@article{discovery1473371,
          volume = {3},
         journal = {Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum},
       publisher = {Estonian Association of the History and Philosophy of Science},
           pages = {5--31},
            year = {2015},
           title = {What's Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism?},
          number = {2},
            issn = {2228-2009},
             url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.11590/abhps.2015.2.01},
        abstract = {For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, the conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for aim-oriented empiricism are subjected to critical scrutiny.},
        keywords = {Empiricism, Metaphysics of physics, Philosophy of physics, Rationality, Scientific method, Theoretical unity},
          author = {Maxwell, N}
}