eprintid: 10195821
rev_number: 11
eprint_status: archive
userid: 699
dir: disk0/10/19/58/21
datestamp: 2024-10-03 07:59:48
lastmod: 2024-10-03 08:06:05
status_changed: 2024-10-03 07:59:48
type: thesis
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 699
creators_name: Corish, James Patrick
title: Stances and Scientism: An Evaluation of Naturalised Metaphysics
ispublished: unpub
divisions: UCL
divisions: B03
divisions: C01
divisions: F16
note: Copyright © The Author 2024. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).  Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms.  Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request.
abstract: Naturalised Metaphysicians, generally speaking, hold that science is our best bet at arriving at knowledge about reality. As such, their metaphysics defers to our best scientific theories in order to determine its ontological commitments. In chapter one of this thesis, drawing from arguments from van Fraassen and Ladyman & Ross, I provide an overview of the naturalised metaphysicians’ motivation for the rejection of so-called ‘heavy-duty metaphysics’. The central reason that non-naturalised (heavy-duty) metaphysics is implausible according to the naturalised metaphysician, is that there is no reason to believe that the methods of inference that they make use of are truth conducive. In chapter two, I provide a positive characterisation of naturalised metaphysics. From here, I demonstrate that the naturalised metaphysician cannot consistently present their position as a doctrine. On this basis, they must adopt what van Fraassen calls a ‘philosophical stance’. After outlining what the adoption of a stance entails, I consider the viability of the voluntarist epistemology that van Fraassen supposes, ought to accompany a philosophical stance. In chapter three, after considering some critiques of this stance voluntarism, I turn to an evaluation of Ladyman & Ross’ approach to stances, which I have called ‘stance monism’. I conclude that this stance monism is untenable as there is no means of demonstrating either the superiority of their own stance, or the implausibility of competing stances. Finally, in chapter four, I consider the viability of stance voluntarist naturalised metaphysics. I argue that whilst this position is internally consistent, there is no objective or pragmatic basis for its adoption. This, combined with the diminished potency of the conclusions that stance-based metaphysics attempts to establish in comparison to its heavy-duty counterpart leads to me to the following conclusion: naturalised metaphysics is possible, but there is simply no good reason to do it.
date: 2024-08-28
date_type: published
oa_status: green
full_text_type: other
thesis_class: res_masters_open
thesis_award: M.Phil.Stud
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 2305302
lyricists_name: Corish, James
lyricists_id: JCORI72
actors_name: Corish, James
actors_id: JCORI72
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
pagerange: 3-63
pages: 63
institution: UCL (University College London)
department: Philosophy
thesis_type: Masters
citation:        Corish, James Patrick;      (2024)    Stances and Scientism: An Evaluation of Naturalised Metaphysics.                   Masters thesis  (M.Phil.Stud), UCL (University College London).     Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10195821/1/Stances%20and%20Scientism%20An%20Evaluation%20of%20Naturalised%20Metaphysics.pdf