eprintid: 14578
rev_number: 37
eprint_status: archive
userid: 600
dir: disk0/00/01/45/78
datestamp: 2009-02-25 11:08:55
lastmod: 2015-07-23 09:36:22
status_changed: 2009-02-25 11:08:55
type: working_paper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Bohnet, I.
creators_name: Harmgart, H.
creators_name: Huck, S.
creators_name: Tyran, J.R.
creators_id: 
creators_id: 
creators_id: SHUCK00
creators_id: 
title: Learning trust
ispublished: pub
subjects: 12000
subjects: 13200
divisions: F24
keywords: JEL classification: C72, C91, L14
abstract: We examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on
the performance of markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due
to sequential exchange. As orthodox theory would predict, we find that
providing buyers with information about sellers’ trading history boosts
market performance. More surprisingly, this beneficial effect of incentives
for reputation building is considerably enhanced if sellers, too, can
observe other sellers’ trading history. This suggests that two-sided market
transparency is an important ingredient for the design of well-functioning
markets that are prone to moral hazard.
date: 2004-09
publisher: ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution
official_url: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php
vfaculties: VSHS
oa_status: green
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
lyricists_name: Huck, S
lyricists_id: SHUCK00
full_text_status: public
series: ELSE Working Papers
number: 100
place_of_pub: London, UK
citation:        Bohnet, I.;    Harmgart, H.;    Huck, S.;    Tyran, J.R.;      (2004)    Learning trust.                    (ELSE Working Papers  100). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14578/1/14578.pdf