eprintid: 10195827
rev_number: 9
eprint_status: archive
userid: 699
dir: disk0/10/19/58/27
datestamp: 2024-08-16 08:23:56
lastmod: 2024-08-16 08:23:56
status_changed: 2024-08-16 08:23:56
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 699
creators_name: Vanello, Daniel
title: Moral understanding, affect, and the imagination
ispublished: inpress
divisions: UCL
divisions: B16
divisions: B14
divisions: J80
keywords: Moral understanding, affect, imagination, perspective-taking, hills
note: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
abstract: The aim of this paper is to defend the view that we need to conceive our moral understanding as in part constituted by our affective and imaginative abilities suitably related. The core argument is that in order to be able to understand and explain the truth of a given moral proposition, we need to understand what the relevant moral concepts refer to, that is, we need to understand the semantic value of the relevant moral concepts. In the moral domain, I argue, this involves appealing to our affective and imaginative abilities suitably related. My account provides a genuinely new alternative to current accounts of moral understanding because it brings in both affect and the imagination central stage. Moreover, my account is a defense of the view that our moral understanding is a distinctive kind of understanding not reducible to non-moral kinds of understanding. The upshot of my argument is a new position in questions about the nature of moral understanding that focuses on the peculiarities of understanding in the moral domain.
date: 2022-05-19
date_type: published
publisher: Informa UK Limited
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2022.2077431
oa_status: green
full_text_type: other
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 2303661
doi: 10.1080/0020174x.2022.2077431
lyricists_name: Vanello, Daniel
lyricists_id: DVANE93
actors_name: Vanello, Daniel
actors_id: DVANE93
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
publication: Inquiry
issn: 0020-174X
citation:        Vanello, Daniel;      (2022)    Moral understanding, affect, and the imagination.                   Inquiry        10.1080/0020174x.2022.2077431 <https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2022.2077431>.    (In press).    Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10195827/3/Vanello_Final%20Manuscript.pdf