TY  - JOUR
TI  - Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
SP  - 287
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.007
AV  - public
JF  - Journal of Economic Theory
EP  - 316
SN  - 0022-0531
ID  - discovery16381
Y1  - 2007/05//
VL  - 134
A1  - Cripps, M.W.
A1  - Mailath, G.J.
A1  - Samuelson, L.
N2  - For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps et al. [Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations, Econometrica 72 (2004) 407?432] showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player's reputation is private. The rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and reputations also disappear in sufficiently long discounted finitely repeated games.
IS  - 1
ER  -