@misc{discovery14428,
           month = {August},
          series = {ELSE Working Papers},
           title = {The projection dynamic, the replicator dynamic and the geometry of population games},
            year = {2007},
       publisher = {ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution},
          number = {271},
         address = {London, UK},
             url = {http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007},
        abstract = {Every population game defines a vector field on the set of strategy distributions X. The
projection dynamic maps each population game to a new vector field: namely, the one closest
to the payoff vector field among those that never point outward from X. We investigate the
geometric underpinnings of the projection dynamic, describe its basic game-theoretic properties,
and establish a number of close connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator
dynamic.},
          author = {Dokumaci, E. and Lahkar, R. and Sandholm, W. H.}
}