eprintid: 10197340
rev_number: 9
eprint_status: archive
userid: 699
dir: disk0/10/19/73/40
datestamp: 2024-09-25 09:09:30
lastmod: 2024-09-25 09:09:30
status_changed: 2024-09-25 09:09:30
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 699
creators_name: Si, H
creators_name: Liang, J
creators_name: Ke, J
creators_name: Cheng, L
creators_name: De Vos, J
title: What limits improper bike-sharing parking most: Penalties or incentives? Findings from an online behavioral experiment
ispublished: pub
divisions: UCL
divisions: B04
divisions: C04
divisions: F39
keywords: Bike sharing, Parking behavior, Perceived value, Behavioral experiment
note: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher's terms and conditions.
abstract: Electronic fences are now used to regulate the parking behavior of bike-sharing users, but the issue of improper parking within such fenced areas has not been resolved. Based on the theories of perceived value and perceived risk, this study used online behavioral experiments to simulate a scenario of users parking shared bicycles. By considering three factors — economic incentives, punitive measures, and travel scenarios — this study examined variations in users’ willingness to standardize the parking of shared bicycles. Data from 809 valid questionnaires were collected and empirically analyzed using bootstrap and regression analyses. According to the results, both economic incentives and penalties significantly enhanced users’ willingness to standardize the parking of shared bicycles, and the impact of penalties was slightly stronger than that of incentives. Perceived value played a mediating role between economic incentives and users’ willingness to properly park shared bicycles. Perceived risk acted as a mediator between punitive measures and the regulated parking intention of users. Travel scenarios served as a moderating factor between penalties and users’ willingness to park shared bicycles in a compliant manner, with the users’ compliance willingness in non-commuting travel scenarios significantly surpassing that in commuting contexts. These findings enrich the knowledge of sustainable usage behaviors among bike-sharing users, providing insights for bike-sharing companies to manage user behavior. Based on these results, several policy recommendations aimed at guiding governments and companies in regulating electronic fences and user parking behaviors are proposed.
date: 2024-11
date_type: published
publisher: ELSEVIER SCI LTD
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trf.2024.09.001
full_text_type: other
language: eng
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 2312093
doi: 10.1016/j.trf.2024.09.001
lyricists_name: De Vos, Jonas
lyricists_id: JDEVO07
actors_name: De Vos, Jonas
actors_id: JDEVO07
actors_role: owner
funding_acknowledgements: 72104128 [National Natural Science Foundation of China]; 52372301 [National Natural Science Foundation of China]; ZR2021QG053 [Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province, China]; [Open Foundation of Key Laboratory of Transport Industry of Comprehensive Transportation Theory]
full_text_status: restricted
publication: Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour
volume: 107
pagerange: 133-148
citation:        Si, H;    Liang, J;    Ke, J;    Cheng, L;    De Vos, J;      (2024)    What limits improper bike-sharing parking most: Penalties or incentives? Findings from an online behavioral experiment.                   Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour , 107    pp. 133-148.    10.1016/j.trf.2024.09.001 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trf.2024.09.001>.      
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10197340/3/De%20Vos_What%20limits%20improper%20bike-sharing%20parking%20most-%20Penalties%20or%20incentives_AAM.pdf