TY  - JOUR
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2013.815260
SN  - 1386-9795
N2  - This paper examines the relations between, on the one hand, accounts of the distinction between an agent's identifying with, as opposed to feeling alienated from, their attitudes; and on the other, metaphysical accounts of action. It claims that a commitment to an event-causal conception of agency, which would analyse agency in terms of the causal potency of psychological states and events, appears to render mandatory a particular style of account of identification and alienation ? namely, the hierarchical model offered by Harry Frankfurt and Michael Bratman. It is argued that such accounts fall foul of a dilemma: the Authority Problem. The failure of attempts to avoid the Authority Problem is then used to motivate an attractive alternative style of account of the distinction, offered by Richard Moran. However, it is pressed that Moran's account rests on claims about agency which seem incompatible with the event-causal conception of agency. By making the links between the metaphysics of agency and accounts of identification and alienation more explicit, the paper allows us to better comprehend both the apparent need for and characteristic failures of some traditional accounts of identification and alienation, as well as make clear the action-theoretical debt incurred by those who would offer an alternative.
ID  - discovery1456765
A1  - Hinshelwood, A
JF  - Philosophical Explorations
Y1  - 2013/09//
AV  - public
VL  - 16
SP  - 243 
EP  -  258
TI  - WINNER OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS ESSAY PRIZE 2013: The relations between agency, identification, and alienation
IS  - 3
N1  - © 2013 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis

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