eprintid: 16584
rev_number: 24
eprint_status: archive
userid: 600
dir: disk0/00/01/65/84
datestamp: 2010-02-17 10:55:28
lastmod: 2015-07-23 09:37:17
status_changed: 2010-02-17 10:55:28
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Huck, S.
creators_name: Sarin, R.
creators_id: SHUCK00
creators_id: 
title: Players with limited memory
ispublished: pub
subjects: 12000
divisions: F24
note: Article number 6. The Berkeley Electronic Press © 2004
abstract: This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited and imperfect. We study how agents with such memory limitations, who have very little information about their choice environment, play games. We introduce the notion of a Limited Memory Equilibrium (LME) and show that play converges to an LME in every generic normal form game. Our characterization of the set of LME suggests that players with limited memory do (weakly) better in games than in decision problems. We also show that agents can do quite well even with severely limited memory, although severe limitations tend to make them behave cautiously.
date: 2004
official_url: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/contributions/vol4/iss1/art6/
vfaculties: VSHS
oa_status: green
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
lyricists_name: Huck, S
lyricists_id: SHUCK00
full_text_status: public
publication: The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics
volume: 4
number: 1
refereed: TRUE
issn: 1935-1704
citation:        Huck, S.;    Sarin, R.;      (2004)    Players with limited memory.                   The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics , 4  (1)            Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/16584/1/16584.pdf