.ac.uk/silva/economics/research/papers/working-papers-2006
N1  - For the version published in the Review of Network Economics, please see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/14556/, and also see http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/15101/ for details of the version published in the American Economic Review
CY  - London, UK
AV  - public
Y1  - 2006/05//
SN  - 1350-6722
ER  -