eprintid: 16381
rev_number: 23
eprint_status: archive
userid: 600
dir: disk0/00/01/63/81
datestamp: 2009-07-27 15:23:14
lastmod: 2015-07-23 09:37:10
status_changed: 2009-07-27 15:23:14
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Cripps, M.W.
creators_name: Mailath, G.J.
creators_name: Samuelson, L.
creators_id: MWCRI35
creators_id: 
creators_id: 
title: Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
ispublished: pub
subjects: 12000
divisions: F24
abstract: For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps et al. [Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations, Econometrica 72 (2004) 407–432] showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player's reputation is private. The rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and reputations also disappear in sufficiently long discounted finitely repeated games.
date: 2007-05
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.007
vfaculties: VSHS
oa_status: green
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.007
lyricists_name: Cripps, M
lyricists_id: MWCRI35
full_text_status: public
publication: Journal of Economic Theory
volume: 134
number: 1
pagerange: 287-316
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0022-0531
citation:        Cripps, M.W.;    Mailath, G.J.;    Samuelson, L.;      (2007)    Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships.                   Journal of Economic Theory , 134  (1)   pp. 287-316.    10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.007 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.007>.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/16381/1/16381.pdf