?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.title=Performance+pay%2C+group+selection+and+group+performance&rft.creator=Konigstein%2C+M.&rft.creator=Luenser%2C+G.&rft.description=Within+a+laboratory+experiment+we+investigate+a+principal-agent+game+in+which+agents+may%2C%0D%0Afirst%2C+self-select+into+a+group+task+(GT)+or+an+individual+task+(IT)+and%2C+second%2C+choose+work%0D%0Aeffort.+In+their+choices+of+task+and+effort+the+agents+have+to+consider+pay+contracts+for+both%0D%0Atasks+as+offered+by+the+principal.+The+rational+solution+of+the+game+implies+that+contract%0D%0Adesign+may+not+induce+agents+to+select+GT+and+provide+positive+effort+in+GT.+Furthermore+it%0D%0Apredicts+equal+behavior+of+agents+with+different+productivities.+In+contrast%2C+considerations+of%0D%0Atrust%2C+reciprocity+and+cooperation+%E2%80%93+the+social-emotional+model+of+behavior+%E2%80%93+suggest+that%0D%0Acontract+design+can+influence+the+agents%E2%80%99+willingness+to+join+groups+and+provide+effort.+We%0D%0Aanalyze+the+data+by+applying+a+two-step+regression+model+(multinomial+logit+and+tobit)+and%0D%0Afind+that+counter+to+the+rational+solution%2C+contract+design+does+influence+both%2C+task+selection%0D%0Aand+effort+choice.+The+principal+can+increase+participation+in+work+groups+and+can+positively%0D%0Ainfluence+group+performance.+Larger+payment+increases+the+share+of+socially+motivated+agents%0D%0Ain+work+groups.+The+selection+effect+is+larger+than+the+motivation+effect.&rft.subject=JEL+classification%3A+M5%2C+J3%2C+C7%2C+C9.+Principal-agent%2C+experiment%2C+work+group%2C+selection%2C+motivation&rft.publisher=ESRC+Centre+for+Economic+Learning+and+Social+Evolution&rft.date=2007-03&rft.type=Working+%2F+discussion+paper&rft.language=eng&rft.source=++++(ELSE+Working+Papers++256).+ESRC+Centre+for+Economic+Learning+and+Social+Evolution%3A+London%2C+UK.+(2007)+++++&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fdiscovery.ucl.ac.uk%2Fid%2Feprint%2F14442%2F1%2F14442.pdf&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fdiscovery.ucl.ac.uk%2Fid%2Feprint%2F14442%2F&rft.rights=open