eprintid: 1471545 rev_number: 27 eprint_status: archive userid: 608 dir: disk0/01/47/15/45 datestamp: 2016-01-19 15:15:29 lastmod: 2021-09-22 22:17:01 status_changed: 2016-01-19 15:15:29 type: article metadata_visibility: show creators_name: Stewart, AJ creators_name: Plotkin, JB title: Collapse of cooperation in evolving games ispublished: pub divisions: UCL divisions: B02 divisions: C08 keywords: cooperation, game theory, evolution, Prisoner's Dilemma, iterated games note: Copyright © The Authors 2014. abstract: Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as a robust outcome in evolving populations. Here we extend evolutionary game theory by allowing players’ payoffs as well as their strategies to evolve in response to selection on heritable mutations. In nature, many organisms engage in mutually beneficial interactions and individuals may seek to change the ratio of risk to reward for cooperation by altering the resources they commit to cooperative interactions. To study this, we construct a general framework for the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in arbitrary iterated games. We show that, when there is a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of cooperation, coevolution often leads to a dramatic loss of cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The collapse of cooperation is so extreme that the average payoff in a population can decline even as the potential reward for mutual cooperation increases. Depending upon the form of tradeoffs, evolution may even move away from the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game altogether. Our work offers a new perspective on the Prisoner’s Dilemma and its predictions for cooperation in natural populations; and it provides a general framework to understand the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in iterated interactions. date: 2014-12-09 date_type: published official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1408618111 oa_status: green full_text_type: other language: eng primo: open primo_central: open_green verified: verified_manual elements_id: 1057027 doi: 10.1073/pnas.1408618111 lyricists_name: Stewart, Alexander lyricists_id: AJSTE98 actors_name: Stewart, Alexander actors_id: AJSTE98 actors_role: owner full_text_status: public publication: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences volume: 111 number: 49 pagerange: 17558-17563 issn: 1091-6490 citation: Stewart, AJ; Plotkin, JB; (2014) Collapse of cooperation in evolving games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 111 (49) pp. 17558-17563. 10.1073/pnas.1408618111 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1408618111>. Green open access document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1471545/1/Stewart_1402.6628v2.pdf