eprintid: 10205522
rev_number: 9
eprint_status: archive
userid: 699
dir: disk0/10/20/55/22
datestamp: 2025-03-05 11:17:26
lastmod: 2025-03-10 16:32:01
status_changed: 2025-03-05 11:17:26
type: working_paper
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 699
creators_name: Kim, Francis D
creators_name: Raj, Prateek
title: Elite Control through Marriage over Institutional Change
ispublished: pub
divisions: UCL
divisions: B02
note: This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
abstract: Economic inequality remains a persistent and widely studied issue in the social sciences. South Korea provides a striking example where the top 23 business groups, controlled by ultra-wealthy, family-owned conglomerates (chaebols), have maintained significant economic persistence and resisted outsider entry, even amidst the disruptive forces of the 21st-century digital age. This study sheds light on how chaebol families have strategically evolved their use of marriage alliances as a key channel to political networks, significantly shaping the dynamics of elite influence over time. In the pre-democratic era, chaebols often formed marriages with politicians to strengthen their influence and boost corporate value. For example, the 2024 divorce between SK Group’s Chey Tae-won and Roh So-young, daughter of former President Roh Tae-woo, highlights how such alliances helped secure key advantages, like SK’s telecom permit in the 1980s (BBC News, 2024.5). However, marriages with other elites or commoners didn’t provide the same benefits. Contrary to the perspective presented by The Economist (2015.4) that such practices among Korean chaebols are enduring, this study finds that blood-based alliances between politicians and elite businessmen was a temporal, institution-specific strategy that have largely disappeared in the democratic era. As South Korea transitioned to a more liberalized regime, the frequency of these political marriages has drastically declined, as confirmed by our analysis. Instead, chaebol families have adapted by leveraging elite marriages within their own business circles to sustain family control over top business groups. These practices have ensured their continued economic dominance while limiting outsider entry into their exclusive networks. This study documents the evolution of marriage alliances as a critical mechanism through which chaebols have navigated changing institutional landscapes, maintaining their entrenched economic power despite shifting political and social conditions.
date: 2025-01
date_type: published
publisher: Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, University of Chicago
official_url: https://www.chicagobooth.edu/research/stigler/research/working-papers
oa_status: green
full_text_type: pub
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 2365378
lyricists_name: Raj, Prateek
lyricists_id: RAJXX96
actors_name: Raj, Prateek
actors_id: RAJXX96
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
series: Stigler Center New Working Paper Series
number: 354
place_of_pub: Chicago, IL, USA
pages: 19
citation:        Kim, Francis D;    Raj, Prateek;      (2025)    Elite Control through Marriage over Institutional Change.                    (Stigler Center New Working Paper Series  354). Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, University of Chicago: Chicago, IL, USA.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10205522/1/354Kim2020PrateekWorking20Paper2025115pdf.pdf