eprintid: 1451595
rev_number: 30
eprint_status: archive
userid: 608
dir: disk0/01/45/15/95
datestamp: 2014-10-16 19:28:11
lastmod: 2024-07-23 08:54:40
status_changed: 2014-10-16 19:28:11
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Zalabardo, JL
title: Précis of Scepticism and Reliable Belief
ispublished: pub
divisions: UCL
divisions: B03
divisions: C01
divisions: F16
keywords: Knowledge, Scepticism, Reliability, Evidence
note: This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
abstract: The problem of scepticism and the analysis of knowledge are two
central topics of the traditional epistemological curriculum. They are intimately related. Sceptical arguments purport to establish the conclusion that
most knowledge is impossible by showing that there are necessary conditions
for knowledge that we cannot satisfy. Whether these conditions have the status that sceptical arguments ascribe to them will depend on how knowledge
should be analysed. If the right analysis makes room for instances of
knowledge that don’t satisfy the conditions that the sceptical arguments treat
as necessary, the arguments will have to be dismissed as unsound.
This aspect of the problem of scepticism is brought to prominence by
externalist analyses of knowledge. All extant sceptical arguments appear to
rest on principles concerning the nature of knowledge that are rejected by externalist analyses. If this is right, then scepticism poses a problem only for
those who endorse internalist analyses of knowledge.
date: 2014
official_url: https://www.unioviedo.es/Teorema/Spanish/Numeros/XXXIII3.html
vfaculties: VARTS
oa_status: green
full_text_type: pub
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
article_type_text: Article
verified: verified_manual
elements_source: Manually entered
elements_id: 985306
lyricists_name: Zalabardo, Jose
lyricists_id: JZALA52
full_text_status: public
publication: Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía
volume: 33
number: 3
pagerange: 88 - 91
event_location: Spain
issn: 0210-1602
citation:        Zalabardo, JL;      (2014)    Précis of Scepticism and Reliable Belief.                   Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía , 33  (3)   88 - 91.          Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1451595/1/Zalabardo_2Precis.pdf