TY  - GEN
N2  - Do conventions need to be common knowledge? David
Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper
explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game
theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann
and others militates against Lewis?s approach, because it demonstrates
that it is almost impossible for something to become common
knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein?s
Email Game suggests that coordinated action is equally hard for rational
players. But an unnecessary simplifying assumption in the Email Game
turns out to be doing all the work, and the paper concludes that common
knowledge is better excluded from a definition of the conventions that
we use to regulate our daily lives.
T3  - ELSE Working Papers
CY  - London, UK
PB  - ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution
Y1  - 2007/06//
A1  - Binmore, K.
ID  - discovery14438
AV  - public
UR  - http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007
TI  - Do conventions need to be common knowledge?
ER  -