eprintid: 10196811
rev_number: 14
eprint_status: archive
userid: 699
dir: disk0/10/19/68/11
datestamp: 2024-10-11 11:09:03
lastmod: 2024-10-11 11:09:03
status_changed: 2024-10-11 11:09:03
type: thesis
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 699
creators_name: Lowe, Katie
title: Evidential and Testimonial Reasons for Belief: An Analysis of Moran’s View on the Epistemological Value of Testimony
ispublished: unpub
divisions: UCL
divisions: B03
divisions: C01
divisions: F16
note: Copyright © The Author 2024.  Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).  Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms.  Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request.
abstract: A large proportion of our knowledge about the world comes from the testimony of other people. Our capacity to investigate things for ourselves is limited, so we depend heavily on the word of others. As such, we ought to know what justifies the beliefs formed by this means. What is it about this mechanism of forming beliefs that means we can trust its deliverances? This question is made more pressing by the fact that as a mechanism for forming beliefs, testimony is frequently unreliable. We know that people lie, mislead, and can be mistaken. 
 
Moran thinks it is a mistake to answer this question without attending to the nature of testimonial acts as speech acts. He argues that there are certain asymmetries between the way we acquire reasons to believe from the speech acts of other people and the traditional epistemological standpoint of the individual observer and interpreter of evidence. These asymmetries are interconnected and numerous throughout the Exchange of Words. In my thesis I will examine just one along with Moran’s accompanying argument that, because of this asymmetry, accounts of testimony that attempt to assimilate its epistemological value to that of evidence will fail.  
 
The aim of my thesis is largely clarificatory; to elucidate Moran’s argumentation and clear up what I think Moran had in mind in places where it is unclear. I will look at cases where our epistemological relationship to evidence undergoes varying levels of mediation and see if Moran’s asymmetry is still accurate. I will clarify what I think Moran’s treatment of these cases, and his response to challenges, would be. Finally, I investigate if the asymmetry I have examined is sufficient for Moran’s conclusion that the reason for belief offered by testimony is indeed distinct from that provided by evidence.
date: 2024-09-28
date_type: published
oa_status: green
full_text_type: other
thesis_class: res_masters_open
thesis_award: M.Phil.Stud
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 2311185
lyricists_name: Lowe, Katie
lyricists_id: KLOWE38
actors_name: Lowe, Katie
actors_id: KLOWE38
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
pagerange: 1-71
pages: 71
institution: UCL (University College London)
department: Philosophy
thesis_type: Masters
citation:        Lowe, Katie;      (2024)    Evidential and Testimonial Reasons for Belief: An Analysis of Moran’s View on the Epistemological Value of Testimony.                   Masters thesis  (M.Phil.Stud), UCL (University College London).     Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10196811/3/Lowe_10196811_thesis.pdf