eprintid: 10200034
rev_number: 7
eprint_status: archive
userid: 699
dir: disk0/10/20/00/34
datestamp: 2024-12-12 15:45:27
lastmod: 2024-12-12 15:45:27
status_changed: 2024-12-12 15:45:27
type: book_section
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 699
creators_name: Kürbis, Nils
title: The Correspondence Theory of Truth
ispublished: pub
divisions: UCL
divisions: B03
divisions: C01
divisions: F16
keywords: Correspondence, Facts, Falsehood, Generality, Logical atomism, Meaning, Metaphysics, Negation, Ontology, Particulars, Propositions, Bertrand Russell, Truth, Universals
note: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
abstract: According to the correspondence theory of truth a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact. The present entry explains this definition, outlines an ontology of facts, and sketches a theory of meaning that naturally accompanies the correspondence theory of truth. It also discusses two major challenges the correspondence theory faces, related to the meanings of the logical expressions “not” and “all,” and surveys possible solutions.
date: 2024
date_type: published
publisher: Elsevier
official_url: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-323-95504-1.00143-5
full_text_type: other
language: eng
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 2335047
doi: 10.1016/B978-0-323-95504-1.00143-5
lyricists_name: Kurbis, Nils
lyricists_id: NKURB54
actors_name: Kurbis, Nils
actors_id: NKURB54
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: restricted
place_of_pub: Amsterdam, Netherlands
book_title: Reference Module in Social Sciences
citation:        Kürbis, Nils;      (2024)    The Correspondence Theory of Truth.                    In:  Reference Module in Social Sciences.    Elsevier: Amsterdam, Netherlands.      
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10200034/1/KurbisCorrespondenceTheory.pdf