eprintid: 14428
rev_number: 30
eprint_status: archive
userid: 600
dir: disk0/00/01/44/28
datestamp: 2009-07-29 13:48:20
lastmod: 2015-07-19 02:09:26
status_changed: 2009-07-29 13:48:20
type: working_paper
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Dokumaci, E.
creators_name: Lahkar, R.
creators_name: Sandholm, W.H.
title: The projection dynamic, the replicator dynamic and the geometry of population games
ispublished: pub
subjects: 13200
abstract: Every population game defines a vector field on the set of strategy distributions X. The
projection dynamic maps each population game to a new vector field: namely, the one closest
to the payoff vector field among those that never point outward from X. We investigate the
geometric underpinnings of the projection dynamic, describe its basic game-theoretic properties,
and establish a number of close connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator
dynamic.
date: 2007-08
publisher: ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution
official_url: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007
oa_status: green
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
full_text_status: public
series: ELSE Working Papers
number: 271
place_of_pub: London, UK
citation:        Dokumaci, E.;    Lahkar, R.;    Sandholm, W.H.;      (2007)    The projection dynamic, the replicator dynamic and the geometry of population games.                    (ELSE Working Papers  271). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14428/1/14428.pdf