TY  - JOUR
IS  - 3
N1  - This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher?s terms and conditions.
SP  - 88 
VL  - 33
JF  - Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía
A1  - Zalabardo, JL
UR  - https://www.unioviedo.es/Teorema/Spanish/Numeros/XXXIII3.html
SN  - 0210-1602
TI  - Précis of Scepticism and Reliable Belief
AV  - public
Y1  - 2014///
EP  -  91
KW  - Knowledge
KW  -  Scepticism
KW  -  Reliability
KW  -  Evidence
N2  - The problem of scepticism and the analysis of knowledge are two
central topics of the traditional epistemological curriculum. They are intimately related. Sceptical arguments purport to establish the conclusion that
most knowledge is impossible by showing that there are necessary conditions
for knowledge that we cannot satisfy. Whether these conditions have the status that sceptical arguments ascribe to them will depend on how knowledge
should be analysed. If the right analysis makes room for instances of
knowledge that don?t satisfy the conditions that the sceptical arguments treat
as necessary, the arguments will have to be dismissed as unsound.
This aspect of the problem of scepticism is brought to prominence by
externalist analyses of knowledge. All extant sceptical arguments appear to
rest on principles concerning the nature of knowledge that are rejected by externalist analyses. If this is right, then scepticism poses a problem only for
those who endorse internalist analyses of knowledge.
ID  - discovery1451595
ER  -