eprintid: 1539044
rev_number: 15
eprint_status: archive
userid: 608
dir: disk0/01/53/90/44
datestamp: 2017-03-17 16:43:40
lastmod: 2020-02-12 14:43:22
status_changed: 2017-03-17 16:43:40
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: D'Orsogna, MR
creators_name: Kendall, R
creators_name: McBride, M
creators_name: Short, MB
title: Criminal Defectors Lead to the Emergence of Cooperation in an Experimental, Adversarial Game
ispublished: pub
divisions: UCL
divisions: A01
divisions: B03
divisions: C03
divisions: F24
note: © 2013 D'Orsogna et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
abstract: While the evolution of cooperation has been widely studied, little attention has been devoted to adversarial settings wherein one actor can directly harm another. Recent theoretical work addresses this issue, introducing an adversarial game in which the emergence of cooperation is heavily reliant on the presence of “Informants,” actors who defect at first-order by harming others, but who cooperate at second-order by punishing other defectors. We experimentally study this adversarial environment in the laboratory with human subjects to test whether Informants are indeed critical for the emergence of cooperation. We find in these experiments that, even more so than predicted by theory, Informants are crucial for the emergence and sustenance of a high cooperation state. A key lesson is that successfully reaching and maintaining a low defection society may require the cultivation of criminals who will also aid in the punishment of others.
date: 2013-04-23
date_type: published
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0061458
oa_status: green
full_text_type: pub
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 1206670
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0061458
lyricists_name: Kendall, Ryan
lyricists_id: RKEND78
actors_name: Kendall, Ryan
actors_id: RKEND78
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
publication: PLoS ONE
volume: 8
number: 4
article_number: e61458
issn: 1932-6203
editors_name: Perc, M
citation:        D'Orsogna, MR;    Kendall, R;    McBride, M;    Short, MB;      (2013)    Criminal Defectors Lead to the Emergence of Cooperation in an Experimental, Adversarial Game.                   PLoS ONE , 8  (4)    , Article e61458.  10.1371/journal.pone.0061458 <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0061458>.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1539044/1/PlosOneCriminalExperimentalKendall.pdf