%0 Journal Article
%@ 0210-1602
%A Zalabardo, JL
%D 2014
%F discovery:1451595
%J Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía
%K Knowledge, Scepticism, Reliability, Evidence
%N 3
%P 88 - 91
%T Précis of Scepticism and Reliable Belief
%U https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1451595/
%V 33
%X The problem of scepticism and the analysis of knowledge are two  central topics of the traditional epistemological curriculum. They are intimately related. Sceptical arguments purport to establish the conclusion that  most knowledge is impossible by showing that there are necessary conditions  for knowledge that we cannot satisfy. Whether these conditions have the status that sceptical arguments ascribe to them will depend on how knowledge  should be analysed. If the right analysis makes room for instances of  knowledge that don’t satisfy the conditions that the sceptical arguments treat  as necessary, the arguments will have to be dismissed as unsound.  This aspect of the problem of scepticism is brought to prominence by  externalist analyses of knowledge. All extant sceptical arguments appear to  rest on principles concerning the nature of knowledge that are rejected by externalist analyses. If this is right, then scepticism poses a problem only for  those who endorse internalist analyses of knowledge.
%Z This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.