eprintid: 1306878
rev_number: 15
eprint_status: archive
userid: 602
dir: disk0/01/30/68/78
datestamp: 2011-07-06 22:01:06
lastmod: 2015-07-20 18:24:44
status_changed: 2011-07-06 22:01:06
type: thesis
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Tait, D.I.
title: A defence of analyticity
ispublished: unpub
divisions: F16
abstract: There is prima facie reason to suppose that there are analytic truths, our knowledge of
which is explained simply by our understanding them. One recent line of argument
challenges this view on the grounds that, for any given proposition, it is always possible to
understand it without knowing it. If understanding is to explain our knowledge of certain
truths, then, how is it possible for someone to understand them and yet fail to know them?
We can accommodate these cases of disagreement by construing the epistemic state in
which a subject is placed by understanding an analytic truth as one of being in a position
to know. In understanding an analytic truth, a subject may have the epistemic resources
required for knowledge and yet be unable to exploit this position; this allows for the
possibility that in those cases where a subject does know such a truth, the knowledge is
explained by the subject’s understanding. This sense of being in a position to know
receives support from the need for such a notion in describing certain features of our
perceptual knowledge.
Understanding an analytic truth enables a subject to recognise that its truth-conditions
must be fulfilled. This is ultimately made possible by there being certain propositions that
have the status of structuring the linguistic practice in which the subject participates.
These propositions are held fixed as we evaluate the possible ways that the world could be
and so come out as true in all possible worlds. A subject who is sufficiently integrated
within the practice and who understands an analytic truth is thereby in a position to
recognise its status within the practice. Using this model we can identify two kinds of
disagreement consistent with the claim that understanding an analytic truth puts one in a
position to know it.
date: 2011-03-28
vfaculties: VARTS
oa_status: green
thesis_class: doctoral_open
language: eng
thesis_view: UCL_Thesis
dart: DART-Europe
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
full_text_status: public
pages: 159
institution: UCL (University College London)
department: Department of Philosophy
thesis_type: Doctoral
citation:        Tait, D.I.;      (2011)    A defence of analyticity.                   Doctoral thesis , UCL (University College London).     Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1306878/1/1306878.pdf