%0 Journal Article
%@ 0034-8252
%A Billon, A
%A Guillot, MV
%D 2014
%E Suárez-Rivero, D
%F discovery:1476638
%J Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica
%K I-thoughts, Token-reflexivity, One-shot thoughts, Paradox, Rationality
%N 136
%P 97-105
%T Can Fregeans have 'I'-thoughts?
%U https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1476638/
%V 53
%X We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let alone a priori true. This further reinforces Glezakos’s objections against the set-up of Frege’s puzzle, while also raising what we think is an acute problem for Fregeans, insofar as I-thought (and indexical thinking more generally), understood in their way, turns out to be incompatible with some basic features of rationality.
%Z This is an Open Access article published under the terms of the Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 Costa Rica Licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/cr/).