?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.title=Public+statistics+and+private+experience%3A+varying+feedback+information+in+a+take+or+pass+game&rft.creator=Huck%2C+S.&rft.creator=Jehiel%2C+P.&rft.description=We+study+how+subjects+in+an+experiment+use+different+forms+of+public%0D%0Ainformation+about+their+opponents%E2%80%99+past+behaviour.+In+the+absence%0D%0Aof+public+information%2C+subjects+appear+to+use+rather+detailed+statistics%0D%0Asummarizing+their+private+experiences.+If+they+have+additional+public%0D%0Ainformation%2C+they+make+use+of+this+information+even+if+it+is+less+precise%0D%0Athan+their+own+private+statistics%E2%80%93except+for+very+high+stakes.+Making%0D%0Apublic+information+more+precise+has+two+consequences%3A+It+is+also%0D%0Aused+when+the+stakes+are+very+high+and+it+reduces+the+number+of+subjects%0D%0Awho+ignore+any+information%E2%80%93public+and+private.+That+is%2C+precise%0D%0Apublic+information+crowds+in+the+use+of+own+information.+Finally%2C+our%0D%0Aresults+shed+some+light+on+unravelling+in+centipede+games.&rft.subject=Backward+induction%2C+analogy-based+equilibrium%2C+experiment&rft.publisher=ESRC+Centre+for+Economic+Learning+and+Social+Evolution&rft.date=2004-09&rft.type=Working+%2F+discussion+paper&rft.language=eng&rft.source=++++(ELSE+Working+Papers++89).+ESRC+Centre+for+Economic+Learning+and+Social+Evolution%3A+London%2C+UK.+(2004)+++++&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fdiscovery.ucl.ac.uk%2Fid%2Feprint%2F14585%2F1%2F14585.pdf&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fdiscovery.ucl.ac.uk%2Fid%2Feprint%2F14585%2F&rft.rights=open