eprintid: 14439
rev_number: 32
eprint_status: archive
userid: 600
dir: disk0/00/01/44/39
datestamp: 2009-07-09 10:44:34
lastmod: 2015-07-23 09:36:17
status_changed: 2009-07-09 10:44:34
type: working_paper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Binmore, K.
creators_name: Swierzbinski, J.
creators_name: Tomlinson, C.
creators_id: KGBIN82
creators_id: JESWI60
creators_id: 
title: An experimental test of Rubinstein's bargaining model
ispublished: pub
subjects: 12000
subjects: 13200
divisions: F24
abstract: This paper offers an experimental test of a version
of Rubinstein’s bargaining model in which the players’ discount
factors are unequal. We find that learning, rationality, and fairness
are all significant in determining the outcome. In particular,
we find that a model of myopic optimization over time predicts
the sign of deviations in the opening proposal from the final
undiscounted agreement in the previous period rather well. To
explain the amplitude of the deviations, we then successfully fit
a perturbed version of the model of myopic adjustment to the
data that allows for a bias toward refusing inequitable offers.
date: 2007-06
publisher: ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution
official_url: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007
vfaculties: VSHS
oa_status: green
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
lyricists_name: Binmore, K
lyricists_name: Swierzbinski, J
lyricists_id: KGBIN82
lyricists_id: JESWI60
full_text_status: public
series: ELSE Working Papers
number: 260
place_of_pub: London, UK
citation:        Binmore, K.;    Swierzbinski, J.;    Tomlinson, C.;      (2007)    An experimental test of Rubinstein's bargaining model.                    (ELSE Working Papers  260). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14439/1/14439.pdf