TY  - UNPB
Y1  - 2011/04/28/
AV  - public
EP  - 102
TI  - The value of equality
N1  - Unpublished
UR  - https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1310433/
PB  - UCL (University College London)
N2  - This thesis undertakes to explain the appeal of the ideal of equality and the
role of the intrinsic value of equality therein. Following John Rawls, it
ultimately argues that justice requires the equal distribution of fundamental
resources and privileges, and that equality may only be deviated from to the
extent that these deviations better the lot of the worst-off. Thus justice
requires equality. However, I argue that Rawls?s difference principle (DP)
is a way of respecting what is politically pragmatic without ensuring true
justice. A proper conclusion of Rawls?s reasoning in support of the
difference principle would permit inequalities only to the extent that they
reflect unequal burdens, as suggested by G. A. Cohen. Despite this
egalitarian conclusion, however, I argue that Rawls need not rely on the
intrinsic value of equality.
To this end, I begin by examining the value of equality as it appears in
egalitarian theories of distributive justice, noting the difficulty in proving
that equality is of underived or intrinsic worth. I then scrutinize two
challenges to Rawls?s DP which, however opposed in direction, share the
assumption that the DP relies on the intrinsic value of equality. Both
challenges reveal weaknesses in Rawls?s principle as it is typically
formulated, leading us to doubt its very appeal ? let alone its ability to prove
the value of equality.
On a proper reading of Rawls, however, what politically matters about
equality doesn?t presuppose that equality itself is a value. Thus we can see
Rawls?s difference principle as intending to do justice to what is owed to
each citizen, without having to be axiologically creative in the way that
Cohen is. Conversely, arguments for the difference principle go beyond the mere sufficiency Frankfurt allows for. So, again, Rawls better reflects the
political attraction of equality than Frankfurt?s appeal to sufficiency can
recognize.
In closing, therefore, I argue that an alternative reading of Rawls?s argument
for the DP offers a compelling explanation for the appeal of the ideal of
equality, an explanation that warrants a more egalitarian conclusion than
Rawls himself concedes. Thus, justice requires equality, but not necessarily
because equality is intrinsically valuable.
ID  - discovery1310433
A1  - O'Halloran, L.M.
M1  - Masters
ER  -