eprintid: 14458
rev_number: 27
eprint_status: archive
userid: 600
dir: disk0/00/01/44/58
datestamp: 2009-10-28 17:52:13
lastmod: 2015-07-23 09:36:18
status_changed: 2009-10-28 17:52:13
type: working_paper
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Irlenbusch, B.
creators_name: Ruchala, G.
creators_id: 
creators_id: GRUCH99
title: Relative rewards within team-based compensation
ispublished: pub
subjects: 13200
keywords: JEL classification: C72, C91, H41, J33, L23, M52. Bonus pools, relative rewards, motivation crowding out, voluntary
cooperation, personnel economics, experiments
abstract: How to design compensation schemes to motivate team members appears to be one of the most challenging
problems in the economic analysis of labour provision. We shed light on this issue by experimentally
investigating team-based compensations with and without bonuses awarded to the highest contributors in teams.
A purely team-based compensation scheme induces agents to voluntarily cooperate while introducing an
additional relative reward increases effort and efficiency only when the bonus is substantial. In this case,
however, the data suggests that tournament competition crowds out voluntary cooperation within a team.
date: 2007-01
publisher: ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution
official_url: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007
oa_status: green
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
lyricists_name: Luenser, G
lyricists_id: GRUCH99
full_text_status: public
series: ELSE Working Papers
number: 239
place_of_pub: London, UK
citation:        Irlenbusch, B.;    Ruchala, G.;      (2007)    Relative rewards within team-based compensation.                    (ELSE Working Papers  239). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14458/1/14458.pdf