eprintid: 10197116
rev_number: 11
eprint_status: archive
userid: 699
dir: disk0/10/19/71/16
datestamp: 2024-10-11 11:05:45
lastmod: 2024-10-11 11:05:45
status_changed: 2024-10-11 11:05:45
type: thesis
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 699
creators_name: Long, Harry
title: Do the kinds of standards applicable in statistical reasoning apply in philosophical reasoning? The example of Simpson’s paradox
ispublished: submitted
divisions: UCL
divisions: B03
divisions: C01
divisions: F16
keywords: epistemology, metaphilosophy, philosophy of statistics, thought-experiments, Simpson's paradox, reference class problem
note: Copyright © The Author 2024. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request.
abstract: My research intersects the philosophy of science and metaphilosophy, with two overarching key aims. First, to investigate the extent to which, how, and when the
kinds of standards we apply in statistical and scientific reasoning apply in instances of case-based philosophical reasoning putatively analogous to controlled scientific experimentation. Second, to discover — in those instances in which those standards do apply — how exactly to meet those standards, so that philosophers executing such reasoning may do better, by their own lights.
This thesis represents the beginning of my research. In particular, it focusses on the problem of Simpson’s paradox, for which many solutions have been developed, and are frequently deployed, in statistical reasoning.
The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, to elucidate the relevance of Simpson’s paradox to philosophy. This is by three means: by providing a necessary condition
for the paradox, by relating it to a collection of other problems of keen philosophical interest, and by proposing solutions to these problems — where available — derived from the tools employed in statistical reasoning. These problems include the problem of base rate neglect, the Monty Hall problem, the Newcomb problem, counterexamples to the Dominance and Sure-Thing Principles, and problems with the ex ante Pareto principle. In each case, I aim to clarify the relationship between Simpson’s paradox and the problem at hand. Additionally, I clarify the relationship between Simpson’s paradox and the more general reference class problem, as well as the relationship between the reference class problem, Bertrand’s paradox, and the problem of (vindicating) induction.
Second, to propose a condition that any philosopher employing case-based reasoning putatively analogous to controlled scientific experimentation must satisfy in order for her reasoning to be valid. The condition requires such reasoners to do two things.
First, to check that their reasoning is not vulnerable to an instance of Simpson’s paradox. Second, if there is a suspected instance of Simpson’s paradox, to handle it by using the appropriate tools developed in statistical reasoning. If these conditions turn out to be difficult to satisfy, then the aspiration that the reasoning is analogous to controlled scientific experimentation may need to be dropped or attenuated.
date: 2024-09-28
date_type: published
oa_status: green
full_text_type: other
thesis_class: res_masters_open
thesis_award: M.Phil.Stud
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 2309189
lyricists_name: Long, Harry
lyricists_id: HLONG84
actors_name: Long, Harry
actors_id: HLONG84
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
pagerange: 1-104
pages: 104
institution: UCL (University College London)
department: Philosophy
thesis_type: Masters
editors_name: Rothschild, daniel
citation:        Long, Harry;      (2024)    Do the kinds of standards applicable in statistical reasoning apply in philosophical reasoning? The example of Simpson’s paradox.                   Masters thesis  (M.Phil.Stud), UCL (University College London).     Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10197116/1/HDL_MPhil_Thesis__Revised_26_July_2024_.pdf