?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.title=An+experimental+test+of+Rubinstein's+bargaining+model&rft.creator=Binmore%2C+K.&rft.creator=Swierzbinski%2C+J.&rft.creator=Tomlinson%2C+C.&rft.description=This+paper+offers+an+experimental+test+of+a+version%0D%0Aof+Rubinstein%E2%80%99s+bargaining+model+in+which+the+players%E2%80%99+discount%0D%0Afactors+are+unequal.+We+find+that+learning%2C+rationality%2C+and+fairness%0D%0Aare+all+significant+in+determining+the+outcome.+In+particular%2C%0D%0Awe+find+that+a+model+of+myopic+optimization+over+time+predicts%0D%0Athe+sign+of+deviations+in+the+opening+proposal+from+the+final%0D%0Aundiscounted+agreement+in+the+previous+period+rather+well.+To%0D%0Aexplain+the+amplitude+of+the+deviations%2C+we+then+successfully+fit%0D%0Aa+perturbed+version+of+the+model+of+myopic+adjustment+to+the%0D%0Adata+that+allows+for+a+bias+toward+refusing+inequitable+offers.&rft.publisher=ESRC+Centre+for+Economic+Learning+and+Social+Evolution&rft.date=2007-06&rft.type=Working+%2F+discussion+paper&rft.language=eng&rft.source=++++(ELSE+Working+Papers++260).+ESRC+Centre+for+Economic+Learning+and+Social+Evolution%3A+London%2C+UK.+(2007)+++++&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fdiscovery.ucl.ac.uk%2Fid%2Feprint%2F14439%2F1%2F14439.pdf&rft.identifier=https%3A%2F%2Fdiscovery.ucl.ac.uk%2Fid%2Feprint%2F14439%2F&rft.rights=open