eprintid: 17153
rev_number: 25
eprint_status: archive
userid: 600
dir: disk0/00/01/71/53
datestamp: 2009-11-25 11:28:40
lastmod: 2015-07-23 09:37:30
status_changed: 2009-11-25 11:28:40
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Schönberg, U.
creators_id: USCHO29
title: Testing for asymmetric employer learning
ispublished: pub
subjects: 12000
divisions: F24
note: © 2007 by The University of Chicago
abstract: Recent evidence suggests that employers acquire more precise information about a worker’s productivity the more time he or she spends in the labor market. The following question arises: Is learning symmetric, that is, do all employers have the same information about workers’ productivity, or is learning asymmetric, that is, does the current employer have superior information about workers’ productivity? This article develops a learning model with endogenous mobility that nests both learning hypotheses. It then proposes new tests for asymmetric employer learning. Overall, learning appears to be mostly symmetric, except possibly when the employees involved are college graduates.
date: 2007-10
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/522905
vfaculties: VSHS
oa_status: green
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
doi: 10.1086/522905
lyricists_name: Schoenberg, U
lyricists_id: USCHO29
full_text_status: public
publication: Journal of Labor Economics
volume: 25
number: 4
pagerange: 651-692
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0734-306X
citation:        Schönberg, U.;      (2007)    Testing for asymmetric employer learning.                   Journal of Labor Economics , 25  (4)   pp. 651-692.    10.1086/522905 <https://doi.org/10.1086/522905>.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/17153/1/17153.pdf